

# The welfare cost of imperfect consumer information: Evidence from a differentiated product market\*

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## Abstract

Imperfect information can lead consumers to make purchases they regret and to forgo beneficial opportunities, while full information would deliver all of the potential surplus to consumers. Yet, lack of post-purchase information has diverted attention from the shortfall. We estimate the surplus that consumers forgo using unusually rich post-purchase usage data and a novel consumer choice framework in which better pre-purchase information enlarges the feasible budget set. We parameterize consumers' ignorance to rationalize current purchases in a simple demand model, using video games as our context. Counterfactual exercises show that imperfect pre-purchase information causes consumers a shortfall in surplus that exceeds their average status quo spending. Fully informed consumers would spend less money while obtaining more usage.

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# Introduction

The availability of a wide variety of differentiated products delivers substantial benefits to diverse consumers. Yet, the varied features of products – and varied tastes of consumers – can make it hard for consumers to know which products they might like. If consumers had full information prior to purchase, then their ex post valuations would match their ex ante expectations. No purchases would lead to regret, and no beneficial purchases would be missed, so that purchase decisions would deliver all of the consumer surplus potentially available. With imperfect information, by contrast, some current purchases may disappoint their buyers while some worthwhile options may be missed; and realized consumer surplus will fall short of potential. Measuring this shortfall – the deviation between *potential consumer surplus* and actual surplus – is the goal of the paper.

While a large literature on differentiated products examines the supply-side inefficiency of entry and product availability, welfare shortfalls on the demand side have received less attention, even though imperfect consumer information is assumed to be widespread.<sup>1</sup> A large body of research explores theoretical consequences of consumers' imperfect information, and a sizable empirical literature explores impacts of *improvements* in pre-purchase information on the *incremental* consumer surplus (CS) realized by purchases.<sup>2</sup> Yet, the overall magnitude of surplus forgone in current consumption is unknown.

The absence of research on this topic is due in part to data challenges. Researchers can typically see purchase behavior, which reveals that ex ante valuations exceed prices. Yet, evidence relevant to ex post satisfaction (e.g., usage or valuations) is seldom available. Evidence of regret would indicate that realized valuations of chosen items often fall short

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, [Mankiw and Whinston \(1986\)](#), [Dixit and Stiglitz \(1977\)](#), [Spence \(1976\)](#), and [Anderson et al. \(1995\)](#).

<sup>2</sup>Central theory papers on the role of information include [Nelson \(1970\)](#), [Weitzman \(1979\)](#), and [Stigler \(1961\)](#). The empirical literature on the welfare increment from better pre-purchase information includes [Allcott \(2013\)](#), [Train \(2015\)](#), and [Reimers and Waldfogel \(2021\)](#). See also Section 1.1 below.

of prices paid, but without explicit quantification of their ex-post valuations, it would not tell us how much welfare is lost to regrettable choices. Even if the extent of regret could be established for purchased products, this evidence alone would not be sufficient; a complete accounting of the welfare shortfall also requires information on how much people would use the products they did not purchase.

In this paper, we estimate the shortfall directly for a context where we have unusually rich individual-level data on product usage. Not only do we observe which consumers purchased each of the products, we also see the amount of time they spent using them and, for a subset, whether they recommend them. Our data, from the video game platform Steam, include information on 50,000 consumers’ cumulative usage of 100 games. Using only data on owned games, we document that consumers commonly purchase games they end up playing very little; and there is evidence that these choices are regretted: Over ten percent of game reviews explicitly express regret; and the games that users play less, in relation to their prices, are more likely to be “not recommended.” The regret we document arises despite Steam’s allowance of returns, which could in principle limit welfare losses from regrettable purchases.<sup>3</sup>

Still more gains, beyond those from avoiding regret, would be possible if consumers were aware of products they did not purchase but would have enjoyed. Quantifying the potential benefits from games that users do not currently own requires additional steps. First, we need a plausible characterization of the realized playtime that each potential purchase would deliver. We observe the realized playtimes directly for the owned games, and we use these to create predictions of playtime for each remaining user-game combination using matrix factorization. We then simulate realized playtime for unowned games as their predicted playtime plus an error that reproduces the correlation between the predicted and realized

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<sup>3</sup>Steam users have two weeks after purchase to return a game they have played less than 120 minutes. Our finding of significant regret in this environment suggests effects would be even larger in contexts with less liberal return policies. See Section 4.4.

playtime for owned games. This step is necessary because using predictions as direct measures of realized playtime would make predictions appear, by construction, to deliver all the benefits of perfect information.<sup>4</sup>

Second, we simplify the consumer’s multidimensional choice problem with utility functions that depend on cumulative hours of game playtime and all other goods.<sup>5</sup> The quality of pre-purchase information available to consumers affects the consumers’ ex ante choice problem through a budget constraint running from all other goods on the  $y$ -axis to hours of playtime on the  $x$ -axis. If consumers were ignorant – they knew the average price of playtime but nothing about the playtime delivered by each game – their expected budget constraints would be linear (based on the average hourly price of playtime). A fully informed consumer, by contrast, has a “bowed-out” budget constraint reflecting the purchase of the lowest price-per-hour games first. Intermediate levels of information – such as what is available in the status quo – deliver intermediate budget constraints. Given their utility functions and the budget sets associated with their pre-purchase information, consumers choose a level of expenditure to maximize attainable utility, and true playtime ensues.

Third, we show in descriptive analyses that consumers could experience large savings by avoiding disappointing status quo purchases. Among currently-owned games, fully informed consumers could achieve the vast majority (90 percent) of their status quo playtime with less than half (40 percent) of status quo expenditure. Allowing for both avoiding regret and the discovery of previously-missed opportunities, we find that, on average, fully informed consumers could achieve a 94 percent increase in realized playtime with current expendi-

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<sup>4</sup>We show that our finding of large full-information effects arises with various alternative ways of modeling true playtime for unowned games. See Section 4.4.

<sup>5</sup>Our approach makes two important simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that hours of different games deliver the same marginal utility. We provide empirical justification for this, as well as robustness analyses in which we relax this assumption, in Section 4.3. Our simplification recalls [Chu et al. \(2011\)](#)’s recasting of mixed bundling as a problem involving the number of products purchased. Second, we assume that games delivering few hours per dollar spent are likely to produce regret, and we provide direct evidence for this in Section 3.3.

ture; they could conversely purchase current playtime with one fifth of current expenditure. The estimated effects remain large in a variety of robustness analyses on both consumer information and preferences in Section 4.4.

Finally, we estimate welfare directly by calibrating a Cobb Douglas model of demand for time spent playing, where utility depends on hours of playtime and all other goods. Our results echo the descriptive results. Relative to the status quo, full information raises average CS by about 125 percent of status quo expenditure while reducing expenditure by a half. Nearly 40 percent of full information’s effect comes from avoiding regrettable purchases; the remainder arises from taking advantage of otherwise-missed opportunities. These results demonstrate that, at least in this market, imperfect information has large welfare effects. They are more than twice the effects of improved information from personalized recommendations; they are also large in comparison with the welfare sacrificed to excess entry (Berry, 1999).

The paper proceeds in six sections. Section 1 discusses the relevant academic literatures and the product-market context; we also provide contextual evidence of ex-post regret. Section 2 introduces our tractable model of the effect of pre-purchase information on a consumer’s choice among product bundles. Section 3 describes the data used in this study, including both predictions of playtime and our main and alternative measures of true realized playtime, as well as evidence relating low playtime per dollar spent to expressions of regret in individual reviews. Section 4 presents descriptive evidence suggestive of large welfare gains from full pre-purchase information. Section 4 also shows that our descriptive findings are robust to alternative measurement assumptions, including the full exercise of Steam’s return policies, and presents evidence supporting the use of aggregate hours in the utility function. Section 5 presents welfare estimates, beginning with our empirical structural model of the budget constraint and our model of utility, in which consumers choose bundles of games to maximize their utility from playtime. The remainder of the section shows welfare

effects of full information, the components of these effects arising from reduced regret, the distributional effects on sellers and buyers; and a comparison of the welfare benefits from a sequence of increasingly sophisticated predictions. We conclude in Section 6.

