MEMORANDUM

FROM: Andrew Katsaros
Inspector General

TO: Rebecca Kelly Slaughter, Acting Chair

SUBJECT: Fiscal Year 2020 Audit of the FTC’s Information Security Program and Practices


The Office of Inspector General (OIG) contracted with RMA Associates, LLC (RMA) to conduct an independent audit to meet the FY 2020 FISMA requirements. The objective of the audit was to evaluate the status of the FTC’s overall information technology security program and practices. The contract required that the audit be performed in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing standards, applicable FISMA requirements, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy and guidance, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and guidelines. RMA concluded that the FTC’s information security program and practices were effective.

RMA is responsible for the attached auditor’s report dated January 26, 2021, and the conclusions expressed therein. We do not express an opinion on the FTC’s compliance with FISMA or conclusions on other matters.

RMA identified areas for improvement in risk management, configuration management, and data protection and privacy. RMA made no recommendations for FY 2020.

The FTC’s response to the draft report is included as Appendix B.

A public version of this report will be posted on the OIG’s website pursuant to sections 4 and 8M of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. App., §§ 4 and 8M).

Pursuant to FISMA and implementation guidance from OMB, the FTC will submit its annual FISMA reports to the Chairperson and Ranking Member of the following Congressional committees:
• House Committee on Oversight and Reform;
• House Committee on Homeland Security;
• House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology;
• Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs;
• Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; and
• The appropriate authorization and appropriations committees of the House and Senate.

Additionally, the agencies must provide a copy of their reports to the Comptroller General of the United States.

The OIG greatly appreciates the cooperation and courtesies extended to RMA and to us by the Office of the Chief Information Officer, Chief Privacy Officer, Financial Management Office, and Office of the Executive Director throughout the FISMA audit.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 326-3527, or by email at akatsaros@ftc.gov.

cc: Commissioner Noah Joshua Phillips
    Commissioner Rohit Chopra
    Commissioner Christine S. Wilson
Federal Trade Commission

Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014

Audit Report for Fiscal Year 2020

RMA Associates, LLC
1005 N. Glebe Road, Suite 610
Arlington, VA 22201
Phone: (571) 429-6600
Fax: (703) 852-7272
www.rmafed.com
January 26, 2021

Andrew Katsaros, Inspector General
Federal Trade Commission
Room CC-5206
600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20580


Dear Mr. Katsaros:

RMA Associates, LLC (RMA) is pleased to submit our final FTC FISMA audit report for FY 2020. We conducted the audit in accordance with the Government Auditing Standards, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, and relevant information security standards established by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We have also prepared the FY 2020 Inspector General (IG) FISMA Reporting Metrics Version 4.0 (April 17, 2020), as shown in Appendix C. These metrics provide reporting requirements across the NIST cybersecurity framework functional areas which are to be addressed in the independent assessment of agencies’ information security programs. The objective of this audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of the FTC’s information security program and practices for the period of October 1, 2019, to September 30, 2020.

In summary, we found the FTC’s information security program and practices were effective for the period October 1, 2019, to September 30, 2020.

We very much appreciate the opportunity to serve your organization and will be pleased to discuss any questions you may have.

Sincerely,

RMA Associates, LLC
Arlington, VA
# Table of Contents

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1  
Summary Evaluation Results ................................................................................................... 1  
Background ................................................................................................................................ 2  
Key Changes to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 IG FISMA Metrics .................................................. 2  
Objectives ............................................................................................................................... 4  
Audit Results ........................................................................................................................... 5  
Scope and Methodology ........................................................................................................... 13  
Criteria ................................................................................................................................... 14  
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................... 17  
Appendix A – Unresolved Prior Audit Recommendations and Current Status ....................... 18  
Appendix B – Management’s Response ................................................................................... 20  
Appendix C – FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics ............................................................. 21
Introduction

This report presents the results of our independent audit of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) information security program and practices. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) requires Federal agencies to have an annual independent audit performed of their information security program and practices to determine the effectiveness of such program and practices, and to report the results of the audits to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). OMB delegated its responsibility to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for the collection of annual FISMA responses. DHS prepared the FISMA questionnaire to collect the responses, which is provided in Appendix C: FY 2020 Inspector General Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 Reporting Metrics (FISMA Reporting Metrics). We also considered applicable OMB and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) policies, standards, and guidelines to perform the audit.

