licensing may also have a positive effect on consumer welfare in the long run if it facilitates the development of new products for which there is potential demand.

In practice, it is close to impossible accurately to balance the welfare-increasing and welfare-decreasing effects of compulsory licensing. As a first approximation, this involves comparing areas CS + Π (the welfare cost of compulsory licensing) and Π + L (the welfare benefit of compulsory licensing) or, after simplification, comparing areas CS and L, which is a complex and inherently somewhat speculative exercise in the real world.

In general, however, compulsory licensing is likely to have an overall negative effect on welfare because area CS is likely to be large than area L. This is true for two reasons. First, the available evidence indicates that innovators do not generally appropriate the entire social value of their innovations, and that most of the value of the new products and processes are sooner or later passed on to consumers. Professor William Nordhaus of Yale University, one of the classical authors on the economics of innovation, using data from the U.S. non-farm business sector, finds that innovators are able to capture only about 2.2 percent of the total surplus created by their innovation.[25] This result implies that the private incentives to innovate are likely to be lower than socially optimal and also that the degree of market power *de facto* enjoyed by innovators is rather limited. Consequently, compulsory licensing is likely to depress innovation from levels that are already inefficiently low, without providing any significant pro-competitive effect in the short-term. In terms of Figure 2, this suggests that area CS is likely to be large and area L small.

Second, area L may also be small because compulsory licensing reduces welfare not only in the long term but also in the short term. Compulsory licensing may: (a) facilitate entry of inefficient producers in the downstream market; (b) promote licensing arrangements that discourage potential entrants from developing products that are

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[25] William D. Nordhaus, *Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement*, 4, n.6 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 1457, 2004), *available at* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=537242.

significantly different from that of the IP holder, thus reducing product variety below what it otherwise would be; and (c) encourage licensing arrangements that help companies coordinate their respective commercial policies, leading to higher prices. In this last respect, as Professor Frank Easterbrook of the University of Chicago has pointed out,[26] there is a contradiction between the primary antitrust goal of protecting and promoting aggressive competition on the merits and a policy that imposes an obligation to deal with competitors in order to achieve a "level playing field" irrespective of differences in business acumen, skill, or foresight.

It follows that compulsory licensing is likely to increase long-run consumer welfare only in *exceptional circumstances*, because only in exceptional circumstances would the benefits of mandatory licensing exceed its costs. In order to determine which exceptional circumstances would justify interfering with the rights conferred by IP law, we should consider first the circumstances under which the positive effects of compulsory licensing would be greatest and then the circumstances under which its costs would be lowest.

The benefits of compulsory licensing will be greatest when: (a) the IP is indispensable to compete; and (b) the refusal to license (i) causes the exclusion of all competition from the downstream market, and (ii) prevents the emergence of markets for new products for which there is substantial demand.[27] Conditions (a) and (b)(i) ensure that the short-term welfare loss resulting from a refusal to license is maximal (area L is large). Sharing a monopoly between a licensor and a licensee does not increase competition unless it leads to improvements in price and output; i.e., nothing has been achieved in terms of enhancing consumer welfare unless compulsory licensing has a first-

[26] Frank H. Easterbrook, *On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct*, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972-980 (1986).

[27] This was clearly the case in *Magill*, in which the European Commission found that the refusal to license RTE's and BBC's copyrights prevented Magill from commercializing a product (a TV listing magazine) that was very popular among Irish TV viewers, and for which there were no substitutes in the market.

order effect on downstream competition. Condition (b)(ii) implies that the refusal to license has a long-run cost as well as a short-term cost.

The costs of compulsory licensing will be smallest when (c) the products to be developed by the licensees are significantly differentiated from those of the IPR holder, e.g., because they satisfy needs that the existing products failed to address, or (d) when the investments needed to obtain the IP were funded by the state or through non-market resources (e.g. prizes).

When conditions (c) and (d) fail to hold, the obligation to license is bound to have both a profoundly negative effect on the incentives for sequential innovation and no social benefit in the short term. However, one would not expect to observe a unilateral refusal to license when these two conditions do hold because in those circumstances the IP holder is likely to be better off licensing its IP, thus reaping some of the rents generated by the new products at no cost to its own existing business. In other words, when (c) and (d) hold, there is likely to be a mutually acceptable license since total industry profits with licensing exceed total industry profits without licensing.

Not surprisingly, most economists are wary of compulsory licensing.[28] This skepticism is enhanced once one takes into account that compulsory licensing may provide incentives for free riding and, hence, reduce the scope for competition in innovation. And it remains even after taking into account the possibility of fine tuning the obligation to deal by allowing positive, reasonable, and non-discriminatory royalty rates. No doubt, the welfare consequences of a compulsory licensing obligation depend, among other things, upon the form of the licensing arrangement (e.g., fixed licensing fees v. two-part tariffs) and the level of the royalty rates, if any is prescribed. A zero-royalty rate will promote the entry of inefficient competitors and have a major negative effect on investment. If the royalty rate is high, however, the compulsory license may not provide meaningful access. To repeat, sharing a monopoly among several competitors does not in itself increase competition unless it leads to improvements in price and output, otherwise nothing has been achieved in terms of enhancing consumer welfare. Competition would

[28] Gilbert & Shapiro, *supra*, note 19.

be improved only if the terms upon which access is offered allow the licensing parties to compete effectively with the dominant firm on the relevant downstream market. Imposition of such conditions would, however, require courts and antitrust enforcers to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, this is "role for which they [courts and agencies] are ill suited."[29]

D. STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT AND STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS

The consensus view supporting a cautious approach to compulsory licensing has been questioned with respect to the licensure of SEPs.[30] The claim is that SEPs confer market power because the standardization process leads to the exclusion of alternative technologies; as a result, it is said, SEP owners have the ability and incentive to charge excessively high royalty rates (and/or apply other onerous terms and conditions) in their licensing agreements or even constructively refuse to license their IP at all.

This view seems to be based upon the assumption that standardization is an exceptional circumstance warranting compulsory licensing. It follows from this view that SEP owners should be required to license their patents at quasi-regulated (i.e. low) rates and be prohibited from seeking an injunction against infringement if licensing negotiations break down.[31] Proponents of this view disregard as impractical or ineffective the commitments most standard-development organizations (SDOs) require of their members, that they make reasonable efforts to identify and disclose any IP that might be relevant to a standard under development and, once disclosed, agree to license their relevant patents on FRAND terms.

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[29] Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).

[30] *See, e.g.*, Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, *A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents*, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1135-1166 (2013).

[31] *Id*.

The lessons of economics are to the contrary: Standardization should not be treated as an "exceptional circumstance" justifying compulsory licensing and price regulation. A patented technology is usually included in a standard because, when the standard was established, it was the best technology available. Under these circumstances, inclusion in the standard confers no additional market power upon the patent owner. Any market power that the SEP owner may enjoy would be due to its technology and not to the standardization process.[32]

Even when there might have been a competition between two or more technologies at the standardization stage, the selected technology may still be chosen due to superior performance, functionality, and/or lower implementation costs by a consensus among the industry engineers who participate in the decision making. Insofar as inclusion in the standard might nonetheless confer some market power, the potential for exploiting it would be foreclosed by the required FRAND obligation and the need of the innovator to continue to "win" such competitions in the future.

Thousands of license negotiations involving FRAND-committed SEPs have been successfully resolved. Arbitrators, courts, and competition authorities should realize that when royalties for a FRAND-encumbered patent are being negotiated, the threat of adjudication or review by a third party will foreclose the exercise of market power and, hence, the exploitation of licensees. Sophisticated customers have the ability and incentive to bring SEP holders to court if they consider that the rates or other terms being offered are not truly FRAND. All other customers, whether large or small, will then be protected by the 'non-discriminatory' part of the FRAND obligation.

There is therefore no reason as a matter of economics to adopt a more regulatory approach toward the unilateral actions of SEP owners when any market power an SEP owner may enjoy is conferred by patent protection, as a reward for successful innovation, and not by the patent's inclusion in a standard. We note that patent owners are subject to the same risk/reward trade off when there are standards as when there are not. A firm

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[32] *See, e.g.*, Anne Layne-Farrar & Jorge Padilla, *Assessing the Link Between Standards and Patents* 19, 25-27, INTN'L J. IT STANDARDS & STANDARDIZATION RES. (July-Dec. 2011) [hereinafter Layne-Farrar & Padilla].

invests hoping to develop a technology or component that can contribute to the standard and therefore receive a return on its investment. Being part of a standard may increase opportunities to earn and collect a royalty, but that upside is offset *ex ante* by the risk that the firm's technology will not be included in the standard, and another technology is selected instead. In other words, the significant risk of not being included in a standard (and thus having likely created technology that has no alternative use) counterbalances the potential benefits from widespread marketplace adoption. *Ex post* regulation of license fees would cap the firm's incentives to invest in the hope of becoming part of that standard.[33] Prospects of inclusion in the standard are part of the calculus that determines whether to invest in creating a superior technology. Restricting or limiting the returns the patent owner receives if its technology is included in the standard alters this calculus, which may result in firms not expecting to cover their long-run costs and therefore deciding not to invest in innovation.

In conclusion, we see no justification for adopting a regulatory approach to the licensing of SEPs.[34] There is no reason to regulate SEP royalties and no valid argument for restricting the right of SEP owners to seek an injunction when licensees are infringing or refusing to negotiate in good faith. The availability of injunctions is essential for the appropriate functioning of the IP system, since compensatory damages are generally insufficient to deter willful behavior. As explained by Denicolò *et al*., the availability of injunctive relief in case of patent infringement leads to more innovation and more

[33] Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet, & Jorge Padilla (2014), *Payments and Participation: The Incentives to Join Cooperative Standard Setting Efforts*, *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, Volume 23, Number 1, Spring 2014, 24-49.

[34] This holds for alleged refusals by vertically integrated SEP holders to license at the component level (i.e., no foreclosure of the component level) so long as (1) the vertically integrated SEP holder does not assert its patents at the component level, and (2) it licenses its SEP portfolio to downstream (finished device) manufacturers on FRAND terms, irrespective of whether they source components from its own subsidiary or from the nonintegrated rival. Jorge Padilla & Wong-Ervin, *Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level*, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN, Vol. 62(3) 494, 505 (2017) [hereinafter Padilla & Wong-Ervin].

consumer welfare.[35] The threat of injunctive relief induces implementers of patented technology to negotiate reasonable terms and conditions without undue delay. This ensures that innovators are appropriately compensated for their efforts, which in turn ensures that firms have incentives to invest in further innovations.

