Identity Theft

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

MAY 24, 2017



Introductory Remarks

John Krebs

Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade Commission

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My Contact Information

John Krebs Federal Trade Commission

jkrebs@ftc.gov

Opening Remarks

Maureen K. Ohlhausen

Acting Chairman, Federal Trade Commission

Setting the Stage: Identity Theft Today

Presenters

Keith Anderson, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission **Sean McCleskey**, Director of Organizational Education and Measurement, Center for Identity, The University of Texas at Austin **Alana Benson**, Identity and Document Fraud Consultant

Keith Anderson

Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission

Identity Theft: What Do the Statistics Tell Us?

Keith B. Anderson Bureau of Economics Federal Trade Commission

Introductory Items

- The views expressed here are just mine and do not represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any of the Commissioners.
- The data I will present here are based on the results of the Bureau of Justice Statistics 2014 ID theft supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey.

Identity Theft, 2014

		Number of Victims	Percent of Adult Population
Total Victims		17,576,200	7.0%
Exist	ing Accounts Misused	16,392,600	6.6%
New	Accounts or Other Misuses	1,760,100	0.7%
	New Accounts Opened	1,077,100	0.4%
	Information Used in Other Ways	713,000	0.3%

Financial Costs of ID Theft

The Total – Social – Cost of an Incident of ID Theft

- No financial cost was reported in 35% of ID thefts.
 - This suggests that 4.5% of consumers were victims of an ID theft involving a financial cost.
- Looking just at those instances in which there was a financial loss, the median cost per ID Theft was \$300.
- However, the losses from ID Theft are heavily skewed, with a limited number of incidents involving a much greater financial loss.
 - In 20% of incidents that involved a financial cost, the total social cost per incident was at least \$1,000.
 - 10% of incidents involved social costs of at least \$2,000 more than 6 times the median value.
 - Almost ¾ of the total cost reported was accounted for by those incidents that involved the top 10 percent of loss per victim.

Financial Costs of ID Theft

Cost of an Incident of ID Theft That Was Borne by the Victim

- Not all of the costs resulting from ID Theft are borne by the victim.
- Indeed, only 13.8% of victims reported that they had paid money out of their own pocket in resolving the issue.
- Of those who incurred an out-of-pocket loss, the median amount was only \$100.
- Again, these figures are highly skewed.
 - In the 20% of cases that involved the highest victim costs, the had out-of-pocket expenses of \$600 of more.
 - In the 10% of cases that involved the highest victim costs, the victim paid at least \$1,500.

Financial Costs of ID Theft

(Median of Non-Zero Values)

	Social Cost	Cost to the Victim
All ID Theft	\$300	\$100
Misuse of Existing Credit Card	\$300	\$40
Misuse of a Checking or Savings Account	\$200	\$90
Misuse of an Other Existing Account	\$200	\$200
Opening New Accounts	\$680	\$300
Other Misuses	\$1,000	\$500

Types of New Accounts and Other Misuses

Type of New Accounts or Other Misuse	Number of Victims	Percent of New Account and Other Misuse Victims
New Credit Card Accounts	531,800	30.2%
Fraudulent Tax Return Filed	261,300	14.8%
New Telephone Accounts	201,700	11.5%
New Loans or Mortgages	157,900	9.0%
False Information Provided to Police	120,500	6.8%
New Checking or Savings Account	104,000	5.9%
Used in Applying for a Job	77,300	4.4%
Used to Get Medical Treatment	74,900	4.3%
New Online Payment Accounts	66,7000	3.8%

Types of New Accounts and Other Misuses (Continued)

Type of New Accounts or Other Misuse	Number of Victims	Percent of New Account and Other Misuse Victims
Used to Rent an Apartment or a House	57,700	3.3%
Used to Apply for Government Benefits	53,000	3.0%
New Auto Insurance Policies	13,200	0.7%
New Medical Insurance Policies	12,000	0.7%

Other Financial Problems Experienced by Victims of New Account and Other Misuses ID Theft

Type of Problem Experienced	
Credit-related Problems	13.1%
Banking Problems	6.7%
Problems with Debt Collectors	14.0%
Legal Problems	3.3%
Problems with Utility Services	1.6%

Non-Financial Costs Borne by Victims

- Victims must spend time resolving problems resulting from having their ID stolen
 - At the time they were interviewed, just over a quarter 27% of victims of new account or other misuse ID theft indicated that they were still dealing with problems
 - Of those who had resolved all problems, 22 % said that they had spent a month or more resolving their problems.
- Many victims also incurred emotional distress as a result of their experience.
 - 55% of victims of new account or other misuse ID theft said that they had experienced either moderate or severe emotional distress as a result
 - This is comparable with the percentage of those who had experienced an assault who said that they had experienced such levels of distress – 51 percent for simple assault and 60 percent for aggravated assault.

Who is More Likely to Become a Victim

- The prevalence of New Account and Other Misuse ID theft is highest among those aged 25 to 64. Among those of this age, about 0.8% were victims. This compares to 0.5% among those who were 65 or over and those between 18 and 24.
- While 0.8% of whites reported being a victim of this type of ID theft, the rates were somewhat higher for blacks or African Americans 1.0% and Hispanics or Latinos 0.8%.
- There are no significant differences based on sex or income level.

Sean McCleskey

Director of Organizational Education and Measurement, Center for Identity, The University of Texas at Austin

IDENTITY THEFT TODAY



Identity theft is the fraudulent acquisition and use of a person's personally identifiable information (PII)



Financial Fraud (via Devices, Credit Cards, Checks, Bank access)



Tax Identity Theft



Synthetic Identity Theft (False ID)



Immigration (Passport & Visa Fraud)



Medical Identity Theft



Cyber Intrusions



Ghosting



Impact of Identity Theft is Big, Real and Diverse.



Proliferation of Identity Theft:

It is simple economics.



Profit potential is high and hidden

- Much higher than those for robbery, burglary, and street level drug dealing
- Businesses are willing to absorb "acceptable levels" of fraud loss
- Proceeds are easy to launder and conceal

Consequences are low

- -These crimes are typically ...
 - detected well after they are committed
 - often unreported
 - due to jurisdictional issues and scarce resources, often never investigated
- Declinations are frequent, sentences tend to be light

Identity crimes fund criminal enterprises

- These crimes are increasingly becoming the purview of organized criminal enterprises, many of which are transnational
- Often perpetrated by individuals and groups engaging in other more serious offenses to include narcotics trafficking, extortion, and murder for hire

Identity crimes facilitate other crimes

- Narcotics/Drug Trafficking
- Organized Crime
- Mail Fraud/Mail Theft (can be a precursor to ID crime)
- Mortgage Fraud
- Weapons trafficking
- Homicide
- Terrorism/National Security
- Wire Fraud
- Human trafficking
- Online Impersonation
- Revenge porn
- Extortion/blackmail



HOW IS IDENTITY STOLEN?




UT CID Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP)

ITAP is a national analytical knowledge repository of identity theft and fraud cases occurring in multiple market sectors, including but not limited to DHS 16 critical infrastructure sectors.

ITAP is a computational model of "how Identity Theft and Fraud is done" identifying risks, vulnerabilities, consequences, solutions, and gaps to understand current threats and to predict future risks.

Where are the vulnerable points of entry?