# 1 Background

This section provides three types of background information. Section 1.1 discusses the academic literatures relevant to this study. Section 1.2 presents information about the video game industry; and Section 1.3 discusses existing evidence on regret, both generally and in video game purchase.

## 1.1 Relevant literatures

Our broad question – about the effect of pre-purchase information on the welfare consequences of differentiated products markets – is related to five literatures. First, our work is related to theoretical studies of the effect of information on the welfare properties of market outcomes (Nelson, 1970; Weitzman, 1979; Stigler, 1961), including studies of inefficiencies arising in differentiated products markets (Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Anderson et al., 1995). The literature has traditionally focused on supply-side challenges associated with the number of entering products; we are instead concerned with the demand-side efficiency consequences of information, given the available products.

Second, our study is relevant to work on the welfare benefit from large numbers of new products, including those associated with “the long tail.” See Anderson (2007), Brynjolfsson et al. (2003), Quan and Williams (2018) and Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) on the welfare benefits of product variety and Waldfogel (2007) for evidence on differentiated product markets and diverse consumers. Like Chu et al. (2011) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), we

estimate welfare consequences of bundle choices.

Third, our basic question – how large is the CS shortfall from imperfect information – is related to the literature on the effect of information on both purchase behavior and welfare. Existing research documents effects of non-personalized information, which has been shown to affect purchase decisions (Reinstein and Snyder, 2005; Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006) and to improve welfare (Reimers and Waldfogel, 2021). Some papers document apparent ex post mistakes (Allcott, 2013; Miravete, 2003) and explicit evidence of regret (Skelton and Allwood, 2017; Einav et al., 2023). Other papers show the effects of specific examples of personalized recommendations on purchase behavior and welfare (Sun et al., 2024; Donnelly et al., 2023; Kaye, 2023; Wu et al., 2023). It is clear from prior work that pre-purchase information can affect purchase decisions and welfare; but the existing literature cannot address the full value of what is at stake with better information, which is our novel contribution.

Fourth, we draw on the literature on recommender systems (Koren et al., 2009; Bobadilla et al., 2013; Lee and Hosanagar, 2021; Koren et al., 2021) to create our personalized predictions. Specifically, we use a collaborative filter approach that uses post-purchase usage for observed consumer-product pairs to estimate usage of consumer-product pairs that are not observed. The matrix factorization approach we use is representative of prediction approaches used in practice (Koren et al., 2021); and it has outperformed more complex functions such as neural networks (Rendle et al., 2020).

Finally, there are substantial literatures on various aspects of video games, including the complementarity between consoles and games (Lee, 2013), the potential impacts of video games on social outcomes (Ward, 2010), and the relationship between work hours and video games (Aguiar et al., 2021).

## 1.2 Industry context

Video games attract substantial amounts of entertainment spending, as well as time use. The video game industry generated \$347 billion in worldwide revenue in 2022, making it substantially larger than the movie and music industries combined.<sup>6</sup> The US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that Americans spent an average of 34.2 minutes per day playing video games during 2022.<sup>7</sup> Between 2014 and 2017, US men between the ages of 21 and 30 spent an average of 3.9 hours per week playing video games (Aguiar et al., 2021). US consumers spent \$47.5 billion on video game content during 2022 while consumer spending overall was \$9.8 trillion.<sup>8</sup> Hence, video games accounted for 0.49 percent of household spending, which we use to inform our expenditure share estimate in the Cobb Douglas analyses.

Video games are played on game consoles (such as the Nintendo Switch or Sony PlayStation), on phones, or on computers, where games are downloaded from digital video game distribution platforms. One of the largest such platforms, Steam, provides the setting for our analysis. Operated by Valve Corporation and founded in 2003, Steam had 33 million concurrent peak users during 2023.<sup>9</sup> Steam offers over 73,000 games, and revenue from game sales on Steam was \$8.8 billion in 2022, about 20 percent of total US spending on video games.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>See <https://www.statista.com/topics/868/video-games/topicOverview>. Global recorded music revenue was \$31.2 billion in 2022. See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/272305/global-revenue-of-the-music-industry/>, while global movie revenue was estimated at \$93.4 billion. See <https://www.ibisworld.com/global/market-size/global-movie-production-distribution/>. Global movie box office alone was \$26 billion. See <https://www.imdb.com/news/ni63899899/>.

<sup>7</sup>See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/502149/average-daily-time-playing-games-and-using-computer-us-by-age/>.

<sup>8</sup>See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/252457/consumer-spending-on-video-games-in-the-us/> and <https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/consumer-expenditures/2022/home.htm>.

<sup>9</sup>See <https://www.statista.com/topics/4282/steam/topicOverview>.

<sup>10</sup>See <https://www.statista.com/statistics/547025/steam-game-sales-revenue/>.

### 1.3 Evidence of ex-post regret

Despite the paucity of direct evidence on consumers' ex post valuations of the products they purchase, there is evidence of regret across a wide swath of markets. [Skelton and Allwood \(2017\)](#) reports the shares of British consumers reporting regretted purchases in each of 20 product categories. They find regret in large shares of purchases. For example, 38 and 16 percent of respondents report regretting clothing and electronics purchases in the past year. The least-regretted category is milk, whose consumers typically have good ex ante information. The pattern of results is strongly suggestive that the CS based on the ex ante valuations motivating buying behavior would understate the potential CS available, particularly for products not purchased repeatedly.<sup>11</sup>

Regret is also common in the video game context. The large number of games available on the Steam platform makes it difficult for consumers to know which products they might find appealing. Social media sites feature discussions of games that consumers regret buying. A Reddit thread entitled “What’s one game you regret buying?” elicited 1,700 comments. The top (most upvoted) reply was, “Probably 70% of my steam library.”<sup>12</sup> Similar comments are shared at Quora; and many YouTube videos describe games that users regret buying.<sup>13</sup> Together, those comments indicate that purchase errors are not only possible but common in this context.

User recommendations provide additional, and more systematic, evidence on varying post-purchase reactions to games. Steam users leaving feedback can “recommend” or “not recommend” a game; and negative recommendations – which suggest regret – are fairly

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<sup>11</sup>There is evidence of regret in other contexts as well. See <https://stradaeducation.org/valuedo-you-regret-your-college-choices/> on education, <https://realestate.usnews.com/real-estate/articles/have-buyers-remorse-with-your-home-heres-what-to-do> on housing, and <https://www.forbes.com/sites/bryanrobinson/2022/12/01/5-reasons-for-boomerang-employees-and-the-great-regret-in-employment/> on labor markets.

<sup>12</sup>See [https://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/comments/12frdsr/whats\\_one\\_game\\_you\\_regret\\_buying/](https://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/comments/12frdsr/whats_one_game_you_regret_buying/).

<sup>13</sup>See, for example, “Video Games I Regret Buying” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14f8CmcLJPk>) or identically titled video (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WoB80aEQsnE&t=16s>).

common. For example, in data that we describe below, we see 59,139 recommendations from 21,065 users, and 7,407 of the recommendations are negative. We show in Section 3.3 that negative recommendations are significantly more likely when games deliver less playtime per dollar spent, providing validation that games delivering few hours of playtime per dollar spent are more likely to be regretted. Consequently, we use aggregate playtime as an argument of the utility function.

## 2 Theory

We are interested in analyzing how better pre-purchase information would affect consumers' choices among high-dimensional bundles of products. In our context, consumers are choosing which bundles, from among 100 games, to own. These decisions depend on their utility functions and their information about games. We discuss each in turn below.

