Good afternoon. Thank you, Todd, for your warm introduction. And thank you to Ghostery and Hogan Lovells for the invitation to speak with all of you today to mark Data Privacy Day. With all that is going on in privacy right now in the U.S. and Europe, Data Privacy Week might have been more appropriate. Todd asked me to address two issues from my perspective as a Federal Trade Commissioner: the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and a transatlantic data transfer mechanism to replace Safe Harbor.

I would like to begin with the GDPR. With all that has been happening with data transfer mechanisms in the wake of the Schrems decision last October, I feel like the GDPR has been a little neglected, at least in the discussions taking place in Washington. But as Eduardo Ustaran pointed out recently, it would be a “huge mistake” to wait two years between the finalization of the Regulation and its effective date before figuring out what it means. That goes for companies as well as enforcement agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

The GDPR will have far-reaching effects on all of us. Setting a global standard has been part of the European privacy project for a long time. The Data Protection Directive’s adequacy requirement has encouraged countries outside the EU to adopt EU-style data protection laws. As the European Commission began to develop the General Data Protection Regulation, at least one European Commissioner explicitly said that part of its goal was to set a global standard. More recently, after the EU institutions reached a political agreement on the final form of the GDPR, the European Commission’s own press release stated that a focus of the Regulation is

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1 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) (Dec. 15, 2015) [“GDPR”].


“setting global data protection standards.” As a result, it has become natural to think of European privacy policy as projecting only outward from Europe towards the United States and elsewhere, radiating its requirements in one direction.

But the GDPR is not a purely European document. Some of the key substantive provisions of the GDPR have roots in U.S. privacy law and policy. And some of the big questions left open in the GDPR that the Europeans will have to grapple with over the coming years are questions that we have been grappling with here in the U.S. for some time. So I think it is more helpful – for both European and U.S. stakeholders – to recognize that the transatlantic discussion about privacy policy that the GDPR has engendered is a bustling two way street. The traffic in ideas about privacy protections travels in both directions, allowing both sides to learn from each other’s experiences. Recognition of this dynamic will allow us to find common ground where it exists as the GDPR is put into practice, and to engage in rich and robust discussions about how to find solutions to common problems.

Of course, there are important differences between the U.S. framework and the framework envisioned by the GDPR. We would be foolish to not discuss those differences just as honestly.

**Elements of a Two-Way Exchange of Privacy and Data Protection Ideas**

Let me begin with some of the clearest examples of the ways in which principles of the US privacy framework have found a home within the GDPR.

**Data Security**

I rarely discuss consumer privacy without bringing data security into the picture. Put simply, there is no privacy without data security. If companies cannot protect consumer data from unauthorized disclosures or uses, privacy is pretty hopeless. Recent FTC cases like Snapchat and TRENDnet illustrate this close connection between privacy and data security. The standard that the FTC enforces in data security cases is reasonable security. Integral to the idea of reasonable security is that it must be a continuing process. Risk assessments, identifying and patching vulnerabilities, training employees to handle personal information appropriately, and employing reasonable technical security measures are all parts of this process.

The GDPR – like the Data Protection Directive before it – incorporates a risk-based data security requirement. Importantly, the GDPR adds the word “ongoing” to its requirements that

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10 See GDPR, art. 30(1) (requiring data controllers and processors to “implement appropriate technical and organizational measures, to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk, . . . ”); DPD art. 17 (requiring “appropriate technical and organizational measures”).
data controllers and processors maintain the security of their personal data processing systems. This additional word suggests strong alignment with the FTC’s view that data security must be an ongoing process. In addition, the GDPR lists a few specific steps that companies should include in their “technical and organizational” measures, including the use of encryption and deidentification, as well as testing their security measures and addressing vulnerabilities that such testing uncovers.\textsuperscript{11} The FTC has recommended these steps, among others, as part of its recent guidance to companies, while also emphasizing that decisions about what is reasonable in a given case will be fact-specific.\textsuperscript{12}

**Security Breach Notifications**

Closely related to these similarities in data security provisions is the issue of security breach notifications. In the U.S., breach notification laws have become nearly ubiquitous since California passed the first general breach notification law in 2002. Before the GDPR, however, breach notification in Europe was limited to communications service providers.\textsuperscript{13} That has now changed. The GDPR, once implemented, will require a data controller to report a breach to the relevant DPA. The notification timeline is much more aggressive under the GDPR than it is under our state laws – rather than expedient notice “without unreasonable delay,”\textsuperscript{14,15} the GDPR requires notification to the DPAs generally within 72 hours.\textsuperscript{16} That’s the bad news, especially if law enforcement is trying to investigate a significant ongoing criminal hack.

