# Strategic News Bundling and Privacy Breach Disclosures

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**Abstract**

I examine how firms strategically bundle news reports to offset the negative effects of a privacy breach disclosure. Using a complete dataset of privacy breaches from 2005 to 2014, I find that firms experience a small and significant 0.27% decrease in their stock price on average following the breaking news disclosure of the privacy breach. But controlling for media coverage, this small decline is offset by an increase in the effect of a larger than usual number of positive news reports released by the firm on that day, which could increase the returns by 0.47% for every additional positive news report compared to their usual media coverage. I further find that disclosure laws have a significant and negative effect on the returns, even when news releases are used to alleviate the decrease. Moreover, a portfolio constructed with breached firms controlling for state disclosure laws outperforms the market over the 2007-2014 period, especially in the case of breached firms in mandatory disclosure states.

Keywords: News Events, Media, Information, Market Efficiency, Security breaches, Event Study, Risk analysis, Information Breach, Privacy, Market Valuation.

JEL Classification: D18, G10, G12, G14, G17, G30, K13, K20, L51, L86, M31, M37.

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# 1 Introduction

The development of online transactions and data aggregation storage for companies has increased the risk of privacy breaches in the past ten years. According to Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, in fact, there were more than 4,540 breaches reported over the period 2005-2014, compared to less than 1,000 over 1995-2005.[1] The increase is primarily due to the increased use, retention, and repackaging of data by companies.

On February 4, 2015, Anthem, Inc., one of the largest health insurance companies in the United States, announced that 80 million customers' and employees' data were stolen. Critical information (social security numbers, names, and dates of birth) for the 80 million affected people was at risk of fraudulent use, making the Anthem breach one of the largest privacy breaches in history. During the next trading day, however, the Anthem stock barely went down from its closed value of $137.6 of the day prior to the brach announcement.[2] The close price represented a decrease of 0.31%, in line with the overall market decrease.[3] The Anthem stock was unaffected by this (random) event.[4] This is one of many examples of data breaches that affected a large amount of customers and their highly personal and sensitive data but did not lead to a market sellout of the firm's stock.

This paper examines why stocks of breached firms do not seem to be significantly affected after reporting a privacy breach. I empirically show that firms counterbalance the effect of a privacy breach disclosure by bundling this negative and potentially costly release with more positive news reports to alleviate any expected decrease in stock value. I also find that firms tend to release the disclosure during a period when there are a smaller than usual amount of negative news reports. My analysis is reinforced by the fact that privacy breaches happen at random times for any given firm, but firms have some small leeway to time their disclosures. States have different laws regarding disclosures that can allow firms to announce

[1] See, for example, Computer Security Institute/Federal Bureau of Investigation Computer Crime and Security Surveys, 1995-2004. http://www.issa-sac.org/library/index.php?ID=5. Last accessed 02/05/2015.

[2] The Anthem stock intraday trading ranged between $135.40 and $138.37 on that day, closing at $137.23. See, for example, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ANTM&a=01&b=5&c=2015&d=04&e=25&f=2015&g=d&z=66&y=0. Last accessed 03/05/2015.

[3] Based on the Dow Jones index that decreased by 0.32% on the day. See, for example, http://www.wsj.com/articles/healthinsurer-anthem-hit-by-hackers-1423103720. Last accessed 02/05/2015.

[4] Within two weeks of the announcement, the stock was higher than $145. See, for example, http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=ANTM&a=01&b=5&c=2015&d=04&e=25&f=2015&g= d&z=66&y=0. Last accessed 03/05/2015.

the privacy breach event to customers or the state attorney general with different timeframes, usually between a day to up to two months after the firm discovers the breach. Moreover, privacy breaches are known to be indicative of negative news since they indicate that private information from customers or employees (or possibly both) has been stolen. Also, privacy breach disclosures, contrary to more frequent and pre-scheduled corporate disclosures, are good identifiable random events to test strategic (voluntary) disclosures by firms. Despite not all states requiring disclosures, firms may want to disclose a privacy breach to avoid developing a negative reputation.

This empirical analysis answers two main questions using privacy breach disclosures: First, can firms counterbalance the negative effect of a privacy breach disclosure by strategically timing the release of more positive media coverage than usual? Second, do disclosure laws have a significant effect on the stock price of the firms that experience a privacy breach?

## 2 Motivation and Literature Review

The overall economic effect of privacy breaches on firm value is unclear. On one hand, privacy breaches, once revealed to the market, should decrease both consumers' and investors' confidence in the firm and affect the sales of its products. Breaches could also lead to potential high remediation costs for failing to protect private consumers data, through costly lawsuits (Miller et al. (2000)), payments of a year of credit reporting, or simply decreases in future customer purchases (Rao et al (2011), Lapre (2011)). It may also decrease new customer reach, as prospective customers may be concerned that their data will be disclosed or lost by the firm (Hays and Hill (1999); Miller et al. (2000)).[5]

On the other hand, negative events like privacy breaches could have a positive effect for companies not often covered by the media. More specifically, firms might suffer from a short-run public relations nightmare due to the privacy breach, but might actually gain more investors and customers later on, due to their positive handling of the crisis.

In the Anthem case described above, the second day after the breach was reported, the Wall Street Journal reported that the stolen social security numbers of the 80 million cus-

[5]There is also a risk of secondary market for stolen data that increases identity theft against customers and the overall cost for breached companies (Camp (2007)).

tomers were not encrypted (note that it is not required by law).[6] Despite this breach news report, the stock opened at $136.95 and closed at $136.33, a small decrease explained mainly by an overall market pullback on the day, exceeding $150 within a month of the report.[7] Even if privacy breaches have long been debated in the public forum, it is a relatively underdeveloped area in the economic and finance literature. Most academic papers analyze only their short-run effects with event studies using small datasets of privacy breaches. This paper goes further by hypothesizing that privacy breach disclosures, due to their random nature, lead to firms bundling the disclosure with positive news reports to offset the negative effect on firms' values of the breach. Previous studies have shown that privacy breaches have a large negative effect on stocks of companies (Acquisti et al. (2006)), making the information of a privacy breach being reflected quickly into the shares of a company due to the negative reputation and data protection effect on the business. Contrary to inefficient markets where information does make it into share prices although the reaction to an announcement may be gradual, sometimes taking several years, the reaction for a privacy breach has been documented to be instant and publicized through remediation. Black and Carnes (2000) argued, that corporate reputation has value to the investor. Based on this argument, a breach disclosure may lead to a loss of reputation that could aggravate if firms do not have a positive environment to counter negative news reports. It could be argued that if (irrational) investors take time to understand the implication of a given privacy breach, the bundling of good news may be decreased. Nonetheless, it is a dangerous bet for companies to not bundle positive news reports with a negative disclosure. Behavioral economics explains that potential customers may refrain from shopping at breached firms.[8]

Using a novel panel dataset of privacy breaches and news events, I find that, controlling for firm and industry characteristics, breaking news reports about a privacy breach lead to a decrease in stock value of about 0.27% on the day of the disclosure of the privacy breach. I also estimate that on the day of the disclosures, abnormally high number of positive news reports would counterbalance the breach announcements in most industries, increasing stock

[6]See, for example, http://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-eye-china-in-anthem-hack-1423167560?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsForth. Last accessed 02/06/2015.

[7]See, for example, Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/investigators-eye-china-in-anthem-hack-1423167560?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsForth. Last accessed 02/06/2015.

[8]The 2011 Ponemon Institute Reputation Impact of a Data Breach study shows that the average diminished value of the brand due to a privacy breach can lead to a 10%-20% decrease in brand valuation and image.

returns on average by 0.47%, a number 20 times larger than the usual effect of an extra positive news report on any given day.[9] I also find that an abnormal number of negative news, other than the breach reports, leads to no significant effect on the day of disclosure of a breach. My findings seem to indicate that firms choose to release a privacy breach in a more positive media environment to try to counter the negative effect of the disclosure at the time.[10]

I contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, we complement the existing work on strategic disclosure literature in finance. The finance literature has ample attempts at finding the textual analysis impact on stock prices (Shiller (1981), Cutler et al. (1989), Mitchell and Mulherin (1994), Boudoukh et al. (2013)).[11] Bundles of news events have been less studied: Wasley and Wu (2005), Lansford (2006), Rogers and Van Buskirk (2012) show how firms use positive disclosures (patent approvals) to mitigate future negative earnings reports. This paper focuses on the opposite effect, more specifically when a firm strategically mitigates a negative disclosure using positive news. The advantage of using privacy breaches is that it is not actually an event controlled by the company in terms of its occurence, contrary to earning reports or directors' nominations. Therefore the time of disclosure for a given privacy breach is not tied to a pre-scheduled future conference call. On the other hand, if firms do not act reasonably quickly in terms of disclosing a privacy breach they might face a Federal Trade Commission (FTC hereafter) or a state department of justice fine for delaying disclosure.[12] My analysis ties with Acquisti et al. (2006) that approached the media variable considering major papers versus wire services for a limited amount of breaches. This paper also expands on Goel and Shawky (2009) that considers news information from public

[9]This effect varies within industries: the financial and insurance, wholesale trade, and service industries lead to the highest decreases (between 0.58% and 1.05%).

[10]Firms, if they choose to do so, may also use this privacy breach disclosure to release "smaller" negative news to the market when investors' attention is focused on the breach.

[11]Boudoukh et al. (2013) find a significant correlation between news and stock price changes. More specifically, news reports help investors make decisions by reporting hard facts or providing analyses or forecasts on firms, reducing potential inefficiencies in the market. The literature is also divided on the matter as Rogers et al. (2013) see news reports as decreasing information asymmetry but Frankel and Li (2004), Green et al. (2012), and Solomon et al. (2014) find that media lead to more information asymmetry.

