NOWHERE TO RUN, NOWHERE TO HIDE: APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CONNECTED CARS IN THE INTERNET-OF-THINGS ERA

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“Privacy is not an option, and it shouldn't be the price we accept for just getting on the Internet.”1

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are in the market for a new motor vehicle. Like many first-time car owners, this is your first major capital purchase. After conducting your own research and looking around the showroom at the car dealership, you have decided on your dream vehicle: a car with built-in 4G LTE Internet access.2 Once you sign all of the required paperwork at the dealer, the new car is yours. Before you drive off the car lot, you are eager to test out the car’s hi-tech features. You connect your iPhone to your car to make calls and access your text messages. Highly satisfied, you begin your drive home in your new car. For now, all is well.

On your way home, you decide to call your best friend to talk about your new car. In your excitement to share all of the details of your new Internet-connected car, you fail to stop at a stop sign. Unfortunately, a police cruiser was stationed near the stop sign, and the police officer in the cruiser had full view of your traffic violation. The police officer pulls you over soon after.

When the officer approaches your window, she informs you that you failed to stop at the stop sign several blocks ago. After you hand the officer your license and registration, she asks if you have been smoking marihuana. You quickly answer “no,” but the officer insists that she smells a marihuana odor coming from the car. The officer then orders you out of the car, places you in handcuffs, and conducts an interior search of your car. The search of the interior returns nothing, so the officer decides to use your car’s touchscreen display to access your text messages and call history. The officer then finds the following text-message exchange between you and a contact named “Rott”:

You: “How much did u put in the trunk?”
Rott: “850g, you’ll be good for a while”
You: “Got it, thanks”

Through her training and expertise, the officer knew that this text-message exchange was related to illegal drug activity. As a result, the officer searched the trunk of your vehicle. In the trunk, the officer found a small box with seventeen plastic baggies. Each baggie was tied up and contained approximately fifty grams of marihuana, with the exception of one baggie, which was opened and almost empty. With this evidence, the officer places you under arrest for criminal possession of marihuana.3 In hindsight, maybe the 1986 Chevrolet Camaro was a better option.

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* MARTHA AND THE VANDELLAS, Nowhere to Run, on DANCE PARTY (Motown 1965).
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2 The 4G LTE connection will allow this vehicle to stream information from the Internet directly to the vehicle and to create a Wi-Fi hotspot, which allows other mobile devices (such as laptops, tablets, and smartphones) to connect to the Internet by using the vehicle’s Internet connection. See OnStar 4G LTE and Wi-Fi Hotspot, ONSTAR, https://www.onstar.com/us/en/services/connections/4glte.html [https://perma.cc/7UJ7-L9M9].
3 On the federal level, marihuana is considered a Schedule I controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2016), and possession of marihuana is a federal crime, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2016). On the state level, possession of marihuana above certain amounts for non-medicinal purposes is a crime. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.20 (LexisNexis 2016) (stating that possession of marihuana above eight ounces is a class E felony).
With the rise of Internet-connected vehicles, situations like the scenario above will become more prevalent. The percentage of new cars equipped with Internet connectivity will rise to seventy-five percent by 2020, up from only thirteen percent in 2015.\(^4\) These Connected Cars\(^5\) will account for an estimated 380 million vehicles on the road by 2021.\(^6\) Currently, many cars record speed, direction, gear settings, and brake usage.\(^7\) In the near future, cars will be so integrated with wireless networks that they will be like giant rolling smartphones—equipped with calling systems, streaming video, cameras, and apps capable of harnessing the unprecedented trove of data that vehicles will produce about themselves and the people who drive them.\(^8\)

A recent study by the United States Department of Justice illustrates the prevalence of vehicle stops and searches by police. In 2011, more than 21.6 million American drivers age sixteen or older were involved in a police-initiated traffic stop; this comprises about 10% of the 212.3 million American drivers age sixteen or older.\(^9\) About 3.5% of all stopped vehicles were searched by police, which is over 750,000 traffic stops that resulted in vehicle searches.\(^10\)

Courts have held that a search warrant is not required for a vehicle search under certain circumstances; for example, an officer may search a vehicle without a warrant if she has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.\(^11\) However, this automobile exception has traditionally been limited to the finite space of the physical vehicle itself, including the trunk\(^12\) and glove compartment.\(^13\) Since the digital data on a Connected Car may not be located in the physical car itself, there is a new legal question in applying the Fourth Amendment

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\(^5\) Connected Cars are automobiles “that have access to the Internet and [contain] a variety of sensors, and . . . are thus able to send and receive signals, sense the physical environment around them, and interact with other vehicles or entities.” Edward H. Baker et al., Connected Car Report 2016: Opportunities, Risk, and Turmoil on the Road to Autonomous Vehicles, PWC STRATEGY&, at 10 (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Connected-car-report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH3E-PJFU].