The good news is that the GDPR qualifies data controllers’ duty to notify supervisory authorities with a risk-based standard. Specifically, notification is not necessary if the breach is “unlikely to result in a risk for the rights and freedoms of individuals.”\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, notification to individual data subjects is necessary only when there is a “high risk” to individual rights and freedoms.\textsuperscript{18} Individual notification also is not necessary if the personal data in the breach was encrypted, the controller takes appropriate steps to mitigate individual risks, or notification would “involve disproportionate effort.”\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
  \item[\textsuperscript{11}] GDPR art. 30(1).
  \item[\textsuperscript{12}] See FTC, Statement Marking the Commission’s 50th Data Security Settlement 1 (Jan. 31, 2014), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140131gmrstatement.pdf (stating “there is no one-size-fits-all data security program”).
  \item[\textsuperscript{16}] GDPR art. 31. A controller may offer a “reasoned justification” to the relevant supervisory authority for failing to meet this deadline. GDPR art. 31(1).
  \item[\textsuperscript{17}] GDPR art. 31(1).
  \item[\textsuperscript{18}] GDPR art. 32.
  \item[\textsuperscript{19}] GDPR art. 32.3.
\end{itemize}
Many of our state laws include risk-based triggers that limit the circumstances under which notification is needed, and many of them exempt encrypted data from the duty to notify. My guess is that the GDPR’s “high risk” trigger is something that many companies in the U.S. will be familiar with, and will welcome. Conversely, only some states require notification to be sent to state attorneys general or other law enforcement officials. Requiring notification to the responsible authorities across a broader portion of the United States would, in my view, serve consumers and companies well by giving all of us a better understanding of specific breaches as well as broader trends.

Encryption

Let me turn to encryption. As I mentioned a moment ago, the FTC encourages companies to encrypt personal data. This message is especially important with respect to the Internet of Things, where some research indicates that the use of encryption is way behind where it ought to be. The FTC has brought enforcement actions against companies whose failure to use encryption to protect sensitive personal information was one element of a systemic data security problem within the company.20 We have also brought cases against companies that misrepresented how much protection their encryption methods would offer to consumers’ data.21

The GDPR lines up rather well with the FTC’s call for more extensive use of encryption. In addition to making encryption a possible means to avoid individual notification of a breach and a consideration in the “appropriate” level of security for personal data, the GDPR makes encryption one consideration among several others in determining whether secondary uses of personal data are lawful – perhaps on the theory that strong data security safeguards are integral to reducing the risk that data kept longer than needed to serve its original purpose will interfere with individuals’ privacy rights.22

The GDPR does not settle or even address explicitly hot-button questions about encryption, such as whether companies should provide “back doors” to allow governments to obtain access to the plain text of encrypted communications under an appropriate court order.

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21 See, e.g., FTC, Press Release, Dental Practice Software Provider Settles FTC Charges It Misled Customers About Encryption of Patient Data (Jan. 5, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/01/dental-practice-software-provider-settles-ftc-charges-it-misled. See also Credit Karma, No. C-4480 (F.T.C. Aug. 13, 2014), Complaint ¶ 22, available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/132-3091/credit-karma-inc (“As a result of these failures, attackers could, in connection with attacks that redirect and intercept network traffic, decrypt, monitor, or alter any of the information transmitted from or to the application, including Social Security numbers, dates of birth, ‘out of wallet’ information, and credit report information.”); Fandango, No. C-4481 (Aug. 13, 2014), Complaint ¶ 20, available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/132-3089/fandango-llc (“As a result of these failures, attackers could have, in connection with attacks that redirect and intercept network traffic, decrypted, monitored, or altered any of the information transmitted from or to the application, including the consumer’s credit card number, security code, expiration date, billing zip code, email address, and password.”).

22 GDPR art. 6(3).
Such questions remain unsettled in the United States, too. A further exchange of ideas in this issue may be fruitful.

**Deidentification**

To stay with technical data protection measures for another minute, let me discuss deidentification and anonymization. For several years there has been a lively debate in the United States about what constitutes deidentified data, how robust technical deidentification measures are, and whether deidentification is useful as a standalone data protection measure. This debate has been deeply informed by the work of computer scientists, who have shown an impressive ability to reidentify data by analyzing deidentified data and by bringing other publicly available data to bear.

The FTC in its 2012 privacy framework recommended a three-pronged approach to deidentification that includes technical, organizational, and legal safeguards. First, we suggested that companies use reasonable technical measures to deidentify data. Second, we recommended that companies publicly committing not to reidentify the data. Third, we recommended that companies require any recipients of the data to keep it in deidentified form. Only then would the data not be reasonably linkable to individuals and thus fall outside of the FTC’s definition of “personal data” and the scope of the substantive practices relating to privacy by design, simplified choice, and greater transparency.

