Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

The Commission challenged Fresenius Medical Care’s proposed purchase of an exclusive sublicense for the manufacture and supply of the drug Venofer to US dialysis clinics from Daiichi Sankyo Company. Venofer is an intravenously administered iron sucrose preparation used primarily to treat iron-deficiency anemia in dialysis patients with chronic kidney disease. The agreement would have given Fresenius, the largest operator of dialysis clinics in the country, the ability to artificially inflate its internal costs for Venofer, and effectively increase Medicare reimbursement payments for all buyers of the drug. In order to settle these concerns about anticompetitive self-dealing, the Commission issued a consent order restricting Fresenius from reporting internally inflated Venofer prices by mandating that the current market price for the drug be used in reporting the average selling price to Medicare.

The Commission charged that Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd’s proposed acquisition of Taro Pharmaceuticals Industries, Ltd would substantially reduce competition, likely resulting in higher prices for three distinct generic formulations of the anticonvulsant drug carbamazepine, used widely as an antiepileptic and to prevent and control seizures. The proposed deal would have reduced the number of drug suppliers to a level where the number of competitors has a direct and substantial impact on prices. In order to remedy these concerns, Sun agreed to divest all of its rights and assets needed to develop three generic forms of carbamazepine: 1) immediate-release tablets; 2) chewable tablets; and 3) extended-release tablets.

On February 10, 2004 the Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that following Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital prices charged to health insurers for medical services increased and, therefore, higher costs for health insurance were passed on to consumers of hospital services in the Cook and Lake counties of Illinois. The complaint also alleged that a physicians group affiliated with both hospitals, Highland Park Independent Physician Group, negotiated prices for physicians on staff at Evanston as well as for several hundred independent physicians not affiliated with either hospital. According to the complaint, these actions constitute illegal price fixing among competing physicians or physician groups and deny consumers the benefits of competition in physician services. In an initial Decision, the Administrative law judge found that the acquisition resulted in higher prices and substantially lessened competition for acute care inpatient services in parts of Chicago’s northwestern suburbs.  The ALJ entered an order that would require the divestiture of the acquired hospital.   On appeal, the Commission ruled that the acquisition was anticompetitive, but concluded that in this “highly unusual case,” divestiture, the remedy imposed by the administrative law judge, would be too costly and potentially risky and instead imposed a conduct remedy. The Commission’s order requires Evanston to set up two separate and independent contract negotiation teams to bargain with managed care organizations to revive competition between Evanston’s two hospitals and the Highland Park hospital.

The Commission charged that Schering-Plough’s proposed $14.4 billion acquisition of Organon Biosciences N.V. threatened to substantially reduce competition in the U.S. market for three popular vaccines used to treat poultry, a staple in American food markets. The November 2007 order settling the charges required the sale of assets required to develop, manufacture, and market these vaccines to Wyeth. In addition, Schering-Plough was required to sign a supply and transition services agreement with Wyeth, under which Schering will provide the vaccines for a period of two years, allowing time for the necessary FDA approvals.

The Commission charged that Schering-Plough’s proposed $14.4 billion acquisition of Organon Biosciences N.V. threatened to substantially reduce competition in the U.S. market for three popular vaccines used to treat poultry, a staple in American food markets. The November 2007 order settling the charges required the sale of assets required to develop, manufacture, and market these vaccines to Wyeth. In addition, Schering-Plough was required to sign a supply and transition services agreement with Wyeth, under which Schering will provide the vaccines for a period of two years, allowing time for the necessary FDA approvals.

In December 2007, the Commission challenged ValueAct Capital Partners’ violations of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification Act’s filing requirements related to the acquisition of stock in three companies, Gartner, Inc., Catalina marketing Group, and Acxiom Corp. The firm previously violated the HSR filing requirements in 2003, and after making corrective filings, and agreeing to put HSR safeguards into place to ensure compliance with the filing requirements, the Commission decided to take no action. However, ValueAct failed to enact the necessary preventative measures and again violated the HSR filing requirements with its aforementioned acquisitions resulting in the Commission seeking civil penalties in the amount of $1.1 million.