Digital vs Non-Digital Theft



Source: UT CID Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) project.



How is PII frequently stolen?

UT CID ITAP cases show common strategies...

- Physical theft- stolen wallets, purses, mail
- Phone and mail scams
- Dumpster diving and shoulder surfing
- Credit card skimming
- Email phishing
- Social engineering
- Using unprotected Wi-Fi networks
- Computer (Network/Software) breaches

Identity Theft "Steal Me" Flags



UT CID ITAP models WHO and WHEN Identity Theft and Fraud occurs.



THE BIG PICTURE: We all are impacted ... consumers, corporations, and governments around the world

- We must understand that recovery from the theft of an Identity asset is not just about replacing a new credit card or driver license.
- It can the sometime represent and insurmountable task of having to repair a lifetime of achievements.
- We need to capture more of these stories!




Do we really even understand what Identity is?


- Again we normally think of Identity Theft in terms of a financial crime, but are there other crimes?
- Is Identity replaceable?
- Is Identity an asset and what is it value?

UT CID Identity Ecosystem defines the "Physics of Identity":

its Contents (PII nodes), Connectedness, Identity Value, Liability, Rate of Change and so on.




Is Identity Replaceable?




- The theft of identity often is tied to a document, credential, or token.
- What about the path that leads to acquiring that item?
- Can you replace your reputation, good decisions, or your general standing in the world?

"To Protect a Thing is to Know a Thing"



- What is an identity asset?
- What is the value of an Identity asset?
- Who is looking to steal these identity assets?
- How are these identity assets compromised?

UT CID Identity Ecosystem Investigates Vulnerable "Entry" Points Given Breached PII.



"I AM NOT SURE WHAT I HAVE?!"

- What type of Identity assets do you hold?
- Where are those Identity assets located?
- Who has access to those identity assets?
- Are those identity assets monitored (analogue vs. cyber?)

MISCONCEPTIONS: Cyber Security is the Total Solution!

• The term cybersecurity is generically used to describe any issues related to the protection or unauthorized disclosure/theft of identity information.

HOWEVER

- 50% of unauthorized disclosures/theft are not related to a machine or network
 - -- according to UT CID ITAP research.

MISCONCEPTIONS: Cyber Security is the Total Solution!

- ✓ There must be a TWO-FRONT fight! ...
 People & Technology
- ✓ Not every identity thief is a hacker operating from a foreign country or government
- ✓ Network/Software security is incredibly important!
- ✓ But don't forget People, Processes, and Policies.

WHAT CAN WE DO?

Research
Training
Awareness
Special Programs



More unbiased academic research is required to uncover the Identity Fundamentals.

Educate an Identity Workforce with the knowledge and skills to protect Identity ASSETS.

Who is the "Identity" Workforce?

- Everyone who uses PII to make decisions.
- Everyone who collects PII.
- Everyone who sells or trades in PII.
- Everyone charged with protecting PII and privacy.
- EVERYONE WHO TOUCHES PII.
- Everyone who looks and prosecutes the identity thieves and fraudsters.

Law Enforcement needs training to look for the right things in the right places

- What does a patrol officer typically look for?
- What should a patrol officer or investigator look for when hunting identity thieves and fraudsters?
 - Computers
 - Printers/ Scanners
 - Thumb/ Jump drives
 - Cell Phones
 - Card readers/ Encoders
 - Embossers
 - Laminators



What to look for









Is this evidence?













This is not an easy crime to investigate.


- Evidence of an identity crime may look innocuous and unimportant
- Unfamiliarity on the process to collect the evidence
- Limited knowledge of the laws available
- Don't throw in the trash!!!

Combating Identity Theft

Creation of Financial Crimes/Identity Theft Task Forces: Comprised in most cases of Federal, State and Local agencies

South Texas Region

 Task Force created by USSS San Antonio Field Office to combat identity theft and major financial crimes



US Secret Service, San Antonio Police
Department, Bexar County Sheriff's Office, Texas
Department of Public Safety, Homeland Security
Investigations, US Postal Inspection Service and
IRS-Criminal Investigative Division



Reduction in Identity-related Crimes

- The Untied States Attorney's Office temporarily suspended loss requirement for case acceptance
- Intelligence was gathered on suspects with high rate of recidivism
- Education of prosecutors and the judiciary
- Outreach to business/organizations

Reduction in Identity-related Crimes

- Task Force being switched hours of operation and utilized drug warrants to initiate contact with suspects
- Worked closely with SAPD and Bexar County narcotics and gang units
- Cultivated contacts in the hotel/motel community
- FINALLY-use of the 1028A statute!!!

Prosecuting the Identity Thief and Fraudster

18 USC 1028A – Aggravated Identity Theft

. . .knowingly transfers, possesses or uses without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person shall, in <u>addition</u> to the punishment provided for such felony, . . .

... During and in relation to <u>ANY</u> felony violation

. . . Be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of <u>2 years</u>.

... A court shall <u>not place on probation</u> any person convicted of a violation of this section . . .

... No term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this section shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment . . .


Case Study: Theft of data from a hotel

- Group of Aryan Brotherhood members and methamphetamine users stole credit card portfolios from storage facility in five-star hotel located in San Antonio, TX
- Hotel unaware of the theft
- 17,000 plus portfolios-contained CC #'s, CVC #"s, name, address of customers
- Information was utilized in conjunction with public sources to create counterfeit credit cards and fraudulent ID documents

Case Study: Theft of data from a hotel

- Hotel unable to notify victims and comply with TX Business & Commerce Code
- Stolen information utilized to fund organized criminal organization
- Complete failure of hotel's policies and procedures on securing identity information
- 1 Defendant (12 total) after release from prison was recently arrested 8 years later with thousands of the stolen portfolios still secreted for potential use

Public Data.com






ID360 Scorecards from the Center for Identity helps organizations benchmark and improve.

- Unbiased
- Confidential
- Transparent
- Top-tier University
- Expert researchers and practitioners



Success in the future will rely on Research and Education.

- Understanding your identity vulnerabilities and risks
- Understanding the Identity Ecosystem
 - PII content, connectedness, value, liability, ...
- Defining and measuring against best practice benchmarks
- Building a knowledgeable and skilled workforce
- Equipping law enforcement and prosecutors with knowledge and resources







18 USC 1028A



R. Sean McCleskey, JD

Special Agent (Retired), U.S. Secret Service Director of Organizational Education and Measurement

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210.875.4844

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Alana Benson

Identity and Document Fraud Consultant

State of New Gampshire

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH

ISIGNACOUNE.

1. CHILD'S NAME (Fine, Middle, Last)

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PENNY JO BENSON

18 BIRCHES ACE. PENNSYLVANIA

SIGNATURE OF PARENT OR OTHER INFORMANT.

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3 MILTIMORE RD

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12: ATTENDANT'S NAME AND TITLE GRIFFITHS, LINDA

CNN

PACYTARRYTOWN ROAD SUITE 105, MANCHESTER, NH 03103

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Identity at the Core

- 1. "Identities" are how agencies and institutions know us.
- 2. Agencies and institutions know our identities through documents.
 - 3. Documents breed other documents: birth certificate > driver's license > passport.