[12]Most state disclosure laws require breached companies to notify customers and the state attorney general within a few months of discovery of the breach. See, for example, the National Conference of State Legislations, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx. Last accessed 05/26/2015.

sources on breaches over 2004-2008.[13] My paper relates to Cohen et al. (2013) that show how firms manipulate the information flow to the market through strategic releases of news using conference calls. I hypothesize that firms keep a stock of good news for unexpected bad news, depending on the type of negative events they need to address. It is efficient for firms to bundle positive news with news of a privacy breach when the number of customers affected by the breach is important and when there is potentially a high risk of more breaches within the same year. For example, Anthem increased its dividend on January 28, 2015, after excellent earnings reports. It also produced ten positive news reports on dividend increased, higher forecasts, share repurchasing, and profit beats.

Hirshleifer et al. (2009), DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), and Neissner (2013) suggest that firms strategically time disclosure information to the market around low perceived investor attention. I advocate the opposite. It is rational for firms to use high perceived attention to mitigate negative news reports using positive news. It may even be an opportunity to use this strategy to dump bad information at the same time. For example, during the Target conference call on the day of the privacy breach disclosure the company explained that sales might decrease over the few quarters following the breach.[14]Similarly, around the time when the Anthem breach was disclosed, Anthem released news of decreasing small business memberships,[15] whereas two days prior it released very positive earnings results and guidance.

My paper also differs from Yayla and Hu (2011) that restrict their analysis to information technology events. A contribution of this paper is the use of an independent and complete

[13]Their empirical analysis of the news effect also suffers from the manual query of Lexis-Nexis and the choice of words used to get the news related to a given breach. The authors explain: "For each identified security breach, media reports covering the security breach were collected and stored in a database. The data collected also included information on the severity of each incident in terms of the number of people impacted. Using the approximate date of the security breach as a starting point, public databases like Lexis Nexis were queried for media reports; those reports that covered more than one individual security breach were associated with each security breach reported. In the event that a single report was published in numerous media outlets, it was considered a single report. To avoid any contamination of the estimation window, I excluded from my sample any firm that experienced more than one security breach within a period of one year." See p.405 in Goel and Shawky (2009).

[14]See, for example, Target press release mixing updates on the breach and future results. http://pressroom.target.com/news/target-provides-update-on-data-breach-and-financial-performance. Last accessed on 3/30/15.

[15]See, for example, Anthem Predicts More Small-Biz Membership Drops – Market Talk, Dow Jones Company, Inc.— 10:20 AM ET 01/28/2015.

dataset of news events. I will measure how the change in news coverage of a company due to privacy breaches will affect stock prices of breached firms.[16] Second, I contribute to the literature of the economics of privacy by measuring the direct equity effect of privacy breach disclosures (Campbell et al. (2003), Cavusoglu et al. (2004), Acquisti et al. (2006), Hovav and D'Arcy (2003), and Horav and Gray (2014)). Overall, previous papers have been divided on the direct short-run effect of privacy breach announcements. In particular, Acquisti et al. (2006) find that there is a negative and statistically significant effect of privacy breaches incidents on a firm's value with a dataset of 85 breaches over the period 1999-2004. Hovav and D'Arcy (2003) show that there is no significant effect of privacy breaches on a firm's value, examining small subsets of privacy breaches (viruses and denial of services) and using mainly event studies prior to 2003. Campbell et al. (2003) find a small and insignificant effect on all security breaches for a dataset of 43 events. Horav and Gray (2014) use a stakeholder analysis to measure the effects on the cyber attack on the TJX company. They find that, with the limitation of studying only one firm, TJX's stock largely increased a year after the announcement of a massive consumer data breach. My paper builds on the existing literature by considering an expanded dataset of 745 breaches for publicly listed companies to measure the impact on the performance of the firms by themselves and its competitors, using the added effect of the "bundled" news released on the day of the announcement of the breach.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 presents my dataset. Section 4 presents the timing of privacy breach disclosures and media coverage for firms. Section 5 describes the empirical strategy of news bundling and disclosures and a portfolio analysis. Section 6 provides a discussion and applications of my results. Section 7 concludes.

# 3 Data

I construct a large dataset of stocks and news reports of publicly traded companies as follows. The data for stock prices comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I

[16]The role of public information on stocks has been studied in the financial literature, but most of the time was limited to firm's announcements, including takeover announcements, shareholder changes, dividend announcements, assets acquisitions and divestitures, management changes, lawsuits. The "firm-controlled" effects were ambiguous depending on the paper. See, for example, Agrawal et al. (1992); Conrad et al. (2002); Ikenberry and Ramnath (2001); Michaely et al. (1995); Palmon and Schneller (1980); Vega (2006).

use daily prices and number of shares outstanding for every company in the CRSP database over the period 2005-2014.[17]

I use Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry numbers for each company from CRSP using Wharton Research Data Services.[18] I rely on the Fama-French 3-factor portfolios for estimation of abnormal returns. Daily and monthly Fama-French Factors are downloaded from Kenneth French's data library.[19]

I build a novel dataset of privacy breaches and hacking from publicly available data from different privacy specialized websites. I consider privacy events from DatalossDB.org, Databreaches.net, PHIprivacy.net, and Privacy Rights Clearinghouse between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2014. For each privacy breach event, I capture all of the critical information, including the date of the privacy breach disclosure, the affected companies, the number of affected customers, the description or type of breach, and the state(s) where the breach happened. The full dataset on privacy breaches contains 4,533 privacy breaches, but I exclusively focus on the 542 breach events that can be matched to the stock data in this paper.[20] I made several adjustments on the privacy breach data. First, if a privacy breach affects multiple firms, I allocate the breach to all of the firms. Second, privacy breaches could affect a product produced by company, like Gmail, a Google, Inc. software, or iCloud, an Apple, Inc. software. In those cases I assign the breach to the firm that provides the product. Third, if a breach references subsidiaries (like Lexis Nexis for Elsevier NV), the parent company is assigned the particular breach. The strategy behind this is to model the direct effect of reputation on the company.[21] Fourth, some companies, like Comcast,

[17]For daily observations where no closing price is available, I follow CRSP's imputation procedure and replace the daily stock price with the average of the bid and the ask prices for that stock on the particular day considered. I also use the CRSP adjusted returns to control for any stock splits.

[18]CRSP preserves the timing of changes to SIC and NAICS categories for each company.

[19]I consider the data on the SMB (SmallMinusBig) portfolio, and the HML (High Minus Low) portfolio. SMB is the average return on three portfolios of small market-capitalization companies minus the average return on three portfolios of large market-capitalization companies. HML is the average return on two value portfolios minus the average return on two growth portfolios.

[20]Note that I also only consider privacy breach data from companies that are publicly listed, despite the fact that the government, universities, and privately owned firms have the majority of the breaches historically. Nonetheless, despite having more breaches, these latter institutions or companies have fewer records breached than the publicly listed companies. It is mainly related to the fact that most of the breaches for universities result from a lost laptop or data misplaced. Government websites and data are breach more often by foreign countries. Privately held companies are most of the time due to the lack of protection as the cost might be too high to get the appropriate level of protection.

[21]For example, Lexis Nexis is a known name in the legal or academic business but a breach on its products

have multiple stock tickers trading on the market (CMCSA and CMCSK). In this case, I consider the effect on both stocks in the analysis.[22] The data on news events comes from the Dow Jones News Service. The dataset contains daily timed news events for all listed companies. I focus on the following types of news stories: (1) "breaking news" type of stories composed of a headline with no body text. Breaking news stories are the first news report released to the market when the privacy breach is revealed; and (2) characterized Dow Jones news, corresponding to usual recurring firm activities, such as earnings, shareholder announcements, director nomination, CEO nomination. I divide those news reports into positive and negative news reports based on the type of positive or negative themes in the articles.[23]

I compute the average number of news events on a given day for a firm. For each day, I count the number of news events for each firm by category. I also use the press releases issued by the firm, both positive and negative. I use those press releases in particular to see if firms would make more positive announcements before a privacy breach disclosure. I find that firms actually tend to release on average more positive press releases the day prior to the annoucements, compared to other days. I also generate a dummy variable if there is any breaking news on a given day and a privacy breach disclosure breaking news dummy whether there is any breaking news report on the day of the breach disclosure. I further consider the abnormal number of positive and negative news report, defined respectively as the deviation from the mean of the number of positive or negative news reports for the firm.[24] I make two types of adjustments on the news data: (1) I consider the news on the day when it is registered, as if it were a continuous flow of information; and (2) I time-adjust the news by assigning every news report coming on a day after end of trading times (4pm EST) or

might have less of an effect on the stock of Elsevier NV due to the distance between the products (at least in the short-run controlling for the number of affected customers).

[22]As a robustness check, I ran the analysis using only one of the stocks for each of the companies when multiple stock tickers existed.

[23]Positive news reports are comprised of distinguishable positive news events, like positive earnings or patent approval. Negative news reports are composed of clearly distinguishable negative news events, like lower guidance, negative earnings, or a plaintiff's lawsuit against the firm. Any event that is not clearly classified is assigned to the unclassified news reports. Those uncharacterized news reports, comprised of less significant events for the firms, would require a more in-depth analysis given that they are rarely recurring news. I will consider them as "chatter" about the firm. I use them as an extra control for robustness check.

[24]I consider the averages using a year, a month, or the entire span of my sample for robustness purposes. Throughout the paper, I report the results with averages over the past year for each firm.

weekend to the next trading day. The second adjustment makes a clean information diffusion argument of a disclosure as stocks can then be sold at market as soon as the opening bell time (9:30am EST).

Table 1 shows the number of privacy breaches per firm and industry. I have a total of 242 firms disclosing a privacy breach.[25] Within this group, 28% are in the finance and insurance industry, 21% are in the manufacturing industry and 15% are in the retail industry. Firms in the finance, insurance, and real estate industry represent more than a third of the firms breached multiple times. The other large group is comprised of companies in the retail, manufacturing, and services industries. Interestingly, 3 firms in finance and insurance industry are breached more than 14 times over the 2005-2014 period as finance and insurance firms are known to hold more sensitive and valuable information like social security numbers and bank account numbers. Table 2 lists all of the breaches per industry and type for each breach event. I find that most of the 542 events can be grouped into the following categories: hacking events, loss of a computer or electronic device, insider breach, and unintended disclosures. Surprisingly, payment or credit card fraud events are a small category of privacy breaches. It may be due to a higher level of security and regulation for companies. Nonetheless when those events happen they usually have larger records breached.