Significantly, Denicolò *et al* find that the optimality of injunctive relief holds true both when implementers face no cost of switching technologies and when switching technologies would costly. In both circumstances, denying the availability of injunctive relief will under-reward innovation, to the ultimate detriment of consumers.

E. IO Toolkit for Vertical Restraints

Licensing agreements are vertical contracts linking a firm operating in an upstream technology market (the licensor) and a firm operating in a downstream market (the licensee). In some cases, the licensor may also be active in the downstream market. In those cases, the licensing agreement may have horizontal implications.

Economists have concluded that most vertical agreements are procompetitive or benign.[36] As the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's) former Director of the Bureau of Economics explained when summarizing the body of economic evidence

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[35] Vincenzo Denicolò, Damien Geradin, Anne Layne-Farrar, & Jorge Padilla, *Revisiting Injunctive Relief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders*, 4 J Competition L. & Econ. 571-608 (2008).

[36] *See, e.g.*, James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O'Brien & Michael G. Vita, *Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference*, 23 Int'l J. Indus. Org. 639, 642, 658 (2005) (surveying the empirical literature, concluding that although "some studies find evidence consistent with both pro- and anticompetitive effects . . . virtually no studies can claim to have identified instances where vertical practices were likely to have harmed competition," and, "[i]n most of the empirical studies reviewed, vertical practices are found to have significant pro-competitive effects"); Benjamin Klein, *Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free-Riding*, 76 Antitrust L.J. 431 (2009); Bruce H. Kobayashi, *Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of the Economic Literature*, 1 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 707 (2005); Daniel P. O'Brien, *The Antitrust Treatment of Vertical Restraints: Beyond the Possibility Theorems*, *in* The Pros and Cons of Vertical Restraints 40, 76 (2008) ("With few exceptions, the literature does not support the view that [vertical restraints] are used for anticompetitive reasons" and "[vertical restraints] are unlikely to be anti-competitive in most cases.").

analyzing vertical restraints, "it appears that when manufacturers choose to impose [vertical] restraints, not only do they make themselves better off but they also typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality products and better service provision."[37]

Some vertical restraints are imposed in order to limit double marginalization,[38] while many others are used simply to encourage downstream firms to expand output.[39] Of course, some vertical agreements may be abused to induce or conceal anticompetitive effects by, for example, facilitating coordination in downstream markets or restricting competition in upstream markets. Examples of the former include some (but far from all) resale price maintenance contracts[40] as well as some (not all) most-favored-nation agreements.[41] Examples of the latter may be some (but far from all) exclusivity and single branding[42] agreements as well as some (not all) agreements involving tying or bundling.[43]

As a matter of economics, the competitive implications of vertical agreements should be assessed using a structured rule-of-reason (or effects-based) approach.[44] Under this approach, a vertical agreement is considered lawful unless it fails one or more tests aimed at establishing that it is like to have an anticompetitive effect, in which case the

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[37] Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, *Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy*, *in* HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 391-414 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

[38] Patrick Rey & Thibaud Vergé, *The Economics of Vertical Restraints*, *in* HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 353-390 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2008).

[39] *Id*.

[40] Benjamin Klein, *The Evolving Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance*, 57 *J. L. & Econ.* S161-S179 (2014).

[41] Amelia Fletcher and Morten Hviid), *Broad Retail Price MFN Clauses: Are they RPM "at its Worst"?*, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 61-98 (2017).

[42] Rey & Vergé, *supra* note 38.

[43] Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, *Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm*, 52 ARIZ. L.REV. 925 (2010).

[44] Matthew Bennett & Jorge Padilla, *Article 81 EC Revisited: Deciphering European Commission Antitrust Goals and Rules, in* COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS ON FROM THE TREATY OF ROME (Xavier Vives ed., 2009).

antitrust authority will balance the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects to determine whether the overall effect of the agreement is anticompetitive.

What is true for a generic vertical agreement, such as one involving a supplier of car parts and a car manufacturer, is also true for licensing agreements. Licensing agreements are generally procompetitive and, as such, should be presumed lawful unless there is evidence that they distort competition to the ultimate detriment of consumers.[45] Determining their compatibility with antitrust laws cannot be based exclusively upon formalistic criteria but requires a detailed economic analysis to identify first whether they are capable of foreclosing competition and, if so, whether the potential anticompetitive effects outweigh any procompetitive benefits.

III. Policy Implications From Economics

This Section provides a roadmap, based upon the economic principles discussed in Section II, for market definition; analysis of monopoly power or market dominance; refusals to license; tying and bundling; grantbacks and cross-licenses; excessive pricing prohibitions, and the seeking or enforcing of injunctive relief against infringement of FRAND-assured SEPs.

A. General Principles

General Principles Roadmap:

(1) Conduct involving IP, including FRAND-assured SEPs, will be analyzed under the same antitrust analysis applied to conduct involving other forms of property, taking into consideration the special characteristics of IPRs, such as ease of misappropriation;

(2) With the exception of naked restraints such as price fixing, IP licensing is generally procompetitive and therefore will be analyzed under an effects-based approach so that licensing restraints will be condemned only if the anticompetitive effects, if any, are not outweighed by procompetitive effects;

[45] DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 20.

(3) In order to protect an IPR holder's core right to exclude, when considering whether specific conduct has anticompetitive effects, the analysis will include a determination of what would have happened in the absence of a license (the "but for world"); and

(4) In analyzing whether conduct has anticompetitive effects, the key inquiry is whether it foreclosed a rival from competing for minimum efficient scale.

The first principle derives from, among other things, the literature (discussed in Section II) developed in the 1960 s through the 1980s on the economics of vertical contractual restraints, as applied to intellectual property. Modern experience with antitrust analysis of IP indicates the IO economics toolkit is sufficiently flexible to deal with IPRs.[46]

The second principle also recognizes the procompetitive benefits of licensing, as explained in Section II.

The third principle honors an IPR holder's core right to exclude and protects the innovation incentives discussed in Section II. Under this principle, when considering the effects of a licensing restraint (such as tying or bundling), the decisionmaker compares actual effects to what would have happened had the IP holder decided to exercise its core right not to license in the first place. This is critically important given that economic analysis and evidence shows that IPRs—the central feature of which is the right to exclude[47]—stimulate innovation.[48] Like other property rights, IPRs also facilitate

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[46] *See e.g.*, Timothy J. Muris, Former Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Competition and Intellectual Policy: The Way Ahead, Address Before the Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), *available at* www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/11/competition-and-intellectual-property-policy-way-ahead.

[47] *See, e.g.*, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowers the Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the *exclusive* Right to their . . . Discoveries" (emphasis added)).

[48] *See, e.g.*, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2003).

economic exchange.[49] In particular, they facilitate the sale and licensing of IP by defining the scope of property right protection, lowering transaction costs, and producing incentives to develop alternative technologies, improvements, and other derivative uses.

The fourth principle recognizes that there can be no anticompetitive effect unless the IPR holder "foreclose[es] a sufficient share of distribution so that a manufacturer's rivals are forced to operate at a significant cost disadvantage for a significant period of time."[50] Absent foreclosure sufficient to deprive a rival of the opportunity to compete for minimum efficient scale, licensing conduct cannot create or maintain market power.[51] Measuring foreclosure of the critical input requires an understanding of the minimum efficient scale of production.

B. MARKET DEFINITION AND MONOPOLY POWER OR MARKET DOMINANCE

Market Definition and Monopoly Power or Market Dominance Roadmap:

(1) Monopoly power is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for monopolization or abuse of dominance, but analysis should be focused on competitive effects. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine a relevant market and conduct an analysis of monopoly power if there is not sufficient evidence of net anticompetitive effects.

(2) There is no presumption that IP confers monopoly power or market dominance. Instead, an analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a specific IP holder has the ability to control market prices and output for a significant period of time.

(3) Market definition is defined to capture as accurately as possible the competitive constraints a firm faces. Those constraints often take the form of demand or supply-side substitutes but, with

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[49] *See e.g.*, Henry E. Smith, *Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information*, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007) (discussing the economic rationale behind intellectual property's close relationship with other property).

[50] Benjamin Klein, *Exclusive Dealing as Competition for Distribution "On the Merits"*, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 122 (2003).

[51] Joshua D. Wright, *Moving Beyond Naïve Foreclosure Analysis*, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 1166 (2012) (collecting sources). *See also* Derek W. Moore & Joshua D. Wright, *Conditional Discounts and the Law of Exclusive Dealing*, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1205 (2015).

respect to SEPs, the constraints may consist of the FRAND assurance and/or complementarities; SEPs are perfect complements, which creates an interdependence among patent holders such that an SEP cannot be licensed in isolation.

Economics counsels a shift away from the focus on market definition and market power and towards a focus on competitive effects. This is particularly important in IP matters where it is often more difficult to determine monopoly power because IP holders must necessarily charge more than marginal costs in order to recoup their investment, and there are substantial risks involved in seeking to create and commercialize IP. Relatedly, in high-tech markets involving IPRs, the lines between markets may be not be clearly delineated. The risk here is in inferring monopoly power from shares of a defined market, an approach that is fraught with error, particularly in high-tech business models involving IP.

Market power and monopoly power are related but not the same. Market power is the ability to raise prices above what would be charged in a competitive market, i.e., the power of a firm to exert some control over the price it charges. Some degree of market power is nearly universal. Few firms are pure price takers facing perfectly elastic demand. For example, the unique location of a dry cleaner may confer slight market power because some customers are willing to pay a little more rather than go an extra block or two to the next-closest dry cleaner. Virtually all products that are differentiated from one another, if only because consumer tastes, seller reputation, or location confer upon their sellers at least some degree of market power. This slight degree of market power is unavoidable and understood not to warrant antitrust intervention.

"Monopoly power" is conventionally understood to mean substantial market power, or the power to control market-wide prices or to exclude competition. Such power must also be more than fleeting; it must be durable.

IP may well guarantee a firm a downward sloping demand curve for its own product or services. However, a firm with a downward sloping demand curve has market power only in the technical economic sense that it can sustain a price greater than its marginal cost (i.e., the cost of producing one more unit); this is true of nearly every firm

in the modern economy.[52] Indeed, in IP-intensive industries (where marginal costs are generally close to or at zero) it is well understood that prices equal to marginal cost would be insufficient to support investment in innovation.[53] The power to sustain a price greater than marginal cost is not the antitrust-relevant power to control market prices and output.[54] Thus, from an antitrust perspective, IP is neither necessary nor sufficient to confer market power.