Apply for a Wyoming Driver's License

To apply for a driver's license in Wyoming, you must visit your local WY DOT office in person. You will need:

- Proof of your identity, such as your:
- U.S. birth certificate.
 - U.S. passport (valid). Citizenship certificate.
 - Proof of your WY residency (2 documents), such as your:
 - - Bank statement.

Utility bill.

Phone bill.

- Proof of your Social Security number (SSN), such as your:

 - Social Security card.
 - Bank statement.
 - W-2 form.



REAL ID COMPLIANT IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS United States Citizens



To obtain a REAL ID COMPLIANT ORIGINAL NH Driver License or Non-Driver Identification Card, you must provide **proof of Identity, Social Security number and NH residency (legal physical address)**. You must provide these items even if you are transferring a compliant card from another state. Please see the bottom of the page for additional requirements needed for driver license applicants less than 18 years of age.

**IMPORTANT: If your current name is different than your birth name on the document you are providing, you must also provide legal documentation (issued by a city, town, state, court or federal agency) to prove your name change, i.e., marriage certificate, civil union certificate or divorce decree

1 OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO SHOW PROOF OF IDENTITY

- An original or certified copy of your birth certificate issued by a city, town, state, court or federal agency with a raised seal or stamp of the issuing authority (this would include US Citizens born abroad or a US Department of State issued birth certificate). IF YOUR NAME HAS CHANGED FROM WHAT IS LISTED ON YOUR BIRTH CERTIFICATE, PLEASE SEE IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOVE**
- Certificate of Naturalization
- A valid unexpired U.S. Passport or U.S. Passport Card

Please note: Driver Licenses or driver privilege cards from other States are not acceptable as proof of identification.

and

1 OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO SHOW PROOF OF SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

- Social Security card issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA). Social Security cards that are laminated, or that are tattered and worn will not be accepted
- Paystub with full Social Security Number
- W-2 statement with full Social Security Number for the current year
- 1099 statement with full Social Security Number for the current year

and

2 OF THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO SHOW PROOF OF NH RESIDENCY

- Valid, non-expired NH Driver License or Non-Driver ID Card
- A title application prepared by a Town or City Clerk or Tax Collector (must not be marked "Non Resident")
- Valid NH Vehicle Registration Certificate (Boat Registration is not acceptable)
- Lease, rental agreement or deed (properly signed by both parties)
- Property Tax (real estate) bill for the current year at the address provided
- Direct verification by a parent or guardian (if parent or guardian is not present, verification must be notarized)
- A notarized letter from a property owner or current resident at the address provided
- A mortgage statement at the property address provided
- Any current utility bill or delivery of service bill with <u>"For Service</u> At" address provided

Gas (natural or propane), Electric, Oil, Water/Sewer, Cable/Dish Service or Telephone (for fixed service only)

- A government check or a government document issued by an official in the municipality (NH town or city) of residence
- A payroll check, payroll document, or employment contract

Documents indicated with a red arrow (➡) must be dated within the last sixty (60) days

TRANSFERRING FROM ANOTHER STATE: The applicant's out-of-state Driver License must be relinquished (RSA 263:4)

RENEWAL: Current Valid NH License ONLY or a NH license that has not been expired for more than one (1) year. If no photo/digital image is on file, the applicant will be treated as an original applicant

DUPLICATE: If photo/digital image is on file, nothing further is required. If no photo/digital image is on file, the applicant will be treated as an original applicant.

UNDER 18: Driver Education Certificate, Parental Authorization Certificate, Driver's Certification of Additional Supervised Driving are also required

Identity Verifying Documents








Identity Supporting Documents

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			Serv	ice To				
PLEASE E	ETURN THIS STUB	WITH PAYMENT	12/6	/2012				
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
How to Steal Identities with Documents

- *1. Find an appropriate obituary from an open state.
- 2. Order the death certificate first.
- *3. Use the death certificate to order the birth certificate.

Open vs. Closed



Open vs. Closed



*Vermont is pending vital record legislation to become a closed state

**New York is broken into New York state vital records and New York City's five boroughs

How to Steal Identities with Documents

- *1. Find an appropriate obituary from an open state.
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Birth

Death

- Full name
- Birth date
- City and state of birth
- Parents full names (including mother's maiden name)

- Full name
- Death date
- City and state of death

Public Health - Seattle & King County Vital Statistics CERTIFIED COPY OF DEATH CERTIFICATE

Date Issued: 1/20/2017

00H 01-000 (10H5)

	OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT VITAL REC	CORDS	ALTH BERVI			
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CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH

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DATE OF BIRTH: FACILITY: PLACE OF BIRTH: TIME OF BIRTH: O9:46 P.M. SEX: FEMALE MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME: PLACE OF BIRTH: WASHINGTON AGE: FATHER'S NAME: *** NONE NAMED *** COUNTY FILE NUMBER: FILING DATE: 10/10/1990	GIVEN NAMES: BRIANNA	***************************************
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FATHER'S NAME: *** NONE NAMED *** COUNTY FILE NUMBER: FILING DATE: 10/10/1990	PLACE OF BIRTH:	WASHINGTON
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Registrar of Vital Statistics Certified Copy



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1a DECEDENTS LEGAL NAME (First, Middle, Lest) (Include A	CA's if any)						16 IF FEMALE, TO FIRST M		LAST NAME PRIOR	2 SEX FEMALE
3. ACTUAL OR PRESUMED DATE OF DEATH 4. SOCIAL 5 (Month/Day/Year) (Spell Month) 2017	40	Se. AGE-LAST BIRTHDAY (Years)	5b. UND Morths	Days Days	5c UND Hours	Minutes Minutes	6 DATE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE		7. COUNTY OF DEAT	
8. PLACE OF DEATH (Check only one) HOSPITAL: inpatient ER/Culpatient 9. FACILITY NAME (If not institution, give street and number)	Med on Arrival OTHER	: Hospice Fecility] Nursing Hon	ne/Long Term Ca	re Facility [e X Other (5	Specify)		
11. BIRTHPLACE (City and State or Foreign Country) KENTUCKY		12 MARETAL STATUS Married Married but Separate	ed B Wes		ver Married known	13. SURV	IVING SPOUSE	(If wife, give n	ame prior to first merri	 '. T.
14 DECEDENTS USUAL OCCUPATION (Kind of work done duri (Do not use retired) CAKE DECORATOR	ng most of working life)		OF BUSINESS	1000			8 2	ARM	DECEDENT EVER IN MED FORCES?	us
17a RESIDENCE - State 17b COUNTY	17c. GITY OR TOW	N .		17d STREET AN	NUMBER	91		17e ZIP COC		M/1S7
18 DECEDENTS EDUCATION (Check the box that best describes the highest degree or level school completed at the time of death.) 8th Grade or Lese 9th - 12th Grade, No Diplome High School Graduate or GED Completed Some College Credit but No Degree Associates Degree (e.g., AA, AS) Bachslor's Degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS) Master's Degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA) Doctorate (e.g., PDD, EdD) or Professional Degree (e.g., MD, ODS, DVM, LLB, JD)	of best describes the "No" box if 8 No, not Spanish Yes, Mexican, No Yes, Puerto Rio Yes, Cuban	HISPANIC ORIGIN? (Check whether the decedent is Spine to the control of the decedent is represented that the decedent is represented that the decedent is not Spanistry (Hispanic/Latino an inst/Hispanic/Latino an inst/Hispanic/Latino	enieh/Hapenio/ Hapenio/Latino	/Letino. Check (White Black or A Black or A Asian India Chinese Filipino Japanese Guarraniar Korean Vietnames	more races to fricen Americ sellen en or Chamorr		Sarro Other (Spec Other (Spec (Name (Name (Spec (Spec	Adian City) Pacific Islander City) City City City Facific Islander City City City City City City City City	April 1
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Identity Supporting Documents