\(^8\) See Baker et al., supra note 5, at 21 (noting that Connected Cars will soon be able to “provide insights into driving patterns, touch point preferences, digital service usage, and vehicle condition, in virtually real time”). Manufacturers can use this data for “preventive and predictive [car] maintenance, optimized marketing, upselling, and making data available to third parties.” Id. (emphasis added).

\(^9\) Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, Police Behavior During Traffic and Street Stops, 2011, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2AN-C6QV] (“About 10% of the 212.3 million U.S. drivers age 16 or older were stopped while operating a motor vehicle during their most recent contact with police.”).

\(^10\) See id. at 9.


\(^12\) United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (holding that a warrantless search of containers in the trunk of a car is permissible).

to Connected Cars; specifically, whether a warrantless search of the physical areas of the Car also permits a search of the digital data on the Car. This Note will answer this question.

Although this Note will focus on Connected Cars, this Note is a case study symbolic of the Fourth Amendment’s application to developing technology. The Supreme Court recently applied Fourth Amendment doctrine to a global positioning system (GPS) and a cell phone. These devices, along with Connected Cars, are some of the many new devices in the Internet of Things (IoT) that can connect to the Internet and collect and share a wide variety of data. The concept of IoT goes beyond computers, smartphones, and tablets; items that were traditionally non-electronic are now being equipped with microchips and various sensors to make the devices more effective and user-friendly. For example, wearable health and fitness sensors can “track and wirelessly transmit information such as heart rate, brain activity, body temperature, and hydration level” in real time. Also, sensors in homes can control, among other things, the temperature, the amount of light in a room, and the opening and closing of doors. There are even smart refrigerators that can detect when it is running low on milk and reorder more online. Since IoT technology is still in its infancy, courts have not had the opportunity to apply the Fourth Amendment to these new technologies, including Connected Cars.

As IoT technology continues to evolve, Fourth Amendment protections also need to evolve in order to maintain the balance of power between individuals and law enforcement. Criminal investigations are more sophisticated due to advances in technology. If these investigation techniques are left unchecked, individual Fourth Amendment protections will become less effective over time. To maintain the level of Fourth Amendment protection intended by the Framers of the Constitution, courts need to modify legal rules to restore the

14 See Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 853 (2016) (“If an effect is defined as the physical object, plus the digital information located in the device and the communication signals to a third-party network, then a whole new Fourth Amendment threshold has been created without clear boundaries.”).


16 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Riley is discussed further in Part II-B infra.

17 See Ferguson, supra note 14, at 812 ("As a general matter, the concept behind the Internet of Things is quite simple: objects embedded with identifiers or recognizable by sensors will be able to communicate digital information to sensors seeking to collect the information."); See Antigone Peyton, A Litigator’s Guide to the Internet of Things, 22 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2016).


19 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 817 n.75.

20 Id. at 817.


22 Id.


25 See Kerr, supra note 23, at 527 (opining that “if a new technology permits the government to access information that it previously could not access without a warrant, using techniques not regulated under preexisting rules that predate that technology, the effect will be that the Fourth Amendment matters less and less over time”).
balance of power between individuals and law enforcement. These legal-rule modifications do not expand Fourth Amendment protections beyond their intended scope; these additional protections only serve to maintain the constitutionally mandated balance of police power.

This Note advocates that the United States Supreme Court impose a search-warrant requirement for the digital data on a Connected Car. For purposes of police searches, the Court should bifurcate the physical areas and the digital data on Connected Cars. This distinction will properly account for the greater individual privacy interests implicated in a search of digital information, as detailed in the Supreme Court decision Riley v. California, where the Supreme Court held that police are required to obtain a warrant prior to searching digital data on a cell phone. The massive trove of data located on a Connected Car is virtually similar, if not greater, to that of a cell phone. Consequently, the Court’s rationales in Riley should be extended to these Cars in order to maintain the balance of power between individuals and law enforcement.

Remarkably, a New York Assistant District Attorney agreed that a warrant should be obtained before searching digital data on a Connected Car. Part I of this Note will briefly discuss the key components of a Connected Car, identify who collects the data from the Car, and examine the various uses for the data. Part II-A will trace the historical development of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, which generally permits law-enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle. Part II-B will discuss how the Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to pre-Internet technologies. Part II-C will discuss two recent Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases, United States v. Jones and Riley v. California, that involve a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device and a cell phone, respectively. Part III-A recommends that a warrant be required for the search of digital data on a Connected Car, which serves to protect the Car owner’s individual privacy interests. Part III-B addresses possible concerns about the efficacy and practicality of a warrant requirement. This Note concludes in Part IV.