Table 3 reports the news coverage of the privacy breach disclosures for all of my 542 events. I find that 38 disclosed privacy breaches did not match with any news (or breaking news) on that day. Those breaches are either of smaller scale or in industries where the data stolen is not strategic. Moreover, more than half of the privacy breach disclosures did not get a breaking news report about the breach on the day of disclosure. This number varies with industries. For example, in the financial industry, privacy breach disclosures are reported as breaking news reports 58% of the time. I find that 281 privacy events match with disclosure days without any news report or breaking news.[26] Table 4 divides the sample by market

[25] Among the breaches that are actually reported, the impact seems to differ. For example, a breach on Apple is reported on average 60% more than a breach on Marriott Hotels. Breaches also differ in terms of customers' impact. For example, Iron Mountain had 800,000 records breached, Marriott Hotels has 206,000, but AT&T had only 1,600 in a 2014 breach in 2014.

[26] My sample contains 13,600,104 news events, even with the adjustments specified above. It should be noted that all days of the week have a similar number of news reports within my sample of firms. It justifies my use of the number of abnormal news reports compared to the average number of news reports. Privacy breach disclosures happen on any days of the week per industry, with a slight bias towards the Monday release. It is mainly due to the fact that 56 of the 130 breaches are disclosed over the weekend. Therefore their effect would only be measured on the next Monday, i.e. the first trading day after disclosure. On

capitalization, number of records breached in the breach, and the different type of industries. I find that the larger the firm, the more likely there will be a breaking news about the breach (83% for firms larger than 100 billion dollars in market capitalization versus only 8% for firms under 1 billion dollars). Also, the higher the number of records breached, the more likely the privacy breach would be released to the market by a breaking news reports (52% for more than a million records breached versus only 40% on average for less than 100,000). All industries seem to be given equal breaking news coverage in the case of a privacy breach, mosly between 30% and 50%.[27]

The data on security breach disclosure laws by state comes from the National Conference of State Legislatures. On January 1, 2015, 47 states had security breach laws that outline the compliance requirements of firms that are victims of privacy breaches. I will mainly consider how the laws differ from the timing of a privacy breach disclosure standpoint and when they were passed or implemented.

# 4 Timing of Privacy Breach Disclosure Through Media Coverage

In this paper I analyze how firms decide to bundle news strategically to the market when disclosing privacy breaches. In particular, managers have a strategic informational advantage when deciding to disclose information to the market. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), Doyle and Magilke (2009), Doyle and Magilke (2012), Michaely et al. (2014) attempt to measure the effect of disclosing information when investors have limited attention. Those papers used

average there is a similar trend of breaking news reports on the day of disclosure irrespective of the week. I notice that there are more news reports at the beginning of the week than towards the end of the week. I notice that there are on average 87.7 days with breaking news reports and 132.3 days when there are no breaking news reports. Unsurprisingly, the industries with the most breaking news reports are the finance, insurance and real estate, services, manufacturing, and retail industries. Those industries get similarly more news reports on average than other ones. Breaking news reports are evenly divided over the days of the week. Not surprisingly, breaking news are reports not often released over the weekend. I assign them to the Monday news data. As a reminder all news are assigned to their trading days. For example, the Tuesday column in my tables corresponds to any news released between Monday after trading closes until Tuesday end of trading, i.e. Monday 4:00:00PM until Tuesday 3:59:59PM. Summary tables for the news and breaking news are available upon request.

[27] I find that mining is an industry always covered by breaking news in case of a privacy breach in my sample, but given the limited amount of observations, it may not be a trend in case of repeated breaches.

mainly controlled and pre-scheduled types of events due to mandatory disclosures (earnings announcements, management forecasts, corporate changes). Contrary to the nature of the events analyzed in those papers, privacy breaches are somewhat uncontrolled and unplanned events in nature. In case a breach happens, firms have to disclose the breach within two months of the discovery of the breach. Affected firms can then strategically consider when to disclose the breach within this timeframe, given that this information could be easily leaked or released in the press. I use a similar approach as Wasley and Wu (2006), Lansford (2006), Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013) that show how firms use positive disclosures (patent approvals) to mitigate future negative earnings reports.

The sample statistics in Section 3 seem to suggest that firm size, media coverage, and breach size tend to have an effect on the probability of getting a breaking news report when a privacy breach is disclosed. I want to analyze more specifically the media environment firms either create (through press releases) or use (through media stories) around a negative disclosure like a privacy breach.

Figure 1 shows the media coverage for the firms in my sample. I divide the type of news reports into positive and negative news and I also consider the breaking news reports. In order to account for different media coverage between firms,[28] I construct the following news ratios: the "abnormal news coverage" can be written as:

$$ABN_{it} = \frac{N_{it} - \bar{N}_i}{\bar{N}_i} \tag{1}$$

where $N_{it}$ is the sum of news stories during day $t$ for firm $i$ and $\bar{N}_i$ is sum of all news stories represents the average over the time period. I consider different time periods for the measure of the "permanent news coverage" in Equation (1). The permanent news coverage of a given firm corresponds to the usual media coverage of a given firm: I use the average over the entire sample 2005-2014 and average per year to better control to changes in company coverage over the years.[29] I also divide my news into positive and negative news. A positive news report is considered to be adding a positive outlook for a firm. Increased dividends, increased

[28] I want to control for the "permanent" media coverage of a given company, i.e. the average amount of news coverage a given firm gets. For example, JP Morgan Chase has on average more than 274.59 news articles a day in my sample, whereas Midas only has an average of 0.68 articles a day. Therefore an extra news article on a given day might have more effect on Midas than JP Morgan Chase.

[29] I report all the results in the paper using the year average as it takes into account the potential change in media coverage over time for a given firm.

buybacks, beating expectations, increased sales, acquisitions, mergers, stakes, change to positive rating from neutral rating, and positive credit changes are examples of positive news. Negative news reports are considered to be giving a negative outlook on the firm. Examples of negative news include missed earnings, decreased sales, bankruptcy, product recalls, change to negative rating from neutral rating, and negative credit changes.[30]

I construct $PABN_{it}$ "positive abnormal news reports" by measuring the amount of positive news reports compared to the "permanent" amount,

$$PABN_{it} = \frac{PN_{it} - \overline{PN_i}}{\overline{PN_i}}, \tag{2}$$

with $PN_{it}$ the sum of positive news stories during day $t$ for firm $i$ and $\overline{PN_i}$ the average of the positive stories over the time period.

I also define $NABN_{it}$ "negative abnormal news reports" by measuring the amount of negative news reports compared to the "permanent" amount

$$NABN_{it} = \frac{NN_{it} - \overline{NN_i}}{\overline{NN_i}} \tag{3}$$

where $NN_{it}$ is the sum of positive news stories during day t for firm i and $\overline{NN_i}$ represents the average of the positive stories over the time period.[31]

Figure 1 plots the media coverage for the entire sample, dividing it into positive, negative news reports using the ratios in (2) and (3). Figure 1 also contains the fraction of events that have a breaking news report on a given day around the privacy breach disclosure. I note that on average there are more breaking news reports after the breach disclosure, at least for the first few days. Moreover, there is a clear drop in average daily negative news compared to the permanent level around the breach disclosure. It has to be noted that the graph also contains all the negative news reports related to the breach, emphasizing that the small spike right after the breach is mainly due to the breach. Therefore, overall there is

[30] I also use as a robustness check for my results the sentiment analytics from the RavenPack dataset which examines each news reports based on story type, events, and tone. I choose 5 different sentiment scores that classify each news story as being either positive, negative or neutral. My classification of the news is robust to those scores.

[31] As previously mentioned, the averages are taken over different time periods for robustness check: average over the entire sample 2005-2014 and average per year to better control to changes in company coverage over the years.

a significant decrease in abnormal negative news reports around the breach disclosure time. Firms seem to use a time when the firm does not have a lot of negative news reports to disclose a privacy breach. I also note that the daily abnormal positive news reports around the breach disclosure have a clear pattern. There is a large decrease in the amount of positive news compared to the permanent level prior to the breach and a strong increase right after the disclosure of the breach, at least for the first five trading days following the disclosure. It seems to show that firms decide to disclose the negative event of a privacy breach in a lower negative news environment and lower than usual positive news reports. Once the breach is disclosed, more positive news reports are released to the market. The proportion of breaking news reports around the breach disclosure is also interesting, as it shows that a breached firm will be more likely to have breaking news reports on average after release of a breach.[32]

I also consider the press releases that firms issue around privacy breaches. I distinguish it from the other media as firms directly control press releases. Figure 3 shows the average daily number of positive and negative press releases compared to the firms' average over the period i.e $PABN_{it}$ and $NABN_{it}$. Prior to the breach, there is a significant drop in the number of negative press releases. Similar to the negative news reports, the negative press releases following the disclosure of the breach mainly relate to the breach. Therefore, it shows that negative press releases are actually down, when parsing out the privacy breach related press releases, over a period of around 10 trading days after the disclosure of a breach. Similarly, there are more positive press releases around the breach disclosure. I find a significant peak prior to the disclosure that may indicate that firms try to create a positive environment to ensure more positive news reports a few days before the disclosure. Similarly, there are more positive press releases on average right after the announcement. Overall, firms seem to create a positive environment around the breach disclosure time to ensure a lower negative impact on stock performance.