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15 State Employer's state ID number	16 State wages, tips, etc.	17 State incom	e tax	18 Local wages, tips, etc.	19 L	ocal income tax	20 Locality name
f Employee's address and ZIP code					-		
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74			0.0-	2383.20 pial security wages	٠.	0.00	
b Employer identification number (EIN)			1 Wa	ges, tips, other compensation	2	Federal income t	
a Employee	's social security number	OMB No. 154	5-0008	This information is being furn are required to file a tax retur may be imposed on you if thi	n, a ne s incor	to the Internal Reven igligence penalty or i me is taxable and yo	ue Service. If you other sanction u fail to report it.

Copy C-For EMPLOYEE'S RECORDS (See Notice to

Employee on the back of Copy B.)

Residential Lease Clause 1. Identification of Landlord and Tenant This agreement is entered into between ___ Heather [Tenant] and Gravity Ranch LLC ILa payment of rent and performance of all other terms of this Agreement. Clause 2. Identification of Premises Subject to the terms and conditions in this Agreement, Landford rents to Tenant, and Tenant rents from Landford, for residential purposes only, the premises located at 636 Lincoln Apt 14 washer, dryer, from remiderator, stove Clause 3. Limits on Use and Occupancy The premises are to be used only as a private residence for Tenant(s) listed in Clause 1 of this Agreement, and their minor children. Occupancy by guests for more than / week prohibited without Landford's written consent and will be considered a breach of this Agreement. Clause 4. Term of the Tenancy The rental will begin on June 1, 16 and end on May 31, 17 Tenant vacates before the term ends. Tenant will be liable for the balance of the rent for the remainder of the term. Clause 5. Payment of Rent.

... is anyone actually doing this?

- The Paper Trip I-IV
- In a report to the VT legislature, cited examples from NJ, CA, OK, VT, CO, and many others.
- As with all fraud, we do not really know how much is happening.



way to create a new identity. (Worth the price of the book alone!)

... but isn't someone checking?


- CSI Effect
- Even when verification occurs, the information agencies have access to is not complete.

	SSA verification of death					
Source of Death Report	Beneficiary	Non-Beneficiary				
State (EDRS)	No	No				
Funeral directors	No	No				
Family members	No	No				
Post offices	Yes	No				
Financial institutions	Yes	No				
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services	Yes	No				
Department of Veterans Affairs	Yes	No				
State (non-EDRS)	Yes	No				

Source: GAO-13-574T

Thank you SSA!


Social Security numbers were invented to keep track of Social Security beneficiaries. That number was then used by other agencies, specifically the IRS, to keep track of tax payer information.





Numident Full DMF Partial DMF

 SSA's record of Social Security beneficiaries, their SSNs, and relevant death data.



Social Security Act forbids sharing state reported data, so a new database is created excluding ~11 million deaths.

Why does the Partial DMF matter?

- Aside from the six agencies that pay federal benefits, the Partial DMF is what agencies and institutions use to confirm your identity.
- If agencies do verify identities, and the database they are using to do so is missing roughly 11 million identities, those agencies cannot be sure they are issuing benefits to real identities.
- Document fraud affects every agency and institution.






Using Benefits to Track Data

- Born in NJ
- Died in NH
- NH Vital Statistics reports death to Social Security Administration
- SSA stops payments and records death on Numident
- Death extracted from Numident, recorded on the Full DMF
- Because it was reported by NH, a state, it is NOT included on the Partial DMF
- NJ Dept. of Pensions continues to send checks because they do not have access to her death data.

Vermont's H.111:

"The House of Representatives took a step toward overhauling the vital records system Wednesday with a preliminary vote to approve H.111, a bill that would require people to show identification to prove they are a relative or authorized representative of the person named on the record before they can receive a certified copy."













September 19, 2016

Mrs. Barbara D. Bovbjerg Managing Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues United States Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mrs. Boybjerg:

Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report, "Improper Payments: Strategy and Additional Actions Needed to Help Ensure Agencies Use the Do Not Pay Working System as Intended" (GAO-17-15). We agree that the Do Not Pay (DNP) portal is an important part of the Administration's efforts to prevent, reduce, and stop improper payments while protecting.

Under current law, we are not authorized to share state death information with the DNP portal. Section 205(r) of the Social Security Act (Act) limits the purposes for which we may disclose state death information. While the Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-109) requires us to share our death information with DNP, it did not amend section 205(r) of the Act to include authority for us to provide DNP State death information. Thus, we appreciate GAO's recommendation that "Congress should consider amending the Act to explicitly allow SSA to share its full death file with Treasury for use through the DNP working system." This recommendation also aligns with a proposal in the President's fiscal year (FV) 2017 Budget that would grant us the legal authority to share all our death information, including data from the states, with DNP.

Our death records are important to our program integrity efforts and help us ensure accurate payment of Social Security benefits. They are also a useful tool for other Federal agencies that issue Federal payments. Nevertheless, we are not the national repository of death information, and as GAO acknowledges in this report, the death data we collect is not a comprehensive accounting of every death in the U.S. We are, however, committed in continuing to share death information with our Federal partners, as required by law, and to improving the accuracy of the data we collect. Accordingly, as recognized in the President's FY 2017 Budget, we believe the best possible way to improve the quality of the death information we collect and share is for Congress to fund the continued expansion by the states of Electronic Death Registration.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION BALTIMORE, MD 21235-8001

Page 2 - Mrs. Barbara Boybierg

If you have any questions, please contact me at (410) 965-4991. Your staff may contact Gary S. Hatcher, Senior Advisor for the Audit Liaison Staff, at (410) 965-0680.

Executive Counselor to the Commissioner

Under current law, we are not authorized to share state death information with the DNP portal. Section 205(r) of the Social Security Act (Act) limits the purposes for which we may disclose state death information. While the Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-109) requires us to share our death information with DNP, it did not amend section 205(r) of the Act to include authority for us to provide DNP State death information. Thus, we appreciate GAO's recommendation that "Congress should consider amending the Act to explicitly allow SSA to share its full death file with Treasury for use through the DNP working system." This recommendation also aligns with a proposal in the President's fiscal year (FY) 2017 Budget that would grant us the legal authority to share all our death information, including data from the states, with DNP.

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Alana Benson | alanabenson10@gmail.com

Tracking the Use of Leaked Consumer Data

Presenters

Dan Salsburg

Christina Yeung

Office of Technology Research and Investigation, Federal Trade Commission

OTech | FTC Office of Technology Research & Investigation www.ftc.gov/OTech | research@ftc.gov

What Happens to Leaked Credentials?

Research question:

When consumer credentials are made public, does anyone use them?

