Legal Library: Cases and Proceedings

The Sherwin-Williams Company agreed to settle charges that its proposed $11.3 billion acquisition of Valspar Corporation is likely anticompetitive by selling Valspar’s North America Industrial Wood Coatings Business to Axalta Coating Systems Ltd. The transaction would combine Sherwin-Williams and Valspar, two of the top three industrial wood coatings manufacturers. According to the complaint, the acquisition as originally proposed likely would reduce competition in the North American market for industrial wood coatings used to make furniture, kitchen cabinets, and building products. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Sherwin-Williams will divest to Axalta two Valspar industrial wood coatings plants, one in High Point, North Carolina, and the other in Cornwall, Ontario. Axalta will also receive the research and development facilities, warehouses and testing facilities of Valspar’s Industrial Wood Coatings Business, as well as customer contracts, intellectual property, inventory, accounts receivable, government licenses and permits, and business records.

Holcim Ltd. and Lafarge S.A. agreed to divest plants, terminals, and a quarry to settle FTC charges that their proposed $25 billion merger creating the world’s largest cement manufacturer would likely harm competition in the United States. According to a complaint filed by the FTC, the merger of Holcim, a Swiss company, and Paris-based Lafarge, would have harmed competition in 12 regional markets for portland cement, an essential ingredient in making concrete, and in two additional regional markets for slag cement, a specialty cement used for making more durable concrete structures. Because cement products are heavy and relatively cheap, transportation costs limit their markets to local or regional areas. The FTC staff cooperated closely with the Canadian Competition Bureau (“CCB”) throughout this investigation.

The American Guild of Organists agreed to eliminate rules that restrict its members from competing for opportunities to perform to settle charges that the guild’s rules restrained competition and harmed consumers in violation of the FTC Act. The guild represents approximately 15,000 member organists and choral directors in 300 chapters in the US and abroad. Under the guild’s code of ethics, if a consumer wished to have someone other than an “incumbent musician” play at a venue for a wedding, funeral or other service, the consumer was required to pay both the incumbent and the consumer’s chosen musician. The code of ethics stated that “members are advised to protect themselves as incumbents” through contracts that secure fees even if they don’t perform. The guild also developed and publicized compensation schedules and formulas, and instructed its chapters and members to develop and use regionally applicable versions to determine charges for their services. The Commission's consent order requires the American Guild of Organists to stop restraining its members from soliciting work as musicians, and to stop issuing compensation schedules, guidance, or model contract provisions for members to use to determine their compensation. The guild must implement an antitrust compliance program, and is required under the order to stop recognizing chapters that fail to certify their compliance with the order’s provisions.

The FTC, together with the Idaho Attorney General, filed a complaint in federal district court seeking to block St. Luke’s Health System, Ltd.’s acquisition of Idaho's largest independent, multi-specialty physician practice group, Saltzer Medical Group P.A. According to the joint complaint, the combination of St. Luke’s and Saltzer would give it the market power to demand higher rates for health care services provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) in Nampa, Idaho and surrounding areas, ultimately leading to higher costs for health care consumers.   The federal district court held that the acquisition violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Idaho Competition Act, and ordered St. Luke’s to fully divest itself of Saltzer’s physicians and assets.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling.

Discount retailers Dollar Tree, Inc. and Family Dollar Stores, Inc. agreed to sell 330 Family Dollar stores to a private equity firm, Sycamore Partners, to settle FTC charges that Dollar Tree’s proposed $9.2 billion acquisition of Family Dollar would likely be anticompetitive. Their stores compete head-to-head in terms of price, product assortment, and quality, as well as location and customer service in local markets nationwide. The FTC identified 330 stores in local markets from 35 states where competition would be lost if the acquisition went forward as proposed. Without a remedy, according to the FTC, the acquisition is likely to lessen competition by eliminating direct competition between Dollar Tree and Family Dollar, and increasing the likelihood that Dollar Tree will unilaterally exercise market power.

Hedge fund founder Ahmet H. Okumus has agreed to pay $180,000 in civil penalties to resolve charges that he violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act by failing to report his purchases of voting securities in the internet services company Web.com Group Inc. The FTC alleged that Okumus violated the HSR Act by exceeding the filing threshold and failing to file as required when he bought shares of Web.com through his hedge fund, Okumus Opportunistic Value Fund, Ltd. According to the complaint, he was in violation of the HSR Act from June 27, 2016, when he purchased the shares, to July 14, 2016, when he sold enough shares so that he did not exceed the threshold. Although the Commission found his HSR violation to be inadvertent, it determined to seek penalties because, as noted in the complaint, this was Okumus’s second HSR violation in two years regarding Web.com.

Entrepreneur Mitchell P. Rales agreed to pay $720,000 in civil penalties to resolve charges that he violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act by failing to report his purchases of shares in two industrial companies, Colfax Corporation and Danaher Corporation.  The FTC alleged that Rales violated the HSR Act by failing to file as required when his wife purchased shares in Colfax in 2011. The shares, which are attributed to Rales under the applicable HSR Rules, were above the filing threshold. According to the complaint, Rales was in violation of the HSR Act from 2011, when the shares were purchased, to 2016, when he made a corrective filing and observed the waiting period. The complaint also alleged that in 2008, Rales violated the HSR Act by buying shares of Danaher that exceeded the filing threshold and failing to file. Rales was in violation of the HSR Act between 2008, when he bought the shares, and 2016, when he made a corrective filing and observed the waiting period. Although Rales contended that the violations were inadvertent, the Commission determined to seek penalties because, as noted in the complaint, Rales had paid civil penalties to settle an earlier HSR enforcement action brought by the Department of Justice in 1991.

