VI.

This order will terminate on April 6, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of this order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part. Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC.

IN THE MATTER OF

AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR COMPANY, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3864. Complaint, April 6, 1999--Decision, April 6, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits a California-based corporation from misrepresenting the extent to which any lawn mower is made in the United States.

Participants

For the Commission: Kent Howerton, Laura Koss, and Elaine Kolish.

For the respondent: Harvey Applebaum, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that American Honda Motor Company, Inc. ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1919 Torrance Boulevard, Torrance, California.

2. Respondent has manufactured, advertised, labeled, offered for sale, sold, and distributed products to the public, including lawn mowers.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated advertisements for its Honda Masters, Honda Harmony II 3-in-1 and Honda Harmony II lawn mowers, including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibits A through C. These advertisements contain the following statements:

A. Exhibit A, advertisement for Honda Masters

"MADE IN AMERICA BY HONDA"
B. Exhibit B, advertisement for Honda Harmony II 3-in-1
   "MADE IN AMERICA BY HONDA"
C. Exhibit C, advertisement for Honda Harmony II
   "MADE IN AMERICA BY HONDA"

5. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent
   has represented, expressly or by implication, that its Honda Masters,
   Honda Harmony II 3-in-1, and Honda Harmony II lawn mowers are
   made in the United States, *i.e.*, that all, or virtually all, of the
   component parts of the lawn mowers are made in the United States,
   and that all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the lawn
   mowers is performed in the United States.

6. In truth and in fact, a substantial portion of the components of
   the Honda Masters, Honda Harmony II 3-in-1 and Honda Harmony
   II lawn mowers is, or has been, of foreign origin. Therefore, the
   representations set forth in paragraph five were, and are, false or
   misleading.

7. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this
   complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
   affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
   Commission Act.
Honda Masters.™
The Ultimate Convertible.

HONDA
Lawn & Garden
Products That Work.

- Powerful 5hp Honda OHV engine
- Hydrostatic Drive (infinitely variable speeds)
- Converts to mulch or side discharge with optional kits
- 6 mowing height adjustments
- Many more features

MADE IN AMERICA BY HONDA

HR21SK1HXA

Your Authorized Full Service Dealer.

LAWN EQUIPMENT SPECIALIST
C&E

2606 W. Lee Blvd. 357-1712

For optimum performance and safety, please read the owner's manual before operating your Honda Power Equipment.

© 1996 American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
Introducing the Honda Harmony™ II
3-in-1

- Bag
- Mulch
- Discharge

One Mower Does It All!
- 1-speed, self-propelled
- 3-in-1 convertible (mulch, bag, discharge)
- Powerful Honda OHV Premium Residential Engine
- 21" steel mowing deck
- 6 height adjustments

HRT216SDA

HONDA Lawn & Garden
Products That Work.

Fields Equipment
3203 Havendale Blvd., Winter Haven
967-0602

For service, performance or sales, please read the owner's manual before operating your Honda Power Equipment.

EXHIBIT B
Introducing the Honda Harmony™ II

- Push-type mulcher
- Powerful Honda OHC Premium Residential Engine
- 21" steel mowing deck
- 6 height adjustments
- Standard side discharge chute

Starting at $299.00

HRS216PDA

HONDA Lawn & Garden Products That Work

Your Authorized Full Service Dealer.
Sales • Parts • Service • Rentals

DeJong Equipment
383 So. Dixie Hwy. (IL Rt. 1) Beecher, IL
(708) 946-6169

For optimum performance and safety, please read the owner's manual before operating your Honda Power Equipment.
© 1998 American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and

The respondent, its attorney, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Act, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1919 Torrance Boulevard, Torrance, California.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent, American Honda Motor Company, Inc., a corporation, its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any lawn mower in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, shall not misrepresent, in any manner, directly or by implication, the extent to which any such lawn mower is made in the United States.

Provided, however, that a representation that any such lawn mower is made in the United States will not be in violation of this order so long as all, or virtually all, of the component parts of the lawn mower are made in the United States and all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the lawn mower is performed in the United States.

Provided, further, that this order shall not apply to the labeling of such lawn mowers manufactured before the effective date of this order.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, for five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All labeling, packaging, advertisements and promotional materials containing the representation;

B. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating the representation; and

C. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations, or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question the representation, or the basis relied upon for the representation, including complaints and other communications with consumers or with governmental or consumer protection organizations.
III.

It is further ordered, That respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future officers, directors, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent American Honda Motor Company, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
VI.

This order will terminate on April 6, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of this order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part. Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealed such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF
RAND INTERNATIONAL LEISURE PRODUCTS, LTD.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3865. Complaint, April 6, 1999--Decision, April 6, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits a New York-based corporation from misrepresenting the extent to which its bicycle tire tube, or any product, is made in the United States.

Participants
For the Commission: Kent Howerton, Laura Koss, and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Pro se.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd. ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd. is a New York corporation with its principal office or place of business at 52 Executive Boulevard, Farmingdale, New York.
2. Respondent has labeled, offered for sale, sold, and distributed products to the public, including the Signature Self-Sealing Tube ("Self-Sealing Tube").
3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
4. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated packaging for its Self-Sealing Tube, including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibit A. The packaging contains the following statement:

"Made in the U.S.A."
5. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that its Self-Sealing Tubes are made in the United States, i.e., that all, or virtually all, of the component parts of the Self-Sealing Tubes are made in the United States, and that all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the Self-Sealing Tubes is performed in the United States.

6. In truth and in fact, the Self-Sealing Tubes packaged in Exhibit A were, or are, finished in the United States from imported tubes that were, or are, manufactured in Taiwan. Therefore, the representations set forth in paragraph five were, and are, false or misleading.

7. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Act, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd. is a New York corporation with its principal office or place of business at 51 Executive Boulevard, Farmingdale, New York.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent, Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd., a corporation, its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any product in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, shall not misrepresent, in any manner, directly or by implication, the extent to which any such product is made in the United States.

Provided, however, that a representation that any such product is made in the United States will not be in violation of this order so long as all, or virtually all, of the component parts of the product are made in the United States and all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the product is performed in the United States.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd., and its successors and assigns, shall, for five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All packaging, labeling, advertisements and promotional materials containing the representation;
B. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating the representation; and
C. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations, or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question the representation, or the basis relied upon for the representation, including complaints and other communications with consumers or with governmental or consumer protection organizations.
III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Rand International Leisure Products, Ltd., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission
a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.

VI.

This order will terminate on April 6, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of this order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part. Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF
USDRIVES CORPORATION

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3866. Complaint, April 6, 1999—Decision, April 6, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits a California-based corporation from misrepresenting the extent to which any CD-ROM drive is made in the United States.

Participants
For the Commission: Kent Howerton, Laura Koss and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Jon Parsons, Palo Alto, CA.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that USDrives Corporation ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent USDrives Corporation is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 850 Auburn Court, Fremont, California.
2. Respondent has manufactured, advertised, labeled, offered for sale, sold, and distributed products to the public, including optical drives that read information on compact disc read-only memory discs ("CD-ROM drives").
3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
4. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated packaging and labeling for its CD-ROM drives, including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibits A through C. The packaging and labeling contain the following statements and depictions:

A. Exhibit A, product packaging for CD-ROM drive 24X IDE
   1. Depiction of the American eagle (on two principal display panels of package);
   2. The statement "MADE IN THE USA" in red and blue (on two principal panels and top panel of package);
3. The company name "USDrives" in red, white, and blue (on all panels except bottom panel of package).

B. Exhibit B, product packaging for CD-ROM drive 20x IDE
1. Depiction of the American flag in red, white, and blue in a circle surrounded by the statement "Well made in the U.S.A." (on two principal display panels and top panel of package);
2. A depiction of the Statue of Liberty (on one principal display panel of package);
3. A depiction of the American eagle (on one principal display panel of package);
4. The company name "USDrives" in red, white, and blue (on all panels except bottom panel of package).

C. Exhibit C, name plate label for Model No.: USDRIVE 24DT
1. The statement "MADE IN USA."

5. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that its CD-ROM drives are made in the United States, i.e., that all, or virtually all, of the component parts of its CD-ROM drives are made in the United States, and that all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing its CD-ROM drives is performed in the United States.

6. In truth and in fact, the CD-ROM drives packaged in Exhibits A or B or labeled with the statement in Exhibit C were, or are, assembled in the United States of primarily imported parts. Therefore, the representations set forth in paragraph five were, and are, false or misleading.

7. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated packaging for its CD-ROM drives, including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibits D and E. The packaging contain the following statements and depictions:

A. Exhibit D, revised product packaging for CD-ROM drive 24x IDE
1. A depiction of the American Eagle (on two principal display panels of package);
2. A depiction of a billowing American flag in red, white, and blue (across two principal display panels of package);
3. The company name "USDrives" in red, white, and blue (on all panels except bottom panel of package);

In small print at the bottom of two side panels, the words "MADE IN CHINA."

B. Exhibit E, product packaging for CD-ROM drive 32x IDE
1. A depiction of a billowing American flag in red, white, and blue (across two principal display panels of package);
2. The company name "USDrives" in red, white, and blue (on all panels except bottom panel of package);

In small print on bottom panel, the words "MADE IN CHINA."
8. Through the means described in paragraph seven, notwithstanding the inconspicuous statement "Made in China," respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that its CD-ROM drives are made in the United States, i.e., that all, or virtually all, of the component parts of its CD-ROM drives are made in the United States, and that all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing its CD-ROM drives is performed in the United States.

9. In truth and in fact, the CD-ROM drives packaged in Exhibits D or E were, or are, made in China of primarily non-U.S. parts. Therefore, the representations set forth in paragraph eight were, and are, false or misleading.

10. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
EXHIBIT A

(principal display panel/side panel)
EXHIBIT A

(top panel)
EXHIBIT B

(first principal disp. panel/side panel)
EXHIBIT B

(second principal display panel/side panel)
EXHIBIT C

DANGER

INVISIBLE LASER RADIATION WHEN OPEN.

AVOID DIRECT EXPOSURE TO BEAM.

VORSICHT

UNBEGRENZTES LASERSTRahlEN UMGEBUNG

NICHT IN DEN STRAHL SEHEN.

ATTENTION

RAYONNEMENT LASER INVISIBLE

EVITE TOUTE EXPOSITION AUX LUMIERES.

CLASS 1 LASER PRODUCT
APPAREIL A LASER DE CLASSE 1
LASER KLASSE 1
LUOKAN 1 LASERLAITE
PRODUCT LASER
CATEGORIE 1

MANUFACTURED MARCH 1998

USDRIVES CORPORATION
EXHIBIT C
EXHIBIT D

(top panel)
EXHIBIT E

(principal display panel/side panel/bottom panel)
DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and

The respondent, its attorney, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Act, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent USDrives Corporation is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 850 Auburn Court, Fremont, California.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent, USDrives Corporation, a corporation, its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation,
subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any optical drive that reads information on compact disc read-only memory discs ("CD-ROM drive") in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, shall not misrepresent, in any manner, directly or by implication, the extent to which any such CD-ROM drive is made in the United States.

Provided, however, that a representation that any such CD-ROM drive is made in the United States will not be in violation of this order so long as all, or virtually all, of the component parts of the CD-ROM drive are made in the United States and all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the CD-ROM drive is performed in the United States.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent USDrives Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall, for five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All packaging, labeling, advertisements and promotional materials containing the representation;

B. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating the representation; and

C. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations, or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question the representation, or the basis relied upon for the representation, including complaints and other communications with consumers or with governmental or consumer protection organizations.

III.

It is further ordered, That respondent USDrives Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement
acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent US Drives Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent US Drives Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.

VI.

This order will terminate on April 6, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that if such complaint is
dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF

ABB AB, ET AL.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3867. Complaint, April 14, 1999--Decision, April 14, 1999

This consent order, among other things, requires the respondents to divest, within six months to a Commission-approved acquirer, the analytical division assets of Elsag Bailey Process Automation, which is involved in the manufacture and sale of process gas chromatographs and the research and development of a process mass spectrometer.

Participants

For the Commission: Steven K. Bernstein, Pamela Taylor, Ann Malester, Naomi Licker, Daniel Ducore, William Baer, J. Elizabeth Callison, and David Meyer.

For the respondents: M. Elaine Johnston, White & Case, New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that respondents, ABB AB and ABB AG (collectively hereinafter "ABB"), corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, have agreed to acquire Elsag Bailey Process Automation N.V. (hereinafter "Elsag Bailey"), a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:

I. DEFINITIONS

1. "Process Gas Chromatograph" means an analytical instrument used in process manufacturing to measure the chemical composition of a gas or a liquid using gas chromatography.

2. "Process Mass Spectrometer" means an analytical instrument used in process manufacturing to measure the chemical composition of a gas or a liquid using mass spectrometry.
II. RESPONDENTS

3. Respondent ABB AB is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Sweden with its principal place of business located at P.O. Box 7373, S10391, Stockholm, Sweden. ABB AB owns 50% of ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd., which is the holding company for the ABB Group. The ABB Group includes approximately 1,000 companies around the world.

4. Respondent ABB AG is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Switzerland with its principal place of business located at P.O. Box 58, CH-5441, Baden, Switzerland. ABB AG owns 50% of ABB Asea Brown Boveri, Ltd.

5. Respondents are engaged in, among other things, the research, development, manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs and Process Mass Spectrometers.

6. Respondents are, and at all times relevant herein have been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and are corporations whose businesses are in or affect commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

III. THE ACQUIRED COMPANY

7. Elsag Bailey Process Automation N.V. is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the Netherlands, with its principal place of business located at Schiphol Boulevard 157, 1118 BG Luchthaven Schiphol, The Netherlands.

8. Elsag Bailey, through its Applied Automation, Inc. division, is engaged in, among other things, the research, development, manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs and the research and development of Process Mass Spectrometers.

9. Elsag Bailey is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affects commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.
IV. THE ACQUISITION

10. Pursuant to an October 26, 1998 cash tender offer, ABB has agreed to acquire 100% of the issued and outstanding voting securities of Elsag Bailey for $1.1 billion ("Acquisition").

V. THE RELEVANT MARKETS

11. For purposes of this complaint, the relevant lines of commerce in which to analyze the effects of the Acquisition are:

(a) The manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs; and

(b) The manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers.

12. For purposes of this complaint, the world is the relevant geographic area in which to analyze the effects of the Acquisition in the relevant lines of commerce.

VI. STRUCTURE OF THE MARKETS

13. The market for the manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs is highly concentrated as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). The post-acquisition HHI is 4,764 points, which is an increase of 2,310 points over the pre-acquisition HHI level. ABB and Elsag Bailey are the two leading suppliers of Process Gas Chromatographs in the world, and combined would have a market share of almost 70%.

14. ABB and Elsag Bailey are actual competitors in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs.

15. The market for the manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers is highly concentrated as measured by the HHI. The pre-acquisition HHI is 4,150. ABB is the world's leading supplier of Process Mass Spectrometers, and Elsag Bailey is involved in the research and development of a Process Mass Spectrometer which it plans to begin manufacturing and selling in 1999.

16. ABB is an actual competitor in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers. Elsag Bailey is an actual potential competitor in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers.
VII. BARRIERS TO ENTRY

17. Entry into either of the relevant markets, other than Elsag Bailey's imminent introduction of a new Process Mass Spectrometer, would not occur in a timely manner to deter or counteract the adverse competitive effects described in paragraph 18 because of, among other things, the difficulty of designing and developing a new product, performing product testing, establishing a track record for product quality, and developing a service and support network.

VIII. EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION

18. The effects of the Acquisition, if consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition and to tend to create a monopoly in the relevant markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others:

(a) By eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between ABB and Elsag Bailey in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs;
(b) By increasing the likelihood that ABB will unilaterally exercise market power in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs;
(c) By increasing the likelihood that customers of Process Gas Chromatographs would be forced to pay higher prices;
(d) By reducing innovation in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Gas Chromatographs;
(e) By eliminating actual potential competition between ABB and Elsag Bailey in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers;
(f) By increasing the likelihood that customers of Process Mass Spectrometers would be forced to pay higher prices;
(g) By reducing innovation in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Process Mass Spectrometers.

IX. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

19. The Acquisition agreement described in paragraph 10 constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of the proposed acquisition by respondents of all of the outstanding shares of Elsag Bailey Process Automation, N.V., and the respondents having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint that the Bureau of Competition presented to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondents with violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45; and

Respondents, their attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondents have violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed agreement containing consent order and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having duly considered the comments received now in further conformity with the procedure described in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent ABB AB is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Sweden, with its office and principal place of business located at P.O. Box 7373, S-10391, Stockholm, Sweden.
2. Respondent ABB AG is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Switzerland, with its office and principal place of business located at P.O. Box 58, CH-5441 Baden, Switzerland.

3. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "ABB AB" means ABB AB, its directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; the subsidiaries, including Elsag Bailey after the proposed acquisition, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by ABB AB, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "ABB AG" means ABB AG, its directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; the subsidiaries, including Elsag Bailey after the proposed acquisition, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by ABB AG, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, and representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

C. "Respondents" means ABB AB and ABB AG.


E. "Applied Automation" means Applied Automation, Inc., a Delaware corporation having its principal office and place of business located at Pawhuska Road, Bartlesville, Oklahoma.


G. "Analytical Division Assets" means:

1. All assets, properties, businesses and goodwill, tangible and intangible, of Applied Automation relating to the research, development, manufacture or sale of Process Gas Chromatographs and
Process Mass Spectrometers, including, without limitation, the following:

a. All owned or leased real property and improvements, buildings, plants, manufacturing operations, machinery, fixtures, equipment, furniture, tools and other tangible personal property located in Applied Automation's Bartlesville Facility, Chicago Facility and Houston Facility;

b. All intellectual property, inventions, technology, know-how, patents, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and copyrights;

c. All research materials, technical information, management information systems, software, specifications, designs, drawings, processes and quality control data;

d. All customer lists, vendor lists, catalogs, sales promotion literature and advertising materials;

e. Inventory and storage capacity;

f. All rights, titles and interests in and to owned or leased real property, together with appurtenances, licenses and permits;

g. All rights, titles and interests in and to contracts relating to the research and development of any Process Gas Chromatograph or Process Mass Spectrometer, including, but not limited to, the August 1, 1992 Research and Development Agreement between Applied Automation and Jencourt, Inc., as amended; the August 1, 1992 Stockholders Agreement by and among Duane P. Littlejohn, Fritz H. Schlereth, Barry Schlereth, and Applied Automation, as amended; the August 1, 1992 Management Agreement by and among Applied Automation, Jencourt, Inc., Duane P. Littlejohn, and Fritz H. Schlereth, as amended; the August 1, 1992 Employment Agreement between Jencourt, Inc. and Duane P. Littlejohn, as amended; and the July 1992 Development Agreement between Leybold Inficon, Inc. and Jencourt Inc.;

h. All rights, titles and interests in and to the contracts entered into in the ordinary course of business with customers (together with associated bid and performance bonds), suppliers, sales representatives, distributors, agents, personal property lessors, personal property lessees, licensors, licensees, consignors and consignees;

i. All rights under warranties and guarantees, express or implied;

j. All books, records and files;

k. All items of prepaid expense; and
2. All additional assets of Elsag Bailey or any of its subsidiaries (but excluding owned or leased real property and improvements) relating to Process Gas Chromatographs and Process Mass Spectrometers, including, but not limited to:

   a. All Sales and Service Operations;
   b. All Systems Integration Operations; and
   c. All intellectual property, inventions, technology, know-how, patents, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and copyrights.

H. "Applied Automation Assets" means:

1. All assets, properties, business and goodwill, tangible and intangible, of Applied Automation, including, without limitation, the following:

   a. All owned or leased real property and improvements, buildings, plants, manufacturing operations, machinery, fixtures, equipment, furniture, tools and other tangible personal property located in Applied Automation’s Bartlesville Facility, Chicago Facility and Houston Facility;
   b. All intellectual property, inventions, technology, know-how, patents, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and copyrights;
   c. All research materials, technical information, management information systems, software, specifications, designs, drawings, processes and quality control data;
   d. All customer lists, vendor lists, catalogs, sales promotion literature and advertising materials;
   e. Inventory and storage capacity;
   f. All rights, titles and interests in and to owned or leased real property, together with appurtenances, licenses and permits;
   g. All rights, titles and interests in and to the contracts entered into for the research and development of any Process Gas Chromatograph or Process Mass Spectrometer, including, but not limited to, the August 1, 1992 Research and Development Agreement between Applied Automation and Jencourt, Inc., as amended; the August 1, 1992 Stockholders Agreement by and among Duane P. Littlejohn, Fritz H. Schlereth, Barry Schlereth, and Applied Automation, as amended; the August 1, 1992 Management Agreement by and among Applied Automation, Jencourt, Inc., Duane P. Littlejohn, and Fritz H. Schlereth, as amended; the August 1, 1992 Employment Agreement
between Jencourt, Inc. and Duane P. Littlejohn, as amended; and the July 1992 Development Agreement between Leybold Inficon, Inc. and Jencourt Inc.;

h. All rights, titles and interests in and to the contracts entered into in the ordinary course of business with customers (together with associated bid and performance bonds), suppliers, sales representatives, distributors, agents, personal property lessors, personal property lessees, licensors, licensees, consignors and consignees;
   i. All rights under warranties and guarantees, express or implied;
   j. All books, records and files;
   k. All items of prepaid expense; and

2. All additional assets of Elsag Bailey or any of its subsidiaries (but excluding owned or leased real property and improvements) relating to Process Gas Chromatographs and Process Mass Spectrometers, including, but not limited to:

   a. All Sales and Service Operations;
   b. All Systems Integration Operations; and
   c. All intellectual property, inventions, technology, know-how, patents, trademarks, trade names, trade secrets and copyrights.

I. "Acquisition" means the proposed acquisition by ABB AB and ABB AG of all of the voting securities of Elsag Bailey.

J. "Bartlesville Facility" means Applied Automation's manufacturing plant located at Pawhuska Road, Bartlesville, Oklahoma.

K. "Chicago Facility" means Applied Automation's sales and service facility located at 500 Joliet Road, Willowbrook, Illinois.

L. "Houston Facility" means Applied Automation's manufacturing plant located at 7101 Hollister Street, Houston, Texas.

M. "Process Gas Chromatograph" means an analytical instrument used in process manufacturing to measure the chemical composition of a gas or a liquid using gas chromatography.

N. "Process Mass Spectrometer" means an analytical instrument used in process manufacturing to measure the chemical composition of a gas or a liquid using mass spectrometry.

O. "Sales and Services Operations" means all of Elsag Bailey's assets, properties, business and goodwill, tangible and intangible, used in the sale or service of Applied Automation's Process Gas Chromatographs or Process Mass Spectrometers, including all contracts with employees or independent contractors.
P. "Systems Integration Operations" means all of Elsag Bailey's assets, properties, business and goodwill, tangible and intangible, located in Telford (United Kingdom), Praunheim (Germany) and Singapore, used to provide systems integration services for Applied Automation's Process Gas Chromatographs or Process Mass Spectrometers.

II.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondents shall divest, absolutely and in good faith, within six months from the date this agreement containing consent order is signed by respondents, the Analytical Division Assets.

B. Respondents shall divest the Analytical Division Assets only to an acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission. The purpose of the divestiture of the Analytical Division Assets is to ensure the continued use of the Analytical Division Assets in the same business in which the Analytical Division Assets are engaged at the time of the acquisition, and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the acquisition as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

C. Pending divestiture of the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets as required by this order, respondents shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of the Analytical Division Assets and the Applied Automation Assets and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration, or impairment of any of the Analytical Division Assets or Applied Automation Assets except for ordinary wear and tear.

D. Respondents shall comply with all of the terms of the Agreement to Hold Separate attached to this order and made a part hereof as Appendix I. The Agreement to Hold Separate shall continue in effect until such time as respondents have divested all the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets as required by this order.

E. At the time of the execution of a purchase agreement between respondents and a proposed acquirer of the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets, respondents shall provide the proposed acquirer with a complete list of all non-clerical, salaried employees of Applied Automation or Elsag Bailey who have been
involved in the research, development, manufacture, sale, service or customization of any Process Gas Chromatograph or Process Mass Spectrometer at any time during the period from January 1, 1998 until the date of the purchase agreement. Respondents shall also provide the proposed acquirer with a complete list of all independent contractors involved in the research, development, manufacture, sale, service or customization of any Process Gas Chromatograph or Process Mass Spectrometer from January 1, 1998 until the date of the purchase agreement. The lists shall state each individual's name, position or positions held from January 1, 1998 until the date of the purchase agreement, address, telephone number, and a description of the duties and work performed by the individual in connection with any Process Gas Chromatograph or Process Mass Spectrometer researched, developed, manufactured or sold by Applied Automation or Elsag Bailey.

F. Respondents shall provide the proposed acquirer with an opportunity to inspect the personnel files and other documentation relating to the individuals identified in paragraph II.E. of this order to the extent permissible under applicable laws, at the request of the proposed acquirer any time after the execution of the purchase agreement.

G. Respondents shall provide the individuals identified in paragraph II.E. of this order with financial incentives to continue in their employment positions during the period covered by the Hold Separate Agreement, hereto attached, and to accept employment with the Commission-approved acquirer at the time of the divestiture. Such incentives shall include:

1. Continuation of all employee benefits offered by Applied Automation or Elsag Bailey until the date of the divestiture; and
2. A bonus equal to 20 percent of an employee's annual salary (including any other bonuses) as of the date this order becomes final for any individual who agrees to accept an offer of employment from the Commission-approved acquirer, payable by respondents upon the beginning of the employee's employment by the Commission-approved acquirer.

H. For a period of one (1) year commencing on the date of the individual's employment by the Commission-approved acquirer, respondents shall not re-hire any of the individuals identified in
paragraph II.E. of this order who accept employment with the Commission-approved acquirer, unless the individual's employment has been terminated by the acquirer.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

A. If respondents have not divested, absolutely and in good faith and with the Commission's prior approval, the Analytical Division Assets within six months from the date this agreement containing consent order is signed, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the Applied Automation Assets. In the event that the Commission or the Attorney General brings an action pursuant to Section 5(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(f), or any other statute enforced by the Commission, respondents shall consent to the appointment of a trustee in such action to divest the Applied Automation Assets. Neither the appointment of a trustee nor a decision not to appoint a trustee under this paragraph shall preclude the Commission or the Attorney General from seeking civil penalties or any other relief available to it, including a court-appointed trustee, pursuant to Section 5(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or any other statute enforced by the Commission, for any failure by the respondents to comply with this order.

B. If a trustee is appointed by the Commission or a court pursuant to paragraph III.A. of this order, respondents shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the trustee's powers, duties, authority, and responsibilities:

1. The Commission shall select the trustee, subject to the consent of respondents, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The trustee shall be a person with experience and expertise in acquisitions and divestitures. If respondents have not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any proposed trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to respondents of the identity of any proposed trustee, respondents shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed trustee.

2. Subject to the prior approval of the Commission, the trustee shall have the exclusive power and authority to divest the Applied Automation Assets.
3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the trustee, respondents shall execute a trust agreement that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, of the court, transfers to the trustee all rights and powers necessary to permit the trustee to effect the divestiture required by this order.

4. The trustee shall have twelve (12) months from the date the Commission approves the trust agreement described in paragraph III.B.3. to accomplish the divestiture, which shall be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. If, however, at the end of the twelve-month period, the trustee has submitted a plan of divestiture or believes that divestiture can be achieved within a reasonable time, the divestiture period may be extended by the Commission, or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court; provided, however, the Commission may extend this period only two (2) times.

5. The trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records and facilities related to the Applied Automation Assets or to any other relevant information, as the trustee may request. Respondents shall develop such financial or other information as such trustee may request and shall cooperate with the trustee. Respondents shall take no action to interfere with or impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture. Any delays in divestiture caused by respondents shall extend the time for divestiture under this paragraph in an amount equal to the delay, as determined by the Commission or, for a court-appointed trustee, by the court.

6. The trustee shall use his or her best efforts to negotiate the most favorable price and terms available in each contract that is submitted to the Commission, subject to respondents' absolute and unconditional obligation to divest at no minimum price. The divestiture shall be made in the manner and to an acquirer as set out in paragraph II of this order; provided, however, if the trustee receives bona fide offers from more than one acquiring entity, and if the Commission determines to approve more than one such acquiring entity, the trustee shall divest to the acquiring entity selected by respondents from among those approved by the Commission; provided further, however, that respondents shall select such entity within five (5) business days of receiving notification of the Commission's approval.
7. The trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the cost and expense of respondents, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission or a court may set. The trustee shall have the authority to employ, at the cost and expense of respondents, such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers, and other representatives and assistants as are necessary to carry out the trustee's duties and responsibilities. The trustee shall account for all monies derived from the divestiture and all expenses incurred. After approval by the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court, of the account of the trustee, including fees for his or her services, all remaining monies shall be paid at the direction of the respondents, and the trustee's power shall be terminated. The trustee's compensation shall be based at least in significant part on a commission arrangement contingent on the trustee's divesting the Applied Automation Assets.

8. Respondents shall indemnify the trustee and hold the trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities, or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the trustee's duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses incurred in connection with the preparation for, or defense of any claim, whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the trustee.

9. If the trustee ceases to act or fails to act diligently, a substitute trustee shall be appointed in the same manner as provided in paragraph III.A. of this order.

10. The Commission or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, the court, may on its own initiative or at the request of the trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the divestiture required by this order.

11. The trustee shall have no obligation or authority to operate or maintain the Applied Automation Assets.

12. The trustee shall report in writing to respondents and the Commission every sixty (60) days concerning the trustee's efforts to accomplish divestiture.
IV.

*It is further ordered,* That:

Within thirty (30) days after the date this order becomes final and every thirty (30) days thereafter until respondents have fully complied with the provisions of paragraphs II. or III. of this order, respondents shall submit to the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they intend to comply, are complying, and have complied with paragraphs II. and III. of this order. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full description of the efforts being made to comply with paragraphs II. and III. of the order, including a description of all substantive contacts or negotiations for the divestiture and the identity of all parties contacted. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports copies of all written communications to and from such parties, all internal memoranda, and all reports and recommendations concerning divestiture.

V.

*It is further ordered,* That respondents shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the corporate respondents such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

VI.

*It is further ordered,* That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, upon written request, respondents shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondents relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five days' notice to respondents and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of respondents, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

PREMISES

Whereas, ABB has proposed to acquire one hundred percent of the issued and outstanding voting securities of Elsag Bailey ("Proposed Acquisition"); and

Whereas, ABB manufactures and markets, among other things, process gas chromatographs and process mass spectrometers; and

Whereas, Elsag Bailey, through its Applied Automation, Inc., subsidiary, manufactures and markets, among other things, process gas chromatographs, and is involved in the research and development of process mass spectrometers; and

Whereas, the Commission is now investigating the Proposed Acquisition to determine if it would violate any of the statutes the Commission enforces; and

Whereas, ABB has entered into an Agreement Containing Consent Order ("Consent Agreement"), which requires, among other things, ABB to divest the Analytical Division Assets of Elsag Bailey, as defined in Paragraph I of the Consent Agreement, or the Applied Automation Assets, as defined in Paragraph I of the Consent Agreement; and

Whereas, if the Commission accepts the Consent Agreement, the Commission will place it on the public record for a period of at least sixty (60) days and subsequently may either withdraw such acceptance or issue and serve its Complaint and decision in disposition of the proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.34 of the Commission's Rules; and

Whereas, the Commission is concerned that if an understanding is not reached, preserving the status quo ante of the Analytical Division Assets and the Applied Automation Assets, as defined in
Paragraph I. of the Consent Agreement, during the period prior to the final issuance of the Consent Agreement by the Commission (after the 60-day public notice period), there may be interim competitive harm, and divestiture or other relief resulting from a proceeding challenging the legality of the proposed acquisition might not be possible, or might be less than an effective remedy; and

Whereas, the purposes of this Agreement to Hold Separate and the Consent Agreement are:

A. To preserve the Analytical Division Assets and the Applied Automation Assets as viable, competitive, and independent businesses pending divestiture of the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets, as required by the Consent Agreement, and

B. To remedy any anticompetitive effects of the Proposed Acquisition; and

Whereas, ABB and Elsag Bailey entering into this Agreement to Hold Separate shall in no way be construed as an admission by ABB or Elsag Bailey that the Proposed Acquisition constitutes a violation of any law; and

Whereas, ABB and Elsag Bailey understand that no act or transaction contemplated by this Agreement to Hold Separate shall be deemed immune or exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission Act by reason of anything contained in this Agreement to Hold Separate.

Now, therefore, upon the understanding that the Commission has not yet determined whether it will challenge the Proposed Acquisition, and in consideration of the Commission's agreement that, at the time it accepts the Consent Agreement for public comment, it will grant early termination of the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting period applicable to the Proposed Acquisition, ABB and Elsag Bailey agree as follows:

1. ABB and Elsag Bailey agree to execute and be bound by the terms of the order contained in the Consent Agreement, as if it were final, from the date ABB and Elsag Bailey sign the Consent Agreement.

2. ABB and Elsag Bailey agree that from the date ABB and Elsag Bailey sign the Consent Agreement until the earlier of the dates listed in subparagraphs 2.a. - 2.b., they will comply with the provisions of Paragraph 3 of this Agreement to Hold Separate:
a. Three (3) business days after the Commission withdraws its acceptance of the Consent Order pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.34 of the Commission's rules;
b. The day after the divestiture required by the Consent Order is completed.

3. To ensure the complete independence and viability of the Analytical Division Assets and the Applied Automation Assets and to assure that no Material Confidential Information ("Material Confidential Information" as used herein, means competitively sensitive or proprietary information not independently known to an entity from sources other than the entity to which the information pertains, and includes, but is not limited to, customer lists, price lists, marketing methods, patents, technologies, processes or other trade secrets) is exchanged between ABB and the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets, ABB shall hold the Applied Automation Assets separate and apart on the following terms and conditions:

   a.. The Applied Automation Assets shall be held separate and apart and shall be managed and operated independently of ABB, except to the extent that ABB must exercise direction and control over such assets to assure compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate, or with the Consent Agreement, and except as otherwise provided in this Agreement to Hold Separate.
   b. ABB will appoint a Manager ("the Manager") within three (3) business days of the date the Proposed Acquisition is consummated to manage and maintain the Applied Automation Assets. The Manager shall not make any changes to the Applied Automation Assets other than changes made in the ordinary course of business. The Manager shall manage the Applied Automation Assets independently of the management of ABB’s other businesses. The Manager shall not be involved in any way in the operations or management of any other ABB business.
   c. The Manager shall have exclusive control over the Applied Automation Assets, with responsibility for the management of the Applied Automation Assets and for maintaining the independence of that business.
   d. ABB shall not exercise direction or control over, or influence directly or indirectly the Manager relating to the operation of the
Applied Automation Assets; provided, however, that ABB may exercise only such direction and control over the Manager and the Applied Automation Assets as is necessary to assure compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate and with all applicable laws.

e. ABB and Elsag Bailey shall maintain the marketability, viability, and competitiveness of the Applied Automation Assets and shall not sell, transfer, encumber them (other than in the normal course of business or to assure compliance with the Consent Agreement), and shall not cause or permit the destruction, removal, wasting or deterioration, or otherwise impair the marketability, viability or competitiveness of the Applied Automation Assets.

f. ABB and Elsag Bailey shall ensure that the Applied Automation Assets have appropriate funds for research and development, quality control, manufacturing and marketing of the products produced by the Applied Automation Assets at a level not lower than that budgeted for the 1998 fiscal year, and shall increase such spending as the Manager shall reasonably determine. ABB and Elsag Bailey shall also ensure that the Applied Automation Assets have sufficient working capital to operate at a level no less than that described in the regularly prepared annual operating plan(s) in effect during the twelve (12) months preceding the date of this Hold Separate Agreement.

g. Employees of the Applied Automation Assets shall not be involved in any other ABB business.

h. Except as required by law, and except to the extent that necessary information is exchanged in the course of evaluating the Proposed Acquisition, defending investigations or litigation, obtaining legal advice, negotiating agreements to divest assets, or complying with this Agreement to Hold Separate or the Consent Agreement, ABB shall not receive or have access to any Material Confidential Information about the Applied Automation Assets or the activities of the Manager or support service employees involved in the Applied Automation Assets.

i. ABB and Elsag Bailey shall circulate to all their salaried, non-clerical employees employed in the research, development, manufacture, or sale of Process Gas Chromatographs or Process Mass Spectrometers and all other salaried, non-clerical employees of the Applied Automation Assets, and appropriately display, a copy of this Agreement to Hold Separate and the Consent Agreement.

j. If the Manager ceases to act or fails to act diligently, ABB shall appoint a substitute Manager, subject to Commission approval.
k. The Manager shall have access to and be informed about all companies who inquire about, seek or propose to buy the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets. ABB may require the Manager to sign a confidentiality agreement prohibiting the disclosure of any Material Confidential Information gained as a result of his or her role as Manager to anyone other than the Commission.

1. Within thirty (30) days after the date this Agreement to Hold Separate is signed and every thirty (30) days thereafter until this Agreement to Hold Separate terminates, the Manager shall report in writing to the Commission concerning his or her efforts to accomplish the purposes of this Agreement to Hold Separate.

4. Should the Commission seek in any proceeding to compel ABB to divest itself of the Analytical Division Assets or the Applied Automation Assets, as provided in the Consent Agreement, or to seek any other injunctive or equitable relief, ABB and Elsag Bailey shall not raise any objection based on the expiration of the applicable Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act waiting period or the fact that the Commission has permitted the Proposed Acquisition. ABB and Elsag Bailey shall also waive all rights to contest the validity of this Agreement to Hold Separate.

5. To the extent that this Agreement to Hold Separate requires ABB or Elsag Bailey to take, or prohibits ABB or Elsag Bailey from taking, certain actions that otherwise may be required or prohibited by contract, ABB and Elsag Bailey shall abide by the terms of this Agreement to Hold Separate, or the Consent Agreement, and shall not assert as a defense such contract requirements in any action brought by the Commission to enforce the terms of this Agreement to Hold Separate or the Consent Agreement.

6. For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate, subject to any legally recognized privilege, and upon written request, and on reasonable notice, to ABB made to its principal office, ABB shall permit any duly authorized representative or representatives of the Commission:

a. Access during the office hours of ABB and in the presence of counsel to inspect any facilities and to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of ABB relating to compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate; and
b. Upon five (5) days' notice to ABB and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of ABB, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

7. For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate, subject to any legally recognized privilege, and upon written request, and on reasonable notice, to Elsag Bailey made to its principal office, Elsag Bailey shall permit any duly authorized representative or representatives of the Commission:

a. Access during the office hours of Elsag Bailey and in the presence of counsel to inspect any facilities and to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of Elsag Bailey relating to compliance with this Agreement to Hold Separate; and

b. Upon five (5) days' notice to Elsag Bailey and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of Elsag Bailey, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

8. This Agreement to Hold Separate shall not be binding until accepted by the Commission.
IN THE MATTER OF

THE BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY P.L.C., ET AL.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3868. Complaint, April 19, 1999—Decision, April 19, 1999

This consent order, among other things, requires BP and Amoco to divest, to
Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., or an acquirer approved by the Commission, 134
gas stations in eight markets and nine light petroleum products terminals.

Participants

For the Commission: Dennis Johnson, Arthur Nolan, Anthony
Low Joseph, Kirsten Wolfe, Constance Salemi, Richard Liebeskind,
Phillip Broyles, Naomi Licker, Daniel Ducore, William Baer,
Charlotte Wojcik, and Leslie Farber.

For the respondents: Robert Osgood, Sullivan & Cromwell, New
York, N.Y. and Ilene Knable Gotts, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act
and the Clayton Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said
Acts, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"),
having reason to believe that respondents The British Petroleum
Company P.L.C. ("BP"), a corporation, and Amoco Corporation
("Amoco"), a corporation, have entered into an agreement and plan
of merger whereby BP proposes to acquire all of the outstanding
common stock of Amoco, that such agreement and plan of merger
violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended,
15 U.S.C. 45, and that such agreement and merger, if consummated,
would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and BP and Amoco having merged into a
corporation ultimately controlled by BP Amoco P.L.C. ("BP Amoco"),
and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect
thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint,
stating its charges as follows:
I. RESPONDENTS

A. The British Petroleum Company, p.l.c.

1. Respondent BP is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England and Wales, with its office and principal place of business located at Britannic House, 1 Finsbury Circus, London EC2M 7BA, England.

2. Respondent BP is, and at all times relevant herein has been, a diversified energy products company engaged in oil and gas exploration; the development, production and transportation of crude oil and natural gas; the refining, marketing, transportation, terminaling and sale of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel and other petroleum products; and the production, marketing and sale of petrochemicals.

3. Respondent BP is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

B. Amoco Corporation

4. Respondent Amoco is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Indiana, with its office and principal place of business located at 200 East Randolph Drive, Chicago, Illinois.

5. Respondent Amoco is, and at all times relevant herein has been, an integrated petroleum and chemical products company engaged in the exploration, development, and production of crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids; the marketing of natural gas and natural gas liquids; the refining, marketing, and transportation of petroleum products, including crude oil, gasoline, jet fuel, diesel fuel, heating oil, asphalt, motor oil, lubricants, natural gas liquids, and petrochemical feedstocks; the terminaling and sale of gasoline, diesel fuel, and other petroleum products; and the manufacture and sale of various petroleum-based chemical products.

