Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

Tthe FTC required Fresenius Medical Care AG & Co. KGaA to sell 60 outpatient dialysis clinics in 43 local markets under a proposed settlement resolving charges that its acquisition of rival dialysis provider Liberty Dialysis Holdings, Inc. would harm competition in numerous local markets for outpatient dialysis services around the country. According to the FTC, Fresenius's acquisition of Liberty would eliminate head-to-head competition between the firms in the 43 markets at issue, leading to higher prices and reduced quality for dialysis consumers.

The FTC challenged ProMedica Health System, Inc.’s consummated acquisition of rival St. Luke’s Hospital in Lucas County, Ohio. The FTC’s administrative complaint alleged that the deal will reduce competition and allow ProMedica to raise prices for general acute-care and inpatient obstetrical services. The FTC staff also filed a separate complaint in federal district court seeking an order requiring ProMedica to preserve St. Luke’s as a separate, independent competitor during the FTC’s administrative proceeding. The action in federal district court was brought jointly with the Attorney General of the State of Ohio. The PI hearing was held on February 10 and 11, 2011. The District Court granted the FTC's request for a preliminary injunction. With an Initial Decision issued on 1/05/2012, the Chief Administrative Law Judge D. Michael Chappell ruled that ProMedica Health System, Inc.'s consummated acquisition of rival St. Luke's Hospital harmed competition in violation of U.S. antitrust law and would allow ProMedica to raise the prices of general acute care inpatient hospital services in Lucas County, Ohio (the Toledo area). Judge Chappell ordered ProMedica to divest St. Luke's Hospital to an FTC-approved buyer within 180 days after the order becomes final. On 3/28/2012, The FTC issued its Opinion and Final Order in a 4-0 decision, ordering ProMedica to divest St. Luke's Hospital to an FTC-approved buyer within six months after the Commission order becomes final. ProMedica appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which upheld the Commission's order.

The FTC required Grifols, S.A., a manufacturer of plasma-derived drugs, to make significant divestitures as part of a settlement allowing Grifols to acquire a leading plasma-derived drug manufacturer, Talecris Biotherapeutics Holdings Corp. It resolves FTC charges that Grifols’ proposed acquisition of Talecris would be anticompetitive and would violate federal antitrust laws. As part of the settlement, Grifols will sell the Talecris fractionation facility in Melville, New York, and Grifols’ plasma collection centers in Mobile, Alabama, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to Kedrion S.p.A. Kedrion is a manufacturer of plasma-derived products in Europe and other markets, and will be a new entrant in the U.S. plasma-derived products industry. Grifols also will manufacture three plasma-derived products for Kedrion for several years under a manufacturing agreement. The FTC approved a final order on July 22, 2011.

Broadcom Limited has agreed to establish a firewall to remedy the FTC’s concerns that its proposed $5.9 billion acquisition of Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. is anticompetitive. These concerns arise because of Broadcom’s current access to the confidential business information of Brocade’s major competitor, Cisco Systems, Inc., that could be used to restrain competition or slow innovation in the worldwide market for fibre channel switches.Fibre channel switches are part of storage area networks that transfer data between servers and storage arrays in data centers. Because fibre channel switches can quickly and securely transfer large amounts of data, they are often used for mission-critical applications. According to the complaint, San Jose, California-based Broadcom makes the fibre channel application specific integrated circuits, or ASICs, that are custom-tailored to carry out the functions of each switch. Brocade and Cisco are the only two competitors in the worldwide market for fibre channel switches, and Broadcom supplies both companies with ASICs to make fibre channel switches. The complaint alleges that Broadcom’s acquisition of Brocade could harm worldwide competition in the fibre channel switch market because as Cisco’s supplier, Broadcom has extensive access to Cisco’s competitively sensitive confidential information.  The FTC order prevents Brocade from using Cisco’s competitively sensitive confidential information for any purpose other than the design, manufacturing and sale of fibre channel ASICs for Cisco. It requires Broadcom’s business group responsible for developing, producing, selling and marketing fibre channel ASICs for Cisco to have separate facilities and a separate information technology system with security protocols that allow access only to authorized individuals, and provides for other information firewall protections. To assure compliance, the Commission will appoint a monitor for five years, and the Commission may extend the appointment for up to an additional five years.

Holcim Ltd. and Lafarge S.A. agreed to divest plants, terminals, and a quarry to settle FTC charges that their proposed $25 billion merger creating the world’s largest cement manufacturer would likely harm competition in the United States. According to a complaint filed by the FTC, the merger of Holcim, a Swiss company, and Paris-based Lafarge, would have harmed competition in 12 regional markets for portland cement, an essential ingredient in making concrete, and in two additional regional markets for slag cement, a specialty cement used for making more durable concrete structures. Because cement products are heavy and relatively cheap, transportation costs limit their markets to local or regional areas. The FTC staff cooperated closely with the Canadian Competition Bureau (“CCB”) throughout this investigation.

