

Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: The United States Beer Industry

Nathan H. Miller and Gloria Sheu and Matthew C. Weinberg

Discussed by Gaurab Aryal (UVA)

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Short Summary: 1

- ▶ Authors consider infinitely-repeated price setting game.
- ▶ One firm (oligopolistic leader) moves first and chooses a price:

$$\text{Price} = \text{Bertrand-Price} + \text{Something.}$$

- ▶ “Member firms” are enticed to follow the leader and choose the Price, if
 - ▶ they value the future enough.
 - ▶ the Price satisfies incentive compatibility constraints.
 - ▶ (implicitly) there is “good-enough” monitoring so punishment is credible.
- ▶ There exists a SPNE in oligopoly price leadership.

Short Summary: 2

- ▶ Industry: US beer.
- ▶ Context: post 2008 Miller/Coors merger, where ABI acts as a price leader.
- ▶ Estimate super-markup (i.e., **Something**) $\approx 6\%$ of Price.
- ▶ Price leadership $\Rightarrow \uparrow$ profit by 8.9% and \downarrow consumer surplus by $4 \times \Delta\text{Profit}$.
- ▶ Looking ahead what can we expect from future (ABI/Modelo) mergers?
 - ▶ Incentive compatibility constraints are relaxed: one less non-cartel firm.
 - ▶ Equilibrium super-markup increases.
 - ▶ Amplify coordinated effects.

Empirical challenges

- ▶ A tractable structural model of repeated games with price leadership.
- ▶ PLE need not be Pareto optimal because the leader can be selfish, and no side-payments.
- ▶ Identification of the **Something=supermarkup**:
 - ▶ One (pricing) first-order condition (FOC) but two unknowns: marginal cost and *supermarkup*.
 - ▶ Assumption: before 2008, *supermarkup* equals zero.
 - ▶ (1) from the FOC applied to pre-2008 data identifies marginal cost.
 - ▶ (2) take that marginal cost and determine *supermarkup* from post-2008 FOC.
- ▶ Costs are “same” before and after 2008.

Empirical Challenges cntd.

▶ Example 1:

- ▶ Alex Gross (2019, UVA JMP): considers bargaining over wholesale price and retail price.
- ▶ Only observes retail price, but want to identify bargaining power and marginal cost.
- ▶ He considers wine industry and uses alcohol control states to estimate marginal costs.
- ▶ Uses that cost estimate to identify bargaining powers.

▶ Example 2:

- ▶ Grennan (2013, AER): considers hospitals and medical devices manufacturers bargaining.
- ▶ Crucially, he observes payment from hospitals to the manufacturers.
- ▶ And exploits the fact that when contracts are long-term but demand changes, prices are out of equilibrium, and future negotiations will be along the demand curve, thereby “tracing” it.

Antitrust Risk-1


- ▶ Often, antitrust risks are mostly ignored.
- ▶ Here, it is incorporated in the payoff function: $R(\text{supermarkup})$.
- ▶ It is the primary policy response from the regulators.
- ▶ In my UG class on auction: for collusion, because of $R(\cdot)$, we focus on larger projects.
- ▶ But we know very little about firms' expectation about the risk.

Antitrust Risk-2

- ▶ How can we identify $R(\cdot)$?
- ▶ Ideal (naïve?) exercise:
 - ▶ Fix the “pie” from PLE fixed, and vary the antitrust regime (politics?)
 - ▶ The change in *supermarkup* (if it can be identified) should inform about $R(\cdot)$.
- ▶ Here parametrize $R(\text{supermarkup}; \phi) = \phi \times \text{supermarkup}$.
- ▶ But in PLE the incentive compatibility constraint for ABI or MillerCoors should bind.
- ▶ Besides the estimated parameters, the constraint depends on (ϕ, δ) .
- ▶ Identifying δ is a nightmare; e.g., Abbring and Daljord (2019, WP).

Antitrust Risk-3

MillerCoors IC constraint



- ▶ Can we use the additional profit under PLE to bound (ϕ, δ) ?
- ▶ We observe PLE so that suggests an upper bound on ϕ ?
- ▶ Perrigne and Vuong (2011, ECMA) consider optimal regulation contract

$$\max_{\text{contracts}} \text{Social Welfare} = \mathbb{E} \left\{ CS(\text{contracts}) + \lambda \times PS(\text{contracts}) \right\}$$

and study the identification of λ , which plays similar role as $R(\cdot)$ here.

- ▶ They show that λ can be identified if
 - ▶ observed payment is not always optimal; and
 - ▶ the error is independent of the observed cost of production.
- ▶ Encourage authors to write another paper that goes into this problem.

Thank You!