6. Respondent Amoco is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined

C. *BP Amoco p.l.c.*

7. Respondent BP Amoco is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England and Wales, with its office and principal place of business located at Britannic House, 1 Finsbury Circus, London EC2M 7BA, England.

8. Respondent BP Amoco is the successor corporation to respondents BP and Amoco.

9. Respondent BP Amoco is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

II. THE PROPOSED MERGER

10. Pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger dated August 11, 1998, BP intends to acquire all of the outstanding common stock of Amoco in exchange for stock of BP valued at the time of the agreement at approximately $48.2 billion, with the combined entity to be renamed BP Amoco p.l.c. As a result of the merger, BP's shareholders will hold approximately 60%, and Amoco's shareholders will hold approximately 40%, of the new combined entity.

11. On or about December 31, 1998, respondents BP and Amoco merged into a corporation ultimately controlled by respondent BP Amoco.

III. TRADE AND COMMERCE

A. *Terminaling*

12. Petroleum terminals are facilities that provide temporary storage of gasoline and other light petroleum products received from a pipeline or marine vessel, and the redelivery of such products from storage tanks into tank trucks or transport trailers for ultimate delivery to retail gasoline stations or other buyers. There are no substitutes for petroleum terminals for providing such terminaling services.
13. The terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products is a relevant line of commerce in which to evaluate the effects of this merger.

14. The following metropolitan areas are relevant sections of the country in which to evaluate the effects of this merger on the terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products: Cleveland, Ohio; Chattanooga and Knoxville, Tennessee; Jacksonville, Florida; Meridian, Mississippi; Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama; and North Augusta and Spartanburg, South Carolina (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "terminaling markets").

15. The terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products in each terminaling market is either moderately concentrated or highly concentrated, and would become significantly more concentrated as a result of the merger. Premerger concentration in the terminaling markets, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, ranges from more than 1,300 to more than 2,500, and as a result of the merger concentration would increase in each terminal market by more than 100 points to levels ranging from more than 1,500 to more than 3,600.

16. Entry into the terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products in each terminaling market is difficult and would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects that may result from this merger.

B. Wholesale Gasoline

17. Gasoline is a motor fuel used in automobiles and other vehicles. It is manufactured from crude oil at refineries in the United States and throughout the world. There are no substitutes for gasoline as a fuel for automobiles and other vehicles that use gasoline.

18. The wholesale sale of gasoline is the business of selling gasoline to retail dealers, or to intermediaries ("jobbers") that in turn sell gasoline to retail dealers. Firms such as BP and Amoco sell gasoline in wholesale quantities as either branded or unbranded fuels at terminals serving particular local areas. The wholesale sale of gasoline is a relevant line of commerce in which to evaluate the effects of this merger.

19. The following cities and metropolitan areas are relevant sections of the country in which to evaluate the effects of this merger on the wholesale sale of gasoline: Albany, Georgia; Athens, Georgia;
Birmingham, Alabama; Charleston, South Carolina; Charlotte, North Carolina; Charlottesville, Virginia; Clarksville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, South Carolina; Columbus, Georgia; Cumberland, Maryland; Dothan, Alabama, Fayetteville, North Carolina; Florence, Alabama; Goldsboro, North Carolina; Hattiesburg, Mississippi; Hickory, North Carolina; Jackson, Tennessee; Memphis, Tennessee; Meridian, Mississippi; Mobile, Alabama; Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Raleigh, North Carolina; Rocky Mount, North Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Sumter, South Carolina; Tallahassee, Florida; Toledo, Ohio; and Youngstown, Ohio (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "gasoline markets").

20. The wholesale sale of gasoline in each gasoline market would be moderately concentrated or highly concentrated after the merger. In markets that would be moderately concentrated after the merger, postmerger concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, would increase by more than 100 points to levels between 1,400 and 1,800. In markets that would be highly concentrated after the merger, postmerger concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, would increase by more than 100 points to levels in excess of 1,800.

21. Entry into the wholesale sale of gasoline in each gasoline market is difficult and would not be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects that may result from this merger.

IV. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

First Violation

22. Respondents Amoco and BP each own terminaling facilities that service each terminaling market, and are competitors for terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products in each terminaling market.

23. The effect of the proposed merger, if consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products in the terminaling markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others:
a. By eliminating direct competition in the terminaling of gasoline and other light petroleum products between Amoco and BP in each terminaling market;

b. By increasing the likelihood of, or facilitating, collusion or coordinated interaction between providers of terminaling services in each terminaling market;

each of which increases the likelihood that the prices of terminaling services for gasoline and other light petroleum products will increase in the terminaling markets.

Second Violation

24. Respondents Amoco and BP are actual competitors in the wholesale sale of gasoline in each gasoline market.

25. The effect of the proposed merger, if consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the wholesale sale of gasoline in the gasoline markets in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others:

a. By eliminating direct competition in the wholesale sale of gasoline between Amoco and BP in each gasoline market;

b. By increasing the likelihood of, or facilitating, collusion or coordinated interaction between Amoco, BP and other wholesale sellers of gasoline in each gasoline market;

each of which increases the likelihood that the prices of gasoline will increase in the gasoline markets.

V. STATUTES VIOLATED


The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") having initiated an investigation of the proposed merger between The British Petroleum Company p.l.c. ("BP") and Amoco Corporation ("Amoco"), which merger resulted in Amoco becoming a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of BP Amoco p.l.c. ("BP Amoco") (collectively "respondents"), and respondents having been furnished with a copy of a draft complaint that the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration, and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondents with violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18; and

Respondents, their attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondents have violated the said Acts, and that complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent BP was a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England and Wales, with its office and principal place of business located at Britannic House, 1 Finsbury Circus, London EC2M 7BA, England. BP was renamed BP Amoco p.l.c.

2. Respondent Amoco was a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Indiana, with its office and principal place of business located at 200 East
Randolph Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60601. Amoco was renamed BP Amoco Corporation, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BP Amoco.

3. Respondent BP Amoco is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England and Wales, with its office and principal place of business located at Britannic House, 1 Finsbury Circus, London EC2M 7BA, England.

4. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Amoco" means Amoco Corporation, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Amoco Corporation, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "BP" means The British Petroleum Company p.l.c., its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by The British Petroleum Company p.l.c., and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

C. "BP Amoco" means BP Amoco p.l.c., its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by BP Amoco p.l.c., and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

D. "Amoco Branded Seller" means any person (other than BP or Amoco) that has, by virtue of contract or agreement with Amoco in effect at the time respondents execute the agreement containing consent order, the right to sell gasoline using Amoco's brand name at Retail Sites located in any Branded Seller Metropolitan Area, or to resell gasoline to any such person. "Amoco Branded Seller" does not
include Retail Sites leased from Amoco except for sites leased from Amoco by Amoco Two Party Dealers.

E. "Amoco Retail Divestiture Assets" means all Retail Assets owned by Amoco or leased by Amoco from another person located in the following Metropolitan Areas: Tallahassee, Florida and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. "Amoco Retail Divestiture Assets" do not include Retail Sites leased from Amoco by Amoco Two Party Dealers.

F. "Amoco Two Party Dealer" means a person that directly or indirectly owns or leases from a lessor other than Amoco a Retail Site in a Branded Seller Metropolitan Area and that has leased to Amoco and directly or indirectly leased back from Amoco the Retail Site.

G. "Amoco Two Party Dealer Lease" means all leases, deeds, contracts, rights and obligations associated with the lease of a Retail Site by any person to Amoco and the lease of that Retail Site back to such person or an affiliate of such person.

H. "BP Branded Seller" means any person (other than BP or Amoco) that has, by virtue of contract or agreement with BP in effect at the time respondents execute the agreement containing consent order, the right to sell gasoline using BP's brand name at Retail Sites located in any Branded Seller Metropolitan Area, or to resell gasoline to any such person, except that "BP Branded Seller" does not include Retail Sites leased from BP.

I. "BP Retail Divestiture Assets" means all Retail Assets owned by BP or leased by BP from another person located in the following Metropolitan Areas: Charleston, South Carolina; Charlotte, North Carolina; Columbia, South Carolina; Jackson, Tennessee; Memphis, Tennessee; and Savannah, Georgia.

J. "Branded Fuels" means motor gasoline purchased by a person for resale under a trade name owned by another person.

K. "Branded Seller Metropolitan Area" means (1) each of the following Metropolitan Areas: Albany, Georgia; Athens, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; Charleston, South Carolina; Charlotte, North Carolina; Charlottesville, Virginia; Clarksville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; Columbia, South Carolina; Columbus, Georgia; Cumberland, Maryland; Dothan, Alabama; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Florence, Alabama; Goldsboro, North Carolina; Hattiesburg, Mississippi; Hickory, North Carolina; Jackson, Tennessee; Memphis, Tennessee; Mobile, Alabama; Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Raleigh, North Carolina; Rocky Mount, North Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Sumter, South Carolina; Tallahassee, Florida; Toledo, Ohio;
and Youngstown, Ohio; and (2) the city of Meridian, Mississippi and
the counties of Kemper, Lauderdale, and Newton, Mississippi.


M. "Deed Restriction" means any obligation that would prevent
or inhibit the owner of a Retail Site (or the owner's tenant) from
selling motor fuels at that Retail Site other than a brand licensed from
respondents.

N. "Existing Supply Agreement" means each franchise agreement,
supply contract, image agreement, jobber outlet incentive program
contract, Amoco Two Party Dealer Lease, and all related agreements
between respondents and any BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded
Seller relating to such person's right or obligation to sell or resell
gasoline using BP's brand name or Amoco's brand name at a Retail
Site in a Branded Seller Metropolitan Area.

O. "Long Term Lease" means a lease the terms of which allow
respondents to divest to the acquirer of Retail Assets a right to occupy
those Retail Assets for ten (10) years or longer from the date on
which the order becomes final, and where such divestiture is not
subject to landlord approval or, if subject to such approval, respondents have obtained the necessary approval prior to the
divestiture. "Long Term Lease" does not include a leasehold interest
in which any respondent is a lessor.

P. "Merger" means the proposed merger of Amoco and BP.

Q. "Metropolitan Area" means any Metropolitan Statistical Area
or Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area as defined by the U.S.

R. "Ohio Metropolitan Area" means each of the following
Metropolitan Areas: Toledo, Ohio, and Youngstown, Ohio.

S. "Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets" means a package of Retail
Assets, to be identified by respondents but approved by the
Commission, (i) that includes individual Retail Sites with aggregate
sales of 40 million gallons of gasoline in Youngstown, Ohio during
1997, and aggregate sales of 14 million gallons of gasoline in Toledo,
Ohio during 1997; (ii) each of which complies with all 1998 and 1999
environmental requirements for underground storage tanks; and (iii)
for each of which respondents can convey fee ownership or a Long
Term Lease.

T. "Option Effective Date" means a date identified by the Amoco
Branded Seller or BP Branded Seller that is not later than sixty (60)
days after respondents' receipt of a written notice from an Amoco Branded Seller or BP Branded Seller pursuant to paragraph IV.A.1.  

U. "Option Period" means, for each BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded Seller, a sixty (60) day period commencing upon the date on which such person receives the written notification specified in paragraph IV.A of this order; except that, if this order is made final on or after April 20, 1999, the Option Period shall end on June 30, 1999.

V. "Person" means any individual, partnership, association, company or corporation.

W. "Respondents" means BP Amoco, Amoco and BP, individually and collectively.

X. "Retail Assets" means, for each Retail Site, all assets, tangible or intangible, that are used at the Retail Site, including but not limited to all permits and contracts, and all assets relating to all ancillary businesses (such as automobile mechanical service, convenience stores, restaurants, and car washes) located at each Retail Site. Respondents shall make good faith diligent efforts to obtain all third-party approvals necessary to convey all licenses, permits, consents and ancillary businesses with each Retail Site. Retail Assets do not include respondents' proprietary trademarks, trade names, logos, tradenames, identification signs, additized product inventory, petroleum franchise agreements, petroleum product supply agreements, credit card agreements, satellite-based or centralized credit card processing equipment not incorporated in gasoline dispensers, or systemwide software and databases.

Y. "Retail Divestiture Assets" means the Amoco Retail Divestiture Assets and the BP Retail Divestiture Assets.

Z. "Retail Site" means a business establishment from which gasoline is sold to the general public.

AA. "Terminaling" means the services performed by a facility that provides temporary storage of gasoline received from a pipeline or marine vessel, and the redelivery of gasoline from storage tanks into tank trucks or transport trailers.

BB. "Terminal Assets" means all assets, tangible and intangible, relating to Terminaling at the Terminaling facilities owned by Amoco (including but not limited to real property, tanks, loading racks, offices, buildings, warehouses, equipment, machinery, fixtures, tools, spare parts, licenses, permits, and other property used for
Terminaling) at the following locations: Aurora, Ohio; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Jacksonville, Florida; Knoxville, Tennessee; Meridian, Mississippi; Mobile, Alabama; Montgomery, Alabama; North Augusta, South Carolina; and Spartanburg, South Carolina.

CC. "Terminated Retail Site" means a Retail Site as to which an Amoco Branded Seller or BP Branded Seller has exercised the option to cancel an Existing Supply Agreement pursuant to paragraph IV of this order.

II.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondents shall divest, absolutely and in good faith, the Terminal Assets to Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., in accordance with the Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998 between Amoco Oil Company and Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., no later than:

(1) Ten (10) days after the date on which the Merger is consummated, or
(2) Thirty (30) days after the date on which respondents sign the agreement containing consent order,

whichever is later. Provided, however, that if respondents have divested the Terminal Assets to Williams Energy Ventures, Inc. prior to the date the order becomes final, and if, at the time the Commission determines to make the order final, the Commission notifies respondents that Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., is not an acceptable buyer of the Terminal Assets or that the manner in which the divestiture was accomplished is not acceptable, then respondents shall immediately rescind the transaction with Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., and shall divest the Terminal Assets within six months from the date the order becomes final, absolutely and in good faith, at no minimum price, to an acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission.

B. Pending divestiture of the Terminal Assets, respondents shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of the Terminal Assets and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration or impairment of any of the Terminal
Assets except for ordinary wear and tear that does not affect the viability and marketability of the Terminal Assets.

C. Respondents shall comply with all terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, between Amoco Oil Company and Williams Energy Ventures, Inc., for the Terminal Assets, and such agreement is incorporated by reference into this order and made a part hereof as Confidential Appendix B. Any failure by respondents to comply with the requirements of such agreement shall constitute a failure to comply with this order.

D. The purpose of this paragraph II is to ensure the continuation of the Terminal Assets as ongoing, viable enterprises engaged in the Terminaling of gasoline and other petroleum products, and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Merger in Terminaling markets as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondents shall divest, at no minimum price, absolutely and in good faith, within six months from the date respondents execute the agreement containing consent order, the Retail Divestiture Assets.

B. Upon divestiture, respondents shall cancel all existing dealer leases, dealer loans, building incentive agreements, and related dealer agreements between respondents and their lessee dealers applicable to the divested Retail Sites.

C. For each Metropolitan Area identified in paragraphs I.E. and I.I., respondents shall divest the Retail Divestiture Assets in such Metropolitan Area to a single acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission.

D. Pending divestiture of the Retail Divestiture Assets, respondents shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of the assets and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration, or impairment of any of such assets except for ordinary wear and tear. Respondents shall continue at least at their scheduled pace all capital projects involving the assets that were ongoing, planned, or approved as of the date the agreement containing consent order is signed by respondents, and otherwise shall maintain the Retail Divestiture Assets at least at the same standards and on the same schedule as respondents have been
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maintaining them until the date of divestiture. Respondents shall not remove or degrade the brand identification at the Retail Divestiture Assets, until the divestiture of the assets is completed.

E. The purpose of this paragraph III is to ensure the continued use of these assets in the same business in which they were engaged at the time of the proposed Merger, and to remedy the lessening of competition in the sale of gasoline in each of the Metropolitan Areas identified in paragraphs I.E. and I.I. resulting from the proposed Merger as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

IV.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Within ten days from the date this order becomes final, respondents shall provide written notification to each BP Branded Seller and each Amoco Branded Seller, giving each such person the option to cancel, without penalty, that portion of any Existing Supply Agreement with BP or Amoco that applies to any Terminated Retail Site, upon the following terms and conditions:

1. Such option to cancel may be exercised by delivering written notice to BP or Amoco during the Option Period. Each such written notice shall identify by address each Retail Site within any Branded Seller Metropolitan Area as to which the BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded Seller intends to exercise such option, and the Option Effective Date for each such Retail Site. The exercise of such option shall become effective on the Option Effective Date.

2. Respondents shall release each BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded Seller from all debts, loans, Deed Restrictions, obligations or responsibilities, attributable to Terminated Retail Sites, except for amounts owed for fuels actually received and for the unamortized portion of any debt identified in Confidential Appendix C, on the condition that such BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded Seller notifies Amoco or BP in writing within the Option Period that such BP Branded Seller or Amoco Branded Seller (a) intends to cease purchasing Branded Fuels from respondents for resale at such Terminated Retail Site, (b) intends to continue to purchase gasoline for resale at such Terminated Retail Site, but (c) will not purchase Branded Fuels for resale as Branded Fuels at such Terminated Retail Site from any person that has a market share of more than 20% in
such Branded Seller Metropolitan Area, as measured by the 1998 annual market share estimates published by NPD Group, Inc.

3. For a period of two years from the Option Effective Date, respondents shall not sell Branded Fuels for resale as Branded Fuels at Terminated Retail Sites. For a period of two years from the date upon which respondents receive the notice specified in paragraph IV.A.1, respondents shall not solicit or engage in any discussions or negotiations to sell Branded Fuels to the Amoco Branded Seller or BP Branded Seller for resale as Branded Fuels at any Terminated Retail Site.

B. The purpose of this paragraph IV is to prevent respondents from enforcing agreements that may deter or impede existing sellers of BP or Amoco gasoline in Branded Seller Metropolitan Areas from switching wholesale suppliers of fuels for resale at Terminated Retail Sites, and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Merger in gasoline markets as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

V.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Unless BP Branded Sellers or Amoco Branded Sellers that in 1998 had total yearly sales of at least 40 million gallons of gasoline in the Youngstown, Ohio Metropolitan Area and 14 million gallons of gasoline in the Toledo, Ohio Metropolitan Area cease purchasing Branded Fuels from respondents by the end of the Option Period or by June 30, 1999, whichever is later, respondents, within twelve (12) months from the date respondents execute the agreement containing consent order, shall divest, at no minimum price, absolutely and in good faith, the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets.

B. Respondents shall divest the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets in each Ohio Metropolitan Area to a single acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission.

C. Pending divestiture of the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets, respondents shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of all Retail Assets that might be included as part of the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets, and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration, or impairment of any of such assets except for ordinary wear and tear. Respondents shall
continue at least at their scheduled pace all capital projects involving any Retail Assets that might be included as part of the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets that were ongoing, planned, or approved as of the date the agreement containing consent order is signed by respondents, and otherwise shall maintain such assets at least at the same standards and on the same schedule as respondents have been maintaining them until the date of divestiture. Respondents shall not remove or degrade the brand identification at any Retail Assets that might be included as part of the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets, until the divestiture of the assets is completed.

D. The purpose of this paragraph V is to ensure the continued use of these assets in the same business in which they were engaged at the time of the proposed Merger, and to remedy the lessening of competition in the sale of gasoline in Toledo and Youngstown, Ohio, resulting from the proposed Merger as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

VI.

It is further ordered, That:

A. If respondents have not divested, absolutely and in good faith, the Terminal Assets pursuant to paragraph II. of this order, the Retail Divestiture Assets pursuant to paragraph III. of this order, and the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets pursuant to paragraph V. of this order, the Commission may appoint a trustee or trustees to divest the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets. The trustee shall divest the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets at no minimum price, to an acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission, and in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission.

B. In the event that the Commission or the Attorney General brings an action pursuant to Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(l), or any other statute enforced by the Commission, respondents shall consent to the appointment of a trustee or trustees in such action. Neither the appointment of a trustee nor a decision not to appoint a trustee under this paragraph shall preclude the Commission or the Attorney General from seeking civil penalties or any other relief available, including a court-appointed trustee or trustees, pursuant to Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade
THE BRITISH PETROLEUM COMPANY P.L.C., ET AL.

Decision and Order

Commission Act, or any other statute enforced by the Commission, for any failure by the respondents to comply with this order.

C. If any trustee is appointed by the Commission or a court pursuant to the terms of this order, respondents shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the trustee's powers, duties, authority, and responsibilities:

1. The Commission shall select the trustee, subject to the consent of respondents, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The trustee shall be a person with experience and expertise in acquisitions and divestitures. If respondents have not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of the proposed trustee, within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to respondents of the identity of the proposed trustee, respondents shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed trustee.

2. Subject to the prior approval of the Commission, the trustee shall have the exclusive power and authority to divest the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the trustee, respondents shall execute a trust agreement that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, of the court, transfers to the trustee all rights and powers necessary to permit the trustee to divest the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets.

4. The trustee shall have twelve (12) months from the date the Commission approves the trust agreement described in paragraph IV.C.3. to accomplish the divestiture, which shall be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. If, however, at the end of the twelve-month period, the trustee has submitted a plan of divestiture or believes that divestiture can be achieved within a reasonable time, the divestiture period may be extended by the Commission, or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court; provided, however, the Commission may extend this period only two (2) times.

5. The trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records and facilities related to the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets, or to any other relevant information, as the trustee may request. Respondents shall develop such financial or other
information as such trustee may request and shall cooperate with the trustee. Respondents shall take no action to interfere with or impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture. Any delays in the divestiture caused by respondents shall extend the time for divestiture under this paragraph in an amount equal to the delay, as determined by the Commission or, for a court-appointed trustee, by the court.

6. The trustee shall use his or her best efforts to negotiate the most favorable price and terms available in each contract that is submitted to the Commission, subject to respondents' absolute and unconditional obligation to divest expeditiously at no minimum price. The divestiture shall be made in the manner and to the acquirer or acquirers as set out in paragraphs II., III., and V. of this order, provided, however, if the trustee receives bona fide offers from more than one acquiring entity, and if the Commission determines to approve more than one such acquiring entity, the trustee shall divest to the acquiring entity or entities selected by respondents from among those approved by the Commission, provided further, however, that respondents shall select such entity within five (5) days of receiving notification of the Commission's approval.

7. The trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the cost and expense of respondents, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission or a court may set. The trustee shall have the authority to employ, at the cost and expense of respondents, such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers, and other representatives and assistants as are necessary to carry out the trustee's duties and responsibilities. The trustee shall account for all monies derived from the divestitures and all expenses incurred. After approval by the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court, of the account of the trustee, including fees for his or her services, all remaining monies shall be paid at the direction of the respondents, and the trustee's power shall be terminated. The trustee's compensation shall be based at least in significant part on a commission arrangement contingent on the trustee's divesting the Terminal Assets, the Retail Divestiture Assets, or the Ohio Retail Divestiture Assets.

8. Respondents shall indemnify the trustee and hold the trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities, or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the trustee's duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses
incurred in connection with the preparation for, or defense of any claim, whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the trustee.

9. If the trustee ceases to act or fails to act diligently, a substitute trustee shall be appointed in the same manner as provided in paragraph VI.A. of this order.

10. The Commission or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, the court, may on its own initiative or at the request of the trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the divestitures required by this order.

11. Except as otherwise provided in this order, the trustee shall have no obligation or authority to operate or maintain the assets to be divested.

12. The trustee shall report in writing to respondents and the Commission every sixty (60) days concerning the trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestitures.

VII.

It is further ordered, That, for a period of ten (10) years from the date this order becomes final, respondents shall not, without providing advance written notification to the Commission, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries, partnerships, joint ventures, or otherwise, acquire:

A.1. Any stock, share capital, equity, partnership, membership or other interest in any concern, corporate or non-corporate, engaged, at the time of such acquisition or within the year preceding such acquisition, in providing Terminating services and located in any of the counties in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina or Tennessee, listed on Appendix A hereto, or

2. Any assets used or previously used (and still suitable for use) in providing Terminating services and located in any of the counties in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Ohio, South Carolina or Tennessee listed on Appendix A hereto, or

B.1. Any stock, share capital, equity, partnership, membership or other interest in any concern, corporate or non-corporate, engaged, at the time of such acquisition or within the year preceding such
acquisition, in the sale of gasoline in any Branded Seller Metropolitan Area, or

2. Any assets used or previously used (and still suitable for use) in the sale of gasoline in any Branded Seller Metropolitan Area for which the aggregate purchase price exceeds $10 million.

Said notification shall be given on the Notification and Report Form set forth in the Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Notification"), and shall be prepared and transmitted in accordance with the requirements of that part, except that no filing fee will be required for any such notification, notification shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, notification need not be made to the United States Department of Justice, and notification is required only of respondents and not of any other party to the transaction. Respondents shall provide the Notification to the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to consummating the transaction (hereinafter referred to as the "first waiting period"). If, within the first waiting period, representatives of the Commission make a written request for additional information or documentary material (within the meaning of 16 CFR 803.20), respondents shall not consummate the transaction until twenty (20) days after submitting such additional information or documentary material. Early termination of the waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested and, where appropriate, granted by letter from the Bureau of Competition. Provided, however, that prior notification shall not be required by this paragraph for a transaction for which notification is required to be made, and has been made, pursuant to Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.

VIII.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Within thirty (30) days from the date this order becomes final and every thirty (30) days thereafter until respondents have fully complied with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, IV and V of this order, respondents shall submit to the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they intend to comply, are complying, and have complied with paragraphs II, III, IV and V of this order. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full
description of the efforts being made to comply with paragraphs II, III, IV and V of this order, including a description of all substantive contacts or negotiations for the divestitures and the identity of all parties contacted. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports copies of all written communications to and from such parties, all internal memoranda, and all reports and recommendations concerning divestitures.

B. One (1) year from the date this order becomes final, annually for the next nine (9) years on the anniversary of the date this order becomes final, and at other times as the Commission may require, respondents shall file a verified written report with the Commission setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied and are complying with each provision of this order.

IX.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondents shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the corporate respondents such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

B. Upon consummation of the Merger, respondents shall cause the merged entity to be bound by the terms of this order.

X.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, upon written request, respondents shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to all facilities and access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondents relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five days' notice to respondents and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of respondents.
APPENDIX A

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## Decision and Order

### APPENDIX A

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APPENDIX A

**Tennessee Counties**

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APPENDIX B

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Purchase and Sale Agreement Between Amoco and Williams

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN ROBERT PITOFSKY AND COMMISSIONERS SHEILA F. ANTHONY AND MOZELLE W. THOMPSON

On December 30, 1998, the Commission published a proposed complaint alleging that this merger would violate Clayton Act Section 7, 15 U.S.C. 18, and FTC Act Section 5, 15 U.S.C. 45, in 30 wholesale gasoline markets and nine light petroleum products terminaling markets in the United States, and accepted a proposed consent order resolving those allegations. The Commission has now accorded final approval to the complaint and consent order. Our colleague, Commissioner Swindle, dissents from that portion of the complaint and consent order that alleges violations and mandates relief in 27 of the wholesale gasoline markets. We write to clarify our view.

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1 In response to comments received during the comment period, the Commission, with the agreement of BP-Amoco, has made a few modifications to the details of the complaint and order. None of these changes, however, alter the core relief.

2 Commissioner Swindle concurs in the complaint and consent order to the extent they allege that the merger of BP and Amoco would violate the antitrust laws in the nine terminal markets and in wholesale gasoline markets in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Cleveland, Toledo and Youngstown, Ohio.
At the time the consent agreement was accepted for public comment -- before the merger at issue was consummated -- British Petroleum Company p.l.c. ("BP") and Amoco Corporation ("Amoco") were integrated producers, refiners and marketers of petroleum products, including gasoline, in the United States. Although BP's and Amoco's operations did not overlap in many areas, both were wholesale marketers of gasoline in the southeastern and midwestern United States, i.e., both BP and Amoco sold gasoline to retail gas stations that they might or might not have owned. In these markets, BP was the only firm that could sell "BP"-branded gasoline to retail dealers, and Amoco was the only firm that could sell "Amoco"-branded gasoline to dealers. Therefore, measuring concentration of retail sales by brand was an adequate proxy for measuring concentration in gasoline wholesaling.

In 25 metropolitan area markets, absent the relief secured by the Commission, the combination of BP and Amoco would have resulted in a highly concentrated wholesale gasoline market, and an increase in concentration in an amount that the Department of Justice-FTC Merger Guidelines presume likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. Merger Guidelines § 1.51(c). In each of these markets, the top four firms would together have had at least

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3 For example, to a large extent, Amoco and BP produced and marketed different petrochemical products in the United States. BP produced acetic acid and acrylonitrile in the U.S., but Amoco did not. Similarly, Amoco produced ethylene, propylene, polypropylene, and styrene in the U.S., but BP did not. In the few petrochemical areas where the parties overlapped in the U.S., concentration did not change significantly as a result of the merger.

4 Indeed, brand concentration may understate concentration in the wholesale market, because some branded wholesale sellers also supply unbranded gasoline to unbranded retail stations. The brand concentration statistics used here would not attribute these unbranded sales by branded wholesalers to the branded wholesalers.

5 The Merger Guidelines presume anticompetitive effects when the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") is over 1800 and there is an increase of more than 100 points. HHI is a statistical index that measures the degree of concentration in a relevant antitrust market. Those metropolitan areas and the changes in HHI would have been: Albany, Georgia (post-merger HHI 3674, increase of 542); Charleston, South Carolina (1865/362); Charlotte, North Carolina (1909/610); Charlottesville, Virginia (2214/278); Clarksville, Tennessee (1863/492); Cleveland, Ohio (1859/124); Columbia, South Carolina (2257/738); Columbus, Georgia (2194/351); Cumberland, Maryland (2592/161); Dothan, Alabama (2259/235); Fayetteville, North Carolina (2635/795); Florence, Alabama (1959/269); Goldsboro, North Carolina (2133/310); Hattiesburg, Mississippi (2214/281); Jackson, Tennessee (2051/508); Memphis, Tennessee (1948/468); Myrtle Beach, South Carolina (2138/353); Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (2129/663); Raleigh, North Carolina (2032/535); Rocky Mount, North Carolina (2003/302); Savannah, Georgia (2668/515); Sumter, South Carolina (1920/528); Tallahassee, Florida (2366/794); Toledo, Ohio (2022/351); and Youngstown, Ohio (2540/1043).
70% of wholesale sales; in 15 markets, the top four firms would have had more than 80%.\(^6\)

Market shares and concentration levels of this magnitude raise antitrust concern because they suggest that a small number of firms might, after this merger, be able to raise price without losing significant sales to what could well be an insignificant fringe.\(^7\) See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990). Concerns about collusion or coordination, and consequent price increases to consumers, are more pronounced in markets -- such as gasoline markets -- where (among other factors) the product is homogeneous and prices are generally observable, making it relatively easier for a small number of firms to coordinate and to detect deviation.

Of course, high market concentration is less of a threat to consumers if retailers in the market are likely to switch to new sources of supply in the event of a wholesale price increase. But, we require persuasive evidence that entry would be timely, likely and sufficient to defeat a coordinated price increase. Merger Guidelines § 3. Our colleague concludes that such entry could occur, and is likely to occur, "if there are enough branded retail gasoline stations that could switch and become customers of the new wholesale entrant."\(^8\) We do not disagree with this analysis, but we are unpersuaded by the investigative record here that there is a sufficient likelihood that enough switching would occur to allay our concerns. The history of switching in these markets appears to be more among incumbents than to new entrants, and switching among incumbents (particularly among incumbents with substantial market shares) will not defeat a wholesale price increase by those incumbents. Dealers also would be less likely to switch to fringe suppliers or to new entrants if there are

\(^6\) In addition, in five areas the HHI would have increased substantially (by more than 100 HHI points): Birmingham, Alabama (post-merger HHI 1778, increasing by 273); Mobile, Alabama (1600/160); Athens, Georgia (1654/251); Meridian, Mississippi (1705/359); and Hickory, North Carolina (1782/354). In each of these "moderately concentrated" markets, the top four firms would together have had at least 70% of wholesale sales, and independent unbranded sellers would have had less than 20%.

\(^7\) In this case, the Commission examined the gasoline markets in which BP and Amoco competed and alleged antitrust violations in markets with a small number of fringe players, and not in markets where fringe competitors collectively appeared to have significant market presence.

\(^8\) We all agree that our concerns about concentration among wholesale sellers of gasoline are not obviated by the asserted fact that retailers can set their own prices for retail gasoline sold at their outlets. The wholesale price of gasoline is plainly the most substantial portion of the dealer’s cost, and increases in wholesale prices will likely result in increases in retail prices.
significant reasons for dealers to prefer major brands (particularly major brands that are well-established in a given area), such as the benefit of local marketing or of brand credit card programs. Moreover, dealers might not have an incentive to switch to new entrants to defeat a price increase by their suppliers in which they also may profit.

Instead, we believe that the consent order will make jobbers and open dealers able to switch, and by relieving them of financial penalties that might deter switching to new entrants, make it more likely that they will in fact switch, preventing an increase in concentration that otherwise could well give rise to a substantial risk of higher prices for gasoline in the markets alleged in the complaint. As we noted, our disagreement with our colleague is narrow: whether, in the absence of the relief under the consent order, jobbers and open dealers are sufficiently likely to switch in substantial numbers to protect the ultimate consumers from the risks that otherwise would be associated with highly concentrated gasoline markets. In this case, we believe the investigative record regarding dealer switching is insufficiently compelling to demand that ultimate consumers bear the substantial risk of higher prices for gasoline that may result from these highly concentrated markets.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ORSON SWINDLE
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSenting IN PART

The Commission's complaint alleges that the merger of Amoco Corporation ("Amoco") and British Petroleum Company p.l.c. ("BP") is likely to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in certain terminaling markets and in certain markets for the wholesale sale of gasoline. I agree that the merger is likely to have anticompetitive effects in terminaling markets and that the divestitures that would be required adequately remedy these antitrust violations. However, because the merger is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects in southeastern United States markets for the wholesale sale of gasoline, I dissent from the allegations and relief related to those markets.

Refined gasoline is transported by pipeline from the refinery to gasoline terminals. Wholesalers sell refined gasoline from terminals

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1 The "southeastern United States markets for the wholesale sale of gasoline" include all of the "gasoline markets" described in Paragraph 19 of the proposed complaint except those located in Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I support the Commission's action in the Ohio and Pittsburgh wholesaling markets.
to retail gasoline stations. Retail gasoline stations may be either unbranded or branded. Unbranded retail gasoline stations do not display the brand of a wholesaler and do not sell branded gasoline. In contrast, branded retail gasoline stations display the brand of the wholesaler, such as "Amoco" or "Texaco," and sell the wholesaler's brand of gasoline, which is refined gasoline plus proprietary additives.

Among branded retail gasoline stations, there are various types of ownership and operation arrangements. The wholesaler may itself own and operate the retail gasoline station (a "company station"). The wholesaler may own the retail gasoline station but lease the station pursuant to an agreement that requires the operator (a "lessee/dealer") to purchase branded gasoline from the wholesaler. The wholesaler may have franchisees ("open dealers") who sell branded gasoline pursuant to a franchise agreement. Finally, the wholesaler may sell branded gasoline to independent firms known as "jobbers" that distribute the branded gasoline to retail gasoline stations (which are sometimes owned by the jobber).

The complaint alleges, among other things, that the merger of Amoco and BP, both wholesalers of branded gasoline, would have an anticompetitive effect in certain southeastern United States markets for the wholesale sale of gasoline. Each of these markets would be moderately concentrated or highly concentrated after the merger, which would significantly increase the levels of concentration in these markets. The theory is that because these markets would be concentrated following the merger, wholesalers could coordinate the wholesale price of gasoline, which, in turn, would harm consumers by causing higher gasoline prices at the pump.²

Any effort by wholesalers to pass on a collusive price increase would be defeated if enough branded retail gasoline stations switched to other wholesalers rather than pay the higher price. Entry by new wholesalers offering lower prices could defeat a collusive price increase, and such entry is likely if there are enough branded retail gasoline stations that could switch and become customers of the new wholesale entrant.³ Cheating by an existing wholesaler on a collusive price also is likely if enough branded retail gasoline stations would switch to make cheating worthwhile.

² There is no evidence that wholesalers in these markets have already attempted to collude.

³ Because the order should help ensure that gasoline terminaling markets in the southeastern United States remain competitive, a new wholesale entrant would be able to purchase gasoline at terminals to sell to jobbers.
Is such switching likely to occur? I certainly think so. An evaluation of the southeastern markets reveals that switching is already the reality, not mere speculation or prediction. Unlike company stations and lessee/dealer stations, open dealers and jobbers have the option of responding to their wholesaler's collusive price increase by switching to another wholesaler. Open dealers and jobbers currently (and with some frequency) switch relatively easily and quickly in response to changes in market conditions, including trying to combat price increases. Open dealers and jobbers have stated that they would in fact switch in response to a price increase attributable to the merger, and they have explained that they would not anticipate significant problems in switching.

Would enough branded retail gasoline stations in the southeastern markets be willing to switch to make possible new wholesale entry or cheating by an existing wholesaler? Again, I certainly think so. In most of these markets, open dealers and jobbers purchase from about 60 percent to about 80 percent of the gasoline that is sold at retail. Given that open dealers and jobbers account for such a large proportion of retail gasoline sales and that they are likely to switch, enough switching likely would occur to induce entry or cheating sufficient to defeat a collusive price increase by wholesalers.

The majority of the Commission emphasizes that the concentration levels in these markets create a presumption of anticompetitive effects and that history demonstrates that switching to new wholesale entrants is unlikely to prevent these effects. Specifically, the majority believes that open dealers and jobbers will switch primarily to incumbent wholesalers. The majority reasons that switching will be limited primarily to incumbent wholesalers because many of them offer benefits (such as local marketing or brand credit card programs) that would not be offered by a new wholesale entrant.

The investigative record is to the contrary. While there has been significant switching by open dealers and jobbers among incumbent

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4 None of the public comments supplied analysis or data directly bearing on the issue of whether switching was likely to occur in these markets in the absence of the relief prescribed by the order.

5 Switching can occur relatively quickly because, although any individual open dealer or jobber may have to wait for its contract to expire before it can switch, the short-term nature of contracts between Amoco and open dealers and jobbers means that some of those contracts are expiring at any given time. Station switching also can occur relatively inexpensively, especially because new wholesalers often reimburse open dealers and jobbers for the costs incurred in switching.

6 By contrast, in other investigations the Commission has determined that sufficient switching would not occur in markets that are dominated by company stations and lessee/dealer stations.
wholesalers, there also has been significant switching away from incumbent wholesalers to new branded wholesalers and new unbranded wholesalers. Moreover, open dealers and jobbers have stated that they would switch in response to a collusive price increase, but have not stated that their switching would be limited to moving from one incumbent wholesaler to another. Detailed economic analysis has shown that whatever non-price benefits incumbent wholesalers may be able to offer to open dealers and jobbers, they are unlikely to induce open dealers and jobbers to ignore promising opportunities offered by new wholesale entrants.

Because switching is likely to defeat any collusive price increase, the merger of Amoco and BP is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects in the southeastern United States markets for the wholesale sale of gasoline. The Commission nevertheless has extracted from the merging parties a variety of costly concessions designed to facilitate switching and improve the marketplace. As explained above, because market forces are likely to cause sufficient switching without government intervention, these measures are simply unnecessary. The Commission thus should have allowed the merger of Amoco and BP to proceed with antitrust relief limited to terminaling as well as the Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania wholesaling situations.

I therefore dissent from the aspects of this matter dealing with gasoline wholesaling in the southeastern United States markets identified in Paragraph 19 of the complaint.

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7 For example, by offering lower prices to induce switching, Citgo has been able to enter Florida and Coastal has expanded in South Carolina. Similarly, by offering lower prices to induce switching, unbranded wholesalers (such as Kwic Trip, Racetrac, Speedway, Smile, Wilco, and Hess) also have been able to enter many of these markets.

8 The majority also posits that instead of switching, open dealers and jobbers may decide to accept a collusive price increase, pass it on consumers at the pump, and share in the profit from the price increase. For an open dealer or jobber to share in the profit from a collusive increase, it would have to be confident that increased prices at the pump would not be undercut by other retailers. Given that wholesalers do not control the pricing at most retail gasoline stations in these markets, open dealers and jobbers would have good reason to worry that any collusive price that they sought to impose would be undercut, especially to the extent that there are unbranded retail gasoline stations in these markets.

9 Because they distort the usual market incentives of jobbers, the order provisions designed to promote switching also may have unintended and unforeseen consequences in the marketplace.

10 The majority has revised the order to respond to public comments regarding the provisions designed to promote switching. Assuming for the sake of argument that the types of provisions contained in the proposed order were needed to promote switching, the revisions contained in the final order are reasonable.
This consent order, among other things, permits Service Corporation International, the largest owner of funeral homes and cemeteries in the world, to acquire Equity Corporation International and requires the respondent to divest certain funeral service and cemetery properties to Carriage Services, Inc.

Participants

For the Commission: Joseph Brownman, Marc Schneider, Barbara Shapiro, Harold Kirtz, James Rohrer, Maridel Freshwater Hoagland, Phillip Broyles, David von Nirschl, Roberta Baruch, William Baer, Louis Silvia, Jeffrey Fischer, and Christopher Garmon.