### 2.1 Consumer utility

In general, consumers would have some utility over the bundle of games, less the utility of money paid for the games:

$$u_{ij} = U(\mathbb{1}_{i1}, \dots, \mathbb{1}_{iJ}) - \sum_{j \in J} p_j \mathbb{1}_{ij},$$

where  $\mathbb{1}_{ij}$  is an indicator that is 1 if individual  $i$  owns game  $j$ ,  $J$  is the full set of available games, and  $P_i = \sum_{j \in J} p_j \mathbb{1}_{ij}$  is the spending required to purchase the bundle of owned games. We simplify the  $2^{100}$ -dimensional choice problem by assuming that users derive utility from games according to the hours of playtime that the games deliver, or

$$u_{ij} = U \left( \sum_{j \in J} h_{ij} \mathbb{1}_{ij} \right) - \sum_{j \in J} p_j \mathbb{1}_{ij}, \quad (1)$$

where  $h_{ij}$  denotes the amount of time that consumer  $i$  would use product  $j$ . This approach incorporates different marginal utilities of ownership across games in the sense that they are proportional to how many hours of playtime the respective games deliver. Depending on the functional form of  $U$ , the approach also allows for game substitutability via diminishing marginal utility of the amount of playtime that user  $i$ 's chosen bundle would deliver,  $H_i = \sum_{j \in J} h_{ij} \mathbb{1}_{ij}$ . Perhaps the strongest implicit assumption embodied in this approach is that utility of games depends on hours in a way that is identical across games. We provide empirical support for reducing the bundle choice to an hours choice, as well as an alternative specification that relaxes this assumption with similar descriptive results, in Section 4.3 below.

## 2.2 Pre-purchase information and the opportunity set

Given what a consumer knows about products prior to purchase, the consumer faces a budget constraint describing how expenditure delivers playtime; and this relationship depends on the consumer's level of pre-purchase information. To derive the budget constraints, it is helpful to begin with two extreme cases, one in which consumers have no information about individual games and another in which they have full information. In the "no information" case, consumers know the average amount of playtime they obtain per dollar spent, which we term  $\rho_i$ , but not the particular realized value for each game. Then a consumer spending a total of  $P_i$  would expect to receive  $H_i = \rho_i P_i$  hours of playtime. We illustrate a budget constraint resulting from random rankings (which we term  $r^\epsilon$ ) in the dashed line in Figure 1, which plots the cumulative amount of playtime ( $x$ -axis) against money available for all other goods ( $y$ -axis). The consumer would face a linear expected budget constraint, with the same expected amount of money per hour  $1/\rho_i$  for each purchased game. While each budget constraint realization depends on the random rank order draw ( $r^\epsilon$ ), the budget constraints will be linear in expectation across draws.

At the other extreme, consumers have full information on the hours they would play each game ( $h_{ij}^T$ ). When armed with full information, consumer  $i$  knows that game  $j$  would deliver  $h_{ij}^T$  of playtime at a price of  $p_j$ . Ordering products by ascending values of  $p_j/h_{ij}^T$ , a ranking we term  $r^T$ , delivers the maximally expansive budget constraint for the consumer. The outer budget constraint in Figure 1, drawn curved to reflect a continuous approximation, represents this full-information case. The shape of the consumer’s full information budget constraint depends on the variability of their price per hour of playtime across games,  $p_j/h_{ij}^T$ . If all games delivered the same hours of playtime per dollar spent, then the full information budget constraint would be linear and indistinguishable from the no-information budget constraints. The greater the variance in a user’s price per hour, the more bowed out is their full information budget constraint.

Any ranking of products based on something other than the true  $p_j/h_{ij}^T$  shrinks the opportunity set relative to the full-information case. For example, if consumers had access to less-than-full pre-purchase information, they would not know  $h_{ij}^T$  in advance but rather a prediction containing error. A consumer would then rank-order games by price per predicted hour of use, and realized playtime would ensue. Provided that the consumer’s information is better than random, this delivers a realized budget constraint that lies somewhere between linearity (ignorance) and full information; and the inner, curved budget constraint in Figure 1 illustrates such a scenario. The deviation of the consumer’s budget constraint from the full-information budget constraint is larger, the less accurate their information.

### 2.3 Status quo information and utility

Consumers in the status quo could have a range of possible budget constraints that would generally fall short of full information. A ranking according to  $r^T$  maximizes the playtime that each expenditure delivers, whereas a random ranking ( $r^\epsilon$ ) produces a linear budget constraint in expectation. A consumer’s information could even be “worse than random”

in the sense that their ranking could be negatively correlated with  $r^T$ . At an extreme, a consumer who ranks products according to  $-r^T$  would attain minimum playtime with any level of expenditure. To accommodate the possibility that status quo information might vary from full information to worse than random, we create an index that weights the random and full information rankings via

$$I(\kappa_i) = \kappa_i r^T + (1 - |\kappa_i|) r^\epsilon, \quad (2)$$

where  $\kappa \in [-1, 1]$ , and the consumer's resulting ranking  $r^I$  is in order of  $I(\kappa_i)$ .

The shape of a consumer's status quo budget constraint depends on the size and sign of  $\kappa_i$ . If the consumer possessed full information in the status quo, then  $\kappa_i = 1$ ; and the consumer's status quo budget constraint would lie on the full information budget constraint. If the status quo consumer has better-than-random but less-than-full information, then  $0 < \kappa_i < 1$  and the average status quo budget constraint is less bowed out. If  $\kappa_i = 0$ , the consumer's budget constraint is linear with a slope based on the average price per hour across games, as depicted by the dashed linear budget constraint in Figure 1. Finally, if  $-1 \leq \kappa_i < 0$ , then the consumer's knowledge gives rise to a budget constraint that is "bowed in" toward the origin. Given that consumers have access to information in the status quo, it seems likely that  $\kappa > 0$ ; and we find below that consumers have better-than-random information in the status quo.

Given the budget constraint associated with their pre-purchase information, the consumer chooses a point such that their marginal rate of substitution (MRS) equals the slope of the expected budget constraint. Figure 1 illustrates the utility-maximizing hours choices with full information and with a less informed budget constraint. In what follows, we develop empirical characterizations of the status quo, full information, and prediction-informed budget constraints, along with models of utility that deliver both status quo and counterfactual

choices and their welfare effects.

## 3 Data and playtime measures

### 3.1 Data

The main data for this study include information on 50,000 Steam users and 100 popular Steam games. For each user, we observe which of these games they own, as well as the cumulative number of hours they have spent playing each of the games, as of data collection between May 9 and 16 of 2021.<sup>14</sup> The underlying data include 192,137 users, who collectively owned 33,844 distinct games. From these, we chose the 100 most popular games (by number of users who bought the game) with positive prices. To ensure sufficient usage history data, we restrict attention to users who purchased at least 20 of those popular games; and we randomly selected 50,000. We collected price data for each game from <https://steampricehistory.com> on November 15, 2023. We obtain the price for each game by averaging prices over time between January 2015 and May 2021.

Our users spend an average of \$508.10 and own an average of 33.64 games. These games provide them with 2,166.4 hours of cumulative playtime; and users play each game an average of 64.4 hours. These averages take into account two features of the environment. First, our main analysis assumes that all users paid the average price for each game, even though games on Steam are sometimes discounted. In Section 4.4 we explore the sensitivity of our results to the possibility that users obtained varying shares of their games at no charge.

Second, Steam allows users a two-week window to return games played less than 120 cumulative minutes. The playtime data thus include times spent briefly playing games that the users ultimately neither purchase nor continue playing. Leaving these in the sample

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<sup>14</sup>See [https://developer.valvesoftware.com/wiki/Steam\\_Web\\_API](https://developer.valvesoftware.com/wiki/Steam_Web_API), which we used to obtain lists of owned games and their playtime for players with publicly visible profiles.

would lead us to overstate welfare effects of better information, as the status quo holdings would appear to include bad games that the users did not actually purchase. We deal with this by eliminating potentially returned games from the sample in a way that is informed by aggregate return tendencies: Industry sources indicate that between 5 and 8 percent of purchased games are returned under Steam’s policy.<sup>15</sup> In our data, 6.5 (the midpoint between 5 and 8) percent of game purchases with nonzero playtimes are played less than 23 minutes. We mimic the true return process by excluding the game purchase instances in which the games were played less than 23 minutes. We explore the consequences of other time cutoffs (between 0 and 120 minutes) in Section 4.4 below.

We use two types of additional data. First, we observe individual reviews left by 21,065 of our users, for a total of 59,139 instances of “recommended” or “not recommended” feedback on the Steam platform.<sup>16</sup> We use these to validate our assumption that games with low hours per price are more likely to be regretted in Section 3.3. Second, we have additional game and user characteristics, which we use in some alternative playtime prediction models discussed in Appendix Section A. In Section 5.4 we also explore whether our welfare estimates vary across users according to user experience on the platform, measured by their join years. Join years, which we observe for 86.8 percent of users, vary from 2003 to 2020, with a median of 2010 and an inter-quartile range from 2007 to 2013.

