

# When Saving is Gambling

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FTC Microeconomics Presentation

# Gambling and Financial Decisions

... “the difference between having fun and being smart”

- Some investors seek lottery-style stocks (Kumar 2009).
  - Highly skewed, high variance, **lower return**.
  - Problematic if... “**financial gambling**” crowds out **textbook investing**.
  - But, what if ... “**financial gambling**” crowds out **gambling**?

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  - But, what if ... **“financial gambling”** crowds out **gambling**?

# This Paper

## How do lottery-like financial products affect gambling?

- **Two Challenges:**

- ① Good data on gambling are hard to find.
- ② Lottery-style financial products do not usually happen randomly.

- **This Paper:**

- New data on casino gambling.
- Quasi-random assignment of lottery-like savings accounts.
  - Distinct from using lotteries as a source of randomness.

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  - Distinct from using lotteries as a source of randomness.

# Empirical Setting

Save to Win was introduced to Nebraska in 2012.

- Lottery instead of fixed rate of interest.
  - Monthly raffles: An entry per \$25 deposit in one-year CD.




VS



# Empirical Setting

Save to Win was introduced to Nebraska in 2012.

- Only available at participating credit unions.
  - Targeted: 10/93 Nebraska counties and 9/68 credit unions.
  - Control regions just across the border.





# Casino Cash Access Data

Proprietary Transaction-Level Data Set.

- Cash withdrawals at U.S. casinos (May 2010 – June 2012).
  - US: 12 million transactions across 2 million patrons.
  - Greater Nebraska: 54,000 transactions across 12,000 patrons.
- Detailed data on cash withdrawals
  - Transactions: Timestamp, amount withdrawn, failed transactions, and method of withdrawal (credit, debit, etc.).
  - Patrons: Home ZIP code, gender and age.
  - Casinos: Location, amenities, and size.

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# Preview of Findings

- ① Savings lotteries substitute for casino gambling.
  - Magnitude: 1/2 of cash withdrawals, 1/9 of reported saving in STW accounts.
  - Extensive Margin: affected patrons are 15.4 pp more likely to not visit a casino at all in the post period.
- ② Larger effects when savings lotteries are more like gambling.
  - Stronger effects for local gambling, dates when raffle is near, and low amenity casinos.
- ③ Effect is concentrated among the financially aware:
  - Stronger effects for patrons with lower “not sufficient funds” rates, and patrons who tend to pay low fees.

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# Why substitution?

- 1 Similar attributes / categories of consumption.
  - Attribute-based substitution?
  - Mental accounting?
- 2 Complementarity among gambles.
  - Yes, but in this context, not as likely as other contexts (dopamine responses are not as likely to create a feedback).
- 3 Behaviorally – why should lotteries substitute for gambling?
  - Barberis (2012): prospect theory, sequence of gambles looks like a lottery payoff.

Why? (1) Similar attributes, complementarities substitute more strongly

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- ③ Behaviorally – why should lotteries substitute for gambling?
  - Barberis (2012): prospect theory, sequence of gambles looks like a lottery payoff.
    - Strong prediction: sophisticates substitute more strongly.



# Sample Coverage Statistics

Table: Characteristics of Sample and Region

	Nebraska	Adjacent to Nebraska
# of Transactions	26,312	28,053
# of Casino Patrons	5722	6033
2010 Population (1000s)	1484.38	833.42
Average Per Capita Income (\$1000s)	37.61	37.19

# Empirical Strategy: Treatment and Control

- Use cash access data to measure casino demand by county and month.
- Observe the effect of being treated by availability of savings lotteries: difference-in-difference estimate.

	<u>Treated</u>	<u>Not Treated</u>
# of Counties	10	44
# of Months	26	26
# of Observations	207	1183
... Before	159	907
... After	48	276

# Balance of Attributes

	<u>Treated</u>	<u>Not Treated</u>
Mean Transaction Amount (\$)	537.40	453.97
Mean # of Transactions	63.85	25.27
% Male	58.44	55.10
% Not Sufficient Funds	14.45	11.53
<b>% Use Credit Card for Cash</b>	<b>54.96</b>	<b>40.18</b>
% Daytime Transactions	34.22	35.91
% Weekend Transactions	46.41	48.54
Per Capita Personal Income (\$1000s)	41.54	39.91
<b>Population (1000s)</b>	<b>122.25</b>	<b>25.47</b>
<b>% with Population &gt; 100,000</b>	<b>30.15</b>	<b>4.61</b>


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  - Condition on population and income in empirical tests.
  - Placebo: do credit unions affect credit card usage?