For the respondent: Marcus Watts and Annette Trip, Liddell, Sapp, Zively, Hill & LaBoon, Houston, TX.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that Service Corporation International ("SCI"), and Equity Corporation International ("ECI"), a corporation, have entered into an agreement in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and that if the terms of such agreement, were they to be satisfied, would result in a violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:

I. RESPONDENT SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL

1. Respondent SCI is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas, with its office and principal place of business located at 1929 Allen
Parkway, Houston, Texas. Respondent SCI had sales in 1997 of approximately $2.4 billion.

2. Respondent SCI is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce, or in activities affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, and Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44.

3. Respondent SCI is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in the provision of (a) funeral services in the funeral service relevant geographic markets and (b) cemetery services in the cemetery service relevant geographic markets.

II. EQUITY CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL

4. ECI is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business located at 415 South First Street, Lufkin, Texas. ECI had sales in 1997 of approximately $135 million.

5. ECI at all times relevant herein has been engaged in commerce, or in activities affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, and Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44.

6. ECI at all times relevant herein has been engaged in the provision of (a) funeral services in the funeral service relevant geographic markets and (b) cemetery services in the cemetery service relevant geographic markets.

III. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION

7. On or about August 6, 1998, respondent SCI and ECI entered into a formal agreement for respondent SCI to acquire ECI. That agreement was subsequently amended on or about December 14, 1998. The price is approximately $578 million.

IV. TRADE AND COMMERCE

8. The relevant lines of commerce in which to analyze the proposed acquisition are (a) funeral services and (b) cemetery services.

9. The relevant sections of the country in which to analyze the proposed acquisition in connection with the provision of funeral services, and the total dollar volume in sales in each market, is as follows:
10. The relevant sections of the country in which to analyze the proposed acquisition in connection with the provision of cemetery services, and the total dollar volume in sales in each market, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cemetery Service Markets</th>
<th>Size of Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Broward County, Florida</td>
<td>$14.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the</td>
<td>$4.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighboring north Georgia suburbs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Citrus County, Florida</td>
<td>$1 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Corpus Christi, Texas</td>
<td>$3.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Eugene and Springfield, Oregon</td>
<td>$1.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. North Richmond, Virginia, and the northern,</td>
<td>$3.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eastern and western suburbs of Richmond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. South Bay area of San Diego, California</td>
<td>$7.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Summit County, Ohio</td>
<td>$11 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. ENTRY CONDITIONS

11. Entry into the relevant markets is difficult, and would not be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects.

VI. CONCENTRATION

12. The relevant markets are highly concentrated, whether measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") or by two-firm or four-firm concentration ratios.

(a) In the funeral service markets:

1. In Columbus, Georgia, and Phenix City, Alabama, the HHI will increase from about 2200 to about 3400;
2. In Evansville, Indiana, the HHI will increase from about 2750 to about 3400;
(3) In Jacksonville Beach, Florida, the HHI will increase from about 7450 to about 10,000, resulting in a monopoly;
(4) In Roseville, California, the HHI will increase from about 5200 to about 10,000;
(5) In Ruskin and Sun City Center, Florida, the HHI will increase from about 3955 to about 6075, resulting in a duopoly;
(6) In West Pasco County and Tarpon Springs, Florida, the HHI will increase from about 2930 to about 4050.

(b) In the cemetery service markets:
(1) In Broward County, Florida, the HHI will increase from about 2800 to about 3750;
(2) In Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the neighboring north Georgia suburbs, the HHI will increase from about 2900 to about 5030;
(3) In Citrus County, Florida, the HHI will increase from about 5840 to about 10,000, resulting in a monopoly;
(4) In Corpus Christi, Texas, the HHI will increase from about 3550 to about 5050, resulting in a duopoly;
(5) In Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, the HHI will increase from about 4400 to about 4770;
(6) In North Richmond, Virginia, and the northern, eastern and western suburbs of Richmond, the HHI will increase from about 2760 to about 4530;
(7) In the South Bay area of San Diego, California, the HHI will increase from about 3970 to about 4660;
(8) In Summit County, Ohio, the HHI will increase from about 2350 to about 3450.

VII. EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION

13. The acquisition may substantially lessen competition in the relevant markets in the following ways, among others:

(a) By eliminating direct competition between respondent and ECI;
(b) By increasing the likelihood that respondent will unilaterally exercise market power; and
(c) By increasing the likelihood of, or facilitating, collusion or coordinated interaction;
each of which increases the likelihood that the prices of funeral services or cemetery services will increase, and that services to customers of funeral services or cemetery services will decrease.

VIII. VIOLATIONS CHARGED


DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") having initiated an investigation of the proposed acquisition by Service Corporation International ("SCI"), hereinafter sometimes referred to as "respondent," of the outstanding voting securities of Equity Corporation International, and respondent having been furnished with a copy of a draft complaint that the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration, and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Clayton Act and Federal Trade Commission Act;

Respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:
1. Respondent SCI is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Texas, with its office and principal place of business located at 1929 Allen Parkway, Houston, Texas.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and over respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Respondent" or "SCI" means Service Corporation International, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors and assigns; its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by SCI, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors and assigns of each.


C. "Acquisition" means the proposed acquisition by SCI of Equity Corporation International.

D. "Funeral Service" means a group of services provided at the death of an individual, the focus of which is some form of commemorative ceremony of the life of the deceased at which ceremony the body is present; this group of services ordinarily includes, but is not limited to: removal of the body from the place of death; embalming or other preparation; making available a place for visitation and viewing, for the conduct of a Funeral Service, and for the display of caskets and outside cases; and arrangement for and conveyance of the body to a cemetery or crematory for final disposition.

E. "Cemetery Service" means a group of goods and services provided for the final disposition of human remains in a cemetery, whether by burial, entombment in a mausoleum or crypt, or disposition in a niche.

F. "Assets To Be Divested" consists of the businesses identified in Schedule A, attached to this order and made a part hereof, and all assets, leases, properties, permits (to the extent transferable), customer lists, businesses and goodwill, tangible and intangible, related to or utilized in the businesses operated at those locations.
G. "Carriage" means Carriage Services, Inc., a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its offices and principal place of business located at 1300 Post Oak Boulevard, Houston, Texas, and its subsidiary, Carriage Funeral Holdings, Inc., a Delaware Corporation operating and doing business at the same address as Carriage Services, Inc.

H. "Carriage Agreement" means the December 18, 1998, asset purchase agreement between respondent SCI and Carriage for the sale or assignment by respondent to Carriage of all Schedule A Assets.

II.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondent SCI shall divest absolutely and in good faith the Assets To Be Divested to:

1. Carriage, pursuant to the Carriage Agreement, which agreement shall not be interpreted so as to vary or contradict any of the terms of this order or the Asset Maintenance Agreement attached to this order and made a part hereof as Appendix I, no later than

   (a) One hundred twenty (120) days from the date on which SCI signs the agreement containing consent order, or
   
   (b) Seven (7) days after the Commission issues its order, whichever is earlier; or

2. An acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission, within four (4) months of the date on which the Commission issues its order.

B. If respondent SCI submits any application for approval of a divestiture pursuant to paragraph II.A.2., respondent shall also provide a complete copy of such application to the Attorney General of each state in which any of the Assets To Be Divested are located. The purpose of this requirement is to allow the Attorney General of any state in which such proposed divestiture assets are located to provide information to the Commission to aid the Commission in its review and action upon each such application.
C. In each of the fourteen (14) geographic areas identified in Schedule A, attached, respondent shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability, marketability, and competitiveness of the Assets To Be Divested, pending the divestiture of the assets required to be divested pursuant to paragraph II.A. of this order in that particular geographic area, and preserve the ability of these assets to compete at the same levels of sales, profitability, and market share as prior to the Acquisition, and shall not permit the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration, or impairment of any of these assets, except for ordinary wear and tear that does not affect their viability, marketability, or competitiveness, and shall transfer each asset required to be divested pursuant to Section II of this order to a Commission-approved acquirer in a manner that preserves the asset's marketability, viability, and competitiveness. Respondent SCI shall comply with all terms of the Asset Maintenance Agreement, attached to this order and made a part hereof as Appendix I. The Asset Maintenance Agreement shall continue in effect until such time as respondent has divested all of the Assets To Be Divested as required by this order.

D. The purposes of this Section II are to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Acquisition, as alleged in the Commission's complaint, and to ensure the continuation of the Assets To Be Divested as ongoing, viable enterprises engaged in the same businesses in which they are engaged at the time of the Acquisition.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

A. If respondent has not divested, absolutely and in good faith, the Assets To Be Divested as required by paragraph II.A. of this order, the Commission may appoint one or more trustees to accomplish the required divestitures, at no minimum price, to an acquirer or acquirers that receive(s) the prior approval of the Commission, and in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission. Each trustee shall be appointed to accomplish the divestitures for one or more of the geographic areas identified in Schedule A.

B. In the event that the Commission or the Attorney General brings an action pursuant to Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(l), or any other statute enforced by the
Commission, the respondent shall consent to the appointment of a
trusted in such action.

C. Neither the appointment of a trustee nor a decision not to
appoint a trustee shall preclude the Commission from seeking civil
penalties or any other relief (including, but not limited to, a court-
appointed trustee) pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act, or
any other statute enforced by the Commission, for any failure by the
respondent to comply with this order.

D. If a trustee is appointed by the Commission or a court
pursuant to paragraphs III.A. or III.B. of this order, respondent shall
consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the trustee's
powers, duties, authority, and responsibilities:

1. The Commission shall select the trustee, subject to the consent
of respondent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.
The trustee shall be a person with experience and expertise in
acquisitions and divestitures. If respondent has not opposed, in
writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any
proposed trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the
Commission to respondent of the identity of any proposed trustee,
respondent shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the
proposed trustee.

2. Subject to the prior approval of the Commission, the trustee
shall have the exclusive power and authority to divest the Assets To
Be Divested.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the trustee,
respondent shall execute a trust agreement that, subject to the prior
approval of the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed
trustee, of the court, transfers to the trustee all rights and powers
necessary to permit the trustee to effect the divestitures required by this
order.

4. The trustee shall have twelve (12) months from the date the
Commission approves the trust agreement described in paragraph
III.D.3. to accomplish the divestitures, which shall be subject to the
prior approval of the Commission. If, however, at the end of the
twelve-month period, the trustee has submitted a plan of divestiture
or believes that divestiture can be achieved within a reasonable time,
the divestiture period may be extended by the Commission, or, in the
case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court; provided, however, the
Commission may extend this period only two (2) times.
5. The trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records and facilities related to the Assets To Be Divested or to any other relevant information, as the trustee may request. Respondent shall develop such financial or other information as such trustee may request and shall cooperate with the trustee. Respondent shall take no action to interfere with or impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestiture. Any delays in divestiture caused by respondent shall extend the time for divestiture under this paragraph in an amount equal to the delay, as determined by the Commission or, for a court-appointed trustee, by the court.

6. The trustee shall use his or her best efforts to negotiate the most favorable price and terms available in each contract that is submitted to the Commission, subject to respondent's absolute and unconditional obligation to divest expeditiously at no minimum price. The divestitures shall be made in the manner and to the acquirer or acquirers as set out in Section II of this order; provided, however, if the trustee receives bona fide offers from more than one acquiring entity, and if the Commission determines to approve more than one such acquiring entity, the trustee shall divest to the acquiring entity or entities selected by respondent from among those approved by the Commission.

7. The trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the cost and expense of respondent, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission or a court may set. The trustee shall have the authority to employ, at the cost and expense of respondent, such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers, and other representatives and assistants as are necessary to carry out the trustee's duties and responsibilities. The trustee shall account for all monies derived from the divestiture and all expenses incurred. After approval by the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court, of the account of the trustee, including fees for his or her services, all remaining monies shall be paid at the direction of the respondent, and the trustee's power shall be terminated. The trustee's compensation shall be based at least in significant part on a commission arrangement contingent on the trustee's divesting the Assets To Be Divested.

8. Respondent shall indemnify the trustee and hold the trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities, or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the trustee's duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses.
incurred in connection with the preparation for, or defense of any claim, whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the trustee.

9. If the trustee ceases to act or fails to act diligently, a substitute trustee shall be appointed in the same manner as provided in paragraph III.A. of this order.

10. The Commission or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, the court, may on its own initiative or at the request of the trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the divestitures required by this order.

11. In the event that the trustee determines that he or she is unable to divest the Assets To Be Divested with respect to any geographic area in a manner consistent with the Commission's purposes as described in paragraph II.D., the trustee may divest such additional assets of respondent in that geographic area as necessary to satisfy the requirements of this order.

12. The trustee shall have no obligation or authority to operate or maintain the Assets To Be Divested.

13. The trustee shall report in writing to respondent and the Commission every sixty (60) days concerning the trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestitures.

IV.

It is further ordered, That:

A. For a period of ten (10) years from the date this order becomes final, respondent shall not, without providing advance written notification to the Commission, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries, partnerships, or otherwise, acquire any stock, share capital, equity or other interest in any concern, corporate or non-corporate, or any assets used or previously used (and still suitable for use), engaged in at the time of such acquisition, or within the two (2) years preceding such acquisition engaged in the provision of

1. Funeral Services in the following geographic areas:

   (a) Phenix City, Alabama, and Columbus, Georgia, including Muscogee County, Georgia, Phenix City, Alabama, and 15-miles out from Muscogee County and Phenix City limits;
(b) Evansville, Indiana, including Posey, Vanderburgh, and Warrick Counties, Indiana;

c) Jacksonville Beach, Florida, including Duval County east and south of the St. Johns River, and a 15-mile radius into St. Johns County from the southernmost county line of Duval County, Florida;

(d) Roseville, California, including Placer County, and Sacramento County north of the American and Sacramento Rivers and including the City of Folsom, California;

(e) Ruskin and Sun City Center, Florida, including Hillsborough County east of Tampa Bay and south of the city limits of Riverview, Florida; and

(f) West Pasco County and Tarpon Springs, Florida, including all of Pasco County west of Interstate 75, Florida, and Tarpon Springs, Florida.

2. Cemetery Services in the following geographic areas:

(a) Broward County, Florida;

(b) Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the neighboring north Georgia suburbs of Chattanooga, including Hamilton County, Tennessee, and Catoosa and Walker Counties, Georgia;

(c) Citrus County, Florida;

(d) Corpus Christi, Texas, including Nueces County, Texas;

(e) Eugene and Springfield, Oregon, including Lane County, Oregon;

(f) North Richmond, Virginia, and the northern, eastern and western suburbs of Richmond, including the City of Richmond, and Goochland, Hanover and Henrico Counties, Virginia;

(g) South Bay area of San Diego, California, including the area of San Diego County south of the northern city limits of the City of San Diego and a line from the northeast corner of the San Diego city limits eastward to the eastern boundary of San Diego County; and

(h) Summit County, Ohio.

B. The aforesaid notification shall be given on the Notification and Report Form set forth in the Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Notification"), and shall be prepared and transmitted in accordance with the requirements of that part, except that no filing fee will be required for any such notification, notification shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, notification need not be made
to the United States Department of Justice, and notification is required only of respondent and not of any other party to the transaction. Respondent shall provide the Notification to the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to consummating the transaction (hereinafter referred to as the "first waiting period"). If, within the first waiting period, representatives of the Commission make a written request for additional information or documentary material (within the meaning of 16 CFR 803.20), respondent shall not consummate the transaction until twenty (20) days after submitting such additional information or documentary material. Early termination of the waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested and, where appropriate, granted by letter from the Bureau of Competition. Provided, however, that prior notification shall not be required by this paragraph for a transaction for which notification is required to be made, and has been made, pursuant to Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.

C. Within three (3) business days of any notification to the Commission required by paragraphs IV.A. and IV.B. of this order, respondent shall deliver a copy of the Notification, return receipt requested, to the office of the Attorney General of each state in which any assets are located with respect to which notification to the Commission is required under paragraphs IV.A and IV.B.

V.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Within thirty (30) days of the date on which the respondent signs the Agreement Containing Consent Order and every thirty (30) days thereafter until respondent has fully complied with the provisions of Sections II and III of this order, respondent shall submit to the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it intends to comply, is complying, and has complied with Sections II, III, and IV of this order. Respondent shall include in its compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full description of the efforts being made to comply with Sections II, III, and IV of the order, including a description of all substantive contacts or negotiations for the divestitures and the identity of all parties contacted. Respondent shall include in its compliance reports copies of all written communications to and from such parties,
all internal memoranda, and all reports and recommendations concerning divestiture.

B. One (1) year from the date on which this order is issued, annually for the next nine (9) years on the anniversary of the date this order is issued, and at other times as the Commission may require, respondent shall file a verified written report with the Commission setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied and is complying with Section IV of this order. Said report shall include, among other things, copies of all return receipts of all Notification forms sent to any state offices in compliance with paragraph IV.C.

VI.

It is further ordered, That respondent shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the respondent such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor entity, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

VII.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, upon written request to counsel, respondent shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to inspect any facility and to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondent relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five (5) days' notice to counsel for respondent, and without restraint or interference from respondent, to interview officers, directors, or employees of respondent, who may have counsel present, regarding such matters.
"ASSETS TO BE DIVESTED"

1. The following Funeral Service assets -
   (a) In the Phenix City, Alabama/Columbus, Georgia, geographic area: (1) Vance Memorial Chapel, 3738 Highway 431 North, Phenix City, Alabama 36867; and (2) Vance Memorial Chapel, 2919 Hamilton Road, Columbus, Georgia 31904
   (b) In the Evansville, Indiana, geographic area: Miller & Miller Colonial Chapel, 219 East Franklin Street, Evansville, Indiana 47711;
   (c) In the Jacksonville Beach, Florida, geographic area: Beaches Funeral Home, 3600 South 3rd Street, Jacksonville Beach, Florida 32250;
   (d) In the Roseville, California, geographic area: Cochrane's Chapel of the Roses, 103 Lincoln Street, Roseville, California 95678;
   (e) In the Ruskin/Sun City Center, Florida, geographic area: Family Funeral Care Funeral Home, 1851 Rickenbacker Road, Sun City Center, Florida 33573; and
   (f) In the West Pasco County, Florida, and Tarpon Springs, Florida, geographic area: Michels & Lundquist Funeral Home, 130 State Road 54, New Port Richey, Florida 34652; and

2. The following Cemetery Service assets -
   (a) In the Broward County, Florida, geographic area: (1) Evergreen Cemetery, 1300 S.E. 10th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316; (2) Lauderdale Memorial Park, 2001 S.W. 4th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33315; and (3) Sunset Memorial Gardens, 3201 19th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33311;
   (b) In the Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the neighboring north Georgia suburbs of Chattanooga geographic area: (1) Lakewood Memory Gardens East Cemetery, 4621 Shallowford Road, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37411; (2) Lakewood Memory Gardens West Cemetery, 3509 Cummings Road, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37419; and (3) Lakewood Memory Gardens South Cemetery, 627 Greens Lake Road, Rossville, Georgia 30741;
   (c) In the Citrus County, Florida, geographic area: Fountains Memorial Park, 4890 South Suncoast Boulevard, Homosassa Springs, Florida 34447;
(d) In the Corpus Christi, Texas, geographic area: Rose Hill Memorial Park, 2731 Comanche, Corpus Christi, Texas 78408;

(e) In the Eugene/Springfield, Oregon, geographic area: Sunset Hills Memorial Gardens, 4810 South Willamette Street, Eugene, Oregon 97405;

(f) In the North Richmond, Virginia, and the northern, eastern, and western suburbs of Richmond geographic area: Forest Lawn Cemetery, 4000 Pilots Lane, Richmond, Virginia 23222;

(g) In the South Bay area of San Diego, California, geographic area: La Vista Memorial Park, 3191 Orange Street, National City, California 91951; and

(h) In the Summit County, Ohio, geographic area: Greenlawn Memorial Park, 2580 Romig Road, Akron, Ohio 44320;

such assets to include, but not be limited to,

1. All rights, titles and interests in and to owned or leased real property, together with all appurtenances, licenses and permits, including property adjoining any cemetery property, whether held unconditionally or through an option or other device;

2. All machinery, fixtures, equipment, furniture, tools, rolling stock, and other tangible personal property;

3. All rights, titles and interests in all trade names; provided however that, with respect to the trade name "Family Funeral Care" associated with the Family Funeral Care Funeral Home located at 1851 Rickenbacker Road, Sun City Center, Florida 33573, the "Family Funeral Care" trade name shall be available for use by the acquirer for a period of 24 months;

4. All rights, titles and interests in the books, records and files pertinent to the Assets to be Divested;

5. All vendor lists, management information systems, software, catalogs, sales promotion literature, and advertising materials; and

6. All rights, titles, and interests in and to the contracts entered into in the ordinary course of business with customers (together with associated bids and performance bonds), suppliers, sales representatives, distributors, agents, personal property lessors, personal property lessees, licensors, licensees, consignors, and consignees.
APPENDIX I

ASSET MAINTENANCE AGREEMENT


PREMISES FOR AGREEMENT

Whereas, on or about August 6, 1998, SCI entered into an agreement with Equity Corporation International ("ECI"), in which SCI agreed to acquire ECI (the "Acquisition"); and

Whereas, both SCI and ECI own or operate assets that provide funeral services or cemetery services to consumers; and

Whereas, the Commission is now investigating the Acquisition to determine whether the Acquisition would violate any of the statutes enforced by the Commission; and

Whereas, if the Commission accepts the Agreement Containing Consent Order to which this Appendix I is attached, the Commission is required to place it on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days for public comment and may subsequently withdraw such acceptance pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.34 of the Commission's Rules of Practice; and

Whereas, the purpose of this agreement and of the Consent Order is to preserve the Assets To Be Divested pending their divestiture to an acquirer or acquirers approved by the Commission, under the terms of the Consent Order, in order to remedy any anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition; and

Whereas, SCI's entering into this agreement shall in no way be construed as an admission by SCI that the Acquisition is illegal; and

Whereas, no act or transaction contemplated by this agreement shall be deemed immune or exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws, or the Federal Trade Commission Act, by reason of anything contained in this agreement;

Now, therefore, in consideration of the Commission's agreement that, unless the Commission determines to reject the Consent Order,
it will terminate SCI's obligation to give twenty (20) days' notice to the Commission's staff prior to consummating the Acquisition, the parties agree as follows:

TERMS OF AGREEMENT

1. SCI agrees to execute, and upon acceptance by the Commission of the Agreement Containing Consent Order for public comment agrees to be bound by, the Consent Order.

2. SCI agrees that from the date this agreement is accepted until the earliest of the dates listed in subparagraphs 2.a and 2.b, it will comply with the provisions of this agreement:

   a. Three business days after the Commission withdraws its acceptance of the Consent Order pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.34 of the Commission's Rules; or

   b. On the day the divestitures set out in the Consent Order have been completed.

3. SCI shall maintain the viability, marketability, and competitiveness of the Assets To Be Divested, as listed in Schedule A of the Agreement Containing Consent Order, and shall not cause the wasting or deterioration of these assets, nor shall it cause the assets to be operated in a manner inconsistent with applicable laws, nor shall they sell, transfer, encumber or otherwise impair the marketability, viability, or competitiveness of the Assets. SCI shall conduct or cause to be conducted the business of the Assets To Be Divested in the regular and ordinary course and in accordance with past practice (including regular repair and maintenance efforts) and shall use its best efforts to preserve the existing relationships with each businesses' suppliers, customers, employees and others having business relations with such businesses, in the ordinary course of their business and in accordance with past practice. SCI shall not terminate the operation of any of the businesses identified within the Assets To Be Divested. SCI shall use its best efforts to keep the organization and properties of each of the businesses identified in the Assets To Be Divested intact, including current business operations, physical facilities, working conditions and a work force of equivalent size, training and expertise associated with each business. Included in the above obligations, SCI shall, without limitation:
a. Maintain all operations and not reduce hours at any business;
b. Make all payments required to be paid under any contract or lease when due, and otherwise pay all liabilities and satisfy all obligations, in a manner consistent with past practice;
c. Maintain each businesses' books and records;
d. Not display any signs or conduct any advertising that indicate that any business is moving its operations to another location or that the business will close;
e. Not change or modify in any material respect the existing advertising practices, programs and policies for any business, other than changes in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice for the business not being closed or relocated; and
f. Not transfer any on-site employees of any business, as of the date this agreement is signed by SCI, to any other business or location, other than transfers in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practice.

4. Should the Federal Trade Commission seek in any proceeding to compel SCI to divest itself of any or all of the Assets To Be Divested, or to seek any other injunctive or equitable relief, SCI shall not raise any objection based upon the expiration of the applicable Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act waiting period or the fact that the Commission has not sought to enjoin the Acquisition. SCI also waives all rights to contest the validity of this agreement.

5. For the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this agreement, subject to any legally recognized privilege, and upon written request with reasonable notice to counsel for SCI, SCI shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

a. Access during the office hours of SCI, in the presence of counsel, to inspect any facility and to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of SCI relating to compliance with this Agreement; and
b. Upon five (5) days' notice to counsel for SCI and without restraint or interference from them, to interview officers or employees of SCI, who may have counsel present, regarding any such matters.

6. This Agreement shall not be binding until approved by the Commission.
Amended Complaint

IN THE MATTER OF

MESA COUNTY PHYSICIANS
INDEPENDENT PRACTICE ASSOCIATION, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT


This consent order, among other things, prohibits an organization of Colorado physicians from engaging in collective negotiations on behalf of its members; collectively refusing to contract with payers; acting as an exclusive bargaining agent for its members; restricting its members from dealing with third-party payers through an entity other than Mesa IPA; and exchanging information among physicians about the terms upon which physicians are willing to deal with third-party payers. In addition, the consent order prohibits the respondent from retaining any employee or any participating physician who Mesa IPA knows is participating in payer contract review.

Participants

For the Commission: Markus Meier, Paul Nolan, Casey Triggs, Elizabeth Palmquist, David Pender, Robert Leibenuft, Rendell Davis, Daniel Ducore, William Baer, Louis Silvia, and Roger Boner.


AMENDED COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Act, the Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that the Mesa County Physicians Independent Practice Association, Inc. ("Mesa County IPA" and "respondent") has violated and is violating Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues this amended complaint stating its charges in that respect as follows:

PARAGRAPH 1. Respondent Mesa County IPA is a corporation, organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Colorado, with its address at 751 Horizon Court, Suite 256, Grand Junction, Mesa County, Colorado.

* Complaint issued May 12, 1997 (unpublished).
PAR. 2. Grand Junction (population exceeds 37,600) is the largest city in Mesa County (population exceeds 100,000), Colorado, and is located approximately 30 miles east of the Utah border. Grand Junction is the largest city between Salt Lake City, Utah to the west, and Denver, Colorado to the east, a distance of approximately 400 miles.

PAR. 3. Respondent Mesa County IPA's members include at least 85% of the physicians (medical doctors and doctors of osteopathic medicine) in private practice in Mesa County, as well as at least 90% of the primary care physicians (family practitioners, general practitioners, internists, and pediatricians). These physicians compete in the Mesa County area. All of respondent's members are engaged in the business of providing health care services for a fee. Except to the extent that competition has been restrained as alleged herein, some or all of the physician members of respondent Mesa County IPA have been, and are now, in competition with each other for the provision of physician services.

PAR. 4. The general business practices of respondent Mesa County IPA and its members, including the acts and practices herein alleged, are in or affect "commerce" as defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45.

PAR. 5. Respondent Mesa County IPA engages in substantial activities for the pecuniary benefit of its members. At all times relevant to this complaint, respondent is and has been organized in substantial part for the profit of its members, and is therefore a corporation within the meaning of Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

PAR. 6. Respondent Mesa County IPA was formed in or about 1987 to promote the collective economic interests of Mesa County physicians. Respondent, acting as a combination of its members, and in conspiracy with at least some of its members, and others, has acted to restrain competition by, among other things, facilitating, entering into, and implementing agreements among its members, express or implied, to fix price and other competitively significant terms of dealing with payers, or by collectively refusing to deal with payers.

PAR. 7. Respondent Mesa County IPA has a multi-year contract with the Rocky Mountain Health Maintenance Organization ("Rocky Mountain HMO"). The alliance between respondent and Rocky Mountain HMO has created a substantial obstacle to the ability of
other payers to contract with a physician panel in Mesa County. Rocky Mountain HMO enrollees currently comprise at least 50% of the total patient volume of respondent's members.

PAR. 8. As early as 1993, respondent Mesa County IPA began negotiating collectively, on behalf of all of its members, with several third-party payers. Respondent Mesa County IPA's Board of Directors approved a set of guidelines and a fee schedule to be used by respondent's Contract Review Committee in reviewing contract offers from payers. Respondent's fee schedule resulted in significantly higher prices to several payers for physician services.

PAR. 9. Respondent Mesa County IPA, through its newsletters, documents, and other published media, has encouraged its physician members not to deal with new health plans or to do so only on terms that were approved by respondent, and has invited or contemplated concerted action by its members to avoid signing payer contracts. Respondent Mesa County IPA reviewed individual contract offerings to its members by third-party payers, and published adverse comments regarding such contracts. To facilitate its review of all contracts, respondent urged its members to forward all contracts to respondent's Contract Review Committee.

PAR. 10. A wide range of third-party payers of physician services, including preferred provider organizations, health maintenance organizations, and employer health care purchasing cooperatives, were excluded from doing business in Mesa County as a result of respondent's conduct. Although most payers sought alternatives to respondent, they were forced to contract with respondent to obtain the physician services they needed to market viable plans, or else abandon their efforts to enter Mesa County.

PAR. 11. In November 1997, respondent Mesa County IPA signed a proposed consent agreement which, if accepted by the Federal Trade Commission, would have required, *inter alia*, that respondent Mesa County IPA abolish its Contract Review Committee. In December 1997, the corporation Innovative Reviewers Inc. was incorporated in the State of Colorado by a group of individuals that included the Executive Director of respondent Mesa County IPA and the former Chairman of the Contract Review Committee of respondent Mesa County IPA. All but one of the fifteen shareholders of Innovative Reviewers Inc. had ties to respondent Mesa County IPA: twelve were physicians participating in respondent Mesa County IPA; one was the Executive Director of respondent
Mesa County IPA; and one was the husband of the Executive Director of respondent Mesa County IPA. After its formation, Innovative Reviewers Inc. engaged in conduct in which the Contract Review Committee of respondent Mesa County IPA had also engaged: reviewing payer contracts submitted by physicians, and advising those physicians whether particular terms and conditions of those contracts were acceptable.

PAR. 12. The physician members of respondent Mesa County IPA have not integrated their practices to create efficiencies sufficient to justify their acts and practices described in paragraphs six through eleven.

PAR. 13. The purpose, effects, tendency, or capacity of the conduct described in paragraphs six through eleven are and have been to restrain trade unreasonably and hinder competition in the provision of primary care physician services, as well as physician services generally, in the Mesa County area in the following ways, among others:

A. Price and other forms of competition among respondent Mesa County IPA's member physicians were unreasonably restrained;
B. Higher prices for physician services have resulted;
C. The development of alternative health care financing and delivery systems, including employer developed self-funded plans, was hindered;
D. Health plans, employers, and individual consumers were deprived of the benefits of competition in the purchase of physician services;
E. Health plans, employers, and individual consumers were deprived of the benefits of competition between health plans.

PAR. 14. The combination, conspiracy, acts and practices described above constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Such combination, conspiracy, acts and practices, or the effects thereof, are continuing and will continue or recur in the absence of the relief herein requested.
DECISION AND ORDER

The Commission having heretofore issued its complaint charging the respondent named in the caption hereof with violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the respondent having been served with a copy of that complaint, together with a notice of contemplated relief; and

The respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by the respondent of all of the jurisdictional facts set forth in the complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Secretary of the Commission having thereafter withdrawn this matter from adjudication in accordance with Section 3.25(c) of its Rules; and

The Commission having considered the matter and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having thereafter determined to modify the order contained in that consent agreement by adding paragraphs I.J, I.K, I.L, and II.F, and to issue an amended complaint to accompany that modified order, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 3.25(f) of its Rules, the Commission hereby makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Mesa County Physicians Independent Practice Association, Inc., is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Colorado, with its office and principal place of business located at 751 Horizon Court, Suite 256, Grand Junction, Colorado.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, for the purposes of this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Mesa IPA" means Mesa County Physicians I.P.A., Inc., its directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; its subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by Mesa IPA, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "Payer" means any person that purchases, reimburses for, or otherwise pays for all or part of any health care services for itself or for any other person. Payer includes, but is not limited to, any health insurance company; preferred provider organization; prepaid hospital, medical, or other health service plan; health maintenance organization; government health benefits program; employer or other person providing or administering self-insured health benefits programs; and patients who purchase health care for themselves.

C. "Person" means both natural persons and artificial persons, including, but not limited to, corporations, unincorporated entities, and governments.

D. "Physician" means a doctor of allopathic medicine ("M.D.") or a doctor of osteopathic medicine ("D.O.").

E. "Participating physician" means any physician (1) who is a stockholder, owner, or member of Mesa IPA; (2) who has agreed to provide services through Mesa IPA; or (3) whose services have been offered to any payer through Mesa IPA.

F. "Provider" means any person that supplies health care services to any other person, including, but not limited to, physicians, hospitals, and clinics.

G. "Qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement" means an arrangement to provide physician services in which (1) the arrangement does not restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of physicians participating in the arrangement to deal with payers individually or through any other arrangement, and (2) all physicians participating in the arrangement share substantial financial risk from their participation in the arrangement through: (a) the provision of physician services to payers at a capitated rate; (b) the provision of physician services for a predetermined percentage of premium or
revenue from payers; (c) the use of significant financial incentives (e.g., substantial withholds) for its participating physicians, as a group, to achieve specified cost-containment goals; or (d) the provision of a complex or extended course of treatment that requires the substantial coordination of care by physicians in different specialties offering a complementary mix of services, for a fixed, predetermined payment, where the costs of that course of treatment for any individual patient can vary greatly due to the individual patient's condition, the choice, complexity, or length of treatment, or other factors.

H. "Qualified clinically integrated joint arrangement" means an arrangement to provide physician services in which (1) the arrangement does not restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of physicians participating in the arrangement to deal with payers individually or through any other arrangement, and (2) all physicians participating in the arrangement participate in active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify the practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and cooperation among, the physicians participating in the arrangement, in order to control costs and ensure quality of the services provided through the arrangement.

I. "Reimbursement" means any payment, whether cash or non-cash, or other benefit received for the provision of physician services.

J. "Payer contract" means any contract, whether actual or proposed, offered by any payer to any physician.

K. "Payer contract review" means any activity, other than a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or a qualified clinically integrated joint arrangement, in which information concerning the terms or conditions of a payer contract is transmitted to a physician practicing in Mesa County and in which such activity

1. Facilitates collective decision-making among physicians,
2. Coordinates physicians' responses to a payer contract,
3. Disseminates to physicians the views or intentions of other physicians as to a payer contract,
4. Includes expressions of opinion as to whether the terms or conditions of a payer contract should be accepted by physicians,
5. Constitutes collective negotiation by physicians with a payer, or
6. Involves decisions as to whether to convey information concerning a payer contract to physicians based, at least in part, on
judgments about the attractiveness of the terms or conditions of the contract.

L. "Conducting payer contract review" means participating, or assisting, in the generation or transmission of information from payer contract review.

II.

It is further ordered, That Mesa IPA, directly or indirectly, or through any corporate or other device, in connection with the provision of physician services in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, cease and desist from:

A. Entering into, adhering to, participating in, maintaining, organizing, implementing, enforcing, or otherwise facilitating any combination, conspiracy, agreement, or understanding to:

1. Negotiate on behalf of any participating physicians with any payer or provider;
2. Deal, or refuse to deal, with any payer or provider;
3. Determine any terms, conditions, or requirements upon which participating physicians deal with any payer or provider, including, but not limited to, terms of reimbursement; or
4. Restrict the ability of participating physicians to deal with payers individually or through any arrangement outside Mesa IPA.

B. Coordinating terms of contracts with payers with any other group of physicians, including independent practice associations, located in Mesa County, Colorado, or any county contiguous to Mesa County, Colorado.

C. Exchanging, or facilitating the exchange of, information among physicians concerning the terms or conditions, including reimbursement, on which any physicians are willing to deal with payers.

D. Encouraging, advising, pressuring, inducing, or attempting to induce any person to engage in any action that would be prohibited if the person were subject to this order.

E. For a period of five (5) years from the date this order becomes final, acting as an agent for participating physicians in dealings with any payer, including transmitting terms on which participating
physicians may wish to independently contract with payers, unless
each of the following conditions is met:

1. Mesa IPA's role in the contracting process between payers and
participating physicians is limited to:

   a. Soliciting or receiving from any participating physician, and
      conveying to the payer, information relating to reimbursement,
      outcomes data, practice parameters, utilization patterns, credentials,
      and qualifications of such individual physician;
   b. Conveying to a participating physician any contract offer made
      by the payer;
   c. Soliciting or receiving from the payer, and conveying to a
      participating physician, clarifications of proposed contract terms;
   d. Providing to a participating physician objective information
      about proposed contract terms, including comparisons with terms
      offered by other payers;
   e. Conveying to a participating physician any response made by
      the payer to information conveyed, or clarifications sought, by Mesa
      IPA;
   f. Conveying, in individual or aggregate form, to the payer, the
      acceptance or rejection by a participating physician of any contract
      offer made by the payer; and
   g. At the request of the payer, providing the individual response,
      information, or views of each participating physician concerning any
      contract offer made by such payer;

2. Each participating physician makes an independent, unilateral
decision to accept or reject each contract offer made by the payer;

3. Mesa IPA does not:

   a. Disseminate to any physician information about another
      physician's proposed or actual reimbursement, or views or intentions
      as to possible terms of dealing with the payer;
   b. Act as an agent for the collective negotiation or agreement by
      the participating physicians; or
   c. Encourage or facilitate collusive behavior among participating
      physicians; and

4. Each participating physician remains free to deal individually
with any payer.
F. For a period of five (5) years from the date this order becomes final, allowing a person to be a participating physician or an employee of Mesa IPA if any managerial or professional employee, or any director of Mesa IPA, has knowledge that such person

1. Is conducting payer contract review, either directly or through an agent,
2. Has requested, and is receiving, information from payer contract review conducted by a physician practicing in Mesa County, or
3. Has entered into an agreement, other than a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or a qualified clinically integrated joint arrangement, with another physician practicing in Mesa County to obtain, and is receiving, information from payer contract review conducted by any person.

Provided that nothing in this order shall be construed to prohibit any agreement or conduct by Mesa IPA that is reasonably necessary to form, facilitate, manage, operate, or participate in:

a. A qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement; or
b. A qualified clinically integrated joint arrangement, if Mesa IPA has provided the prior notification(s) as required by this paragraph (b). Such prior notification must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to forming, facilitating, managing, operating, participating in, or taking any action, other than planning, in furtherance of any joint arrangement requiring such notice ("first waiting period"), and shall include for such arrangement the identity of each participant; the location or area of operation; a copy of the agreement and any supporting organizational documents; a description of its purpose or function; a description of the nature and extent of the integration expected to be achieved, and the anticipated resulting efficiencies; an explanation of the relationship of any agreement on reimbursement to furthering the integration and achieving the expected efficiencies; and a description of any procedures proposed to be implemented to limit possible anti-competitive effects resulting from such agreement(s).

If, within the first waiting period, a representative of the Commission makes a written request for additional information, Mesa IPA shall not form, facilitate, manage, operate, participate in, or take any action, other than planning, in furtherance of such joint arrangement.
until thirty (30) days after substantially complying with such request for additional information ("second waiting period") or such shorter waiting period as may be granted by letter from the Bureau of Competition.

III.

*It is further ordered,* That Mesa IPA shall:

A. Within thirty (30) days after the date on which this order becomes final:

1. Distribute by first-class mail a copy of this order and the complaint to each participating physician, officer, director, manager, and employee; and to each payer enumerated in Attachment A to this order;

2. Amend its "Physician Manual" to bring it into compliance with this order and the antitrust laws, and distribute the amended Physician Manual to participating physicians; and


B. Terminate any agreement or contract with any payer for the provision of physician services that does not comply with paragraph II. of this order at the earlier of: (1) the termination or renewal date (including any automatic renewal date) of such agreement or contract; or (2) receipt of a written request from a payer to terminate such agreement or contract.

C. For a period of five (5) years after the date this order becomes final:

1. Distribute by first-class mail a copy of this order and the complaint to each new participating physician, officer, director, manager, and employee within thirty (30) days of his or her admission, election, appointment, or employment;

2. Annually publish in an official annual report or newsletter sent to all participating physicians, a copy of this order and the complaint with such prominence as is given to regularly featured articles; and

3. Annually brief participating physicians on the meaning and requirements of this consent order and the antitrust laws, including penalties for the violation of this consent order.
IV.

*It is further ordered,* That Mesa IPA shall file a verified written report within sixty (60) days after the date this order becomes final, annually thereafter for five (5) years on the anniversary of the date this order becomes final, and at such other times as the Commission may by written notice require, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied and is complying with the order. In addition to any other information that may be necessary to demonstrate compliance, Mesa IPA shall include in such reports: (1) information identifying each payer that has contacted Mesa IPA for the purpose of contracting for physician services, the terms of any contract the payer was seeking with Mesa IPA, and Mesa IPA's response to the payer; (2) information sufficient to describe the manner in which participating physicians share financial risk in each qualified non-exclusive risk-sharing arrangement in which it participates; (3) a copy of the roster of the participating physicians who have attended the annual briefings required in paragraph III.C.3., and the text of such briefings; and (4) copies of the minutes of Mesa IPA's annual meetings.

V.

*It is further ordered,* That Mesa IPA shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in Mesa IPA such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries, or any other change in Mesa IPA that may affect compliance obligations arising out of this order.