The question of market power requires a case-by-case, fact-specific analysis of what constitutes a well-defined relevant market, whether there are potential substitutes and, with respect to SEPs, the degree to which any market power is mitigated by the FRAND assurance and/or complementarities.[55]

With respect to SEPs, it is also important to remember that SEPs are self-declared to SDOs—often through blanket declarations—yet no SDO evaluates essentiality, which may change over time as the standard continues through development.[56] Thus, until an independent review (legal and technical) establishes that a particular declared SEP is in fact essential, there can be no presumption of monopoly power.[57]

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[52] John Shepard Wiley, Jr. & Benjamin Klein, *Competitive Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal*, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 624–26 (2003) [hereinafter Wiley & Klein].

[53] *See, e.g.*, William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, *The New Economy and Ubiquitous* Competitive *Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power*, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 665–68 (2003).

[54] *See, e.g.*, Wiley, Jr. & Klein, *supra* note 52, at 628-29; *see also* United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956) ("[A] party has monopoly power if it has, over 'any part of the trade or commerce among the several states,' a power of controlling prices or unreasonably restricting competition.") (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 85 (1911)); DOJ/FTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 20, § 2.3; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 2.1, 5.3 (2010), *available at* www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.

[55] *See generally* ChriMar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 72 F. Supp. 3d 1012 (N.D. Cal. 2014).

[56] Many SDO's require patent holders to disclose whether they have patents (or pending patent applications) on any technology submitted for possible inclusion in a standard. Such disclosures are generally in the form of declarations from patent holders.

[57] Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren Wong-Ervin, *Standard-Essential Patents and Market Power*, 2–3 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 16-47, 2016), *available at*

With respect to market definition, as the OECD has explained, the relevant market should be defined so that the competitive constraints a firm faces are captured as accurately as possible. While competitive constraints are often demand- and/or supply-side substitutes, that is not always the case. With respect to SEPs, the FRAND assurance mitigates monopoly power by limiting a FRAND-assured SEP holder to a "reasonable" royalty. It is also important to remember that SEPs are perfect complements (i.e., like nuts and bolts), which creates a connection among the patents and patent holders such that SEPs licensing terms cannot be set unilaterally by patent holders. Indeed, FRAND royalty rates are tied to the value the patented technologies contribute to the standard. Therefore, in contrast to monopolists, who can set prices without consideration of other firms, SEP holders must take into account the value of other SEPs when setting their royalty rates. In this way, complementarity acts as a competitive constraint.[58] (This is, however, not to say that all SEPs are of identical value. Empirical analysis shows that the value of patents is highly skewed.[59])

In addition, because licensees know they must license various SEPs to be compliant with a given standard, they push back in negotiations if they think a SEP holder is asking for more than its proportionate share. This, too, limits any market power that might be conferred by essentiality. As such, the relevant market may well comprise all truly essential patents in a specific standard as opposed to any single SEP.

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https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872172; *see also* ChriMar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., 72 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ("In order to allege market power, the *Samsung* court required the plaintiff to allege that 'there was an alternative technology that the SSO was considering during the standard setting process and that the SSO would have adopted an alternative standard had it known of the patent holder's intellectual property rights.'" (quoting Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Case No. 11–CV–01846–LHK, 2011 WL 4948567, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2011))).

[58] Layne-Farrar & Wong-Ervin, *supra* note 57, at 2.

[59] *See, e.g.*, Jonathan D. Putnam, *Value Shares of Technologically Complex Products* (April 16, 2014) (concluding that the top 10% of patents account for almost 65% of the total value of a patent portfolio, whereas the bottom 50% of patents capture only 5% of the portfolio value), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2461533 [hereinafter Putman]. Mark Schankerman, *How Valuable is Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology Field*, RAND J. ECON. 29(1): 77-107 (1998), http://www.nber.org/papers/w3780.pdf.

There is evidence for this conclusion. For example, the distribution of SEPs for 3G and 4G is a long-tail with two-thirds of contributions (and 80% of declared SEPs) coming from the top nine contributing firms out of the 500+ firms that participated in the development of those standards.[60] Moreover, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized, not all SEP holders assert their patents. In fact, many SEP holders do not. The expected return to licensing their SEPs is likely to be insufficient to cover the costs of launching an active licensing program.

In terms of bargaining power—which is defined by the strength of each party's outside options—the implementer likely enjoys significant bargaining power. The value of the SEP holder's outside options is often zero, since walking away from standard compliant negotiation yields no revenues. In contrast, the value of the implementer's outside options can be high since walking away enables it to postpone payment. Indeed, given the time value of money and the fact that the worst penalty an SEP infringer is likely to face after adjudication around the world (and then only on a patent-by-patent basis) is merely paying the FRAND royalty that it should have agreed to pay when first asked, it is easy to understand why holdout can be an attractive strategy for an implementer.

Lastly, empirical research suggests there are limited cases in which a standard makes a patent a "winner" (i.e., confers market power) in the marketplace. Instead, more important technologies are natural candidates for inclusion in standards and therefore

[60] Kirti Gupta, *How SSOs Work: Unpacking the Mobile Industry's 3GPP Standards* Figure 5 (Nov. 2017), *available at* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3063360. Specifically, based on data from the 3GPP contributions database, over one-third of the approximately 500 unique member entities that participated in the 3G and 4G standard setting process did not make a single contribution during the period 2005-2013. Among the firms that did contribute, the distribution of intensity of contributions is highly skewed, with a handful of firms making the majority of the technical contributions. Out of the approximately 500 member entities that participated in the 3G and 4G standard setting process in 3GPP from 2005-2013, 161 members made zero contributions, 95 members made 1-5 contributions, 63 members made 6-25 contributions, 49 firms made 26-100 contributions, 81 firms made 100-300 contributions, and 32 firms made 300-1000 contributions. The top nine contributing firms each made over 10,000 contributions and are responsible for a total of approximately 80% of the contributions that form these standards. *Id.*

SDOs tend to "crown winners" that already have some market power, as opposed to creating market power including a technology in a standard.[61] For example, a study analyzing a database of patents declared essential to a range of standards, including telecommunications technology (e.g., W-CDMA) and imaging standards (e.g., MPEG2 and MPEG4), found that inclusion in a standard has no or negligible effect on the value or importance of a patent, measured by forward citations, suggesting that the inclusion in a standard in itself does not create market power.[62]

C. Refusals to License

Refusals to License Roadmap:

(1) Unilateral, unconditional refusals to license are generally per se lawful. An exception may be permitted in unusual circumstances, such as when a vertically integrated company (one both licensing IP in the upstream market and selling complementary products in the downstream market) has monopoly power in a particular indispensable technology and refuses to license competitors in the downstream market, resulting in substantial foreclosure in the downstream product market. Claims based on alleged "essential facilities" are not actionable.

This approach recognizes that potential inventors are less likely to undertake the R&D that lead to an invention if the inventor's reward for its efforts is reduced by having to share its patent. Conversely, if businesses know they can easily gain access to the patents of other firms, then they have less incentive to innovate and more incentive instead to free-ride on the risky and expensive research of others. Requiring businesses to grant licenses to competitors wishing to use a patented invention is likely to result in less innovation, which will harm consumers in the long run.

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[61] *See, e.g.*, Layne-Farrar & Padilla, *supra* note 32. *See also generally* Browyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, *Market Value and Patent Citations*, 36 RAND J. OF ECON. 16-38 (2005) (establishing the usefulness of patent citations as a measure of the importance of a firm's patents; finding that citation-weighted patent stocks are more highly correlated with market value than patent stocks themselves and that this fact is due mainly to the high valuation placed on firms that hold very highly cited patents).

[62] Layne-Farrar & Padilla, *supra* note 32, at 40-43.

Although a firm's competitors may desire to use a particular technology in their own products, there are few situations in which access to a particular IPR is necessary to compete in a market. Indeed, those who advocate forced sharing of an "essential" facility often have underestimated the ability of a determined rival to compete around the facility, with resulting benefits to consumers. This is particularly true with respect to fast moving technologies, where technological and market developments can present multiple opportunities to work around a competitor's IP. And it is significantly easier to work around an IPR than it is to work around other property, such as a physical structure.

D. Tying and Bundling

Tying and Bundling Roadmap:

(1) Tying and bundling are ubiquitous and widely used in a variety of industries and for a variety of reasons. The potential to harm competition and generate anticompetitive effects arises only when tying or bundling is practiced by a firm with monopoly power in either the tying good or one of the goods included in a bundle. The fact that a licensee or purchaser is forced to license IP or buy a product it otherwise would not have bought even from another seller does not imply an adverse effect on competition. Instead, for tying or bundling to harm competition, there needs to be an exclusionary effect on another seller because tying or bundling thwarts the buyers' desire to purchase substitutes for one or more of the goods in the bundle from another sellers to an extent that harms competition in the markets for these products.

Tying with respect to IPRs is an arrangement under which a licensor agrees to license IPRs (or specific IPRs) on the condition that the licensee also licenses or purchases a different (or tied) IPR or product. Examples include tying SEPs to non-SEPs or tying the license of IPRs to the purchase of a product, such as a chipset. With respect to bundling, it is important to distinguish between "pure" and "mixed" bundling. Pure bundling means the firm offers only the package and not the stand-alone goods. This is distinguishable from tying in that pure bundling occurs when there are no alternative sellers of the component goods so only the bundle is available. Mixed bundling means both the bundle (e.g., SEPs and non-SEPs) and the unbundled patents are available from the bundling firm. Thus, if a patent holder offers its SEPs separately from its non-SEPs,

then the conduct at issue constitutes mixed bundling as opposed to tying, i.e., there is no coercion.

Both tying and bundling are ubiquitous and are used by a variety of firms and for a variety of reasons.[63] In the vast majority of cases, package sales are "easily explained by economies of scope in production or by reductions in transactions and information costs, with an obvious benefit to the seller, the buyer or both."[64] Those benefits can include lower prices for consumers, facilitating entry into new markets, reducing conflicting incentives between manufacturers and their distributors, and mitigating retailer free-riding and other types of agency problems.[65]

In 2015, the International Competition Network (ICN) published a workbook chapter on tying and bundling, identifying anticompetitive foreclosure as the "main anticompetitive concern with tying."[66] The workbook chapter focuses on the "leveraging theory," which relates to the possibility of extending a monopoly in one market into a

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[63] *See, e.g.*, Kobayashi, *supra* note 36, at 708; *see also* THOMAS T. NAGLE & REED K. HOLDEN, THE STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF PRICING: A GUIDE TO PROFITABLE DECISION MAKING (Prentice Hall 3d ed. 2002); David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, *Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law*, 22 YALE. J. ON REG. 37 (2005); Stefan Stremersch & Gerard J. Tellis, *Strategic Bundling of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Marketing*, 66 J. MKT'G 55 (2002).

