The Accuracy of Hospital Merger Screening Methods

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*The views expressed in this presentation are mine and not necessarily those of the FTC or any individual Commissioner.

Outline

Objective:

 To test the pre-merger predictions of various hospital merger screening tools against the post-merger price changes for a relatively large sample of consummated hospital mergers

Outline

- Literature/Case Review:
 - History of hospital antitrust enforcement
 - Hospital competition literature
- Hospital merger screening tools
- Mergers and price change measurement
- Comparison of pre-merger predictions and post-merger price changes

Hospital Merger History

- 1981-1992: 397 hospital mergers
 - FTC/DOJ challenged 15
 - 14 preliminary injunctions granted
- 1993-2000: 1,042 hospital mergers
 - FTC/DOJ/CAAG challenged 8
 - 0 preliminary injunctions granted
- Why the change?
 - For-Profit vs. Non-Profit
 - Increasing reliance on Elzinga/Hogarty test and Critical Loss Analysis for geographic market definition
 - Judicial contempt for and general backlash against HMOs
 - State action immunity

Hospital Competition Research

- Extensive literature on price and quality effects of hospital competition and mergers
- New economic models and tools developed for hospital competition analysis:
 - Town and Vistnes (2001)
 - Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003)
 - Willingness-to-Pay (WTP)
 - Gaynor and Vogt (2003)
 - Antwi, Gaynor, and Vogt (2013)
 - Logit Competition Index (LOCI)
 - WTP and LOCI merger price effects driven largely by diversion
 - Analogous to Upward Pricing Pressure Index (UPPI)

FTC Activities

- Hospital Merger Retrospectives Project
 - Detailed study of four consummated hospital mergers
- Merger Litigation Task Force
- Evanston Northwestern Healthcare/Highland Park Hospital
 - FTC challenged consummated merger using administrative litigation

Recent Merger Challenges

- Inova/Prince William Hospital (2008)
- Promedica/St. Luke's (2011)
- OSF/Rockford (2011)
- Phoebe Putney/Palmyra (2011)
- Reading Health/SIR (2012)
- Capella/Mercy Hot Springs (2013)*
- St. Luke's/Saltzer Medical Group (2013)

* No complaint was issued in this case, but the FTC's Bureau of Competition stated that it recommended a challenge before the merger was abandoned. See <u>http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/06/statement-ftc-competition-director-richard-feinstein-todays</u>

Use of New Screening Tools

- ProMedica/St. Luke's
 - Diversion ratios, WTP, and merger simulation
- OSF/Rockford
 - Diversion ratios and WTP
- UKCC Private Health Care Market Investigation
 - LOCI
- Research on the accuracy of the new tools:
 - Fournier and Gai (2007): Compares WTP-based merger simulation to the price change for one merger
 - May (2013): Compares WTP changes to price changes for two mergers
 - Brand and Balan (2013): Compares diversion ratios, WTP changes, and merger simulations to post-merger price changes in data produced by a virtual market/bargaining model

Overview

- Comparison of screens to price changes for 23 consummated mergers
- Multiple screens evaluated, including traditional market shares/concentration measures
 - All screens constructed with data usually available in initial investigation
- Selection bias due to active antitrust enforcement (Carlton (2009))
 - Sample includes 10 mergers from North Carolina 1997-2001


The Contenders

- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
 - Hospital-location-based bed shares in the Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
 - Approximates EH/CLA markets
 - Patient-location-based discharge shares in the acquired hospital's Hospital Service Area (HSA)
 - Patient-location-based discharge shares in the combined hospitals' weighted service area
- Diversion Ratios
- WTP change
- LOCI price change estimate
- WTP-based merger simulation


The Mergers

- 23 mergers of competing general acute care (GAC) hospitals across 7 states
- Post-merger case-mix-adjusted commercial price change relative to controls
 - Price measured using method of Dafny (2009)
 - In most cases, control group is the set of all non-merging, urban GAC hospitals with >100 beds in the state (but outside of the merging hospitals' MSA)
- All measures are based on GAC services performed at non-federal short-term GAC hospitals


The Results: WTP




The Results: WTP



The Results: HHI



The Results: HHI



Conclusions

- Diversion ratios, WTP, and LOCI provide information not captured with traditional measures
- Merger simulation performs poorly, but this is likely due to the limitations of the data
- All of the HHIs perform poorly
- Going forward, we need:
 - Better data to calibrate models and measure merger effects
 - All-payer claims data
 - Better models of hospital competition