VI.

*It is further ordered,* That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, Mesa IPA shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, calendars, and other records and documents in the possession or under its control relating to any matter contained in this order; and
B. Upon five (5) days' notice to Mesa IPA, and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of Mesa IPA.

VII.

*It is further ordered,* That this order shall terminate on May 4, 2019.

**ATTACHMENT A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADMAR</th>
<th>HealthCare/Compare/ Affordable/ OUCH</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aetna/U.S. Healthcare</td>
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<td>QMC3-CRA Managed Care</td>
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<td>USA Health Network</td>
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IN THE MATTER OF
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY

SET ASIDE ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT


This order reopens and sets aside a 1995 consent order that, among other things, required Eli Lilly and Company to ensure that the acquired company, PCS Health Systems, maintains an open formulary.

Participants
For the Commission: Pamela Gill and Roberta Baruch.
For the respondent: Jack Kaufman, Dewey Ballantine, New York

ORDER REOPENING AND SETTING ASIDE ORDER

On February 5, 1999, respondent Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") filed a Petition to Reopen and Set Aside July 28, 1995 Decision and Order ("Petition"), pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(b), and Section 2.51 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 16 CFR 2.51. In its Petition, Lilly requests that the Commission reopen the order in Docket No. C-3594 ("Order") to relieve Lilly of its compliance obligations under the Order.1 The Petition was placed on the public record for thirty days pursuant to Section 2.51(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. The Order requires that Lilly, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer, take measures to ensure that its drugs are not given unwarranted preference over those of its competitors in the "Pharmacy Benefits Management Services" ("PBM Services") that Lilly would provide after PCS Health Systems, Inc. ("PCS"), a subsidiary of McKesson Corporation ("McKesson"), became Lilly's subsidiary. Specifically, the Order requires Lilly to cause PCS to maintain an "Open Formulary."2 The Open Formulary must include any drug approved by an independent "Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee," as prescribed by the Order. In addition, Lilly is required to cause PCS to accept all discounts, rebates or other concessions

1 120 FTC 243 (1995). Paragraphs II.B.-II.E., and III-X are the only remaining operative paragraphs of the Order. See Order ¶¶ II.B.-II.E., III-X.

2 A formulary is a list of drugs used as a guide in prescribing and dispensing pharmaceuticals to health plan beneficiaries.
offered by Lilly's competitors for drugs on the Open Formulary and to accurately reflect such discounts in ranking the drugs on the formulary. Another provision of the Order prohibits PCS and Lilly from sharing proprietary or other "Non-Public Information," such as price data, that PCS may obtain from competitors of Lilly whose drugs may be placed on a PCS formulary, or from PBM competitors of PCS that must deal with Lilly to complete their formularies. Lilly is also required to obtain the prior approval of the Commission for any exclusive distribution agreement with McKesson. The other provisions of the Order require Lilly to file annual reports respecting its compliance with the Order and provide that the Commission shall have access to specified records and officers and personnel of Lilly. The Order expires, pursuant to Paragraph X, on August 18, 2005.

On January 22, 1999, Rite Aid Corporation ("Rite Aid") acquired from Lilly 100% of the stock of PCS Holdings Corporation, which in turn owns 100% of the stock of PCS. According to Lilly, with this change, the Order no longer serves any useful purpose.3

Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(b), provides that the Commission shall reopen an order to consider whether it should be modified if the respondent "makes a satisfactory showing that changed conditions of law or fact" so require.4 A satisfactory showing sufficient to require reopening is made when a request to reopen identifies significant changes in circumstances and shows that the changes eliminate the need for the order or make continued application of it inequitable or harmful to competition.5

The language of Section 5(b) plainly places the burden on the petitioner to make a "satisfactory showing" of changed conditions to obtain reopening of the order. The legislative history also makes clear that the petitioner has the burden of showing, other than by

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3 Petition at 2; Kauffman Affidavit at ¶ 6.

4 Section 5(b) also provides that the Commission may modify an order when, although changed circumstances would not require reopening, the Commission determines that the public interest so requires. Respondents are therefore invited in petitions to reopen to show how the public interest warrants the requested modification. Lilly has based its request upon changed conditions of fact and not the public interest standard for reopening and modifying orders.

5 S. Rep. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979) (significant changes or changes causing unfair disadvantage); Louisiana-Pacific Corp., Docket No. C-2956, Letter to John C. Hart (June 5, 1986), at 4 (unpublished) ("Hart Letter"). See also United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 967 F.2d 1372, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A decision to reopen does not necessarily entail a decision to modify the order. Reopening may occur even where the petition itself does not plead facts requiring modification").
conclusory statements, why an order should be modified. The Commission "may properly decline to reopen an order if a request is merely conclusory or otherwise fails to set forth specific facts demonstrating in detail the nature of the changed conditions and the reasons why these changed conditions require the requested modification of the order." If the Commission determines that the petitioner has made the necessary showing, the Commission must reopen the order to consider whether modification is required and, if so, the nature and extent of the modification. The Commission is not required to reopen the order, however, if the petitioner fails to meet its burden of making the satisfactory showing required by the statute. The petitioner's burden is not a light one in view of the public interest in repose and the finality of Commission orders. However, if the Commission denies relief, it must provide a sufficient explanation of its reasons for the denial.

Upon consideration of Lilly's request and other information, the Commission finds, pursuant to Section 2.51 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, that changed conditions of fact warrant reopening and setting aside the Order. Lilly has shown that there is no need for the Order by presenting evidence of the sale by Lilly of PCS to Rite Aid and that Lilly is not in a position to control PCS. As a result of the sale, Lilly is no longer engaged in the PBM Services business which gave rise to the Order, and the Commission has no reason to believe that Lilly has any present intent to re-enter that business in the future. The Order addresses competitive concerns that arose through the vertical integration between Lilly, a pharmaceuticals manufacturer, and PCS, a PBM Services provider. Rite Aid, unlike Lilly, is not a pharmaceuticals manufacturer. Therefore, the competitive problems that prompted issuance of the Order no longer exist. Since there are no competitive concerns that would justify the need to maintain the Order, the Order should be set aside.

Accordingly, It is ordered, That this matter be, and it hereby is, reopened and that the Commission's Order issued on July 28, 1995, be and it hereby is, set aside as of the effective date of this Order.

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6 S. Rep. No. 96-500, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979); see also Rule 2.51(b) (requiring affidavits in support of petitions to reopen and modify).


8 United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 754 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1985).
IN THE MATTER OF
NOVARTIS CORPORATION, ET AL.

FINAL ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECS. 5 AND 12 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT


This final order, among other things, prohibits Novartis Corporation and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., successors-in-interest to Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self Medication, Inc., and the marketers of Doan’s Pills, from representing that any over-the-counter analgesic drug is more effective than other over-the-counter analgesic drugs unless they possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates their claims. In addition, the order requires the respondents to include a corrective notice in certain of Doan’s advertisements, and to possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence as substantiation for any claims regarding the efficacy, safety, benefits or performance of any over-the-counter analgesic they market.

Participants


For the respondents: Michael Denger, Boyd Johnson and Phillip Rudolph, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Ciba-Geigy Corporation, and CIBA Self-Medication, Inc., corporations ("respondents"), have violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, alleges:

PARAGRAPHS 1. Respondent Ciba-Geigy Corporation ("Ciba-Geigy") is a New York corporation with its principal office or place of business at 444 Saw Mill River Road, Ardsley, New York.

Respondent CIBA Self-Medication, Inc. ("CIBA Self-Medication"), is a Delaware corporation with its principal office or place of business at 581 Main Street, Woodbridge, New Jersey. CIBA Self-Medication is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ciba-Geigy.

PAR. 2. Respondents have manufactured, labeled, advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed drug products, including Doan's analgesic products, to the public. Doan's analgesic products are
"drugs" within the meaning of Sections 12 and 15 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.


PAR. 4. The acts and practices of respondents alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

PAR. 5. Respondents have disseminated or caused to be disseminated advertisements for Doan's analgesic products, including, but not necessarily limited to, the attached Exhibits A-I. Respondents have disseminated these or substantially similar advertisements for at least eight years. These advertisements contain the following statements and depictions:

A. Doctors measure back pain by how far you can bend. Extra Strength Doan's is made for back pain relief with an ingredient these pain relievers don't have. [Depiction of large package of Doan's in front of smaller packages of Bayer, Advil and Tylenol] Doan's makes back pain go away. Extra Strength Doan's. The Back Specialist. [Superscript: The back specialist] [Exhibit A: "Graph" 15-Second Television]

B. Lower back pain. Neck pain. Upper back pain. There are all kinds of back pain. Doan's relieves them all. With a special ingredient these brands don't have. [Depiction of large package of Doan's in front of smaller packages of Bayer, Advil and Tylenol]. Relieve back pain with Doan's, the Back Specialist. [Superscript: The Back Specialist.] [Exhibit B: "Black & White Back" 15-Second Television]

C. Now. Back pain doesn't have to ruin another night's sleep. Introducing new Doan's P.M. Doan's starts with a unique pain reliever these brands don't have; [Depiction of large package of Doan's P.M. and smaller packages of Tylenol, Bayer and Advil] [Superscript: Magnesium Salicylate] then adds a second ingredient to help you sleep. New Doan's P.M. For nighttime back pain. [Superscript: For Nighttime Back Pain] [Exhibit C: "Ruin A Night's Sleep" 15-Second Television]

D. If nothing seems to help, try Doan's. It relieves back pain no matter where it hurts. Doan's has an ingredient these pain relievers don't have. [Depiction of large package of Doan's in front of smaller packages of Bayer, Aleve, Advil and
Tylenol\textsuperscript{Magnesium Salicylate}. Doan’s. The back Specialist. \textsuperscript{The Back Specialist}

[Exhibit D: "Activity - Pets" 15-Second Television]

E. There are hundreds of muscles in the back. Any one can put you in agony. That’s when you need Doan’s. \textsuperscript{Depiction of Doan’s package on top of packages of Tylenol, Bayer, Aleve and Advil}. Doan’s has an ingredient the leading brands don’t. It relieves back pain no matter where it hurts. There are hundreds of muscles in the back. \textsuperscript{Superimposed: The Back Specialist} Doan’s relieves them all.

[Exhibit E: "Muscles" 15-Second Television]

F. Doan’s. Made for back pain relief. With an ingredient these other pain relievers don’t have. \textsuperscript{Depiction of packages of Bayer, Tylenol, and Advil}.

[Exhibit F: Print Advertisement]

G. Back pain is different. Why use these pain relievers? \textsuperscript{Depiction of packages of Tylenol, Motrin, and Advil}. Doan’s is just for back pain.

[Exhibit G: Print Advertisement]

H. BACK PAIN SUFFERERS[: IT’S EASY TO SEE WHY YOU NEED DOANS. These are for all kinds of aches and pains. \textsuperscript{Depiction of packages of Tylenol, Bayer, Motrin, and Advil, with a magnifying glass on the Tylenol package emphasizing Tylenol’s labeling indications for use for "the temporary relief of minor aches, pains, headaches and fever."} Doan’s is just for back pain.

[Exhibit H: Print Advertisement]

I. WHY TREAT GENERAL ACHES? \textsuperscript{Depiction of packages of Bayer, Tylenol, Advil, and Aleve}.

BACK PAIN NEEDS THE SPECIALIST \textsuperscript{Depiction of packages of Regular Strength Doan’s, Extra Strength Doan’s, and Extra Strength Doan’s P.M.}. DOANS. WITH A UNIQUE INGREDIENT THE OTHERS DON’T HAVE.

[Exhibit I: Print Advertisement]

PAR. 6. Through the use of the statements and depictions contained in the advertisements referred to in paragraph five, including but not necessarily limited to the advertisements attached as Exhibits A–I, respondents have represented, directly or by implication, that Doan’s analgesic products are more effective than other analgesics, including Bayer, Advil, Tylenol, Aleve, and Motrin, for relieving back pain.

PAR. 7. Through the use of the statements and depictions contained in the advertisements referred to in paragraph five, including, but not necessarily limited to, the advertisements attached as Exhibits A–I, respondents have represented, directly or by implication, that at the time they made the representation set forth in paragraph six, respondents possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis that substantiated such representation.
PAR. 8. In truth and in fact, at the time they made the representation set forth in paragraph six, respondents did not possess and rely upon a reasonable basis that substantiated such representation. Therefore, the representation set forth in paragraph seven was, and is, false and misleading.

PAR. 9. The acts and practices of respondents as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices and the making of false advertisements in or affecting commerce in violation of Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Commissioner Azcuenaga dissenting.
Doan's®
The Back Specialist.

Doctors measure back pain by how far you can bend. Extra Strength Doan's is made for back pain relief.

Use only as directed.

with an ingredient these pain relievers don't have. Doan's makes back pain go away.

Extra Strength Doan's, The Back Specialist.
EXHIBIT B

**Doan's. The Back Specialist.**
Relieves all kinds of back pain.

- **Lower Back Pain**
  - Lower back pain.
- **Upper Back Pain**
  - Upper back pain.
- **Neck Pain**
  - Neck Pain.

- **(SFX) Doan's relieves them all.**
- **(Music) Doan's relieves these brands don't have.**
- **Relieve back pain with The Back Specialist.**
DOAN'S P.M. RELIEVES BACK PAIN
AND HELPS YOU SLEEP

Now, back pain doesn't have to ruin another night's sleep.

Introducing new Doan's PM. Doan's starts with a unique pain reliever
then adds a second ingredient to help you sleep.

New Doan's PM. For nighttime back pain.

these brands don't have
EXHIBIT D

DOAN'S
"ACTIVITY-PETS": 15 TV

ANNCR: "VO: He's your best friend... and he's also killing your back.

If nothing seems to help, try Doan's. It relieves back pain.

no matter where it hurts. Doan's has an ingredient those pain relievers don't have.

Doan's The Back Specialist.

©1994 Ciba Consumer Pharmaceuticals

EXHIBIT D

020002
DOAN'S

"Muscles - Male 15 TV"

AVO: There are hundreds of

Muscles in the back

Any one can put you in agony.

That's when you need Doan's.

Doan's has an ingredient the leading brands don't

It relieves back pain.

no matter where it hurts.

There are hundreds of muscles in the back.

Doan's relieves them all.

EXHIBIT E

Agency: Jordan, McSohn, Case & Tavor, Inc.
EXHIBIT F
Back pain is different.

Why use these pain relievers?

Doan's is just for back pain.

TRY DOAN'S FREE!
CALL 1-800-35-BACK-1

for a free sample of Extra Strength Doan's and a valuable coupon for your next purchase. If you already use Doan's, we'll send you a $1.00 coupon for your next purchase.

Offer expires 6/16/91.
BACK PAIN SUFFERERS

IT'S EASY TO SEE WHY YOU NEED DOAN'S.

EXTRA STRENGTH
Doan's
REMOVES BACKACHE PAIN

These are for all kinds of aches and pains.

Doan's is just for back pain.

SAVE $2.00
On Regular or Extra Strength Doan's

EXHIBIT H
NOVARTIS CORPORATION, ET AL. 593

INITIAL DECISION

BY LEWIS F. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
MARCH 9, 1998

I. INTRODUCTION


Novartis manufactures, advertises and sells Doan's analgesic products. The complaint alleges that Novartis has represented, directly or by implication, that these products are more effective than other analgesics, including Bayer, Advil, Tylenol, Aleve, and Motrin, for relieving back pain.

The complaint further charges that Novartis has, by the use of several ads, falsely represented, directly or by implication, that at the time it made its effectiveness claims, it possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis that substantiated them.

After extensive pretrial discovery, trial was held in Washington, D.C. The record was closed on December 5, 1997 and the parties filed their proposed findings on December 19, 1997. Replies were filed on January 16, 1998.

This decision is based on the transcript of testimony, the exhibits which I received in evidence, and the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and answers thereto, filed by the parties. I have adopted several proposed findings verbatim. Others have been adopted in substance. All other findings are rejected either because they are not supported by the record or because they are irrelevant.

INITIAL DECISION

BY LEWIS F. PARKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
MARCH 9, 1998

I. INTRODUCTION


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Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Mary L. Azcuénaga

Although I have reason to believe that the respondents have violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as alleged in the complaint, I dissent on the ground that, because the case could have been settled on satisfactory terms, it is not in the public interest to litigate.

INITIAL DECISION

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II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Novartis

1. Respondent Novartis is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York, with its offices and principal place of business located at 556 Morris Avenue, Summit, New Jersey. Respondent Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its offices and principal place of business located at 560 Morris Avenue, Summit, New Jersey. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., is a subsidiary of Novartis Corporation. (See Ans ¶ 1; JX 2 ¶ 11.)

2. Novartis and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., (hereinafter, individually and collectively referred to as "Novartis") are successors-in-interest to, respectively, Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self-Medication, Inc. (hereinafter individually, and collectively referred to as "Ciba") (JX 2 ¶ 11).

3. On April 23, 1997, upon agreement of the parties, Novartis was substituted for Ciba as respondent in this proceeding. (Order dated March 23, 1997.)

4. Novartis is a subsidiary of Novartis AG, a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Switzerland with its office and principal place of business located at Centralbahnstrasse 7, CH-4010 Basel, Switzerland. (Ciba-Geigy Limited, Dkt. C-3725 (March 24, 1997).)

5. Novartis manufactures and sells many over-the-counter ("OTC") products in addition to Doan's, including such well known brands as Ascriptin, Ciba Vision, Desenex, Dulcolax, ExLax, Gas-X, Habitrol, Maalox, Sunkist Vitamin C, Tavist-D, Theraflu, and Triaminic. (See, e.g., CX 401-A; CX 385-Z-36-39.)

6. From January 1987 to December 1994, Ciba-Geigy Corporation was responsible for the marketing and advertising of Doan's analgesic products ("Doan's"). In December 1994, Ciba transferred the Doan's line of products to Ciba Self Medication ("CSM"), a wholly-owned subsidiary. CSM was responsible for the marketing of Doan's analgesics.

7. At all relevant times, the acts and practices of Novartis challenged in the complaint have been in or affecting commerce (Ans ¶ 4; JX 2 ¶ 15).

B. Doan's

8. Doan's has been sold in this country for over 90 years and has always been advertised (or "positioned") for the relief of back pain (Peabody Tr. 285-87) (Mr. Peabody is the Director of Marketing Research at Novartis Consumer Health, Inc.).

9. Ciba purchased the Doan's brand in early 1987 from DEP Corporation, which had shortly before acquired the brand from Jeffrey Martin, Inc. (JX 2 ¶ 12; CX 455-A; CX 500 at 19-20 [Russo Dep.]).

10. Ciba purchased the Doan's brand for approximately $35 million (CX 500 at 21-33 [Russo Dep.]) because it believed that Doan's was a brand name with a high level of awareness and potential for expanding sales (CX 501 at 24 [Sloan Dep.]). At that time, Ciba believed that Doan's did not have much of a brand image and was viewed as dated and old fashioned. This view was confirmed by consumer research that Ciba had conducted shortly after acquiring the brand (Peabody Tr. 285).

11. In 1986, before Ciba purchased the Doan's brand, Jeffrey Martin, Inc., was disseminating three different 30-second television commercials for Doan's: "Hollingshead," "Schwartz" (CX 431), and "Drake" (CX 432) (CX 508-Z-2). The creative strategy for these ads was that Doan's "relieves minor muscular back pain." The ads featured hidden camera testimonials with individuals explaining how they got relief from Doan's pills. (See id. at Z-2-3; CX 431; CX 432; Mazis Tr. 942-45.)

12. Until late 1987, the only Doan's analgesic product sold was named "Doan's." In the fourth quarter of 1987, Ciba introduced Extra Strength Doan's, containing a larger dose of the active ingredient. The original product was renamed "Regular Strength Doan's." (See Peabody Tr. 584-85; JX 2 ¶ 18; CX 455-B.) In September 1991, Ciba
introduced Doan’s P.M., which contains a sleep aid (JX 2 ¶ 18; CX 455-B).

13. Regular Strength Doan’s is available in 24 pill or "count" packages, Extra Strength Doan’s is available in 24 count and 48 count packages, and Doan’s P.M. is available in 20 count packages (CX 455-J).

14. The active analgesic ingredient in Doan’s products is magnesium salicylate (JX 1 ¶ 1). Regular Strength Doan’s contains 325 mg of magnesium salicylate and Extra Strength Doan’s contains 467 mg of magnesium salicylate (CX 455-B). Doan’s P.M. contains 500 mg of magnesium salicylate, as well as 25 mg of diphenhydramine, a sleep aid (CX 368-D; CX 455-B). The recommended dosage for all three Doan’s products is two tablets (CX 497 at 40 [Esayian Dep.]; see also CX 510-Z-24).

15. Doan’s analgesic products are sold at a price premium over general purpose analgesic products (CX 402-F; CX 496 at 23-24 [Caputo Dep.]). This is true for both Doan’s factory prices (i.e., the price paid by retailers) and retail prices. (See Peabody Tr. 331, 550-52; CX 360-Z-38; CX 497 at 173 [Esayian Dep.].) In 1992, the retail price of a 24 count package of Doan’s Regular Strength tablets was $4.32, while 24 count packages of regular strength Tylenol and Bayer tablets sold for $2.61 and $2.57, respectively, constituting price premiums of 66% and 68%. (See CX 360-Z-38; CX 402-F.)

16. Doan’s is more expensive relative to other OTC analgesics on a per pill basis (CX 402-F). The largest size packages of Doan’s available, depending on the particular version, are 20, 24, or 48 count packages, whereas general analgesics are sold in substantially larger, more economical packages. (See CX 368-D-I; CX 402-F; CX 455-J; Peabody Tr. 551.) In 1995, a 24 count package of Doan’s Regular Strength cost $.18 per pill, while in 100 count packages, Regular Strength Tylenol cost $.06 per pill, Advil cost $.08 per pill, and private label aspirin cost $.03 per pill (CX 402-F). On this basis, Doan’s was sold at a 200% premium over Tylenol and a 500% premium over private label aspirin. With respect to Advil, the recommended dose is only one pill, while the recommended dose of Doan’s is two pills. Accordingly, one dose of Doan’s cost $.35 versus $.08 for Advil, a premium of over 300%. Doan’s premium price may have been a barrier to increased brand usage (CX 501, pp. 89-90; CX 454-C), so Ciba’s strategy for marketing it was to "use back pain
specific/special ingredient strategy to justify price premium" (CX 351-Z-27).

C. Doan's And The FDA

17. Product labeling for magnesium salicylate, the active ingredient in Doan's analgesic products, is regulated by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"). Tentative Final Monograph on Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, Antirheumatic Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use (53 Fed. Reg. 46,204, Nov. 16, 1988) ("Monograph") (JX 1-1).

18. Under the Monograph, an OTC analgesic drug product may be labeled as indicated for the temporary relief of minor aches and pain associated with one or more of the following: a cold, the common cold, sore throat, headache, toothache, muscular aches, backache, premenstrual or menstrual periods or cramps, and arthritis. 53 Fed. Reg. at 46,209. (JX 1-B ¶ 5.)

19. In 1988, when it promulgated the Monograph, the FDA was aware of comments expressing the concern that pain-specific labeling would suggest to consumers that "one product offers unique advantages over another for the specific indications stated on the label" (RX 88.1-Z-7). Despite this view, the FDA permitted pain-specific labeling as an alternative labeling option, concluding that such labeling "May be helpful to consumers to provide them with examples of the general types of pain for which OTC internal analgesic products are useful" (JX 1-B ¶ 5). Many OTC analgesic brands have positioned themselves for or advertised their efficacy for specific indications, such as headaches, arthritis, or back pain relief (RX 60-A-Z). Doan's specific positioning as a back pain reliever is consistent with the Monograph (JX 1-B ¶ 5; RX 88; RX 88.1) although it has not been FDA approved. (See CX 114-A; CX 500 at pp 14, 74-76.)

20. Although the Monograph states that magnesium salicylate is effective for pain relief for several ailments, the only indication for which Novartis has marketed Doan's has been for the relief of back pain (CX 501 at 20 [Sloan Dep.]). The manufacturers of Advil, Aleve, Bayer, Motrin, and Tylenol label their products as providing relief from pain associated with several different problems. (See Peabody Tr. 557; see, e.g., RX 114.)
21. The Monograph does not state that any approved analgesic ingredient is more effective for the relief of back pain than any other approved ingredient (CX 415-A-Z-31) and it does not sanction a company's labeling or advertising of its analgesic product as being more effective for back pain (id.; see also Peabody Tr. 588-89; Scheffman Tr. 2643-44).

22. No other brand of OTC analgesic contains magnesium salicylate as its active ingredient (Peabody Tr. 314), but there are no studies demonstrating that it relieves back pain more effectively than acetaminophen, aspirin, ibuprofen or naproxen sodium (CX 584; JX 1 ¶ 9).

D. The Dissemination of Doan's Ads

23. The challenged ads were disseminated in a long-running national ad campaign beginning in May 1988, and continuing through May 1996 (JX 2 ¶¶ 25, 35, 36).

24. Ciba's ad efforts for Doan's products used national television ads and free-standing inserts ("FSI's") and, at times, radio ads disseminated in selected markets (JX 2 ¶¶ 25, 28, 29, 33-36). FSI's are ads appearing in Sunday newspaper supplements with, in some cases, attached discount coupons. FSI's are primarily used by "coupon clippers." During the relevant period Doan's FSI's were redeemed by less than 1% of newspaper subscribers (RX 160-A; Peabody Tr. 486).

25. Over the period 1988 through 1996, Ciba's broadcast ad expenditures for Doan's products totaled approximately $55 million, and its consumer promotion spending for Doan's (including FSI production and dissemination and merchandising materials) totaled about $10 million (JX 2 ¶ 21).

26. The target audience for Doan's ads was backache sufferers who treat their back pain with OTC pain relievers ("sufferers/treaters") within specified age ranges that varied over time (JX 2 ¶ 27). The goals of Ciba's ad and promotion campaign were to maintain the loyalty of existing Doan's users, encourage Doan's users to increase their usage of Doan's pills for treating their backaches, regain lapsed Doan's users, and attract new users who had been using other OTC pain relievers to treat their back pain or who were new to the analgesics market. (See, e.g., Peabody Tr. 150; Stewart Tr. 3608; CX 360-Z-43; CX 455-I; CX 508-O.)
1. Television Ads

27. Between January 1987 and June 1996, Doan’s television ads were disseminated nationally both on network television during daytime and late night hours, as well as on syndicated and cable television during prime time, early evening, weekend, daytime and late night. (See JX 2 ¶ 28; CX 370-A-Z-78; CX 371-A-Z-39; Stewart Tr. 3418-19, 3440.) They appeared during such popular television shows as One Life to Live, The Young and the Restless, General Hospital, Family Feud, Jeopardy, Wheel of Fortune, Cops, Inside Edition, Current Affair, Oprah Winfrey, Rush Limbaugh, and, in 1989, during prime time newscasts (JX 2 ¶ 29; CX 370-A-Z-78). Doan’s television commercials appeared on cable stations such as the Cable News Network, Nashville Network, USA Network, Turner Network Television, Turner Broadcasting Service, Weather Channel, and Lifetime (JX 2 ¶ 29). It also bought time on cable television programs with high Southern viewership, such as "Country News Late," "Texas Connection," "Western Block," and "Truck and Tractor" (CX 371-A-Z-79; Stewart Tr. 3438-39).

28. The advertising agencies Hicks & Greist and Ketchum Advertising participated in the creative development, production, and media dissemination of Doan’s television commercials from 1987 to April 1993. Jordan, McGrath, Case & Taylor, Inc. ("Jordan McGrath"), another advertising agency, participated in the creative development, production, and media dissemination of Doan’s television commercials from April 1993 to June 1996. Ciba gave final approval for all advertising copy and dissemination (JX 2 ¶ 26).

29. The television ads disseminated by Ciba were 15-second spots (JX 2 ¶ 25). According to Jordan McGrath, the rationale for using 15-second ads is that they provide maximum efficiency, afford continuity and build frequency (CX 390-S; see also CX 503 at 110-11 [Jackson Dep.]). Ciba’s one-time Marketing Director for Doan’s testified that 15-second ads are an effective way of advertising the product, because Doan’s television commercials had a fairly singular communication point that could be easily made in 15 seconds (CX 499 at 135 [Nagy Dep.]). Doan’s competitors apparently disagree, for more than 80% of TV commercials for Tylenol, Advil, Motrin and Aleve were 30 seconds in length or longer in 1984 (JX 2-H ¶ 31; RX 36-Z-27).
30. For purposes of efficiently purchasing air time for Doan’s television commercials, Ciba defined the Doan’s target market in terms of the age demographics it believed best described potential Doan’s purchasers. From 1988 to 1990, the age demographics of the target audience for Doan’s television commercials were adults 35 years of age or older. From 1991 to 1996, the age demographics of the target audience for Doan’s television commercials were adults 25 to 54 years of age (JX 2 ¶ 27; Stewart Tr. 3431).

31. Based on estimates by Ciba’s ad agencies, from 1988 to 1996 television commercials for Doan’s reached 80% to 90% of the Doan’s target audience, on average, 20 to 27 times per year (JX 2 ¶ 28).

32. The first ads disseminated by Ciba for Doan’s were 15-second versions of the "Hollingshead" and "Schwartz" television commercials developed by Doan’s prior owner, Jeffrey Martin, Inc. These ads were disseminated from January 1987 through February 1988. After it introduced Extra-Strength Doan’s, Ciba modified these ads by adding tag lines announcing the Extra-Strength product. These revised "Hollingshead" and "Schwartz" (CX 2) ads aired from February through May 1988 (JX 2 ¶ 25; see also Mazis Tr. 947; CX 500 at 57-58 [Russo Dep.]; Peabody Tr. 161, 605-607).

33. The first television commercial created by Ciba, "Graph" (CX 2; CX 13), was disseminated from May 1988 through June 1991. A television ad known alternatively as "X-Ray" or "Acetate" (CX 14), which was a variation of the "Graph" ad, was disseminated concurrently with "Graph" from August 1989 through June 1991 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

34. The "Black & White Back" television ad (CX 15) was disseminated from June 1991 through October 1992. A variation of the "Black & White Back" ad known as "Black & White Pan" (CX 7; CX 16) was disseminated from December 1992 through June 1994 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

35. The "Ruin A Night's Sleep" television ad (CX 7; CX 17) was disseminated from January 1992 through August 1992. Subsequently, "Ruin A Night's Sleep - Non-New" (CX 8; CX 18) was disseminated concurrently with "Black & White Pan" from August 1993 through June 1994 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

36. The "Activity–Pets" (CX 8; CX 22) and "Activity–Playtime" (CX 8; CX 10; CX 20) television ads were disseminated concurrently from July 1994 through July 1995 (JX 2 ¶ 25).
37. The "Muscles" television ad (CX 11; CX 23) was disseminated from August 1995 through May 1996 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

38. The most recent challenged television ad, "Muscles," last aired in May 1996 (JX 2 ¶ 25). Beginning in May 1996, a revised version of the "Muscles" ad, "New Muscles - Male" (RX 17; RX 24-A), and a revised female version, "New Muscles - Female" (RX 18), have been disseminated (RX 5-Z-84, Z-90-92; RX 17; RX 18; RX 24-A).

2. Free Standing Inserts

39. Between 1987 and mid-1996, Ciba disseminated FSI’s for Doan’s products in Sunday newspaper supplements two to three times per year (JX 2 ¶ 36). One FSI (CX 32-A) was disseminated on May 21, 1989 in newspapers with circulations totaling 34.9 million, and was used twice again, appearing on October 14, 1990 in 45.3 million individual newspapers (CX 29-J) and on September 29, 1991 in 12.6 million individual newspapers (CX 29-Z-4). On June 2, 1991, two different FSI’s (CX 29-U; CX 29-W) appeared in 583,000 newspapers and 473,000 newspapers, respectively. On January 8, 1995, another FSI (CX 53-E; CX 544) appeared in 40.3 million newspapers.

3. Radio Ads

40. From March through December 1991, Ciba tested local radio ads for Doan’s in five cities: Denver, Nashville, Oklahoma City, Orlando, and Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater. For each twelve-week flight, the tested Doan’s radio ads reached an estimated 45% to 52% of the target audience (adults between the ages of 25 and 54) an average of 17 to 20 times each (JX 2 ¶ 33). In 1992, at least three four-week flights of Doan’s radio ads were aired in selected markets (JX 2 ¶ 34).

41. From May through September 1993, Ciba tested Spanish language Doan’s radio ads (CX 58 [translated as CX 467]; CX 59 [translated as CX 468]; CX 60 [translated as CX 469]; CX 61 [translated as CX 470]; CX 62 [translated as CX 471]; CX 472 [translated as CX 473]; CX 474 [translated as CX 475]; and CX 476 [translated at CX 477]) targeted at Hispanic consumers in Houston. Three Houston radio stations broadcast between twelve and seventeen Doan’s ads weekly for ten weeks (JX 2 ¶ 35).
Novartis voluntarily ceased running the challenged ads in May 1996, prior to the issuance of the complaint (Peabody Tr. 442; JX 2-E ¶ 25).

E. The Claims Conveyed By The Challenged Ads

42. Several expert witnesses were called by the parties to testify about significant issues in this case -- the claims conveyed by the challenged ads, their materiality, and the need for corrective advertising if the complaint's allegations were upheld.

1. Complaint Counsel's Experts

   a. Dr. Michael B. Mazis

43. Dr. Mazis is a tenured Professor of Marketing at The American University in the Kogod College of Business Administration (Mazis Tr. 923, 925; CX 417-A, J). Dr. Mazis has taught Principles of Marketing to undergraduates; Marketing and Public Policy to graduate students; marketing research courses to both undergraduates and graduate level students; and consumer behavior courses to undergraduates, graduate level students, and Ph.D. level students (Mazis Tr. 925; CX 417-J).

44. Dr. Mazis received his Doctor of Business Administration from Pennsylvania State University in 1971 with a major in marketing and minors in social psychology and quantitative business analysis (statistics) (Mazis Tr. 924; CX 417-A). From 1971 to 1976, Dr. Mazis was an Assistant Professor and Associate Professor of Marketing at the University of Florida where he taught a variety of courses involving marketing research and consumer behavior (Mazis Tr. 924-25; CX 417-B).

45. From 1976 to 1979, Dr. Mazis served as a full time consultant, first to the FDA's Bureau of Drugs, then in the FTC's Division of National Advertising, and finally as Chief of Marketing and Consumer Research in the FTC's Office of Policy and Planning (Mazis Tr. 925; CX 417-B). During this period he conducted consumer research and worked on a variety of issues related to advertising and consumer information (Mazis Tr. 925).

46. Dr. Mazis was made a full professor at American University in 1981 (Mazis Tr. 925). From 1980 to 1989, he was the Chair of the Department of Marketing. In 1991, Dr. Mazis was awarded the Kogod College Award for Scholarship (CX 417-J).
47. Dr. Mazis has published extensively in peer-reviewed journals, including many articles with application to advertising and public policy issues (CX 417-C-H). These include an article regarding copy testing issues in FTC advertising cases and four articles regarding corrective advertising (Mazis Tr. 926-27; CX 417-E-G).

48. Dr. Mazis was awarded a $700,000 grant from the National Institutes of Health to study consumer perceptions of alcohol warning labels (Mazis Tr. 926; CX 417-C) and has served as a consultant to several government agencies, including the FTC, the FDA, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Department of Justice and the State of California (Mazis Tr. 926; CX 417-J).

49. Dr. Mazis has served as a consultant to numerous private corporations, has conducted litigation copy testing for Lanham Act cases, and has testified as an expert witness (Mazis Tr. 926, 929). In prior expert testimony that has been accepted by the courts, he has on a number of occasions analyzed advertising and marketing materials on the face of the ad and offered an opinion with regard to what reasonable consumers are likely to take away from such advertising or promotional materials (id., 929, 932).

b. Dr. David W. Stewart

50. Dr. Stewart is a full Professor of Marketing in the Marshall School of Business at the University of Southern California (Stewart Tr. 3390-91; CX 589-A, B, E). He holds the Robert E. Brooker Chair and currently serves as the Chairperson of the Department of Marketing (Stewart Tr. 3391, 3393; CX 589-A-B). Dr. Stewart has taught a variety of graduate and undergraduate level courses related to advertising, advertising and promotional management, consumer behavior, marketing research, market analysis, marketing strategy, product management, and sales management (Stewart Tr. 3393; CX 598-E). Dr. Stewart received his Ph.D. and M.A. in psychology from Baylor University and his B.A. in psychology from Northeast Louisiana University (Stewart Tr. 3391; CX 589-A-B).

51. Dr. Stewart has had a long and distinguished academic career. Prior to his teaching at the University of Southern California, he was employed as an Associate Professor of Psychology and Business at Jacksonville State University from 1978 to 1980, and as an Associate Professor of both marketing and psychology at Vanderbilt from 1980 to 1986 (Stewart Tr. 3392; CX 589-E-F).
52. Dr. Stewart has authored or co-authored six books on advertising related issues and has written over 70 articles which have been accepted in peer reviewed academic journals (Stewart Tr. 3396; CX 589-A, Z-1-9). His published works have involved the effectiveness of comparative advertising for brands with low market share, the manner in which advertising campaigns wear in and out, the defensive role of advertising for mature brands, and whether sales increases are sufficient to determine whether an advertising campaign has been successful (Stewart Tr. 3397-98). A number of his publications have involved the ARS copy testing methodology used by Research Systems Corporation (Stewart Tr. 3397, 3450).

53. Dr. Stewart has received numerous academic honors during his teaching career. Currently he is the President of the Academic Council of the American Marketing Association and chairman of the Section on Statistics in Marketing of the American Statistical Association (Stewart Tr. 3393-95; CX 589-A, H). He is a past president of the Society of Consumer Psychology of the American Psychological Association (Stewart Tr. 3395; CX 589-A, I). He has won numerous awards, including awards from the American Academy of Advertising for best paper published during 1989 in the Journal of Advertising and the best paper published during 1992-1994 in the Journal of Public Policy and Marketing (Stewart Tr. 3397; CX 589-A, C-D).

54. Dr. Stewart has served as the editor, associate editor, or member of the editorial board of numerous academic journals (Stewart Tr. 3397; CX 589-H-J) and has served as a peer reviewer of articles submitted for publication to numerous academic journals (CX 589-J).

55. Dr. Stewart was also employed for two years as the Research Manager for a major advertising agency, Needham, Harper, and Steers (now called DDB Needham) where he managed a research department and was responsible for research, including diagnostic copy testing and communication tests, research regarding markets, and profiling consumers (Stewart Tr. 3391-92; CX 589-A, F).

56. Dr. Stewart has also done extensive consulting work for major corporations in the areas of advertising effectiveness, consumer behavior, and the structure of markets (Stewart Tr. 3398).

57. Dr. Stewart has testified as an expert witness both before the Federal Trade Commission and in U.S. district courts (Stewart Tr. 3399-3400; CX 589-A, T-U). He has previously testified as an expert
in advertising, marketing, marketing research, survey methodology, marketing communication, and branding (Stewart Tr. 3400; CX 589-A).

2. Novartis’ Experts

a. Dr. David Scheffman

58. Dr. Scheffman is the Justin Potter Professor of American Competitive Enterprise and Professor of Business Strategy and Marketing at the Owen Graduate School of Management at Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee (Scheffman Tr. 2513; RX 205-A). He is also a consultant for a national consulting company, Law & Economic Consulting Group, Inc. (Scheffman Tr. 2513, 2515; RX 205-A).

59. Dr. Scheffman teaches courses in marketing, pricing, strategic management, brand equity evaluation and distribution to MBA and executive MBA students (Scheffman Tr. 2516; RX 205-C-D). Dr. Scheffman specializes in industrial organization economics, which uses various theories and tools to evaluate quantitative and qualitative evidence concerning markets and competition (Scheffman Tr. 2513).

60. Dr. Scheffman has a B.S. in mathematics from the University of Minnesota and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in economics (Scheffman Tr. 2512; RX 205-A).

61. Dr. Scheffman worked for the Commission beginning in 1982 (RX 205-B). From 1985 to 1988, he was the Director of the Bureau of Economics, and served as the chief economist on all matters being investigated or litigated by the Commission, including consumer protection matters (Scheffman Tr. 2515; RX 205-B).

62. Dr. Scheffman has co-authored five books and written forty-one articles (RX 205-M-Q). Dr. Scheffman has written articles about the relationship between advertising and product quality, and has authored one book on consumer protection regulation (Scheffman Tr. 2524).

b. Mr. Robert Lavidge

63. Mr. Robert Lavidge was qualified as an expert in consumer survey research, marketing and advertising (Lavidge Tr. 746-47).

64. Mr. Lavidge received a B.A. with highest honors in 1943 from DePauw University, and an M.B.A. with highest honors in 1947 from the University of Chicago (Lavidge Tr. 742; RX 21-A). For over
thirty years, Mr. Lavidge has taught in the areas of marketing and advertising as a member of the adjunct faculty of the Northwestern University School of Management (Lavidge Tr. 743). Since 1980, Mr. Lavidge has served as a member of the Advisory Council for the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business (RX 21-B).

65. Since 1951, Mr. Lavidge has served as the President of Elrick & Lavidge, one of the largest consumer survey research companies in the country (Lavidge Tr. 739). As President of Elrick & Lavidge, Mr. Lavidge has participated in thousands of surveys, hundreds of which have been offered as evidence in court (Lavidge Tr. 739).

66. Mr. Lavidge has served as the President of the American Marketing Association ("AMA") (Lavidge Tr. 740). Mr. Lavidge also has served as the head of the AMA's Marketing Research Division, the chairman of the Census Advisory Committee and of the Long-Range Planning Committee, and is currently serving as the chair of the AMA's Foundation Board of Trustees, which provides a means for members of the AMA and others in the marketing field to perform public service (Lavidge Tr. 741-42).

