# Panoptispy: Characterizing Audio and Video Exfiltration from Android Applications

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# Motivation





© SilverPush ultrasonic beacons for cross-device linking



patents for recognizing user emotion



listening for unlicensed broadcasting



photos taken surreptitiously by shrinking preview to 1x1 pixel



## Goals

- Identify & measure media (audio, images, video) exfiltration at scale
  - Large number of apps & broad coverage of app stores
- Focus on exfiltration over network
- Is the exfiltration a leak (undisclosed/unexpected)?
- How do apps use sensors?
  - Permissions requested
  - APIs called
  - First or third-parties







## **Definition of media leak**


### Suspicious or unexpected



- Does it further the primary purpose of the app?
- 2. Is it disclosed to the user?
  - Privacy policies
- 3. Is it employed by similar apps?
- 4. Is it encrypted over the internet?

No? It's a **leak** 






## **App Selection**

 Apps from Google Play + 3 third-party app stores that requested camera and/or record audio permissions = 17,260 apps

## **Static Analysis**

- Permission analysis (camera, record audio)
- Media API references (camera, record audio, video, screen capturing)
  - References found in third-party libraries





#### **Dynamic Analysis**

- Android phones w/ automated, random interaction
- Recorded network traffic
- Extracted media using file magic numbers
  - E.g. JPEG files: FF D8 FF ...
- Validation: test app, known apps, verified detected media



## Results



- 21 cases of detected media 12 considered leaks
  - Unexpected or unencrypted
- 9 shared with third parties



# Case Study: Photography Apps













- Server-side photo editing
  - Photos are sent to servers
  - Users not notified
- App has no other functionality requiring internet connection
- Privacy policy vaguely disclosed (5 apps) or didn't mention (1 app)



# Case Study: Screen Recording

## goPuff

- Screen recording of user interaction, where PII was exposed
  - Leaked to an Appsee domain

## **⊡**appsee

- Screen recording as a feature
- Developers are responsible for hiding sensitive screens
- Few apps use the API method to do so 5/33 apps
  - Server-side way exists, unknown how many apps use it



# Responsible Disclosure



- Pulled Appsee from Android & iOS buildsUpdated privacy policy



- Reviewed GoPuff & Appsee
  - "Google constantly monitors apps and analytics providers to ensure they are policy-compliant. When notified of our findings, they reviewed GoPuff and Appsee and took the appropriate actions."
- Removed additional apps beyond our findings



#### These Academics Spent the Last Year Testing Whether Your Phone Is Secretly Listening to You





**Uh-oh. Boffins say most Android apps** can slurp your screen - and you wouldn't even know it

Your phone isn't listening to you, researchers say, but it may be watching e

There's a new conspiracy theory in town

No, your smartphone is not list

By Makena Kelly | Jul 3, 2018, 3:36pm EDT



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By Andy Meek, BGR

Your phone is probably spying on

July 5, 2018 | 10:25am | Updated

al aire Friday at may be spying on you pect

But it may be watching you

By Cal Jeffrey on July 3, 2018, 7:17 PM 25 comments

### Smartphone apps don't listen to your conversations, but they do something equally creepy

The researchers found that while smartphone applications did not send audio clippings to third-party domains, they did send screenshots or screen recordings to them.

BusinessToday.In New Delhi Last Updated: July 4, 2018 | 22:14 IST

## Yes, your phone is spying on you...but not how you think it is

Yahoo Finance Video • July 5, 2018



20/20

Eancy that

'ScreenTime: Diane Sawyer Reporting' - Watch Friday at 8 7c on ABC

# Recommendations

- Access to the screen should be protected by OS
  - Or, users should at least be notified & able to opt out
- Main app & third-party permissions should be separated
- Need for independent, automated testing to audit apps



# Conclusion

- 12 cases of unexpected or unencrypted media
  - 9 cases of third party sharing
- Screen recording video sent to a third party library
  - Sensitive input fields
  - No permissions or notification to the user
  - Could leak credit card numbers, passwords, unsent messages...
- More work needs to be done on iOS screen recording behavior also found in major iOS apps

https://recon.meddle.mobi/panoptispy/