[64] Kobayashi, *supra* note 36, at 708; *see also* Stremersch & Tellis, *supra* note 63, at 70; David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, *Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practice: A Neo Chicago Approach*, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005).

[65] Kobayashi, *supra* note 36, at 708; *see also* Bruce H. Kobayashi, *Two Tales of Bundling: Implications for the Application of Antitrust Law to Bundled Discounts*, (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research Paper No 05-27, 2005), *available at* https://ssrn.com/abstract=796432.

[66] INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKBOOK, CH. 6: TYING AND BUNDLING ¶ 7 (Apr. 2015), *available at* www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/2014-15/icn%20unilateral%20conduct%20workbook%20-%20chapter%206%20tying%20and%20bundling.pdf [hereinafter ICN UCWG WORKBOOK] (This chapter was prepared by the ICN's Unilateral Conduct Working Group. The drafters were competition enforcers (both attorneys and economists) from around the world, including from the U.S. antitrust agencies.).

related second market—a theory that "has great importance for the assessment of tying in many jurisdictions."[67]

The workbook reflects the general understanding among economists that a monopolist will not be able successfully to leverage monopoly power in one market into another through tying and bundling due to the "one-monopoly profit theory," which shows that "under certain circumstances there is no gain to the tying firm from leveraging its dominance into the tied product market. Tying in such instances is expected to be competitively neutral or, for instance if the tie lowers costs, even procompetitive."[68]

Indeed, as Drs. Anne Layne-Farrar and Michael Salinger explain, the leveraging theory "rests on the implicit assumption that the seller can attach B to A and charge a price increment above the marginal cost of B without lowering demand," an assumption that in general, "is not warranted," particularly when B is available in a competitive market.[69]

> To illustrate with a numerical example, suppose the profit-maximizing price for A is $10/unit and B is available in a competitive market for $5/unit. Since perfect competition drives price down to marginal cost, $5 is also the marginal cost of B. For tying to be profitable, the firm must be able to charge more than $15 for the A-B bundle. However, because consumers can already buy A and B for a combined price of $15 (the monopoly price of $10 for A and the competitive price of $5 for B), a price of $16 for the A-B bundle is a price increase and will generally lower demand. Moreover, the $10 price for A was chosen by the monopoly seller of A, presumably to maximize its profits. It had the option of charging $11 for stand- alone A sales, but decided not to do so. Yet, given the availability of B on the market for $5, selling the bundle of A and B for $16 is

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[67] *Id.*, ¶ 6. *See also* Koren Wong-Ervin, Evan Hicks & Ariel Slonim, *Tying and Bundling Involving Standard-Essential Patents*, 24:5 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), *available at* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2956359.

[68] ICN UCWG WORKBOOK, *supra* note 66, ¶ 6.

[69] *See* Anne Layne-Farrar & Michael A. Salinger, *Bundling of RAND-committed Patents*, 45 RES. POL'Y 1155, 1156-57 (Feb. 2016), *available at* http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733316300269.

> in effect charging $11 for A. To the extent that selling A on a stand-alone basis for $11 yields lower profits than selling it for $10, then we should expect the $16 price for the bundle (which entails an implicit price of $11 for A) also to result in lower profits. Indeed, this is the case even if everyone who would purchase A would also want to buy B. If some people who want A would not purchase B for $5, then the bundling strategy would be even less profitable.[70]

In other words, when the same consumers are buying both products in fixed proportions, the total price determines consumer sales, and thereby the monopolist's optimal (profit-maximizing) price; when a monopolist has already set a profit-maximizing price, obtaining the second monopoly will not allow the monopolist to raise prices further to obtain higher profits.[71] If the monopolist attempted to increase the total price further, consumers would decrease their purchases, and the monopolist's total profit would fall, prompting the monopolist to decrease prices back to the previous level in order to obtain higher profits. "As such, the principal motives for the tie would not be exclusionary conduct aimed at monopolizing the market for the tied product in order to raise its price. Rather, the firm could be using the tie for some other purpose, such as price discrimination or reducing costs."[72]

Subsequent economic work, including a seminal paper in this area by Dr. Michael Whinston, has demonstrated that the one-monopoly profit theorem relies on some restrictive assumptions, namely "that the same consumers are buying both products in fixed proportions, and that the tied good market has a competitive, constant returns-to-

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[70] *Id.*

[71] *See, e.g.*, Alden F. Abbott & Joshua D. Wright, *Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements and Exclusion Dealing* 10 (Geo. Mason Univ. L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 08-37, 2008), *available at* http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1145529.

[72] *Id.* at 10, citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199-200 (2d ed. 2001); Patrick DeGraba, *Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion*, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY, 433-47 (1996).

scale structure."[73] "By relaxing those assumptions, some economists have identified exclusionary motives for tying, as well as strategic reasons for bundling and tying."[74]

However, as the ICN Unilateral Conduct Workbook explains:

> Even with scale economies and an oligopolistic market structure in the tied market, if the tied product is a complementary product used in fixed proportions with the tying product, and has no other uses beyond that as a complement to the tying product, the single monopoly profit result still holds. The key condition is that the dominant firm's tying product is essential for all uses of the tied product, which implies that the dominant firm always benefits from greater sales of the tied product, even if it is a rival's product.[75]

With respect to SEPs in particular, some contend that, a refusal by a vertically integrated SEP holder (i.e., one that also produces the component at issue, in competition with unintegrated component makers) to license a component manufacturer is in effect a "bundle" of the SEP holder's component with its SEP portfolio. However, as Dr. Jorge Padilla and Koren Wong-Ervin show with the help of a stylized model, this bundling strategy cannot lead to the foreclosure of the component market so long as "(1) the vertically integrated SEP holder does not assert its patents at the component level, and (2) it licenses its SEP portfolio to downstream (finished device) manufacturers on FRAND terms, irrespective of whether they source components from its own subsidiary or from the nonintegrated rival."[76]

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[73] Abbott & Wright, *supra* note 71, at 10-11, citing Ward S. Bowman, Jr., *Tying Arrangements and the Leveraging Problem*, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Michael D. Whinston, *Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion*, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837, 837-38 (1990).

[74] Abbott & Wright, *supra* note 71, at 11 (internal citations omitted); *see also* Whinston, *supra* note 73, at 839; Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, *Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets* (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11407, 2005), *available at* www.nber.org/papers/w11407.pdf.

[75] ICN UCWG WORKBOOK, *supra* note 65, ¶ 70.

[76] Padilla & Wong-Ervin, *supra* note 34, at 505-507 and Appendix A.

E. Grantbacks and Cross-Licenses

Grantbacks and Cross-Licenses Roadmap:

(1) A grantback is an arrangement under which a licensee agrees to extend to the licensor of IP the right to use the licensee's improvements to the licensed technology. Grantbacks are often procompetitive and, as such, are analyzed under an effects-based approach. The focus is on IP holders with market power and whether a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce significantly a licensee's incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology that would affect the competitive process. If such a reduction is found, then the inquiry will focus on the extent to which the provision has offsetting procompetitive benefits. Procompetitive benefits may include (1) increasing licensors' incentives to innovate in the first place, (2) promoting dissemination of licensees' improvements to the licensed technology, (3) increasing the licensors' incentives to disseminate the licensed technology, or (4) otherwise increasing competition and output in a relevant technology or research and development market. Non-exclusive grantbacks are unlikely to result in harm to innovation or the competitive process.

(2) Cross-licensing agreements are often procompetitive and, as such, absent naked price-fixing or market allocation schemes, are analyzed under an effects-based approach. The focus is on IP holders with market power and whether such agreements result in harm to the competitive process. If such effects are found, then the analysis focuses on potential procompetitive benefits such as integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.

Because such provisions have the potential to increase output and innovation via the dissemination and improvement of patented technologies, they are generally viewed by courts and scholars as procompetitive.[77] The potentially positive effects of grantbacks are several. First, grantbacks encourage patent holders to license (more advanced) technology by eliminating the concern that a licensee will ultimately "leapfrog" and exclude the licensor from technology based its own patent. Second, grantbacks "provide a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and [to] reward the licensor for

[77] *See, e.g.*, Herbert Hovenkamp, *Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination*, 76:3 Ohio State L.J. 467, 537 (2015).

making possible further innovation based on or informed by the licensed technology, and both promote innovation in the first place and promote the subsequent licensing of the results of the innovation."[78]

The main theory of harm is that grantbacks may have a negative impact on the licensee's innovation (or R&D) incentives, which may affect the overall competitive process. However, as Dr. Jay Pil Choi shows, the reduced R&D incentive is not necessarily anticompetitive.[79] For example, "grantback clauses can enhance the efficacy of the licensee's R&D spending by transferring a more advanced technology. If the prohibition of the grant-back clause results in the licensing of the backward technology instead of the advanced technology, grantback clauses can eliminate wasteful and inefficient research expenditures."[80] Another example arises when "unbridled R&D competition between the licensor and licensee tends to be excessive and rent-dissipating. It is well known in the literature that the winner-takes-all payoff structure of the R&D game often implies excessive rent dissipation."[81]

With respect to cross-licenses, the main concern is that they can be used to cover up a collusive agreement, namely price-fixing or market sharing. That is possible when cross-licensing agreements involve substitute technologies.

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[78] DOJ/FTC IP Guidelines, *supra* note 20, §5.6.

[79] Jay Phil Choi, *A Dynamic Analysis of Licensing: The "Boomerang" Effect and Grant-Back Clauses*, CESifo Working paper Series No. 188 (Sept. 2001) (developing an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynamic effects of licensing on R&D competition in the innovation market and to examine the rationale for often observed grant-back clauses), *available at* https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=273012.

[80] *Id.* at 21.

[81] *Id.* at 22.

F. EXCESSIVE PRICING PROHIBITIONS (INCLUDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)

Excessive Pricing and Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs Roadmap:

(1) Excessive pricing of IPR, including SEPs, is not actionable. Instead, IP holders, including monopolists, are free unilaterally to set or privately to negotiate their prices.