## 3.2 Modeling true playtime and realistic predictions

Answering our research questions requires measures of true, realized playtime  $h_{ij}^T$  for each user and game, including those not currently owned. This section discusses how we create measures of true playtime by first using matrix factorization to obtain playtime predictions ( $h_{ij}^P$ , in Section 3.2.1), and then adding errors to mimic realizations, as explained in Sec-

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<sup>15</sup>See <https://newsletter.gamediscover.co/p/game-refunds-and-the-hidden-costs>.

<sup>16</sup>We collected these data from [https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/\[steamid\]/recommended](https://steamcommunity.com/profiles/[steamid]/recommended) during June of 2024.

tion 3.2.2. We also use these predictions directly for a secondary question, quantifying the share of potential benefits available from heeding sophisticated predictions.

### 3.2.1 Predictions of playtime from matrix factorization ( $h_{ij}^P$ )

Our users own a third of the 100 games on average, so the data matrix for generating predictions is sparse.<sup>17</sup> One can imagine a variety of approaches to filling in the prediction matrix. Our preferred prediction approach is to create a collaborative filter using matrix factorization, and we show below that our approach outperforms other prediction techniques.

Our implementation of the collaborative filter follows the approach of Koren et al. (2009). We employ a matrix factorization model that maps both users and products to a joint latent factor space with  $k = 100$  dimensions. Each product  $j$  is associated with a vector  $\mathbf{m}_j \in \mathbb{R}^k$ , and each user  $i$  is associated with a vector  $\mathbf{n}_i \in \mathbb{R}^k$ . The elements in  $\mathbf{m}_j$  ( $\mathbf{n}_i$ ) capture the extent to which a product (user) possesses those latent factors. We estimate the fitted values of the log playtime that a user would derive from a given game from the inner products in that latent space,  $\hat{h}_{ij} = \mathbf{m}_j^T \mathbf{n}_i$ .

Estimation of the predicted playtime values proceeds in two steps. First, we tune the hyperparameters of our prediction model to minimize the regularized squared error between observed hours and the product  $\mathbf{m}_j^T \mathbf{n}_i$  on the set of owned games, without overfitting. These hyperparameters are the number of iterative model fitting steps, the step size by which parameters change, and the penalty for parameters that are very large or very small.<sup>18</sup> We tune the hyperparameters on a training set that includes all but one owned game per user, which we save for the test set.<sup>19</sup> From the test set, we retain 10 percent as a final validation

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<sup>17</sup>This has been formulated as a matrix completion problem, in which missing elements of the user-item matrix have to be predicted from limited historical data as not every user has interacted with every item (Jannach et al., 2016).

<sup>18</sup>We fine-tune the model’s hyperparameters by independent uniform random sampling of parameter values (Bergstra and Bengio, 2012).

<sup>19</sup>As is typical in the recommender literature, we perform leave-one-out cross validation. Because there is no natural order to individuals’ interactions with products, we selected one game at random for each

data set that does not inform the chosen hyperparameters.

In the second step, we refit the model using the hyperparameters with the lowest validation-set error from above. We do this ten times, holding out a different tenth of the sample each time. This gives us out-of-sample playtime predictions for every owned and unowned user-game combination.

Our latent factor estimation uses stochastic gradient descent optimization (Funk, 2006). Although the modeling approach includes no observable characteristics of games nor users, the large number of latent factors implicitly captures these types of variation. In the video game context, the 100 latent factors we estimate reflect game and user characteristics, such as demographics and tastes. Because they are based on users’ game usage, rather than observed user or game characteristics, they might also capture less well-defined dimensions such as pace of game play (real time vs. round based), the visual style of the game (realistic vs. cartoon), or dimensions that cannot be interpreted at all.

How well do our out-of-sample predictions perform? Table 1 shows the root mean squared errors (RMSE) from a sequence of prediction approaches, from the global average (using the average value of playtime across users and games as the common prediction) to matrix factorization with 100 factors.<sup>20</sup> The RMSE measures for the out-of-sample validation sets run from 0.722 with the global average to 0.607 with our preferred, “sophisticated” prediction approach. Our preferred approach substantially outperforms the alternative techniques.<sup>21</sup>

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individual as test data.

<sup>20</sup>We discuss all prediction approaches, including their fits, in more detail in Appendix Section A.

<sup>21</sup>Achievable RMSE values are often quite compressed (Koren, 2009) but there is evidence that even small improvements in RMSE terms can have a significant impact on the quality recommendations. To put this number in perspective: The equivalent improvement of personalized recommendations via matrix factorization ( $k = 50$ ) over product-level averages on the Movielens 100K dataset – a common benchmark dataset used in the recommender literature – and predicting star ratings on a 1-5 scale is 8.1 percent (Adomavicius and Zhang, 2012).

### 3.2.2 Measures of true playtime

Measuring the full welfare effects of information requires measures of true playtime  $h_{ij}^T$ . We directly observe realized playtime for the owned games; the additional task is to create realistic measures of playtime for unowned games, where playtime is not observed. One might be tempted to directly use the sophisticated predictions as estimates of true playtime, but doing so would make predictions artificially appear to deliver the benefits of full information by construction. Instead, we need to realistically model the errors in the predictions.

Our main approach estimates  $h_{ij}^T$  for the unowned games as the prediction ( $h_{ij}^P$ ) plus an error. We choose the errors from the empirical distribution for owned games as follows. First, we sort all observations by the prediction  $h_{ij}^P$ . Then, for unowned games, we use the realized error associated with the owned observation with the next-highest value of  $h_{ij}^P$ . Matching each unowned game to the owned game with the next-higher  $h_{ij}^P$  is a simple, nonparametric, rank-based way to borrow a residual from a similar point in “prediction space.” It is a form of right-continuous nearest-neighbor/quantile-mapping of residuals that preserves the monotone ordering by  $h^P$ , captures heteroskedasticity in errors, avoids parametric assumptions, and prevents optimistic interpolation. This method uses within-user realized errors while keeping the ranking logic intact. Because of the way that the errors are assigned to predicted playtimes  $h_{ij}^P$ , we reproduce the same correlation of predicted playtime and the error for both owned and unowned games.<sup>22</sup> In addition to the main approach, we also explore four alternative approaches using empirical and parametric error distributions in Section 4.4.

We report summary statistics for prices as well as realized and predicted playtimes in Table 2, which reports averages of user-by-game observations for owned games, unowned games, and total games. Prices average \$15.22 per game, with little difference between owned and unowned games. By contrast, owned games deliver both more predicted and

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<sup>22</sup>Unlike linear regressions, which produce errors that are orthogonal to predictions, the deviations of realized playtime from the matrix factorization predictions can be correlated.

realized playtime than unowned games. Using the true measure, owned games deliver an average of 6.65 log minutes (or 64.4 hours), while unowned games deliver an average of 5.80 log minutes, or 39.9 hours. Predicted playtimes are similarly different between owned and unowned games. This suggests both that status quo consumers have some information and that they value playtime.

### 3.3 Playtime, user reviews, and regret

Our modeling approach assumes that games delivering little playtime per dollar spent are more likely to be regretted by their buyers. We take “not recommend” reviews as indicators of regret; and of the 59,139 reviews that we observe for owned user-game combinations in our data, 12.5 percent (7,407 reviews) are not recommended. We explore the relationship between playtime per dollar spent and regret with regressions of measures of recommendation on the logarithm of playtime per price for owned games.

Table 3 shows coefficients from these regressions. Columns 1-4 include only observations for which a user left “recommended” or “not recommended” feedback (and includes only users leaving both positive and negative reviews). Regardless of whether game or user fixed effects are included, playtime per dollar spent bears a negative and significant relationship to the tendency to not recommend the game. Columns 5 and 6 use the same users but also include user-game observations without a recommendation, and the dependent variable is a regret index (1 for not recommended, 0 for no review, and -1 for recommended). Column 5 reports a linear model with game and user fixed effects, while column 6 reports an ordered probit without fixed effects. In both columns 5 and 6, the coefficients are negative and significant. We take the estimates in Table 3 as evidence that games that are little-played in relation to their prices are regretted and, by extension, that playtime is a reasonable determinant of utility.