I. WHAT IS A CONNECTED CAR?

Connected Cars will provide manufacturers with a level of insight into their customers that they have never had before. Connected Cars contain several categories of data collection. First, the Car records geographic location in several ways. Navigation systems in the Car record the Car’s physical location, the last location the Car was parked, and “previous destinations entered into [the] navigation system.” Second, the Car records operational data, including vehicle speed, travel direction, and times and distances traveled. Finally, the Car records

26 Id. at 482.
27 See id. at 527.
29 Id. at 2495.
30 Telephone Interview with Assistant District Attorney, New York (Feb. 16, 2017).
32 See Baker et al., supra note 5, at 21 (noting that “[t]he auto industry has not had the frequent digital touch points to be able to” use the data collected from customers).
34 Markey, supra note 33, at 8.
35 Id.
various miscellaneous events, including potential crash events (sudden changes in speed), seat belt use, and air bag deployment. All of this data is stored locally on the Car and/or transmitted to the manufacturer. Local storage is done on a special hard drive, and a typical hard drive can hold between 100 gigabytes and 320 gigabytes of data.

Aside from data collection, cell phone integration allows certain data on the cell phone to be accessed through the Car’s head unit. Apple CarPlay and Android Auto are two examples of head-unit software that allow this cell phone connectivity. While the user only has access to certain cell phone information through the head-unit software, the Car itself has access to much more. For example, Apple CarPlay “can predict where you most likely want to go using addresses from your email, texts, contacts, and calendars.” Consider this scenario: You send a text message to your friend, Jane Doe, to meet you at Utopia Pizzeria. You then decide to drive your Connected Car, with Apple CarPlay, to Utopia Pizzeria. When you connect your cell phone to your Car, the navigation system immediately suggests Utopia Pizzeria as your next destination. Assuming you have never been to Utopia Pizzeria, the Car would not know that you want to visit Utopia Pizzeria if it did not have access to your text message to Jane Doe.

The requisite privacy statements for Connected Car services detail the collection and sharing of the Car data. For example, OnStar—a multi-purpose Connected Car system with more than seven million subscribers in North America and China—remotely collects and stores the Car data mentioned earlier. Under the terms of OnStar’s privacy statement, OnStar may use the Car’s data “for any purpose,” so long as they anonymize it to no longer reasonably identify the Car’s owner or the Car itself; this permits OnStar to share the Car data with marketing companies and other third parties. To retrieve this data from OnStar, police would need to obtain a warrant, subpoena, or court order. For example, in 2009, Louisiana police obtained a warrant to compel OnStar to track a vehicle travelling from Texas to Louisiana.
complied, and the police found ecstasy, cocaine, and a gun inside the vehicle.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, even if an OnStar subscriber cancels their service, OnStar will continue to collect the Car’s data unless the Car owner specifically opts out of the data collection.\textsuperscript{51}

Consumers grant manufacturers the permission to access and collect this data through their agreements to the manufacturer’s privacy statements without considering the content of these statements.\textsuperscript{52} If manufacturers disclose in their privacy statement that they are collecting and sharing a Car owner’s data, the owner will be deemed to have expressly consented to the manufacturer’s policies.\textsuperscript{53} If a Car owner chooses to cease the manufacturer’s data collection, they are usually prohibited from using some of the Car’s valuable functionalities, such as GPS.\textsuperscript{54} One Car manufacturer even stated that there was “no reason to inform users” of data collection.\textsuperscript{55} To provide more transparency, some critics have advocated for an “affirmative consent” principle where the Car owner would need to opt in to having certain information collected by the manufacturer.\textsuperscript{56} Thus far, their calls have fallen on deaf ears.\textsuperscript{57}

II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”\textsuperscript{58} A “search” occurs when, “for the purpose of finding evidence of a crime,” a law-enforcement officer examines a person’s body, property, or another area that the person would reasonably expect to consider private.\textsuperscript{59} A warrantless search conducted by a law-enforcement officer is per se unreasonable,\textsuperscript{60} but the Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to this rule that do not require a warrant prior to a search.\textsuperscript{61} One of these exceptions is the automobile exception.

A. Lesser Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles

\textsuperscript{50} Id. Since police obtained a warrant prior to searching the vehicle, this scenario does not pose a Fourth Amendment issue.


\textsuperscript{52} See Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/KJJ5-GZKS].

\textsuperscript{53} See PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 36-38 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2014).

\textsuperscript{54} Markey, supra note 33, at 12.

\textsuperscript{55} See id.

\textsuperscript{56} See id.

\textsuperscript{57} See id.

\textsuperscript{58} U.S. CONST. amend. IV.


\textsuperscript{60} Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”). In general, evidence obtained by law-enforcement officers as a result of an unreasonable search will be suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).