(2) Seeking or enforcing injunctive relief on a FRAND-assured SEP is likewise not actionable when the theory of harm is that the injunctive relief allowed the SEP holder to charge a higher price. This is fundamentally an excessive pricing theory and not premised on exclusion or foreclosure resulting in harm to the competitive process.

Requiring by law that prices be "fair" or "reasonable," or prohibiting a firm from charging "unfairly high" prices risks punishing vigorous competition.[82] In general, competition policy should not prohibit a monopolist from charging whatever price for its products, including its IPRs, it believes will maximize its profits. It is axiomatic in economics and in antitrust law that the "charging of monopoly prices is—at least for a short period—what attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth."[83] This is particularly important in the case of IPRs; the very purpose for which nations create and protect IPRs is to induce investment in risky and costly research and development. To achieve a balance between innovation and the protection of competition, monopoly prices should be unlawful only if they are the result of conduct that is unlawful on other grounds.

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[82] Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, *"Excessive Royalty" Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate*, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Mar. 2016), *available at* www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Excessive-Royalty-Prohibitions.pdf. *See also* FTC, *Investigation of Gasoline Price Manipulation and Post-Katrina Gasoline Price Increases* at 196 (2006) ("If pricing signals are not present or are distorted by legislative or regulatory command, markets may not function efficiently and consumers may be worse off. Accordingly…throughout antitrust jurisprudence, one area into which the courts have refused to tread is the question of what constitutes a "reasonable price."").

[83] Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004); s*ee also* JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 89-90 (George Allen & Unwin 1976).

Moreover, economics teaches that, absent information about the prices of unconstrained market transactions, it can be particularly difficult to identify a “fair” price. Indeed, it is even more difficult to assess the “fairness” of prices associated with licensing IPRs both because the fixed costs of innovation requires prices well above marginal cost in order to secure an adequate return on investments in innovation, and because IPRs themselves are highly differentiated products, which makes reliable price comparisons difficult, if not impossible. The risk of placing overly strict limitations upon IPR prices is that the return to innovative behavior is reduced, which means firms will reduce their investment in further innovations, to the detriment of consumers. Compounding the problem, with such limits in place, IPR holders will face significant uncertainty in determining whether their licensing practices violate competition laws, and legal uncertainty is the enemy of financial investment.

In addition, in order to determine whether a particular price is excessive, a competition agency would need to calculate a reasonable royalty range as a baseline against which to compare the allegedly excessive price. In our experience, competition agencies do not have the requisite information to determine market prices generally, let alone royalty rates for a particular invention. This is a task that is best left to negotiations in the market or, as a last resort, to the courts in those limited cases when the parties cannot reach agreement.[84]

With respect to SEPs, intervention against excessive pricing raises the very same problems that we identified for other high-tech markets. Standard price benchmarking tests, price-cost tests, and profitability tests are unlikely to deliver accurate results in SEP licensing. Scepticism regarding the practical application and relevance of conventional

[84] For a discussion of the difficulties of court-determined rate setting, *see* Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, *Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European Union, India and the United States*, 8:2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 127 (2017).

excessive pricing tests also applies to the so-called "ex ante" test,[85] proposed by Daniel Swanson and William Baumol,[86] and the "numerical proportionality" advocated by some industry participants and pundits,[87] to determine whether SEP royalties are FRAND. We consider the "ex ante" test a useful tool for identifying situations in which prices are not excessive. If "ex post" and "ex ante" royalties are the same, then there has been no attempt to exercise market power conferred by standardization, and no basis for competition law intervention. If they are different, however, that is not necessarily indicative of exploitation; rather it indicates that further analysis of the reasons for the difference is required.

With respect to "numerical proportionality," or the equal-patent-counting approach, empirical analysis shows that the value of patents is highly skewed.[88] For example, in a recent study, Dr. Jonathan Putnam provides some simple, broadly applicable guidelines for translating the value of patent portfolio into valuations of the individual patents that cause that value. Specifically, he draws on the economic literature on the distribution of patent values and adopts a very general framework for computing the share of a given patent portfolio that can reasonably be attributed to any one patent. The guidelines place the focus where it should be: on using all available information (e.g., forward citations) to rank each patent against the other patents that belong to the same portfolio, and subsequently derive the relative value of each patent as compared against the "average patent" of the portfolio. Among others, the author concludes that the top 10% of patents account for almost 65% of the total value of a patent portfolio, whereas the bottom 50% of patents capture only 5% of the portfolio value.[89] Because Dr.

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[85] "Ex ante" tests refer to a counterfactual that exists prior to a standard being adopted. However, at this point, innovation risk has already been taken into account. Ex ante in this sense means before the adoption of the standard rather than before the R&D expenditure.

[86] Daniel Swanson & William Baumol, *Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (Rand) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power*, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Swanson & Baumol].

[87] Philippe Chappette, *FRAND Commitments – The Case for Antitrust Intervention*, 5:2 EUR. COMPETITION J. 319-346 (2009).

[88] *See, e.g.*, Putman, *supra* note 59.

[89] *Id.*

Putnam adopts a very general framework, the empirical findings are robust to various specifications and relevant to a wide variety of technologies under diverse circumstances.

As Dr. Anne Layne-Farrar and Professor Koren Wong-Ervin have explained:

> [I]t makes no economic sense to estimate an aggregate rate for a standard by assuming that all SEP holders would charge the same rate as the one being challenged in the current lawsuit. A numeric example illustrates how this estimation approach can go horribly wrong. Suppose that a standard is defined by 5 SEPs (1 – 5), with one patent each held by 5 patent holders (A- E). The value the set of 5 patents contribute to the standard (as embodied in the downstream product) is known to be 10 per product unit. Suppose that patent 1 accounts for 50% of the aggregate value of 10, patent 2 accounts for 20% of the value, while patents 3 – 5 each account for 10%. Each patent is a perfect complement (must be used together to achieve any product value); each is thus essential, but the values are not equal. FRAND would dictate that patent 1 can command a per-unit royalty of 5, patent 2 can command 2, and patents 3 – 5 can command 1 each. Suppose patent holder A is the first to seek a license and asks for 5 per unit, commensurate with its FRAND value. But under the common estimation approach, the downstream manufacturer will accuse that patent holder of holdup because the aggregate royalty estimated by multiplying the offered rate of 5 by the 5 patent holders implies a total rate of 25, two and a half times larger than the known value contributed by all 5 patents together. A judge accepting this argument would wrongly conclude that patent holder A was attempting holdup and creating or contributing to a royalty stack. Suppose instead that SEP holder E is the first to seek a license and it sets its offer at 2, twice as much as the value of its patented technology. In this case, a judge multiplying the rate by the 5 essential patents would conclude, again wrongly, that this rate was FRAND as the aggregate rate of 10 exactly equals the known value of the 5 patents—even though SEP holder E was asking for twice the value that its patent contributes to the standard.[90]

To the extent that arbitrators, courts, and/or competition authorities are going to enforce FRAND obligations, they should consider whether market outcomes are

[90] Anne *Layne* Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, *Methodologies for calculating FRAND damages: an economic and comparative analysis of the case law from China, the European Union, India, and the United States*, JINDAL GLOBAL L.R. Volume 8, Issue 2, 127-160 (Oct. 2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41020-017-0048-9?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorAssignedToIssue.

consistent with excessive pricing. First, arbitrators, courts and/or competition authorities should consider whether the inclusion of a patented technology in a standard confers any additional market power on the patent holder or whether it simply reflects a return on the investment in developing a superior technology. Economic theory unambiguously establishes that there is no reason to adopt a stricter approach when assessing the royalty rates charged for SEPs unless it can be shown that the market power enjoyed by SEP owners is conferred by standardisation.[91] It follows that regulation of SEP prices is not warranted when any market power SEP owners may enjoy is conferred by patent protection more generally. Second, standardisation in and of itself is not a sufficient condition to warrant price regulation.

Arbitrators, courts and/or competition authorities should realise that when prices are negotiated under the shelter of a FRAND obligation, the threat of adjudication or review by a third party will prevent the exercise of any market power and, hence, the exploitation of customers. Finally, they would need to consider the downstream markets. Markets downstream from SEP licensors, such as markets for wireless devices like phones and tablets, are vibrantly competitive, profitable for the leading downstream firms, and also reflect high rates of consumer adoption. The robustness of downstream markets undermines the view that royalty rates are too high.[92]

In short, the high probability of error, coupled with the asymmetry of the resulting costs, strongly militates in favour of non-intervention except in exceptional circumstances. If, however, a particular jurisdiction insists on regulating the prices of IPRs, that intervention should be restricted to exceptional cases when *all* of the following conditions are met: (a) the company whose prices are reviewed holds significant market

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[91] *See* Swanson & Baumol, *supra* note 86; Anne Layne-Farrar, Jorge Padilla & Richard Schmalensee, *Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments*, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671 (2007).

[92] *See* Pierre Larouche, Jorge Padilla & Richard S. Taffet, *Settling Frand Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?*, (Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 023/2013 and HOOVER IP[2] Working Paper Series No. 13003, 2013) *available at* http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346892.

power that is not the result of prior investment or innovation, (b) barriers to entry prevent the market from adjusting, and (c) intervention is unlikely to reduce the incentive and ability of the dominant company to invest and innovate.[93] These conditions are cumulative: if just one is not met then intervention is unjustified.

Because price-cost tests, profitability tests, and price benchmarking tests are complex to implement and may produce incorrect results, competition policy authorities and courts should focus more on the mechanisms by which prices are determined and the market outcomes that result. In particular, they should consider the manner in which prices are determined, because this may prevent the exercise of market power and, hence, the exploitation of customers. For example, competition authorities should not be concerned about excessive prices when prices can be subject to a third-party review (e.g. in a court adjudication or an arbitration) at the request of a customer.[94] They should also consider market outcomes in downstream markets and measures of consumer welfare. Consider for example a dominant company setting a price for an intermediate product or technology that is used in the production of a series of end products. If the price is excessive (assuming that could be determined), then there are unlikely to be any direct customers of the dominant company earning significant profits and consumer welfare will be reduced because end products are unduly expensive and their diffusion limited. On the other hand, if downstream markets are healthy, with robust competition, high product penetration rates, and the possibility for superior downstream firms to earn high profits, then the price is surely "fair" or reasonable.

