The Digital Privacy Paradox: Small Money, Small Costs, Small Talk

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Why Do People Say They Care About Privacy and Government Surveillance...







But Then Share Personal Data with Firms...





...and Knowingly Use Technologies That Do Not Safeguard their Privacy







Unpacking The Privacy Paradox

- What can we learn from the MIT Digital Currency Experiment about these apparent privacy paradoxes?
- This is not a paper about digital currency per se... although a key promise of blockchain and cryptocurrencies is improved digital privacy!
- Surprisingly little economics work on the malleability of privacy preferences (Acquisti is the exception)
- Background policy question:
 - What are we trying to regulate?
 - What are we trying to protect consumers from?



The MIT Digital Currency Experiment



PRIVACYCON

- ~5,000 students eligible. Survey on privacy preferences, digital payments etc
- 3 randomizations and related privacy choices and outcomes. Students had to select/generate a digital wallet, learn about encryption

Key Findings: small incentives, small costs and small talk lead participants to ignore their privacy preferences (both stated, and past revealed)

1. Small Money

Whereas people say they care about privacy, they are willing to relinquish private data quite easily...



We asked for the emails of the students' closest friends. However, it turns out that this is some of the personal data that is considered most private...



At Least in Surveys...

		= All	Mos	t Some	times	Never
Your Social Security number	%	26%			68%	
Your list of contacts	55 10	%	27%		60%	
The content of your emails	5% 1	0%	33%		52%	6
The names of your children	3% 11	%	40%		4	7%
Your current location when online or using a mobile device	4%	15%		44%		38%
Your credit card information	%7%		54%	6		37%
Your photos/videos	4%	15%		48%		32%
The websites you go to, what you look at, and what you	5%	21%		46%		29%
Your location	5%	16%		53%		26%
The history of what you've purchased	6%	16%		53%		25%
Your phone number	5%	17%		62%		15%
Your home address	7%	18%	<u> </u>	60%		14%
Your household income	6%	23%		57%	a de la companya de la	14%
Your full name	9%	26	%	5	3%	12%
Your age or date of birth	13%	6	28%		50%	9%
Your email address	10%		37%		47%	5%
Your gender		25%		36%		36% 3%

Source: National Cyber Security Alliance (2014), N=493



... in Print and Lawsuits



Apps path

The Wrong Way: Path Uploads iOS Users' Address Books Without Permission

Posted Feb 7, 2012 by Chris Velazco (@chrisvelazco)

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What started as a bit of aimless tinkering for developer Arun Thampi ultimately unearthed something very surprising about personal lifesharing service Path. As a fan of the app, Thampi took it upon himself to look at the API calls that the app made to Path's service and found that his "entire address book (including full names, emails and phone numbers) was being sent as a plist to Path."

LinkedIn will pay \$13M for sending those awful emails

by Jeff John Roberts @jeffjohnroberts

OCTOBER 5, 2015, 8:23 AM EDT









Random 50% of the Sample: Pizza In Exchange For Their Closest Friends' Emails







Do You Protect the Privacy of Your Friends?





54% decrease

VARIABLES	(1) All Invalid	(2) All Invalid	(3) All Invalid	(4) All Invalid	(5) All Invalid	(6) All Invalid	(7) All Invalid
Ask + Incentive (AI)	-0.0285*** (0.0059)	-0.0268*** (0.0066)	-0.0224*** (0.0076)	-0.0249*** (0.0068)	-0.0245*** (0.0074)	-0.0327*** (0.0060)	-0.0332*** (0.0066)
AI × Above Median Privacy Public		-0.0045 (0.0079)					
$AI \times Above Median$ Privacy Intermediary			-0.0110 (0.0081)				
$AI \times Above Median$ Privacy Government				-0.0085 (0.0078)			
$AI \times Above Median$ Trust Government					-0.0080 (0.0079)		
$AI \times Above Median$ Trust Startup						0.0153 (0.0100)	
$AI \times Above Median$ Trust Retailer							$\begin{array}{c} 0.0105 \\ (0.0081) \end{array}$
Constant	0.0531*** (0.0057)	0.0531*** (0.0057)	0.0531^{***} (0.0057)	0.0531^{***} (0.0057)	0.0531^{***} (0.0057)	0.0531^{***} (0.0057)	0.0531^{***} (0.0057)
Observations R-squared	3,086 0.005	3,086 0.006	3,086 0.006	3,086 0.006	3,086 0.006	3,086 0.006	3,086 0.006



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Heterogeneous Effects? None!

- Gender
- Race
- Citizenship Status
- Year of Study
- Coding Ability
- Digital Wallet Preference
- Will the Bitcoin price go down?
- Are you a Mac or a PC?
- Privacy Sensitive



2. Small Costs

Small frictions in the process of selecting a new technology, have large effects on privacy choices.



Inspired by the Microsoft Windows "Browser Ballot" Screen







us.

