Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

John C. Malone, CEO and Chairman of Discovery Holding Company, agreed to pay a $1.4 million civil penalty to settle Federal Trade Commission charges that he violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) in connection with acquisitions of Discovery shares in 2005 and 2008. The FTC alleged that Malone failed to file the required notice in 2005 after buying Discovery shares, and then in 2008 purchased additional Discovery shares before the expiration of a waiting period required by the HSR Act.

The FTC authorized a lawsuit to block CSL Limited’s proposed $3.1 billion acquisition of Talecris Biotherapeutics Holdings Corporation, charging that the deal would would substantially reduce competition in the U.S. markets for four plasma-derivative protein therapies – Immune globulin (Ig), Albumin, Rho-D, and Alpha-1. These therapies are used to treat patients suffering from illnesses such as primary immunodeficiency diseases, chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy, alpha-1 antitrypsin disease, and hemolytic disease of the newborn. In approving the administrative complaint seeking to block the deal, the Commission also authorized the staff to seek a preliminary injunction in federal district court in Washington, D.C., to stop the transaction pending completion of the administrative trial.  Following the FTC's lawsuit to block the transaction, CSL Limited announced that it would not proceed with its proposed acquisition.

The FTC challenged Hexion LLC's proposed acquisition of Huntsman Corp., and settled its charges with a proposed consent order which requiredthe divestiture of Hexion's specialty epoxy business, and prevented the sharing of sensitive and non-public information which could lead to coordination of prices. Huntsman and Hexion are both producers of high-performance and specialty chemicals used in the aerospace and alternative energy industries. Subsequently, Hexion LLC and Huntsman Corporation petitioned the Commission to reopen and set aside two orders related to their proposed merger because they terminated their planned merger; the Commission granted, in part, the petition but left in place provisions of the order requiring Hexion for three years to seek the Commission’s approval prior to any acquisition of Huntsman, or any merger or other combination with Huntsman.

The Commission challenged Lubrizol Corporation’s consummated 2007 acquisition of the oxidate assets of The Lockhart Company which had the effect of substantially lessening competition in the already highly concentrated U.S. market for chemical rust inhibitors. These inhibitors are commonly used to prevent rusting during the manufacture of metal products such as automobiles and other heavy equipment. According to the Commission’s complaint the acquisition removed Lubrizol’s last substantial competitor in the relevant market. In addition, the Commission challenged a non-compete agreement included in the terms of the acquisition which prevented Lockhart from competing in the relevant market for 5 years as anticompetitive because it restrained the ability of new firms to enter the market. The Commission issued a consent order remedying its anticompetitive concerns requiring the divestiture of the oxidate assets in question to Additives International and the elimination of the non-compete agreement.

The Commission challenged Getinge AB’s proposed $865 million acquisition of rival Datascope Corporation as anticompetitive in the market for endoscopic vessel harvesting devices (EVHs). EVHs are used during coronary artery bypass graft surgery where a vein is removed from a patients leg or arm to replace a damaged or blocked coronary artery. According to the Commission’s complaint, the acquisition as proposed would give Getinge nearly a 90% market share and the ability to unilaterally increase prices while reducing the likelihood of innovation. The Commission issued a consent order requiring that Datascope divest its EVH assets to Sorin Group USA within 10 days of consummating the transaction.

The Commission charged that West Penn Multi-List, operator of the only MLS service for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area, unreasonablay restricted access to its MLS services, which restrained competition.  Specifically, West Penn’s MLS rules limited publication and marketing of the listing of sellers’ properties based solely on the terms of the seller’s listing contract with the real estate broker. The MLS provider limited MLS access to those brokers with a traditional full-time listing agreement with their seller, thus constraining the ability of brokers with non-traditional listing agreements to compete.  To settle the charges, West Penn agreed to a consent order which prohibits West Penn from adopting or enforcing rules that (1) require brokers to comply with the MLS form contract and submit copies of their listing contracts to the MLS, and that (2) discourage brokers and home sellers from contracting for services for terms of less than a year.

In December 2008, the Commission settled antitrust concerns raised by the proposed $8.9 billion acquisition of Barr Pharmaceuticals by Teva Pharmaceutical Industries. The proposed acquisition would have lessened competition in the markets for 17 commonly used generic medications including drugs used in the treatment of cancer, bacterial infections, diabetes, acid reflux, and depression as well as several varieties of oral contraceptives. According to the Commission’s complaint, the acquisition would have likely led to higher prices for consumers through the removal of one of only four competitors in each of these markets. The Commission’s consent agreement requires both Teva and Barr to sell assets in 29 U.S. markets to either Watson Pharmaceuticals or Qualitest Pharmaceuticals.

In order to restore competition in the U.S. market for consumer pregnancy tests, the Commission effectively reversed a consummated transaction in which Inverness Medical Innovations, a 70% market share holder, purchased the assets related to the development of a water-soluble dye based pregnancy test from ACON Laboratories in order to protect its monopoly power in the market. According to the Commission’s complaint, Inverness restrained competition in two ways. First, Inverness issued covenants not to compete to ACON, took profits from ACON’s joint venture with Church & Dwight, and purchased intellectual property rights which would restrict ACON from developing competing products. Second, Inverness limited product innovation by purchasing, but not using, the water-soluble dye test technology purchased from ACON, one of the only companies utilizing that technology. The Commission’s consent order ended any restrictions Inverness had over the joint venture between ACON and Church & Dwight, and required that Inverness divest its assets relating to the water-soluble dye technology, and its related pregnancy test product.