IV. SURVEY OF THE APPROACHES IN CHINA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDIA, JAPAN, KOREA, AND THE UNITED STATES

See Appendix A, below.

[93] *See* ROBERT O'DONOGHUE & JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 771-775 (2013).

[94] This is the case, for example, in licensing SEP technology subject to a FRAND assurance.

V. CONCLUSION

As agencies around the world continue to search for the best antitrust approaches to matters involving IPRs, we submit that a careful study of the significant IO economics literature on innovation and IP protection and vertical restraints provides a roadmap worth following.

APPENDIX A: SURVEY OF THE APPROACHES IN CHINA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, INDIA, JAPAN, KOREA, AND THE UNITED STATES

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
General Approach	Article 55 of the Antimonopoly Law (AML) provides that the AML does not apply to the legitimate exercise of IPRs under laws and relevant administrative regulations on IPRs; however, it does apply to the "abuse" of IPRs that "eliminate or restrict" competition.[1] The AML and IP laws share the same goals of "protecting competition and promoting innovation, enhancing economic efficiency, protecting consumers'	The European Commission (E.C.) recognizes the general IPR to exclude, yet the fact that IP laws "grant exclusive rights of exploitation, does not imply" immunity from competition law intervention; that said, "[m]ost licence agreements do not restrict competition and create pro-competitive efficiencies."[3] With the exception of hardcore restrictions (such as price-fixing), the E.C. analyzes licensing agreements by weighing any procompetitive effects against possible harm to competition,[4] focusing on the impact to inter-technology and	The general prohibition on anticompetitive agreements[8] and abuse of dominance[9] under the 2002 Competition Act applies equally to IP-related business practices as it would to non-IP related conduct. Section 3(5) of the Act creates a carve out from the provision prohibiting anticompetitive agreements to allow "reasonable and necessary" conditions for protecting IPRs.[10] There is no carve out for the provision prohibiting unilateral conduct.	The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) recognizes the general importance of IPRs to innovation and aims to apply the Antimonopoly Act to "restrictions that deviate from the intent of the intellectual property systems."[11] Japan applies an effects test when determining if an IP practice reduces competition.[12]	South Korea purports to generally apply an effects test to matters involving IPRs,[13] yet considers substantial restrictions on competition to be "especially likely" when: (1) there is a "strong market dominating power," (2) the IP is "an essential element necessary for production," (3) a horizontal relationship exists between the parties, (4) there is an increased probability of "collaborative practices," and (5) "when the possibility for other enterprisers	The United States (U.S.) applies the same general antitrust approach to IP as to other forms of intangible and to tangible property. With the exception of naked restraints such as price fixing, licensing is generally deemed procompetitive and thus analyzed under the rule of reason (i.e., an effects-based approach). In determining whether conduct results in anticompetitive effects, the U.S. antitrust agencies consider what would have

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
	interests and social welfare."[2]	intra-technology competition.[5] Restrictions "by object" (i.e., "those that by their very nature restrict competition") do not require a demonstration of any effects on the market in light of their "high potential for negative effects on competition." Restrictions "by effect" do require a showing of actual or potential effects.[6] "The assessment of whether a licence agreement restricts competition must be made within the actual context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agreement with its alleged restrictions."[7]			to enter the market is reduced."[14]	happened in the but-for world (i.e., in the absence of a license).[15]

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
Market Power or Dominance	**IP does not necessarily confer market power.** • Both the 2015 Final Rules of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC)[16] (one of China's three AML agencies) and the latest version (2017) of the State Council's draft AML-IP Guidelines[17] state that IPRs do not necessarily confer a dominant position. • With respect to SEPs, the AML-IP Guidelines state that "the following factors may be	**IP does not necessarily confer market power, although "lock-in" is considered for SEPs.** • Court cases and E.C. Guidelines provide that mere ownership of an IPR does not confer a dominant position. *See, e.g.*, European Court of Justice (ECJ) *Magill*[20] and E.C. Guidelines.[21] • With respect to SEPs, in the 2014 *Motorola* case, the E.C. concluded that Motorola held a 100% share of the market for the licensing of GPRS not solely based on its IPRs, but on an assessment of factors, namely: (1) the widespread adoption of the GPRS standard	**IP does not necessarily confer market power.** • One factor is whether the dominant position is "acquired as a result of any statute." • In cases such as *Three D Integrated Solutions Ltd. v. Verifone Sales Pvt. Ltd.* (Case no. 13/2013), the Competition Commission of India (CCI) examined market power associated with IP on the basis of general principles contained in Section 19 (4) of the Competition Act, such as market share, technical substitutability,	**IP does not necessarily confer market power.** • JFTC IP Guidelines: "whether or not [a] licensor has a dominant bargaining position over licensees is examined through a comprehensiv e consideration of the degree of influence of the technology," "the extent to which the licensees' business activities depend on the technology, the positions of the parties in the	**IP does not necessarily confer market power, but special rules exist for SEPs.** • Market Dominance "is determined by . . . considering not only existence or non-existence of IPRs but also the technologies' influences, existence or non-existence of the alternative technologies, and competition-related situation in the relevant market." However, holders of SEPs are	**IP, including SEPs, does not necessarily confer market power.** • In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the approach taken by the U.S. antitrust agencies in their 1995 IP Guidelines, holding that IPRs do not necessarily confer market power.[28] • With respect to SEPs, owning an SEP does not necessarily confer market power (see *ChriMar*).[29]

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
	further considered: (i) The market value, range of application and degree of application of the standards; (ii) Whether any standards with alternative relationship are available, including the possibility of using alternative standards, and the cost for such shift; (iii) The extent of the reliance of industries on relevant standards; (iv) The evolution and compatibility of relevant standards; (v) The possibility of	made it indispensable for manufacturers of mobile devices to implement; and (2) mobile device operators and device manufacturers needed to base their products on the same air interface technology to enable different devices to communicate on the same network. This resulted in "lock-in," which further proved Motorola's market power. [22] *See also Rambus* (E.C. defined the relevant market as "the worldwide technology market for DRAM interface technology (whether there is a	bargaining power, size, and the importance of competitors. • With respect to SEPs, see CCI's prima facie orders against Ericsson, defining the relevant market as the provision of SEP(s) for 2G, 3G and 4G technologies in standard "GSM compliant mobile communication devices" in India, concluding that "prima facie it is apparent that Ericsson [was] dominant" because it held 400 Indian patents, was the "largest holder of SEPs for mobile	technology or product market, the state of the technology or product market and the disparity in the scale of business activities between the parties."[25]	"highly likely to have market dominance."[26] • See KFTC's decision against Qualcomm, concluding that because "SEPs cannot be replaced by other technologies" the owner of an SEP necessarily "gains complete monopolistic power by holding even a single SEP."[27]	

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
	replacing relevant technologies that have been included in the standards.” • With respect to SEPs and market definition, MOFCOM has taken varying approaches. *Compare* Microsoft/Nokia (2014) (concluding that each SEP is its own relevant market with 100% market share)[18] *with* Nokia/Alcatel-Lucent (2015) (defining the relevant market as the entire information and communication technology SEP market, stating that, even	single market for the full package of DRAM interface technologies, or whether there are separate worldwide markets for individual DRAM interface subtechnologies).”[23]	communications like 2G, 3G and 4G patents used for smart phones, tablets etc,” and there was no alternate technology in the market.[24]			

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	though this market could be divided into more specific markets based on demand-side analysis, it would have made no difference to the analysis in this deal).[19]					
Refusals to License	**Prohibits refusals to license by dominant firms, particularly for "essential facilities."** • The 2017 version of the State Council's draft AML-IP Guidelines states that refusals to license can be an abuse of market position when the patent holder has a dominant market position	**Prohibits refusals to license by dominant firms under exceptional circumstances, including indispensability.** • Under case law, IPR holders have no general duty to deal,[32] except in "exceptional circumstances."[33] *See IMS Health*[34] and *Microsoft*.[35] • Refusals to license can be found to violate Article 102 when the IP is deemed	**Prohibits refusal to license as an anti-competitive vertical restraint as well as by dominant firms, primarily on the basis of a rule of reason.** • Key factors considered include the extent to which the refusal results in a denial of market access,[38] restricts the production of goods or services,[39] or restricts the	**Prohibits refusals to license by dominant firms when, judging by its effects, it would "exclude or control the business activities of other entrepreneurs."**[42] • With respect to SEPs, the JFTC IP Guidelines state that "[r]efusal to license or bringing an action for injunction	**Prohibits refusals to license by dominant firms when it threatens to restrict competition.** • The 2016 KFTC IP guidelines state that refusals to license are generally not antitrust violations.[44] Exceptions include: "(1) Act of collaborating with	**Unconditional, unilateral refusals to license generally lawful.** • U.S. courts apply a general presumption of legality for unilateral, unconditional refusals to license.[47] • The 2017 IP Guidelines state that the antitrust laws "generally do not impose liability upon a firm for a

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
	and refuses to license its IPR "without justification." This is particularly true when the IPR constitutes an essential facility.[30] • With respect to SEPs, the 2015 SAIC Final Rules prohibit a company with a dominant market position from refusing to license after its IPR has become part of a standard, which it considers a violation of "FRAND principles."[31]	"indispensable" and the refusal to license results in anticompetitive foreclosure.[36] • The E.C.'s guidance suggests it will prioritize enforcement if three elements are present: (1) "the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market"; (2) "the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market; and" (3) "the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm."[37]	technical or scientific development relating to goods or services.[40] • *See* CCI's *Auto Parts* decision,[41] in which CCI viewed the car companies' refusal to license their diagnostic (software) tools and repair manuals to independent repairers and workshops as an anticompetitive "refusal to deal" due to anticompetitive foreclosure.	against a party who is willing to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered [SEP] holder, or refusal to license or bringing an action for injunction against a party who is willing to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered [SEP] holder after the withdrawal of the FRAND Declaration for that SEP may fall under the exclusion of business activities of other entrepreneurs by making it difficult to	competing enterprisers to refuse to grant a license to particular enterprisers without justifiable reasons"; "(2) Act of unfairly refusing to grant a license to particular enterprisers"; "(3) Act of refusing to grant a license for unjust purposes such as refusing to grant a license because the patentee's unfair terms were not accepted."[45] • *See* KFTC-Apple decision, rejecting Apple's contention that	unilateral refusal to assist its competitors, in part because doing so may undermine incentives for investment and innovation."[48] Agency officials have applied this to SEPs as well.[49] • The U.S. DOJ has recently taken the position that "a unilateral refusal to license a valid patent should be per se legal."[50] • Regarding SEPs, the DOJ has recently stated that FRAND is not "a compulsory licensing scheme."[51]