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# No Significant Pre-Trends



- Robustness also allows for different pre-trends by large population and low unemployment regions.

# Main Specification

County-month panel.

Table: Dependent Variable: logged cash withdrawals

	(1)	(2)
post × # of participating CUs	-0.188*** (0.047)	-0.197*** (0.049)
# of participating CUs	-0.132 (0.097)	
Population and Income Controls	x	x
Month-Year FE	x	x
County FE		x
$R^2$	0.488	0.675
$N$	1390	1390

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# Robustness Checks

Estimated effect size ranges from 10.4 pp to 20.4 pp.

Table: Dependent Variable: logged cash withdrawals

Robustness Test	Estimated Effect
Within Nebraska Controls Only	-0.135** (0.062)
Adjacent to Nebraska Controls Only	-0.185*** (0.055)
Only January through June Observations (seasonality)	-0.137*** (0.049)
Difference Relative to 2011 Trend	-0.104** (0.049)
Differential Trend by > 50,000 residents	-0.133** (0.058)
Differential Trend by > 100,000 residents	-0.164** (0.064)
Differential Trend by > median unemployment	-0.195** (0.058)
Differential Trend by > 90th percentile unemployment	-0.176** (0.050)
Controlling for Jackpot Lottery Sales	-0.204** (0.048)

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# On the Magnitude of the Effect

A back-of-the envelope calculation.

- The effect is 24.98 percent ( $2.402 \times 0.104$ ) of cash withdrawals using the smallest estimate.
- Relative to total gambling cash:
  - Effect is **-8.3 percent** if one dollar is brought per dollar accessed at the casino.
  - Call report data: **+5.7 percent** (\$2.3 million) in deposits at STW credit unions versus not.
- Dollar for dollar substitution is approximately **\$100** for the median patron.
  - STW White Paper: \$857 in PLS deposits by July.



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# Substitution with Other Lotteries

Not just a change in withdrawals. Lottery substitution is stronger on dollar-for-dollar basis.

Table: Dependent Variable: logged expenditure on scratch tickets

	(1)	(2)
post × # of participating CUs	-0.025*** (0.009)	-0.018*** (0.006)
Game × Month-Year FE	x	x
County FE	x	
ZIP Code FE		x
$R^2$	0.556	0.714
# of Counties	35	35
# of Months	24	24
# of Games	13	13
$N$	2006	2006

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# Heterogeneity Resembles Substitution

Stronger substitution when savings lotteries and casino gambling are similar.

Table: Dependent Variable: logged cash withdrawals

Sample Split	Estimated Effect
<u>Similar</u>	
Close Transactions (within 120 miles)	-0.222** (0.101)
Short Time Until Lottery (week 4 transactions)	-0.239*** (0.083)
Casinos without Nightlife	-0.218*** (0.055)
<u>Differentiated</u>	
Far Transactions (outside of 120 miles)	-0.063 (0.086)
Long Time Until Lottery (week 1 transactions)	-0.157 (0.113)
Casinos with Nightlife	0.053** (0.024)

# Stronger Substitution among Sophisticates

More sophisticated are more prone to substituting.

Table: Dependent Variable: logged cash withdrawals

Sample Split	Estimated Effect
<u>Sophisticated</u>	
Infrequent Use of Credit Card for Cash	-0.329** (0.076)
Never Use a Credit Card for Cash	-0.247*** (0.092)
Infrequently Requesting Unavailable Funds	-0.353*** (0.066)
<u>Not Sophisticated</u>	
Frequent Use of Credit Card for Cash	-0.017 (0.076)
Use a Credit Card for Cash	-0.039 (0.092)
Frequently Requesting Unavailable Funds	-0.039 (0.066)

Estimates are computed from one standard deviation above/below the mean in a regression that interacts the effect with measures of sophistication.