67. Mr. Lavidge has been qualified as an expert witness concerning marketing and survey research in excess of forty times (Lavidge Tr. 746).

68. In 1961, Mr. Lavidge wrote an article for the Journal of Marketing entitled, "A Model for Predictive Measures of Advertising Effectiveness" (Lavidge Tr. 744; RX 21-C). This article is credited with introducing the concept of the "hierarchy of effects," has been reprinted in numerous publications over the years, and is regarded as a seminal article by researchers and others studying the functions and effects of advertising (Lavidge Tr. 744; Mazis Tr. 1627).

c. Dr. Jacob Jacoby

69. Dr. Jacoby was qualified as an expert in the fields of consumer behavior, consumer research, social science research methodology, and the comprehension and miscomprehension of advertising (Jacoby Tr. 2921-22).

70. Dr. Jacoby received a B.A. in Psychology in 1961 and a Masters in Psychology in 1963 from Brooklyn College (Jacoby Tr. 2910; RX 4-A). Dr. Jacoby received a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Michigan State University in 1966 (Jacoby Tr. 2910; RX 4-A).
71. Dr. Jacoby has taught for over thirty years in the areas of advertising and marketing (Jacoby Tr. 2911-13; RX 4-A). From 1968 to 1981, Dr. Jacoby served as an assistant professor and then professor in the Department of Psychology at Purdue University (Jacoby Tr. 2911; RX 4-A). While at Purdue, Dr. Jacoby taught courses in consumer behavior and research methods (Jacoby Tr. 2911-12). Since 1981, Dr. Jacoby has held an endowed chair as the Merchants Council Professor, Consumer Behavior and Marketing at the Stern School of Business, New York University (Jacoby Tr. 2912; RX 4-A). At New York University, Dr. Jacoby has taught courses in consumer behavior, research methods, and market research, among others, to undergraduates, masters, and doctoral students (Jacoby Tr. 2912-13; RX 4-A).

72. Since 1968, Dr. Jacoby has worked as a consultant for clients including the Commission, the FDA, General Electric, Pillsbury and Proctor & Gamble, among others (Jacoby Tr. 2905-07). As a consultant, Dr. Jacoby has designed well over 1000 studies, hundreds of which have been offered in court (Jacoby Tr. 2907-08), including hundreds of studies focusing on the effects of advertising (Jacoby Tr. 2908).

73. Dr. Jacoby has served as the President of the Consumer Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association (Jacoby Tr. 2917; RX 4-B). Dr. Jacoby has served on the Executive Committee of the Market Research Council (Jacoby Tr. 2918; RX 4-C). Dr. Jacoby also has served as a reviewer of proposals for the FDA and for the National Science Foundation (Jacoby Tr. 2919; RX 4-C).

74. Dr. Jacoby has co-authored seven books and written over 100 articles, including books and articles on deceptive advertising, corrective advertising, the miscomprehension of televised and print communication, and research methodology (Jacoby Tr. 2920).

75. Dr. Jacoby has been qualified as an expert over 100 times in federal court (Jacoby Tr. 2921).

d. Dr. Morris Whitcup

76. Dr. Morris Whitcup was qualified as an expert in marketing and consumer research (Whitcup Tr. 2102). Dr. Whitcup designed, conducted and analyzed two studies for Novartis (Whitcup Tr. 2082).

77. Dr. Whitcup received a B.A. from Yeshiva College (Whitcup Tr. 2085). He subsequently received a Ph.D. in social psychology
from Columbia University in 1977 (Whitcup Tr. 2085; RX 1-A).
Dr. Whitcup has over twenty years of professional experience in consumer marketing research (Whitcup Tr. 2085) and has participated in more than 2,500 marketing research studies (Whitcup Tr. 2093; RX 1-A).

78. In 1995, Dr. Whitcup founded Advanced Analytics, Inc., a full-service market research company (Whitcup Tr. 2089; RX 1-A). Advanced Analytics, Inc. is a division of Guideline Research Corporation, one of the top 50 marketing research companies in the world (Whitcup Tr. 2090; RX 1-A).

79. Over the years, Dr. Whitcup has conducted various types of consumer research studies, including tracking studies, communication studies, and attitude studies (Whitcup Tr. 2094-97).

80. Dr. Whitcup has extensive experience conducting consumer research in the pharmaceutical area (Whitcup Tr. 2088; RX 1-A). For example, Dr. Whitcup was involved in a number of studies related to the switch of Aleve from a prescription brand analgesic to an OTC product (Whitcup Tr. 2098). Dr. Whitcup also has been involved in research for the FDA involving packaging and consumer comprehension of labels and packages (Whitcup Tr. 2089).

81. Dr. Whitcup has been qualified as an expert a number of times in court and before the NAD appeals board and the NARB (Whitcup Tr. 2101; RX 1-A).

e. Dr. James Jaccard

82. Dr. James Jaccard is a professor of psychology at the State University of New York at Albany (Jaccard Tr. 1400; RX 122-C). He specializes in social science research methodology, including the design of scientific experiments and surveys and the analysis of the results to draw conclusions about consumer attitudes, behavior, and decision-making (Jaccard Tr. 1401, 1405). In connection with his work in social science research methodology, Dr. Jaccard has taught, applied, and evaluated statistical methodology for analyzing behavioral data (Jaccard Tr. 1401; RX 122-B).

83. Dr. Jaccard received an A.B. in psychology from the University of California at Berkeley in 1971 (Jaccard Tr. 1400; RX 122-C). He received his A.M. and Ph.D. in social psychology from the University of Illinois, Urbana in 1972 and 1976, respectively (Jaccard Tr. 1400; RX 122-C).
84. Dr. Jaccard has taught and practiced social science research methodology for more than twenty years (RX 122-C-D). Since 1987, he has served as a professor in the Department of Psychology at the State University of New York, Albany, New York (RX 122-C). Dr. Jaccard has taught graduate and undergraduate courses on research methodology, experimental design, and statistical methods as applied to the analysis of behavioral data (Jaccard Tr. 1402; RX 122-B-C, S).

85. Dr. Jaccard has been a statistical consultant for the federal government and the State of New York, as well as for numerous industries (Jaccard Tr. 1403-04; RX 122-B). Dr. Jaccard also has served as a consulting editor for a number of major scientific journals, and has evaluated statistical analyses of original research (Jaccard Tr. 1404-05; RX 122-B).

86. Dr. Jaccard has authored or co-authored four books addressing statistical methods for evaluating behavioral data. He also has written numerous book chapters and articles published in peer reviewed academic journals (RX 122-A, B, D to N). In these articles, Dr. Jaccard has developed, explained, and applied statistical approaches for evaluating behavioral data (Jaccard Tr. 1408). Several of Dr. Jaccard’s publications have dealt specifically with consumer attitudes and decision-making (Jaccard Tr. 1406, 1408-09).

3. Facial Analysis Of The Challenged Ads

   a. TV Ads

87. In the first ad Ciba created for Doan’s -- "Graph" -- (CX 13) a voice-over announces that "New Extra Strength Doan’s is made for back pain relief." This statement is followed by a depiction of a Doan’s package on the left side of the screen and packages of three competing analgesic brands -- Advil, Extra Strength Tylenol, and Bayer -- on the right. The voice-over states: "with an ingredient these pain relievers don't have," as the spotlight on the competing brands is darkened, leaving only the Doan’s package clearly visible on the screen.

88. All of the challenged television ads disseminated after "Graph" continued to focus on Doan’s special efficacy in relieving back pain, and emphasized that Doan’s has an ingredient not found in competing analgesics. The ads, like "Graph," display and then visually diminish competitive analgesics. The same symbolism has
been used by Doan's competitors (RX 60; CX 14; CX 15; CX 16; CX 17; CX 18; CX 20; CX 22; CX 23).

89. "X-Ray" (CX 14) is a variation of the "Graph" ad with the addition of an audio and visual reference to Doan's as "The back specialist." The Ketchum advertising executive who oversaw Doan's advertising from 1987 through 1991 testified that he intended the "back specialist" phrase to create a memorable analogy to a doctor who treats backs only. A conference report summarizing a meeting between Ciba and Jordan McGrath stated with respect to "X-Ray": "Since Doan's is the expert, Doan's works better for back pain" (CX 131-B).

90. The "back specialist" tag line was used in most subsequent Doan's television ads (CX 15; CX 16; CX 20; CX 22; CX 23).

91. In "Black & White Back" (CX 15), the ingredient the other pain relievers don't have is referred to as a "special ingredient," and in the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ads (CX 17; CX 18) that ingredient is described as "unique." Jordan McGrath's Senior Vice President, who was responsible for the Doan's ads created subsequent to "Ruin A Night's Sleep," but who was not involved in the creation of "Black & White Back," testified that she would not have approved a Dean's advertisement that contained the phrase "with a special ingredient." (See CX 504 at 116 [Schaler Dep.].)

92. The final frames of "Activity–Playtime" (CX 20) and "Activity–Pets" (CX 22), Novartis' more recent ads, depict a package of Doan's alongside packages of Advil, Tylenol, Bayer, and a newly introduced competitor, Aleve, while the voice-over states that "Doan's has an ingredient these pain relievers don't have." These ads conclude with the "back specialist" tag line, as does "Muscles" (CX 23).

b. Free Standing Inserts

93. An FSI that first ran in 1989 (and that was disseminated again in 1990 and 1991) features a large Doan's package alongside smaller but clearly visible packages of Advil, Extra-Strength Tylenol, and Bayer (CX 32-A; CX 29-J; CX 29-Z-4). Prominent copy above the packages states: "Doan's. Made for back pain relief." Under this statement, and just above the packages of the competing brands, is the claim "With an ingredient these other pain relievers don't have."

94. One of two FSI's that ran in 1991 headlined: "Back Pain Sufferers -- It's Easy to See Why You Need Doan's" (CX 29-W). This
statement appears directly above packages of Bayer, Extra-Strength Tylenol, Advil, and Motrin. A magnifying glass is superimposed on the packages, highlighting an excerpt from the product labeling for Extra-Strength Tylenol, i.e., that Extra Strength Tylenol is "For the temporary relief of minor aches, pains, headaches and fever." Below the competing packages is the phrase "These are for all kinds of aches and pains." To the right is a Doan’s package accompanied by the words "Doan’s is just for back pain." The second FSI features the statement "Back pain is different" above a display of the three competing analgesic packages, with the phrase "Why use these pain relievers?" alongside them (CX 29-U). Directly below is a package of Doan’s and the words "Doan’s is just for back pain." In a similar vein, a 1995 FSI asks "Why Treat General Aches?" above a display of packages of Bayer, Extra Strength Tylenol, Advil and Aleve (CX 53-E; CX 544). It continues: "Back Pain Needs the Specialist," set above pictures of Doan’s packages.

c. Radio Ads

95. In a Spanish radio ad, a woman complains of back pain and a man tells her, "Buy Doan’s. It's the medicine that works best when I need back-pain-relief" (CX 61 [translated as CX 470]). She asks, "And what is it that Doan’s has that makes it work so well?" The announcer answers her, "Doan’s has a unique ingredient that alleviates pain, and no other pain reliever has it." The ad concludes "Trust Doan’s, the back specialist."

96. The claims in its TV, FSI and radio ads that Doan’s is special because it has an ingredient other pain relievers don’t have, that it is the "back specialist" (see CX 131-B) and that it is made for back pain relief clearly carries the message that it is more effective than other OTC analgesics for back pain relief.

d. Expert Testimony

97. Dr. Jacoby testified that it would be inappropriate for an expert to make a facial analysis of the challenged ads (Jacoby Tr. 2945).

98. Dr. Mazis disagreed, and, applying his understanding of consumer psychology and after reviewing certain Ciba strategy and research documents, testified that several Doan’s ads made the alleged superiority claim. He stated that "Graph," which refers to an
"ingredient that [other] pain relievers don't have" conveys the message that Doan's is unique and different, and couples this claim with references to back pain, thus conveying the net impression that Doan's is more effective for back pain relief than other pain relievers mentioned in the ad (Mazis Tr. 932, 949-51, 957; CX 508-Z-32).

99. Dr. Mazis gave essentially the same opinion with respect to other Doan's TV ads and FSI's comparing Doan's with other OTC analgesics: "X-Ray" (adding "The Back Specialist") (CX 14; Mazis Tr. 952-54); "Black & White Back" (CX 15; Mazis Tr. 958-60); "Black & White Pan" (CX 16; Mazis Tr. 960-63); "Ruin A Night's Sleep" (CX 17; Mazis Tr. 961-62) and "Ruin A Night's Sleep - Non-New" (CX 17; CX 18; Mazis Tr. 961-63); "Activity–Pets" and "Activity–Playtime" (CX 20; CX 22; Mazis Tr. 964-66); "Muscles" (Mazis Tr. 966-69); FSI, May 1989 (CX 32-A; Mazis Tr. 971); FSI "Back Pain Is Different" (CX 29-U; Mazis Tr. 974); FSI "back pain sufferers" (CX 29-W; Mazis Tr. 974-76); FSI, 1995 (CX 53-E; CX 544; Mazis Tr. 976-78).

4. Novartis' Knowledge Of The Claims Conveyed By The Ads

100. Ciba's Marketing Department knew that advertising claims required substantiation, and that, while the OTC Analgesics Monograph supported efficacy claims, superiority claims would require one or two well-controlled clinical studies (CX 501 at 27-28 [Sloan Dep.]; see also CX 499 at 58-59 [Nagy Dep.]). Company officials, members of the Marketing Department, and ad agency executives were unaware of any scientific evidence that Doan's was more effective than other analgesics (see e.g., CX 501 at 8-10 [Sloan Dep.]; CX 496 at 64-65 [Caputo Dep.]; CX 497 at 42 [Esayan Dep.]; CX 498 at 18-19 [Gray Dep.]; CX 499 at 58-59 [Nagy Dep.]; CX 500 at 62 [Russo Dep.]; CX 504 at 48-49 [Schaler Dep.]).

101. In a 1994 letter addressed to the Marketing Director for Doan's, Jordan McGrath's Senior Vice President responsible for Doan's stated: "Doan's cannot support product 'superiority'... nor can it deliver a unique or seemingly superior consumer benefit" (CX 169-D; CX 504 at 136 [Schaler Dep.]).

102. In a "demo exploratory" document attached to a summary of discussions between Jordan McGrath and Ciba regarding creative strategy for 1995, the agency noted:
While we would like to *imply* that Doan's provides superior efficacy because of its unique ingredient, we *cannot* clinically support this since the other brands work equally well as Doan's at relieving back pain.

(emphasis in original) (CX 147-J.)

103. In a June 1995 response to an inquiry from the Federal Trade Commission, Ciba's Vice President of Marketing responsible for Doan's wrote that there are "no such documents or studies in existence demonstrating that magnesium salicylate relieves back pain more quickly and/or effectively than acetaminophen, aspirin, ibuprofen or naproxen sodium" (CX 584).

104. Despite its awareness that it lacked substantiation, Ciba knowingly and intentionally conveyed in its ads that Doan's was better for back pain than other OTC analgesics, an intention which is shown by the creative strategy upon which the first ads it created were based: "Graph" (CX 13) and "X-Ray" (CX 14). This strategy targeted "adults 35+ who: suffer from backache" and "seek better relief than provided by all purpose pain relievers" and sought to convince them that because Doan's "is made for back pain relief" and "contains a back pain medicine that no leading analgesic product has" it "provides relief from backache that the leading pain relievers may not be able to do" (CX 508-Z-31-32; Peabody Tr. 260-61).

105. Mr. Peabody testified that a reason that Ciba tested Doan's commercials prior to dissemination was to make sure that the ad did not miscommunicate a claim for which Ciba did not have support, and that he became concerned about miscommunication if an ad communicated a claim in copy testing at a 10% to 15% level (Peabody Tr. 149-51), but that he would not be concerned if the target audience was composed of a disproportionate share of users since this group tends to play back a "more favorable message" (Peabody Tr. 617-18).

106. A communication test of the "Graph" ad conducted prior to its production and dissemination informed virtually all of the senior marketing executives at Ciba that it communicated "product superiority" to 38% of respondents (CX 225-C; Peabody Tr. 171-73). This exceeded Mr. Peabody's 10% to 15% miscommunication threshold. An executive summary of the results of this study recommended the production of "Graph," since it had the strengths of the prior ad "as well as communicates product superiority and perceived efficacy" (CX 225-A-D). Doan's 1989 Marketing Plan
repeated the product superiority playback and described the ad as a "strong execution which effectively communicates product superiority and perceived efficacy" (CX 335-Z-8). Ciba disseminated the "Graph" ad from May 1988 through June 1991 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

107. The report of a 1989 focus group of the "Graph" ad informed Ciba that "[m]entioning the competitive brands by name ... appears to create the impression that Doan's may in fact be better than the other brands, thereby promulgating a more favorable predisposition to trying Doan's" (CX 227-Z-3).

108. In September 1990, Ciba commissioned a communication test of three alternative commercial executions to see which best communicated Doan's "Relieving All Kinds of Back Pain" strategy. One of the three ads was the "Black & White Back" ad (CX 15). The test showed that it had a 62% open-ended communication of "superiority over other products" (CX 236-M, Z-67; Peabody Tr. 180). (An open-ended question is one that provides respondents with very little context or structure in order to obtain unprompted answers in respondents' own words (Mazis Tr. 100; Peabody Tr. 165).) The ad was tested prior to its production by the ASI 24-hour delayed-recall methodology (CX 76-A-D; CX 237-A-Z-38; Peabody Tr. 181). A memorandum from the Marketing Research Department to Ciba's senior marketing executives compared ASI test results of "Black & White Back" to an ASI test of "Graph" and reported that "Black and White Back' does a better job than 'Graph' in establishing Doan's relief/efficacy, quality, and brand superiority" (CX 76-A, C; Peabody Tr. 183-85). A Doan's Marketing Plan also reported, "Our current execution, 'Black & White Back,' is a strong performer .... Communicates backache relief, efficacy and product superiority" (CX 360-Z-100; Peabody Tr. 263). Ciba disseminated the "Black & White Back" ad from June 1991 through October 1992 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

109. A pre-production communications test of the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ad reported 35% open-ended communication of "superiority over other products" among non-users of Doan's and 15% open-ended communication of "superiority over other products" among Doan's users (CX 244-F, T; Peabody Tr. 188-89). A report of this study, as well as an executive summary, was distributed to the Marketing Department. Ciba disseminated the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ad from January 1992 through August 1992, and then disseminated "Ruin A Night's Sleep - Non-New" (CX 18) from August 1993 through June 1994 (JX 2 ¶ 25).
110. In April 1993, Ciba switched the Doan's account from Ketchum Advertising to Jordan McGrath. Ciba and its new ad agency intended to convey the message that Doan's was more effective for back pain. A December 1993 Conference Report of discussions between Ciba and Jordan McGrath indicates that Ciba and the agency agreed to pursue several executions to "strongly communicate that Doan's has something the others don't have (thereby implying that Doan's is different/better)" and to "more clearly communicate that since Doan's is the expert, Doan's works better on back pain" (emphasis in originals) (CX 131-A-B).

111. In May 1994, Ciba and Jordan McGrath were put on notice regarding an implied superiority claim. Jordan McGrath wrote to Ciba:

All three Networks are requiring substantiation for the claim "If nothing you take seems to help." The Networks believe that this language implies that Doan's provides superior efficacy vis-a-vis the competitive products shown .... As such, to make this claim, we will need substantiation that Doan's is more effective (due to its Magnesium Salicylate ingredient) at relieving back pain versus the competitors pictured. Importantly, our Agency council [sic] agrees with the networks.

(emphasis in original) (CX 165-A). Ciba could not provide the networks with substantiation (see, CX 166-A; CX 503 at 83-93 [Jackson Dep.]; CPF. ?). The "Activity" ads disseminated later contain language similar to that which the networks disapproved: "If nothing seems to help try Doan's. It relieves back pain no matter where it hurts. Doan's has an ingredient these pain relievers don't have" (CX 20).

112. Further evidence of Ciba's knowledge of its implied superiority claim involves the "Activity–Playtime" (CX 20) ad. At approximately the same time the ad was first disseminated, it was tested by ARS using its 72-hour delayed recall testing methodology (CX 169-A; CX 387-G). Several weeks after "Activity–Playtime" began airing, Jordan McGrath's Senior Vice President responsible for Doan's wrote to Ciba's Marketing Director, notifying her that the ARS testing showed 12% "implied superiority" and stating:

Doan's cannot support product "superiority" ... nor can it deliver a unique or seemingly superior consumer benefit. Hence, it's a challenge for the advertising execution to compensate and persuasively deliver a dimension of competitive "news."
Several days later, the agency’s Vice President Account Supervisor also wrote to Ciba’s Marketing Director, telling her:

"Unfortunately, as we all know, in the Doan’s 'Activity' executions our 'unique ingredient' story is not linked to a specific 'back pain relief' claim. Rather our claim 'Doan’s has an ingredient these pain relievers don't have,' is used as a copy point that stands by itself with the objective of implied superiority." (emphasis in original) (CX 170-B; see CX 503 at 55-58 [Jackson Dep.]; CX 504 at 143-44 [Schaler Dep.]). Subsequent to this correspondence, no one from Ciba asked that the "Activity–Playtime" ad be modified or withdrawn from dissemination (CX 504 at 135-36 [Schaler Dep.]; CX 503 at 57-58 [Jackson Dep.]). Ciba disseminated the "Activity–Playtime" ad from July 1994 through July 1995 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

113. In a "demo exploratory" attached to a February 1995 Conference Report of a meeting between Ciba and Jordan McGrath regarding the creative strategy for 1995, the agency noted:

While we would like to imply that Doan's provides superior efficacy because of its unique ingredient, we cannot clinically support this since the other brands work equally well as Doan's at relieving back pain.

(emphasis in original)(CX 147-J). Nevertheless, before the "Muscles" (CX 23) ad was produced it was also tested by ARS 72-hour delayed recall testing (CX 265-A; Peabody Tr. 191-93). In that study, 18% of those with related recall played back a "better/best product" claim (see CX 265-M; Peabody Tr. 196). A report of this study, as well as an executive summary, was distributed to the Marketing Department (CX 265-A). The executive summary noted that "The conclusion that our product may be better/best is more likely to be conveyed in 'Muscles' than in 'Activity Playtime' ...." (CX 265-B). Ciba disseminated the "Muscles" ad from August 1995 through May 1996 (JX 2 ¶ 25).

114. Although comparative advertising may be the optimal technique for the promotion of low-share brands (Stewart Tr. 3459) and although Mr. Peabody denied any intention by Ciba to do so (Peabody Tr. 539), I find that Ciba’s advertising campaign created the false message that Doan’s was more effective for the relief of back pain than other OTC analgesics. This finding is based on the clear
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import of the challenged ads, Dr. Mazis' analysis of them, and Ciba's comments on those ads (F 98, 99, 102, 104, 106, 107-113).

5. Copy Tests Of The Challenged Ads

115. Respondents or their agents performed copy tests in the ordinary course of business on a number of the challenged ads. In addition, complaint counsel commissioned the United States Research Company ("USR") to execute a copy test of two of the challenged ads. These tests support the conclusion that Doan's ads communicated the false message that it was superior to other OTC analgesics for the relief of back pain.

a. Copy Tests Conducted For Ciba

(1) Bruno & Ridgeway Copy Tests Of The "Graph" Ad

116. In March 1988, Bruno & Ridgeway, an independent consumer research company, copy tested the "Graph" ad (CX 2; CX 13), a potential ad, "Twisted," and an ad which was being run, "Hollingshead" (CX 224-E; Peabody Tr. 158). The questionnaires were designed by the staff of Ciba's marketing department and researchers at Bruno & Ridgeway (Peabody Tr. 159-60; CX 502 at 70).

117. This test used the mall intercept method in six geographically dispersed shopping centers. Qualified respondents were taken to a central interviewing room and were shown one of the test ads (Mazis Tr. 996; CX 224-D; Z-97).

118. Qualified respondents included adult back pain sufferers/treaters aged 35 to 64 (CX 224-E, Z-97-98; Mazis Tr. 997; Peabody Tr. 158-59). Respondents were not required to have used or been aware of Doan's for the treatment of backache. These demographics constituted the target audience that Ciba was attempting to reach with its Doan's ads at the time (Peabody Tr. 159). This was an appropriate group of consumers upon which to test these ads (Whitcup Tr. 2383-84; Mazis Tr. 997).

119. A total of 300 copy test respondents were included in this survey (CX 224-E). Each respondent was shown one of the three tested ads which were in a rough, unfinished form. Ciba routinely tested unfinished ads to save the approximately $300,000 it would cost to produce fully three different ads, none of which might ultimately be aired (Peabody Tr. 338-39). In the experience of Ciba's marketing research department, the results obtained from copy testing
rough versions of Doan's ads provided an accurate measure of how those ads would communicate to consumers in finished form (Peabody Tr. 148-49, 338-40; CX 224-Z-99).

120. Approximately 100 respondents were exposed twice to each tested ad (CX 224-E, Z-99; Mazis Tr. 999-1000). Thereafter, they were asked to identify the advertised product, state how likely they were to buy it, and explain why (Questions 7a-8b) (CX 224-Z-100).

121. Respondents were then asked an open-ended question (F 108) (9a) asking what they thought was the main idea of the ad (id., Mazis Tr. 1000-01). Thereafter, respondents were asked another open-ended question (9c) to elicit what other ideas had been communicated to them by the ad (CX 224-Z-101; Mazis Tr. 1002). There is nothing in the questionnaire that would bias the results of the copy test (CX 502 at 74 [Wright Dep.]).

122. In response to question 9a, 18% of the respondents answered that the main idea of the "Graph" ad was "Superior to other products" (CX 224-M; Mazis Tr. 1002). When the results of the "main idea" question (9a) and the "other ideas" question (9c) were netted, 38% of the respondents exposed to the "Graph" ad were coded as answering that it communicated that Doan's was "Superior to other products" (CX 224-M; Mazis Tr. 1003; Peabody Tr. 163-64).

123. The open-ended responses that were coded as "Superior to other products" only included responses that Doan's was "better than/more effective than other products" (CX 224-Z-22; Mazis Tr. 1006; CX 502 at 84 [Wright Dep.]). In their own research conducted for this litigation, the experts for both parties coded such "better than/more effective than other products" responses to mean superior efficacy for back pain, since back pain is the subject of the ads (Whitcup Tr. 2418-23; Jacoby Tr. 3063; Lavidge Tr. 902-03; RX 128-D-E). The "Superior to other products" category is equivalent to the superior efficacy claim alleged in the complaint (Mazis Tr. 1007).

124. A 38% communication of a superior efficacy message in response to open-ended questions is quite high (Mazis Tr. 1009). In its report to Ciba, Bruno & Ridgeway concluded that the "Graph" ad was "successful at communicating the more specific ideas of: ... Superiority to other products" (CX 224-K).

125. Respondents' marketing research department recommended "Graph" for finished production since it had many of the same
strengths as "Hollingshead" and communicated product superiority and perceived efficacy (CX 225-D).

126. The "Graph" test did not use a control ad, i.e., an ad that is similar to the tested ad but which is believed not to make the claim that the tested ad is making. The purpose of a control ad is to account for "noise" -- responses that come from sources other than the ad's communication (Mazis Tr. 1077-78). For close-ended questions, the results of the control ad are subtracted from the results of the test ad to net out the effects of such noise. (Close-ended questions ask about specific topics and provide the respondent with a finite number of response options such as "yes" or "no" or "more," "same" or "less," Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC 40, 68 (1991).) The results obtained from open-ended questions are usually not deducted from the test ad (Jacoby Tr. 325).

127. Copy testing research done in the ordinary course of business for Ciba did not employ control ads (id. at 354-56). Ciba relied heavily upon these copy tests in making consumer research-based business decisions (Peabody Tr. 354-56, 622).

128. The "Hollingshead" ad tested in CX 224 had an Extra-Strength tag line to announce its introduction. Only 7% of the respondents exposed to "Hollingshead" were coded as saying it conveyed a "superior to other products" claim. Thirty-seven percent of them were coded as stating that it communicated extra strength (CX 224-M; Mazis Tr. 1009).

129. Both the "Graph" and "Hollingshead" ads promoted Extra-Strength Doan's. Of the respondents viewing the "Graph" ad, 38% were coded as stating it communicated "Superior to other products," but only 24% were coded as stating it communicated "Extra Strength." Conversely, 7% of the respondents viewing "Hollingshead" were coded as stating the ad communicated "Superior to other products," but 37% were coded as stating it communicated "Extra-Strength" (CX 224-M). There is no correlation between consumer playback of the extra strength nature of the advertised Doan's product and consumer playback of superior efficacy (CX 224-M; Whitcup Tr. 2376-81).

130. Responses to open-ended questions 9a and 9c that were coded as "Extra-Strength" in CX 224 were not included in the "Superior to other products" code (Peabody Tr. 610-12; Whitcup Tr. 2355). Based upon the copy test results, Ciba's marketing research
department concluded that "Extra Strength" was a secondary message for the "Hollingshead" execution. It did not find "Extra Strength" to be a secondary message in the "Graph" ad, which the marketing research department stated "was perhaps due to greater intrusiveness of Extra Strength in Hollingshead" (CX 225-C).

(2) Bruno & Ridgeway Copy Test Of The "Black & White Back" Ad

131. In September 1990, Bruno & Ridgeway copy tested the "Black & White Back" ad (CX 15) and two other potential ads named "Thermography" and "Broadcast News" (CX 236-E-F; Peabody Tr. 174).

132. The purpose of this mall intercept copy test was to test these ads for communication of a new message: that Doan's was effective at relieving all kinds of back pain (Peabody Tr. 357-76; CX 236-E).

133. The target audience in this test was current and lapsed Doan's users (users who had not used Doan's in the previous six months (CX 236-E-F; Peabody Tr. 376).

134. Approximately 100 copy test respondents were exposed to each tested ad (CX 236-Z-44). Each respondent was shown one of the three tested ads in unfinished form (id. at Z-206). The first exposure placed the Doan's ad in the middle of a reel of five commercials. The four ads surrounding the Doan's ad were for products unrelated to analgesics or back pain (CX 236-Z-44, Z-206; Mazis Tr. 1012-13). This "clutter reel" methodology was infrequently used by Ciba (Peabody Tr. 175).

135. After this first exposure, respondents were asked what products they recalled being advertised. For those who recalled a Doan's ad, three open-ended questions (5a-c) were asked to elicit respondents' take-away from the Doan's ad. Respondents were then exposed to the Doan's ad by itself (CX 236-Z-206-07; Peabody Tr. 175-76).

136. Following the second exposure to the Doan's ad, respondents were asked open-ended questions regarding what brand was advertised (questions 7a-b), what was the main idea of the ad (question 8), what other ideas was the ad trying to communicate (question 9), and what, based upon the ad, the respondent would like about the advertised product (questions 10a-b) (CX 236-Z-207-08; Mazis Tr. 1017-18). Open-ended questions 8-10 were not leading (Mazis Tr. 1023; see Peabody Tr. 178).
137. In response to open-ended questions, 5a-c, 46% of the respondents who saw the "Black & White Back" ad gave answers that were coded as "Superiority over other products" (CX 236-J, T; Mazis Tr. 1018; Peabody Tr. 177). Bruno & Ridgeway included a number of groups of comments into this superiority coding category, including "Better/more effective than Tylenol/Advil/aspirin," "Works better than other products," "Best backache medication," and "Works faster than other brands" (CX 236-T, Z-67-68). Dr. Mazis testified that the 46% result was extraordinarily high and demonstrates consumer take-away of the superior efficacy message (Mazis Tr. 1022).

138. Bruno & Ridgeway also netted the "Superiority over other products" responses for all of the open-ended questions (5a-c, 8, 9, and 10a-b) (CX 236-Z-67; Mazis Tr. 1021; Peabody Tr. 179). The result of that netting shows that 62% of the respondents exposed to "Black & White Back" understood it to communicate a superior efficacy claim (CX 236-Y, Z-67; Mazis Tr. 1021; Peabody Tr. 180). Bruno & Ridgeway concluded that this data established that "Black & White Back" "generate[d] high playback of Doan's being superior to other products. . . ." (CX 236-M) and that it "appear[s] to be highly successful at breaking through clutter" (CX 236-I). Clutter refers to the other commercials that were shown respondents in this copy test (CX 236-E, I; Mazis Tr. 1012-13).

139. Sixteen percent of the respondents viewing "Black & White Back" gave an answer to an open-ended question that was coded as "Extra Strength" (CX 236-Z-71). The 16% of responses coded as "Extra Strength" were not included in the "Superiority over other products" coding category (see Peabody Tr. 619-22; Whitcup Tr. 2355).

(3) December 1990 ASI Copy Test Of The "Black & White Back" Ad

140. In December 1990, Ciba had a research company, ASI, conduct a copy test on the same "Black & White Back" commercial that was tested in the 1990 Bruno & Ridgeway Copy Test (Peabody Tr. 386-87; RX 98-A-Z-11). Consumer playback was measured 24 hours after exposure to the commercial through telephone interviews (Peabody Tr. 387-88).
141. The 1990 ASI Copy Test reported that only 3% of the 384 respondents questioned twenty-four hours after exposure to the "Black & White Back" commercial said that it communicated "product superiority" (Peabody Tr. 389; RX 98-H). Similarly, only 1% of respondents played back that Doan's was "more effective/works better" in comparison to other products (Peabody Tr. 390; RX 98-H).

142. Ciba believed that the ASI testing method is closer to a real world viewing situation than the Bruno & Ridgeway method, and, since it measures both communication and recall, that the data from the 1990 ASI Copy Test provided more reliable evidence of the effectiveness of the "Black & White Back" commercial than data from the 1990 Bruno & Ridgeway Copy Test (Peabody Tr. 392, 394-95).

(4) The Bruno & Ridgeway Copy Test Of The "Ruin A Night's Sleep" Ad

143. In October 1991, Bruno & Ridgeway copy tested the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" and "Car Bed" ads (CX 7; CX 17; CX 244-B; Peabody Tr. 185) to determine which of the ads best communicated consumers' response to the new Doan's P.M., a line extension product aimed at people who suffered nighttime back pain (Peabody Tr. 396-97).

144. This copy test used the mall intercept procedure, and it targeted nighttime back pain sufferers/treaters within the past 6 months, aged 25-60, one-half of whom who had ever used Doan's (CX 243-A-C; CX 244-B; CX 245-H; Peabody Tr. 186-87).

145. Respondents were asked open-ended questions and a close-ended question (CX 243-D; Mazis Tr. 1033).

146. Approximately 25% of consumers gave answers that were coded "superiority over other products," a result which Dr. Mazis testified was quite high for open-ended questions. This superiority coding included such responses as "works better than others," "Better than Tylenol," "Better than Advil," "Better than Bayer" (Mazis Tr. 1039-40).

147. Four percent of the respondents reported that the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ad communicated that Doan's "is the best brand for back pain versus other brands" (Peabody Tr. 405; CX 244-V) and Mr. Peabody claimed that the rest of the 25% superiority playback was linked to the presence of the second sleep ingredient in Doan's
P.M. which was not available in formulations offered by Doan’s competitors (Peabody Tr. 405-06).

(5) 1991 ARS Copy Test Of "Ruin A Night's Sleep"

148. In 1991, ARS (F 159) tested the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" commercial and found that only 2% of the 165 backache sufferers reported 72 hours after exposure that it communicated that Doan’s was "effective/works/better" and four percent of these respondents reported that the commercial communicated "good product/better/best" (Peabody Tr. 411; RX 89-Z-20). Of the 81 nighttime backache sufferers/treaters included in the test, 7% reported that the commercial communicated "good product/better/best" (Peabody Tr. 412; RX 89-Z-20).

149. In addition, there were no respondents in the 1991 ARS Copy Test who recalled that "Ruin A Night's Sleep" communicated that Doan’s P.M. had a "unique combination of ingredients/pain relieving medicine that Advil, Tylenol & Bayer don’t have" (Peabody Tr. 414-15; RX 89-P, R, S, T, U).

(6) The 1993 ARS Copy Test Of "Black & White Pan Rev. 15"

150. In 1993, Ciba asked ARS to conduct a copy test of the proposed "Black & White Pan Rev. 15" commercial (Peabody Tr. 436; RX 32-A-Z-33). The ARS testing methodology measures the "persuasion" of a proposed commercial on a scale of one to seven. A score of zero to two is called "inelastic" and predicts a zero percent chance of the proposed advertising generating sales (Peabody Tr. 416-18; Stewart Tr. 3522). A score of two to four is called "low elasticity" and indicates that there is only a small possibility that the advertisement will increase sales (Peabody Tr. 418). A score of four to seven is called "moderate elasticity" and predicts a 50% chance of positive sales response from the advertising (Peabody Tr. 417).

151. Dr. Stewart testified that the ARS persuasion score was a "perfectly appropriate measure" for Ciba to rely upon in determining the effectiveness of its advertising campaign (Stewart Tr. 3516).

152. "Black & White Pan Rev. 15" scored in the low elasticity range of 2.3 to 3.7 on the ARS persuasion scale (Peabody Tr. 437; RX 32-F). Despite this, Ciba ran the "Black & White Pan Rev. 15" commercial (Peabody Tr. 437).
153. In addition to poor persuasion scores, 4% of the 163 male and female back pain sufferers who viewed "Black & White Pan Rev. 15" recalled that the commercial communicated "good product/better/best" (Peabody Tr. 438; RX 32-Y). Because playback of "good product" does not necessarily connote superiority, Mr. Peabody testified that the 4% figure overestimated the playback of a more effective claim in the 1993 ARS Copy Test (Peabody Tr. 438-39).

154. One percent of respondents recalled that "Black & White Pan Rev. 15" communicated that Doan's "contains a back pain relieving medicine that no leading analgesic product has" (Peabody Tr. 440; RX 32-M).

(7) The 1994 ARS Copy Test Of "Activity–Playtime"

155. In 1994, Ciba had ARS conduct a copy test of the proposed "Activity–Playtime" commercial. The persuasion scores for it were "abysmally low," i.e., in the 1.5 to 2.1 inelastic range (Peabody Tr. 429; RX 33-J). According to ARS studies, a score in this range would not have any positive impact on Doan's sales (Stewart Tr. 3514).

156. Nevertheless, Ciba decided to run this commercial because the "prior ad we had been running I think at this point was worn out, was equally as ineffective as this one" (Peabody Tr. 429).

157. In addition to the "abysmal" persuasion scores, only 4% of the 201 male and female backache sufferers who viewed the "Activity–Playtime" commercial recalled -- 72 hours after exposure -- that the commercial communicated "works/effective/more effective" (Peabody Tr. 433; RX 33-Z-4). Three percent of these respondents recalled that the commercial communicated "good product/better/best" (Peabody Tr. 434; RX 33-Z-4).

158. Less than ½ % of respondents recalled that "Activity–Playtime" communicated that Doan's "has an ingredient other pain relievers don't have" (Peabody Tr. 435; RX 33-Z-5). Less than ½ % of respondents recalled the commercial communicating that Doan's "has a special ingredient others don't have" (Peabody Tr. 435-36; RX 33-Z-5).

(8) The 1995 ARS Copy Test Of "Muscles"

159. In late March and early April 1995, ARS, an independent consumer research provider, implemented a 72-hour delayed recall
test of the "Muscles" ad (CX 11, 23) (CX 265; Peabody Tr. 191). ARS testing is done in a theater-type setting where respondents are pre-recruited to watch two pilot television shows. Prior to viewing the program, respondents are given a depiction of various products in each category in which the brands whose advertisements will be tested compete, and are asked to select one from each product category with the promise that one person will win their selections. They then view the program material, which is interspersed with pods of ads. At the end of the program, the product selection task is done again, with the promise that another respondent will win the products they select (Peabody Tr. 191-93; Stewart Tr. 3450-51).

160. An ARS test includes a total of 12 ads in the one hour of programming shown. The remaining 11 ads are in product categories unrelated to the ad being tested (CX 265-Z-23; Peabody Tr. 194).

161. From the data it obtains comparing the respondents' product selections made before and after exposure to the programming material and ads, ARS calculates a persuasion score for each ad tested. In making this calculation, ARS takes additional factors into account, such as the number of competitors in the product category and the degree of brand switching in that category. Positive scores are interpreted to mean that the ad will have a net persuasive affect (Stewart Tr. 3450-52; Peabody Tr. 191-93).

162. Seventy-two hours after the ARS test is conducted, respondents are recontacted by telephone. If they can remember an ad for the tested product and give some correct playback from that ad, they are considered to be a "related recaller" of the ad (Peabody Tr. 193; CX 265-Z-23). For evaluative purposes, ARS also provides a "norm" related recall score, which is an average calculated from scores obtained for all ads tested by ARS in the category in which the brand competes (Stewart Tr. 3452-53; see CX 265-L). The ARS "norm" against which the Doan's ads were compared was 23%+ related recall, i.e., whether 23% or more of the respondents recalled the ad and gave some correct playback from it (CX 265-L). Recall above that level was viewed as more memorable than the average ad for the category, which is calculated mostly from 30-second ads. Dr. Stewart acknowledged that "Muscles," as well as "Black & White Back" and "Activity Playtime," although persuasive, were not memorable (Stewart Tr. 3449, 3452-53).
163. The persuasion scores for "Muscles" were in the low elasticity range with a low likelihood of generating a positive sales response (Peabody Tr. 441-42).