\textsuperscript{61} See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (discussing the automobile exception); Benjamin Holley, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the Private Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (2010) (discussing the private search exception, which permits government agents, without a warrant, to recreate the search done by the private party so long as they do not exceed the scope of the private search). For more discussion about the exceptions to the warrant requirement, see Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
The Supreme Court has subjected vehicles to a lesser expectation of privacy because of their inherent mobility and their ability to be used for transportation; a lesser expectation of privacy is why the warrantless searches are permissible. The automobile exception was set forth in the landmark Supreme Court case, *Carroll v. United States*. There, law-enforcement officers suspected that the defendants were transporting illegal goods in their vehicle. As a result, the officers pulled over the defendants, searched their car without a warrant, and found illegal goods hidden underneath the seat cushions. *Carroll* distinguished a vehicle search from a search of a building because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought”; as a result, taking the time to secure a warrant may be impracticable. The Court held that the warrantless search of a vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the Court established that concealed contraband goods located within a vehicle were not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Thus, if a law-enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she has the constitutional authority to search it immediately and a warrant is not required for the search.

*Carroll*’s automobile exception was later applied to vehicles that were moved by police from the site of the stop. In *Chambers v. Maroney*, police officers stopped a vehicle that matched the description of the getaway vehicle used in a gas-station robbery. Both occupants were arrested, and the officers took the car to the police station to search it. The warrantless search at the police station returned two .38-caliber revolvers and numerous items that belonged to the robbery victim. Even though there was no risk of the vehicle being moved out of the police jurisdiction during the time it would take to secure a warrant, the Court held that probable cause existed to conduct the warrantless vehicle search at the police station. Regardless of the time lapse between the original vehicle stop and the vehicle search, the Court found that the officers still had probable cause to believe that the robbery vehicle contained contraband and did not need a warrant. As long as probable cause exists, an officer is permitted to either conduct

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63 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
64 Id. at 135.
65 Id. at 136.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 156.
68 In this Note, “contraband” is defined as any item, prohibited by statute, that is subject to seizure and forfeiture by a designated governmental actor. *See, e.g.*, id. at 149-53.
69 Id. at 153.
70 Id. at 156.
72 Id. at 44.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 50-51.
76 Id. at 52. Officer safety may have also played a role in the Court’s decision. *See id.* at 52 n.10 (noting that “[i]t was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house. All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers”).
an immediate warrantless search of the vehicle, or even search the vehicle at a later time. To this point, the Court did not delineate an outer temporal border for the automobile exception.

The Court placed limitations on the automobile exception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire. In Coolidge, the defendant was questioned by the police at his house in connection with a murder. After the police conducted a lie detector test on the defendant, visited the defendant’s house a second time, and collected other evidence from the defendant’s wife, the defendant was arrested at his house three weeks after the initial police visit. The police then searched the defendant’s vehicle, which was located in the driveway adjacent to his house, and found evidence linking the defendant to the murder. The plurality rejected the State’s use of the automobile exception to justify the search of the defendant’s vehicle. Even though the police had probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle, the plurality found that it was not impracticable to obtain a search warrant; in fact, they had “ample opportunity” to do so. Today, advances in technology have made it even quicker to obtain search warrants. Distinguishing Carroll and Chambers, the plurality emphasized that the items in the defendant’s car were not contraband and that the opportunity to search the defendant’s vehicle was not “fleeting.” As a result, “the application of the Carroll case to [Coolidge’s] facts would extend it far beyond its original rationale.” With this decision, the Court prohibited the use of the automobile exception in circumstances where “no exigent circumstances” existed. The Court also emphasized that “[t]he word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”

Despite Coolidge’s limitation on the automobile exception, the Court continued to reaffirm warrantless searches in several physical areas within a vehicle, including the glove compartment, center console, trunk, and any containers within the interior or trunk of the car.

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77 Id. at 52.
78 See id. at 51 (noting that the warrantless vehicle search “must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search”) (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 445.
81 Id. at 447. The second police visit to the defendant’s home was done by a different pair of officers, and they were unaware of the first visit made by the other officers. Id.
82 Id. at 448. The police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s vehicle, but the plurality invalidated the warrant since it was not obtained by a “neutral and detached magistrate [as] required by the Constitution.” Id. at 453. As a result, the State sought, inter alia, to invoke the automobile exception. Id. at 458.
83 Id. at 464.
84 Id. at 462. The plurality found no evidence that would permit the use of the automobile exception. Id. (noting there was “no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile”).
85 For further discussion on the ease obtaining a warrant today, see infra Part III-B.
86 For the definition of “contraband,” see supra note 68.
87 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460-62.
88 Id. at 458.
89 See id. at 464.
90 Id. at 461.
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Technology in the Pre-Internet Era

Automobiles are an early example of how the Supreme Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to new technologies. Advances in technology have continued to create problems for our legal framework. Over time, developing technology has continued to change society’s reasonable expectations of privacy. An expectation of privacy is reasonable when an individual exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy and that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. As the Court recognizes, the reasonable expectation of privacy continues to change as technology changes over time.