# Substitution at the Patron Level

Visitation, Moderation, and/or Sophistication.

	Log(Cash Withdrawn)		No Withdrawals Dummy		Log(Fees)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
post × # of participating CUs	-0.156*** (0.055)		0.036*** (0.007)		0.007 (0.016)	
post × STW Accounts Available		-0.674*** (0.223)		0.154*** (0.026)		0.004 (0.074)
ZIP Code FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
$R^2$	0.149	0.150	0.479	0.479	0.404	0.404
# of ZIP Codes	482	482	654	654	482	482
$N$	7262	7262	18730	18730	7262	7262

ZIP code clustered standard errors in parentheses. \* \* \*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# Robustness and Placebos

The effect...

- ① is unrelated to daytime or weekend gambling. [Table](#)
- ② does not change credit card usage or the frequency of not sufficient funds. [Table](#)
- ③ is robust to using distance to credit union rather than treatment/control. [Table](#)
- ④ is greater for patrons who gamble more (quantile regressions).



# Discussion

## Two main takeaways

- In this context, “financial gambling” and gambling are substitutes.
  - Maybe utilizing gambling motives to increase saving is welfare enhancing.
- Innovative financial products do not (completely) substitute for financial education.
  - Greater awareness enhances the effectiveness of innovative financial products when take-up matters.

# Thank you

Thank you!

# Sample Composition: Characteristics

[Back](#)

	% Daytime	% Weekend	% Male
post × # of participating CUs	0.000 (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	0.038* (0.023)
Month-Year FE	x	x	x
County FE	x	x	x
$R^2$	0.088	0.112	0.339
# of Counties	54	54	54
# of Months	26	26	26
$N$	1390	1390	1091

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# Sample Composition: Behavior

[Back](#)

	% NSF	% Credit Card
post $\times$ # of participating CUs	0.004 (0.006)	0.011 (0.010)
Month-Year FE	x	x
County FE	x	x
$R^2$	0.193	0.447
# of Counties	54	54
# of Months	26	26
$N$	1390	1390

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

## Controlling for Differential Pre-Trends by Urban/Rural

Back

	Pre-Trends by 50,000 residents			Pre-Trends by 100,000 residents		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
post × # of participating CUs	-0.120** (0.054)	-0.120** (0.055)	-0.133** (0.058)	-0.154** (0.060)	-0.153** (0.061)	-0.164** (0.064)
Month-Year FE		x	x		x	x
County FE			x			x
$R^2$	0.472	0.500	0.678	0.491	0.519	0.676
# of Counties	54	54	54	54	54	54
# of Months	26	26	26	26	26	26
$N$	1390	1390	1390	1390	1390	1390

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

## Controlling for Jackpot Lottery Sales

Back

	Full Sample		Within-Nebraska Sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
post × # of participating CUs	-0.197*** (0.049)	-0.204*** (0.048)	-0.129* (0.067)	-0.137* (0.074)
<i>log(jackpot_sales)</i>		-0.373 (0.312)		-1.041 (1.554)
Month-Year FE	x	x	x	x
County FE	x	x	x	x
Dummy for Missing		x		
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.675	0.676	0.662	0.663
# of Counties	54	54	26	26
# of Months	26	26	26	26
<i>N</i>	1390	1390	629	629

County clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.

# Distance to Credit Union

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	Logged Withdrawal Amount			Indicator for No Withdrawals		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
post $\times$ log(distance)	0.148**			-0.036***		
...nearest branch	(0.051)			(0.006)		
post $\times$ log(distance)		0.141*			-0.043***	
...nearest five branches		(0.071)			(0.008)	
post $\times$ log(distance)			0.149*			-0.040***
...nearest headquarters			(0.063)			(0.009)
ZIP Code FE	x	x	x	x	x	x
$R^2$	0.149	0.147	0.148	0.480	0.480	0.480
# of ZIP Codes	482	482	482	653	653	653
$N$	7262	7262	7262	18728	18728	18728

ZIP clustered standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate statistical significance at the one, five, and ten percent level.