164. The results reported by ARS for the sample of "male and female back pain sufferers in past year" in the "Muscles" ad test was based upon the entire sample of 143 such respondents. Of that sample, 45% had any related recall of the tested ad and 8% were coded as having said "superiority" was a claim conveyed by the ad (CX 265-M; Peabody Tr. 196; Mazis Tr. 1064-65). As a percentage of the related recallers, however, 18% of the recalling sample took away the "superiority" claim (Mazis Tr. 1065-66; see Peabody Tr. 196).

(9) Doan's FSI Mail Panel Communication Test

165. In January 1991, Market Facts, an independent consumer research provider, undertook a communication study of several Doan's FSI's using its mail panel research methodology (CX 238; Peabody Tr. 207-15; CX 502 at 47-49 [Wright Dep.]).

166. The respondents who were surveyed by Market Facts had previously completed a mail panel questionnaire inquiring about backaches and how they are treated (CX 238-Z-126; Peabody Tr. 209). The survey was mailed to the members of the Market Facts mail panel with instructions to give the questionnaire to the person in the household who had completed the previous backache related questionnaire (CX 238-Z-126; Peabody Tr. 208-09). No verification procedure was undertaken to ensure that the individual completing this questionnaire was identical to the one who completed the earlier questionnaire (Peabody Tr. 209-10).

167. One purpose of the mail panel study was to determine the communication effect of five FSI's (CX 502 at 47-48 [Wright Dep.]). Question 5 of the questionnaire asked respondents to rate their agreement or disagreement with a list of statements on a five-point scale, "Based on what this offer [FSI] said about Doan's" (CX 238-Z-128). One of those statements was: "Is better for back pain than other pain relievers" (id.).

168. The results of question 5 for the statement "Is better for back pain than other pain relievers" were presented at CX 238-Z-71 (Peabody Tr. 214-15). For an FSI that was identical to CX 32-A and nearly identical to CX 29-J and CX 29-Z-4 (CPF 165), 47.4% of the
respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that the FSI made that claim (CX 238-Z-71; see Peabody Tr. 212-13).

169. For FSI's that were substantially similar to CX 29-U and 29-W (CPF 165), 51.5% and 59.0%, respectively, of the respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that the FSI's made the superior efficacy claim (CX 238-Z-71; see Peabody Tr. 207-08, 213-14).

b. Dr. Mazis’ Copy Test

170. U.S. Research, Inc. ("USR") conducted a mall intercept copy test designed by Dr. Mazis to determine if two of the challenged ads communicated the superiority claim. The Doan’s ads tested were "Activity–Playtime" (CX 10) and an FSI entitled "Why treat general aches? Back pain needs the back specialist" (CX 53). Dr. Mazis’ use of an FSI was appropriate because it contained an ad message as well as a coupon (Mazis Tr. 976, 1902, 2034-35).

171. The copy test used the "funneling" technique: it asked open-ended questions followed by filtering questions to focus the questioning and minimize guessing, and then close-ended questions (Mazis Tr. 1084-90). The test also used a screener, a main questionnaire, and, to eliminate bias, control ads and control questions (Mazis Tr. 1077, 1087, 1090; CX 419-K-Z-8).

172. USR pretested the main questionnaire to determine if any of the questions were confusing. Some changes were made to the questionnaire (Kloc Tr. 671, 708). USR also validated the test to ensure that there was no interviewer misconduct or cheating (Mazis Tr. 1128).

173. USR’s coding department developed proposed codes after review of a portion of the open-ended questions. The codes were developed by professional coders at USR, each of whom had between six and twenty years of experience as coders. To develop the codes, the coders took samplings from each of the open-ended questions to ascertain the thoughts and ideas that respondents gave to those particular questions (Kloc Tr. 694-98). They then combined similar thoughts into categories and created a list of proposed codes. The proposed codes were then reviewed by Dr. Mazis (Mazis Tr. 1069).

174. Dr. Mazis’ universe was comprised of men and women, twenty-five to seventy years old who had suffered back pain in the last six months and treated it with an OTC analgesic (CX 419-F;
Mazis Tr. 1070-71). His universe matched target audiences defined by Ciba (see JX 2 ¶ 27).

175. Dr. Mazis chose control ads (F 126) for analgesics which focused on back pain and excluded ads that made or implied superiority claims (Mazis Tr. 1079). He decided not to use a Doan's ad purged of superiority features, as did Dr. Jacoby in his study (Mazis Tr. 1079, 1370-72; Jacoby Tr. 2948-49).

176. The control ads were a Motrin TV commercial and an FSI for Nuprin (CX 540; CX 545).

177. The control ads did not include any references to "Extra Strength" while the Doan's ads did, but this language was unlikely to communicate a superiority claim since it was hardly visible in the tested TV ad (Mazis Tr. 1919-20). Furthermore, the "extra strength" language does not carry with it, in most cases, a superiority message (CX 419-Z-76). (See F 129, 130, 193.)

178. Dr. Mazis' copy test gradually filtered out those respondents who did not have anything relevant to offer, then asked the qualifying respondents a series of open-ended and close-ended questions (Mazis Tr. 1084-90).

179. USR tabulated the results of each open-ended question separately (Kloc Tr. 704; see CX 419-Z-29-37, Z-39-47, Z-49-55, Z-59-63). It also netted the results of all three open-ended questions for each coding category (Kloc Tr. 705-06; Mazis Tr. 1091-92). This "total ad communication" tabulation lists the total number of respondents who gave a particular response to the open-ended questions, without any double counting (Kloc Tr. 705-06).

180. For each of the two challenged ads shown to respondents in Dr. Mazis's copy test, the following is the percentage who responded in their own words to the open-ended questions (which may understate the total communication (Whitcup Tr. 2829-30)), that the ads communicated that Doan's is more effective than other pain relievers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Activity-Playtime&quot;</td>
<td>56.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Why treat general aches?&quot; FSI</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Q2: "What does the commercial state or imply about Doan’s?")
(Q3b: "What reason or reasons does the commercial state for buying Doan’s?")
(Q4b: "What does the commercial state or imply about Doan’s in comparison to other pain relievers?")

181. If the results of only the first two, broadest open-ended questions are tabulated, the following is the percentage of consumers who responded that the tested ads communicated that Doan's is more effective than other pain relievers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Open-ended communication of superior efficacy based on Q2 and Q3b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Activity–Playtime&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Why treat general aches?&quot; FSI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mazis Tr. 1095-96). The open-ended responses that were coded as "more effective" for back pain included responses coded that Doan's was "better overall" or "better than other pain relievers" (RX 128-D-E; Mazis Tr. 1915-18). Respondents' expert, Dr. Jacoby, also coded "best/better" and "better than other pain relievers" to mean superior efficacy for back pain, since back pain is the subject of the ads (Jacoby Tr. 3063; Mazis Tr. 1920). This is the standard manner in which to code these responses in the context of these ads (Mazis Tr. 1920-21).

182. The magnitude of the superiority responses given in response to the open-ended questions in Dr. Mazis’ copy test is extremely high and is consistent with data from the copy tests respondents performed in the ordinary course of business on other challenged ads and FSI’s (Mazis Tr. 1093, 1096-97).

183. For each of the two challenged ads shown to respondents in Dr. Mazis’ copy test, the following is the percentage of consumers who responded that the advertisement conveyed that Doan’s was more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief in response to close-ended question 5a:
Total close-ended communication of superior efficacy based on Q5a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>73.3%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Activity–Playtime&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Why treat general aches?&quot; FSI</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mazis Tr. 1098-99; CX 419-Z-56).

(Q. 5a: "Does the ad state or imply that Doan’s is more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain relief?")

184. To control for beliefs consumers might have that all back pain claims are akin to superiority claims and for yea saying bias, Dr. Mazis first subtracted the "yea saying" responses (consumers who responded "yes" to 5b, the headache control question) ("Does the ad state or imply that the product is more effective than other OTC products for headaches?") from the total percentage of consumers who took away a "more effective" claim from the test and control ads in response to question 5a. Dr. Mazis then subtracted the result of this calculation for the control ad from the result obtained for the test ad. The use of this double control procedure provides a conservative estimate of the superiority communication conveyed by close-ended question 5a (Mazis Tr. 1087, 1100-01).

185. The superiority playback of the tested ads from the close-ended question 5a, net of controls, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>58.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Activity–Playtime&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Why treat general aches?&quot; FSI</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Mazis Tr. 1100). This magnitude of results confirms that consumers take the challenged superiority claims from these ads (Mazis Tr. 1092).
c. Dr. Jacoby's Copy Test

186. Dr. Jacoby designed a survey on behalf of respondents for the purposes of this litigation (RX 5) which measured, in separate sections, both beliefs about Doan's and the communication of selected Doan's ads (Jacoby Tr. 2962, 2971). The belief portion of this study is discussed below. The copy testing portion of Dr. Jacoby's study measured the communication of two challenged Doan's ads, "Activity-Playtime" and "Muscles." Complaint counsel challenge Dr. Jacoby's conclusion with respect to close-ended question 8(a) ("Based on what the commercial said, showed or suggested, would you say that when it comes to relieving back pain, the advertised brand is as effective, less effective, or more effective than other brands") (RX 5-Z-61) because of "priming" by question 1(d) ("Do you believe any of the brands [of analgesics] that you mentioned [in response to questions 1a-c] is more effective for back pain than any of the other brands you mentioned") (RX 5-Z-57).

187. "Priming" refers to information given or concepts raised in earlier questions in an interview that sensitize respondents to that issue and result in respondents providing that information or concept as an answer to a later question only because they had been primed to think about it by the prior question (Mazis Tr. 1109; Jacoby Tr. 3217-18).

188. Complaint counsel claim that question 1d primed respondents to answer question 8a with the "more effective" response, with the result that the superiority claim playback could have been inflated (Mazis Tr. 1109).

189. Complaint counsel's argument may be valid, but the most significant aspect of Dr. Jacoby's study is the responses to its open-ended questions which provide the most reliable measure of ad communication that can be extracted from it (Mazis Tr. 1108-10). These questions asked for the main idea of the tested ad (Q6a) and what other points or ideas the ad communicated (Q6b).

190. These results provide reasonably reliable data which support the conclusion that the superior efficacy claim was conveyed to consumers by the "Activity-Playtime" and "Muscles" ads.

191. The data reported in RX 5 shows that 35% of the respondents who viewed the "Activity-Playtime" ad took the superior efficacy claim from it based upon their responses to the two open-
ended questions (RX 5-Z-123; Jacoby Tr. 3063-64; Mazis Tr. 1111-12). Dr. Jacoby characterized that figure as "high" (Jacoby Tr. 3065).

192. The data reported in RX 5 shows that 19% of the respondents who viewed the "Muscles" ad took the superior efficacy claim from it based upon their responses to the two open-ended questions (RX 5-Z-124; Mazis Tr. 1112).

193. In response to these open-ended questions (Questions 6a-b), only one percent of respondents exposed to the "Activity-Playtime" commercial played back a "strong/extra strength/need fewer" message, while 35% of respondents played back a superiority claim (RX 5-Z-123; Jacoby Tr. 3121-22; Mazis Tr. 1728-29). Similarly, after exposure to the challenged "Muscles" commercial, only 2% of respondents played back a "strong/extra strength/need fewer" message, while nineteen percent played back a superiority claim (RX 5-Z-124; Mazis Tr. 1728-29). These data indicate that the "Extra Strength" claim is not the reason respondents are taking a superiority message (see Mazis Tr. 1728, 1874, 1922).

194. Dr. Mazis undertook an independent review of the verbatims from the three open-ended questions (6a-b, 7d) in Dr. Jacoby’s copy test, adding a third category entitled "Faster" because these responses are properly included in the net superior efficacy take away (Mazis Tr. 1114).

195. Netting the three coding categories across the three open-ended communication questions yields a net superior efficacy take away of 47.9% for the "Activity-Playtime" ad and 22.1% for the "Muscles" ad (CX 453-C-D; Mazis Tr. 1114-15).

d. Mr. Lavidge’s Copy Test

196. Mr. Lavidge designed three studies on behalf of respondents for the purpose of this litigation (RX 23) which measured both the communication of certain Doan’s ads and beliefs about Doan’s (Lavidge Tr. 758-60). The belief portion of the studies is discussed below. The copy testing portion of Mr. Lavidge’s studies attempted to measure the communication of the challenged "Muscles" ad and the unchallenged "New Muscles - Male" ad, immediately after exposure and eleven days later (RX 23-E).

197. Mr. Lavidge’s three surveys were called Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3 (RX 23-E). Tests 1 and 2 were identical except with regard to the Doan’s ad shown; Test 1 showed the challenged "Muscles" ad and
Test 2 showed the modified, "New Muscles - Male" ad. Test 3 was identical in ad exposure to Test 1, but obtained its recall and belief measures between 10 and 12 days after that exposure (Lavidge Tr. 758-59).

198. In Tests 1, 2, and 3, respondents were exposed to advertising in the same way. The Doan’s ad of interest was included on a so-called "clutter tape" with three other 15-second ads for Bufferin, Advil, and Extra Strength Tylenol Aches & Strains (Lavidge Tr. 758, 844). Each of these ads only promoted the advertised analgesic for the treatment of back pain. These commercials were shown twice and in random order (Lavidge Tr. 776-77; RX 23-F). Prior to this study, Mr. Lavidge had never used the clutter tape methodology, a procedure which was necessary here because of the combination of the belief and communication studies (Lavidge Tr. 759-60, 844-46).

199. All of the ads on the clutter tapes were for OTC analgesics to treat back pain, an unusual procedure, for clutter ads never use a product in the same category as the tested ad (Mazis Tr. 1264-66; Peabody Tr. 175-77).

200. Mr. Lavidge and Mr. Peabody testified that they would not recommend the placement of a Doan’s ad in a group of other OTC ads because consumers would have difficulty recalling the Doan’s message (Peabody Tr. 156; Lavidge Tr. 849). Thus, their use in the copy test would confuse respondents (Mazis Tr. 1266; Lavidge Tr. 851) with the result that it would likely discourage ad recall (Mazis Tr. 1265-67) Test 3 also discouraged ad recall by delaying questioning until, on average, eleven days after exposure to the clutter tape (Mazis Tr. 1267).

201. Copy tests seeking to determine whether implied claims are made usually ask that question (Mazis Tr. 1269; Whitcup Tr. 2829). Mr. Lavidge’s communication question did not do so (Mazis Tr. 1064, 1269).

202. Tests 1, 2, and 3 did not employ close-ended ad communication questions; the result may have been to miss playback of all ad claims (Whitcup Tr. 2829; Mazis Tr. 1994).

203. The use of the clutter tapes, the eleven-day recall methodology in Test 3, the lack of close-ended communication questions and the failure to ask for implied claims, resulted in an understatement of the ads' communication of superiority claims (Mazis Tr. 1265-68).
F. Substantiation Of The Superiority Claim

204. According to accepted principles of scientific and medical practice, two well-controlled clinical studies are required to establish the therapeutic superiority of an OTC analgesic over competing OTC analgesics (JX 1 ¶ 6).

205. Although the Advisory Review Panel On OTC Internal Analgesic and Antirheumatic Products and the FDA concluded that magnesium salicylate is safe and effective for the treatment of backache and other pain (Peabody Tr. 313-14), the OTC Analgesic Monograph does not state that any approved analgesic ingredient is more effective for the relief of back pain than any other approved analgesic product (CX 415-A-Z-31).

206. No studies have been conducted regarding the efficacy of any Doan's product or the exact formulation contained in any Doan's product offered for sale to the public (JX 1 ¶ 8).

207. There are no specific studies demonstrating the therapeutic superiority of magnesium salicylate over aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, or naproxen sodium for the relief of back pain, or for any other approved OTC Analgesic Monograph indications (JX 1 ¶ 9).

208. Ciba's former Vice President of Marketing stated that there are no documents or studies in existence demonstrating that magnesium salicylate relieves back pain more effectively than acetaminophen, aspirin, ibuprofen or naproxen sodium (CX 584; see also CX 501 at 22 [Sloan Dep.]).

209. The only scientific review Ciba conducted prior to purchasing the Doan's brand was a review of FDA's OTC Analgesics Monograph (CX 501 at 25 [Sloan Dep.]).

210. Ciba's former Vice President of Marketing testified that during the time he was responsible for Doan's he knew that advertising claims required substantiation and that, while the OTC Analgesics Monograph was sufficient to support basic efficacy claims, superiority claims would require one or two well-controlled clinical studies (CX 501 at 27-28 [Sloan Dep.]). He also stated that he never saw any scientific evidence that Doan's was more effective than other analgesics (CX 501 at 22 [Sloan Dep.]).

211. In 1989, Ciba's legal counsel and the Marketing Manager for Doan's received a memorandum from Ciba's medical division stating that "clinical studies have shown that magnesium salicylate is an effective analgesic and is comparable to aspirin" and that "there are
no clinical studies of Doan's in combination with other over-the-counter medications" (CX 71-B; CX 519-A).

212. As part of the network review process, Ciba sometimes received comments from the TV networks that the way a claim was structured might imply superiority and requesting substantiation (CX 501 at 37 [Sloan Dep.]; CX 503 at 86-91 [Jackson Dep.]). Ciba did not provide the networks with substantiation for a superiority claim and, instead, revised its ads or withdrew them from consideration (see e.g., CX 166-A; CX 177-A-B; CX 212-A; CX 501 at 37 [Sloan Dep.]).

213. In a 1994 letter addressed to the then-Marketing Director for Doan's, Jordan McGrath's Senior Vice President responsible for Doan's stated:

Doan's cannot support product "superiority" ... nor can it deliver a unique or seemingly superior consumer benefit. Hence, it's a challenge for the advertising execution to compensate and persuasively deliver a dimension of competitive "news."

(CX 169-D; CX 504 at 136 [Schaler Dep.]).

214. In a "demo exploratory" document attached to a summary of discussions between Jordan McGrath and Ciba regarding creative strategy for 1995, the agency noted:

While we would like to imply that Doan's provides superior efficacy because of its unique ingredient, we cannot clinically support this since the other brands work equally as well as Doan's at relieving back pain.

(emphasis in original) (CX 147-J).

G. Materiality Of The Superiority Claim

215. Dr. Jacoby's study (RX 5) analyzed the impact which the ads "Activity–Playtime" and the old "Muscles" might have on respondents' [consumers'] future purchasing behavior (Jacoby Tr. 3053; RX 5-Z-112).

216. Specifically, after exposure to the commercials, Dr. Jacoby asked respondents the following questions: "Did seeing this commercial influence whether or not you would buy the advertised product in the future?"; "Did it make you more likely to buy this product, or less likely to buy this product?"; and "What is it about what the commercial said, showed or suggested that makes you more likely to buy it in the future?" (Jacoby Tr. 3055; RX 5-Z-112-13).
217. The percentage of consumers reporting that the test ad made them more likely to buy the advertised product were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity—Playtime</th>
<th>25%</th>
<th>Advil</th>
<th>28%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Muscles&quot; (challenged)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Tylenol Aches &amp; Strains</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Muscles&quot; (new &amp; not challenged)</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>(RX 5-Z to Z-8).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the measurements taken from these questions, the unchallenged Doan’s commercials exerted a slightly greater impact on respondents’ purchase decisions than the challenged "Activity—Playtime" and "Muscles" commercials (Jacoby Tr. 3057; RX 5-Z-112-13). The fact that the unchallenged Doan’s "Muscles" commercial actually exerted more impact on respondents' purchase behavior is especially telling according to Dr. Jacoby (Jacoby Tr. 3057-58). Similar to the comparison between the two "Muscles" commercials, the Tylenol control commercial had a greater impact on respondents' purchase decisions than any of the Doan’s commercials that were shown (Jacoby Tr. 3059-60; RX 5-Z-112).

218. Respondents were then asked what it was about the ad that made them more likely to buy (RX 5-Z-59). In response, only 2% out of 142 (2% of the 122 nonusers of Doan’s and 0% of the 20 users of Doan’s) who viewed the "Activity—Playtime" commercial attributed this reaction to a supposed claim in the ad that Doan’s "works better/best/more/most effective." Only 3% of the same group indicated that the positive impact on their purchase interest was due to "Activity—Playtime" saying that Doan’s had a "special/unique ingredient" (Jacoby Tr. 3058; RX 5-Z-114).

219. Two percent of the respondents who viewed the old "Muscles-Male" commercial indicated that the positive impact on their purchase interest was due to the commercial saying that Doan’s "works better/best/more/most effective" (Jacoby Tr. 3059; RX 5-Z-115). Two percent of the same group indicated that the positive impact on their purchase interest was due to old "Muscles" saying that Doan’s had a "special/unique ingredient" (Jacoby Tr. 3059; RX 5-Z-115).

220. Based on these measurements, Dr. Jacoby testified that any alleged more effective claim in the challenged Doan’s advertising did not have a positive impact on relevant consumers' interest in purchasing Doan’s (Jacoby Tr. 3061).
221. He also concluded that, to the extent that respondents in the Jacoby Study who indicated that the "Activity–Playtime" commercial communicated a more effective claim, the same respondents did not believe that such a claim would positively affect their purchase behavior (Jacoby Tr. 3338-42).

222. Of the 129 respondents who viewed the old "Muscles-Male" commercial, 4.7% reported that the commercial communicated a more effective claim and that the claim exerted a material impact on their purchase intentions (Jacoby Tr. 3341; RX 209-A). After controlling for noise by subtracting the response level from the new "Muscles-Male" commercial, the net amount of respondents who thought the old "Muscles-Male" commercial communicated a more effective claim that exerted a material impact on their purchase intentions was 1.9% (Jacoby Tr. 3341; RX 209-A).

223. Of the 142 respondents who viewed the "Activity-Playtime" commercial, 12.7% reported that the commercial communicated a more effective claim and that the claim exerted a material impact on their purchase intentions (Jacoby Tr. 3340; RX 209-A). After controlling for noise by subtracting the response level from the Tylenol control commercial, the net amount of respondents who thought that the "Activity–Playtime" commercial communicated a more effective claim that exerted a material impact on their purchase intentions was 7.9% (Jacoby Tr. 3341).

224. These data, according to Dr. Jacoby, demonstrate that even to the extent that consumers may have extracted a superior efficacy claim from the "Activity–Playtime" and old "Muscles-Male" commercials, the claims were not material (Jacoby Tr. 3342-43).

225. Furthermore, Mr. Peabody testified that the ARS persuasion scores for "Black and White Pan Rev. 15," "Activity–Playtime" and "Muscles" would not generate significant sales for Doan’s (Peabody Tr. 429, 437, 441-42).

226. Complaint counsel argue that the challenged ads were material because they involve information that is important to consumers and would likely affect their purchasing decisions.

227. Complaint counsel cite the following evidence in support of their claim:

The Bruno & Ridgeway copy test of "Graph" which found that the idea of "superiority" conveyed by the ad "seems to be an important and persuasive idea" to consumers (CX 224-L).
The conclusion of a market research company report discussing "Graph" which "appears to create the impression that Doan's may in fact be better than other brands, thereby promulgating a more favorable predisposition to trying Doan's" (CX 227-Z-3).

The Brand Equity study (CX 25a), (whose conclusions I reject (F 246)), shows that superior efficacy for back pain is an important attribute of OTC analgesics (Mazis Tr. 1618).

The fact that consumers were willing to pay a premium price for Doan's (F 15).

The 80% increase in Doan's dollar sales during the time the challenged ads were disseminated (JX 2 ¶ 17).

Despite the results of Dr. Jacoby's study, I am compelled by the strong presumption of materiality and the evidence cited by complaint counsel to find that the challenged ads were material.

H. The Need For Corrective Advertising

228. Complaint counsel's argument for the imposition of a corrective advertising order claims that: (1) there exists a misbelief about Doan's efficacy, (2) the misbelief was substantially created or reinforced by the challenged advertising, and (3) the misbelief is likely to linger unless respondents are compelled to engage in an advertising campaign which will correct the misapprehension created by Doan's eight year advertising campaign.

229. Complaint counsel argue that the need for corrective advertising can be inferred. They also cite three extrinsic "belief" studies -- the 1987 A&U study, the Brand Equity study, and the NFO study, in support of their argument.

230. Respondents, on the other hand, cite "advertising penetration data" as well as consumer belief studies conducted by Mr. Lavidge and Drs. Jacoby and Whitcup which, they say, lead to the conclusion that corrective advertising is not an appropriate remedy in this case.

1. The Impression Created By Doan's Ads

   a. Ordinary Course Of Business Studies

      (1) The ASI and ARS Tests

231. The 1990 ASI and 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995 ARS copy tests revealed low 24 (ASI) and 72 (ARS) hour recall (2% to 8%) by respondents of a "more effective" or "good product/better/best" message (F 140, 148, 150, 155, 159).
232. Dr. Jacoby testified that if only a small percent of consumers recall a "more effective" or "good product/better/best" message within one to three days after exposure to a commercial in a test environment, it shows the absence of any widespread lingering misimpression by consumers (Jacoby Tr. 2996-97).

(2) The 1987 Attitude And Usage Study

233. In June and July 1987, Arbor, Inc., an independent consumer research provider, conducted an attitude and usage study ("A&U study") by telephone for Doan's among adults who were back pain sufferers (CX 221-I; Peabody Tr. 134). The A&U study was undertaken shortly after Ciba purchased the Doan's brand and was conducted to help Ciba understand the product category in which Doan's competed, to determine consumer awareness of the Doan's brand, and to determine the imagery and beliefs analgesic users held for Doan's and the brands with which it competed (CX 221-H; Peabody Tr. 133, 287; Mazis Tr. 979).

234. Question 22 of this study asked respondents to rate each of three selected brands of which they were aware on a list of 14 attributes, including one which stated "Is the most effective pain reliever you can buy for backaches" (CX 221-Z-120; Mazis Tr. 989-90; Peabody Tr. 141).

235. The mean results of respondents' ratings of the four brands (using a 1-7 scale) on the attribute "Is the most effective pain reliever you can buy for backaches" were: Doan's, 4.4; Extra-Strength Tylenol, 5.1; Advil, 4.8; Bayer, 4.2 (CX 221-Z-72). These ratings provide a measure of back pain sufferers/treaters' perceptions about the four brands on that attribute as of the time of the study (Peabody Tr. 141). They show that Doan's was rated below Extra-Strength Tylenol and Advil and about the same as Bayer on this attribute (id. at 143).

236. Ciba's marketing research department's analysis of the A&U study results concluded that "Extra-Strength Tylenol is clearly the gold standard for backache pain relief followed by Advil. Bayer and Doan's are consistently perceived weakest" (CX 221-C). That conclusion was based, in part, on the attribute rating for "Is the most effective pain reliever you can buy for backaches" (Peabody Tr. 144). The marketing research department further concluded that "Doan's has a weak image in comparison to the leading brands of analgesics
and would benefit from positioning itself as a more effective product that is strong enough for the types of backaches sufferers usually get" (CX 221-C-D).

237. The results of the Doan's A&U study were used to help create new Doan's advertising. The first new Doan's ad that was created and disseminated after Ciba's receipt of the Doan's A&U study results was the "Graph" ad (Peabody Tr. 146).

(3) The Brand Equity Study

238. In July 1993, five years after the ad campaign at issue in this case began, CLT Research Associates, Inc., an independent consumer research company, implemented a research project called the Brand Equity study for Ciba. The study was conducted, in part, to help Ciba understand the strengths and weaknesses of the Doan's brand and establish the current equity and brand image of Doan's compared to its competitors in the backache market (CX 256-C; Peabody Tr. 217; Mazis Tr. 1042).

239. One purpose of the Brand Equity study was to evaluate how Doan's was perceived on a set of attributes compared to other analgesics used to treat back pain (Mazis Tr. 1042; see CX 259-B-C).

240. Question 2b of the study used an answer booklet (CX 259-B; CX 260) which consisted of a list of the 21 attributes and a grid of six boxes adjacent to each of the attributes (CX 260-B). The left hand box was labeled "Unacceptable, brand couldn't be worse," the right hand box was labeled "Ideal, nothing could make brand better," and in the middle above the dividing line between the third and fourth box was the label "Good" (id.). Respondents were asked to rate each of a group of analgesic products they were aware of for the treatment of back pain on each of the 21 attributes using this grid (Peabody Tr. 222-23; Mazis Tr. 1047).

241. The report of the Brand Equity study does not contain a detailed discussion of the results of question 2b (Mazis Tr. 1048-49). That data was contained in CX 486 and CX 507, which were massive printouts of the Brand Equity data. CX 480 contains a summary of some of the data obtained from question 2b, taken from those computer printouts.

242. The data in CX 480 is presented separately for users and aware non-users of Doan's, Extra-Strength Tylenol, Advil, and Motrin IB. This is appropriate since it takes account of the "usage
effect" *i.e.*, the tendency of users to rate a product higher than do non-users (Mazis Tr. 992, 1055, 1158).

243. The data for both users and aware non-users in CX 480 is presented both in terms of "top box" results and "top two box" results. Top box results are the percentages of respondents giving the highest rating to the product. In this case, top box refers to the proportion marking the boxes labeled "Ideal, nothing could make brand better." Top two box results are the percentage of individuals who selected either the "Ideal" rating or the box to its immediate left. Hypothetically, if the scale were rated from one to six with the "Ideal" box given a rating of six, the top two box figures reflect the percentage of respondents who rated a product with either a five or a six (Mazis Tr. 1051).

244. The following are the ratings of users of the products on the attribute "Being particularly effective for back pain":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Doan's</th>
<th>ES Tylenol</th>
<th>Advil</th>
<th>Motrin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Box</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Box</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CX 480-A-B).

245. The following are the ratings of aware non-users of the products on the attribute "Being particularly effective for back pain":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Doan's</th>
<th>ES Tylenol</th>
<th>Advil</th>
<th>Motrin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top Box</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top Two Box</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CX 480-C-D).

246. Dr. Mazis testified that the attribute "Being particularly effective for back pain" is similar to the attribute "Is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief" (Mazis Tr. 1058). I disagree. "Particularly effective for back pain" probably reflects consumers' association of Doan's with back pain relief. It does not necessarily imply equivalence to the phrase "more effective" and this study, therefore, is not probative on the issue of belief.
b. The NFO Belief Study

247. NFO is a marketing research company which provides mail panel research. Mail panel research involves mailing research instruments to individuals, who have previously agreed to serve as survey respondents, for them to complete and return to NFO by mail. Over 500,000 households participate in NFO research projects (Clarke Tr. 8-9).

248. NFO conducts over 3,000 consumer research studies annually using the mail panel methodology for major corporate clients, including 45 of the top 100 companies listed in the Fortune 500 (Clarke Tr. 9). Its research includes tracking studies, consumer attitude studies, advertising studies, concept studies, etc. These corporate clients, including Ciba and Novartis, rely on mail panel research by NFO and its competitors to make business decisions (Clarke Tr. 10; Peabody Tr. 203, 520-21, 196-98, 206-07, 215).

249. A NFO multi-card survey is an omnibus mailing of various questionnaires to a large group of panelists (Clarke Tr. 10). NFO mailed a multi-card questionnaire to 40,000 households (8 panels) in October 1996 on behalf of complaint counsel (Clarke Tr. 10-14; CX 420-H) and prepared a report tabulating the results of that survey (CX 420). The multi-card survey was intended to identify back pain sufferers/treaters who were Doan's users or aware non-users who could be sent a follow-up questionnaire to determine whether they held the belief that Doan's was more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief (Mazis Tr. 1118; Clarke Tr. 14).

250. None of the additional survey questionnaires that were included in the multi-card mailout with complaint counsel's questionnaire related to OTC medications or pain-related products. NFO received 30,025 completed questionnaires of the 40,000 mailed out (Clarke Tr. 18-20; CX 420-H).

251. Dr. Mazis decided to employ a mail panel to screen for Doan's users and aware non-users because it is a very cost effective method by which to locate users of a niche product like Doan's (Mazis Tr. 1117-18; Clarke Tr. 11; Peabody Tr. 518). Dr. Mazis has had experience using mail panel research and he has found it to provide useful and reliable results (Mazis Tr. 1119).

252. The survey, which was designed by Dr. Mazis (Tr. 1117), used a screening questionnaire to exclude respondents who did not meet the criteria established by him. An identical screening process
was used in Doan's Brand Equity study (Mazis Tr. 1117-20; CX 258-C). Telephone validation of the NFO screening questionnaire was not conducted because there was no interviewer in this mail panel who might engage in misconduct (Mazis Tr. 1128).

253. In December 1996, NFO conducted a follow-up study for complaint counsel to assess beliefs of Doan's users and aware non-users (CX 421-H; Clarke Tr. 32; Mazis Tr. 1121-22, 1129). The sample of this survey consisted of 400 Doan's users and 400 Doan's aware non-users selected on a random basis from the larger population of both groups identified in the multi-card screening survey (Mazis Tr. 1130; Clarke Tr. 34-35). Dr. Mazis excluded consumers unaware of Doan's from his study because they do not hold any opinions about the product (Mazis Tr. 1122). Mr. Peabody confirmed the importance of obtaining data from users of Doan's (Peabody Tr. 377, 398).

254. At the time he designed the NFO belief study, Dr. Mazis planned to analyze the data that he obtained by comparing the belief measures of (1) users of Doan's to users of other analgesics for back plain relief, and (2) aware non-users of Doan's to aware non-users of other analgesics. The purpose of such matched comparisons was to take into account and control for the usage effect (Mazis Tr. 1129, 1158, 1199-1201). Novartis' expert statistician agreed that this sort of paired analysis is appropriate and necessary to remove the impact of the usage effect (Jaccard Tr. 1527-28; accord Lavidge Tr. 879).

255. The belief questionnaire presented to the respondents ten attribute statements, including "Is more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain relief" (CX 421-Z-12; Mazis Tr. 1131) as well as "Has an ingredient for back pain" and "Is just for back pain." The remaining belief statements were included so as not to focus undue attention on the belief measures of interest, resulting in a list which was unbiased (Mazis Tr. 1134-35).

256. About 20% of respondents gave inconsistent answers, agreeing that the same product was both just for headaches and just for back pain, but Dr. Jaccard agreed that this was no cause for concern about responses to other survey questions (Jaccard Tr. 1539).

257. NFO's analysis of its belief study (CX 421-N-W) was recalculated by Dr. Mazis to exclude those respondents (38) who were unaware of any analgesic other than Doan's. This made the results of the NFO study more balanced (CX 481; Mazis Tr. 1139-40).
258. The results for three belief statements, "Is more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain relief," "Has an ingredient especially for back pain," and "Is just for back pain" are summarized in CX 482 (Mazis Tr. 1147-51). That summary contains an aggregation of the percentages of respondents who agreed with each of those belief statements for each product by combining the data for the "strongly agree," "agree," and "somewhat agree" responses (id. at 1148). That data is reported both for users of each product and for aware non-users of each product (CX 482). The results for the belief statement "Is more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain relief" are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Doan's</th>
<th>Advil</th>
<th>Aleve</th>
<th>Bayer</th>
<th>Motrin</th>
<th>Tylenol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Users</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Users</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CX 482).

259. Users of a brand tend to have more favorable beliefs about brands they use. It is inappropriate to look at the overall ratings for each brand by the whole sample regardless of usage, because usage behavior can exert influences on perceptions (Jaccard Tr. 1528). To account for this usage effect, one must compare the beliefs of users of Doan's to the beliefs of users of the other brands. Similarly, the beliefs of Doan's aware non-users must be compared to the beliefs of aware non-users of the other brands. Dr. Mazis conducted a statistical analysis of the NFO data to account for the usage effect.

260. For each of the five comparison analgesic products, Advil, Aleve, Bayer, Motrin, and Tylenol, Dr. Mazis' analysis looked at the subgroup of individuals who used that brand and Doan's ("joint users") (CX 424-A-Z-25; CX 422-A-F; Mazis Tr. 1158-59). Then, for each set of joint users of Doan's and a comparison product, he compared those individuals' beliefs about Doan's to their beliefs about that comparison product (a "user-to-user comparison"). For example, one of the analyses looked at individuals in the NFO sample who used both Advil and Doan's and compared their beliefs about Advil to their beliefs about Doan's (Mazis Tr. 1159-61). A similar analysis was done for each set of joint users (e.g., Aleve and Doan's joint users) (Mazis Tr. 1158-59, 1199-1201). Dr. Mazis conducted a
similar analysis for aware non-users (CX 424-A-Z-25; CX 422-A-F; Mazis Tr. 1159).

261. Dr. Mazis' analysis focused on whether respondents agreed or did not agree that a brand they rated "is more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain relief." If the respondent either "strongly agreed," "agreed," or "somewhat agreed" on the seven-point scale, they were treated as an "agreer." If he or she "strongly disagreed," "disagreed," "somewhat disagreed," or "neither agreed or disagreed," that respondent was treated as a "non-agreer." The analysis concentrated on the percentages or proportions of joint users and joint aware non-users "agreeing" that a product was more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics (Mazis Tr.1162-63).

262. The following table presents the percentages of joint users who agreed that Doan's or another of the five comparison brands was more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Among joint users of both Doan's and comparison brand</th>
<th>Doan's is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief</th>
<th>Comparison brand is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief</th>
<th>Difference in % agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Advil</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Aleve</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Bayer</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Motrin</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Tylenol</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CX 424-Z-16-20; CX 422-E-F; see Mazis Tr. 1171-73).

263. On average, the proportions of joint users agreeing that Doan's is more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics is 26% higher than the proportions agreeing that the other brands are more effective (Mazis Tr.1173-74).

264. The following table presents the percentages of joint aware non-users who agreed that Doan's or another of the five comparison brands was more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief.
Among those aware of both Doan's and comparison brand but who use neither

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparison brand relievers for back pain relief</th>
<th>Doan's is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief</th>
<th>Difference in % agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Advil</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Aleve</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Bayer</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Motrin</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doan's &amp; Tylenol</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(CX 424-Z-16-20; CX 422-E-F; Mazis Tr. 1175-76).

265. On average, the proportions of joint aware non-users agreeing that Doan's is more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics was 20% higher than the proportions agreeing that the other brands were more effective (Mazis Tr. 1176).

266. Dr. Mazis conducted a statistical analysis to determine whether the differences in beliefs about Doan’s and other brands could have occurred by chance (Mazis Tr. 1178-81).

267. A statistical significance test determines whether the "null hypothesis" of no real difference is rejected. For example, in this case the null hypothesis might be that the proportion of joint users who believe Doan's is superior for back pain is not different than the proportion believing other brands superior. If the null hypothesis is rejected, one concludes that the observed difference is real and did not occur by chance (Mazis Tr. 1178-81; Jaccard Tr. 1421-22).

268. Usually, statistical analysis accepts a result, i.e., rejects the null hypothesis, when the likelihood of that result occurring by chance is less than five percent (Mazis Tr. 1178-79, 1181; Jaccard Tr. 1489). This is referred to as a "p value" of less than .05 (Mazis Tr. 1178-79). The p value is also known as an "alpha level" (Jaccard Tr. 1488-89). Dr. Mazis used .05 as the p value for his analysis of the NFO belief study data (Mazis Tr. 1182).

269. Dr. Mazis's analysis of the NFO belief study data used a "two-tailed" statistical significance test to measure the p value rather than a "one-tailed" approach (Mazis Tr. 1180; Jaccard Tr. 1487).
270. A "two-tailed" test is equally concerned about a difference in either direction, e.g., whether the percentage of joint users believing Doan's is superior is statistically significantly higher or lower than the percentage believing that the other product is superior (Mazis Tr. 1182). A "one-tailed" test is only concerned with a difference in one pre-determined direction (Mazis Tr. 1183; Jaccard Tr. 1486).

271. A two-tailed test is more conservative than a one-tailed test because using the former makes it more difficult to achieve a p value of .05 or less and, therefore, more difficult to conclude that there is a real difference (Mazis Tr. 1180-81; Jaccard Tr. 1488).

272. Because the issue in this proceeding is only whether there is a disproportionate belief that Doan's is more effective, a one-tailed test would have been appropriate (Mazis Tr. 1183). Dr. Jaccard agreed that the hypothesis at issue is concerned only with a result in that one direction and testified that it might be appropriate to use a one-tailed test to analyze the NFO data (Jaccard Tr. 1485-88).

273. Dr. Mazis calculated that all of the observed differences in the user-to-user comparison for the attribute "more effective for back pain" were statistically significant at the .05 level, as were the p values for four of the five aware non-user to aware non-user comparisons for the attribute "more effective for back pain" (CX 424-Z-16-20; CX 422-E-F; Mazis Tr. 1187-89; Jaccard Tr. 1496-98).

274. Dr. Mazis also analyzed the NFO data by applying the so-called Bonferroni adjustment to correct for experiment-wise error which may occur when statistical analyses involve hypotheses based on multiple statistical tests (Mazis Tr. 1190-94). Even after making these adjustments, the results were not that much different than in his other analysis (Mazis Tr. 1195-96).

275. There is often more than one acceptable statistical model for analyzing a data set (Mazis Tr. 1163; Jaccard Tr. 1484). Dr. Mazis used a repeated measures loglinear statistical analysis to analyze the NFO belief study data (Mazis Tr. 1157). Dr. Jaccard, who has used the loglinear approach to analyze data in his research, reanalyzed the NFO belief study data using a statistical analysis based on the general linear model which makes the assumption that the distribution of the difference scores has "normal" bell-shaped distribution (Mazis Tr. 1166-67; Jaccard Tr. 1484). If the data are not normally
distributed, the results of an analysis based on the general linear model may be unreliable (Jaccard Tr. 1532-33).

276. The results of Dr. Jaccard's re-analysis of the NFO belief study data using the general linear model and mean ratings are consistent with the loglinear model analyses conducted by Dr. Mazis (Mazis Tr. 1839, 1845-46). The loglinear and general linear analyses are also consistent after applying a Bonferroni adjustment for experiment-wise error (Jaccard Tr. 1510; Mazis Tr. 1845-46).