Originally, in Olmstead v. United States, technology was afforded a lesser expectation of privacy. In this 1928 Supreme Court case, the defendant was suspected of selling illegal goods, so federal officers installed wiretaps in the basement of the defendant’s building. The wiretaps were installed without trespassing onto the defendant’s property and were used to listen to his telephone conversations. Later, the officers intercepted incriminating evidence from the wiretap, and the officers arrested the defendant. The Court held that the wiretap was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Relying on dicta in Carroll, the Court indicated that the Fourth Amendment only protects against a physical search of constitutionally protected areas: one’s person, papers, home, or “tangible material effects.” Since telephone conversations are intangible and not physical in nature, they were not protected under the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in *Olmstead* criticized the majority’s strict reliance on the original text of the Fourth Amendment. Brandeis recognized that the language of the Fourth Amendment should not be construed to apply solely to its original enacted purposes. Furthermore, Brandeis had the foresight to recognize that advances in technology would provide the government with more non-physical ways to seize information, which would create even greater privacy concerns. In other words, as technology continues to develop and become more sophisticated, the government’s surveillance capabilities will advance and not rely on physical interventions, so a literal understanding of the Fourth Amendment will diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy over time. As a result, it is important to establish a proper balance between law enforcement interests and individual interests when construing the Fourth Amendment.

In line with Justice Brandeis’s dissent, the Court later overruled *Olmstead* in the seminal case *Katz v. United States*. In *Katz*, the government placed a voice recording device on top of a public payphone that the defendant regularly used to conduct illegal activity over telephone conversations. The defendant was later arrested, and the recorded telephone conversations were admitted into evidence. The Court held that the government’s use of the recording device was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. From the outset, the Court rejected the notion that Fourth Amendment searches only apply to physical searches of constitutionally protected areas, thereby overruling the core holding of *Olmstead*. The Court emphasized that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” The Court went on to distinguish protected activity from activity not protected under the Fourth Amendment: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Here, the defendant’s use of the public telephone booth was protected activity because the defendant expected the content of his conversations to remain private. Since the government’s search “violated the privacy upon which [the defendant]...

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106 See *id.* at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
107 *Id.* at 473.
108 See *id.* at 474 (opining that “[w]ays may some day be developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home”). Unfortunately, Brandeis’s prediction was correct. See *Kyllo v. United States*, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the government’s use of a thermal imaging device outside of a person’s home to record heat being emitted from inside the home was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment).
109 See *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
111 *Id.* at 348. The defendant was accused of transmitting information to facilitate gambling, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994). *Id.*
112 *Id.* at 348-49. Since “there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the defendant],” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the telephone conversations into evidence. *Katz v. United States*, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
113 *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 353.
114 *Id.* at 350, 353. *Id.* at 351.
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth,” the government should have obtained a warrant to conduct this search.117

Justice Harlan’s concurrence in *Katz* expanded on the majority’s argument by proposing a two-prong test for whether a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” The first prong asks whether, depending on the facts and circumstances, the individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy. The second prong asks whether that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable; this involves an objective analysis. Harlan’s subjective-objective standard was later adopted by the Court to determine whether a particular governmental investigative technique constituted a Fourth Amendment search, and *Katz* continued to be the guidepost for a long time in the Fourth Amendment framework.

C. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Technology in the Post-Internet Era

Even within this *Katz* framework, the rise of the Internet and continued development of technology have created a new host of Fourth Amendment issues. The Framers did not envision devices that could instantly pinpoint one’s location and contain massive troves of data, yet still able to fit in the palm of your hand. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently confronted the challenge of applying the Fourth Amendment to two new technologies: a GPS tracking device in *United States v. Jones* (2012) and a cell phone in *Riley v. California* (2014).

*Jones* addressed whether “the attachment of a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” There, the government placed a GPS tracking device underneath the defendant’s car and used the GPS to monitor the vehicle’s movement for twenty-eight days. Despite holding that the government’s installation of the GPS device was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court deviated from the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test articulated in *Katz* in favor of the traditional, property-based approach from *Olmstead*. In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized the physical intrusion of the defendant’s car and how the intrusion fit within the original scope of the Fourth Amendment. Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that recent cases deviated from *Olmstead*’s property-based approach, Scalia insisted that *Katz* did not eliminate the *Olmstead* approach, in fact, Scalia noted that the

117 *Katz*, 389 U.S. at 353.
118 *Id.* at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
119 *Id.*
120 *Id.*
121 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1979) (applying the *Katz* analysis as detailed by Justice Harlan).
122 See Ric Simmons, *From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies*, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1322 (2002).
124 *Id.* During those twenty-eight days, the GPS tracking device transmitted over 2,000 pages of data. *Id.* at 949.
125 *Id.* at 949. This rationale was used to buttress the plurality’s arguments in *Olmstead*, so it is difficult to argue that this is not a return to the *Olmstead* approach. *See* Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by *Katz* v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and *Berger v. New York*, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
126 *But* see Ferguson, supra note 14, at 831 n.161 (arguing that the Court’s “assertion belies the history and general discussion of the issue, which has long left the *Olmstead* line of cases in the graveyard of Fourth Amendment history”). Scholars have questioned whether the Court’s return to *Olmstead* was justified. *See*, e.g., Erin Murphy, *Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones*, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325 (2012); Thomas K
reasonable expectation of privacy test “has been added to, not substituted for,” the *Olmstead* approach. Thus, after *Jones*, there is now a three-prong test used to determine whether a particular governmental investigative technique has violated the Fourth Amendment: (1) the technique must be a physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected area; (2) the trespass must be done to obtain information; and (3) the *Katz* reasonable expectation of privacy test must be satisfied.