## 4 Descriptive welfare evidence

Using our measures of true and predicted playtime, we document the additional hours of playtime that status quo expenditures could buy if users had better information. We do this in four parts. First, Section 4.1 analyzes owned games, for which we observe true realized playtime directly; and we calculate measures suggestive of regrettable choices. Second, Section 4.2 uses both owned and unowned games to calculate the additional playtime – or reduced expenditure – that full (or better) pre-purchase information would allow. Third, Section 4.3 shows that our results are robust to allowing users to value playtime differently across games. Finally, Section 4.4 shows that the descriptive results are robust to different measurement assumptions about game usage and prices.

### 4.1 Analysis of owned games

The data on games that users currently own provide a useful first glimpse into the regrettable nature of status quo consumption. Consumers in our sample spend an average of \$508.1 to purchase games delivering 2,166.4 hours of playtime. Here, we calculate the maximum hours potentially available to a user at any level of expenditure by ordering the games they had purchased by  $p_j/h_{ij}^T$ , then summing the realized cumulative playtime. The solid line in Figure 2 shows the ensuing average realized playtimes for consumers if they had full information. On average, users in our sample could achieve half of their status quo playtime with a very small share – 7.4 percent – of status quo expenditure. As the first vertical line indicates, users could achieve the vast majority (90 percent) of status quo playtime with 40.3 percent of initial expenditure, or at a 59.7 percent “discount.” The last 10 percent of playtime costs consumers an average of roughly 12 times more, per hour, than the first 90 percent.

The analysis of owned games also provides hints about how much of the potential benefit of information sophisticated predictions could deliver. A consumer relying on sophisticated

predictions  $h_{ij}^P$  could maximize expected playtime by purchasing games in ascending order of price per predicted hour, or  $p_j/h_{ij}^P$ . The dashed line in Figure 2 shows the maximum realized playtime ( $h_{ij}^T$ ) achieved from reliance on these predictions. Sophisticated predictions achieve 90 percent of status quo playtime with a 24.8 percent discount, about 40 percent of the discount allowed by full information. It is of course conceivable that consumers value the time spent playing marginal games more highly than their prices per hour, so Figure 2 is merely suggestive of regret at this point. Still, the results in Figure 2 foreshadow our main finding: The potential benefit of full information is large and is over twice the potential effect of personalized predictions.

## 4.2 Pre-purchase information, expenditure, and hours

The full effect of information depends not only on the regrettable purchases avoided but also on the beneficial purchase opportunities missed in the status quo. We calculate the overall effect of information, relative to the status quo, by comparing average hours of realized playtime delivered by status quo choices against two extreme alternatives that status quo expenditure could produce, random game choices and choices made with full information.

Panel A of Figure 3 summarizes the resulting calculations. First, randomly chosen bundles exhausting status quo budgets deliver on average 27.6 percent fewer hours of playtime than status quo choices, confirming that consumers, on average, have useful information in the status quo. Second, a consumer armed with full information prior to purchase could on average nearly double status quo playtime (a 94.2 percent increase). Third, a consumer heeding sophisticated predictions would on average achieve a 36.0 percent increase over status quo playtime, a little over a third of the effect of full information.

Panel B of Figure 3 depicts the descriptive results in expenditure rather than hours terms. The better the information the consumer has, the less costly is the achievement of status quo hours. The figure points to large welfare benefits of better information relative to the

status quo. Full information allows status quo playtime to be achieved with just 19 percent of status quo expenditure – a \$400 reduction in spending relative to the status quo. Hence, the average welfare benefit of full information to consumers is at least \$400. Sophisticated predictions that are heeded analogously allow users just under half of the full benefit, or about \$195. Of course, the actual welfare effect of better information arises not only from a cost reduction for the achievement of status quo hours but also from users’ informed choice of how many hours to purchase.

### 4.3 Modeling bundles with aggregate hours

Our basic modeling approach assumes that consumers value bundles according to the aggregate hours they deliver. This, in turn, implies that the marginal utility of hours is equal across games. The data on game purchases can be used to explore the reasonableness of this assumption. The idea is simple: If people value an hour of play similarly across games, then they will be more willing to buy games delivering more hours, all things equal; and deviations from this pattern could indicate variations in the values of playtime. To explore this, we aggregate the data to the game level. Define  $s_j$  as the share of our users owning game  $j$  and  $H_j$  as a measure of the average hours delivered by game  $j$ .<sup>23</sup> We postulate that consumer  $i$ ’s utility for game  $j$  depends on a function of the average hours the game delivers, its price, a game-specific unobservable  $\xi_j$ , and an extreme value error; and we estimate this model as a simple logit, using levels and logs of both hours measures, via

$$\ln(s_j/1-s_j) = \beta_0 + \beta f(H_j) + \alpha p_j + \xi_j. \quad (3)$$

For example, when we use the log of the hours estimate ( $h_{ij}^T$ ),  $\hat{\beta} = 0.354$  (with a standard error of 0.051), and  $\hat{\alpha} = -0.020$  (se = 0.0058). Patterns are very similar for the other three

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<sup>23</sup>We use two measures, the average of observed hours among owners and the average measure of true hours across all users.

specifications. The left panel of Figure 4 depicts the relationship between  $s_j$  and  $\ln(H_j)$  across all games using observed hours of playtime, and a positive relationship is clearly evident. This supports the idea that users purchase games for the hours that they deliver, which itself lends support to aggregation of hours across games.

Yet, the points in the left panel of Figure 4 are not precisely on a line. Although this is partly because the figure does not account for prices, unobserved game ownership tendencies ( $\xi_j$ ) differ additionally for a variety of possible reasons, including different marginal utilities of playtime across games. We explore this by loading all of the variation in  $\xi_j$  into game-specific hours weights ( $\omega_j$ ) in Equation (3). These game-specific weights solve  $\beta \ln(H_j) + \xi_j = \beta \ln(\omega_j H_j)$ , so  $\omega_j = (e^{\xi_j})^{(1/\beta)}$ . We use degrees of these weights to create a range of adjusted hours measures. User  $i$ 's weighted hours measure is then:

$$H_i^* = \sum_{j \in J} \left( \lambda \times \omega_j + (1 - \lambda) \times 1 \right) h_{ij} \mathbb{1}_{ij},$$

where  $\lambda$  ranges from 0 (unweighted estimates) to 1 (full weighting).

The right panel of Figure 4 shows weighted estimates of the proportional gains in effective playtime at status quo expenditure, for full information (solid line) and predictions (dashed line), and various values of  $\lambda$ . The leftmost dots (at  $\lambda = 0$ ) reproduce the baseline results from Figure 3 Panel A. Two things are clear. First, even when we attribute all cross-game variance in ownership to different marginal utilities (when  $\lambda = 1$ ), the gain from full information remains at 60 percent. Second, sophisticated predictions achieve about 40 percent of the full information gains for all values of  $\lambda$ . We conclude, first, that modeling the bundle through the hours it delivers is reasonable and, second, that the assumption implicit in our use of aggregate hours in the utility function does not drive our main finding of substantial opportunities forgone to imperfect information in status quo consumption.

## 4.4 Measurement assumptions and playtime

We have made various measurement assumptions above that may drive the large estimated impacts of full information. These include assumptions about 1) the realized playtimes for both owned and unowned games, 2) the measurement of prices at purchase and therefore status quo expenditure, and 3) tendencies to return games. We address each of these in Appendix Section B, noting here that our main results of large welfare impacts of full information – less than half of which is achieved by personalized predictions – emerge with a large range of assumptions.