Goal:

Design and conduct a study that tracks the attempted use of stolen consumer credentials

Study of Credential Use


- Create ~100 consumer accounts
- 2. Post account data publicly
- 3. Track use of data

Fake Customer Data

- 1. Name
- Address
- 3. Phone number
- 4. Email address
- Password
- 6. Payment mechanism
 - Credit card number
 - Online payment account
 - Bitcoin wallet



Posting of Fake Customer Data



Posting One vs. Posting Two

- Same data, posted twice
- Different format and time of day

Posting 1: ~100 views


Posting 2: ~550 views


(Picked up by Twitter bot)

Monitoring of Data Usage


- Monitored for about three weeks
 - Week before Posting 1 (Pre-study control)
 - Week after Posting 1 (Week 1)
 - Week after Posting 2 (Week 2)
- Logged
 - Email account access attempts
 - Payment account access attempts
 - Credit card attempted charges
 - Texts and calls received by phone numbers

Time Before First Unauthorized Access Attempt







Total Unauthorized Access Attempts




Unauthorized Access Attempts by Account Type




Account Activity



Email Account Access Attempts by Week




Email Access Attempts by Unique IP Addresses



#IDTheftFTC

Geolocation of IPs Used in Access Attempts



IP Country of Origin

*IP addresses identified as suspicious by a freely available service


Credit Card Purchase Attempts

- Max: \$2,697.75, at a clothing website
- Total amount within two weeks: \$12,825.53
 - Includes multiple payment attempts
 - Includes preauthorization charges
- Noteworthy attempts:
 - Online dating service
 - Pizza place
 - Hotels

Amount Attempted per Charge



Charge by Category



Additional Thoughts

- If you post it, they will use it
- Paste sites should be monitored by email and payment service providers
- Two factor authentication provides some protection against stolen credentials
- Merchants should consider refusing seriatim purchase attempts

Future work

- Analysis of email spam, text spam, and phone calls received by fake consumer email accounts
- Posting of consumer data in other ways that might attract different types of thieves

Have relevant research?

www.ftc.gov/OTech research@ftc.gov

Contributors

- Sheryl Roth
- Phoebe Rouge
- Joe Calandrino
- Aaron Alva
- Justin Brookman
- Phillip Miyo

- Nicole Davis
- Aaron Kaufman
- Amber Howe
- Biaunca Morris
- Jonathan Aid
- Anne Blackman



The Identity Theft Marketplace

Moderator

John Krebs, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade Commission

Panelists


Danny Rogers, CEO, Terbium Labs


Robert Hoback, Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative Division, United States Secret Service

Danny Rogers


CEO, Terbium Labs

Online Anonymity 101





The "Dark Web"



#IDTheftFTC

The "Dark Web"

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Views: 2799 / Blds: Fixed price

Views: 3874 / Bids: Fixed price Quantity left: Unlimited

Item # 46637 - Personal Information & Scans / Personal Information & Scans - AGENT350

USD 0.00 (0.0000 BTC)

Quantity left: Unlimited

₩ ₩ HQ IDs and PASSPORTS ₩ ₩

Quantity left: Unlimited

Quantity left: Unlimited

doxbin5vadxhatzg.onion/index.php?dox=fbi_director_family_edition

DOXBIN

September 4, 2001- Present

Last Name

City

State

Year

Model

2920 SACRAMENTO ST A,

WASHINGTON, DC 20004

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94115

1455 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW UNIT 1000,

family: and old addresses

Vin

Director

HIS CAR:

R MUELLER First Name

Mueller

Chicago Zip 60631

Illinois

2003 Make Toyota

Avalon


43300

ADDRESS 1:

ADDRESS 2:


77784 PO BOX, WASHINGTON, DC 20013


Robert Swan Mueller, III, (born August 7, 1944)



#IDTheftFTC

Is the "Dark Web" all bad?





What are they doing with this data?

- "Classic" Identity
 Theft (mortgages, loans, etc.)
- Tax Fraud
- Three-way ecommerce and other retail scams





Impact: Domestic & International Gang Activity

Impact: Subsidizing Geopolitical Interference

During the conspiracy, the FSB officers facilitated Belan's other criminal activities, by providing him with sensitive FSB law enforcement and intelligence information that would have helped him avoid detection by U.S. and other law enforcement agencies outside Russia, including information regarding FSB investigations of computer hacking and FSB techniques for identifying criminal hackers. Additionally, while working with his FSB conspirators to compromise Yahoo's network and its users, Belan used his access to steal financial information such as gift card and credit card numbers from webmail accounts; to gain access to more than 30 million accounts whose contacts were then stolen to facilitate a spam campaign; and to earn commissions from fraudulently redirecting a subset of Yahoo's search engine traffic.

Impact: Undermining Trust in the Internet























Robert Hoback

Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge, Criminal Investigative Division, United States Secret Service

ShadowCrew & Operation Firewall

- The concept of ShadowCrew (a "dark web" cybercrime chat forum) was developed in early 2002 during a series of chat sessions between cyber criminals. They came up with the idea of an eBay style business model and the subsequent vendor review system that introduced people in need of stolen data or counterfeit identification to verified sellers of such products.
- The ShadowCrew website also contained a number of sub-forums where the latest information about hacking tricks, social engineering, credit card fraud, virus development, scams, and phishing
- <u>carderplanet.com</u> owned by Dmitry Gubolov a.k.a. Script, a website primarily in the Russian language.


ShadowCrew & Operation Firewall

- Important to note that Shadowcrew was the forerunner of today's cybercrime forums and marketplaces. The structure, marketplace, review system, and other innovations that began with Shadowcrew laid the basis of today's underground forums and marketplaces
- This was the beginning of the Secret Service beginning to focus on the dark web and underground marketplace for stolen financial information and PII/Identity Theft
- Shadowcrew website was taken down in 2004 by the Secret Service

 Criminal communities regrouped on Eurasian sites using the
 Shadowcrew concept


Underground Forum Advertisement

 Advertisement on a dark web cyber crime forum for automated card vending shop 2pac.cc



2pac.cc Automated Card Vending Shop

- Automated websites for the sale of stolen credit cards
- Administered by cyber criminals
- Sell stolen cards obtained through skimming operations, online retail breaches and largescale point-of-sale breaches
- Customer support
- Refund Policy




Dark Web Recent Trends

- Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) or Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) - i.e. Account Checkers
- Medical Records / Electronic Health Record Databases
- Institutions of Higher Learning / Educational Services



Recent Trends – Cybercrime-as-a-Service

- Sale of stolen credit cards
- Sale of compromised bank accounts
- Sale of malware
- Sale of "botnet" logs
- "Drop" services
- Exploit Kits
- DDOS services
- Bulletproof Hosting
- "Cashout" services
- Cybercrime tips
- Self-policing



Recent Trends – Cybercrime-as-a-Service

- It is lucrative, there is a market for it, and the risk is very low. The market
 is those criminals who are good at committing fraud but may not have had
 the ability in the past to create malware and write code.
- Exploit kits that steal credit card information, crack passwords or harvest credentials can be bought for the right price. Botnets can be rented if you are interested in constructing a DDoS attack, or you simply want to scam a business by threatening a DDoS attack unless they pay a ransom (scareware).
- By lowering the barrier to entry, anyone with rudimentary knowledge can suddenly use "top notch" malware to steal, hold files for ransom, or cause general havoc.
- THE DARK WEB MARKETPLACE = ONE STOP SHOPPING