- Wallets differ in terms of how much they expose a user's transactions to an intermediary, the government and the public
- Random Order

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 Increased Transparency: 50% randomly exposed to additional information on key trade-offs

	How is my privacy protected?	How secure is my data?	How can I lose my bitcoin?	How can I access US dollars?	Can a government agency or the IRS seiz my transaction data?
coinbase	+ It is hard for external parties to identify you when you send out money - Has access to all your transactions	+ The company heavily invests in the security of their accounts - Your data is secure as long as any of the company security infrastructure is not breached, including through personal identity theft	+ If you are locked out of your wallet, you may be able to unlock it by proving your identity to the company - The company could freeze your account or go out of business	+ Easy conversion to and from US dollars (e.g., from bank account, credit card, debit card)	– Yes
Electrum	+ Only you have access to all your transactions - External parties could identify you when you send out money	+ Your data is secure as long as your passwords are secure	Nobody can freeze your account – If you are locked out of your wallet or lese access to your computer without a proper backup, it will be impossible for you to regain access	 Only through a third-party service or individual 	+ No
Biockchain	 Has access to all your transactions External parties could identify you when you send out money 	+ Your data is secure as long as your passwords are secure - Hackers could compromise your account through browser vulnerabilities	+ As long as you remember your password, you might be able to access a backup of your wallet - If you are locked out of your wallet, it may be impossible for you to regain access	- Only through a third-party service or individual	– Maybe
Circle	+ It is hard for external parties to identify you when you send out money - Has access to all your transactions	+ The company heavily invests in the security of their accounts - Your data is secure as long as any of the company security infrastructure is not breached, including through personal identity theit	+ If you are locked out of your wallet, you may be able to unlock it by proving your identify to the company + if the bitcoin is lost because of a breach at Click, their deposit insurance may cover your loss - The company could freeze your account or go out of business	+ Easy conversion to and from US dollars (e.g., from bank account, credit card, debit card)	- Yes
Other wallets					

To receive your bitcoin, you will need to have a Bitcoin wallet set up and share the public address with

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized
	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy
	from the	from the	from the	from the	from the	from the
VARIABLES	Public	Public	Intermediary	Intermediary	Government	Government
Best Wallet Not 1st	-0.1301***	-0.1761^{***}	-0.1320***	-0.1839^{***}	-0.0379***	-0.0164
	(0.0161)	(0.0240)	(0.0147)	(0.0225)	(0.0130)	(0.0165)
Increased Transparency	-17%	0.0902^{***}	-46%	-0.1845^{***}	-32%	0.0644^{***}
		(0.0210)		(0.0225)		(0.0231)
Best Not 1st \times Increased		0.0966^{***}		0.1082^{***}		-0.0391
Transparency		(0.0318)		(0.0290)		(0.0257)
Constant	0.7777***	0.7313***	0.2867***	0.3779***	0.1199***	0.0859***
	(0.0105)	(0.0161)	(0.0115)	(0.0174)	(0.0117)	(0.0148)
Observations	3,108	3,108	3,108	3,108	3,108	$3,\!108$
R-squared	0.021	0.047	0.025	0.054	0.003	0.008





	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized	Maximized
	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy	Privacy
	from the	from the	from the	from the	from the	from the
VARIABLES	Public	Public	Intermediary	Intermediary	Government	Governmen
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	(0.0161)	(0.0240)	(0.0147)	(0.0225)	(0.0130)	(0.0165)
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3. Small Talk

Can easily distract people from escaping surveillance with orthogonal talk...





Encryption Randomization

"PGP is a program that gives your electronic mail something that it otherwise doesn't have: Privacy. It does this by encrypting your mail so that nobody but the intended person can read it. When encrypted, the message looks like a meaningless jumble of random characters. PGP has proven itself quite capable of resisting even the most sophisticated forms of analysis aimed at reading the encrypted text.

PGP can also be used to apply a digital signature to a message without encrypting it. This is normally used in public postings where you don't want to hide what you are saying, but rather want to allow others to confirm that the message actually came from you. Once a digital signature is created, it is impossible for anyone to modify either the message or the signature without the modification being detected by PGP."

PGP makes sure that any communication between you and someone else can only be read by the sender and the receiver.

"End-to-end encryption creates a sort of digital tunnel between the senders and receivers of e-mails -- helping to keep the prying eyes of everyone from governments to Internet service providers and mail providers themselves from seeing the content of messages" (source:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/08/07/yahoo-to-role-out-end-to-end-encryption-option-for-all-yahoo-mail-users-in-2015/)

Although the technology has been available for a while, it is catching traction among those concerned about privacy and security. Both Yahoo! and Google have recently announced plans to integrate PGP into their email services. (For more information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy)



Effect of Small Talk on Privacy

- A Sealer

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Escaping	Escaping	Escaping
	Surveillance	Surveillance	Surveillance
	from the	from the	from the
VARIABLES	Public	Intermediary	Government
Encryption	-0.0105*	-0.0361	-0.0331*
Randomization	(0.0061)	(0.0250)	(0.0182)
Constant	0.0229***	0.6921***	0.8820***
	(0.0049)	(0.0175)	(0.0122)
Observations	1,882	$1,\!410$	$1,\!410$
R-squared	0.002	0.001	0.002

Conclusions (I)

- Although we study a very specific setting and technology...we are able to document possibly more general digital privacy paradoxes using field experiment data
 - People say they care about privacy, but in the face of 'small money' they are willing to share very sensitive data
 - People say they want privacy-protecting technologies but are put off from using them by very '**small costs**' such as scrolling down a list
 - People worry about government surveillance, but stop worrying when receive reassurance 'small talk' about something completely orthogonal

Conclusions (II)

- Debate in the US and Europe about the regulation of **personal data**
- Sensitive data is becoming more valuable because of machine learning and prediction
- Survey-based privacy research may not be best grounding for policy
- Policy focus has been on restricting data access through use of consent mechanisms...but this approach has implicit in it assumptions about the lack of malleability of users' preferences

We document multiple, potential market failures in digital privacy

Thank you!

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