FISMA requires the agency Inspector General (IG) or an independent external auditor, as determined by the IG, to perform the annual audit. Consequently, the FTC Office of Inspector General (OIG) engaged RMA Associates LLC (RMA) to conduct an annual audit of the FTC’s information security program and practices in support of the FISMA requirements. The objective of the audit was to evaluate the effectiveness of the FTC’s information security program and practices for the period of October 1, 2019, to September 30, 2020.

Summary Evaluation Results

We concluded, consistent with applicable FISMA requirements, OMB policy and guidance, and NIST standards and guidelines, the FTC’s information security program and practices were established and maintained for the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions and eight FISMA Metric Domains. The overall maturity level of the FTC’s information security program was determined as Managed and Measurable, as described in this report. Accordingly, we found the FTC’s information security program and practices were effective for the period October 1, 2019, to September 30, 2020.

We provided the FTC a draft of this report for comment; however, there was no internal control weakness noted. In a written response, management concurs with the results of our audit. See Management’s Response in Appendix B for the FTC’s response in its entirety.

---

1 OMB, DHS, and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency developed the FISMA Reporting Metrics in consultation with the Federal Chief Information Officers Council. The eight FISMA Metric Domains were aligned with the five functions: (1) identify, (2) protect, (3) detect, (4) respond, and (5) recover as defined in the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.

2 As described in the FISMA Reporting Metrics, the eight FISMA Metric Domains are: (1) risk management, (2) configuration management, (3) identity and access management, (4) data protection and privacy, (5) security training, (6) information security continuous monitoring, (7) incident response, and (8) contingency planning.
Background

Federal Trade Commission

The FTC is a bipartisan Federal agency with a unique dual mission to protect consumers and promote competition. Moreover, the agency is dedicated to advancing consumer interests while encouraging innovation and competition in a dynamic, global economy.

The FTC develops policy and research tools through hearings, workshops, and conferences. Additionally, the FTC collaborates with law enforcement partners across the country and around the world to advance consumer protection and competition missions. Furthermore, the FTC cooperates with international agencies and organizations to protect consumers in the global marketplace.

As it relates to information technology (IT), the FTC relies extensively on information systems and the sharing of information to accomplish its mission. Information systems with effective security controls reduce risk and strengthen management’s oversight of information, property, and finances to ensure information systems and the data shared between them are protected. Improving the overall management and security of IT resources and stakeholder information must be a top priority for the FTC. While technology enables and enhances the ability to share information instantaneously among stakeholders through computers and networks, increased connectivity also makes an organization’s networks and IT resources vulnerable to malicious activity and exploitation by internal and external sources. Insiders with malicious intent, recreational and institutional hackers, and attacks by foreign intelligence organizations are significant threats to the FTC’s critical systems. Therefore, the operational effectiveness of security controls must be periodically assessed to make certain those controls are operating as intended to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of information.

Key Changes to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 IG FISMA Metrics

One of the goals of the annual FISMA audit is to assess the agency’s progress toward achieving outcomes that strengthen Federal cybersecurity, including implementing the Administration’s priorities and best practices. The FY 2020 Chief Information Officer (CIO) FISMA Metrics include an additional focus on the security of mobile devices (Government-furnished equipment (GFE) and non-GFE), particularly in the areas of mobile device management and enterprise mobility management. As such, the FISMA Reporting Metrics include updates to questions on asset management, security architecture, and flaw remediation (Questions 2, 3, 6, and 19) to assess agency progress in securing mobile endpoints and employing secure application development processes.

Furthermore, OMB has issued updated guidance on the Trusted Internet Connection (TIC) initiative. Specifically, OMB Memorandum M-19-26, Update to the Trusted Internet Connections Initiative (September 12, 2019), provides updated guidance to Federal agencies on the use of TIC capabilities in modern architectures and frameworks, such as cloud-based infrastructures. While
the memorandum gives agencies until September 12, 2020 to implement new TIC requirements, the IG FISMA metrics on TIC implementation (Question 20) have been updated to assess the agency’s progress in planning for the effective implementation of the security capabilities outlined in OMB M-19-26.

Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014

Title III of the E-Government Act, entitled the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, requires each Federal agency to develop, document, and implement an agency-wide program to provide information security for the information and systems that support the operations and assets of the agency, including those provided or managed by another agency, contractor, or other sources. FISMA amended the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 and provided several modifications that modernize Federal security practices to address evolving security concerns. These changes result in less overall reporting, strengthened use of continuous monitoring in systems, and increased focus on the agencies for compliance and reporting that is more focused on the issues caused by security incidents.

FISMA, along with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 (known as the Clinger-Cohen Act), explicitly emphasizes a risk-based policy for cost-effective security. In support of this legislation, OMB, through Circular No. A-130, Managing Federal Information as a Strategic Resource, requires executive agencies within the Federal government to:

- Plan for security;
- Ensure appropriate officials are assigned security responsibility;
- Periodically review the security controls in their systems; and
- Authorize system processing prior to operations and periodically thereafter.

These management responsibilities presume responsible agency officials understand the risks and other factors that could adversely affect their missions. Moreover, these officials must understand the current status of their security programs and the security controls planned or in place to protect their information and systems to make informed judgments and investments that appropriately mitigate risk to an acceptable level. The ultimate objective is to conduct the day-to-day operations of the agency and to accomplish the agency's stated missions with adequate security, or security commensurate with risk, including the magnitude of harm resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information.

NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.
NIST also developed an integrated Risk Management Framework (RMF) that effectively brings together all FISMA-related security standards and guidance to promote the development of comprehensive and balanced information security programs by agencies.

**FISMA Reporting Metrics**

We evaluated the effectiveness of the information security program and practices on a maturity model spectrum in which the foundation levels ensure the development of sound policies and procedures. The FISMA Reporting Metrics classify information security programs and practices into five maturity model levels: Ad Hoc, Defined, Consistently Implemented, Managed and Measurable, and Optimized. Within the context of the maturity model, Level 4, Managed and Measurable, represents an effective level of security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maturity Level</th>
<th>Maturity Level Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1: Ad Hoc</strong></td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies were not formalized; activities were performed in an ad hoc, reactive manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 2: Defined</strong></td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies were formalized and documented but not consistently implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 3: Consistently Implemented</strong></td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies were consistently implemented, but quantitative and qualitative effectiveness measures were lacking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 4: Managed and Measurable</strong></td>
<td>Quantitative and qualitative measures on the effectiveness of policies, procedures, and strategies were collected across the organization and used to assess them and make necessary changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 5: Optimized</strong></td>
<td>Policies, procedures, and strategies were fully institutionalized, repeatable, self-generating, consistently implemented, and regularly updated based on a changing threat and technology landscape and business/mission needs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Objectives

The objective of this audit was to evaluate the status of the FTC’s overall IT security program and practices by evaluating the five NIST Cybersecurity Framework Functions:

- **Identify**, which includes questions pertaining to risk management;
- **Protect**, which includes questions pertaining to configuration management, identity and access management, data protection and privacy, and security training;
- **Detect**, which includes questions pertaining to information security continuous monitoring;
- **Respond**, which includes questions pertaining to incident response; and
- **Recover**, which includes questions pertaining to contingency planning.
The answers to the 67 FISMA Reporting Metrics in Appendix C reflect the results of our testing of the FTC’s information security program and practices.

This audit also had an objective to review corrective actions taken by the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) to implement OIG’s prior audit recommendations, as listed in Appendix A.

Audit Results

We determined the maturity level for each FISMA domain based on the responses to the questions contained in the FISMA Reporting Metrics and testing for each domain. We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for its security program as Managed and Measurable based upon a simple majority of the component scores for each domain’s maturity level. Our testing of the information security program found no significant control issues and concluded the FTC’s security program controls in place were effective.

Below is a summary of each domain.

Risk Management

Managing information system-related security risks is a complex, multifaceted undertaking that requires the involvement of the entire organization from senior leaders providing the strategic vision, top-level goals, and objectives for the organization, to mid-level leaders planning and managing projects, to individuals on the front lines developing, implementing, and operating the systems supporting the organization’s core missions and business processes. Federal guidance views risk management as a holistic activity fully integrated into every aspect of the organization.