I consider how news coverage changes on the days around the breach disclosure. I also take into account the different state legal requirements about the timing of privacy breaches disclosures, which could explain why some firms are more likely to be in the news than others. Most states insist on the fact that there should not be any unreasonable delay for

[32] I also find in Figure 2 that breaking news reports for firms are usually distributed during the day on average, but in the particular case of cyber attacks breaking news reports the disclosure seems to happen mainly outside of the trading hours.

disclosing a privacy breach. In practice the time period allowed for disclosure varies between 2 and 45 days after discovery of the breach.[33] In states without disclosure laws, firms may wait longer to disclose the breach to their customers or the attorney general of the state.[34] I estimate the following equation for the positive news reports:

$$PN_{it} = \alpha + \beta X_{it} + \sum_{k=-l}^{l} {}_{k}.PB_{i,t+k} + \sum_{j=-l}^{l} \phi_j.PB_{i,t+j}.DiscLaw_{i,t+j} \tag{4}$$

where $X_{it}$ contains market capitalization, firms controls, industry controls, year, month and day controls. I cluster my regression at the firm level. $PB_{i,t+k}$ corresponds to the kth day after (if $k > 0$) or prior to the privacy breach disclosure at date $t$. Similarly, I run the following model for negative news reports:

$$NN_{it} = \alpha + \beta X_{it} + \sum_{k=-l}^{l} {}_{k}.PB_{i,t+k} + \sum_{j=-l}^{l} \phi_j.PB_{i,t+j}.DiscLaw_{i,t+j}. \tag{5}$$

Table 5 shows the results of these regressions.[35] There is a significantly larger number of positive news reports on the day prior to the privacy breach disclosure, which is consistent with the fact that firms tend to release a privacy breach disclosure in a more positive environment. More importantly, I find a significant and lower number of negative news reports on the day of disclosure, despite all the news related to the privacy breach. It tends to show that the firm avoids negative media environments around a breach disclosure. But for the breach disclosure both results seem to lead to an overall positive media sentiment about the firm.[36] When considering that those effects differ by state disclosure laws, I find that firms subject to disclosure laws tend to release significantly fewer negative news on the day of the announcement than firms without disclosure. This result is all the more important that it

[33] As a reminder, I consider the date when the legislation was implemented in my empirical analysis. See, for example, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2014-security-breach-legislation.aspx. Last accessed 05/23/15.

[34] For example, AT&T reported in June 2014 a breach on its customers' accounts that happened two months prior. See, for example, http://www.cio.com/article/2369870/mobile/at-t-waits-a-month-to-notify-customers-of-data-breach.html). Last Accessed 03/30/15.

[35] I run the regressions with ${}_{k}$ or with $\phi_j$ terms for up to 10 days prior and after. I only report in Table 5 the results for $t = -1, 0, 1$ as the effect of other days is insignificant.

[36] The other days prior to or after the breach disclosure do not lead to any significant coefficient. I tested it using up to 10 days before and after as regressors.

contains the news reports pertaining to the privacy breach. On the day after the announcement, firms subject to the disclosure laws have more negative news reports mainly due to the privacy breach annoucement itself. I also find that the day prior to the announcement firms subject to disclosure laws have a significantly larger amount of positive news compared to the other firms. This seems to point towards firms carefully picking a period when there are fewer negative news and more positive news reports to disclose the privacy breach.

Considering that the breach disclosure is a negative news event whose release is controlled by firms, I find that firms create an environment to alleviate its potential negative effect on the stock by bundling it with positive news around the time of disclosure (merger, patent, or joint venture).

In effect, firms build up a stock of positive and negative news that they release to the market when disclosing a privacy breach.[37] In a way, the positive news reports act as an insurance payment for the stock of the company or a mechanism to increase noise about a firm to hide the negative privacy breach signal. Therefore, a firm has an incentive to keep some stock of positive news reports under wraps in case of a privacy breach. The stock price decrease due to the breach could then be offset by the timely release of positive news reports to the market on the same day. Also, the firm may want to avoid negative press releases to the market around the time of disclosure. We will analyze those effects in the next section.

# 5 News Bundling and Stock Performance

So far, I presented evidence on timing of a privacy breach disclosure and positive media coverage environment. I consider in this section how this timing translates in terms of stock performance. I expect to find that firms will manage to lessen the negative effect on stock return of a privacy breach disclosure by bundling the annoucement with some positive news reports. The effect for firms in states with dislosure laws should have a larger negative effect as they are more constrained than other firms in terms of timing of disclosure.

The amount of time between the breach and a news report disclosure varies from a few days up to six months. I consider breaking news reports on the day of the privacy breach

[37] If a privacy breach occurs, the company has to disclose it to the breached customers and the regulator (as well as the market) but has some leeway in its release. It may wait for a few weeks or months depending of state disclosures laws (see Romanosky et al. (2011) ) and the number of records breached.

announcement as the direct effect of the breach on a given firm valuation. This news release represents the moment when the market first learns about the breach and reacts to it. I will also look at the diffusion of the release of information of the breach on the stock behavior by analyzing both the short-run event studies approach and the panel data analysis of the announcement of the breaches.[38]

## 5.1 Stock Returns and Privacy Breach Disclosures

I create a panel of privacy breaches and stock prices using for each firm data on news reports, breaking news, market capitalization, privacy breaches and the number of records breached, for 30 trading days prior and after the breach disclosure.

I first consider the immediate short run impact of a privacy breach to the value of a company. I consider 10 trading and 50 trading days before and after the event, similar to Acquisti et al. (2006) and Campbell et al. (2003). I restrict the sample of privacy breaches used in the event studies to include stocks with a full span of 10 days or 50 days of trading around the breach date. I disregard stocks breached right after their IPOs or at the end of my sample to avoid any unexpected results due to the IPO and the lack of data post-breach. I included those stocks later for robustness checks. I generate the abnormal returns $AR_{it}$ for each firm and period using the Fama-French controls to account for market fluctuations.

I estimate the direct effect of a privacy breach disclosure using the following equation:

$$AR_{it} = \zeta + \theta X_{it} + \lambda Privacy\,Breach_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{6}$$

where $Privacy\,Breach_{it}$ is a dummy if there is a breach disclosure on day t for firm i. The controls $X_{it}$ contain the following variables: (log of) market capitalization, number of records breached (when available), industry controls, year controls, and days of the week controls for each firm i and day t. I also run the regression adjusting $Privacy\,Breach_{it}$ for a disclosure on the day or the day after. In this case, the dummy takes the value of 1 on

[38] First, I perform event studies with windows of 10, 30 and 50 days prior and after the announcement, similar to Acquisti et al. (2006) and Campbell et al. (2003). I then integrate the news bundle theory within the event studies to understand the pattern of news releases to the market on days of unexpected negative news release. In the panel data approach I examine the average effect of the breach on the adjusted value of firms, with the overall bundling of news coverage around the breach disclosure time. In this paper, I report all of the results using a 30 day window around the disclosure.

both the day and day after the disclosure. I use firm-level, SIC-level and multi-level using SIC and day clusterings in my analysis following Cameron et al. (2011).[39]

Table 6 reports the results of this regression. I find that there is a significant negative effect of a breach disclosure (-0.27%) on the day and the next (-0.24%). I notice that the market capitalization and the number of records breached are not significant. It may be due to the fact that records are only a by-product of a breach and investors are more concerned about the fact that the firm itself was breached. In specification (6), I report a significant -0.25% effect on the abnormal returns if there is a privacy breach dummy disclosure on the day, or the day before or after disclosure.[40] All of the results are robust to the choice of specification and controls.[41] I show in Figure 4 the average abnormal returns and average cumulative abnormal returns for the firms in my sample. I find that there is on average a negative abnormal return over the 30-day trading period after the privacy breach disclosure. I notice that if I control for news reports the shape of the average abnormal returns are similar, but the negative abnormal returns are most of the time less negative than when not controlling for the news. I also see that the average cumulative abnormal returns is mainly decreasing over the 30 days around the breach.[42] Those patterns are different for every firm in the sample. Almost half of the firms actually see positive abnormal returns after the disclosure of the privacy breach.[43] This type of different behavior might be due to the timing of the disclosure. Given the pattern found on the positive and negative news reports, firms seem to use positive news reports as a way to insure themselves against a larger drop in stock price.

In order to check this result, I modify Equation (6) to incorporate the news report effects as follows:

[39] When multiple firms are part of a same breach, I also cluster at that particular group level as a robustness check to control for potential within industry dependence. I used clusters on industries and robust standard errors for robustness checks. The results are unchanged. I also considered a non-parametric inference approach to individual level event studies following Conley and Taber (2011) and Gelbach et al. (2011).

[40] As a reminder, a breaking news report about the breach on the day prior to disclosure means that the disclosure happened after hours on the previous trading day.

[41] Firms seem to be less affected by privacy breaches disclosures over 2005-2014, compared to prior to 2005 as in Acquisti et al. (2006).

[42] The dataset for events studies are a subset of my large panel dataset. I only consider privacy breach events that are only separated by 30 days to avoid any cofounding effects.