## 5 Welfare estimation

The descriptive results suggest substantial welfare forgone in status quo consumption, relative to full information. Yet, the calculations are rough in that they neither allow endogenous selection of expenditure and playtime, nor do they quantify the welfare benefit of information in dollar terms. To analyze the welfare effects of improved information in a theory-consistent way, we need two major ingredients. First, we need to calculate status quo, full-information, and prediction-informed budget sets, which we obtain using the framework from Section 2. We do this in Section 5.1. Second, we need a utility function for selecting the utility-maximizing points on the respective budget constraints. To this end, we discuss our Cobb Douglas implementation based on aggregate hours in Section 5.2. We then present welfare estimates. Section 5.3 presents estimated welfare benefits of full information, both overall and from avoiding regretted purchases. We explore the variation in these effects across users and games in Section 5.4. Finally, Section 5.5 compares the shares of the potential information benefits achievable with increasingly sophisticated predictions.

## 5.1 Information and the expected budget constraint

The budget constraint that each consumer faces depends on their information, which is embodied in the model through the parameter  $\kappa_i$  in Equation (2). In particular, we model each consumer’s rank ordering of games as depending on an index which is a convex combination of the random and full information ranks,  $I(\kappa_i) = \kappa_i r^T + (1 - |\kappa_i|) r^e$ , where  $\kappa \in [-1, 1]$ .

We simulate the index based on 50 draws of the random ranking  $r^e$  for each user and each value of  $\kappa \in \{-1, -0.9, \dots, 0.9, 1\}$ . For each user and  $\kappa$ , we compute the average hours of playtime that each user’s status quo expenditure would deliver,  $H_i(P_i; \kappa)$ , and we choose the  $\kappa_i$  that minimizes the distance between the average simulated playtime  $H_i(P_i; \kappa)$  and the status quo playtime  $H_i$ . The median value of  $\kappa$  is 0.2, and the inter-quartile range runs from 0 to 0.4. Each draw gives a user’s budget constraint. We calculate the slope of the status quo budget constraint for each user as the average game price over the average hours delivered for the game purchase where simulated cumulative expenditure is closest to status quo expenditure. The resulting user-specific slopes of the status quo budget constraints ( $p_H(\kappa)$ ) imply that an additional hour costs an average of \$0.56 (median of \$0.42) at users’ status quo bundles. This varies between \$0.26 at the 25<sup>th</sup> percentile and \$0.69 at the 75<sup>th</sup>.

## 5.2 Cobb Douglas calibration

We estimate welfare effects using a Cobb-Douglas calibration where utility depends on both hours of playtime, and consumption of all other goods, as  $U = H^a A^{1-a}$ , where  $a$  is informed by expenditure data.<sup>24</sup> We observe a status quo hours choice for each user, which (suppressing  $i$  subscripts) we now denote by  $H_0$ ; and the  $\kappa$  derivation above delivers the status quo budget constraint slope at  $H_0$ . This allows us to infer the status quo levels of “all other goods,” or *AOG* level  $A_0$  and therefore to calculate status quo utility, as follows. User utility

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<sup>24</sup>We report Cobb Douglas estimates based on  $a = 0.05$ . Results are nearly identical with  $a = 0.1$  or  $a = 0.005$ .

maximization arises where their marginal rate of substitution ( $MRS = {}^a A_0 / (1-a) H_0$ ) equals the slope of the budget constraint,  $p_H(\kappa)$ . Rearranging terms, we solve

$$A_0 = \frac{1-a}{a} H_0 p_H(\kappa)$$

for each user. Status quo utility is then  $U_0 = H_0^a A_0^{1-a}$ .

In order to generate the full-information budget constraints, we need the point where the status quo and full information budget constraints meet the *AOG* axis (the user’s income level). We calculate this as  $I = A_0 + P_0$ . Given  $I$ , we create the full-information budget constraints by sorting all products by their price per realized hour of playtime, and we calculate the choices for each user as the utility-maximizing points along these budget constraints. The value of information, relative to status quo choices, is the amount of money the user would need to forgo from an informed state to bring their utility to the status quo level. In analogous exercises, we sort products according to their price per predicted playtime and add the playtime realizations to obtain prediction-informed budget constraints.

### 5.3 Welfare benefits of full information

While the full welfare gains we calculate arise from better information about both purchased and non-purchased games, we begin with a simpler calculation of the gains from avoiding purchases that users regretted, and we then report the full welfare results from all games. We report the welfare effects of information in Table 4. The top panel – “actual” – describes status quo hours, game purchases, and expenditure.

The first row of the “full information” panel presents the no-regret results. We solve the utility models against budget constraints that include only the games purchased in the status quo. By construction, expenditure, games purchased, and hours decrease. With full information about already-owned games, users would buy an average of 11.9 of the 33.6

games they had purchased in the status quo, reducing their expenditure by \$339.1, or by about two thirds. Because consumers are just eliminating games, their playtime must fall; but the average hours reduction is only about 13.8 percent. Given the large expenditure reductions and relatively small playtime reductions, consumer surplus rises by an average of \$245.3, or by nearly half of status quo expenditure.

The “overall effect” row of Table 4 reports the welfare effects of full information about all games, including those that the consumer might have missed in the status quo. While avoiding regret by itself reduces both purchases and hours played, full information about all games raises hours played substantially. Hours rise by roughly three fifths above the status quo level. At the same time, expenditures (and games purchased) decline by about a half. Full information raises consumer surplus by an average of \$626.4, or by 123.2 percent of the \$508.1 in status quo expenditures. These estimates of the change in CS are roughly 2.5 times the effects from eliminating regret alone. Hence, full information would allow substantially higher utility with much less expenditure, relative to the status quo; and about 60 percent of the overall gain stem from the purchase of otherwise-unknown games.

## 5.4 Distributional effects of information on users and game sellers

**Users.** While consumers unambiguously gain from full information, welfare outcomes vary substantially across users. The inter-quartile range in  $\Delta CS$  runs from \$460.0 to \$731.5, and the inter-quartile range for expenditure reduction runs from \$164.6 to \$375.4

In our modeling framework, changes in expenditure and CS depend on two factors. First, consumers can be differently informed in the status quo. Users with poor information – low or negative  $\kappa_i$  and therefore less bowed-out budget constraints – get larger benefits from additional information, all else constant. Second, users for whom the price of hours varies substantially across games (i.e., with a higher variance of  $h_{ij}^T/p_j$ ) have more to gain from additional information. Empirically, both matter; but the variation in  $\kappa$  gives rise to much

more of the variation in welfare outcomes.<sup>25</sup>

Because we have an estimate of  $\Delta CS$  for each individual, we can also explore how it varies with user time on the platform, measured by their join year. The change in CS, relative to expenditure, is higher for users with less time on the platform. The ratio  $\frac{\Delta CS}{\text{expenditure}}$  is roughly 1.5 for users joining in 2015 and 2016 while it averages below 1.2 for users joining between 2002 and 2011.

**Sellers.** The gains to consumers come at sellers' expense. Full information reduces expenditure substantially – by 56 percent – overall, so game sales fall. Figure 5 plots game sales quantities in the fully informed state ( $y$ -axis) against status quo sales ( $x$ -axis). Points above the diagonal indicate higher sales under full information, and those below the diagonal indicate lower sales. Full information reduces quantities sold for 97 of our sample games. Sales fall for both popular and less popular sample games, so information does not appear to change the concentration of sales. Overall, better information would bring about a large transfer from sellers to buyers. Of course, revenue effects would differ if prices were not held constant across information environments; and patterns of demand changed by better pre-purchase information could affect prices and revenue.

## 5.5 The value of prediction technology

The estimated effect of full information is large relative to current expenditure. How much of the potential benefit is made possible by specific information improvements of the sort studied in previous literature? We answer this by calculating the welfare effects of heeding various predictions, ranging from common-to-all consumers averages (akin to star ratings) to those from our full collaborative filtering model with  $k = 100$  latent factors. Figure 6

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<sup>25</sup>We run the regression  $\Delta CS_i = \nu_0 + \nu_1 \kappa_i + \nu_2 \sigma_i (h_{ij}^T / p_j) + \varepsilon_i$ , where the  $\sigma$  term is the user-specific standard error of  $h/p$ . We estimate  $\hat{\nu}_1 = -1053.0$  (se = 2.53) and  $\hat{\nu}_2 = 0.34$  (0.01). The resulting coefficients imply that a one-standard deviation increase in  $\kappa$  changes  $\Delta CS$  by 6.6 times the change for a one-standard deviation increase in our measure of the variation in  $h/p$ .

reports the percent of the potential CS gains from full information arising from this sequence of predictions. Predictions based on user averages alone would make consumers worse off than the status quo, while all other predictions would raise CS on average. Matrix factorization with 10 latent factors raises CS by \$203.7 above status quo levels and allows achievement of 23.6 percent of the full information gain in CS. Predictions based on game averages allows 31.0 percent of the full-information gains, and our 100 latent factor model using only half of the data achieves similar gains, 31.7 percent of potential. Matrix factorization with 50 latent factors, and using all of the data, allows 34.5 percent of the potential gain, similar to the effect of the random forest prediction. Finally, our most sophisticated prediction approach raises CS by \$292.5 relative to the status quo. This is still just 38.8 percent of the full benefit.