In separate concurrences in *Jones*, Justices Alito and Sotomayor both agreed that GPS tracking can reveal intricate details about a person. Justice Sotomayor observed that advances in technology will generate more nonphysical modes of surveillance, which would render the trespassory test less useful, but “[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to *Katz* analysis.” As a result, Sotomayor believed that both long-term and short-term GPS monitoring might impinge on reasonable expectations of privacy. Similarly, Justice Alito believed that only long-term GPS monitoring may impinge on reasonable expectations of privacy, but short-term GPS monitoring probably would not. Neither Sotomayor nor Alito delineated when exactly long-term GPS tracking of a vehicle would commence, but Alito found that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”

Soon after *Jones*, the Supreme Court addressed the privacy interests implicated in one of the most pervasive forms of technology today—the cell phone. In *Riley v. California*, the Court decided whether a warrantless search of digital data on a cell phone is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. In two separate incidents, police officers recovered a cell phone following a search incident to arrest. Through the normal operation of each cell phone, the officers accessed incriminating information by reviewing call records, pictures, and videos on each phone without obtaining warrants. The Court held that police officers must obtain a


*Jones*, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted).

See *id.* at 951 n.5.

Compare *id.* at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) with *id.* at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the *Katz* analysis will require particular attention.”).

*Id.* at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This can occur when the government is given remote access to “factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled smartphones.” *Id.*

*Id.*

*Id.* at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).

*Id.*


*Riley* focuses on searches incident to arrest, but the implications of its reasoning reach far beyond this narrower issue. See *id.* at 2485. Even though *Riley* addressed the retention of the warrant requirement for cell phone searches, courts have relied on *Riley* to apply other Fourth Amendment doctrines to cell phones. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (relying on *Riley* to apply the Fourth Amendment private search exception to cell phones).

*Id.* at 2480-82. In a consolidated opinion, both David Riley and Brima Wurie had their cell phones taken from their person. *Id.*

*Id.* at 2480-81. Riley had a smartphone, which has a wide range of features and large storage capacity, while Wurie had a flip phone, which generally has less features than a smartphone. *Id.* Neither cell phone was password protected. *Id.*
warrant before searching the digital information located on a cell phone. In reaching its holding, the Court differentiated physical objects from digital content on a cell phone. For example, to ensure officer safety, police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a suspect incident to arrest. As a result, the officers could search the physical parts of a cell phone to ensure there are no concealed razor blades within. However, the Court noted that cell-phone data presented no threat to officer safety.

In Riley, the Court emphasized that a search of digital information on a cell phone implicates greater individual privacy interests than a physical search. Cell phones implicate greater privacy interests due to their large storage capacity, the variety of information they can store, and the possibility that a search may extend beyond the data on the phone itself. As the Court indicated, “A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as would routinely be kept on a [cell] phone.”

The Court’s emphasis on these three factors suggest that any device with similar capabilities to a cell phone would be subject to a warrant requirement. The Court did not need to predict what other devices may be analogized to a cell phone; however, with Connected Cars entering the marketplace, the privacy interests implicated in other IoT devices must be explored.

III. SAFEGUARDING OUR PRIVACY: THE NEED FOR A WARRANT REQUIREMENT

To protect the privacy interests of Connected Car users, the Supreme Court should require law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before searching any data on a Connected Car. As previously discussed, cell phone searches implicate greater individual privacy interests. Since Connected Cars share many cell-phone attributes, Connected Cars should also implicate greater individual privacy interests. In comparing a cell phone with a Connected Car, the three-prong Jones test is useful.