The GDPR contains similar ideas, but the terminology and its legal significance is a bit different. The GDPR refers to “pseudonymous” data, which is data that “can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information.” Data is pseudonymous as long as a controller maintains technical and organizational measures to prevent such “additional information” from being used to link data to individuals. So “pseudonymous data” is roughly the same as “deidentified data” under the FTC framework, but under the GDPR approach, pseudonymity is contingent and reversible, whereas the FTC requires enforceable commitments to protect against reidentification.

This makes a bit more sense when you consider that the significance of making data pseudonymous under the GDPR is smaller than it is in the FTC’s framework. The GDPR does not deem pseudonymized data to be outside the scope of the Regulation. That is, pseudonymized data is still personal data. Still, the GDPR encourages data controllers to use

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25 GDPR art. 4.3(b).

26 See GDPR art. 4(1), (3b); R. 23 (“Data which has undergone pseudonymization, which could be identified to a natural person by the use of additional information, should be considered as information on an identifiable natural person.”).
pseudonymization as part of fulfilling the GDPR’s privacy by design and security mandates.\(^{27}\) Only when personal data is transformed to be “anonymous information” – meaning that data subjects cannot be identified – is data considered to be outside the scope of the substantive requirements of the GDPR.\(^{28}\)

**Privacy by Design**

Although the FTC was not the first to use the term “privacy by design,” we have recommended privacy and security by design for a long time.\(^{29}\) The GDPR also discusses privacy and security by design, and calls out data minimization as a specific step that companies should take as part of data protection by design.\(^{30}\) The FTC made the same recommendation in its 2012 privacy report. Indeed, data minimization is a foundational privacy principle that I have continued to encourage companies to embrace, rather than kick to the side as a relic of the antiquated times soon to be known as “BBD” – “before big data”.

**Children’s Privacy**

Still more evidence of the dynamic dialogue between the privacy principles on both sides of the Atlantic is the mutual focus on heightened protections for data about children. In the United States, these protections take the form of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which protects children under the age of 13 and has been the law of the land since 1998.\(^{31}\) One of COPPA’s requirements is that websites directed toward children, or whose operators know that they are collecting personal data from children, must obtain verifiable parental consent before doing so.\(^{32}\)

Like COPPA, the GDPR recognizes that children’s data is sensitive,\(^{33}\) In another similarity to COPPA, the GDPR requires operators of online services under some circumstances to obtain verifiable parental consent to process children’s data.\(^{34}\) However, the GDPR departs from COPPA in one significant way. The GDPR’s parental consent provisions apply to individuals up to 16 years of age, though Member States can lower this age to 13. Those three years are pretty important in children’s lives. Some scholars believe that allowing young teenagers – even those younger than 13 – to navigate the shoals of social media is an important

\(^{27}\) GDPR arts. 23 and 30.

\(^{28}\) See GDPR R. 23 (“The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information, that is information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to data rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation therefore does not concern the processing of such anonymous information, including for statistical and research purposes.”).

\(^{29}\) See 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 24, at 22-30.

\(^{30}\) See GDPR art. 23(1).


\(^{33}\) GDPR R. 29 (“Children deserve specific protection of their personal data, as they may be less aware of risks, consequences, safeguards and their rights in relation to the processing of personal data.”).

\(^{34}\) GDPR art. 8(1a).
part of the maturation process. I wonder whether European tweens who are looking forward to joining their peers on social networks will end up provoking a backlash against a requirement that they must wait another three years. I also wonder how this requirement to keep them off social media and other online services without parental consent can be enforced. I guess we shall see.

**Right to Be Forgotten**

In some instances, the parallels that one might draw between provisions of U.S. and European law only go so far. This is the case with the right to be forgotten.

Let’s start with the parallels we can draw. When the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in *Google Spain v. AEPD* that search engines must remove links to material that “appear[s] to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive . . . in light of the time that has elapsed,” I described this holding as an effort to restore some of the obscurity that was lost as the Internet ushered in an “Age of Omniscience.”

I pointed out that provisions to preserve or restore some obscurity are not entirely unknown to U.S. law. For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires credit reporting agencies to eliminate many kinds of information from consumer reports once it reaches a certain age, generally seven or 10 years. I have long called on data brokers to allow consumers to have greater control over the information in their profiles, including the ability to access their profiles and correct information that is used to make substantive decisions about them. And the FTC has required “people search” companies to honor their promises to allow consumers to opt out of having their information appear in search results.

At the same time, I noted that *Google Spain* left many questions unanswered. Among these questions were whether the decision would be interpreted to apply to data controllers other than search engines, and whether the obligations to remove information would extend outside of the EU. The CJEU’s judgment left open the possibility that courts would answer these questions on a case-by-case basis.