The FTC uses performance measures as a management tool in its internal improvement efforts and links the implementation of its information security program to agency-level strategic planning efforts. Information security measures are used to facilitate decision-making and improve performance and accountability through the collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance-related data. The measures also provide the means for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of security controls.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the risk management program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC defined the priority levels for its IT systems and implemented continuous monitoring processes that considered risks from the supporting business functions and mission impacts to help its leadership make informed risk management decisions. Additionally, the agency has risk management policies, procedures, and strategies, including methodologies for categorizing risk, developing a risk profile, assessing risk, risk appetite/tolerance levels, responding to risk, and monitoring risk. Furthermore, the FTC maintained comprehensive and
accurate hardware and software inventories. Lastly, the agency evaluated risks associated with its assets and determined it had no high-value asset (HVA).

The FTC has a process for identifying and prioritizing internal and external threats using a common vulnerability scoring system that identifies network vulnerabilities and the potential likelihood of business impacts of threats. The agency consistently manages its Plans of Action & Milestones (POA&Ms) to identify and track weaknesses at the enterprise-level and monitor system-specific weaknesses at the system-level.

Although we found an area where the FTC can improve its program, the risk management controls were operating as intended. We concluded the FTC’s risk management program controls in place were effective.

**Area of Improvement 1:** In order to increase the cybersecurity maturity level for FISMA DHS to Managed and Measurable (Level 4), the FTC

---

**Configuration Management**

Configuration management comprises a collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of software and hardware systems, through control of the processes for installing, initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those systems. Procedures cover employee roles and responsibilities, change control and system documentation requirements, the establishment of a decision-making structure, and configuration management training.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the configuration management program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC consistently implemented an organization-wide configuration management plan, and the plan was integrated into risk management and continuous monitoring processes. The FTC identified configuration management roles and responsibilities that described specific functions to be performed by officials. The FTC established an Enterprise Change Advisory Board (ECAB) to approve and manage all configuration changes. The FTC monitors, analyzes, and reports qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its change control activities.

The FTC applied standard baselines to control hardware and software configurations and centrally managed its flaw remediation process and applied software patches. In addition, the agency’s

---

3 An HVA is information or an information system that is so critical to an organization that the loss or corruption of this information or loss of access to this system would have serious impact on the organization’s ability to perform its mission or conduct business.

4 FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics v 4.0 April 17, 2020.
Continuous Assurance Branch (CAB) performs vulnerability scans at least monthly for all the FTC government-owned and operated systems. Moreover, the FTC employed Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) enabled scanners to detect network vulnerabilities and maintain an up-to-date, complete, accurate, and readily available view of the security configuration for all system components connected to its network.

The FTC utilizes various automated mechanisms to detect unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware on its network and take immediate actions to limit any security impact.

Furthermore, the FTC adopted the TIC program to assist in protecting its network. FTC uses The FTC also transmits external network traffic through the Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Service (MTIPS)\(^5\) connection.

Although we found an area where the FTC can improve its program, the configuration management controls were operating as intended. We concluded the FTC’s configuration management program controls in place were effective.

**Area of Improvement 2:** In order to increase the cybersecurity maturity level for FISMA DHS to Managed and Measurable (Level 4), the FTC

**Identity and Access Management**

Identity and Access Management (ICAM) is the means of verifying the identity of a user or device, typically as a prerequisite for granting access to resources in an information system. For most systems, identification and authentication are the first lines of defense. Identification and authentication are technical measures that prevent unauthorized individuals or devices from entering a system. These defenses are critical building blocks of information security since it is the basis for most types of access control and for establishing user accountability. Access control often requires the system to be able to identify and differentiate between users. For example, access control is usually based on least privilege, which refers to granting users only those accesses required to perform their duties. User accountability requires linking activities on a system to specific individuals and, therefore, requires the system to identify users. If the user is identified and authenticated through security controls, the user may then be granted access related to the user’s permissions settings.

\(^{5}\) MTIPS was developed by the GSA to allow US Federal agencies to physically and logically connect to the public Internet and other external connections in compliance with the OMB TIC initiative.

\(^{6}\) FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics v 4.0 April 17, 2020.
We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the identity and access management program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC established an identification and authentication policy that defines processes of managing, monitoring, and securing access to protected resources. In addition, the FTC’s access control policy required the Information System Security Officer (ISSO) to ensure a review of system and user accounts are performed monthly for privileged access and annually for non-privileged access.