Recent Trends – Medical Records/EHR Databases


- Health records have gone digital in the last seven years If online theft continues to accelerate at the current pace, everyone in the U.S. will have had their health care data compromised
- Common theme It is very lucrative. As a hospital administrator, how much do you think your patients medical records that contain PII (Personably Identifiable Information – Name, DOB, SS#) are worth on the criminal underground?
- Records contain not just your PII, but driver's license #, credit card #'s and INSURANCE INFO (fraudulent billing and prescription fraud)
- Electronic Health Record Databases Complete EHR databases can command \$500,000 on the dark web.
- *Monetizing raw data such as PII is not new on the dark web, but EHR contains data that can be used to create new markets for fraudulent tax returns, fake ID's, birth certificates, stolen prescriptions = Synthetic Fraud*

Recent Trends – Educational Services


- Research studies across myriad disciplines conducted at universities put them in the sights of state-affiliated groups.
- However, according to Verizon, breach findings showed that over half involved the compromise and disclosure of **stored personal information** of both students and employees, while only a little over a quarter resulted in the disclosure of intellectual property.
- Criminal actors want your PII info to sell on the dark web and what better place to obtain it than your school personnel files?
- Phishing via email was the most prevalent variety of social attacks, while use of stolen credentials against web applications was the dominant hacking tactic.

Account Checkers

- Account checkers are basic brute force tools that test emails and passwords against a company website in order to validate accounts.
- Most likely over 20 sites/domains on the dark web that offer account checkers for approximately 85 wellknown businesses (retail, hospitality, home improvement – ecommerce and brick and mortar)



Popular Account Checking Toolkits (Private Keeper & Sentry MBA)






Popular Account Checking Toolkits (con't)

- Increase of account checkers over the past year on dark web forums – why?
- Recent massive database leaks (Yahoo/LinkedIn) leads to increase in "combo lists" (compromised user names and passwords) for sale on dark web. Attackers can attempt to reuse against other sites
- The data base info/"combo lists" are widely circulated among underground actors who use it in conjunction with account-checker tools

SLILPP.BIZ Homepage



SLILPP.BIZ Homepage



Only the Finest Customer Support





The Identity Theft Marketplace Moderated Discussion

The Impact of Identity Theft: The Big Picture

Moderator

Mark Eichorn, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade Commission

Panelists

Ann Patterson, Senior Vice President, Program Director, Medical Identity Fraud Alliance

Christopher Mascaro, Vice President, Threat Intelligence & Analytics, First Data Corporation

Michael Beebe, Director, Return Integrity & Compliance Services (RICS) and IRS Security Summit Executive Lead, Internal Revenue Service

Todd Egaas, IRS Executive Official, Identity Theft Tax Refund Fraud ISAC, Internal Revenue Service

Kenn Kern, Chief of Staff to the Investigative Division and Special Assistant for International Relations, New York County District Attorney's Office

Kenn Kern

Chief of Staff to the Investigative Division and Special Assistant for International Relations, New York County District Attorney's Office


STRUCTURE OF THE OFFICE

- Investigation Division
 - Cybercrime and Identity Theft
 Bureau
 - High Technology Analysis Unit
 - Cyber Intelligence Unit
 - Financial Fraud Bureau
 - Major Economic Crimes Bureau
 - Financial Intelligence Unit
 - International Money Movement Center
 - Rackets Bureau
 - Tax Crimes Unit
 - Asset Forfeiture Unit
 - Public Corruption Unit
 - Investigation Bureau



THE CYBERCRIME AND IDENTITY THEFT BUREAU

- Cybercrime or identity theft related charges make up over **25%** of all felony complaints
- District Attorney Vance created the Cybercrime and Identity Theft Bureau in 2010
 - 15 full-time ADAs
 - 90 additional Trial Division ADAs
 - 15 analysts
- Provide training to other parts of the Office
- The Bureau also includes an in-house lab for computer, phone, and other digital forensic work
- Cyber Intelligence Unit conducts long-term, strategic investigations into high-value targets



How Thieves Commit Fraud


- Recent arrest on May 3, 2017
- 39 defendants
- Theft of over \$1 million through counterfeit check cashing

How Thieves Commit Fraud

Debit Card Cracking Scheme:



Complexity of Identity Theft Cases



- The Defendants gained control of legitimate StubHub accounts, fraudulently purchased etickets for popular events, resold the tickets, and then laundered the money internationally
- Victimized more than 1,600 StubHub users and credit card accountholders
- Charged with Money Laundering, Grand Larceny, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property, and Identity Theft, among others

Collaboration and Partnership










Royal Canadian Mounted Police



Barriers to Investigation: Encryption



October 1, 2014 - April 11, 2017



Device Type	iOS	Count
iPhone 5	10	4
iPhone 5C	10	2
	8	1
	9	40
iPhone 5S	10	6
	8	74
	8-9	19
	9	92
iPhone 6	10	7
	8	41
	8-9	4
	9	29
iPhone 6+	10	7
	9	77
iPhone 6S	10	15
	9	40
iPhone 6S+	10	16
	9	2
iPhone SE	10	2
iPhone 7	10	21
iPhone 7+	10	10
iPads (various)	N/A	38
iPods	10	1
Total		548

The Impact of Identity Theft: The Big Picture Moderated Discussion



The Victim's Perspective

Moderator

Lisa Schifferle, Division of Consumer and Business Education, Federal Trade Commission

Panelists

Amy Wang, Identity Theft Victim

Tamera Fine, Assistant United States Attorney, District of Maryland

Eva Velasquez, CEO, Identity Theft Resource Center

Ellen Abbott, Manager, Consumer Investigations, Identity Theft & Breach Notification, Kroll

Tamera Fine

Assistant United States Attorney, District of Maryland

Dangers to Victims – Financial Fraud

- Dangers flow from the way the identities are being used.
 - Huge variance in how much harm is sustained by financial fraud victims.
 - Generally these variances fall into established patterns, but...

....there are always outliers and we must always remain open to assisting victims who are the unlucky few percent of victims who sustain lasting harm.

Dangers to Victims – Financial Fraud

- Some types of financial fraud, such as account takeovers, auto and home purchases, are generally easily resolved, due to records maintained by the creditor.
- New Accounts require significantly more effort to resolve.
- Utilities and Services are notoriously difficult to convince that you have been a victim, as are rental management companies.
- There are groups, such as the Felony Lane Gang out of Florida, which specifically target bank accounts, which often result in victims losing access not to credit, but to their own funds.

Dangers to Victims – Financial Fraud

- Just as financial fraud targets banks and businesses, benefits fraud targets the deep pockets of Uncle Sam. Benefits fraud includes:
 - Stolen Identity Refund Fraud (SIRF)
 - Unemployment, Social Security Retirement and Disability.
- This fraud diverts funds from the victims to the perpetrator.
- Whether it is a tax refund you are expecting and don't get, or a social security check that gets diverted into another account, these disruptions can cause significant hardship, even if the funds are eventually restored.
- In addition, benefits can be cancelled due to an identity thief earning income using the victim's identity.