[43] Overall 57.5% of my sample leads to negative abnormal returns on the day of disclosure of a privacy breach. Using news controls, years, days of the week, industry, I find that the negative abnormal returns drop to 54.4% of my sample.

$$
\begin{aligned}
AR_{it} &= \zeta + \theta X_{it} + \alpha_1 BR_{it} + \alpha_2 BR_{it}.D_{it} \\
&\quad + \gamma_P PABN_{it} + \gamma_{P0} PABN_{it}.D_{it} \\
&\quad + \gamma_N NABN_{it} + \gamma_{N0} NABN_{it}.D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}
\end{aligned} \tag{7}
$$

$X_{it}$ contains all of the other controls for the regression: market capitalization, SIC industry controls, year controls, day of the week controls, and Fama-French factors. $BR_{it}$ is a dummy for breaking news on day t for firm i. $D_{it}$ is the dummy variable of the privacy breach disclosure for firm i at date t. The variable $BR_{it}.D_{it}$ represents the presence of a breaking news report on the privacy breach disclosure on the disclosure day. The variables $NABN_{it}.D_{it}$ and $PABN_{it}.D_{it}$ represent negative and positive abnormal news reports respectively on the day of disclosure of the privacy breach.[44] Table 7 presents the results of this regression. I find that overall abnormal returns on the day of disclosure are significantly and positively affected by abormal positive news reports on average. I still find that on the day of disclosure of a privacy breach, a breaking news report leads to a significant negative effect of -0.25% on the abnormal returns, controlling for any abnormal amount of news. On any other day breaking news reports actually have no significant effect or are more likely to have a small but positive effect on the stock price. I find that the effect of abnormal positive news reports is significant and large (0.46%). It is 15 times higher than the effect on any other day (0.03% and significant) and therefore offsets the potential negative effect of the privacy breach disclosure. This large effect may be partly due to the more positive environment created by the firm right before releasing the disclosure about the breach as seen in the earlier figures. Investors might be more receptive to good news on days when expectations are lower due to an unexpected negative breaking news report. On the contrary, abnormal negative news reports have usually a significant but small negative effect (-0.03%). But on the day of a privacy breach disclosure this effect is small, positive, and most of the time insignificant. It implies that firms may release some other negative, but less strategic negative news that

[44] I also add the type of privacy breach (hacking, laptop stolen) and the type of data that was stolen. The types of data stolen are social security number, names, credit card. I find that controlling for the changes in news changes the impact on the abnormal returns, but overall does not alter the signs of the abnormal returns of the stock. Surprisingly, the different types of breaches do not have a significant effect on the returns.

the market puts into perspective with the privacy breach. In sum, it explains why stocks could increase on the day of a disclosure of a privacy breach and raises the question of the effects of bundling news by companies as the firm likely has the power to counteract the negative effect of the privacy breach disclosure by providing one additional unit of positive abnormal news.[45] I also find that stocks of firms with a larger market capitalizations are also significantly lower due to the privacy breach disclosure. It could mean that larger firms need to release more positive information to alleviate the negative effect of a disclosure of a breach.

I also examine if the effects of privacy breach disclosures differ by type of industry, given that news coverage varies per industry.[46] Table 8 shows that privacy breaches in the banking or insurance industry reported with a breaking news report lead to a large, significant negative effect on the stock price due mainly to the sensitive customer data they own. Similarly, there is a large, negative significant effect of a privacy breach announced through a breaking news report for the wholesale trade and services industries. It may be due to the fact that transaction costs for consumers to switch between those firms is small contrary to the financial industry. Therefore, if a privacy breach occurs and customer data has been compromised, investors anticipate a switch to another provider of goods.[47]

Overall, I find that privacy breaches announcements have a negative effect on the stock prices of companies, but this effect is short-lived.[48] Privacy breaches are random events that shock the stock of the firms as a surprise announcement, but in the long run should not have a large effect as firms have insurance, engage in public relations strategy, and increase their level of security for the future. Media coverage plays a central role in determining the performance of firms' stocks around privacy breach disclosures. Disclosing in a period with a largely

[45] There could be a strategy for the firm to disclose around the same time some minor negative news that it has to disclose by law. In some specifications, the negative news reports actually have a very small and significant effect.

[46] I control those effects per industry using positive and negative news per division and firm. The standard errors are clustered at the industry and firm level. Results in the paper are reported at the firm level.

[47] A privacy breach is as likely to affect any company within the industry. If one of them gets breached, the entire industry as a whole does not necessarily benefit: firms in the industry need to upgrade their defenses to avoid becoming the next target of a breach.

[48] This is why a given stock may react positively or negatively to a disclosure of a privacy breach based on the mix of news on or around the day of the disclosure: if I suppose that firms choose to disclose privacy breaches at the same time as other news reports, the news reports will actually affect the returns of the stock. It may depend on what investors will weigh more in their stock analysis.

positive media environment leads to a smaller negative effect on the stock performance. This result complements the previous section where I showed that firms strategically manage the news flow around the disclosure of privacy breaches. In this section I presented evidence that this concerted media effort has an effect the firm's stock performance.

Overall, firms follow the following process: they first choose to disclose a privacy breach during a more positive media environment, within the legal requirements in states with disclosure laws. Then they may also look to add to positive news reports on or around the disclosure by announcing more positive events, like joint ventures, raised guidances. Given the positive market environment generated by those positive news reports, other negative news may have a lower effect on the stock of the company. It could be a window to release less important negative events to the market, as most of the media coverage would be centered on the privacy breach.[49]

## 5.2 Disclosure Laws and Portfolios

In this section I analyze the effect of state disclosure laws on stock returns of breached firms. I found in Table 5 that news coverage is affected by the different type of disclosures. Previous results suggest that firms find it harder to control the negative effect of a privacy breach using a more favorable environment. I want to measure whether states with disclosure laws can effectively incentivize firms to improve their data security and limit the effect of a privacy breach on the misuse of consumers' sensitive information. In those states, firms have to report the existence of a breach and its full impact to customers and the state attorney general in a timely manner. The goal of this practice is to prevent a misuse of the personal customer data.[50]

Simply put, data breach disclosure laws require firms to notify breach-affected individuals within a reasonable timeframe, no later than 45 calendar days[51] after discovery of the breach.

[49] Given that positive news reports are strategically released to the market, the number of records breached should have a very small effect on the abnormal returns of the stock on the day of the breach disclosure.

[50] Prior empirical work on the correlation between disclosure laws and crime has not been successful. For example, Romanosky et al. (2011) found an insignificant effect of the disclosure law on identity thefts.

[51] This timeframe depends on the type of breach and the state where the breach occurred. Most states require firms to send notices to affected customers with a brief description of the breach, including (if known) the date of the breach and the date of the discovery of the breach; the information stolen; procedure for affected customers to protect themselves from potential harm as a result of the breach; updates on investigation of the breach and future protection against any further breaches; and contact information.

The breach is considered "discovered" on the first day it is known (or reasonably should have been known) by a breached firm.

I consider a variation of the previous model adding the disclosure laws by states as follows:

$$AR_{it} = \zeta + \theta M_{it} + \varphi DL_{it} + \phi_p DL_{ip}.d_{i,p} + ... + \phi_5 DL_{it}.d_{i,p+5} + \varepsilon_{it} \tag{8}$$

where $M_{it}$ corresponds to all of the controls in Equation (7). The disclosure laws are $DL_{it}$ for state $i$ at time $t$. I also consider their impact on each particular trading day after the disclosure using the potential breaking news about the data breach $d_{ip}$ where $p$ is the day of the privacy law disclosure. The terms $DL_{it}.d_{ip}$ represent the effect of a breaking news on the day of the disclosure of the privacy breach in a state with $DL_{it}$ dislosure law. Table 9 reports the results of the estimation.

I find that controlling for states and number of records breached, disclosure laws by states have a negative and significant effect on the returns (-0.17%) but this effect is significant when including the breaking news reports. It may be due to the fact that if firms have to disclose privacy breaches they may only partially control the timing of the disclosures themselves. In the case of breaches occurring in states without disclosure laws, firms might feel confident to release the news to the market as a sign of strength in their ability to handle the crisis and solve the problem.[52] I also notice that on the day before the disclosure abnormal negative news reports have a stronger negative effect than usual on the returns in states with disclosure laws, about 9 times larger than usual. Alternatively, abnormal positive news reports have a strong positive effect of smaller magnitude (only 3 to 4 times larger than in Table 7).

I also estimate that a company that disclosed a breach in a state with disclosure laws has a negative and significant effect on the abnormal returns of its stock on the day after the disclosure (-0.70%) when a breaking news report is issued about it the day after the breach.[53] This significant result actually helps an investor as they could short a breached firm or buy an option on the stock on the day after the disclosure of the breach as soon as a breaking news report is released. I consider buying a $1 of the stock of a firm that was

[52] I run the analysis both with and without state dummies as the disclosure laws are state-specific.

[53] I find that this effect is only significant for the day after the disclosure and disappears as soon as the second day. I also find that controlling for disclosure state laws the negative news other than the breaches seems to significantly slightly increase the returns of the stocks.

breached on the day after disclosure and selling it at the end of the day over the entire time period 2007-2014. I compare this portfolio to a simple portfolio consisting in buying $1 of a weighted (by market capitalization) average index of the three main stock exchanges in the U.S. (NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX).[54] Figure 5 shows the "breached firms" portfolio and the composite index over the period 2007-2014.[55]

I find that in states with disclosure laws and without breaking news reports, the portfolio hugely outperforms the index, 60 versus 20. The portfolios without both disclosure laws and breaking news reports lead to a smaller return, but might still outperform the index. In states without disclosure laws and breaches are reported by breaking news reports, the portfolio would also outperform the index. It may be due to the fact that firms report a breach, while not required to do so, leading investors to sell shares out of concern for a larger breach. Buying those stocks in the portfolio results in using the volatility of the stock on those days. When breaches are reported through a breaking news report and firms required to report a privacy breach in states with disclosure laws, the portfolio leads to a worse return than the composite index. [56]

# 6 Discussion

In this paper I showed that the overall effect of privacy breach disclosure was, on average, small and significant. As random events affecting firms only a few times over their lifetime, privacy breaches are short-term mitigated relevant events. Privacy breaches have a long run effect of -0.24% on the value of the firm if I use only the day the breach was disclosed. If I extend the window to both the day and the day after the breach, the result is still robust at -0.18%. The result is also robust to different specifications using year, trading days, and industry controls. Overall, the impact of privacy breach disclosures on the value of firms

[54] Using a S&P500 index leads to similar results.

[55] Comparing the returns by year over my full period 2005-2014 leads to 2007 and the period 2009-2014 outperformance of the market. This is due to the fact that contrary to the 2005-2006 trading period, investors have adapted to the idea of a breach as a transitory, unavoidable shock. Similarly, given the effect of breaking news of privacy breach in states with disclosure laws, I short the breached stocks over the day and found that the strategy would outperform the index in 2006, 2008, 2011, and 2013.

