Every year the FTC brings hundreds of cases against individuals and companies for violating consumer protection and competition laws that the agency enforces. These cases can involve fraud, scams, identity theft, false advertising, privacy violations, anti-competitive behavior and more. The Legal Library has detailed information about cases we have brought in federal court or through our internal administrative process, called an adjudicative proceeding.
Lifewatch Inc.
Announced in June 2019 as part of a crackdown on illegal robocalls against operations around the country responsible for more than one billion calls, this court order contains provisions related to two sets of defendants: 1) the Lifewatch defendants, which includes Lifewatch, Inc., Evan Sirlin, and Mitchel May; and 2) the Roman defendants, which includes Safe Home Security, MedGuard Alert, Inc., and David Roman. The order permanently bans the Lifewatch defendants from telemarketing and prohibits them from misrepresenting the terms associated with the sale of any product or service. It also imposes a financial judgment of $25.3 million against Lifewatch and Sirlin. According to the FTC’s July 2015 complaint, filed jointly with the Florida Attorney General’s Office, since 2012 the defendants bombarded primarily elderly consumers with at least a billion unsolicited robocalls to pitch supposedly “free” medical alert systems.
Keystone Holdings, LLC and Compagnie St. Gobain, In the Matter of
The FTC preserved competition in the North American market for alumina wear tile by imposing conditions on Keystone Holdings, LLC and Compagnie de Saint-Gobain in a settlement involving Keystone’s planned acquisition of Saint-Gobain’s Advanced Ceramics Business. According to the FTC’s complaint, the deal as originally structured would have reduced competition in the relevant markets by eliminating direct competition between CoorsTek – the Keystone subsidiary that manufactures its tiles – and Saint-Gobain. In addition, the deal would increase CoorsTek’s market share substantially, eliminate CoorsTek’s most significant alumina wear tile competitor in North America, allow the combined company to raise prices for alumina wear tile, and increase the likelihood that the remaining firms could act together to raise prices for alumina wear tile.
Lubrizol Corporation, The, and The Lockhart Company, In the Matter of
The Commission challenged Lubrizol Corporation’s consummated 2007 acquisition of the oxidate assets of The Lockhart Company which had the effect of substantially lessening competition in the already highly concentrated U.S. market for chemical rust inhibitors. These inhibitors are commonly used to prevent rusting during the manufacture of metal products such as automobiles and other heavy equipment. According to the Commission’s complaint the acquisition removed Lubrizol’s last substantial competitor in the relevant market. In addition, the Commission challenged a non-compete agreement included in the terms of the acquisition which prevented Lockhart from competing in the relevant market for 5 years as anticompetitive because it restrained the ability of new firms to enter the market. The Commission issued a consent order remedying its anticompetitive concerns requiring the divestiture of the oxidate assets in question to Additives International and the elimination of the non-compete agreement.
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group, Inc.
On February 10, 2004 the Commission issued an administrative complaint alleging that following Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital prices charged to health insurers for medical services increased and, therefore, higher costs for health insurance were passed on to consumers of hospital services in the Cook and Lake counties of Illinois. The complaint also alleged that a physicians group affiliated with both hospitals, Highland Park Independent Physician Group, negotiated prices for physicians on staff at Evanston as well as for several hundred independent physicians not affiliated with either hospital. According to the complaint, these actions constitute illegal price fixing among competing physicians or physician groups and deny consumers the benefits of competition in physician services. In an initial Decision, the Administrative law judge found that the acquisition resulted in higher prices and substantially lessened competition for acute care inpatient services in parts of Chicago’s northwestern suburbs. The ALJ entered an order that would require the divestiture of the acquired hospital. On appeal, the Commission ruled that the acquisition was anticompetitive, but concluded that in this “highly unusual case,” divestiture, the remedy imposed by the administrative law judge, would be too costly and potentially risky and instead imposed a conduct remedy. The Commission’s order requires Evanston to set up two separate and independent contract negotiation teams to bargain with managed care organizations to revive competition between Evanston’s two hospitals and the Highland Park hospital.
Hospira, Inc., and Mayne Pharma Limited, In the Matter of
The consent order settles charges that Hospira Inc.’s proposed $2 billion acquisition of rival drug manufacturer Mayne Pharma Ltd. would likely reduce competition in the following products: hydromorphone hydrochloride (hydromorphone), nalbuphine hydrochloride (nalbuphine), morphine sulfate (morphine), preservative-free morphine, and deferoxamine mesylate (deferoxamine). In settling the Commission’s charges, the companies agreed to divest to Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Barr), within 10 days of the acquisition, Mayne’s rights and assets related to the relevant products.
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.; Carderm Capital L.P.; and Andrx Corporation
A consent order settled allegations in an administrative complaint that charged that Hoechst agreed to pay Andrx Corporation millions of dollars not to market and distribute a generic version of Hoechst’s branded Cardizem CD, a once-a-day diltiazem drug product used in the treatment of hypertension and angina. The consent order prohibits the companies from entering into agreements designed to restrict the entry of generic competitors in an attempt to monopolize relevant markets .