Dangers to Victims – Employment

- Anywhere there is a large illegal immigrant population, there is use of other's identities for employment purposes. This use can create big issues for victims:
 - Tax Issues
 - Benefits issues
 - MVA/DMV suspensions and revocations
 - Criminal Warrants

Dangers to Victims – "Collateral" Impacts

- Even financial fraud and use of a stolen identity for employment can have massive collateral consequences for victims:
 - Inability to get a job.
 - Inability to pass a background check.
 - Loss of security clearance.

Dangers to Victims – Medical Identity Theft

- One of the most devastating forms of identity theft is medical identity theft
 - Medical treatment is obtained using stolen health insurance information, or sometimes "on credit."
 - The residual unpaid bills are the least of the problem.
 - The victim's medical record becomes "polluted" with information about the health conditions, medications, and treatments of the identity thief.
 - In emergency situations, this has potential catastrophic consequences.

Dangers to Victims – Medical Identity Theft

- Identity Theft of Medical Credentials
 - We have had examples of people who pose a medical professionals, including treating patients and prescribing medications.
 - Here, again, access to what seems like insignificant personal details can greatly assist in the identity theft: where the victim went to school, what states they are licensed in, where they have practiced in the past.
- In addition to the danger this form of identity theft poses to the reputation and license of the medical professional, think of the potential of harm to the public.

Dangers to Victims – Criminal Activity

- Many career criminals use stolen identities because they have warrants outstanding.
- If caught, they give the fraudulent identification information.
- Stolen identities are often used to commit new crimes, such as check fraud schemes.
- When the scheme unravels, law enforcement comes after the name on the fraudulent account – the victim.

Dangers to Victims – Criminal Activity

- The problem of erroneous arrest of identity theft victims has become so significant that states are taking steps to "authenticate" identity theft victims to law enforcement.
- Use of stolen identities to avoid SORNA reporting requirements is common.
- Identity theft victims have been placed on terrorist watch lists and even forcibly removed from airplanes.

Contact Information

- Contact Information:
 - Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA)
 Tamera Fine
 - 410-209-4806 (work)
 - 410-961-4502 (cell)
 - tamera.fine@usdoj.gov



Eva Velasquez

CEO, Identity Theft Resource Center



888.400.5530 | www.idtheftcenter.org | itrc@idtheftcenter.org

The Aftermath: In their own words

- "One of the worst ways identity theft has affected me is the ongoing feeling of persecution. Not being able to trust ANYONE and being borderline paranoid when anyone asks for ANY personal information for any reason even when it is business related."
- "I am always in fear about what will happen next, and who my information will get sold to."
- "The identity theft was a bewildering, stressful experience. Since I don't know who perpetrated the theft, I worry that he/she could use my information to victimize me again."

Emotional Reactions

Frustration/Annoyance (81%)

Fear for financial security (69%)

Rage or Anger (58%)

Powerlessness/helplessness (54%)

Loss of ability to trust (51%)

Isolation (31%)

Shame or embarrassment (28%)

Suicidal (8%)

Behavioral and Physical Reactions



Lost Opportunity Costs

Spent time away from other life experiences (39.9%)

Took time off work (28.8%)

Spent time away from family (26.3%)

Delayed educational opportunities (16.7%)



From a household to our nation:

The ripple effect that directly impacts you

Borrowed money from family/friends (35%)

Used online accounts less frequently or not at all (33%)

Closed existing online accounts (23%)

Applied for government benefits (17%)



The Aftermath: In their own words

- "The thief was my landlord; hence I had to go to the Sheriff's office to get assistance in gaining access to what was left of my personal property. I spent hundreds of dollars in legal paperwork, a mover, hotel rooms I had to live in until procuring another place to rent."
- "I have been forced to do my income tax separate from my spouse at a higher bracket."
- "Used my name for medical treatment. I was assessed with unpaid taxes, medical bills, and my medical record corrupted. I have yet to be able to get her information off my medical records."

The Victim's Perspective Moderated Discussion

Resources for Recovery

Moderator

Ryan Mehm, Division of Privacy and Identity Protection, Federal Trade Commission

Panelists


Nat Wood, Associate Director, Division of Consumer and Business Education, Federal Trade Commission

Laura Ivkovich, Policy Analyst, Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice


Eugenia Buggs, Vice President, Global Marketing, Identity and Digital Protection Services, Generali Global Assistance

Nat Wood

Associate Director, Division of Consumer and Business Education, Federal Trade Commission




Which statement best describes your situation?



What did the identity thief use your information for?

\checkmark	Credit card accounts
	Telephone, mobile, or utility accounts
	Debit, checking, or savings accounts
	Employment or taxes
	Government benefits or IDs
	Loans or leases
	Other account types (Internet, insurance, securities, medical, etc.)















Report Identity Theft to the FTC

Next, we are going to ask for specific details. We will use the information you provide to create your:









These will help you fix problems caused by identity theft.



How we handle your information

It's up to you to determine how much personal information you want to provide. The FTC enters this information into a secure online database that law enforcement agencies use in their investigations.

Please read our Privacy Policy to learn more about how we safeguard your personal information.

OMB Control Number: 3084-0047



I am the victim of identity theft. This is my offical statement about the crime.

Contact Information

Jane May Smith 100 Main Street Washington, DC 20405 202-876-5309 Jane.smith@email.com

Personal Statement

I received a credit card bill from Chase, even though I've never had a credit card with Chase. I called and the bank said I needed to fill out an identity theft report. Just a few days later, I got a call from Vertzon about buying a new IPhone. I told them I didn't buy an IPhone. Someone else had gone to a store in New Jersey and added two new lines to my account.

Accounts Affected by the Crime

Credit card opened by the thief							
Company or Organization: Chase							
Account Number: 988889888							
Date fraud began		Date that I discovered it	Total fraudulent amount				
1/15/16		3/15/16	\$400				

Mobile phone with fraudulent charges (account takeover)							
Company or Organization: Verizon Wireless							
Account Number: 54-70000089							
Date fraud began		Date that I discovered it	Total fraudulent amount				
1/15/16		3/15/16	\$900				

Your Report is not submitted yet.

Almost Done! We recommend creating a free account so you can:


- Get a personal recovery plan that tracks your progress
- Print prefilled letters & forms
- Return anytime to update and view your affidavit
- Save time if this ever happens again

Yes, submit and create account \Rightarrow

No thanks, submit without an account


I understand that I will NOT be able to make updates.

Instead, I will receive a one-time copy of my affidavit and recovery plan.





Send a follow-up letter to Bank of America.



IdentityTheft.gov

November 19, 2015

Pat Smith 123 Maple Street

Washington, District of Columbia 20001

ABC Lending Corp.

678 Elm Street

Washington, District of Columbia 20001

RE: Disputed Account – Notice to Furnisher 987654321

Dear Sir or Madam:

On November 19, 2015, I notified you that I'm a victim of identity theft and requested that you do the following:

- Close the unauthorized account
- · Remove any charges on the unauthorized account, and
- · Take steps to remove information about this account from my credit files.

I still have not received written confirmation of these actions. As I stated before:

I am a victim of Identity theft, and I am writing to dispute certain information you have reported about me to the credit reporting agencies (CRAs). I recently learned that my personal information was used to open an account at your company. I did not open nor authorize this account, and I request that it be closed immediately. Please send me written confirmation that I am not responsible for charges on this account, and take appropriate steps to remove information about this account from my credit files.