Moreover, the FTC conducted background investigations on all new employees before allowing access to its network, as well as centrally tracked and shared risk designations and screening information with necessary parties. The FTC employed automated mechanisms to effectively implement its policies and procedures for ICAM. The FTC also granted access only on a need-to-know basis and employees, including contractors to use Personal Identity Verification (PIV) for identification, authentication, and access to IT services and physical locations.

Our testing found no exceptions, and the controls were operating as intended. We concluded the FTC’s identity and access management program controls in place were effective.

### Data Protection and Privacy

Data Protection and Privacy refer to a collection of activities focused on the security objective of confidentiality, restrictions on information access, and protection of personal privacy and proprietary information. Individual trust in the privacy and security of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is strengthened through the effective implementation of information security controls. PII can range from an individual’s name or email address to an individual’s financial and medical records or criminal history. Unauthorized access, use, or disclosure of PII can seriously harm individuals and organizations, by contributing to identity theft, blackmail, or embarrassment. Organizations must identify and protect PII located within an organization’s environment, assign PII impact levels, and select safeguards, respectively.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the data protection and privacy program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC protects PII through a combination of measures, including operational safeguards, privacy-specific safeguards, and security controls. The FTC uses a risk-based approach for protecting the confidentiality of PII. The FTC’s Privacy Program Plan requires a Privacy Steering Committee and a Chief Privacy Officer (CPO). The Privacy Steering Committee comprises an internal agency advisory group of representatives from bureaus and offices within the FTC. Its mission is to help implement an effective agency-wide privacy program and ensure sound practices and controls are integrated into the FTC’s operations. The committee also acts as a consulting board for the agency and offers solutions and feedback on privacy matters across the organization.
The CPO advises the Chair and other senior officials on internal privacy issues, including the protection of PII. The CPO duties include overseeing the agency’s privacy compliance efforts, reviewing all agency privacy policies, performing assessments and monitoring, directing privacy training for all the FTC employees and contractors, and promoting privacy awareness amongst the FTC staff.

Moreover, the FTC dedicated significant resources to its privacy program. It maintained an inventory of the collection and use of PII, conducted, and maintained privacy impact assessments and system of record notices for all applicable systems. The FTC also removed unnecessary PII and had an independent third-party review of its privacy program.

The FTC has defined and communicated its data breach response plan, including its processes and procedures for data breach notification. The breach response team participates in table-top exercises and uses lessons learned to make improvements to the plan.

Although we found an area where the FTC can improve its program, the data protection and privacy controls were operating as intended. We concluded the FTC’s data protection and privacy program controls in place were effective.

**Area of Improvement 3:** In order to increase the cybersecurity maturity level for FISMA DHS to Managed and Measurable (Level 4), the FTC...

**Security Awareness Training**

A successful IT security program consists of 1) developing IT security policy that reflects the business needs to be tempered by known risks; 2) informing users of their IT security responsibilities, as documented in agency security policy and procedures; and 3) establishing processes for monitoring and reviewing the program. Security awareness and training should be focused on the organization’s entire user population. Management should set an example of proper IT security behavior within an organization and an awareness program aimed at all levels of the organization, including senior and executive managers. The effectiveness of this effort will usually determine the effectiveness of the awareness and training program.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the security training program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC developed, documented, and disseminated comprehensive policies and procedures\(^\text{10}\) for security awareness and specialized security training. The FTC defined the roles and responsibilities of individuals executing duties serving the security awareness and training

\(^{10}\) FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics v 4.0 April 17, 2020.
In addition, the FTC’s security training program has three main parts. The first is mandatory, annual training for every current employee and new hire, to gain or maintain access to the FTC information systems. The second part is the auditing of that training for all employees, through fake phishing emails delivered into their accounts to test their application of training concepts during their everyday job. Finally, the third part is role-based/specialized training, which is deployed to individuals in specific roles or duties (system owners, authorizing officials, etc.) to enhance their understanding of the particular challenges faced during their roles/duties.

Our testing of the security training program found no exceptions and concluded the FTC’s security training program controls in place were effective.