The American Guild of Organists agreed to eliminate rules that restrict its members from competing for opportunities to perform to settle charges that the guild’s rules restrained competition and harmed consumers in violation of the FTC Act. The guild represents approximately 15,000 member organists and choral directors in 300 chapters in the US and abroad. Under the guild’s code of ethics, if a consumer wished to have someone other than an “incumbent musician” play at a venue for a wedding, funeral or other service, the consumer was required to pay both the incumbent and the consumer’s chosen musician. The code of ethics stated that “members are advised to protect themselves as incumbents” through contracts that secure fees even if they don’t perform. The guild also developed and publicized compensation schedules and formulas, and instructed its chapters and members to develop and use regionally applicable versions to determine charges for their services. The Commission's consent order requires the American Guild of Organists to stop restraining its members from soliciting work as musicians, and to stop issuing compensation schedules, guidance, or model contract provisions for members to use to determine their compensation. The guild must implement an antitrust compliance program, and is required under the order to stop recognizing chapters that fail to certify their compliance with the order’s provisions.

The FTC, together with the Idaho Attorney General, filed a complaint in federal district court seeking to block St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.’s acquisition of Idaho's largest independent, multi-specialty physician practice group, Saltzer Medical Group P.A. According to the joint complaint, the combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to demand higher rates for health care services provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) in Nampa, Idaho and surrounding areas, ultimately leading to higher costs for health care consumers.   The federal district court held that the acquisition violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Idaho Competition Act, and ordered St. Luke’s to fully divest itself of Saltzer’s physicians and assets.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling.

iSpring Water Systems, LLC, a Georgia-based distributor of water filtration systems, agreed to stop making misleading unqualified claims that its products are made in the United States, under a settlement with the Federal Trade Commission. In its complaint against the company, the FTC alleged that it deceived consumers with false, misleading, or unsupported claims that its water filtration systems and parts are made in the USA. The order prohibits iSpring from making unqualified “Made in USA” claims for any product unless it can show that the product’s final assembly or processing – and all significant processing – take place in the United States, and that all or virtually all ingredients or components of the product are made and sourced in the United States. iSpring also is prohibited from making any country-of-origin representation about its products unless it possesses and relies upon a reasonable basis for that representation. On April 18, 2017, the Commission announced that the proposed order had been made final.

German cement producer HeidelbergCement AG and Italian producer Italcementi S.p.A. agreed to divest a cement plant in Martinsburg, WV and up to 11 cement distribution terminals in six other states to settle charges that their proposed $4.2 billion merger would likely harm competition in five regional markets for cement in the United States. Heidelberg and Italcementi are the second and fourth largest producers of cement in the world, and in the United States, the two companies compete through their respective U.S. subsidiaries, Lehigh Hanson and Essroc Cement Corp., to sell portland cement – an essential ingredient in making concrete. According to the FTC complaint, the merger as proposed would harm competition for portland cement in five metropolitan areas: Baltimore-Washington, DC; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, Virginia; Syracuse, New York; and Indianapolis, Indiana. In each of these markets, the FTC alleges the merger as originally proposed would have reduced the number of competitively significant suppliers from three to two. The proposed consent agreement requires the merged company to divest to an FTC-approved buyer an Essroc cement plant and quarry in Martinsburg, West Virginia; seven Essroc terminals in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania; and a Lehigh terminal in Solvay, New York. At the buyer’s option, the order also requires the merged company to divest two additional Essroc terminals in Ohio. Under the proposed order, these divestitures must occur within 120 days after the merger is complete. In addition, the merged company has ten days after the merger is complete to divest Essroc’s terminal in Indianapolis to Cemex, Inc.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. agreed to sell the rights and assets related to 79 pharmaceutical products to settle FTC charges that its proposed $40.5 billion acquisition of Allergan plc’s generic pharmaceutical business would be anticompetitive. The remedy requires Teva to divest the drug portfolio to eleven firms, and will preserve competition in U.S. pharmaceutical markets where Teva and Allergan compete now or would likely have competed in the future if not for the merger. The divested products include anesthetics, antibiotics, weight loss drugs, oral contraceptives, and treatments for a wide variety of diseases and conditions, including ADHD, allergies, arthritis, cancers, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, mental illnesses, opioid dependence, pain, Parkinson’s disease, and respiratory, skin and sleep disorders. The acquirers of the divested products are Mayne Pharma Group Ltd., Impax Laboratories, Inc., Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Sagent Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Cipla Limited, Zydus Worldwide DMCC, Mikah Pharma LLC, Perrigo Pharma International D.A.C., Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., Prasco LLC and 3M Company.  In addition to the product divestitures, to address the anticompetitive effects likely to arise in markets for 15 pharmaceutical products where Teva supplies active pharmaceutical ingredients to current or future Allergan competitors, the FTC order additionally requires Teva to offer these existing API customers the option of entering into long-term API supply contracts.