A. Jones Applied to Connected Cars

Applying the three-prong Jones test to a Connected Car illustrates its similarity to a cell phone. First, in the Introduction scenario, the police officer conducted a physical trespass on the Car. The officer conducted a physical search by searching the interior of the Car and using the head-unit touchscreen to search the electronic data on the Car. This situation appears to

140 Id. at 2485. The Court refused to extend the “search incident to arrest” exception to cell phones, which generally allows police officers to search an arrestee in order to preserve evidence or ensure the safety of the officer. Id.; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1969).
141 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. By making this distinction, the Court was able to avoid adhering to the precedent in its previous “search incident to arrest” cases. See id. at 2484-85.
142 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764.
143 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973). In Robinson, the Court found that an officer could conduct a search incident to arrest because the “danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.” Id.
144 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
145 Id. at 2488-89 (noting that “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse”).
146 See id. at 2489-91.
147 Id. at 2489.
148 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 834 (“While Riley addressed the existing technologies of smartphones in 2014, the broader conclusions apply to any smart device that can track, collect, share, store, and process personal data about its owner.”); see Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”).
149 See id. at 2488-89.
150 In applying the Jones test, consider the scenario detailed in the Introduction of this Note. See supra Introduction.
combine the searches conducted in *Carroll* and *Riley*. Assuming the officer reasonably believed there was marihuana inside the vehicle, the physical search would be permissible under *Carroll*. However, the officer then accessed the call records and text messages from the cell phone through the Car’s head unit. Warrantless access to these records is precisely what the *Riley* Court sought to avoid.

Second, the physical trespass was done to obtain information. The officer looked for evidence of marihuana in the interior and trunk of the Car, and she looked on the Car’s head unit to find any evidence of marihuana activity.

The third prong of the *Jones* test is the reasonable expectation of privacy test from *Katz*. As previously stated, the two-pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test first asks whether the individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and then whether that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Each of these two prongs will be addressed in turn. For the first prong, the Car driver exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by not consenting to a search of her vehicle, which included the electronic data. In this instance, lack of consent may be the only way to prove that the driver maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in her vehicle.

Applying the second prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, which involves an objective analysis of the analogy between a Connected Car and a cell phone, presents challenges. On one hand, the Connected Car is a vehicle, which is normally subject to a lesser expectation of privacy. On the other hand, with all the data it contains and can reveal, Connected Cars hold “the privacies of life” and should implicate greater privacy interests.

In his concurrence in *Riley*, Justice Alito advocated for a revised balancing of law enforcement interests and privacy interests due to changes in technology, and he urged Congress or state legislatures to delineate “reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps other variables.”

It appears that the *Riley* majority delineated three potential variables in finding that cell phones implicate greater privacy interests: their large storage capacity, the variety of information they can store, and the possibility that a search may extend beyond the data on the phone itself. These three variables are applicable to Connected Cars.

Firstly, Connected Cars have a large storage capacity. Connected Cars can store the data they collect on the Car onto a special hard drive; these hard drives typically hold between 100 gigabytes and 320 gigabytes of data. This is a massive amount of storage capacity. For comparison, a mere sixteen gigabytes can store “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures,

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151 Marihuana is classified as a Schedule I drug under federal law, which would make it contraband. *See* 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23) (2016); *supra* note 68.

152 *See Riley*, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.


155 *See Riley*, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.

156 *Id.* at 2496-97. Alito agreed with the majority in that pre-digital precedent from previous “search incident to arrest” cases should not be mechanically applied to a cell phone search. *Id.* at 2496.

157 *Id.* at 2497.

158 *See id.* at 2489-91.

159 *See supra* Part I.

160 *See supra* note 38.
or hundreds of videos” on a cell phone. Along with cell phones, Connected Car storage capacity will only continue to increase in the future.

Secondly, Connected Cars store a wide variety of information. Aside from operational data, potential crash events, and other types of information detailed in Part I, Connected Cars also record geographical location through GPS tracking. Connected Cars and cell phones both contain GPS tracking capabilities. If a law-enforcement officer were able to search through the historical location information on the Car, the officer would be able to reconstruct the inconspicuous intimate details of the Car owner’s life, which is normally far beyond the scope of any police search. As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones, both short-term and long-term “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”

Thirdly, a data search on a Connected Car might extend beyond the data on the Car itself. This is especially true with cell phone integration. Through Apple CarPlay and Android Auto, Car owners have direct and indirect access to the data stored on their phone. In the Introduction scenario, the officer’s search went beyond the data on the Car when she used the Car’s head unit to access text messages and call records that were located on the cell phone. Additionally, to retrieve vehicle data from a Connected Car system like OnStar, OnStar requires law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant anyway. Thus, the second prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test has been met, and the three Riley variables have been satisfied. As a result, Connected Cars should implicate greater privacy interests, and a warrant requirement would protect these interests.

With a warrant requirement in place for digital data on Connected Cars, the officer’s warrantless search in the Introduction scenario would have ceased once the officer finished searching the interior of the Car. Aside from the three variables from Riley, consider the original reason for the automobile exception in Carroll: to find contraband. In the Introduction scenario, the contraband sought by the officer was marihuana. Once the officer found nothing in the physical vehicle, the warrantless search should have ceased. Instead, the officer began to search through the Car’s digital data. It cannot be argued that the officer continued to search for the contraband marihuana on the Car’s head unit data, so the warrantless search should not have extended into the Car’s head unit.