277. Dr. Jaccard also criticized Dr. Mazis' loglinear analysis for collapsing his scale into "agreeers v. non-agreeers" (Jaccard Tr. 1423-25) rather than using mean scales but other researchers have used this procedure (Peabody Tr. 142-43; Jaccard Tr. 1520-21; Whitcup Tr. 2846-48).

c. Respondents' Belief Studies

(1) The Jacoby Study

278. Dr. Jacoby designed a survey for this litigation to determine whether consumers believe that Doan's is superior in efficacy for back pain relief and, if so, whether the belief arose from Doan's advertising (RX 5).

279. Dr. Jacoby's study included some respondents who were not back pain sufferers and who were unaware of Doan's (Jacoby Tr. 2959, 3138-39, 3140; Mazis Tr. 1120; Lavidge Tr. 770; Whitcup Tr. 2109).

280. Although those who were unaware of Doan's could not express an opinion about its efficacy, Dr. Jacoby included them because they were potential purchasers (Jacoby Tr. 3139, 3377-78).

281. Dr. Jacoby also excluded Doan's non-users (79% of the respondents) because they would have no basis for forming efficacy beliefs except from personal use (Jacoby Tr. 3151).

282. Other exclusions of some respondents for questions about efficacy probably resulted in understatement of those who would have expressed efficacy opinions (RX 5-Z-56-57; Jacoby Tr. 2963, 2965, 3153-54, 2989; Mazis Tr. 1297, 1274-75).

283. Despite these flaws, complaint counsel rely on results of the Jacoby study which indicates that 38% of the Doan's users in the sample believed that Doan's is more effective for the relief of back pain, whereas 23% of Advil users and 17% of Tylenol users believed their brand is superior. Dr. Mazis testified that the results of user-to-
user comparisons are consistent with the results of the 1993 Brand Equity study and the NFO belief study, which demonstrated that there is a clear, long-term, disproportionately strong belief that Doan’s is more effective for back pain than other pain relievers (Mazis Tr. 1155-57).

284. The survey’s questionnaire also presents some problems. Question 1f was an open-ended question directed to respondents who stated that a particular brand was more effective than others for back pain in response to questions 1d-e. It asked those respondents to tell the interviewer what made them say that brand was more effective (RX 5-Z-57). The interviewer was permitted to follow-up only once with the probe, "Anything else" (Jacoby Tr. 3158-59). Dr. Jacoby acknowledged that limiting the interviewer to one follow-up probe would not fully capture all of the reasons some respondents had for believing one brand was more effective than another. He also agreed that for open-ended questions in this study that he believed to be important, he permitted unlimited probing by the interviewer (Jacoby Tr. 3158-60, 2974-75).

285. In response to question 1f, 8% of the respondents who had previously identified Doan’s as more effective for the treatment of back pain gave advertising as a reason they held that belief (RX 5-Z-107), but Dr. Mazis testified that this was not an insignificant amount (Mazis Tr. 1299-1300) given the fact that some consumers are reluctant to admit that they are influenced by advertising (Whitcup Tr. 2805-06; Lavidge Tr. 890-91); furthermore, it is a well known marketing principle that consumers are often not aware that their views are shaped by advertising (Mazis Tr. 1300-03; Lavidge Tr. 890-91; Jacoby Tr. 3194).

286. Dr. Jacoby concluded that the superiority beliefs elicited in his survey for Doan’s, Advil and Tylenol were caused by past product usage and not the lingering effects of advertising (RX 5-Z-106; Jacoby Tr. 2984-85). He based this conclusion on the fact that 218 of 220 respondents (99%) who said one of those brands was superior in efficacy for back pain in response to question 1e were users of those brands. However, this result occurred in part because of the design of question 1d which excluded non-users (RX 5-Z-56-57).

287. Question 2b asked users of a particular brand why they used that brand. Eleven percent cited advertising as the reason (Jacoby Tr. 3209-11; RX 5-Z-58). Some of this response may be due to the fact
that Doan's users had a stronger recall of Doan's ads than did users of Tylenol or Advil (Jacoby Tr. 3209-11). Also, the 11% of Doan's users who cited advertising was higher than the 1% or less who cited advertising as the reason they used Tylenol or Advil (see RX 5-Z-109).

288. Question 3b asked those respondents who recalled advertising for a brand to state what the advertising communicated. Based on the fact that only 3% of the Doan's users gave responses that were coded as a superior efficacy claim, Dr. Jacoby concluded that there were few, if any, lingering effects of advertising related to the challenged claim (RX 5-Z-58), although he agreed at trial that the fact that respondents played back a general recall of Doan's ads, does not establish that they did not form a superiority belief from their exposure to Doan's ads (Jacoby Tr. 3208-09; see also Mazis Tr. 2017-19). He also agreed that people who see an ad can have beliefs based on the ad, hold those beliefs and yet not recall the ad (Jacoby Tr. 3201).

(2) The Whitcup Study

289. Dr. Whitcup designed a survey for this litigation to determine whether consumers believe that Doan's is superior in efficacy for back pain relief and whether any such belief arose from Doan's advertising (RX 2).

290. The universe for Dr. Whitcup's survey consisted of men and women aged 18 and older who were back pain sufferers/treaters within the past year (Whitcup Tr. 2109-10; RX 2-Z-8-10). He did not exclude back pain sufferers/treaters who were unaware of Doan's for the treatment of back pain (Whitcup Tr. 2111). According to Dr. Mazis, this made the universe over inclusive (Mazis Tr. 1273).

291. Dr. Whitcup did not supplement his sample, with the result that only 35 Doan's users were in it, compared with 190 Tylenol users and 121 Advil users (RX 2-Z-49).

292. As a result of the small number of Doan's users in his study, Dr. Whitcup added the letter "c" ("caution small base") whenever he presented data based on their responses (RX 2-Z-49; RX 2-Q-S, V-W, Z-1).

293. In contrast, Mr. Peabody testified that when Doan's marketing research department wanted to analyze the responses of Doan's users in a consumer research study, it sought a large enough
sample to perform a proper analysis (preferably at least 100 Doan’s users per cell) (Peabody Tr. 297).

294. Dr. Mazis testified that because of the small number of Doan’s users in this study, the usage effect resulted in understatement of the superiority beliefs for Doan’s (Mazis Tr. 1290-91), making the data unreliable. Questions 1a-b and 1c-d, did not mention back pain, with the result that respondents were primed to think of all-purpose rather than back pain drugs, thus causing an understatement of Doan’s awareness caused by advertising (Mazis Tr. 1280-81).

295. The main reason given -- that Dr. Whitcup did not want to poison respondents’ minds (Whitcup Tr. 2148-49) -- did not dissuade other experts from referring to "back pain" in their screening questionnaires (CX 420-Z-34; RX 23-Z-398; RX 5-Z-6), although Dr. Jacoby stated that asking respondents first about awareness or use of OTC analgesics for back pain would not poison their minds (Jacoby Tr. 3146).

296. Based upon unaided questions 1c-d of his questionnaire, Dr. Whitcup concluded that awareness of Doan’s ads is virtually nil and that they are unmemorable (RX 2-Z-3; see Whitcup Tr. 2160) but Dr. Mazis concluded that, because of priming, they understate respondents' recollection of Doan’s advertising (Mazis Tr. 1647). Furthermore, Dr. Whitcup acknowledged that a respondent's failure to mention Doan’s ads on an unaided basis does not mean that they were unaware of Doan’s ads (Whitcup Tr. 1280-81).

297. Question 1f asked respondents who had indicated that they used multiple brands to treat back pain which brand they used most often (RX 2-Z-11). Question 2 asked respondents, if they used only one brand of pain reliever to treat back pain, why they used that brand (id. at Z-12). If respondents used more than one brand, they were only asked question 2 with regard to the brand they used most often (id.). Thus, if a Doan’s user used another brand more often, he or she was not asked why they used Doan’s. This design resulted in question 2 not fully eliciting the magnitude of the belief among the few Doan’s users surveyed that Doan’s is more effective for back pain relief (Mazis Tr. 1283; Whitcup Tr. 2789). Dr. Whitcup agreed that the underlying questionnaires contain examples of Doan’s users who were not asked question 2 but who responded to later questions that Doan’s was more effective than other pain relievers for back pain.
relief but he argued that most respondents did not mention superiority (Whitcup Tr. 2790-95).

298. Dr. Mazis concluded, after analyzing the questionnaire, that it biased the outcome toward understating the playback of Doan’s related information (Mazis Tr. 1289).

(3) The Lavidge Study

299. Mr. Lavidge designed a survey for this litigation to determine what claims the "Muscles" ad conveyed and whether consumers held a belief that Doan’s was superior in efficacy for back pain relief (RX 23).

300. Mr. Lavidge did not limit the universe in this study to Doan’s users and aware non-users (Lavidge Tr. 755-56; see RX 23-Z-395-98); he included respondents who were not aware of Doan’s because they were potential purchasers (Lavidge Tr. 755-56), but Dr. Mazis testified that a belief study for a niche brand like Doan’s should not include respondents who are unaware of the product, and thus could have no beliefs about it (Mazis Tr. 1273). The data collected in this survey shows that 71% of the sample were unaware of Doan’s for the treatment of back pain (RX 182). In contrast, 79% of the sample were aware of (and 70% used) Tylenol; and 68% were aware of (and 59% used) Advil (RX 182). The inclusion of respondents who were unaware of Doan’s caused different awareness rates and made it impossible to determine if there is a disproportionate belief regarding Doan’s (Mazis Tr. 1273, 1279).

301. Mr. Lavidge’s copy test asked belief questions subsequent to the viewing of a clutter tape which included the challenged "Muscles" ad (CX 23) (Tests 1 and 3) or the "New Muscles - Male" ad (RX 24-A) (Test 2) and three other 15-second ads for analgesic products being promoted for back pain relief. Question 13, which was asked after two exposures to the clutter reel, purports to measure beliefs about product efficacy.

302. Exposure to the Doan’s ad in the midst of a clutter tape containing three similar back pain-oriented ads for other analgesics does not reflect how consumers are exposed to Doan’s ads in natural surroundings (Peabody Tr. 156; Lavidge Tr. 849).

303. The appropriate way to measure whether lingering beliefs exist is to measure them without exposure to an ad (Mazis Tr. 1276). Dr. Jacoby repeatedly testified with regard to the belief study portion
of his methodology that lingering beliefs cannot properly be measured after exposure to an ad (Jacoby Tr. 2962, 2968, 3155).

304. The belief question (13a) began by asking respondents "Do you think any non-prescription pain killer product is more effective in relieving back pain than the other non-prescription products which are sold for that purpose, or don't you have an opinion about that?" For respondents who answered affirmatively, question 13b was asked: "Which non-prescription product do you think is more effective than others in relieving back pain?" This was followed by a question asking what respondents thought made that product more effective (RX 23-Z-401).

305. Question 13a does not provide respondents with a list of brands to be rated on the more effective for back pain attribute, or any other attributes (id.; see RX 23-Z-401). This requires respondents to sort through a mental list, a processing requirement that is difficult for many consumers to perform. This form of questioning can result in an understatement of consumer beliefs (Mazis Tr. 1274-76).

306. A better way of asking such a question is to ask respondents what their beliefs are for a list of brands with regard to certain attributes, as was done in the A&U study, the Brand Equity study, and the NFO belief study (Mazis Tr. 1274-75). This procedure is the one most commonly used in the consumer research industry (Mazis Tr. 1274; Peabody Tr. 412).

307. Question 13a uses the term "any non-prescription pain killer product" and 13b uses the term "which non-prescription product" (RX 23-Z-401; Lavidge Tr. 889). Mr. Lavidge acknowledged that the term "product" in both questions was singular and that he was asking respondents to identify only one product they believed to be more effective (Lavidge Tr. 889-90). This question is flawed because it limits respondents to giving only one product when they may believe that more than one are more effective. This is particularly limiting for a niche product such as Doan's, which could be one of multiple products a respondent believes to be more effective, but does not come immediately to mind (Mazis Tr. 1275-76).

308. Novartis' other consumer research experts recognized the problem inherent in such a limitation and permitted respondents to provide multiple products in response to their belief question (RX 2-Z-13; Whitcup Tr. 2811; RX 5-Z-57; Jacoby Tr. 3158). Dr. Whitcup testified that 15% of the respondents answering his belief question
identified multiple brands (Whitcup Tr. 2811). The singular wording of the term "product" in questions 13a-b of the Lavidge study may have resulted in those questions understating the number of products that respondents believed to be more effective for the treatment of back pain.

309. Because there were only a small number of Doan's users in Mr. Lavidge's study, the usage effect probably resulted in the superiority beliefs for Doan's being understated according to Dr. Mazis (Mazis Tr. 1271, 1291).

310. The presentation of the data in the Lavidge study does not break down the superiority belief into those held by users of each product or aware non-users of each product (Mazis Tr. 1271; see id. at 1291). Such comparisons are the only reliable way to equalize any usage effects (Mazis Tr. 1158-59, 1199-1200; Jaccard Tr. 1528-29). There is no reliable data or data analysis in RX 23 that permits one to draw any conclusions regarding the existence of a superior efficacy belief with regard to the Doan's product (Mazis Tr. 1272-73; see id. at 1295-96). Mr. Lavidge acknowledged this at the hearing (Lavidge Tr. 879).

d. The Creation Of Consumer Misbelief By The Challenged Ads

311. The NFO Belief study shows that Doan's ad campaign created a consumer misbelief about the efficacy of Doan's -- i.e., that Doan's is more effective than other OTC analgesics for the relief of back pain.

312. That belief, however, has no significance unless complaint counsel establish that it has been substantially created or reinforced by the challenged ads (CPF 314).

313. Factors other than advertising, such as experience, word-of-mouth, doctor recommendations and packaging may have played some role in consumer belief about the efficacy of Doan's (Mazis Tr. 1606-09; CX 502 at 123-24 [Wright Dep.]; Lavidge Tr. 750-52; RX 179), but the evidence leads to the conclusion that advertising was also a factor in the creation of that belief (Mazis Tr. 1201-02, 1609; Stewart Tr. 3468-69).

314. The purpose of Doan's ads was to convince consumers that it was superior to other OTC analgesics for relieving back pain and, to that end, Ciba spent $55 million from 1988 through 1996 for Doan's broadcast ads and $10 million for consumer promotions (JX 2 ¶ 21).
315. Doan’s is a "niche" product which competes in the back pain segment of the OTC analgesics market and its ads target that audience (Stewart Tr. 3478; CX 501 at 68 [Sloan Dep.]). Marketers using niche ads can reach their intended audience with less ad dollars than marketers who target a broader audience (Stewart Tr. 3476, 3478).

316. Doan’s ad agencies estimated that it reached between 80 and 90% of its target audience 20 to 27 times per year between 1988 and 1996 (JX 2 ¶ 25; Stewart Tr. 3413-14).

317. For most of the period in which the challenged Doan’s ads were aired, Ciba used a "flighting" strategy. Flighting is a common method of scheduling in which the advertiser is on the air for a period of time, and off the air for other periods (Stewart Tr. 3421). Ciba started flighting in 1991 "to increase visibility and reach in order to attract additional users to the brand" (CX 514-C; Stewart Tr. 3420). Flighting works especially well for niche brands if the advertiser’s objective is both to persuade new users to try the brand and to reinforce the preferences of current users (Stewart Tr. 3422).

318. Ciba produced 15-second rather than 30-second ads for Doan’s after it acquired the brand (JX 2 ¶ 25; CX 508-Z-13). Ingrid Nagy, who was Doan’s Business Unit Manager from 1988-1991 and its Marketing Director from 1994-1995, believed that the 15-second format was an effective strategy for Doan’s ad campaign (CX 499 at 135 [Nagy Dep.]).

319. One means of determining whether a 15-second ad is as effective as a 30-second ad is to test it in a copy test (Stewart Tr. 3446-47, 3461-62; CX 506 at 87-88 [M. Seiden Dep.]). If a 15-second ad performs as well as a 30-second ad, it makes sense to use it because it costs half as much (Stewart Tr. 3449; CX 506 at 87-88 [M. Seiden Dep.]).

320. Ciba tested the first ad it created for Doan’s, "Graph," through an ASI test. It achieved a 19% recall score (Stewart Tr. 3448; CX 335-Z-7). This exceeded the average (or "norm") for 15-second ads for drug and health products by 5% (CX 335-Z-7; CX 120-C). The score equaled the norm for the average 30-second ad in the drug and health products category (Stewart Tr. 3448-49; Peabody Tr. 258; CX 335-Z-7; Mazis Tr. 2010), indicating that "Graph" was as memorable as the typical 30-second ad in the category (Stewart Tr. 3448-49; Mazis Tr. 2010-11).
321. Ciba tested the second ad it created for Doan's, "Black & White Back," through ASI. This ad also achieved a related recall score of 19% (RX 98-F).

322. Another Doan's ad, "Ruin A Night's Sleep," was tested by ARS in 1991 and achieved a recall score of 42%, 19% above the category average (RX 89-L; Mazis Tr. 2008-09). "Black & White Back Pan" was tested by ARS in 1993 and achieved a recall score of 38%, 15% above the average of the OTC analgesics category. "Activity–Playtime" was tested by ARS in 1994 and achieved a recall score of 34%, 11% above the average (Stewart Tr. 3452-53; CX 393-Z-30). "Muscles" was tested by ARS in 1995 and achieved a recall score of 45%, 22% above the average (id.; Peabody Tr. 196).

323. Dr. Stewart testified that these ARS recall scores indicate that the tested 15-second Doan's ads were more memorable than the average for the category, which is calculated mostly from 30-second ads (Stewart Tr. 3449, 3452-53), and he concluded that Ciba’s use of 15-second ads for Doan’s was a very effective strategy (Stewart Tr. 3462).

324. Dr. Jacoby’s study (RX 5) shows that the Doan’s advertising campaign was memorable among back pain sufferers/treaters when compared to the more extensive advertising campaigns for Advil and Tylenol during the same period. In the Jacoby study, before exposure to any test ad, respondents were asked about their recall of ads for the brands they used (RX 5-Z-58). Fifty-two percent of Doan’s users said they recalled Doan’s advertising (RX 5-Z-111) but only 3% of them recalled any superiority claim in Doan’s ads (Jacoby Tr. 2996).

325. Dr. Stewart testified that the only way to differentiate Doan’s and affect its market performance is through advertising; and, in fact, the Doan’s brand group and its ad agency frequently referred to Doan’s as an ad-driven brand (Stewart Tr. 3468). Other statements by Doan’s employees and its ad agency confirm that the brand is advertising sensitive (CX 335-D; Peabody Tr. 257; CX 514-C; CX 499 at 82 [Nagy Dep.]; CX 120-A; CX 497 at 38 [Esayan Dep.]; CX 407-A; CX 496 at 104-05 [Caputo Dep.]).

326. Other Ciba documents refer to the crucial role advertising played in the marketing of Doan’s and in driving Doan’s sales (CX 404-A-B; CX 499-A). The "Doan’s 1996 1st Half Brand Update" states: "Doan’s support continues to drive strong volume and share performance despite competitive activity." This document also states
that "Doan's advertising has historically improved category performance, as well as Doan’s share/volume."

327. Mr. Peabody testified that Doan’s P.M. sales were "very sensitive to advertising" (Peabody Tr. 566; see also CX 157-B; Peabody Tr. 567; CX 185-E; CX 504 at 138 [Schaler Dep.]; Peabody Tr. 626-27; CX 144-B).

328. ARS also tested "Ruin A Night's Sleep," "Black & White Back," "Activity Playtime," and "Muscles" for persuasion (CX 393-Z-30; RX 98; RX 32; RX 33; CX 265). The persuasion measure is calculated based on the test respondents' choice of a "prize" grocery basket of products the respondents select prior to and after the one hour of "pilot" television shows they view. In calculating the persuasion score, ARS takes additional factors into account, such as the number of competitors in the product category and the degree of switching in the category. Persuasion scores can be negative or positive; a positive score reflects the fact that the ad is having a net persuasive effect on the market, over and beyond what one might expect given various marketplace conditions (Peabody Tr. 191-93; Stewart Tr. 345-52).

329. All of the Doan’s ads tested by ARS received positive scores, ranging from 1.5 for "Activity-Playtime" to 6.8 for "Ruin A Night's Sleep" (CX 393-Z-30; RX 89-K). All of the tested ads would be expected to have a net persuasive effect on the market (Stewart Tr. 3452).

330. Dr. Stewart testified that Doan’s competes in the analgesics market, which is a "mature market." In such markets, it is difficult to persuade long-time customers to switch brands on the basis of one exposure to a competing ad. For a niche brand in the category, the persuasion scores achieved by the Doan’s ads were quite good (Stewart Tr. 3452).

331. The ad which achieved the lowest, but still net positive persuasion score, "Activity Playtime," was very successful in generating sales for Doan’s. In this instance the persuasion score was not a good predictor of what occurred in the real world (CX 504 at 55-57, 138 [Schaler Dep.]; Stewart Tr. 3472).

332. Between 1987, when Ciba bought the brand, and 1996, Doan’s factory sales have increased by approximately 80%, from $10.2 million to a high of $18.9 million in 1994 (with a small drop from 1994 to 1995) (JX 2 ¶ 17; Mazis Tr. 2026; Stewart Tr. 3469;
Peabody Tr. 141-42). Consumer sales, which were first tracked in 1992, rose from $21.5 million in 1992 to $23.3 million in 1995.

333. Consumer sales of Doan’s products increased at approximately the same rate as consumer sales of all analgesic products between 1992 and 1995 (JX 2 ¶ 16, 19; Stewart Tr. 3481). This parallel growth occurred even though advertising spending for all analgesic products increased by almost one third during this period, while advertising expenditures for Doan’s remained relatively constant (JX 2 ¶¶ 21, 23). Doan’s successfully maintained its sales without increasing advertising expenditures by focusing effectively on its niche of back pain sufferers (Stewart Tr. 3481-82).

334. The "contribution" for a brand refers to the amount it contributes to Ciba’s profits. "Contribution" is calculated by subtracting the brand's expenses from its sales (CX 496 at 93 [Caputo Dep.]). Doan’s contribution to Ciba’s profits remained relatively constant between 1990 and 1997, delivering approximately 22 to 25% of sales as contribution (Peabody Tr. 549-50). This percentage equaled or exceeded the contribution from Ciba’s other OTC pharmaceutical brands (CX 496 at 93 [Caputo Dep.]; CX 401-A-B).

335. In "mature" product categories such as analgesics, a central purpose of advertising is to retain current users. This is because the overall market for the products in the category may not be growing appreciably. In these categories, sales increases are not the only measure of the success of an advertising campaign. A key criterion for success of the advertising is whether it is succeeding in maintaining share, particularly in the case of a competitive onslaught (Stewart Tr. 3467; Mazis Tr. 1202; CX 597).

336. Since Ciba acquired Doan’s, several new entrants have entered the back pain specific category (which consists of analgesics that are marketed only for back pain) and the general analgesics category (CX 393-R; CX 97-B). Despite these competitive pressures, Doan’s was able to maintain and even increase its sales (Stewart Tr. 3468).

337. Doan’s responded to these competitive entries partially through the use of advertising (Stewart Tr. 3434-37; Mazis Tr. 2028-32). When Nuprin Backache was introduced in the first half of 1993, Ciba’s media planners increased Doan’s television advertising budget by approximately $500,000 to respond to this competitive threat (CX 357-B; Mazis Tr. 2033-34; Stewart Tr. 3434). Similarly, when Bayer Select Backache was introduced, Ciba increased spending to
run more advertising during the introductory period for Bayer Select (CX 378-K; Stewart Tr. 3434-35). Doan’s Marketing Director wrote that both the Nuprin Backache and Bayer Select Backache products were unsuccessful because Doan’s used a "consistent, strong advertising campaign to defend and even build share in the face of these competitors" (CX 399-B). Both products had been withdrawn from the market by 1996 (CX 496 at 24 [Caputo Dep.]).

338. At the time that Aleve was being introduced in mid-1994, Ciba directed its advertising agency to include the Aleve package in the competitive "set" in the "Activity" commercials that were then being produced. Ciba carefully tracked the entry of Aleve and consulted with its advertising agency regarding the most appropriate ways to defend Doan’s during Aleve’s introduction (CX 168-A-M).

339. Drs. Mazis and Stewart testified that the numerous references in the Doan’s marketing and strategy documents to the fact that the brand is advertising driven, indicates that the challenged ads must have played an important role in sustaining and growing the Doan’s brand (Mazis Tr. 2026; Stewart Tr. 3408-09).

340. It is not surprising that the challenged ads were successful, because academic research has shown that ads for low share brands which include explicit comparative references to high share brands in the same category are very effective. Such ads succeed in attracting more attention to the low share brand and increase purchase intention for the low share brand relative to the high share brand. This comparative reference strategy was employed in all of the challenged Doan’s ads (Stewart Tr. 3458-61; CX 595-A-L; CX 596-A-I).

341. The advertising campaign for Doan’s was a highly successful one for a niche brand (Stewart Tr. 3485).

342. Dr. Stewart testified that the ad expenditures for Doan’s, the media strategies employed, and the type of ads that were used, created or reinforced consumers’ beliefs that Doan’s is more effective than other analgesics for back pain (Stewart Tr. 3485-86).

e. Consumer Research Into The Creation Of The Superiority Belief

343. The NFO study shows that more Doan’s users and aware non-users believe that Doan’s is superior for back pain than do those users and aware non-users of other brands who believe those brands are superior (CPF 347-52, 395-429). The similarity in the beliefs of
users and aware non-users is evidence that Doan’s advertising played a role in creating and reinforcing that superiority belief, since by definition the beliefs of aware non-users about Doan’s stem from factors other than their usage experiences with the product (Mazis Tr. 1203-08; CX 502 at 123-25 [Wright Dep.]). And, the superiority beliefs among Doan’s users cannot be explained by usage experience because of the inability of consumers to evaluate the comparative efficiency of analgesics (CPF 546-47).

344. Further evidence that advertising created or reinforced superiority beliefs is that Doan’s users and aware non-users have beliefs that track other claims conveyed by Doan’s advertising -- Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" and "just for back pain" (Mazis Tr. 1210-18).

345. The NFO belief study demonstrates that there is a strong and disproportionate belief among both Doan’s users and Doan’s aware non-users that Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" and "is just for back pain." In that study, survey respondents rated their levels of agreement or disagreement with these attributes for each of the brands of OTC back pain relievers of which they were aware (CX 422-A-D).

346. Dr. Mazis conducted the same statistical paired comparison analyses regarding these attributes, looking at joint users and joint aware non-users, that he conducted for the attribute "more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics" (CX 424-G-K, Q-U; CX 422-D; Mazis Tr. 1208). Across the five user-to-user comparisons, the proportions of joint users agreeing that Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" is on average 54% higher than the proportions agreeing that each of the other brands (Advil, Aleve, Bayer, Motrin, or Tylenol) has that attribute (see CX 424-A-U; CX 422-C-D). Across the five aware non-user-to-aware non-user comparisons, the proportions agreeing that Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" is on average 46% higher than the proportions agreeing that each of the other brands has that attribute. For the attribute "just for back pain," on average 62% more joint users and 54% more joint aware non-users agreed that Doan’s has that attribute (see CX 424-G-K; CX 422-A-B). Each of the differences in beliefs among every user-to-user and aware non-user-to-aware non-user comparison is large and highly statistically significant (Mazis Tr. 1209).
347. The eight year advertising campaign claiming that Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" and that it "is just for back pain" played a substantial role in the creation or reinforcement of beliefs that mirror those claims (Mazis Tr. 1217). Mr. Peabody testified that Doan’s advertising is likely one of the sources of the beliefs that Doan’s "has an ingredient especially for back pain" and that it "is just for back pain" (Peabody Tr. 226-28) and Dr. Mazis concluded that consumers would not infer that a product had a special ingredient for back pain simply from the fact it is only advertised and marketed for back pain (Mazis Tr. 1621). The fact that the ads created beliefs consistent with these claims further supports the conclusion that they played a role in creating or reinforcing the belief that Doan’s is more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics (Mazis Tr. 1217; see id. at 1057-58; see also CX 480-A-D; Mazis Tr. 1054-58 (1993 Brand Equity Study)).

348. The 1987 A&U study and the 1996 NFO belief study measured the beliefs of users and aware non-users of Doan’s, Extra-Strength Tylenol, Advil, and Bayer regarding the product attribute "most effective" (the A&U study) and "more effective" than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief (CX 421-Z-12; CPF 383).

349. Since the A&U study was conducted just before the challenged ads were disseminated (CPF 326, 336), Dr. Mazis felt that comparing its results with those of NFO’s 1993 belief study, which took place six months after they were abandoned, would permit him to determine if beliefs among users and non-users of these products had changed over the years and to measure the impact of the Doan’s ad campaign on consumer beliefs (Mazis Tr. 1219-20).

350. I agree with respondents’ experts that Dr. Mazis’ comparison of these two studies is unsound since there are a number of differences in the methodologies and questions used in the 1987 A&U study and 1996 NFO study that could be responsible for the change in reported attribute ratings (Jaccard Tr. 1461-73; RX 133-B-E).

351. These include: (1) a difference in the wording of the key attribute in the two studies (CX 221-Z-120; CX 421-Z-12); (2) differences in the structure of the studies’ questionnaires (Jaccard Tr. 1462-71); (3) differences in the response dimensions (how much attributes "applied" to a brand v. how much respondents "agreed" that the attributes described the tested brands) (Jaccard Tr. 1465; RX 133-B); and, (4) differences in the studies’ response scales (Jaccard Tr. 1465-67; Jacoby Tr. 3021-22; RX 133-C).
352. The methodologies of the studies were also different. The 1987 A&U study was a telephone survey; the NFO study was a mail survey (Jaccard Tr. 1468-69; RX 133-C).

353. Finally, the samples in the two studies differed in terms of the nature of respondents' back pain (i.e., suffered "in an average six month period" versus "on a regular basis"), the usual type of treatment (i.e., "prescription or non-prescription medication" versus "over-the-counter medication"), and respondents' role in the purchase of the treatment product. Other key demographic variables -- such as age, gender, income, education, occupation, geographic location, and household size -- are not specified in the 1987 A&U study and could have varied from the demographics of the sample surveyed in the 1996 NFO Mail study. These many differences between the samples of respondents surveyed in the two studies could account for the discrepancy in respondents' attribute ratings (Jaccard Tr. 1470-71; RX 133-D).

354. Given the many differences in the questions, response dimensions, response scales, methodology, and samples in the 1987 A&U study and the 1996 NFO Mail study, I find that the attempted comparison of the two studies to draw inferences regarding the impact of the challenged advertising on consumer beliefs has no methodological merit (Jaccard Tr. 1577-78; RX 133-A).

f. The Lingering Effect Of The Challenged Ads

355. The challenged ads which were widely disseminated for several years communicated a message which created a disproportionate belief in the target audiences that Doan's is superior to other OTC analgesics for back pain.

356. Dr. Jacoby testified about the lingering effects of advertising in *American Home Prods.*, 98 FTC 283 (Initial Decision). He stated that beliefs concerning attributes that had been stressed in analgesic product ads can endure long after they have ceased (*American Home Prods.*, 98 FTC at 293 (IDF 592) (Initial Decision)). Dr. Jacoby also testified that among users of an analgesic product that was advertised as superior to its competitors, that superiority belief would linger long after the cessation of the advertising because product usage will continually reinforce that image (id. at 284).

357. The NFO belief study was conducted in December 1996, six to seven months after the last challenged ad was disseminated (Mazis Tr. 1254-55; CX 421-H; JX 2 ¶ 25), and it shows, according to
Dr. Mazis, that a strong superior efficacy belief lingered, and is likely to linger (Mazis Tr. 1254-55).

358. Dr. Mazis' conclusion is echoed by three empirical studies of the lingering effect of ads. The first study, authored by Kinnear, Taylor and Gur-Arie, was a follow-up study of the effect of a Commission corrective advertising order in RJR Foods, Inc., 83 FTC 7 (1973). The purpose of the study was to measure the change in consumers' beliefs regarding the fruit juice content of Hawaiian Punch (Mazis Tr. 1257-59; CX 536-N-O).

359. This research continued for eight and one-half years (Mazis Tr. 1259; CX 536-N) and found that the percentage of the tested population that held the factually correct belief, the result the corrective advertising was intended to achieve, increased from 20% to 40% in a year's time, improved to 50% by the fifth year, and increased to 70% after eight years. This data shows that advertising based beliefs that are imbedded in consumers' minds can last a very long time, even in the face of corrective advertising. Such ad-created beliefs would have remained at even higher levels for a longer period of time, if the challenged advertising had ceased and no corrective advertising was required (Mazis Tr. 1259-61).

360. Two studies of the corrective advertising order in Listerine -- one conducted by Armstrong, Russ, and Gurol and the other by Dr. Mazis, -- tracked the effect of the corrective advertising requirement over time. These studies showed a reduction of between 11% and 20% in the false beliefs over the course of the approximately one and one-half year corrective advertising effort, according to Dr. Mazis, and support the conclusion that embedded advertising-based beliefs do not change quickly, even in the face of corrective advertising (Mazis Tr. 1261-63).

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Introduction

Doan's has been marketed for over 90 years. Ciba purchased the Doan's brand in early 1987 for approximately $35 million because it believed that Doan's could be successfully marketed if its old fashioned image could be changed (F 8-10).

The so-called Attitude & Usage study ("A&U") which was conducted for Ciba shortly after its purchase of Doan's tested consumer awareness of Doan's and its competitors (F 233). Among
other things, the study concluded that Doan's should position itself "as a more effective product." The results of this study convinced Ciba to embark on the eight year comparative ad campaign which featured the challenged ads (F 236-37).

B. The Challenged Ads Conveyed The Superiority Claims

1. Legal Standard

Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits material and deceptive representations or omissions which are likely to mislead reasonable consumers into unwarranted beliefs about the advertised product. Clifdale Associates, Inc., 103 FTC 110, 164-65 (1984). Appeal dismissed sub nom. Koven v. FTC No. 84-5337 (11th Cir. Oct. 10, 1984) ("Deception Statement").

The Commission deems an ad to convey a claim if consumers, acting reasonably under the circumstances, would interpret it to convey that claim, even if a challenged, misleading claim is accompanied in the same ad by non-misleading claims. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC 40, 120 n.9 (1991), aff'd, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993); Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 789 n.7, 818 (1984).

Both express and implied ads may be deceptive, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F. 2d 1398, 1402-03 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1977), and intent to convey a claim need not be established, Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 121; however, if an advertiser intends to make a claim, it is reasonable to conclude that the ads make that claim. Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 791.

2. Facial Analysis

Despite Dr. Jacoby's and respondents' argument to the contrary (F 97), the Commission has often held that facial analysis of a challenged ad may be the basis for concluding that it conveys a challenged claim to consumers, and that extrinsic evidence of its meaning is not necessary. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 121; Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 789.

Facial analysis of the challenged ads supports the conclusion that they make a claim of superior efficacy by referring to Doan's as the "back specialist" which has an ingredient not found in competing analgesics (F 88-89, 91, 93). See American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 654 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Dr. Mazis also concluded that several of the challenged ads made the superiority claim. For example, he testified that the "Graph" ad, which refers to an "ingredient that [other] pain relievers don't have" conveys the message that Doan's is unique and different, and coupling the claim with references to back pain, conveys the net impression that Doan's is more effective for back pain relief than other pain relievers mentioned in the ad (F 98).

3. Copy Test Evidence

Methodologically sound copy tests of challenged ads are often resorted to as evidence of the messages which they convey. Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 790.

The parties rely on two kinds of copy tests: Those which were conducted in the ordinary course of business by or for Ciba, and those which were designed and administered for purposes of this proceeding.

Prior to their dissemination, the "Graph," "Black & White Back" and "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ads were copy tested by Bruno & Ridgeway, a consumer research company.

If its "main idea" and "other idea" questions are netted, the copy test of the "Graph" ad indicates that 38% of respondents exposed to it were coded as answering that it communicates the claim that Doan's was "Superior to other products" (F 122), a quite high response to open-ended questions (F 124). Stouffer Food Corp., Dkt 9250 (Sept. 26, 1994).

The "Black & White Back" copy test found that 46% of the respondents who saw this ad gave answers that were coded as "superiority over other products." If responses to all of the open-ended questions are netted, 62% of the respondents took away a superior efficacy claim (F 137-38).

The copy test for the "Ruin A Night's Sleep" ad produced similar results: 25% of respondents gave answers that were coded "superiority over other products" (F 146).

The 1991 copy test of the challenged FSI's revealed that between 47% and 59% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that Doan's is better for back pain than other pain relievers, a response whose magnitude confirms that the claim was conveyed (F 168-69). See Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 797, 805-06 (22% of those
viewing the ad believed Aspercreme contained aspirin). See also Warner-Lambert, 86 FTC 1398, 1504 (1975).

U.S. Research conducted a mall test of a Doan's ad, "Activity-Playtime" and an FSI. Fifty-seven percent of the "Activity-Playtime" and 40% of the FSI respondents took the superior efficacy claim from these ads (F 180). See also F 181, 183, 185.

The part of Dr. Jacoby's copy test for respondents which measured the communication of the challenged ads "Activity-Playtime" and "Muscles" showed that 35% of the respondents viewing "Activity-Playtime" and 19% of those viewing "Muscles" took away the superiority claim from open-ended questions (F 191-92).

The results of the copy tests relied on by complaint counsel provide solid evidence that the challenged ads conveyed the superiority message, as did Ciba's dissemination of ads which it knew conveyed a false superior efficacy claim. ABSI, Dkt 9275, slip op. at 40 (March 3, 1997); Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 791. (If an advertiser intends to make a particular claim, it is reasonable to interpret the ads as making that claim.) Furthermore, the ads were a significant factor in creating the superiority belief (F 342). Warner-Lambert, 86 FTC at 1503.

C. The Superior Efficacy Claim Is Unsubstantiated

The parties have stipulated that two well controlled clinical studies are required to substantiate a superiority claim for an analgesic like Doan's. JX 1 ¶¶ 6, 9; see Thompson Medical, 104 FTC at 822-825. The parties also stipulated that there are no scientific studies demonstrating the therapeutic superiority of magnesium salicylate (Doan's active ingredient) over aspirin, acetaminophen (the active ingredient in Tylenol), ibuprofen (the active ingredient in Advil and Motrin) or naproxen sodium (the active ingredient in Aleve) for the relief of back pain. JX 1 ¶ 9. Nothing in the FDA analgesics monograph supports the superior efficacy of magnesium salicylate. Respondents knew that they possessed no substantiation for the superior efficacy claim (F 101, 102, 103).
D. The Superior Efficacy Claim Is Material

For deception to occur the challenged representation or omission must be material, *i.e.*, likely to affect consumer choice or conduct with respect to a product.

Respondents' ads make claims regarding the efficacy or comparative efficacy of Doan's. They may be considered presumptively material because they relate to the central characteristics of that product, Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 182, because they involve an important health claim, *Kraft, Inc.*, 114 FTC at 135-36, and because respondents intended to make a superior efficacy claim (F 104).

E. Corrective Advertising Is Not Warranted

In *Warner-Lambert*, 86 FTC at 1499-1500, the only litigated case in which corrective advertising was ordered, the Commission stated with respect to Listerine's forty-year deceptive ad campaign:

> [I]f a deceptive advertisement has played a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false and material belief which lives on after the false advertising ceases, there is clear and continuing injury to competition and to the consuming public as consumers continue to make purchasing decisions based on the false belief. Since the injury cannot be averted by merely requiring respondent to cease disseminating the advertisement, we may appropriately order respondent to take affirmative action designed to terminate the otherwise continuing ill effects of the advertisement. 86 FTC at 1499-1500.

There is strong academic support for the imposition of corrective ads in the appropriate circumstances (F 356, 358-60), and the NFO belief study shows that a superior efficacy belief lingered for six months after the last challenged ad was disseminated (F 357).

However, given the difference between the length of time that the false Doan's and Listerine ads ran, there is no certainty that the belief at issue requires corrective advertising and I reject Dr. Mazis' contrary conclusion (F 357) as well as complaint counsel's claim that the need for a corrective advertising order can be inferred.

In fact, there are indications in the record that the belief in Doan's superiority may be transitory.

The ASI and ARS copy tests reveal low 24 and 72 hour recall (2% to 8%) by respondents of a "more effective" or a "good product/better/best" message (F 231-32) and Dr. Jacoby testified that this shows that the ads did not create any widespread, lingering
misimpression by consumers. Dr. Whitcup and Dr. Stewart testified that Doan's ads were not memorable, a further indication that the effect of the ads which they analyzed will not linger for a substantial period of time (F 162, 296).

That the remedy sought by complaint counsel is drastic\(^2\) is shown by the Commission's failure to enter a corrective advertising order in cases where some or all of the conditions for doing so existed. See e.g., Bristol Myers Co., 102 FTC at 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 FTC 395 (1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); American Home Prods. Corp., 98 FTC 136 (1981), aff'd as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982).

The parties agree that not every case of deception warrants corrective advertising: some unique circumstances must exist before that remedy is adopted. Complaint counsel have not shown what is memorable about an ad campaign, which, while successful in retaining market share (F 333), created no significant increase in sales (JX 2-B, ¶¶ 16, 19; Scheffman Tr. 2543-46).

I therefore reject corrective advertising as an appropriate remedy in this case.

**F. The Appropriate Order**

1. Introduction

Because respondents' violations were serious, deliberate, and transferable, a comprehensive "fencing-in" order is appropriate. See *Thompson Medical*, 104 FTC at 843-44.