Mylan Inc. agreed to divest the rights and assets related to two generic pharmaceutical products in order to settle FTC charges that its proposed $7.2 billion acquisition of Swedish drug maker Meda would be anticompetitive. The FTC order preserves competition in the markets for 250 mg generic carisoprodol tablets, which treat muscle spasms and stiffness, and for 400 mg and 600 mg generic felbamate tablets, which treat refractory epilepsy. Under the proposed order, the U.S.-based generic pharmaceutical company Alvogen Pharma US, Inc. will acquire all of Mylan’s rights and assets related to 400 mg and 600 mg felbamate tablets. The proposed order also requires Mylan to provide transitional services and take all actions that are necessary for Alvogen to obtain FDA approval to manufacture and market 400 mg and 600 mg generic felbamate tablets. According to the FTC’s complaint, Meda and one other company currently market 250 mg generic carisoprodol tablets, and Mylan, which owns the U.S. marketing rights to a recently approved carisoprodol product, is the next likely entrant. Without a remedy, the acquisition would eliminate Mylan’s entry as a third independent competitor, delaying beneficial competition and future price decreases. Under the proposed order, Mylan must relinquish its U.S. marketing rights for the drug. With the settlement, Indicus Pharma LLC, which owns the product, manufactures it, and markets it internationally, will compete independently in the U.S. market.

Energy companies Energy Transfer Equity, L.P. (“ETE”), and The Williams Companies, Inc., agreed to divest Williams’ interest in an interstate natural gas pipeline to proceed with ETE’s proposed acquisition of Williams. According to the complaint, the proposed merger, if consummated, would have reduced competition in the market for “firm” – i.e., guaranteed – pipeline capacity to deliver natural gas to points within the Florida peninsula. In Florida, natural gas is extensively used for electric power generation, making competitive access to constant and reliable sources of supply critical. The complaint alleges that absent a remedy, the acquisition would eliminate the competition between FGT and Gulfstream, which historically has enabled Florida customers to obtain lower transportation rates and better terms of service. It also would have resulted in a pipeline monopoly at many natural gas delivery points within the peninsula.  The complaint also alleges that the proposed merger likely would harm future competition from a new interstate pipeline, Sabal Trail Transmission LLC, which is scheduled to start transporting natural gas to parts of the Florida peninsula in May 2017. According to the complaint, Sabal Trail and its future customers will rely on leased access to a segment of the Transco Pipeline, a Williams-owned, large interstate pipeline, for natural gas supply. The complaint alleges that the newly merged company would have an incentive to deny Sabal Trail additional capacity expansions on Transco because ETE’s FGT pipeline is a closer competitor to Sabal Trail than was Williams’ Gulfstream pipeline.

Ball Corporation has agreed to sell to Ardagh Group S.A. eight U.S. aluminum can plants and associated assets in order to settle charges that its proposed $8.4 billion acquisition of Rexam PLC is likely anticompetitive. According to the complaint, the acquisition would eliminate direct competition in the United States between Ball and Rexam, which are the first and second largest manufacturers of aluminum beverage cans in both the United States and the world. The complaint alleges without a divestiture, it is likely that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for standard 12-ounce aluminum cans in three regional U.S. markets – the South and Southeast, the Midwest, and the West. The complaint also alleges that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for specialty aluminum cans nationwide. Ball and Rexam produce specialty aluminum cans that range in size from 7.5 ounces to 24 ounces, come in different shapes, and are used to market a wide variety of different products such as portioncontrolled drinks and energy drinks. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Ball and Rexam are required to divest eight aluminum can plants and related assets in the United States to Ardagh, one of the world’s largest producers of glass bottles for the beverage industry and metal cans for the food industry. Ardagh will acquire aluminum can body plants in Fairfield, Calif., Chicago, Ill., Whitehouse, Ohio, Fremont, Ohio, Winston-Salem, N.C., Bishopville, S.C., and Olive Branch, Miss., and Rexam’s aluminum can end plant located in Valparaiso, Ind.. Ardagh also will acquire Rexam’s U.S. headquarters in Chicago, Ill., and Rexam’s U.S. Technical Center in Elk Grove, Ill.

The FTC filed an administrative complaint charging that the proposed $982 million merger of Canadian chemical suppliers Superior Plus Corp. and Canexus Corp. would violate the antitrust laws by significantly reducing competition in the North American market for sodium chlorate – a commodity chemical used to bleach wood pulp that is then processed into paper, tissue, diaper liners, and other products. Superior and Canexus are two of the three major producers of sodium chlorate in North America. If the merger takes place, the new company and rival AkzoNobel will control approximately 80 percent of the total sodium chlorate production capacity in North America.  By combining more than half of all North American sodium chlorate production capacity in the merged Superior and Canexus, the acquisition is likely to lead to anticompetitive reductions in output and higher prices, the complaint alleges. Additionally, by removing Canexus as an independent sodium chlorate producer, with its large scale and low-costs, the acquisition will also increase the likelihood of coordination in an already vulnerable market, according to the complaint.  The FTC also authorized staff to seek a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction in federal court to prevent the parties from consummating the merger and to maintain the status quo pending the administrative proceeding. The FTC and the Canadian Competition Bureau collaborated in this investigation.  On June 30, the parties abandoned their plans.