[56] As a reminder, I construct my portfolio buying a dollar of a stock of a firm disclosing a breach on day $t$ compared to buying a dollar of the composite index on the same day $t$. I sell both those "stocks" at the closing price of the next day $(t+1)$. Therefore the index performance is different on days whether firms with or without disclosure laws are breached.

is small, reinforcing that financial markets are efficient due to the low and corrected effect over time. It may reveal that firms take advantage of the decreased expectations of the stock returns on the breach disclosure day to unload positive news onto the stock. This would lead to a positive bounce in the stock value. Firms may also use the breach as an opportunity to hide some other negative news on the day of the disclosure. I indeed evaluate that negative news on that day has mainly an insignificant effect on the stock price, contrary to the significant and negative effect of negative news on other days. Privacy breach disclosure days may be a strategic time to release to the market some negative news while investors are focused on both the privacy breach and the positive news reports released.

My empirical results are in line with Yayla and Hu (2011) that find that security events occurring in more recent years have less significant impact than earlier ones. Given that breaches are random events and that they affect firms only a few times over their lifetime, I can think of them as mitigated relevant events. It is a clear decrease from (-0.58%) from 2000-2005 found in Acquisti et al. (2005).[57] Another explanation for the small effect of privacy breach disclosure on the market is the consumers' breach fatigue. Also, I may consider that the decline in response over the years to a given privacy breach might be due to the number of privacy events overall: Acquisti et al. (2005) counts only 79 events compared to my 501 over 8 years (both studies only counting events concerning companies traded on the stock market).

I prove that in the short-run the stock price of breached firms can increase, decrease, or stay stable as a result of a privacy breach disclosure, controlling for other market factors. Contrary to other events affecting a company, privacy breaches are somewhat expected by investors due to the randomness of the event and the lack of clear determination on how privacy breaches happen. This result should be compared to other potential events affecting companies: Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) use auto recall announcements and find a significant

[57]Similarly Campbell et al. (2003) finds -5.4% with only 11 events over 1995-2000. This effect was nonetheless driven by the restriction of the analysis to personal data access. If they project it to all security breaches, with 43 events, they find an insignificant -1.9% result. Cardenas et al. (2012) find that impact security breaches leads to an increase of 22% of the systematic risk of public companies over the period 2002-2008. Others have also found non significant results like Horav and D'Arc (2003). Given that those studies were done earlier than 2005 and the critical Choicepoint breach, their effect might have been magnified as breaches did not necessarily need to be reported then. As a result of this breach, 22 states ended up enacting consumer privacy laws in 2005, and 43 states are in effect since 2010. Those consumer security breach laws force companies to report breaches to their affected consumers directly.

decrease in share prices between 2.5 and 3.5%, Dowdell et al. (1992) finds a decrease of 29% of Johnson and Johnson stock after the 1982 tainted Tylenol episode was revealed, and Jory et al. (2015) find that corporate scandals decrease share prices between 6.5% and 9.5% within the first month after the announcement. These studies were using events that were widely unexpected at the time and might have provided large effects. They also do not control for news reports around the date of the announcement.

I explore how my analysis of privacy breach disclosures compares to other uncontrolled negative news events for the firms in my sample to compare the effect of the breach to the other events over 2005-2014. I consider nine other types of events: cyber-attacks, analyst rating downgrades, congressional hearings, copyright infringement claims, fraud, industrial accidents, lawsuits, patent infringement, and product recalls.[58] I consider the same regression as above to find the effect of breaking news on the day of disclosure of each particular event:

$$AR_{it} = \zeta + \theta X_{it} + \lambda Event_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{9}$$

where $Event_{it}$ is a dummy if there is a event disclosure on day $t$ for firm $i$.

Table 10 reports the results on only the effect of the day of disclosure. A breaking news report on the day of disclosure of cyber-attacks, a sub-sample of my overall sample of privacy breaches, has a significant negative effect on the abnormal returns. The coefficient for cyber-attacks is twice the coefficient for privacy breaches in general (-0.53% versus -0.27%). I find that disclosure of an analyst downgrade through breaking news reports has also a strong negative effect on the abnormal returns (-1.42%). Other categories do not seem to respond significantly to the breaking news reports, but the effects might be due to a small number of observations. It may be due to the fact that lawsuits, industrial accidents, fraud, copyright infringement claims, patent infringement, and product recalls are not as well defined events in the news reports.

I consider the same regression to get the effect of the disclosure of the event by breaking news, as well as positive and negative news reports:

$$AR_{it} = \zeta + \theta X_{it} + \alpha_1 BR_{it} + \alpha_2 BR_{it}.D_{it} \tag{10}$$

[58] I use the same method outlined in the empirical strategy section of the paper to calculate the abnormal returns.

$$+\gamma_P PABN_{it} + \gamma_{P0} PABN_{it}.D_{it}$$
$$+\gamma_N NABN_{it} + \gamma_{N0} NABN_{it}.D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

where $D_{it}$ corresponds to the day of the disclosure of the considered event.

The results for Equation (10) with positive and negative news reports are in Table 11. I find that, when controlling for positive and negative abnormal news reports, both on the day of disclosure and other days, the effect of the breaking news reports on the day of disclosure on the abnormal of returns disappears for most of the different events. Most of the relevant information on the cyber-attacks might be concentrated in the type of abnormal news on the day of disclosure, positive or negative. The analyst downgrade event breaking news still has a negative, significant effect (-0.61%) but seems to have a negative externality on all types of news on the day (both coefficients on positive and negative abnormal news reports are negative). Congressional hearings breaking news reports have a negative and significant effect (-0.57%) when controlling for news reports. These results suggest that privacy breaches are a different type of event than the nine mentioned above (except for cyber-attacks). They are more random and firms have no control on whether or not a breach happens, even if they take appropriate measures for security.

My results suggest that the effects of a privacy breach on a breached firm are very small, but significant. I also find that an abnormal number of positive news on the day of disclosure helps offset a decrease of abnormal returns due to the disclosure of a privacy breach. There are multiple public policy implications to my results. First, given that there is a significant negative but small effect of the news reporting of a breach, imposing a press release reporting for all types of breaches would lead to more transparency. This is a larger scale reporting than simply notifying breached customers as per security breach laws. Such a new policy has a small cost on the firm at the time of release but leads to faster and transparent breach reporting. Also, if a firm fears that a larger breach would have a larger negative effect on its reputation, and in turn on its stock, it would be incentivized to protect its data better against any privacy breach. The added weight of facing instantly the market reaction and public judgment should lead companies to increase their security practices.

Second, the result on news provides a strategy for firms to protect themselves against a negative, random, unexpected disclosure. Firms need a stock of positive news reports to outweigh the potential negative effect of the unexpected disclosure. Using my comparisons

with other negative and unexpected events I notice that this method would only work for (cyber-attacks and) privacy breaches.

Third, the portfolios on firms disclosing privacy breaches constructed in Section 5 show that firms subject to disclosure laws and breaking news reports experience a decrease in stock price. It may be a source of punishment for firms if they are not compliant with a growing need for private data security.

# 7 Conclusion

This paper analyzes the effects of privacy breach disclosures and its potential bundling with positive news on that day on the stock market. My key finding is that firms manage to avoid the full negative effect of a privacy breach event disclosure by releasing on the same day an abnormal amount of positive news to the market. Specifically, I show that after the "breaking news" release of a privacy breach a large amount of positive news to the market tends to have a dominating effect. My results suggest that a larger abnormal amount of positive news on the day of the breach disclosure more than offsets the negative effect of the disclosure. These findings are consistent with the empirical behavioral literature where bad news reports are usually released to the market when investors are not paying attention. In my particular case of privacy breaches, investors are distracted by the negative news report on privacy breaches. I provide evidence that firms tend to release bundled news to the market to offset negative random events, potentially stocking good news. Contrary to planned news that firms prepare months in advance, most privacy breaches need to be disclosed within two months of discovery. I find that there exists a strategic bundling of news by firms around unexpected negative events. My interpretation focuses on the premise that firms are not entirely in control of a privacy breach release and will try to bundle positive news to be able to control the effect of the privacy breach disclosure on their stock.

A trading strategy based on the mix of breaking news and disclosure laws outperforms the market. In essence, disclosure laws seem to punish breached firms, especially if the disclosure is reinforced by breaking news reports. It may be an indirect way for the FTC to ensure firms are setting the right standards of protection against privacy breaches.

