The legal library gives you easy access to the FTC’s case information and other official legal, policy, and guidance documents.
20150954: TransDigm Group Incorporated; Odyssey Investment Partners Fund IV, LP
20150927: Audax Private Equity Fund IV, L.P.; Pfingsten Partners Fund IV, L.P.
20150928: The Baring Asia Private Equity Fund IV, L.P.; Sterling International Schools C Corporation
Comment of the United States Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of Justice Before the United States Department of Commerce Patent and Trademark Office: In the Matter of Request For Comments On Enhancing Patent Quality
20150915: Summit Partners Growth Equity Fund VIII-A, L.P.; Lightyear Fund III, L.P.
20150926: Kagome Co., Ltd.; ASG-Omni LLC
20150837: DH Corporation; GTCR Fund X/A LP
20150850: KKR North America Fund XI, L.P.; KKR Magellan Aggregator L.P.
20150875: OEP Secondary Fund Feeder (Cayman), L.P.; The Wendy's Company
1504001 Informal Interpretation
20150895: Shamrock Capital Growth Fund III, L.P.; FanDuel Limited
20150677: MABEG Verein zur Forderung und Beratung der MAHLE Gruppe eV; Delphi Automotive PLC
20150857: Berkshire Fund VIII, L.P.; Trilantic Capital Partners IV, LP
McWane, Inc., and Star Pipe Products, Ltd., In the Matter of
The FTC filed separate complaints against the three largest U.S. suppliers of ductile iron pipe fittings, which are used in municipal water systems around the United States. The FTC charged that the three companies, McWane, Inc., Star Pipe Products, Ltd., and Sigma Corporation, illegally conspired to set and maintain prices for pipe fittings, and that McWane illegally maintained its monopoly power in the market for U.S.-made pipe fittings by implementing an exclusive dealing policy. Sigma settled the FTC's charges prior to litigation (final order dated Feb. 27, 2012); Star settled soon after (final order dated May 8, 2012). On 5/9/2013, Chief Administrative Law Judge D. Michael Chappell dismissed charges that McWane illegally conspired with its competitors to raise and stabilize DIPF prices but found that McWane violated the antitrust laws when it excluded competitors from the market for U.S. made DIPF (domestic DIPF). On 5/13/2013, both parties filed notices of appeal of the Initial Decision. On February 6, 2014, the Commission issued a decision finding that McWane unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the domestic fittings market through its "Full Support Program", which foreclosed potential entrants from accessing distributors. The Commission's order bars McWane from requiring exclusivity from its customers. On April 17, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Commission's order.
20150829: CCP III AIV I, L.P.; Apollo Investment Fund VII, L.P.
20150826: FUJIFILM Holdings Corporation; Cellular Dynamics International, Inc.
20150797: ICG Europe Fund V Investor Feeder LP; Private Equity Holdings Fund LP
Novartis AG, In the Matter of (GlaxoSmithKline)
Global pharmaceutical company Novartis AG agreed to divest Habitrol, its nicotine replacement therapy patch, to settle FTC charges that its consumer health care products joint venture with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) would likely be anticompetitive. Under the terms of the proposed joint venture agreement, GSK will control the joint venture and contribute, among other products, its nicotine patch business. Novartis will have a 36.5 percent interest in the joint venture, and without the divestitures required by the proposed order, would continue to own the Habitrol business. According to the complaint, without the divestiture contained in the proposed settlement, Novartis’s ownership of both Habitrol and a substantial interest in the joint venture that sells GSK’s nicotine patches would substantially reduce competition and lead to higher prices for Habitrol and Novartis’s private-label patches. (C-4498)
Separately, Novartis AG also agreed to divest all assets related to its BRAF and MEK inhibitor drugs, products in development, to Boulder, Colorado-based Array BioPharma to settle FTC charges that Novartis’s $16 billion acquisition of GlaxoSmithKline’s portfolio of cancer-treatment drugs would likely be anticompetitive. According to the complaint, the Switzerland-based Novartis and the London-based GSK are two of a small number of companies with either a BRAF or MEK inhibitor currently on the market or in development, and two of only three companies marketing or developing a BRAF/MEK combination product to treat melanoma. If the acquisition goes forward as proposed, Novartis would likely delay or terminate development of both its BRAF and MEK inhibitors, as well as the combination product. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Novartis is required to provide transitional services to Array BioPharma to ensure that development of the BRAF and MEK inhibitors continues uninterrupted and that competition in BRAF and MEK inhibitor markets is not reduced. (C-4510)