The findings in Figure 6 suggest two things. First, the full potential gain in CS is nearly 3 times the gains available from contemporary predictions, even if they were heeded. Second, the quantification of the value of better prediction may be useful both for guiding social investment in prediction technology, as well as for understanding effects of regulations that may make prediction less accurate.

## 6 Conclusion

Differentiated products can deliver substantial value to heterogeneous consumers, but only if people know which products to purchase. Lack of post-purchase usage data has diverted attention from the possible problems of regret and missed opportunities in differentiated product choices. Using novel data on post-purchase usage of video games, we document that status quo purchases deliver usage that falls far short of what full information would allow; and we present evidence that games that are little-played in relation to their prices are regretted by their buyers. Descriptive analysis shows that full information would allow

consumers to purchase nearly double the hours of playtime with status quo expenditures.

To measure the welfare effects of better information, we develop an explicit measurement framework in two parts. First, we develop a model of how information affects choice sets; and second, we create a tractable model of consumer choices of product bundles. Using a Cobb Douglas calibration, we find that status quo consumption forgoes a great deal of potential benefit. In our setting, full information could raise CS by over 120 percent of status quo expenditure while cutting expenditure in half. Sophisticated prediction approaches, if heeded, would allow recovery of only about 40 percent of this untapped potential welfare benefit. Our finding of a large effect of full information is robust to a wide range of alternative assumptions.

The potentially undesirable effects of entry and product availability in differentiated product markets are well understood, both theoretically and empirically. We believe that the shortfall in consumer surplus from imperfect information also merits attention. The welfare shortfall might arise in a variety of contexts in which heterogeneous consumers choose among differentiated products. Given suitable data – on post-purchase usage and user satisfaction – documenting the shortcomings of status quo consumption for other contexts is a fruitful area for further study.

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## 7 Tables and figures

**Table 1:** RMSE for different prediction models

Approach	RMSE			Details
	Train	Test	Validation	
<b>Collab. Filtering</b>	<b>0.286</b>	<b>0.589</b>	<b>0.607</b>	<b>Our model, <math>k = 100</math></b>
	0.314	0.596	0.611	$k = 50$
	0.467	0.621	0.639	$k = 10$
	0.524	0.622	0.647	$k = 5$
Game & user FEs	0.589	0.611	0.627	
Game & user char's	0.616	0.623	0.640	Random Forest (nonlin.+interactions)
Game & user char's	0.625	0.630	0.645	All characteristics from below
Game FEs	0.629	0.634	0.648	
Game char's	0.629	0.634	0.648	6 attributes & 95 tag dummies
Game char's	0.684	0.688	0.701	6 attributes
User char's	0.703	0.708	0.720	7 attributes & 117 country dummies
User char's	0.704	0.708	0.721	7 attributes
Global average	0.706	0.711	0.722	

**Note:** Prediction error (RMSE) for training, test, and validation sets for a data subset of 39,130 users for whom user-level characteristics are available and 100 games with at least partial game-level level data. The models are estimated with OLS unless stated otherwise. Game and user attributes used in the models are described in detail in Appendix Section A, and missing observations were imputed with means.

**Table 2:** Summary statistics

	by ownership status		total
	owned games	non-owned	all games
Price	15.10 (9.36)	15.28 (9.78)	15.22 (9.64)
True ln(minutes)	6.65 (1.75)	5.80 (2.19)	6.08 (2.09)
Predicted ln(minutes)	6.40 (1.12)	5.93 (1.13)	6.09 (1.15)
N	1,682,214	3,317,786	5,000,000

**Note:** Averages and standard deviations for expenditure and playtime for owned and unowned games (columns 1 and 2), as well as for all games in the dataset (column 3). All summary statistics are at the user-game level, and playtime measures are in natural logs of minutes. We treat games played less than 23 minutes as unowned.

**Table 3:** Playtime and expressions of user regret

	“not recommended” among reviewed				regret index	
	(1) None	(2) User	(3) Game	(4) Both	(5) Both	(6) Probit
ln(mins per dollar)	-0.0288*** (0.00194)	-0.0482*** (0.00233)	-0.0463*** (0.00201)	-0.0692*** (0.00241)	-0.0588*** (0.000895)	-0.127*** (0.00259)
<i>N</i>	19,801	19,785	19,801	19,785	114,278	114,290


**Note:** Regressions of user recommendation measures on hours played per dollar spend. Columns 1-4 use only user-game observations with a recommendation and from users who left both positive and negative reviews. The dependent variable is 1 for negative recommendations. Column 1 includes no fixed effects, column 2 includes user fixed effects, 3 includes game fixed effects, and 4 includes both. Columns 5 and 6 include the non-recommended game observations as well (for users leaving both positive and negative reviews), and the dependent variable is an index: 1 for “not recommended,” 0 for no review, and -1 for “recommended.” Column 5 reports a linear model with user and game fixed effects, and column 6 reports an ordered probit without fixed effects.

**Table 4:** Welfare results

	hours	# games	game expenditure	$\Delta$ CS
Actual	2166.44	33.64	508.10	
Full information				
Avoiding regret	1917.95	11.91	169.00	245.34
Overall effect	3472.12	15.95	224.70	626.43


**Note:** Simulations of the effects of full information on purchase and usage of, as well as consumer surplus from, all games in the dataset. These simulations quantify the combined value of both avoiding regrettable status quo purchases and finding otherwise-unknown games. The first row shows status quo values of hours, the number of games purchased, and game expenditure; and the remaining rows show these measures, as well as the change in consumer surplus, from various simulations. The second – “avoiding regret” - row shows results when only considering already-owned games. The last row shows overall results when allowing consumers to purchase the best among all games in the dataset. All figures are per-person averages.

**Figure 1:** Pre-purchase information, hours of playtime, and expenditure on games




**Notes:** The figure depicts two budget constraints for hours of playtime ( $x$ -axis) vs all other goods ( $y$ -axis). The outer budget constraint reflects full information about games' playtime and prices, while the inner curved budget constraint reflects imperfect but better-than-random information on games' playtime in relation to their prices. A fully informed consumer maximizes utility by choosing point B, while the imperfectly informed consumer maximizes utility by choosing A. The less accurate the information the consumer has, the less "bowed out" the budget constraint. A consumer with no information about games would face the (dashed) straight-line budget constraint.

**Figure 2:** Potential for regret




**Notes:** This figure plots the share of status quo playtime delivered by shares of status quo expenditure on owned games. The solid line reflects full information: games are ordered by realized playtime per dollar spent. It shows that users could on average attain 90 percent of status quo playtime with just over 40 percent of status quo expenditure. The dashed line shows the effects of heeding sophisticated predictions: A user heeding such predictions could achieve 90 percent of status quo playtime with roughly 75 percent of status quo expenditure. The two vertical line illustrate these shares.

**Figure 3:** Potential for welfare gains




**Notes:** The bars in Panel A show the average cumulative playtime, relative to the status quo, that status quo expenditure could purchase under different information assumptions. For example, the leftmost bar indicates that random selection of games would deliver 72.4 percent of status quo playtime, while full information would allow the achievement of 94.2 percent more playtime. Panel B shows the results in terms of expenditure needed to achieve status quo playtime. For example, users buying random games would need to spend 33.4 percent more than status quo consumers for the same playtime, while fully informed users could attain status quo playtime with 19 percent of status quo expenditure.