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# Tables

Table 1: Number of Privacy Breaches per Firm by Industry

| Number of Breaches | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 14 | 15 | 16 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mining | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Construction | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Manufacturing | 31 | 10 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51 |
| Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services | 17 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 |
| Wholesale Trade | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 |
| Retail Trade | 17 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 35 |
| Finance, Insurance and Real Estate | 33 | 14 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 67 |
| Services | 19 | 14 | 7 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44 |
| Other | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| Total | 131 | 51 | 21 | 16 | 7 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 242 |

Table 2: Number of Privacy Breaches by SIC Industry Division and Type of Breach

| | Payment Card Fraud | Unintended Disclosure | Hacking or Malware | Insider | Non-Electronic Physical Loss | Electronic Port. Device Loss | Electronic Stat. Device Loss | Unknown | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mining | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Construction | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| Manufacturing | 5 | 10 | 27 | 18 | 3 | 39 | 4 | 3 | 109 |
| Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services | 0 | 9 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 18 | 1 | 2 | 56 |
| Wholesale Trade | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 8 |
| Retail Trade | 3 | 15 | 16 | 27 | 13 | 14 | 2 | 1 | 91 |
| Finance, Insurance and Real Estate | 15 | 33 | 21 | 40 | 6 | 47 | 5 | 15 | 182 |
| Services | 0 | 13 | 28 | 11 | 5 | 22 | 4 | 2 | 85 |
| Other | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| Total | 23 | 84 | 110 | 108 | 29 | 147 | 17 | 24 | 542 |

Table 3: Number of Privacy Breaches with News and Breaking News Reported

| | News Reported | | Breaking News Reported | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Breaches With | Breaches Without | Breaches With | Breaches Without |
| Mining | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Construction | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Manufacturing | 103 | 6 | 54 | 55 |
| Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services | 52 | 4 | 26 | 30 |
| Wholesale Trade | 5 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
| Retail Trade | 84 | 7 | 40 | 51 |
| Finance, Insurance and Real Estate | 171 | 11 | 107 | 75 |
| Services | 80 | 5 | 28 | 57 |
| Other | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| Total | 504 | 38 | 261 | 281 |

Table 4: Proportion of Events with Breaking News on the Day of Breach

| | Number of Events | Mean | Standard Deviation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | 544 | 0.4798 | 0.5001 |
| Market Capitalization < 1B | 48 | 0.0833 | 0.2793 |
| 1B < Market Capitalization < 100B | 390 | 0.4333 | 0.4962 |
| Market Capitalization > 100B | 106 | 0.8302 | 0.3773 |
| Records Breached < 100,000 | 129 | 0.4031 | 0.4924 |
| 100,000 < Records Breached < 1,000,000 | 36 | 0.4722 | 0.5063 |
| Records Breached > 1,000,000 | 297 | 0.5286 | 0.5000 |
| Mining | 2 | 1.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Construction | 3 | 0.3333 | 0.5774 |
| Manufacturing | 109 | 0.4954 | 0.5023 |
| Transportation, Communication, Elecric, Gas and Sanitary Services | 56 | 0.4643 | 0.5032 |
| Wholesale Trade | 8 | 0.1250 | 0.3536 |
| Retail Trade | 91 | 0.4396 | 0.4991 |
| Finance, Insurance and Real Estate | 182 | 0.5879 | 0.4936 |
| Services | 85 | 0.3294 | 0.4728 |
| Other | 6 | 0.3333 | 0.5164 |

Table 5: Effects of Privacy Breaches on Number of News Events

| | Number of Positive Categorized News | Number of Negative Categorized News | Number of Positive Categorized News | Number of Negative Categorized News | Number of Positive Categorized News | Number of Negative Categorized News |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $Privacy\ Breach_{t=-1}$ | 0.225* | 0.0276 | | | 0.00504 | -0.0964 |
| | (0.122) | (0.0668) | | | (0.238) | (0.0911) |
| $Privacy\ Breach_{t=0}$ | -0.0278 | -0.0981* | | | 0.0860 | 0.111 |
| | (0.113) | (0.0584) | | | (0.213) | (0.135) |
| $Privacy\ Breach_{t=1}$ | 0.0634 | 0.0908 | | | 0.0410 | -0.0973 |
| | (0.101) | (0.0553) | | | (0.298) | (0.0942) |
| $Disclosure\ Law\ Dummy \times Privacy\ Breach_{t=-1}$ | | | 0.288** | 0.0635 | 0.283 | 0.160 |
| | | | (0.145) | (0.0795) | (0.287) | (0.114) |
| $Disclosure\ Law\ Dummy \times Privacy\ Breach_{t=0}$ | | | -0.0609 | -0.158** | -0.147 | -0.269* |
| | | | (0.118) | (0.0663) | (0.216) | (0.155) |
| $Disclosure\ Law\ Dummy \times Privacy\ Breach_{t=1}$ | | | 0.0697 | 0.145* | 0.0288 | 0.242* |
| | | | (0.131) | (0.0761) | (0.365) | (0.141) |
| $Market\ Capitalization$ | 0.108 | 0.0511 | 0.108 | 0.0511 | 0.108 | 0.0512 |
| | (0.115) | (0.144) | (0.114) | (0.144) | (0.114) | (0.144) |
| $Constant$ | 1.789 | 1.279 | 1.796 | 1.280 | 1.793 | 1.282 |
| | (1.649) | (2.095) | (1.648) | (2.094) | (1.649) | (2.092) |
| Firm Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Month Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $N$ | 32391 | 32391 | 32391 | 32391 | 32391 | 32391 |
| $R^2$ | 0.359 | 0.317 | 0.359 | 0.318 | 0.359 | 0.318 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Effects of Privacy Breach Reports

| | (1) Ab.Returns Fama French | (2) Ab.Returns Fama French | (3) Ab.Returns Fama French | (4) Ab.Returns Fama French | (5) Ab.Returns Fama French | (6) Ab.Returns Fama French |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $Privacy\,Breach_{t=0}$ | -0.271** | -0.270** | | | | |
| | (0.133) | (0.133) | | | | |
| $Privacy\,Breach_{t=0,1}$ | | | -0.245** | -0.244** | | |
| | | | (0.100) | (0.1000) | | |
| $Privacy\,Breach_{t=-1,0,1}$ | | | | | -0.259*** | -0.259*** |
| | | | | | (0.0849) | (0.0848) |
| $Market\,Capitalization$ | | 0.0191 | | 0.0191 | | 0.0191 |
| | | (0.0221) | | (0.0221) | | (0.0221) |
| $Records\,Breached > 100,000$ | -0.00506 | -0.00828 | -0.0353 | -0.0381 | -0.0253 | -0.0280 |
| | (0.192) | (0.192) | (0.171) | (0.171) | (0.170) | (0.170) |
| $Constant$ | 0.158 | -0.153 | 0.161 | -0.150 | 0.167 | -0.144 |
| | (0.161) | (0.305) | (0.162) | (0.304) | (0.163) | (0.304) |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $N$ | 16165 | 16165 | 16165 | 16165 | 16165 | 16165 |
| $R^2$ | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{*}$ $p < .1$ , $^{**}$ $p < .05$ , $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Effects of News Events and Privacy Breach Reports

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | $R_i - r_f$ | $R_i - r_f$ | $R_i - r_f$ | $R_i - r_f$ | $R_i - r_f$ | $R_i - r_f$ |
| *Breaking News* | -0.00806 | 0.134*** | 0.0291 | -0.00791 | 0.135*** | 0.0292 |
| | (0.0244) | (0.0261) | (0.0249) | (0.0244) | (0.0261) | (0.0249) |
| $Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.240** | -0.0473 | -0.249** | | | |
| | (0.101) | (0.192) | (0.101) | | | |
| $Breaking\,News_{t=0,1}$ | | | | -0.189** | -0.0909 | -0.188** |
| | | | | (0.0872) | (0.121) | (0.0875) |
| *Positive News Ratio* | 0.0358*** | | 0.0433*** | 0.0358*** | | 0.0433*** |
| | (0.00312) | | (0.00336) | (0.00312) | | (0.00336) |
| *Negative News Ratio* | | -0.0284*** | -0.0332*** | | -0.0284*** | -0.0332*** |
| | | (0.00256) | (0.00275) | | (0.00256) | (0.00275) |
| $Positive\,News\,Ratio_{t=0}$ | 0.467*** | | 0.460*** | 0.466*** | | 0.459*** |
| | (0.129) | | (0.129) | (0.130) | | (0.130) |
| $Negative\,News\,Ratio_{t=0}$ | | 0.0373*** | 0.0164 | | 0.0375*** | 0.0162 |
| | | (0.0104) | (0.0165) | | (0.0103) | (0.0166) |
| *Market Capitalization* | -0.210*** | -0.214*** | -0.211*** | -0.210*** | -0.214*** | -0.211*** |
| | (0.0648) | (0.0650) | (0.0650) | (0.0648) | (0.0650) | (0.0650) |
| *Constant* | 3.495*** | 3.428*** | 3.499*** | 3.495*** | 3.428*** | 3.499*** |
| | (0.945) | (0.948) | (0.948) | (0.945) | (0.948) | (0.948) |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Fama French Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $N$ | 529591 | 528226 | 528226 | 529591 | 528226 | 528226 |
| $R^2$ | 0.128 | 0.128 | 0.129 | 0.128 | 0.128 | 0.129 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$ , ** $p < .05$ , *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Effects of News Events and Privacy Breach Reports on the Panel by SIC Industry Division

| | (1) Ab.Returns Fama French | (2) Ab.Returns Fama French | (3) Ab.Returns Fama French |
|---|---|---|---|
| $Construction \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.985 | | |
| | (0.614) | | |
| $Mining \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.190 | -1.890 | 0 |
| | (0.675) | (0.674) | |
| $Manufacturing \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | 0.0496 | 0.040 | 0.008 |
| | (0.289) | (0.289) | (0.290) |
| $Transportation,\ Communication,\ Elecric,\ Gas\,and\,Sanitary\,Services \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.316 | -0.317 | -0.206 |
| | (0.352) | (0.351) | (0.341) |
| $Wholesale\,Trade \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -1.035*** | -1.060*** | -1.244* |
| | (0.226) | (0.226) | (0.666) |
| $Retail\,Trade \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.665* | -0.677* | -0.353 |
| | (0.360) | (0.360) | (0.265) |
| $Finance,\ Insurance\,and\,Real\,Estate \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.549** | -0.557*** | -0.348** |
| | (0.215) | (0.215) | (0.177) |
| $Services \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.869* | -0.877* | -0.494* |
| | (0.467) | (0.466) | (0.274) |
| $Other \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.273 | -0.269 | -7.11 |
| | (0.377) | (0.377) | (8.407) |
| Abnormal Positive News | Yes | Yes | No |
| Abnormal Negative News | Yes | Yes | No |
| Abnormal Positive News × Division | No | No | Yes |
| Abnormal Negative News × Division | No | No | Yes |
| Market Capitalization | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 530 | 528 | 528 |
| $R^2$ | 0.486 | 0.486 | 0.589 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$ , ** $p < .05$ , *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Effects of Media Coverage, Privacy Breaches and Disclosure Laws