As part of a $90 million proposed settlement, T-Mobile is refunding customers who were unfairly billed third-party charges by the company.

T-Mobile has been contacting all of its current and former crammed customers to let them know about the refund program and claims process. Customers can get more information about T-Mobile’s refund program at www.t-mobilerefund.com.

Investment firm founder Fayez Sarofim agreed to pay $720,000 in civil penalties to resolve allegations that he violated the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act by failing to report stock purchases from several issuers between 2001 and 2012. The HSR Act exempts acquisitions of up to ten percent of voting securities if they are made solely for investment purposes, but this exemption is not available to individuals who serve on the board of directors of the issuer at the time the shares are acquired. The FTC alleged that because Sarofim was serving as a board member at each company for which he acquired voting shares, he was ineligible for an investment-only exemption from filing and his failure to report a series of transactions to U.S. antitrust authorities violated the Act. From 2001 to 2012, Sarofim acquired voting shares of energy infrastructure company Kinder Morgan, Inc., crossing three different filing thresholds without making the filings required under the HSR Act. In 2007, he acquired voting shares in insurance holding company Kemper Corporation and did not file as required under the Act. According to the complaint, he was already serving as a board member at Kinder Morgan and at Kemper’s predecessor company, Unitrin Inc., before he made the respective stock purchases.

The FTC's order requires CentraCare Health, a healthcare provider in St. Cloud, Minnesota, to release some physicians from “non-compete” contract clauses, allowing them to join competing practices, under a settlement mitigating likely anticompetitive effects from CentraCare’s proposed merger with St. Cloud Medical Group (“SCMG”). CentraCare Health, a non-profit health system in central Minnesota, also includes a multi-specialty physician practice group. SCMG is a physician-owned, multi-specialty practice group that operates four clinics in and around St. Cloud. According to the FTC, CentraCare’s planned acquisition of SCMG would combine the two largest providers of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN services in the St. Cloud area. By eliminating SCMG as a potential alternative in the St. Cloud area, the acquisition would likely increase CentraCare’s bargaining power vis-à-vis commercial health plans, allowing it to raise reimbursement rates and secure more favorable terms, the complaint states. However, SCMG was failing financially, and a number of physicians had already left the practice. SCMG’s multi-year search did not identify an alternative purchaser to CentraCare for the entire group, but at least one local provider has expressed interest in expanding its practice by hiring some of SCMG’s physicians. The consent order permitted the acquisition to proceed, but lessened its potential anticompetitive effects by requiring CentraCare to allow a number of adult primary care, pediatric, and OB/GYN physicians to leave the health system and work for other local providers or establish a new practice in the area and to provide certain financial incentives to a number of departing physicians.

Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. agreed to sell the rights and assets related to 79 pharmaceutical products to settle FTC charges that its proposed $40.5 billion acquisition of Allergan plc’s generic pharmaceutical business would be anticompetitive. The remedy requires Teva to divest the drug portfolio to eleven firms, and will preserve competition in U.S. pharmaceutical markets where Teva and Allergan compete now or would likely have competed in the future if not for the merger. The divested products include anesthetics, antibiotics, weight loss drugs, oral contraceptives, and treatments for a wide variety of diseases and conditions, including ADHD, allergies, arthritis, cancers, diabetes, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, mental illnesses, opioid dependence, pain, Parkinson’s disease, and respiratory, skin and sleep disorders. The acquirers of the divested products are Mayne Pharma Group Ltd., Impax Laboratories, Inc., Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Sagent Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Cipla Limited, Zydus Worldwide DMCC, Mikah Pharma LLC, Perrigo Pharma International D.A.C., Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., Prasco LLC and 3M Company.  In addition to the product divestitures, to address the anticompetitive effects likely to arise in markets for 15 pharmaceutical products where Teva supplies active pharmaceutical ingredients to current or future Allergan competitors, the FTC order additionally requires Teva to offer these existing API customers the option of entering into long-term API supply contracts.

Ball Corporation has agreed to sell to Ardagh Group S.A. eight U.S. aluminum can plants and associated assets in order to settle charges that its proposed $8.4 billion acquisition of Rexam PLC is likely anticompetitive. According to the complaint, the acquisition would eliminate direct competition in the United States between Ball and Rexam, which are the first and second largest manufacturers of aluminum beverage cans in both the United States and the world. The complaint alleges without a divestiture, it is likely that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for standard 12-ounce aluminum cans in three regional U.S. markets – the South and Southeast, the Midwest, and the West. The complaint also alleges that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for specialty aluminum cans nationwide. Ball and Rexam produce specialty aluminum cans that range in size from 7.5 ounces to 24 ounces, come in different shapes, and are used to market a wide variety of different products such as portioncontrolled drinks and energy drinks. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Ball and Rexam are required to divest eight aluminum can plants and related assets in the United States to Ardagh, one of the world’s largest producers of glass bottles for the beverage industry and metal cans for the food industry. Ardagh will acquire aluminum can body plants in Fairfield, Calif., Chicago, Ill., Whitehouse, Ohio, Fremont, Ohio, Winston-Salem, N.C., Bishopville, S.C., and Olive Branch, Miss., and Rexam’s aluminum can end plant located in Valparaiso, Ind.. Ardagh also will acquire Rexam’s U.S. headquarters in Chicago, Ill., and Rexam’s U.S. Technical Center in Elk Grove, Ill.