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
				research & develop, produce or sell the products adopting the standards."[43]	Samsung's request for injunctive relief on Apple's SEPs constituted a refusal of access to essential facilities, concluding that FRAND-encumbered SEPs do not constitute essential facilities.[46] *But see* KFTC-Qualcomm decision referenced under market power, above.	
Excessive Pricing	**Prohibits holders of dominant market positions from charging "unfairly high" prices.** • Under the AML, firms	**Prohibits excessive pricing and has found pricing to be excessive when deception was used in the standard setting process.**	**Prohibits excessive pricing and views it as prima facie abuse of dominance.** • The Competition Act considers imposition of an	**Does not regulate price, but an excessive pricing theory may fit under prohibitions on refusals to deal.**	**May prohibit excessive royalty rates.** • The KFTC's IP Guidelines prohibit excessive licensing by a	**No excessive pricing prohibitions.** • U.S. antitrust law does not regulate price. Rather, firms, including

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	with dominant market positions are prohibited from abusing those positions by selling commodities at "unfairly high" prices.[52] The 2017 State Council draft AML-IP Guidelines applies this prohibition to IPRs.[53] • In 2014, the Guangdong Higher People's Court in *Huawei v. InterDigital* found that InterDigital violated the AML by seeking, *inter alia*, unfairly high royalty payments for its mobile SEPs	• The 2011 E.C. Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines recognize charging excessive royalty fees as a possible violation of competition laws.[55] These guidelines provide guidance to assess whether fees charged in the standard setting context are unfair or unreasonable.[56] In practice, few cases have been brought under an excessive pricing theory.[57] • The E.C. adopted an excessive pricing theory in *Rambus*, finding that it abused its dominance by charging excessively high royalties for the use of its patents that it would not have	"unfair" or discriminatory price to be an abuse of dominance.[60] • CCI considers imposition of excessive and unfair royalty rates a prima facie abuse of dominance.[61] • In a number of prima facie orders against Ericsson, CCI stated that royalties based on the end-user device "seem" "contrary" to FRAND terms, and that this "[c]harging of two different license fees per unit phone for use of the same technology *prima facie* is discriminatory and also reflects	• Japan's competition law does not include an excessive pricing provision; however, the JFTC's IP Guidelines indicate that it may treat refusal to license as functionally equivalent to excessive pricing if royalty demanded is prohibitively expensive.[63]	dominant firm with "overwhelmin g market dominance."[64] • Within the standard setting context, the guidelines indicate that imposing unreasonable levels of royalty may violate competition laws.[65] • Excessive pricing theories may not be pursued aggressively by enforcers in practice.[66]	monopolists, are free unilaterally to set or privately negotiate their prices.[67] This hands-off approach applies to all IPRs, including SEPs.[68]

	China	European Union	India	Japan	South Korea	United States
	(case pending appeal before China's Supreme People's Court). • In 2015, the NDRC imposed a $975 million fine against Qualcomm for allegedly charging unreasonably high royalties by refusing to provide their patent list and charging royalties for expired patents, requiring royalty-free grantbacks of relevant patents, bundling SEPs and non-SEPs, and charging "relatively high royalty rate[s] based on the	been able to claim absent its deceptive conduct during the standard setting process.[58] • Royalties have also been found excessive under Article 102.[59]	excessive pricing vis-à-vis high cost phones." CCI's rationale was that "[f]or the use of GSM chip in a phone costing Rs 100, royalty would be Rs. 1.25 but if this GSM chip is used in a phone of Rs. 1000, royalty would be Rs. 12.5."[62] • In certain matters, CCI's approach to excessive pricing of IP appears consistent with its general approach to unfair pricing, under which it has adopted a simple cost-plus approach for determining whether the price has a reasonable relation to the			

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	wholesale net selling price of devices."[54]		economic value of the product supplied.			
Injunctive Relief	**May prohibit a dominant firm that seeks injunctive relief in order to obtain unfairly high royalties.** • Under Article 26 of the State Council's 2017 draft AML-IP Guidelines, SEP holders with a dominant market position that apply for injunctive relief to obtain unfairly high license fees may be found to exclude or restrict competition.[69]	**Safe harbor from competition law for SEP holders that seek or enforce injunctive relief.** • In *Huawei v. ZTE*, the ECJ found that SEP holders have "the right to bring an action for a prohibitory injunction" and that an injunction may only be an abuse of dominance in a few exceptional circumstances.[70] • The court created a safe harbor for an SEP holder that: 1. prior to initiating an infringement action, alerts the alleged infringer of the claimed infringement and specifies the way in	**Unclear**. • In dicta, the Delhi High Court has suggested that an SEP holder may be in violation of the Competition Act by seeking injunctive relief against its implementers. However, in those cases, the court also granted interim injunctions on FRAND-assured SEPs against "unwilling licensees."[71]	**May prohibit a firm from seeking injunctive relief in order to obtain unfairly high royalties.** • JFTC IP Guidelines provide: "Refusal to license or bringing an action for injunction against a party who is willing to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered [SEP] holder, or refusal to license or bringing an action for injunction against a party who is willing	**May prohibit an SEP holder from seeking an injunction against a willing licensee.** • KFTC's IP Guidelines provide for possible antitrust liability against an SEP holder that files an injunction against a "willing licensee."[73] • *See also* KFTC-Apple decision, concluding that, because Apple failed to engage in good faith negotiations, Samsung's	**Likely not an antitrust violation.** • No U.S. court has held that seeking an injunction on a FRAND committed SEP violates antitrust law. • Instead, U.S. courts have held that, absent sham, the *Noerr-Pennngton* doctrine generally precludes antitrust liability for seeking or enforcing injunctive relief, including on SEPs.[75]

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		which the patent has been infringed; and 2. after the alleged infringer has expressed its willingness to conclude a license agreement on FRAND terms, presents to the alleged infringer a specific, written offer for a license, specifying the royalty and calculation methodology. • The ECJ put the burden on the alleged infringer to "diligently respond" to the SEP holder's offer, "in accordance with recognized commercial practices in the field and in good faith," by promptly providing a specific written		to take a license by a FRAND-encumbered [SEP] holder after the withdrawal of the FRAND Declaration for that [SEP] may fall under the exclusion of business activities of other entrepreneurs by making it difficult to research & develop, produce or sell the products adopting the standards."[72]	injunction claims on its SEPs did not constitute an abuse of dominance or unfair trade practice.[74]	• DOJ and FTC heads have stated that such conduct is properly analyzed under contract (or fraud) law, and not antitrust.[76] • The FTC entered two negotiated consents (*Bosch* and *MMI/Google*) under its standalone Section 5 "unfair methods of competition" authority (and not under traditional antitrust law) that precluded the firms from seeking injunctive relief.[77]

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		counter-offer that corresponds to FRAND terms, and by providing appropriate security (e.g., a bond or funds in escrow) from the time at which the counter-offer is rejected and prior to using the teachings of the SEP.				
Tying & Bundling	**Prohibits tying or imposing "unreasonable trading conditions" without "any justifiable cause."** • The State Council's 2017 draft AML-IP Guidelines state that tying involving IPRs are evaluated using the same factors as other types of products.[78]	**Tying is generally evaluated under an effects-based approach.** • The Technology Transfer Guidelines recognize the possibility of restrictive effects as well as efficiencies of tying relationships for IPRs generally.[81]	**Prohibits tying as an anti-competitive vertical restraint as well as by abuse of dominance, primarily on the basis of a rule of reason.** • When market share exceeds 30%, CCI applies an effects-based approach. • In *Auto Parts*, CCI held that the car manufacturers	**Tying that results in foreclosure is generally prohibited.** • "Where Tying causes difficulty in the business activities of competitors who are unable to easily find alternative trade partners in the market of the tied	**Tying is generally evaluated under a rule of reason; for SEPs, tying is likely to be considered "unfair behavior" if it is conditioned upon licensing unnecessary, non-SEPs.** • KFTC's IP Guidelines state that "an act of coercing a licensee to	**Tying is generally evaluated using an effects-based approach.** • Tying by a monopolist is quasi *per se* unlawful under the Supreme Court's decision in *Jefferson Paris Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*.[85] However, several lower courts have essentially

[44] KFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 13, at § III.3.B (stating that "the ability of the patentee within reasonable bounds to refuse to grant a license to protect its rights is generally deemed to be a fair exercise of its patent right").

[45] *Id*.

[46] Press Release, Korea Fair Trade Comm'n, Strict Sanctions on Qualcomm's Abuse of Cellular SEPs (Dec. 28, 2016), www.qualcomm.com/documents/kftc-issued-press-release-dated-december-28-2016-unofficial-english-translation (unofficial translation) [hereinafter KFTC Apple Samsung Press Release]; *See also* Koren W. Wong-Ervin, *Standard-Essential Patents: The International Landscape*, ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW INTELLECTUAL PROP. COMM. NEWSLETTER (Spring 2014), www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/standard-essential_patents_the_intl_landscape.pdf [hereinafter Wong-Ervin].

[47] *In re Indep. Serv. Organizations Antitrust Litig.*, 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws. We therefore will not inquire into his subjective motivation for exerting his statutory rights, even though his refusal to sell or license his patented invention may have an anticompetitive effect, so long as that anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory patent grant."); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 30 (2007), www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 2007 IP REPORT) ("Taking all of the relevant factors together—including the fact that no case supported this type of antitrust liability before Kodak, and the silence of section 271(d)(4) on the issue, the Agencies conclude that liability for mere unconditional, unilateral refusals to license will not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and antitrust protections."); U.S 2017 IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 15, at 3 ("The antitrust laws generally do not impose liability upon a firm for a unilateral refusal to assist its competitors, in part because doing so may undermine incentives for investment and innovation.").

[48] U.S 2017 IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 15, at § 2.1 (citing *Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP*, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004); *United States v. Colgate & Co.*, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); U.S. 2007 IP REPORT, *supra* note 48, at 27-28.

[49] Ramirez, *supra* note 29, at 4 (stating that "the same key enforcement principles [found in the 1995 IP Guidelines] also guide our analysis when standard essential patents are involved").

[50] Makan Delrahim, Asst. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Take It to the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law, Address Before the USC Gould School of Law – Application of Competition Policy to Technology and IP Licensing 8 (Nov. 10, 2017), www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download.

