Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

An administrative law judge upheld the administrative complaint that charged that the North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP), a physician group practicing in Forth Worth, Texas, collectively determined acceptable fees for physician services in negotiating contracts with health insurance plans and other third party payers; thus engaging in horizontal price fixing. On December 1, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous decision upholding the allegations that NTSP negotiated agreements among participating physicians on price and other terms, refused to negotiate with payers except on terms agreed to among its members, and refused to submit payors offers to members if the terms did not satisfy the group’s demands. The Commission concluded that the group’s contracting activities with payors amounts to unlawful horizontal price fixing and that respondent’s efficiency claims were not legitimate and not supported by the evidence.

The respondent appealed the Commission decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court agreed with the Commission that the anticompetitive effects of NTSP’s practices were obvious. Per remand by the Court, the Commission modified one provision of its remedial order, issuing a Final Order in September 2008. On February 28, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court denied NTSP's petition for review.

The Commission challenged Flow International Corporation’s proposed $109 million acquisition of rival waterjet manufacturer OMAX Corporation. Both corporations develop, manufacture, and sell computerized waterjet cutting systems which use pressurized water mixed with abrasive garnet particles to cut various materials, including steel and stone. The proposed acquisition would have united the two largest competitors in the market for the manufacture and sale of computerized waterjet cutting systems and allowed Flow to exercise market power and increase prices. Furthermore, the Commission charged that entry would be very unlikely because OMAX received two broad patents relating to the control systems for waterjet cutting systems. The Commission approved a consent agreement requiring OMAX to grant any request for a royalty-free license for its controller patents.

The Commission challenged a series of acquisitions by TALX Corporation, a fully owned subsidiary of Equifax, Inc., that lessened competition in the markets for outsourced unemployment compensation management (UCM) and verification of income and employment (VOIE) services. Unemployment compensation management services consist of the administration of unemployment compensation claims filed with a state or territory. Verification of income and employment services consists of providing income and employment information on behalf of employers to third parties, such as lenders or other creditors. According to the Commission’s complaint, TALX’s series of acquisitions from 2002 to 2005 substantially reduced competition in the nationwide provision of VOIE services and in the provision of outsourced UCM services, and enhanced TALX’s ability to unilaterally increase prices and decrease the quality of its services. Under the Commission consent order designed to restore competition, TALX agreed to allow certain customers terminate their agreements and give notice to the FTC before acquiring, or entering a management contract with, a UCM or VOIE service provider.

Under the terms of the proposed consent order, the Missouri Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors agreed to settle charges that it deterred competitive entry in the retail sale of caskets by adopting a rule that only licensed funeral directors could sell caskets to consumers on an at-need basis. Under the proposed settlement, the Board is required to communicate to the public that it is not necessary to obtain a license from the Board to offer for retail sale caskets and other funeral merchandise to customers in Missouri.

There is a related administrative proceeding.

On March 7, 2007, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in the appeal by respondents of the Commission's opinion in NTSP. The Court agreed with the Commission that the anticompetitive effects of NTSP’s practices were obvious. Per remand by the Court, the Commission modified one provision of its remedial order, issuing a Final Order in September 2008. On February 28, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court denied NTSP's petition for review.

The consent order settled charges that Service Corporation International’s (SCI) proposed acquisition of Alderwoods Group Inc. would likely lessen competition in 47 markets for funeral or cemetery services, leaving consumers with fewer choices and the prospect of higher prices or reduced levels of service. Under the settlement, SCI must sell funeral homes in 29 markets and cemeteries in 12 markets across the United States. In six other markets, SCI must sell certain funeral homes that it plans to acquire or end its licensing agreements with third-party funeral homes affiliated with SCI.

The FTC challenged a group boycott between two Connecticut chiropractic associations in which the health care providers refused to deal with a cost-saving Connecticut health plan. The Commission issued a consent order ending the agreement and preventing the involved parties from entering into such agreements in the future.

Multiple Listing Service, Inc. (MLS), a group of real estate professionals based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, settled charges that its rules unreasonably restrained competition among real estate brokers in Milwaukee.  The complaint alleges that MLS acted anticompetitively by adopting rules and policies that limit the publication and marketing of certain sellers’ properties, but not others, based solely on the terms of their respective listing contracts. The Commission alleged that the rules were collusive and exclusionary and served to withhold valuable benefits of the MLS from brokers who did not use traditional listing contracts with their customers.  Under the terms of the December 2007 consent, MLS is barred from adopting or enforcing any rule that treats one type of real estate listing agreement more advantageously than any other, and from interfering with the ability of its members to enter into any kind of lawful listing agreement with home sellers.