I have enclosed a copy of my FTC Identity Theft Affidavit and my credit report showing the fraudulent account. Because the information you are reporting is inaccurate and the result of identity theft, I request that you stop reporting this information to the CRAs, as directed by section 623(a)(f)(B) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681s-2(a)(f)(B). I ask that you take these steps as soon as possible.

I also have enclosed a copy of the FTC's Notice to Furnishers, which explains your responsibilities when reporting information to CRAs. Please stop reporting this fraudulent information, investigate this matter, and delete any disputed items as soon as possible.

Please send me a letter explaining your findings and actions.

Sincerely,

Pat Smith

Enclosures:

- Identity Theft Affidavit
- Proof of Identity
- . Copy of Credit Report Indicating Information to be corrected
- FTC Notice to Furnishers of Information





Save and Go Back to Your Plan

Correct your Equifax credit report.

Completed?	Tasks
S	Write to Equifax. We've created a letter for you based on the information you've already provided. Review and Print letter
Y	When did you mail the dispute letter? Year
← Save and	Did Equifax correct your credit reports? O Yes No Go Back to Your Plan

January 20, 2016

IdentityTheft.gov

Jane Smith

123 Main Street

Washington, DC, USA 20000

Equifax Consumer Fraud Division

P.O. Box 740256

Atlanta, GA 30374

RE: Request to Block Unauthorized Charges from Credit Report under FCRA 605B

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am a victim of identity theft. The information listed below, which appears on my credit report, is the result of identity theft.

Account Name:	Account Number:	Charge:	Date:
Citibank	12345678	\$607.00	10/2015

I have enclosed my Identity Theft Report, proof of my identity and a copy of my credit report showing the fraudulent items. Please block this information from my credit report, as directed by section 605B of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and notify all furnishers of this information.

I appreciate your prompt attention to this matter, and await your reply.

Sincerely,

Jane Smith

Enclosures:

- FTC Affidavit and police report (Identity Theft Report)
- Proof of identity
- Fair Credit Reporting Act Section 605B

Laura Ivkovich

Policy Analyst, Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Department of Justice

Presentation Overview

- What is OVC?
- How can OVC Help?
- Victims of Crime Act Funding (VOCA)
- Victim Services Available (In person and On line)
- National ID Theft Victim Assistance Network (NITVAN)
- Benefits of Collaboration/Force Multipliers

Office for Victims of Crime (OVC)

- In 1982, President Reagan established the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime,
- Task Force charged with assessing the treatment of crime victims throughout the Nation,
 - "The innocent victims of crime have been overlooked, their pleas for justice have gone unheeded, and their wounds—personal, emotional, and financial—have gone unattended."
- Task Force recommendations resulted in:
 - Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) enacted in 1984
 - VOCA establishes the Crime Victims Fund 1985
 - 1988 amendment to VOCA formally establishes the Office for Victims of Crime

VOCA

- Victims of Crime Act of 1984:
 - VOCA authorizes OVC to use monies from the Crime Victims Fund to support a number of programs that assist crime victims, including:
 - State Victim Assistance programs (formula)
 - State Compensation programs (formula)
 - Discretionary programs

VOCA Authorized Activities

Crime Victim Compensation (formula)

- To states to fund direct payments for crime victims
- Reimbursement for crime-related expenses (e.g., medical, mental health counseling, funeral and burial, lost wages, and loss of support)

Victim Assistance Services (formula)

- To states for community-based victim service programs
- Supports the delivery of direct services (e.g., counseling, legal advocacy, etc.)

Discretionary Activities

- National scope training and technical assistance
- Demonstration programs
- Victims' legal assistance
- Program evaluation
- Fellowships
- Services to victims of federal crimes (e.g. Tribal Victim Assistance)

VOCA Funding Appropriations Cap Raised States See Quadruple Rise in Victim Assistance Grant Funding

VOCA Cap:

- FY 14 cap was \$745 Million
- FY 15 cap went up to \$2.361 Billion
- FY 16 cap went up to \$3.042 Billion *

OVC Awarded:

- FY 14 \$456 million in state victim assistance grants
- FY 15 \$1.9 billion in state victim assistance grants
- FY 16 \$2.2 billion in state victim assistance grants
- * VOCA statute expand s use of federal funds to include "victim services," in addition to the current authority for demonstration projects, program evaluation, compliance efforts, and training and technical assistance services.

OVC Online Directory of Victim Services





National ID Theft Victim Assistance Network (NITVAN)

- State Victim Resources (numbers, links)
- Laws including Civil Suits, Access Devices, Cyber Crimes, Security Breaches
- Security Freeze Law & State-Specific 'How To's'
- ID Theft Passport Law
- Inclusion in state's restitution definitions
 - ovcttac.gov/identitytheftnetwork
 - Twitter.com/IDTheftNetwork
 - Facebook.com/IdentityTheftNetwork



NITVAN Resources You Can Use Now

- Printable Outreach Material
 - Brochures
 - Website Material
 - PSA Scripts & Audio & Visual Samples
- Quick Tip Sheets
- Ready-To-Use Forms
- Sample MOU's
- Training Slides, Instructor Manuals, Worksheets



NITVAN II – New OVC Funding…

- Adding 20 additional coalitions to the network (3-yr project) competitive \$50,000 sub-awards
- Training and TA as well as policy assistance
- Guidance to the new and existing programs and coalitions... with an emphasis on cybercrime identity theft victims
- Force multiplier help expand the outreach and capacity of victim service programs to better address the rights and needs of victims of identity theft through the establishment of collaborative regional, statewide, or communitybased coalitions dedicated to improving the response to victims of id theft

OVC - Online Interactive Training for Advocates

www.ovcttac.gov/IdentityTheft



ID Theft Help Mobile App

Features:

- Identity Theft Q&A Solution Tree
- LiveChat
- Direct Dialing
- Educational Information
- Resources



The ITRC ID Theft Help Mobile App is available on both the Apple and Android Platforms and is completely free of charge.

www.itrc.org

Eugenia Buggs

Vice President, Global Marketing, Identity and Digital Protection Services, Generali Global Assistance

Risk is a Reality

 No company or service can guarantee that your identity will never be stolen,









Risk is a Reality

 No company or service can guarantee that your identity will never be stolen,

BUT...



Denial of Inaccurate Loss of Trust Medical **Employment** Having to forego Loss of Treatment or delay payment Federal or of other things State Benefits Damaged Reputation There Is Damaged Anxiety personal relationships A Lot At Stake Hassel of having to change banking/credit Legal Issues accounts **Financial Loss Emotional** Sense of **Distress** Frustration Loss of Peace of Mind Reduced Time off or Inability to make

major purchases

Invasion of

Privacy

Credit Score

away from

work

Identity Protection Services Typically Include:

- Prevention/Education
- Monitoring & Alerts
 - Credit
 - Identity
- Resolution
- Insurance

What Should Consumers Research?

- Prevention/Education
 - Trends
 - Tips

ALL SERVICES ARE NOT CREATED EQUAL

- 24// Availability
- Insurance
 - Is it Insurance
 - What's Covered

Where Should Consumers Start?



Resources for Recovery Moderated Discussion

Closing Remarks

Thomas B. Pahl

Acting Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission



Identity Theft

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

MAY 24, 2017