**Information Security Continuous Monitoring**

Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) is defined as maintaining ongoing awareness of information security, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions. An ISCM program is established to collect information in accordance with pre-established metrics, using information readily available through implemented security controls. Organizational officials gather and analyze the data regularly and as often as needed to manage risks appropriate for each organizational tier. This process involves the entire organization, from senior leaders providing governance and strategic vision to individuals developing, implementing, and operating individual systems in support of the organization’s core missions and business processes. Subsequently, determinations are made from an organizational perspective on whether to conduct mitigation activities or to reject, transfer, or accept risk.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the ISCM program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC’s ISCM strategy\(^\text{12}\) established a general approach to maintain awareness of the FTC’s cybersecurity posture to support risk management decisions and establish guidelines for granting ongoing authorizations. The strategy focused on actions at enterprise and system-levels that support the shift from a static snapshot of the organization’s security posture, to a near real-time, dynamic security status. The strategy initiated the CAB referenced earlier, which supports and prioritizes the implementation of the DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program and aligns the ISCM activities.

Additionally, the FTC continuously maintained the status of known security weaknesses by its POA&M process. The POA&M process documented and tracked weaknesses of security controls and other program deficiencies in the [redacted] tool. Furthermore, the FTC maintains a list of control activities that are continuously monitored and analyzed that act as qualitative and quantitative performance measures on the effectiveness of its ISCM strategy.
Our testing of the ISCM program found no exceptions and concluded the FTC’s ISCM program controls in place were effective.

**Incident Response**

Computer security incident response has become an essential component of IT programs. Cybersecurity-related attacks have become not only more numerous and diverse but also more damaging and disruptive. New types of security-related incidents emerge frequently. Preventive activities based on the results of risk assessments can lower the number of incidents, but not all incidents can be prevented. An incident response capability is therefore necessary for rapidly detecting incidents, minimizing loss and destruction, mitigating the weaknesses that were exploited, and restoring IT services.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the incident response program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC has published Incident Response policies and procedures\(^\text{13}\) that establish the FTC level of its Incident Response program, which outlines containment strategies, consideration for potential damage to and theft of resources, evidence preservation, service availability, time, resources, and duration of the solution. Also, the FTC centralized its incident response function by establishing the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT), which is comprised of incident handlers within the CAB and other agency security officials.

We found the FTC personnel reported potential incidents to the CSIRT, which handled reported incidents in accordance with the plan. In addition, the FTC used several software tools to detect suspected incidences and uses a ticketing system to track incidences, mitigate the threat, and determine whether the threat affected other systems. Also, the ticketing system keeps track of reported incident response activities sent to the United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT).

The FTC utilizes Tenable security center dashboards to measure and manage the timely reporting of incident information to organizational officials and external stakeholders.

Moreover, the FTC uses [redacted] for intrusion detection/prevention capabilities for traffic entering and leaving the FTC’s networks. The agency uses the incident detection and prevention services provided by [redacted]. Through this capability, the FTC was able to detect and prevent potential compromises.

Our testing of the incident response program found no exceptions and concluded the FTC’s incident response program controls in place were effective.
Contingency Planning

Information system contingency planning refers to a coordinated strategy involving plans, procedures, and technical measures that enable the recovery of information systems, operations, and data after a disruption. Contingency planning generally includes one or more of the following approaches to restore disrupted services:

- Restoring information systems using alternate equipment;
- Performing some or all the affected business processes using alternate processing (manual) means (typically acceptable for only short-term disruptions);
- Recovering information systems operations at an alternate location (usually acceptable for only long-term disruptions or those physically impacting the facility); and
- Implementing appropriate contingency planning controls based on the information system’s security impact level.

We determined the FTC’s overall maturity level for the contingency planning program is Managed and Measurable. The FTC developed, maintained, and integrated system contingency planning through policies, procedures, and strategies. The policies and procedures defined roles and responsibilities which the agency posted to an intranet site to notify all stakeholders. Additionally, the FTC allocated people, processes, and technology in a risk-based manner to effectively implement system contingency planning activities. The FTC prepared a Business Impact Assessment (BIA) and used the results to guide contingency planning efforts. Moreover, the FTC performed a tabletop exercise of its information system contingency planning processes and used the lesson learned to improve the plan.

During our testing of the contingency planning program, we found no exceptions and concluded the FTC’s contingency planning program security controls were in place and were operating effectively.