| | (1) Ab.Returns Fama French | (2) Ab.Returns Fama French | (3) Ab.Returns Fama French | (4) Ab.Returns Fama French |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $Breaking\,News$ | -0.0221 | -0.0132 | -0.0219 | -0.0405 |
| | (0.0392) | (0.0270) | (0.0391) | (0.0386) |
| $Breaking\,News_{t=-1}$ | -0.0980 | 0.808 | -0.0979 | -0.0839 |
| | (0.314) | (0.629) | (0.314) | (0.319) |
| $Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | -0.508$^{**}$ | -0.506$^{**}$ | -0.541$^{**}$ | -0.474$^{*}$ |
| | (0.237) | (0.234) | (0.216) | (0.245) |
| $Breaking\,News_{t=1}$ | 0.261 | 0.118 | 0.261 | 0.252 |
| | (0.244) | (0.198) | (0.244) | (0.239) |
| $Positive\,News\,Ratio$ | 0.0155 | 0.0308$^{***}$ | 0.0155 | 0.0120 |
| | (0.0135) | (0.0107) | (0.0135) | (0.0130) |
| $Positive\,News\,Ratio_{t=-1}$ | -0.0308 | -0.106$^{***}$ | -0.0309 | -0.0231 |
| | (0.0331) | (0.0325) | (0.0331) | (0.0338) |
| $Positive\,News\,Ratio_{t=0}$ | 0.167$^{*}$ | 0.462$^{***}$ | 0.168$^{*}$ | 0.170$^{*}$ |
| | (0.0988) | (0.134) | (0.0982) | (0.0982) |
| $Positive\,News\,Ratio_{t=1}$ | -0.0916 | -0.0439 | -0.0916 | -0.0887 |
| | (0.0766) | (0.0492) | (0.0766) | (0.0772) |
| $Negative\,News\,Ratio$ | -0.0392$^{***}$ | -0.0367$^{***}$ | -0.0392$^{***}$ | -0.0335$^{***}$ |
| | (0.0111) | (0.00804) | (0.0111) | (0.0101) |
| $Negative\,News\,Ratio_{t=-1}$ | -0.271$^{*}$ | -0.0675 | -0.271$^{*}$ | -0.276$^{*}$ |
| | (0.140) | (0.102) | (0.140) | (0.141) |
| $Negative\,News\,Ratio_{t=0}$ | 0.0437$^{***}$ | 0.0193 | 0.0431$^{***}$ | 0.0385$^{***}$ |
| | (0.0136) | (0.0174) | (0.0132) | (0.0128) |
| $Negative\,News\,Ratio_{t=1}$ | -0.0205 | 0.0342 | -0.0205 | -0.0257 |
| | (0.0692) | (0.0343) | (0.0692) | (0.0686) |
| $Market\,Capitalization$ | 0.0271 | 0.00219 | 0.0270 | 0.0530$^{+}$ |
| | (0.0232) | (0.0102) | (0.0232) | (0.0323) |
| $Disclosure\,Law\,Dummy$ | -0.0229 | -0.0379 | -0.0230 | -0.169$^{*}$ |
| | (0.0631) | (0.0504) | (0.0631) | (0.0950) |
| $Disclosure\,Law\,Dummy \times Breaking\,News_{t=-1}$ | -0.210 | -0.870 | -0.210 | -0.228 |
| | (0.422) | (0.656) | (0.422) | (0.427) |
| $Disclosure\,Law\,Dummy \times Breaking\,News_{t=0}$ | 0.259 | 0.264 | 0.276 | 0.221 |
| | (0.262) | (0.253) | (0.259) | (0.271) |
| $Disclosure\,Law\,Dummy \times Breaking\,News_{t=1}$ | -0.704$^{**}$ | -0.328$^{+}$ | -0.704$^{**}$ | -0.701$^{**}$ |
| | (0.307) | (0.214) | (0.307) | (0.303) |
| $Records\,Breached > 100,000$ | -0.0747 | | | -0.0907 |
| | (0.182) | | | (0.186) |
| $Constant$ | -0.272 | 0.404$^{*}$ | -0.272 | -1.273$^{*}$ |
| | (0.313) | (0.214) | (0.313) | (0.693) |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| State Controls | No | No | No | Yes |
| $N$ | 16104 | 32330 | 16104 | 16043 |
| $R^2$ | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.003 |

Standard errors in parentheses

$^{+}$ $p < 0.15$ , $^{*}$ $p < .1$ , $^{**}$ $p < .05$ , $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Comparison of Reported News Events

| | (1) Privacy Breaches | (2) Cyber-Attacks | (3) Analyst Rating Downgrade | (4) Congressional Hearing | (5) Copyright Infringement | (6) Fraud | (7) Industrial Accidents | (8) Lawsuits | (9) Patent Infringement | (10) Product Recall |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $Event\ Reported_{t=0}$ | -0.270** | -0.530** | -1.425*** | -0.211 | 1.029 | -0.618 | 0.177 | -0.0759 | 0.0772 | 0.0772 |
| | (0.133) | (0.246) | (0.119) | (0.231) | (0.906) | (0.480) | (0.201) | (0.0632) | (0.112) | (0.133) |
| $Market\ Capitalization$ | 0.0191 | 0.0424 | -0.00245 | 0.0350 | -0.0263*** | 0.301 | 0.0312 | -0.0194 | -0.0255 | -0.0120 |
| | (0.0221) | (0.0934) | (0.00586) | (0.0250) | (0.00560) | (0.356) | (0.0262) | (0.0127) | (0.0169) | (0.0135) |
| $Constant$ | -0.153 | 1.063 | 0.203** | -0.388 | 0.804** | -6.219 | -0.546 | 0.349* | 0.662* | 0.194 |
| | (0.305) | (0.997) | (0.0941) | (0.598) | (0.342) | (7.089) | (0.462) | (0.179) | (0.339) | (0.266) |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $N$ | 16165 | 3294 | 330678 | 1769 | 610 | 2928 | 5795 | 157134 | 9211 | 17934 |
| $R^2$ | 0.0001 | 0.007 | 0.003 | 0.008 | 0.052 | 0.004 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.004 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$ , ** $p < .05$ , *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Comparison of Reported News Events

| | (1) Privacy Breaches | (2) Cyber-Attacks | (3) Analyst Rating Downgrade | (4) Congressional Hearing | (5) Copyright Infringement | (6) Fraud | (7) Industrial Accidents | (8) Lawsuits | (9) Patent Infringement | (10) Product Recall |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Breaking News* | -0.0141 | -0.0872 | -0.0204 | -0.173 | 0.229 | -0.119 | 0.0606 | 0.0263 | -0.0361 | 0.00672 |
| | (0.0238) | (0.154) | (0.0134) | (0.186) | (0.285) | (0.174) | (0.0414) | (0.0313) | (0.0468) | (0.0396) |
| $Breaking\ News_{t=0}$ | -0.291*** | -0.509 | -0.614*** | -0.571** | 0.252 | -0.281 | -0.0748 | -0.0698 | 0.109 | -0.208 |
| | (0.108) | (0.430) | (0.0928) | (0.222) | (0.595) | (0.556) | (0.154) | (0.0754) | (0.167) | (0.144) |
| *Positive News Ratio* | 0.0300*** | 0.0838** | 0.0487*** | 0.0829 | 0.0197 | 0.0349 | 0.0386 | 0.0485*** | 0.0935*** | 0.0333* |
| | (0.009) | (0.0406) | (0.00816) | (0.0586) | (0.0815) | (0.0780) | (0.0234) | (0.00731) | (0.0228) | (0.0167) |
| *Negative News Ratio* | -0.0366*** | -0.0563 | -0.0437*** | -0.0225 | 0.0668 | -0.0631 | -0.0211 | -0.0452*** | -0.0646*** | -0.0643*** |
| | (0.007) | (0.0342) | (0.00439) | (0.0408) | (0.200) | (0.0612) | (0.0131) | (0.00530) | (0.0211) | (0.0161) |
| $Positive\ News\ Ratio_{t=0}$ | 0.464*** | 0.260** | -0.0889*** | -0.168 | -0.496 | -0.169 | -0.0662 | -0.0416 | -0.0178 | -0.0546** |
| | (0.134) | (0.125) | (0.0252) | (0.143) | (0.358) | (0.330) | (0.116) | (0.0341) | (0.0593) | (0.0242) |
| $Negative\ News\ Ratio_{t=0}$ | 0.0179 | 0.0572* | -0.0561*** | 0.142*** | 0.141 | -0.000191 | 0.0509 | 0.0423*** | 0.0650** | 0.0995*** |
| | (0.0177) | (0.0295) | (0.0119) | (0.0493) | (0.261) | (0.0871) | (0.0326) | (0.00657) | (0.0249) | (0.0293) |
| *Market Capitalization* | 0.00128 | 0.0448 | -0.00274 | 0.0266 | -0.0272*** | 0.304 | 0.0263 | -0.0221 | -0.0225 | -0.0113 |
| | (0.0103) | (0.102) | (0.00597) | (0.0220) | (0.00659) | (0.360) | (0.0269) | (0.0154) | (0.0191) | (0.0148) |
| *Constant* | 0.456** | 1.072 | 0.207** | -0.0472 | 0.708* | -6.174 | -0.493 | 0.406* | 0.632* | 0.153 |
| | (0.196) | (0.963) | (0.0941) | (0.528) | (0.318) | (7.124) | (0.481) | (0.206) | (0.355) | (0.276) |
| SIC Industry Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Year Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Day of Week Controls | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| $N$ | 32330 | 3294 | 330674 | 1769 | 610 | 2928 | 5795 | 157134 | 9211 | 17934 |
| $R^2$ | 0.003 | 0.007 | 0.010 | 0.016 | 0.063 | 0.004 | 0.016 | 0.002 | 0.018 | 0.017 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .1$ , ** $p < .05$ , *** $p < 0.01$

# Figures




Figure 1: Media Coverage of Firms




Figure 2: Distribution of News Reports During the Day




Figure 3: News Reports Directly Released by Firm




Figure 4: Average Firm Returns




Figure 5: Portfolio Construction