**Figure 4:** Robustness to varying utility weights across games




**Notes:** This figure shows the robustness of our descriptive results to varying utilities per hour of playtime across games. Panel A plots the share of users owning a game against the natural log of the average realized playtimes among those who own the game, for all 100 games in the sample. Panel B shows how the additional playtime that full information (or, in the dashed line, sophisticated prediction) allows status quo expenditure to achieve varies with the weight given to game-specific coefficients implied by the deviations in Panel A. Using game-specific weights that fully explain cross-game-purchase propensities, full information raises the playtime delivered by status quo expenditure by just over 60 percent, rather than the main 94 percent estimate. Full weighting reduces the effect of sophisticated prediction from 38 percent to about 25.

**Figure 5:** Full information vs status quo quantities by game



**Notes:** The figure plots status quo quantities sold ( $x$ -axis) and full-information counterfactual quantities sold ( $y$ -axis) for all 100 games in the dataset. Points below the 45-degree line indicate games selling fewer units under full information, and points above the line represent games selling more under full information.

**Figure 6:** Welfare effects for a progression of playtime predictions



**Notes:** This figure presents mean  $\Delta CS$  estimates relative to the status quo, as percentages of the potential CS gains from perfect information. The estimates show the increase in CS that would ensue from heeding personalized playtime predictions arising from various kinds of prediction models. The rightmost point (“ $k = 100$ ”) is the baseline estimate of the average welfare effect of our preferred prediction approach, matrix factorization with 100 latent factors. These predictions achieve just under 40 percent of the full-information gains. Less sophisticated predictions achieve lower gains.

# Appendix

## A Prediction approach details

In Section 3.2 we use a number of prediction approaches. Here we provide additional details about the models.

1. A common mean across users and games (an OLS regression model with just an intercept).
2. A regression model with user characteristics (these include the number of Steam “friends” a user has ( $\ln(\text{friends}+1)$ ), the user’s average game completion rate (“average percentage of achievements earned per game”), the number of perfect games (“number of games where this player has gotten every achievement”), the time since the user joined the Steam platform, and whether the user’s name is characteristically male, female, or of an unknown gender).<sup>26</sup>
3. A regression model with more user characteristics (the variables above plus indicators for 117 user countries of origin).
4. A regression model with a small number of game attributes: the game’s price and its square, indicators for whether the game includes the indie genre tag and the action genre tag, recent and cumulative review categories (overwhelmingly positive, mostly positive, mixed, very positive, unknown), and the average review score (out of 100) for recent and cumulative reviews.
5. A regression model with a larger number of game attributes. The full set of attributes consists of the above plus indicators for 77 game tags, including features such as multiplayer, strategy, sports, classic, etc.
6. Game-level average playtimes, estimated as an OLS with game fixed effects.
7. A regression model with all user and game attributes above.
8. A random forest-based prediction using all of the variables, as well as their squares and interactions (Breiman, 2001).

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<sup>26</sup>See url’s of the form [https://steamcommunity.com/id/\[steamuserid\]](https://steamcommunity.com/id/[steamuserid]).

9. Game and user average playtimes, estimated as an OLS with both game and user fixed effects.
10. Our collaborative filter approach, using 5, 10, 50, and 100 factors.

Table 1 in the main text reports fits of these models. As expected, the global average approach performs worst, with a validation set RMSE of 0.722. Adding simple user characteristics, as well as country indicators, improves only slightly on the global average, to 0.720. Using simple game attributes but no user characteristics improves RMSE to 0.701; adding game fixed effects improves RMSE to 0.648, while using all user and game observables in a random forest brings the RMSE to 0.640. Collaborative filtering approaches using matrix factorization improve substantially on most of these. Using only 5 factors delivers RMSE of 0.647, 10 factors give an RMSE of 0.639, and 50 and 100 factors deliver 0.611 and 0.607, respectively.

## B Robustness of descriptive results

**Playtime assumptions** Our main approach to measuring true playtime adds errors to predictions for unowned games that are sized to match the realized prediction errors for owned games. It is possible, however, that users' decisions not to purchase certain games reflect their knowledge that those games would deliver lower playtime, so that the true errors would be more negative for unowned games. Then, our main approach would overstate the realization errors, and therefore playtime, for unowned games. We explore this possibility by subtracting a sequence of differentials from our measures of true hours for non-owned games, in Panel A of Figure A.1. The leftmost dots show the baseline results. The horizontal axis shows the proportionate reduction in the realized playtime values for unowned games. The larger the reduction, the smaller the effect of information on realized playtime. It is difficult to know what is a plausible upper bound, but if we shaded playtime for unowned games by 50 percent, full information would still allow status quo expenditure to produce a 45 percent increase over status quo playtime. Moreover, greater shading reduces the share of potential benefit that sophisticated predictions could achieve.

We also verify that we obtain similar estimates using four alternative ways of estimating true playtime for both owned and unowned games. We get errors in two ways: We obtain random errors from the empirical distribution of deviations between true and predicted playtime; we also add parametric errors from a normal approximation to the error distribution.

We use these two errors in two ways: We add these respective errors randomly to predictions only for unowned games; and we also estimate our true hours measures for all games as the predictions ( $h_{ij}^P$ ) plus these errors. Using all four approaches, full information on average raises hours by between 92 and 128 percent, while sophisticated prediction raises average hours by between 45 and 61 percent.

**Pricing assumptions** Our main analysis treats sample games as though they were purchased at their average prevailing prices, but Steam sometimes makes games available at a discount or even free of charge. If users obtained games without payment, then our main analysis would overstate both users' status quo expenditure and the benefit that full information expenditure reallocation could deliver. We explore the robustness of our result to game discounts by recalculating the playtime gains available with full information and sophisticated predictions when we assume that a share  $T$  of each consumer's least-played games was obtained for free rather than at their average price. Treating the least-played, rather than average, games as free (instead of as regrettable purchases), gives a lower bound of information effects at any share  $T$ .


Panel B of Figure A.1 illustrates playtime achieved when varying shares of owned games are assumed to have been free. At one extreme – the baseline case – no games are assumed to be free. Then full information reallocation of status quo expenditure raises playtime by the baseline 94 percent (the left dot on the solid line). At the other extreme, if all games were free, then there would be no status quo expenditure and therefore no additional playtime with full information. The ratio would be one, reflecting a zero percent increase in hours. The increase falls between the extremes for intermediate values of  $T$ . If 20 percent of users' games had been free, then full information would raise playtime by 80 percent. As the share of games obtained without charge rises, the full information benefit falls; but the full information increase in playtime remains above 50 percent with up to 80 percent of games obtained without charge. Further, the higher the share of free games, the lower the share of potential benefit that predictions could achieve. We conclude that free games do not explain our basic results.

**Ownership assumptions** We also do a related robustness analysis. Users are eligible to return games they played less than two hours, and we know that 5 to 8 percent of games are returned. We rationalize this fact in our main analysis by assuming that games played less than 23 minutes are returned. To verify that this cutoff is not driving our results, we recalculate the additional playtime that additional information can deliver for a range

of thresholds from 0 to 120 minutes. The proportionate effect of full information on the playtime that status quo expenditure buys runs from 1.96 to 1.90 as the threshold rises from 0 to 120 minutes. The proportionate playtime effect of sophisticated predictions runs from 1.39 to 1.29. Results are essentially unchanged relative to the main analysis.

## C Appendix figures

**Figure A.1:** Playtime at status quo expenditure for varying measurement assumptions



**Notes:** This figure plots the playtime that can be achieved at status quo expenditure, relative to status quo playtime, for varying assumptions about realized playtime for unowned games (panel A), and for varying assumptions about prices paid for owned games (panel B). The solid line in Panel A shows the playtime attainable with full information, relative to status quo playtime, for various degrees of shading of unowned games' playtime. For example, if unowned games delivered 40 percent less usage than owned games, then full information would allow 45 percent, rather than 94 percent, more playtime. The dashed line does the analogous calculation for prediction-informed choices. Panel B performs similar calculations based on the shares of owned games assumed to be obtained free rather than at their average prices. For example, if 80 percent of games had been free, then full information would allow 50 percent, rather than 94 percent, more playtime.