[51] *Id.* at 12 ("We should not transform commitments to license on FRAND terms into a compulsory licensing scheme").

[52] Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, *supra* note 1, at art. 17(1).

[53] AML-IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 2, at art. 14.

[54] *See* Koren W. Wong-Ervin, *Antitrust and IP in China: Quo Vadis?* 5-6 (Apr. 16, 2015), www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-presentations/wong-ervin_-_2015_aba_spring_meeting_4-16-15.pdf [hereinafter Wong-Ervin, *Antitrust and IP in China*]; *see also* Press Release, Qualcomm Inc., Qualcomm and China's National Development and Reform Commission Reach Resolution -NDRC Accepts Qualcomm's Rectification Plan -Qualcomm Raises Midpoints of Fiscal 2015 Revenue and Non-GAAP EPS Guidance (Feb. 9, 2015), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/QCOM/3864235320x0x808060/382E59E5-B9AA-4D59-ABFF-BDFB9AB8F1E9/Qualcomm_and_China_NDRC_Resolution_final.pdf.

[55] Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11)1, ¶ 269 (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter EC Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines].

[56] *Id.* at ¶ 289–90 (2011) (internal citations omitted).

[57] Case C‑177/16—*Biedrība 'Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība' v. Konkurences padome, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl* ¶ 3 (Apr. 6, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=req&docid=189662&occ=first&dir=&cid=756879 (stating that the E.C. has been "been extremely reluctant to make use of that provision against (allegedly) high prices practiced by dominant undertakings").

[58] Case COMP/38.636—*Rambus, Comm'n Decision*, ¶ 28 (Dec. 9, 2009) (summary at 2010 O.J. (C 30) 17), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38636/38636_1203_1.pdf.

[59] *See, e.g.*, Joined Cases 110/88, 241/88, 242/88, *Lucazeau v SACEM* [1989] E.C.R. 2811, ¶¶ 21-33, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:61988CJ0110&from=EN.

[60] The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, § II.4.2, www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/cci_pdf/competitionact2012.pdf (India).

[61] Case No. 04/15—*Best IT World (India) Private Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson* ¶ 14 (May 12, 2015), www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/042015_0.pdf (stating that "The Commission observes that forcing a party to execute NDA and imposing excessive and unfair royalty rates, prima facie, amount to abuse of dominance in violation of section 4 of the Act").

[62] Case No. 50/2013—*In re: Micromax Informatics Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson*, Comm'n Decision, ¶ 17 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/502013_0.pdf; *see also* Case No. 76/2013, *In re Intex Techn. Ltd., v. Telfonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Comm'n Decision*, ¶ 17 (Jan. 16, 2014), http://cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/762013_0.pdf.

[63] JFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 11, at pt. 3(1)(i).

[64] KFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 13, at § II.2.B.

[65] *Id*. at § III(5)(A). Note that the KFTC has stated that the phrase "likely to impede fair trade" found in its English version of its Guidelines should be translated as "may harm competition".

[66] Glob. Antitrust Inst., Geo. Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, A Conversation with Former Federal Trade Commissioner Joshua D. Wright & Korea Fair Trade Commission Vice-Chairman Kim Hack-hyun 9 (Apr 8, 2016), http://masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/GAI%20Interview%20Final%28VC%20Kim%29%282%29.pdf ("[T]here are very few cases where we actually enforced this provision. As far as I remember, the last case that this provision was applied to was the case in 1992, the early stage of the competition law enforcement. It was a very rare case where the output was drastically reduced with prices unchanged.").

[67] *See, e.g.*, *Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP*, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).

[68] *See, e.g.*, Bill Baer, Former Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Reflections on the Role of Competition Agencies When Patents Become Essential, Address Before the 19th Annual International Bar Association Competition Conference 10 (Sept. 11, 2015), www.justice.gov/opa/file/782356/download ("We don't use antitrust enforcement to regulate royalties. That notion of price controls interferes with free market competition and blunts incentives to innovate. For this reason, U.S. antitrust law does not bar 'excessive pricing' in and of itself. Rather, lawful monopolists are perfectly free to charge monopoly prices if they choose to do so. This approach promotes innovation from rivals or new entrants drawn by the lure of large rewards."); Ramirez, *supra* note 29, at 8 ("In contrast to the FTC's and EC's approach, media reports indicate that China's antitrust authorities may be willing to impose liability solely on the royalty terms that a patent owner demands for a license to its FRAND-encumbered SEPs, as well as royalty demands for licenses for other patents that may not be subject to a voluntary FRAND commitment."); Keith N. Hylton, *Antitrust Snoops on the Loose*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2015, at A9, *reprinted in* CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (June 2015) *available at* www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/file/view/7396.

[69] AML-IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 2, at art. 26.

[70] Case C-170/13, *Huawei Techs. Co. Ltd. v. ZTE Corp.*, EU:C:2015:477, ¶¶ 65–67 (July 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-170/13.

[71] Case No. 50/2013—*In re Micromax Informatics Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson*, Comm'n Decision, ¶ 199 (Nov. 12, 2013), http://cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/502013_0.pdf; Case No W.P.(C) 464/2014 & CM Nos.911/2014 & 915/2014, *Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson v. Competition Comm'n of India*, (Mar. 30, 2016), http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/telefonaktiebolaget-lm-Ericsson-publ-v-competition-commission-of-india-and-anr (High Ct. of Delhi).

[72] JFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 11, at pts. 3(1)(i)(e) & 4(2)(iv).

[73] KFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 13, at § III(5)(B).

[74] KFTC Apple Samsung Press Release, *supra* note 46; *see* Wong-Ervin, *supra* note 46.

[75] *Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc.*, 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (the court dismissed Apple's Sherman Act Section 2 claims on Noerr-Pennington grounds). The Noerr-Pennington doctrine precludes antitrust liability for the act of petitioning the government and conduct incidental to it. The doctrine states that petitioning is protected by the First Amendment. Sham exception holds that using the petitioning process simply as an anticompetitive tool without legitimately seeking a positive outcome to the petitioning destroys immunity.

[76] *See e.g.*, Delrahim, *supra* note 50, at 12; Maureen Ohlhausen, *The Elusive Role of Competition in the Standard-Setting Antitrust Debate*, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93 (2017).

[77] For a discussion of these consent agreements, *see* Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua D. Wright, *Intellectual Property and Standard Setting*, 17 FEDERALIST SOC'Y REV. 523 (Oct. 2016).

[78] AML-IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 2, at art. 16.

[79] Nat'l Dev. & Reform Comm'n, Administrative Penalty Decision No. [2015] (Feb. 9, 2015) *available in Chinese at* www.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201503/t20150302_666209.html (unofficial English translation of decision on file with author).

[80] InterDigital, Inc., Quarterly Report 12 (Form 10-Q), at 12 (Sept. 30, 2013), www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1405495/000140549513000040/idcc-20139302013.htm.; *see* Anne Layne-Farrar & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, *Methodologies for Calculating FRAND Damages: An Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Case Law from China, the European Union, India and the United States*, 8:2 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 127 (2017).

[81] E.C. IP Guidelines, *supra* note 3, at ¶¶ 221–25.

[82] COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE COMPETITION ACT 6–7 (2002), www.competition-commission-india.nic.in/advocacy/Intellectual_property_rights.PDF [hereinafter CCI IP GUIDANCE].

[83] JFTC, THE GUIDELINES FOR EXCLUSIONARY PRIVATE MONOPOLIZATION UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT parts II 4(1) & (2) (2009), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/guidelines_exclusionary.pdf.

[84] KFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 13, at § III(3)(D)(5).

[85] *Jefferson Paris Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2, 25 (1984) (confirmed the continued role of a per se analysis, yet emphasizes that market power in the tying product was a requirement for per se illegality). Later that same year, the Supreme Court explained that the application of the per se rule to tying had evolved to incorporate a market analysis: "[T]here is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, while the Court has spoken of a 'per se' rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have

procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis." *Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.*, 468 U.S. 85, 104 n.26 (1984) (citation omitted).

[86] *Wells Real Estate, Inc. v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors*, 850 F.2d 803, 815 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The tying claim must fail absent any proof of anti-competitive effects in the market for the tied product."); *Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs. (Gulf), Inc.*, 806 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1986) (declining to apply the *per se* rule to a tie that "simply does not imply a sufficiently great likelihood of anticompetitive effect").

[87] *United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp.*, 187 F. Supp. 545, 557-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), *aff'd per curiam*, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (concluding that a tie was justified for a limited time in a new industry to assure effective functioning of complex equipment); *Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc.*, 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (upholding verdict for defendant because the tie may have been found to be the least expensive and most effective means of policing quality); *Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. O. Smith Corp.*, 292 F.2d 653, 655-57 (1st Cir. 1961) (affirming a judgment of a district court that directed a verdict in favor of the defendant because a tie was necessary to assure utility of two products when separate sales led to malfunctions and widespread customer dissatisfaction); *see also Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc.*, 675 F.3d 1192, 1200 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Like other vertical restraints, tying arrangements may promote rather than injure competition.").

[88] U.S 2017 IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 15, § 5.3.

[89] InterDigital, *supra* note 80.

[90] Wong-Ervin, *Antitrust and IP in China*, *supra* note 54, at 5-6; *see also* Qualcomm Press Release, *supra* note 544.

[91] E.C. IP Guidelines, *supra* note 3, ¶¶ 129–32. Article 5(1)(a) of the Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulations (TTBER) states, "The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to any of the following obligations contained in technology transfer agreements: (a) any direct or indirect obligation on the licensee to grant an exclusive licence or to assign rights, in whole or in part, to the licensor or to a third party designated by the licensor in respect of its own improvements to, or its own new applications of, the licensed technology." Comm'n Regulation (EU) No. 316/2014 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 2014 O.J. (L 93) 17, 22.

[92] CCI IP GUIDANCE, *supra* note 82, at 5.

[93] *Id*.

[94] JFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 11, at pt. 4(5)(viii),(xi).

[95] *Id*. at pt. 3(2)(iii).

[96] KFTC IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 13, at § III(4)(B)

[97] *Id.*; *see id.* at § III(4)(A)(1)–(3) (discussing certain conditions in patent pools that also apply to cross-licensing arrangements).

[98] U.S 2017 IP GUIDELINES, *supra* note 15, at § 5.6 (citing *Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.*, 329 U.S. 637, 645–48 (1947)).

[99] *Id.* at § 3.1.