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Incrementalism did not carry the day. Under the GDPR, the right to be forgotten applies to all data controllers. And the scope of the right to be forgotten does not appear to be limited to European territory. The Article 29 Working Party had already interpreted the Google Spain decision to require takedowns to be given global effect, on the ground that viewing information that an individual considers irrelevant is an infringement of her right to privacy, no matter where the information is viewed. Such broad interpretations have raised questions about the balance between the right to be forgotten and the extent to which orders to comply with takedown requests are enforceable outside the EU. I expect those questions to be even more prominent under the GDPR.

**Traffic Cops on the Two-Way Street: Jurisdiction and Enforcement Cooperation**

All highways have traffic cops. So let me turn to the traffic cops on our two way street of bustling traffic between the US and European privacy protection principles: jurisdictional reach and enforcement cooperation.

The GDPR has broad jurisdictional reach. It applies to data processors and controllers if they monitor the behavior of data subjects taking place within the European Union, a reach much broader than previously existed in the Directive.

This begs the question of how far data protection authorities will attempt to press their jurisdictional reach in practice? Perhaps it is best to say at this point in time that we will have to wait and see.

While we wait for answers about jurisdiction, there will be more immediate issues for enforcement authorities on both sides of the Atlantic to address. One of the most important is enforcement cooperation. The FTC and its counterparts in Europe and elsewhere have made strides in this area in recent years.

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39 GDPR art. 17. Indeed, the GDPR calls for a controller that receives a takedown request to notify other controllers of the request. GDPR R. 54.

40 See Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment in “Google Spain and Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzáles C-131/12” 3 (Nov. 26, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf (“In order to give full effect to the data subject’s rights as defined in the Court’s ruling, de-listing decisions must be implemented in such a way that they guarantee the effective and complete protection of data subjects’ rights and that EU law cannot be circumvented. . . . In practice, this means that in any case de-listing should also be effective on all relevant domains, including .com.”).

41 Compare GDPR art. 3(2)(b) with DPD arts. 3 and 4.

I am concerned that the GDPR may reverse this trend by limiting the FTC’s ability to cooperate with Member State DPAs. Article 43a appears to prohibit companies from disclosing data covered by the GDPR in response to “any judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority” unless the request is made pursuant to an “international agreement” or MLAT. Whether this provision could limit the FTC’s ability to further its investigations by obtaining information from companies in Europe is something that the FTC is currently examining. It would be a loss for consumers in the U.S. and EU if this provision of the GDPR ends up turning enforcement cooperation into dead end.

**The Ongoing Need for a Transatlantic Data Transfer Framework**

Now to the ongoing negotiations over a transatlantic data protection framework to replace Safe Harbor. Those negotiations are at a delicate stage, so I cannot get into too much detail. Instead, I would like to spend a moment reemphasizing my support for such a framework.

Many advocates and DPAs hailed the *Schrems* decision as a victory for the fundamental right of privacy, but some of the losses are now becoming apparent. The first loss is transparency. When a company joined Safe Harbor, consumers knew it, advocates knew it, and the entire enforcement community knew it. The principles and operating procedures for Safe Harbor were also well known and uniform. The same cannot be said for other data transfer mechanisms, such as binding corporate rules and model contractual clauses.

The second loss is FTC enforcement. Simply put, the absence of Safe Harbor may limit the FTC’s ability to take action against companies if they misrepresent how they follow European privacy standards. And, in the absence of Safe Harbor, there is little reason for companies to make those representations in the first place. Before *Schrems*, The FTC had brought 39 enforcement actions against companies for alleged Safe Harbor violations, as well as an action against TRUSTe for allegedly misrepresenting the extent of its Safe Harbor assessments.

Finally, small and medium enterprises – which made up around 60 percent of Safe Harbor membership[^43] – stand to lose the most from the *Schrems* decision. Like the biggest companies that are often discussed in public debates in Europe, these SMEs depend on the free flow of information to sell goods and services globally, build global workforces, and take advantage of low-cost cloud computing resources. Unlike the big companies, however, these SMEs do not have the resources to get BCRs approved or put model contractual clauses in place.

I hope to see a new transatlantic data protection framework in place very soon. This will be to the benefit of consumers and companies on both sides of the Atlantic. Agreeing on a framework would also allow everyone involved to start focusing on the many other challenges that the U.S. and Europe should try to address together. The GDPR itself is one of them. The Internet of Things, big data analytics, and all of their associated privacy and security challenges are also on this list. If we are going to bring appropriate data protections to these new technologies, and help them reach their full potential, we need to start addressing these challenges together, and we need to start right now.

Thank you.