B. Opposing the Warrant Requirement

1. Impact on Law Enforcement

It is conceded that the warrant requirement for data on Connected Cars will impact how police officers do their jobs. Cell phones can provide valuable information to help prosecute

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161 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
163 See supra Part I.
164 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; Habeck et al., supra note 33, at 14.
166 Id.
167 See supra Part I.
168 See id.
169 See supra Introduction.
170 See Privacy Statement, supra note 46; supra Part I.
172 The Riley Court anticipated the same with cell phones. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
criminals. A warrant requirement could also deter officers from pursuing low-level offenders. Nonetheless, individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of officer convenience, so “[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”

Firstly, to reiterate, my proposal for a warrant requirement does not prevent police officers from searching the physical vehicle under circumstances that warrant it. My purpose is to simply require officers to obtain warrants before searching digital data on a Connected Car.

Secondly, under Coolidge, police may still justify a warrantless search of data on a Connected Car if exigent circumstances exist; this could include preventing the imminent destruction of evidence and rendering emergency assistance to people who are injured or threatened with imminent injury. For example, in the Introduction scenario, if the text message from Rott actually said “5 IEDs, that should do the trick,” then the officer would be permitted to check the trunk in order to protect herself and those around her.

Thirdly, several states now have judges on-call 24/7 to sign warrants. Judge Dale O. Harris, a Minnesota state court judge, is one of the many judges that sign warrants outside working hours. The officer would bring the completed warrant and affidavit of support to the judge’s location for the judge to sign, even if it was a holiday, outside of work hours, or the judge was at his home. Interestingly, Judge Harris noted that many of the warrants he currently signs involve searches of cell phones and computers. According to Judge Brandon Birmingham, a state court judge in Texas, reading through the affidavit and signing the warrant only takes about fifteen minutes.

Lastly, recent technological advances have made it easier to obtain a warrant. More than thirty states currently allow electronic warrant applications in various forms, including “telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video conferencing.” For example, in one county in Kansas, “[P]olice officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads; judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.” Federal magistrate judges can also issue warrants based on “information communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means.” While this may not be a perfect solution, individual privacy interests cannot be sacrificed merely for the sake of
police convenience. By discouraging law-enforcement officers from embarking on fishing expeditions for evidence based on post-hoc rationalizations, an appropriate safeguard will be in place to protect the Car-owner's privacy interests.

2. “Overprotection” for Connected Cars

Some may argue that this warrant requirement favors protection of Connected Cars over traditional automobiles. In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito suggested that the warrant requirement for cell phones would protect digital data in instances where hard-copy information would not be protected. Accordingly, digital data found on a Connected Car might be protected in instances where it would not be protected in a traditional automobile.

Nonetheless, Justice Alito noted that there was no other “workable alternative,” and this is also the case for Connected Cars. Firstly, police officers need clear rules to determine how to do their jobs. Alito opined that it would take “many years for the courts to develop more nuanced rules” about searching a cell phone; I anticipate the same with Connected Cars. In the interim, officers need to know how to approach a Connected Car search so that the evidence obtained is not suppressed later on. In fact, with reference to my Introduction scenario, a New York Assistant District Attorney opined that the marijuana recovered by the officer would very likely be suppressed. Lastly, this counterargument ignores the greater privacy interests afforded to digital data on Connected Cars. As discussed earlier, constant technology changes allow the collection and storage of digital data on Connected Cars. Also, this Connected Car warrant requirement categorically protects all data on the Car rather than favoring some types of data over others, which is in line with Riley’s categorical protection of digital data on cell phones. As a result, this warrant requirement helps to maintain the balance between individual rights and police power.

IV. CONCLUSION

To protect the privacy interests of Connected Car owners, the Supreme Court should adopt a warrant requirement for the digital data on a Connected Car. This proposed warrant requirement gives the Court a framework to apply the Fourth Amendment to current and future IoT technologies. The warrant requirement also serves to maintain the balance of police power with the privacy interests of individuals. Riley already requires a warrant for cell-phone searches, so this warrant requirement merely provides the corollary for Connected Cars and other emerging IoT technologies.

This proposed warrant requirement should not be limited to Connected Cars; it is merely a starting point in the Fourth Amendment/IoT conversation. It is unquestionable that IoT technology will continue to develop and pervade our everyday lives; Google Glasses, Virtual Reality headsets, and microchip implants will soon become commonplace. This pervasiveness permits intimate details of one’s life to be aggregated in ways that have never been possible.

186 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is an important working part of our machinery of government, not merely an inconvenience to be somehow weighed against the claims of police efficiency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 See id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Telephone Interview with Assistant District Attorney, New York (Feb. 16, 2017).
191 See supra Part I.
Doing nothing is not an option, for we will be left with a “large-scale surveillance network . . . without constitutional limits.” As a result, a solution to manage IoT technology must be designed, and it must be done soon.

193 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 879-80.