Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

The Commission filed an administrative complaint charging that between 1991 and 1996 Rambus, Inc. joined and participated in the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association (JEDEC), the leading standard-setting industry for computer memory. According to the complaint, while a member of JEDEC, Rambus observed standard-setting work involving technologies which Rambus believed were or could be covered by its patent applications, but failed to disclose this to JEDEC. In 1999 and 2000, after JEDEC had adopted industry-wide standards incorporating the technologies at issue and the industry had become locked in to the use of those technologies, Rambus sought to enforce its patents against companies producing JEDEC-compliant memory, and collected substantial royalties from several producers of DRAM (dynamic random access memory).

The administrative law judge dismissed all charges against Rambus, finding that Rambus’ conduct before the JEDEC standard-setting organization did not amount to deception and did not violate any extrinsic duties, such as a duty of good faith to disclose patents or patent applications. Upon review, the FTC issued an opinion concluding that Rambus unlawfully monopolized markets for four computer memory technologies that have been incorporated into industry standards DRAM chips. The Commission found that, through a course of deceptive conduct, Rambus was able to distort a critical standard-setting process and engage in an anticompetitive “hold up” of the computer memory industry. In a separate opinion on the appropriate remedy, the Commission barred Rambus from making misrepresentations or omissions to standard-setting organizations, and required Rambus to license its SDRAM and DDR SDRAM technology and setting limits to the royalty rates it can collect under the licensing agreements.Tp>

Rambus appealed the Commission’s order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, and in April 2008, the appellate court set aside the Commissions final orders. The Supreme Court denied the Commission's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and on May 14, 2009 the Commission formally dismissed the complaint.

The Commission challenged the proposed acquisition by Carlyle Partners IV, L.P. of INEOS Group Ltd., alleging that the deal would be anticompetitive in the highly concentrated Midwestern market for sodium silicate. Sodium silicates are used in detergents and other products, and are important chemicals used by the pulp and paper industry. The acquisition would have joined market leader PQ Corporation, which is owned by Carlyle, with INEOS, the third-largest sodium silicate provider. Under the Commission’s order, Carlyle must divest PQ’s sodium silicate plant in Utica, Illinois, and all associated intellectual property required to operate the plant to Oak Hill Company within five days of consummating the transaction.

An administrative law judge upheld the administrative complaint that charged that the North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP), a physician group practicing in Forth Worth, Texas, collectively determined acceptable fees for physician services in negotiating contracts with health insurance plans and other third party payers; thus engaging in horizontal price fixing. On December 1, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous decision upholding the allegations that NTSP negotiated agreements among participating physicians on price and other terms, refused to negotiate with payers except on terms agreed to among its members, and refused to submit payors offers to members if the terms did not satisfy the group’s demands. The Commission concluded that the group’s contracting activities with payors amounts to unlawful horizontal price fixing and that respondent’s efficiency claims were not legitimate and not supported by the evidence.

The respondent appealed the Commission decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court agreed with the Commission that the anticompetitive effects of NTSP’s practices were obvious. Per remand by the Court, the Commission modified one provision of its remedial order, issuing a Final Order in September 2008. On February 28, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court denied NTSP's petition for review.

The consent order settled charges that Service Corporation International’s (SCI) proposed acquisition of Alderwoods Group Inc. would likely lessen competition in 47 markets for funeral or cemetery services, leaving consumers with fewer choices and the prospect of higher prices or reduced levels of service. Under the settlement, SCI must sell funeral homes in 29 markets and cemeteries in 12 markets across the United States. In six other markets, SCI must sell certain funeral homes that it plans to acquire or end its licensing agreements with third-party funeral homes affiliated with SCI.

The consent order settles charges that Hospira Inc.’s proposed $2 billion acquisition of rival drug manufacturer Mayne Pharma Ltd. would likely reduce competition in the following products: hydromorphone hydrochloride (hydromorphone), nalbuphine hydrochloride (nalbuphine), morphine sulfate (morphine), preservative-free morphine, and deferoxamine mesylate (deferoxamine).  In settling the Commission’s charges, the companies agreed to divest to Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Barr), within 10 days of the acquisition, Mayne’s rights and assets related to the relevant products.

The Commission approved a final consent order to ensure the maintenance of competition in the market for prone stereotactic breast biopsy systems (SBBSs). The Commission had challenged this merger which was consummated in 2005. The order required the divestiture of all prone SBBS assets to Siemens, a company well-positioned to become a competitor in this market.

After an administrative trial, the administrative law judge found that a group of affiliated intrastate movers had engaged in horizontal price-fixing by filing collective rates on behalf of its member motor common carriers for the intrastate transportation of property within the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The judge also ruled that the association’s conduct was not protected by the state action doctrine because the State of Kentucky did not supervise the rate-making practices of the group. On July 12, 2004, the Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association, Inc. filed an appeal of the initial decision with the Commission. On June 22, 2005, the Commission issued a unanimous opinion finding that the Kentucky Household Goods Carriers Association, Inc. engaged in illegal price-fixing by jointly filing tariffs containing collective rates on behalf of its members, and that the state action doctrine does not immunize that activity from antitrust liability. On August 22, 2006, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion of the Commission.

Penn National Gaming, Inc. agreed to sell a casino in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to settle charges that its acquisition of Argosy Gaming Company would create a monopoly for casino services in that area.  Penn National agreed to sell Argosy's casino to Columbia Sussex Corporation within four months of the order becoming final.

To resolve competitive concerns for three generic pharmaceuticals that arose from Novartis AG’s acquisition of Eon Labs, Inc., Novartis agreed to divest all the assets necessary to manufacture and market generic desipramine hydrochloride tablets, orphenadrine citrate extended release (ER) tablets, and rifampin oral capsules in the United States to Amide within 10 days of Novartis’s acquisition of Eon. Further, Novartis, through its Sandoz generic pharmaceuticals division, will supply Amide with orphenadrine citrate ER and desipramide hydrochloride tablets until Amide obtains FDA approval to manufacture the products itself, and will assist Amide in obtaining all necessary FDA approvals.