Overall Conclusion

We concluded, consistent with applicable FISMA requirements, OMB policy and guidance, and NIST standards and guidelines, the FTC’s information security program and practices were established and have been maintained for the five Cybersecurity Functions and eight FISMA Metric Domains. Additionally, we found the FTC’s information security program and practices were effective for the period October 1, 2019, to September 30, 2020, and the overall maturity level of the FTC’s information security program was Managed and Measurable.
Scope and Methodology

Scope

The scope of the FISMA audit evaluated the overall information security program and practices of the FTC’s unclassified systems to determine the effectiveness of such programs and practices for FY 2020. RMA answered the 67 FISMA Reporting Metrics issued by DHS. Our audit tested the effectiveness of the agency’s information security policies, procedures, and practices of the FTC information systems to ascertain if it enabled the protection of the CIA of information.

Methodology

We conducted this audit in accordance with Government Auditing Standards. The audit is designed to determine whether the FTC implemented selected security controls for selected information systems in support of FISMA.

We also conducted this audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) (also known as the Yellow Book)\(^\text{15}\) issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. These standards require we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We obtained evidence that provided a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The overall strategy of our audit considered NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53A Revision 4, Guide for Assessing Security Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations, NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, and the FISMA guidance from Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), OMB, and DHS. Our testing procedures were developed from NIST SP 800-53A. We determined the overall maturity level of each of the eight domains by a simple majority of the competent scores of the maturity level of each question within the domain, in accordance with the FISMA Reporting Metrics.

For testing the operating effectiveness of the security controls, we exercised statistical analysis and methods in determining the number of items to select for testing and the method to be used to select items. We also considered the relative risk and the significance or criticality of the specific items in achieving the related control objectives along with the severity of a deficiency related to the control activity.

\(^{15}\) GAO Government Audit Standards (2018 Revision).
Criteria

We focused our FISMA audit approach on Federal information security guidelines developed by NIST, OMB, DHS, and the FTC. NIST SPs provide guidelines that were considered essential to the development and implementation of the FTC’s security programs. The following is a listing of the criteria used in the performance of the FY 2020 FISMA audit:

**NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publications**

- FIPS Publication 200, *Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems*
- FIPS Publication 201-2, *Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors*
- NIST SP 800-30, Revision 1, *Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments*
- NIST SP 800-34, Revision 1, *Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems*
- NIST SP 800-40, Revision 3, *Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Technologies*
- NIST SP 800-50, *Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training Program*
- NIST SP 800-53 Revision 4, *Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations*
- NIST SP 800-60, Revision 1, *Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories*
- NIST SP 800-61 Revision 1, *Computer Security Incident Handling Guide*
- NIST SP 800-63-3, *Digital Identity Guidelines*
- NIST SP 800-83, Revision 1, *Guide to Malware Prevention and Handling for Desktops and Laptops*
- NIST SP 800-84, *Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities*
- NIST SP 800-86, *Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response*
- NIST SP 800-137, *Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) for Federal Information Systems and Organizations*
- NIST SP 800-181, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework

**OMB Policy Directives**
- OMB Memorandum M-19-03, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Agencies by Enhancing the High-Value Asset Program
- OMB Memorandum M-19-26, Update to the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) Initiative
- OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource

