Every year the FTC brings hundreds of cases against individuals and companies for violating consumer protection and competition laws that the agency enforces. These cases can involve fraud, scams, identity theft, false advertising, privacy violations, anti-competitive behavior and more. The Legal Library has detailed information about cases we have brought in federal court or through our internal administrative process, called an adjudicative proceeding.
Statement of Commissioner Wilson In the Matter of Sycamore Partners II, L.P., Staples, Inc. and Essendant Inc.
Alimentation Couche-Tard and CrossAmerica Partners, In the Matter of
Alimentation Couche-Tard and CrossAmerica Partners, In the Matter of
Alimentation Couche-Tard and CST Brands, In the Matter of
Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. agreed to divest up to 71 retail fuel stations with convenience stores to Empire Petroleum Partners in order to settle charges that ACT’s proposed $4.4 billion acquisition of competitor CST Brands, Inc. would violate federal antitrust law. The divestiture order requires ACT to divest 70 CST fuel stations to Empire, and to give Empire the option of acquiring an additional location owned by ACT. The fuel stations to be divested are in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, and Texas. According to the complaint, the geographic markets for the retail sale of gasoline and diesel are localized, generally ranging from a few blocks to a few miles. The complaint alleges that without a remedy the merger would significantly increase market concentration for the retail sales of gasoline or diesel in each of the 71 local markets, resulting in a monopoly in ten markets and reducing the number of competitors in the rest to two or three.
Dollar Tree, Inc./Family Dollar Stores, Inc., In the Matter of
Discount retailers Dollar Tree, Inc. and Family Dollar Stores, Inc. agreed to sell 330 Family Dollar stores to a private equity firm, Sycamore Partners, to settle FTC charges that Dollar Tree’s proposed $9.2 billion acquisition of Family Dollar would likely be anticompetitive. Their stores compete head-to-head in terms of price, product assortment, and quality, as well as location and customer service in local markets nationwide. The FTC identified 330 stores in local markets from 35 states where competition would be lost if the acquisition went forward as proposed. Without a remedy, according to the FTC, the acquisition is likely to lessen competition by eliminating direct competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar, and increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power.
Cerberus Institutional Partners V, LP., AB Acquisition LLC, and Safeway Inc., In the Matter of
Supermarket operators Albertsons and Safeway Inc. agreed to sell 168 supermarkets to settle FTC charges that their proposed $9.2 billion merger would likely be anticompetitive in 130 local markets in Arizona, California, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming. Under the settlement, Haggen Holdings, LLC will acquire 146 Albertsons and Safeway stores located in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington; Supervalu Inc. will acquire two Albertsons stores in Washington; Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. will acquire 12 Albertsons and Safeway stores in Texas; and Associated Food Stores Inc. will acquire eight Albertsons and Safeway stores in Montana and Wyoming. It is expected that Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. will assign its operating rights in the 12 Texas stores it is acquiring to RLS Supermarkets, LLC (doing business as Minyard Food Stores) and that Associated Food Stores Inc. will assign its rights in the eight Montana and Wyoming stores it is acquiring to Missoula Fresh Market LLC, Ridley’s Family Markets, Inc., and Stokes Inc.
Partners in Health Care Association, Inc.
ArcLight Energy Partners Fund VI, L.P., In the Matter of
ArcLight Energy Partners Fund VI, L.P., agreed to divest its ownership interest in four light petroleum product terminals in Pennsylvania, to settle charges that ArcLight’s acquisition of Gulf Oil Limited Partnership from its parent company, Cumberland Farms, Inc., would likely be anticompetitive in three Pennsylvania terminal markets: Altoona, where ArcLight would own the only terminal handling gasoline and one of two terminals handling distillates; Scranton, where ArcLight would own one of two terminals handling gasoline and distillates; and Harrisburg, where ArcLight would own one of two terminals handling gasoline and one of three terminals handling distillates.
Third Point, LLC
Three affiliated hedge fund companies and their management company, Third Point LLC, have agreed to settle FTC charges that they violated premerger reporting laws in connection with their 2011 acquisitions of stock in Yahoo! Inc. The complaint alleges that Third Point Partners
Qualified L.P., Third Point Ultra, LTD, and Third Point Offshore Fund, LTD failed to observe the filing and waiting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act before purchasing shares in Yahoo. According to the complaint, the three defendant funds claimed that they were exempt from reporting to the U.S. antitrust authorities because the purchases were made solely for investment purposes. At the time of the stock purchases, however, defendant Third Point LLC, which made investment decisions on behalf of the funds, was taking actions inconsistent with an investment-only intent. Under the terms of the proposed stipulated five-year federal court order, the defendants are prohibited from relying on the investment-only exemption if they have contacted third parties to gauge their interest in joining the board of the target company, communicated with the target company about proposed candidates for its board, or engaged in other specified conduct in the four months prior to acquiring voting securities above the HSR Act threshold. In this case, the agencies determined not to seek civil penalties based on several factors, including that the violation was inadvertent and short-lived, and this was the defendants’ first violation of the HSR Act.
H.I.G. Bayside Debt, et al., In the Matter of
The FTC required Surgery Center Holdings, Inc., known as Surgery Partners, and Symbion Holdings Corporation, to divest Symbion’s ownership interest in an ambulatory surgery center in Orange City, Florida to Dr. Mark W. Hollmann, as part of a settlement resolving charges that Surgery Partners’ $792 million purchase of Symbion would be anticompetitive. Both companies operate a large number of ambulatory surgery centers located throughout the country that sell and provide outpatient surgical services to commercial health plans and commercially insured patients. The proposed merger would have combined the only two multi-specialty ambulatory surgical centers in the Orange City/Deltona area of Florida, and would have left commercial health plans and commercially insured patients there with only one meaningful alternative to Surgery Partners’ outpatient surgical services.
TXVT Limited Partnership, In the Matter of
AmeriGas and Blue Rhino, In the Matter of
The FTC issued an administrative complaint against Ferrellgas Partners, L.P and Ferrellgas, L.P. (doing business as Blue Rhino) and UGI Corporation and AmeriGas Partners, L.P. (doing business as AmeriGas Cylinder Exchange), alleging that they illegally agreed on reducing the amount of propane in their tanks sold to a key customer. The complaint alleges that, together, Blue Rhino and AmeriGas controlled approximately 80 percent of the market for wholesale propane exchange tanks in the United States. In 2008, Blue Rhino and AmeriGas each decided to implement a price increase by reducing the amount of propane in their exchange tanks from 17 pounds to 15 pounds, without a corresponding reduction in the wholesale price. On 10/31/14, AmeriGas and Blue Rhino agreed to settle FTC charges of restraining competition. Faced with resistance from Walmart, the two companies colluded by secretly agreeing to coordinate their negotiations with Walmart in order to push it to accept the reduction. The consent agreements prohibit the companies from soliciting, offering, participating in, or entering or attempting to enter into any type of agreement with any competitor in the propane exchange business to raise, fix, maintain, or stabilize the prices or price levels of propane exchange tanks through any means – including modifying the fill level contained in propane tanks or coordinating communications to customers. The companies also are prohibited from sharing sensitive non-public business information with competitors except in narrowly defined circumstances.