**Department of Homeland Security**

**Federal Trade Commission**
null
Acronyms

BLA .......................................... Business Impact Assessment
CAB .......................................... Continuous Assurance Branch
CDM .......................................... Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
CIA .......................................... Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability
CIGIE ...................................... Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIO .......................................... Chief Information Officer
CPO .......................................... Chief Privacy Officer
CSIRT ...................................... Computer Security Incident Response Team
DHS .......................................... Department of Homeland Security
ECAB ...................................... Enterprise Change Advisory Board
ERM .......................................... Enterprise Risk Management
FIPS ......................................... Federal Information Processing Standards
FISMA ...................................... Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
FTC .......................................... Federal Trade Commission
FY ............................................ Fiscal Year
GFE .......................................... Government Furnished Equipment
GSA .......................................... General Services Administration
GAGAS ..................................... Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO .......................................... Government Accountability Office
HVA .......................................... High-Value Asset
ICAM ...................................... Identity and Access Management
IG ............................................. Inspector General
ISCM ...................................... Information Security Continuous Monitoring
ISSO .......................................... Information System Security Officer
IT ............................................. Information Technology
MTIPS ...................................... Managed Trusted Internet Protocol Service
NIST ......................................... National Institute of Standards and Technology
OCIO ....................................... Office of the Chief Information Officer
OIG .......................................... Office of Inspector General
OMB ........................................ Office of Management and Budget
PII ............................................ Personally Identifiable Information
PIV ............................................ Personal Identity Verification
POA&M .................................... Plan of Action and Milestones
RMA .......................................... RMA Associates LLC
RMF .......................................... Risk Management Framework
SCAP ....................................... Security Content Automation Protocol
SP ............................................. Special Publication
US-CERT .................................. United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team
### Appendix A – Unresolved Prior Audit Recommendations and Current Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISMA Year</th>
<th>Unresolved Recommendation No.</th>
<th>Current Recommendation Status</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Develop and maintain an information security architecture with embedded information security plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Implement policies and procedures for conducting system-level risk assessments and maintain appropriate security artifacts, including authorizations to operate or use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Complete implementation of prior year action plans and provide a centralized, enterprise-wide view of risks across the organization, including risk control and remediation activities, dependencies, risk scores/levels, and management dashboards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Complete the defined security configuration baselines for all information systems and components.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Implement an Information Security Continuous Monitoring (ISCM) program in accordance with security control monitoring practices identified in related policies and procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Closed^17</td>
<td>FTC develop a consistent approval process that includes the designation of management’s approval embedded in its policies, procedures, plans, strategies, assessments, profiles, and reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>FTC implement fully effective policies and procedures related to POA&amp;M to ensure all identified security weaknesses are tracked, prioritized, and remediated in a timely manner, including a process to evaluate the adequacy of justifications to ensure the estimated completion date is met and determine the dependencies and completion of milestones that affect the estimated due date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Closed^18</td>
<td>FTC enhance its process of performing Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) assessments to determine the respective risk posture of its</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

^16 RMA recognizes some of the recommendations have been closed; however, RMA has not had the opportunity to validate the effectiveness of all closed recommendations.

^17 Ibid.

^18 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FISMA Year</th>
<th>Unresolved Recommendation No.</th>
<th>Current Recommendation Status(^{16})</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
|            |                               |                                 | systems to include the entity-wide performance metrics for measuring the effectiveness of its:  
|            |                               |                                 | • Contractor-operated systems and contractor-provided IT services;  
|            |                               |                                 | • Change control activities to ensure data supporting the metrics is obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format;  
|            |                               |                                 | • Data exfiltration and enhanced network defenses; and  
|            |                               |                                 | • Data Breach Response Plan to ensure data supporting the metrics is obtained accurately, consistently, and in a reproducible format. |
| 2019       | 4                             | Closed                          | FTC develops and implements a defined process to prevent and detect unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware on its network and employs automated mechanisms such as application whitelisting and network management tools to detect unauthorized hardware, software, and firmware on its systems. |
| 2019       | 5                             | Closed                          | FTC implement automated mechanisms to remove or disable inactive privileged and non-privileged accounts, inventory and manage accounts, and perform segregation of duties and least privilege reviews. |
| 2019       | 6                             | Closed                          | FTC consistently reviews and updates its BIA based on its defined frequency to ensure the operational impact is appropriately measured and contingency planning can be developed appropriately. |
Appendix B – Management’s Response

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

MEMORANDUM

DATE: January 11, 2021
FROM: Raghav Vajjhala, Chief Information and Chief Data Officer
TO: Andrew Katsaros, Inspector General

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Management appreciates the report produced by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and RMA Associates. The agency takes information security very seriously and will use the RMA recommendations for areas of improvement to strengthen its Information Security Program.

The Report recognizes that the Information Security Program of the Federal Trade Commission is effective and acknowledges the closure of eight open recommendation items. The Report further identifies three areas of improvement which the agency will incorporate into continuing modernization efforts in support of the agency Information Resource Management (IRM) plan and overall Strategic Plan.

The FTC is committed to continually improving its Information Security and Privacy Program through continued partnership with the OIG.

RAGHAV VAJJHALA

Digitally signed by RAGHAV VAJJHALA
Date: 2021.01.13 10:11:53 -05'00'

Raghav Vajjhala, Chief Information Officer and Chief Data Officer
Appendix C – FY 2020 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics

The subsequent section of the report “Appendix C” is not being publicly released due to the sensitive security content.