2. The Violations Were Serious And Deliberate

The challenged ads ran for eight years and were extensively disseminated (F 23). Total expenditures of the campaign were sizeable -- $55 million for broadcast advertising and $10 million for consumer promotions (JX 2 ¶ 21).

\(^2\) Although both corrective advertising and affirmative disclosure are forms of fencing-in relief..., the standard for imposing corrective advertising is significantly more stringent than that for an affirmative disclosure.... [which] requires only that the disclosure be 'reasonably related' to the alleged violations. In my view, it is important to distinguish between corrective advertising and affirmative disclosures because the Commission should not evade the more demanding standard for corrective advertising where it is clearly applicable.

The challenged claims were health related and consumers suffered economic injury because Doan’s products are significantly more expensive than other OTC analgesics (F 15).

Consumers could not evaluate the efficacy of Doan’s and could not make informed decisions about purchasing the product. *Thompson Medical*, 104 FTC at 834; *American Home Prods v. FTC*, 695 F.2d at 707.

Ciba’s violations were serious and deliberate, for it designed ads which it knew would convey a superiority message which was unsubstantiated (F 100-113).

3. The Violations Are Transferable

Ciba’s violations -- false and unsubstantiated superiority claims -- are transferable to other OTC analgesics and an order prohibiting transference is appropriate. *Sears & Roebuck*, 676 F.2d at 394-95.

4. The Injunctive Provisions Of The Notice Order

The injunctive provisions of the proposed order are necessary and appropriate to address respondents' violations.

Part I of the proposed order addresses the specific violation in this case, requiring competent and reliable scientific substantiation for any claim that any OTC analgesic is more effective than any other OTC analgesic for pain relief. It specifies that the substantiation required for these claims must include at least two well-controlled clinical studies. This is the appropriate standard for comparative efficacy claims for OTC analgesics. *Thompson Medical*, 104 FTC at 821-26, 832.

Part II of the proposed order contains the fencing-in relief, prohibiting unsubstantiated efficacy, safety, benefits, or performance claims for any OTC analgesic-drug.

Part III of the proposed order contains a "safe harbor" provision for claims approved by FDA under a tentative or final monograph, or pursuant to an approved new drug application.

Parts IV-VIII consist of standard compliance, record keeping and sunsetting provisions.
IV. SUMMARY

A. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction over the advertising of Doan's analgesic products under Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

B. Respondents disseminated advertisements for Doan's analgesic products that falsely represented to reasonable consumers that Doan's analgesics products are more effective than other analgesics for relieving back pain.

C. At the time respondents made these representations, they did not possess or rely upon a reasonable basis that substantiated such representations.

D. Respondents' representations were material.

E. The acts and practices of respondents as herein found were all to the prejudice and injury of the public and constitute unfair and deceptive acts and practices and false advertisements in or affecting commerce in violation of Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

F. The accompanying order is necessary and appropriate under applicable legal precedent and the facts of this case.

ORDER

For purposes of this order:

1. "Doan's" shall mean any over-the-counter analgesic drug, as "drug" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, bearing the Doan's brand name, including, but not limited to, Regular Strength Doan's analgesic, Extra Strength Doan's analgesic, and Extra Strength Doan's P.M. analgesic.

2. "Competent and reliable scientific evidence" shall mean tests, analyses, research, studies, or other evidence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that has been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.

3. "Advertisement" shall mean any written, oral or electronic statement, illustration or depiction which is designed to create interest in the purchasing of, impart information about the attributes of, publicize the availability of, or effect the sale or use of goods or services, whether it appears in a brochure, newspaper, magazine, free standing insert, marketing kit, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert,
letter, catalogue, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card, point-of-purchase display, package insert, package label, product instructions, electronic mail, website, homepage, film, slide, radio, television, cable television, program-length commercial or "informercial," or in any other medium.

I.

It is ordered, That respondents Novartis Corporation, and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., corporations, their successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of Doan's or any other over-the-counter analgesic drug, in or affecting commerce, as "drug" and "commerce" are defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, do forthwith cease and desist from representing, in any manner, directly or by implication, that such product is more effective than other over-the-counter analgesic drugs for relieving back pain or any other particular kind of pain, unless, at the time of making such representation, respondents possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation. For purposes of Part I of this order, "competent and reliable scientific evidence" shall include at least two adequate and well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies which conform to acceptable designs and protocols and are conducted by different persons, each of whom is qualified by training and experience to conduct such studies, independently of each other.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondents Novartis Corporation, and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., corporations, their successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any over-the-counter analgesic drug in or affecting commerce, as "drug" and "commerce" are defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, do forthwith cease and desist from making any representation, in any manner, directly or by implication, regarding such product's efficacy,
safety, benefits, or performance, unless, at the time of making such representation, respondents possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation.

III.

Nothing in this order shall prohibit respondents from making any representation for any drug that is permitted in labeling for any such drug under any tentative final or final standard promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration, or under any new drug application approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

IV.

It is further ordered, That for a period of five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, respondents, or their successors and assigns, shall maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating such representations; and

B. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question such representation, or the basis relied upon for such representation, including complaints from consumers.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall:

A. Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this order, provide a copy of this order to each of their current principals, officers, directors and managers, and to all personnel, agents, and representatives having sales, advertising, or policy responsibility with respect to the subject matter of this order; and

B. For a period of ten (10) years from the date of entry of this order, provide a copy of this order to each of their future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all personnel, agents, and representatives having sales, advertising, or policy responsibility with respect to the subject matter of this order who are associated with them or any subsidiary, successor, or assign, within three (3) days after the person assumes his or her position.
VI.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in their corporate structures, including, but not limited to, dissolution, assignment, or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or affiliates, or any other corporate change that may affect compliance obligations arising out of this order.

VII.

It is further ordered, That this order will terminate twenty (20) years from the date of its issuance, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any paragraph in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this paragraph.

Provided further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondents did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this paragraph as though the complaint was never filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.

VIII.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall, within sixty (60) days from the date of entry of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied with this order.
OPINION OF THE COMMISSION

BY ANTHONY, Commissioner:

This case is about a company that chose to market an over-the-counter ("OTC") analgesic by advertising that the product was superior to others in the treatment of back pain without any basis for that claim. Respondents Novartis Corporation and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. (collectively "Novartis") appeal from an Initial Decision and Order of Administrative Law Judge Lewis F. Parker (the "ALJ"), holding that superiority claims in advertisements for Doan's products were material and therefore deceptive in violation of Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, 52. Complaint counsel cross-appeals the ALJ's decision not to order a corrective advertising remedy.

We affirm the ALJ's holding that the unsubstantiated superior efficacy claims for back pain relief were material and thus deceptive. We reverse the ALJ's holding regarding corrective advertising. We agree with the ALJ's findings and conclusions to the extent that they are consistent with those set forth in this opinion, and, except as noted herein, adopt them as our own.

1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Novartis Corporation is a New York corporation and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. is a Delaware corporation. Both are subsidiaries of Novartis AG, a Swiss corporation, and successors-in-interest to Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self-Medication, Inc. (collectively "Ciba"). On April 23, 1997 the ALJ issued an order, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, substituting Novartis for Ciba as respondent in this proceeding.

We are in general agreement with the dissent regarding the applicable legal standards. The disagreements are over differing interpretations of the evidence.

Ciba acquired the Doan's brand from DEP Corporation in early 1987. DEP Corporation had acquired the brand from Jeffrey Martin, Inc. shortly before. From January 1987 to December 1994, Ciba was responsible for the marketing and advertising of Doan's analgesic products. In December 1994, Ciba transferred the Doan's line of products to CSM, a wholly-owned subsidiary. CSM was responsible for the marketing and advertising of Doan's analgesic products from December 1994 to March 1997. JX 2A ¶ 13.

References to the record are abbreviated as follows:

IDF Initial Decision Finding JX Joint Exhibit
ID Initial Decision RAB Respondents' Appeal Brief
Tr. Transcript of Trial Testimony CCAB Complaint Counsel's Answering and Cross-Appeal Brief
CX Complaint Counsel's Exhibit RRAB Respondents' Reply and Answering Brief
RX Respondents' Exhibit CCRB Complaint Counsel's Reply Brief

1 Novartis is the successor-in-interest to Ciba-Geigy Corporation and Ciba Self-Medication, Inc. On April 23, 1997 the ALJ issued an order, pursuant to the agreement of the parties, substituting Novartis for Ciba as respondent in this proceeding.

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4 References to the record are abbreviated as follows:
to the Doan's line, Novartis manufactures and sells other OTC products.\textsuperscript{5}

Doan's has been marketed and sold for over 90 years and has always been advertised as a backache product. IDF 8; Peabody Tr. 286. The active analgesic ingredient in the Doan's products is magnesium salicylate. IDF 14; JX 1 \( \parallel \) 11. While no other brand of OTC analgesic contains magnesium salicylate as an active ingredient, IDF 22; Peabody Tr. 314, there are no scientific studies demonstrating that magnesium salicylate is more efficacious than other analgesics. IDF 22; JX 1 \( \parallel \) 9. The Food and Drug Administration (the "FDA") regulates product labeling for Doan's pursuant to its Tentative Final Monograph on Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, Antirheumatic Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use (the "Monograph"). Under the Monograph, an OTC analgesic drug may be labeled as indicated for the temporary relief of minor aches and pain associated with one or more of the following: cold, sore throat, headache, toothache, muscular aches, backaches, and arthritis. JX 1 \( \parallel \) 5.

Doan's is a relatively small player in a large market. In 1987, the total advertising spending for all OTC analgesic products was $299 million; for the first half of 1996 it was $351.1 million. JX 2D \( \parallel \) 23. Doan's advertising expenditures were a small fraction (1 to 3\%) of the total analgesic advertising spending from 1988 to 1996. JX 2E \( \parallel \) 24. Between 1988 and 1994, Doan's share of the back pain advertising spending ranged from 8 to 12\%. Id. Doan's analgesic products sell at a significant price premium over general purpose analgesic products at both the factory level (the retailer's purchase price) and the retail level (the consumer's purchase price). IDF 15.

After Ciba acquired the Doan's line in 1987, it commissioned a study, the Attitude and Usage Telephone Study (the "A&U Study"), CX 221, to find out how consumers perceived Doan's and to direct future marketing efforts. See Peabody Tr. 133-34. The A&U Study surveyed users of the Doan's product and non-users who were aware of the product. After analyzing the results of the A&U Study, Ciba's Marketing Research Department concluded that "Doan's has a weak image in comparison to the leading brands of analgesics and would benefit from positioning itself as a more effective product that is

\textsuperscript{5} These products include Ascription, Ciba Vision, Desenex, Dulcolax, ExLax, Gas-X, Habitrol, Maalox, Sunkist Vitamin C, Tavist-D, Theraflu, and Triaminic. IDF 5.
strong enough for the types of backaches sufferers usually get." CX 221-c,d (emphasis added). It further concluded that "Extra-Strength Tylenol is clearly the gold standard for backache pain relief followed by Advil. Bayer and Doan's are consistently perceived weakest." CX 221-c.

Ciba used the results from the A&U Study to create a new Doan's advertising strategy. Peabody Tr. 146. The strategy of this new campaign was to compare Doan's to other general analgesics. Comparative claims for small-share niche brands like Doan's are especially effective according to one of complaint counsel's experts, Dr. David Stewart. Stewart Tr. 3457. Specifically, Dr. Stewart explained that explicit comparative references made by low-share brands attract more attention to, and increased purchase intention for the low-share brand relative to the high share brand. Stewart Tr. 3458-59.

Ciba's marketing plans showed that its goals were to maintain its existing customers, to regain lapsed users and, of course, to attract new users. See CX 335-z-12; CX 343-z-65; CX 351-z-59. In the fourth quarter of 1987, Ciba introduced "Extra Strength Doan's," containing a larger dose of the active analgesic ingredient, and renamed the original product "Regular Strength Doan's." After its introduction, the Extra Strength product captured more than half of the Doan's product sales. JX 2B ¶18. In September 1991, Ciba introduced Doan's P.M., which contains a sleep aid.

Increasingly, Doan's faced competition from new back pain products, general analgesics, and private label brands. See CX 335-d; CX 343-f; CX 351-c; Peabody Tr. 146. The marketing plans outlined strategies to deal with such competition. For example, in August 1992, Ketchum Advertising prepared a "Doan's Defense Plan" intended to respond to the anticipated 1993 introduction of Nuprin Backache. See CX 357. The 1996 Marketing Plan reports that in 1994 Ciba regained its 1993 loss. CX 400-h.

To send its message, Ciba used national television ads and, to a lesser extent, free standing inserts ("FSIs"). Ciba disseminated FSIs in Sunday newspaper supplements two to three times per year. JX 2I ¶36. From 1987 through 1996, Ciba spent $55 million for broadcast ads and $10 million for FSIs. JX 2C ¶21. Doan's television ads appeared nationally both on network television and on syndicated and cable television. See JX 2F ¶28. The television ads were 15-second commercials. JX 2E ¶25. Ingrid Nagy, Doan's Business Unit Manager
from 1988 to 1991 and its Marketing Director from 1994 to 1995, believed that 15-second ads were effective because of the fairly singular communication point of the ads. IDF 29; CX 499 at 135 [Nagy Dep.]. In addition, Ciba disseminated the television ads through a flighting strategy \(^6\) during 26 weeks of the year. Based on estimates by Ciba’s advertising agencies, from 1988 to 1996, television commercials for Doan’s reached 80% to 90% of the Doan’s target audience, on average, between 20 and 27 times per year. JX 2F ¶28. Finally, for short periods in 1991 and 1993, Ciba tested radio ads including Spanish radio ads in Houston. JX 2I ¶¶34, 35.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 21, 1996, the Federal Trade Commission (the "Commission") issued a complaint alleging that Ciba had violated Section 5 by making unsubstantiated claims in its advertisements (1) that Doan’s analgesic products were more effective than other analgesics, including Bayer, Advil, Tylenol, Aleve, and Motrin, for relieving back pain; and (2) that Ciba possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis to substantiate such claims. During litigation, complaint counsel sought an order requiring that the following corrective notice appear on all advertising and packaging: "Although Doan’s is an effective pain reliever, there is no evidence that Doan’s is more effective than other pain relievers for back pain." \(^7\) Complaint counsel sought to impose a performance standard for determining when the corrective notice was no longer needed. Specifically, the corrective notice would appear until Ciba (now Novartis) submitted consumer survey data to the Commission demonstrating that consumer beliefs had reached a specified level. \(^8\)

After extensive discovery and an administrative trial, the ALJ issued his Initial Decision and Order on March 9, 1998. The ALJ found that a facial analysis of the challenged advertisements supports the conclusion that the advertisements conveyed a claim of superior

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\(^6\) In contrast to ads that are aired every week, flights are ads that air for several weeks and then are off the air for several weeks. Peabody Tr. 130.

\(^7\) For TV, radio, or other broadcast advertisements, Novartis would have the option of substituting either of the following corrective notices: "There is no evidence that Doan’s is more effective for back pain relief than other over-the-counter pain relievers;" or "There is no evidence that Doan’s is more effective than other pain relievers for back pain."

\(^8\) The performance standard was modeled after the 1996 NFO belief study relied upon by complaint counsel in this litigation.
efficacy for the treatment of back pain. The ALJ concluded that the Doan’s superior efficacy claims were presumptively material because they relate to the central characteristics of the product and involve health claims. He also found that the claims cause consumers economic injury because the Doan’s products are significantly more expensive than other OTC analgesics. He therefore held the superiority claims to be deceptive in violation of 15 U.S.C. 45 and 52. Further, the ALJ concluded that Ciba intended to make the challenged claims. ID at 63-66.

The ALJ’s order prohibits Novartis from making superiority claims for any OTC analgesic drug with regard to the product’s ability to relieve back pain or any other particular kind of pain without competent and reliable scientific evidence that includes at least two adequate and well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies. (Part I) As fencing-in relief, the ALJ’s order prohibits Novartis from making any representation regarding any OTC analgesic drug’s efficacy, safety, benefits, or performance without competent and reliable scientific evidence to substantiate the claim. (Part II) Finally, the order contains a "safe harbor" for claims approved by the FDA under a tentative or final monograph, or pursuant to an approved new drug application. (Part III).

The ALJ concluded that the record did not support the imposition of a corrective advertising remedy. He noted that a belief study, relied upon by complaint counsel, showed that a superior efficacy belief lingered for six months after the last challenged ad was disseminated. Nevertheless, the ALJ compared the 51 years Warner Lambert ran deceptive Listerine ads to the eight-year Doan’s campaign and concluded that there was insufficient evidence that consumer misbeliefs in Doan’s superiority for the treatment of back pain would linger in the absence of the remedy. ID at 64. Finally, he rejected complaint counsel’s claim that the need for corrective advertising could be inferred.

III. DECEPTION ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

The first issue in this case is whether the challenged Doan’s ads were deceptive. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. 45. Section 12 of the Act declares
dissemination of false advertisements regarding certain categories of products, including drugs, to constitute an unfair or deceptive act or practice under Section 5. 15 U.S.C. 52.

As the Commission explained in its policy statement on deception, appended to Clifdale Assocs., Inc. 103 FTC 110, 176-184 (1984) (the "Deception Statement"), a representation is deceptive if it "is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." Id. at 176. In practice, the Commission's deception analysis is applied as a three-part test asking whether (1) a claim was made; (2) the claim was likely to mislead a reasonable consumer; and (3) the claim was material. E.g., Clifdale Assocs., Inc. 103 FTC at 165. There is no requirement of intent. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC 40, 121 (1991) ("Evidence of intent to deceive is not required to find liability."), aff'd, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993).

The factors and evidence the Commission weighs in assessing the three prongs of the deception analysis are often interrelated. While Novartis' sole question on appeal is whether the ALJ "err[ed] in concluding that the alleged implied superior efficacy claim was material to consumers," RAB 7, its claims arguably implicate the other two parts of the test. Therefore, to address fully Novartis' arguments on appeal, and to provide a context for our discussion of the materiality issue, we briefly discuss the first two elements before considering materiality.

B. The Challenged Ads Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.

We first consider whether the challenged ads communicated a superior efficacy claim for the treatment of back pain. In determining what claims may reasonably be ascribed to an ad, the Commission examines the entire ad and assesses the overall net impression it conveys. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 176; Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 122; Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC 648, 790 (1984), aff'd 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).

In its appeal brief, Novartis states that while it "disputes the [ALJ's] finding that the challenged Doan's advertisements conveyed an implied superior efficacy claim to the requisite number of consumers under applicable precedent, it does not challenge that finding for purposes of this appeal." RAB 6. Novartis repeats that its appeal "challenges only the ALJ's conclusion that complaint counsel established the materiality of the alleged superiority claim," in its reply brief. RRAB 2. In a footnote, Novartis states that it is not conceding that the claim was communicated. Id. 2 n.1. By failing to appeal the issue, however, Novartis has conceded the issue for purposes of this litigation.
Claims can either be express or implied. Here we are dealing with an implied claim. Implied claims range on a continuum. At one end are claims that are "virtually synonymous with an express claim" and use "language that literally says one thing but strongly suggests another." Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 789. At the other end of the spectrum are claims that use "language that relatively few consumers would interpret as making a particular representation." Id.

The Commission's assessment of whether an implied claim is made necessarily begins with the advertisement itself. A facial analysis alone will suffice if it permits the Commission to conclude with confidence that the ad makes the implied claim. See Stouffer Foods Corp. 118 FTC 746, 798 (1994); Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 121; Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 789. In cases where the claim is not manifest from an examination of the ad, the Commission will look to extrinsic evidence. Id. at 799; Kraft Inc., 114 FTC at 121; Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 789. Such evidence might include, for example, the testimony of expert witnesses, market research studies regarding consumer reactions to the use of certain common terms, or consumer surveys. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 121-22. The Commission will carefully assess the quality and reliability of any extrinsic evidence introduced by the parties. Stouffer, 118 FTC at 799; Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 176. While methodological perfection is not required, with regard to reliance on copy tests and other consumer surveys, flaws in methodology may affect the weight the Commission gives to such results. Id.

1. A Facial Analysis of the Ads Reveals That They Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.

Respondent ran the challenged ads over eight years.\textsuperscript{10} JX 2E ¶25. The "Graph" ad was the first in the new campaign. It begins with a visual of the profile of a person in front of what appears to be graph paper. CX 13. The individual twice attempts to bend over; the second time (after he has implicitly ingested Doan's), he is able to bend farther. The audio portion of the ad states that "Doctors measure back

\textsuperscript{10} Graph (CX 13) ran from May 1988 through June 1991; X-Ray (CX 14) ran from August 1989 through June 1991; Black & White (CX 15) ran from June 1991 through October 1992; Black & White Pan (CX 16) ran from December 1992 through June 1994; Ruin A Night's Sleep (CX 17) ran from January 1992 through August 1992; Ruin A Night's Sleep (CX 18) ran from August 1993 through June 1994; Activity Playtime (CX 20) ran from July 1994 through July 1995; Activity Pets (CX 22) ran from July 1994 through July 1995; and Muscles (CX 23) ran from August 1995 through June 1996. JX 2E ¶25.
pain by how far you can bend." The ad then depicts a package of Doan's on the left side of the screen while packages of three competing analgesic brands -- Advil, Tylenol and Bayer -- are displayed on the right. The audio portion concludes: "With an ingredient these pain relievers don't have." The spotlight on the other brands is then darkened leaving only a visual of the Doan's package on the screen.

The television ads respondent disseminated after "Graph" continued to emphasize that Doan's has an ingredient not found in competing analgesics while depicting competing products. The "X-Ray" ad introduces an audio and visual reference to Doan's as "the back specialist," and this tag line is also used in several subsequent Doan's ads. CX 14. Respondent began to use the terms "special" and "unique" to modify references to Doan's "ingredient" in "Black and White Back" and "Ruin a Night's Sleep" ads, respectively. CX 15; CX 17.

The superiority themes begun in "Graph" and "X-Ray" continued in subsequent ads such as "Activity Playtime" and "Activity Pets." CX 20; CX 22. As in earlier ads, both depict a package of Doan's alongside other analgesics while the voice-over states, "Doan's has an ingredient these pain relievers don't have." And once again, the ads conclude with the "back specialist" tag line. Respondent repeated similar themes in the challenged "Muscles" ad. CX 23.

The Free Standing Inserts -- color print advertisements included with newspapers -- closely tracked the claims in the television ads. One FSI that first ran in 1989 and again in 1990 and 1991, features a large Doan's package alongside smaller but clearly visible packages of Advil, Extra-Strength Tylenol, and Bayer. CX 32. Copy above the packages states: "Doan's. Made for back pain relief. With an Ingredient these other pain relievers don't have." Id. Other FSIs made similar claims and included depictions of competing brands. See, e.g., CX 33-39.

Based upon a facial analysis of the challenged ads, we find that they clearly conveyed a claim that Doan's is superior to other analgesics, such as Bayer, Advil, Tylenol, Aleve and Motrin, for relieving back pain. The express claims that Doan's is made for back pain and contains a unique or special ingredient that the other featured brands do not have, coupled with the depiction of the other brands, combine to communicate that Doan's is superior to the
competing analgesics for back pain. This message is reinforced by the statement in some ads that Doan’s is the "back specialist." The superior efficacy claim is implied, but on the continuum of implied claims, we find the claim so clear as to be nearly express.

2. Extrinsic Evidence Confirms That the Challenged Ads Conveyed Superior Efficacy Claims.

Substantial extrinsic evidence confirms our conclusion that the challenged ads make a superior efficacy claim. We affirm and adopt the ALJ's findings on this point (ID at 62-63), and highlight some of the more persuasive extrinsic evidence.

Several consumer surveys and copy tests show that consumers understood the ads to be making a superiority claim. For example, copy tests on mock-up versions of some of the challenged ads conducted by Bruno & Ridgeway, an independent consumer research company employed by Ciba, showed that approximately 30 to 45% of the consumers tested discerned a superiority message from the ads. Likewise, a Mail Panel Communication Test conducted by Market Facts, a firm retained by Ciba to test the 1991 FSI s, revealed that between 47 to 59% of respondents strongly or somewhat agreed that the FSI s indicated that Doan’s is better for back pain than other pain relievers. CX 238-z-71. In addition, complaint counsel commissioned U.S. Research ("USR") to conduct a mall intercept copy test to determine if the challenged ads communicated the superiority claim. Fifty-seven percent of the "Activity-Playtime" ad and 40% of the FSI respondents took the superior efficacy claim from the ads. IDF 179, 180; ID at 63.

11 Bruno & Ridgeway used a mall intercept methodology where qualified respondents were shown mock-ups of the ads and then asked questions. CX 224-d; Peabody Tr. 160. A mall intercept study is conducted in suburban shopping malls in different cities. Interviewers posted in the mall solicit passers-by to participate. Interviewers first determine whether a participant meets the demographic requirements of the study. If so, the participant is shown materials and asked questions. Peabody Tr. 358. Mall intercept studies are sometimes criticized as less demographically balanced than mail panel or telephone surveys because mall-goers are not necessarily representative of society at large. See Peabody Tr. 204. Tests of this nature are referred to as forced-exposure communication tests.

Thirty-eight percent of the consumers tested indicated that the "Graph" ad communicated, as a primary or secondary message, that Doan’s was "superior to other products." CX 224-m. In response to open-ended questions, 44% of the consumers who saw the "Black and White" ad gave answers that were coded as "superiority over other products." CX 236-j. If responses to all of the open-ended questions are netted, 62% indicated that at least one ad conveyed a superiority claim. CX 236-m. Similarly, the results for "Ruin A Night’s Sleep" ad reported that 23% of Doan’s users and 38% of Doan’s non-users gave answers that were coded "superiority over other products." CX 244-h,v.
Ciba prepared these tests in the regular course of business, which indicates that at the time Ciba was running the ads, it was well aware that consumers understood them as conveying a superior efficacy message. Mr. Edward Peabody, the Director of Marketing Research, testified that he became concerned about miscommunication at the 10 to 15% level. Peabody Tr. 150-51. Nevertheless, as noted above, Ciba ran ads from which percentages of 30 to 45% drew a superiority message. While a respondent need not intend to make a claim in order to be held liable, evidence of intent to make a claim may support a finding that the claims were indeed made.

Novartis counters its own commissioned Bruno & Ridgeway test results with results obtained in ASI and ARS copy tests\(^\text{12}\) that show low percentages of consumers drawing a superiority message from the ads.\(^\text{13}\) We find that the ARS and ASI test methods likely understate the communication results. These were tests of recall and persuasion administered either one or three days after exposure to the ad. The legal issue in the first prong of deception, however, is whether the claim was made and not whether it was memorable. Forced-exposure tests, like those conducted by Bruno & Ridgeway, where questions are asked when the ad is fresh in the consumer's mind, are more telling regarding whether a particular claim was made. The ARS and ASI tests also tend toward understatement because their questionnaires contain no close-ended questions, and the open-ended questions asked consumers about express claims in the tested ads rather than what the ad implied or suggested. Peabody Tr. 194-95.

In sum, the issue of whether the claim was made is not a close one. While technically an implied claim, respondent's superior efficacy message is plain from a facial analysis of the challenged ads

\(^{12}\) ASI tests expose consumers to commercials during pilot shows on unused cable channels. The consumer watches one or two pilots with test commercials embedded for Doan's and other products. Twenty-four hours later, consumers are called and asked questions about the ads. Peabody Tr. 181-83. ARS testing is similar to ASI testing except it is done in a theater-like setting, often at a hotel. Three days after seeing the pilot, consumers are called and asked questions about the ads. Peabody Tr. 350-52.

\(^{13}\) Specifically, Novartis argues that a 1990 ASI copy test of "Black and White Back" reported that only 3% of the respondents questioned twenty-four hours after exposure to the ad reported that it communicated "product superiority," and that only 1% reported that it was "more effective/works better" in comparison to other products. Peabody Tr. 389; RX 98-h. Novartis also relies on ARS copy test data from 1991, 1993, 1994 and 1995 to show low percentages of consumer recall for a "more effective" or "good product/better/best" message within one to three days after exposure to the ads. RX 89-z-20; RX 32-y; RX 33-z-4; CX 265-z-2,3.
alone. The extrinsic evidence introduced on this issue provides additional support for our finding that the superiority claims for back pain treatment were made.

C. The Challenged Ads Were Likely to Mislead Reasonable Consumers.

Having concluded that the claims were made, we proceed to consider whether those claims were likely to mislead reasonable consumers. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 177. The applicable standard is whether a claim is likely to mislead; proof that particular consumers were actually deceived is not required. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC 133; Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 FTC at 165; Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 176. Further, "[t]he test is whether the consumer's interpretation or reaction is reasonable." Id. The interpretation need not be the only one to be reasonable. For example, a respondent can be held liable where multiple interpretations of a claim are possible, only one of which is deceptive. Stouffer Foods Corp., 118 FTC at 799; Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 120-21 n.8; Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 789 n.7. The reasonableness of an interpretation is not contingent upon its being shared by a majority of consumers. A claim would likely mislead a reasonable consumer if at least "a significant minority of consumers" would be deceived by it. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 177 n.20. Importantly, the Deception Statement adds that an interpretation is presumed reasonable if it is one the respondents intended to convey. Id. at 178.

The misleading nature of the superior efficacy claims at issue here is plain. The claims are entirely unsubstantiated. Novartis concedes that no scientific studies demonstrate the therapeutic superiority of magnesium salicylate, the active ingredient in Doan’s, over aspirin, acetaminophen, ibuprofen, or naproxen sodium for relief of back pain or any other indications contained in the Monograph issued by the FDA. IX 1D ¶ 9. As a general matter, the Commission considers claims regarding the efficacy of analgesics to be adequately substantiated when the claims are supported by the results of two well-controlled clinical studies. Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 825.

Here, the claim that Doan’s is superior to various other OTC analgesics for treating back pain is baseless and, consequently, likely to mislead reasonable consumers.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Ciba intended to make the superiority claim. Ciba knew from its own copy testing data that consumers were taking a superiority message from the ads and that it had no substantiation for such a claim. Indeed, more than a significant minority -- 30 to 45% -- of consumers discerned this superiority message. Yet, Ciba continued to run the ads. This demonstrates that Ciba intended to, and in fact did, convey a superiority message. Therefore, consumers receiving such a message from the ads behaved reasonably in doing so. See Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 791.

Our finding of the reasonableness of the deceptive interpretation is further supported by the nature of the product. Analgesics are products the efficacy of which consumers cannot readily judge for themselves. Well-documented phenomena such as the "placebo effect" and the "usage effect" make it difficult for consumers to judge accurately the degree of an analgesic's efficacy. Superiority vis-a-vis other types of analgesics is even more difficult to ascertain absent well-controlled clinical trials. Thus, consumers necessarily rely upon manufacturers' representations and behave reasonably when they take those representations to be substantiated and accurate.

D. The Claims Are Material.

Finally, the Commission must determine whether the superior efficacy claim is material. A "material" misrepresentation is one that involves information important to consumers and that is therefore likely to affect the consumer's choice of, or conduct regarding, a product. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 182. Materiality is closely related to injury in that when a consumer's choice is affected by a misrepresentation, the consumer, as well as competition generally, is injured. Id. at 182-83. However, proof of actual consumer injury is not required. Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 134.

The ALJ concluded that the challenged claims were presumptively material, ID at 63-64, and found that the misleading

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14 The "placebo effect" is the tendency of patients to respond favorably to a treatment regardless of the treatment's medical efficacy. See Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 715 (Initial Decision.) The "usage effect" is the tendency of users of a product to rate it more highly than non-users of the product. Mazis Tr. 992, 1055-56. Users tend to use a product because they believe it works and thus tend to give it higher ratings than non-users. Id.; Jacoby Tr. 2987. This may be attributable, in part, to consumers' inability to evaluate effectively the efficacy of OTC analgesic products they use. See American Home Prods. Corp., 98 FTC at 282 (Initial Decision).
claims were material based upon this presumption and the record evidence. IDF 227.

On appeal, Novartis argues that the ALJ misapplied the presumption, and improperly evaluated the evidence submitted by the parties. We conclude that the respondent's implied superior efficacy claim was material.

1. The Presumption of Materiality

a. Generally

Novartis and amicus curiae Grocery Manufacturers Association argue that the ALJ improperly elevated the presumption of materiality to a virtually irrebuttable conclusion of law. We disagree.

Certain categories of information are presumptively material, including, but not limited to, express claims, claims significantly involving health or safety, and claims pertaining to the central characteristic of the product. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 182. Similarly, the Commission will infer materiality where the record shows that respondent intended to make an implied claim. Id. However, we "will always consider relevant and competent evidence to rebut presumptions of materiality." Id. at 182 n.47.

"To establish a 'presumption' is to say that a finding of the predicate fact," here, any of the factors listed above, "produces a required conclusion in the absence of explanation," here, materiality. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to rebut the presumption, respondent must come forward with sufficient evidence to support a finding that the claim at issue is not material. Respondent can present evidence that tends to disprove the predicate fact from which the presumption springs (e.g., that the claim did not involve a health issue) or evidence directly contradicting the initial presumption of materiality. This is not a high hurdle. Unless the rebuttal evidence is so strong that the fact-finder could not reasonably find materiality, the fact finder next proceeds to weigh all of the evidence presented by the parties on the issue. See id. at 516 (noting that after the presumption drops out, "the inquiry ... turns from the few generalized factors that establish [the presumption] to the specific proofs and rebuttals ... the parties have introduced"). While the presumption itself is negated by sufficient rebuttal evidence, as previously noted, the predicate facts that gave rise to the presumption are not. These facts remain evidence
from which materiality can be inferred. See Boise Cascade, 113 FTC at 975 (1990). However, this evidence is simply part of the entire body of evidence considered. See also 21 Charles Alan Wright and Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence §§ 5122 et seq. (1977 and 1998 Supp.) (discussing the history and application of presumptions).

b. The Facts Underlying the Presumption

The ALJ applied a presumption of materiality because the challenged claim involves a health issue. He also concluded that the presumption was appropriate in light of evidence that the challenged superior efficacy claim relates to the central characteristic of the product, that is, Doan's ability to relieve back pain. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, 102 FTC at 753 (efficacy is "the most important feature of any analgesic"). Novartis admits that the presumption of materiality properly flows from these facts. RAB 46; RRAB 9.

We likewise conclude that these predicate facts -- that the claims go to health\textsuperscript{15} and to a central characteristic of the product -- both support an initial presumption of materiality and constitute strong evidence that the claims were material. Common sense and experience, along with the Commission's expertise in advertising matters, counsel that respondent's representation that Doan's is more effective than other analgesics in the treatment of back pain was important to consumers considering a purchase and likely affected their decisions as to which product to buy. This requires no great leap.

Along with the "health claim" and "central characteristic" bases for the presumption of materiality, the ALJ found that Ciba's intent to make a superior efficacy claim was evidence that the claim was material and supplied an independent basis for the presumption. ID at 64. Novartis objects to this finding.

An advertiser's intent to make a claim generally implies that the advertiser believes that the claim is important to consumers. See American Home Prods., 98 FTC 136, 368 (1981) ("The very fact that AHP sought to distinguish its products from aspirin strongly implies that knowledge of the true ingredients of those products would be material to consumers.")], aff'd, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, the Deception Statement includes intent as a predicate fact giving rise

\textsuperscript{15} The record establishes that approximately 50\% of adults in the United States suffer from back pain; thus, the treatment of that pain is an important health concern. CX 388-b.
to a presumption of materiality. 103 FTC at 182; see also Thompson Med. Co., 104 FTC at 816. For express claims, the intent to make the representation is self-evident. In the context of implied claims, however, extrinsic evidence is required to establish an intent to make the claim.

Complaint counsel presents various documents showing that Ciba knew that the ads were conveying a superiority message. Novartis argues that the documents have been taken out of context and offers the testimony of employees who state that Ciba had no intent to make the claim. We find complaint counsel's evidence more credible and compelling and conclude that Ciba did indeed intend to communicate a superior efficacy message to consumers.

The record is replete with evidence demonstrating that Doan's ads were communicating a superiority claim and that Ciba management was aware of that communication. For example, the Bruno & Ridgeway communication study of the "Graph" ad categorized 38% of consumers exposed to the ad as answering that it communicated that Doan's was "superior to other products." CX 224-m. In a May 1988, memorandum to Ciba regarding the study, Bruno & Ridgeway recommended producing the ad, inter alia, because it "communicated product superiority and perceived efficacy." CX 225-d (emphasis added). This memorandum was directed to Ciba's Marketing Research Department and circulated to the Group Vice President of Marketing and other senior marketing executives at Ciba. In addition, the 1989 Doan's Marketing Plan prepared by Ciba reported the product superiority interpretation of the ad and described the "Graph" ad as a "strong execution which effectively communicates product superiority and perceived efficacy . . . ." CX 335-z-8.

Communication tests conducted for Ciba on its "Black & White Back," "Ruin A Night's Sleep," and "Activity Playtime" advertisements indicated that they communicated a product superiority claim as well. For example, the Bruno & Ridgeway copy test for "Black & White Back" reported that 46% of respondents recalled a message of superiority over other products. CX 236-j.

In May, 1994, Ciba's advertising agency, Jordan McGrath Case & Taylor, wrote to Ciba indicating that the networks were seeking substantiation for one of the implied superiority claims:

All three Networks are requiring substantiation for the claim "If nothing you take seems to help." The Networks believe that this language implies that Doan's
provides superior efficacy vis-a-vis the competitive products shown .... As such, to make this claim we will need substantiation that Doan's is more effective (due to its Magnesium Salicylate ingredient) at relieving back pain versus the competitors pictured. Importantly, our Agency counsel agrees with the networks.

IDF 111; CX 165-a. In response, Ciba deleted the words "you take" from the ad copy so that the ad stated "if nothing seems to help." CX 20.

Despite its knowledge that the ads were communicating an unsubstantiated efficacy claim, Ciba continued to disseminate some of the ads until May, 1996, just a month before the Commission's decision to issue a complaint in this matter and well after its investigation had begun.

Novartis argues that Ciba did not intend to make a superior efficacy claim, but rather to distinguish Doan's from other products. Novartis primarily relies on the testimony of former and current Ciba/Novartis managers who stated that Ciba did not intend to make any superiority claims. We are unpersuaded by these post facto denials. They ring hollow in the face of the contemporaneous documentary evidence revealing knowledge that a superiority claim was being communicated. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 506, 602 (1957).

In sum, we agree with the ALJ that Ciba intended to make the superiority claim and conclude that this intent, along with the predicate facts that the claim goes to health and to a central characteristic of the product, create a presumption, and provide strong evidence, of materiality.

2. Complaint Counsel's Additional Evidence of Materiality

Along with the evidence that gave rise to the initial presumption of materiality, discussed above, the record contains substantial additional evidence supporting a finding that the claim was material. This diverse body of evidence includes consumer survey results, expert testimony, and business records.

a. The Nature of the Claims

The record contains ample evidence showing that superior efficacy claims are important to consumers attempting to choose a back pain remedy. First, experts for both parties testified that a superior efficacy claim would be important to the back pain sufferer
when choosing an OTC analgesic. Mazis Tr. 1983 (testifying that superior efficacy is the primary reason why consumers choose one analgesic over another); Jacoby Tr. 3371 (testifying that superior efficacy claim would "motivate" back pain sufferers to purchase a product).

Second, the results of a study performed by Dr. Whitcup show the importance of efficacy claims. Dr. Whitcup asked consumers to rate the characteristics of pain relief products. Dr. Whitcup found that efficacy-related responses constituted three of the top four characteristics. RX 2-z-105. These results led Dr. Whitcup to conclude that analgesic products are generally chosen "on the basis of perceived efficacy," along with other factors. RX 2-z-3; Whitcup Tr. at 2815.

Third, several studies and copy tests Ciba commissioned in the ordinary course of business demonstrate the importance of efficacy claims to consumers of back-pain remedies. For example, a study delivered to Ciba management highlights a key finding: "[Doan's] is seen as particularly effective for back pain, and as having a special ingredient . . . . this specificity is what users are looking for . . . ." CX 256-c (Brand Equity Study, Exec. Summary). Similarly, Bruno & Ridgeway stated in its report on the copy test for the "Graph" ad that superiority "seems to be an important and persuasive idea." CX 224-1. Weiss Marketing Research Co. likewise concluded that the fact that the "Graph" ad created the impression that Doan's is better may persuade people to try Doan's. CX 227-z-3.

b. The Price Premium

Throughout the relevant period, Doan's was priced well above the general purpose analgesics depicted in the challenged ads, including Tylenol, Advil, and Bayer. In 1992, for example, a 24-count package of Doan's cost consumers 66% more than the same size package of Tylenol. IDF 15-16. The existence of this price premium constitutes further evidence of materiality. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 183.

Respondent argues that these price premiums cannot be linked to the challenged claim because the premium is attributable to Doan's status as a niche brand. RAB 83. However, the challenged ads compared Doan's to general purpose, lower-priced analgesics and not to other similarly priced niche products. Thus, the ads used a misrepresentation in an effort to convince consumers to pay the additional amount for a product similar to general purpose analgesics.
3. Novartis' Evidence Against Materiality

Novartis offers several arguments to support its contention that the superior efficacy claim was not material. While we find that Novartis submitted a sufficient amount of relevant evidence to rebut the presumption of materiality, the totality of the evidence strongly compels a finding of materiality.

a. Effectiveness of the Ads

Novartis primarily argues that the ads were ineffective in communicating their message to consumers and therefore did not affect consumer purchase decisions (i.e., they were not material). Respondent argues that Ciba ran ads that it knew were ineffective in order to appease retailers who demand manufacturer support for niche brands.\(^\text{16}\) RAB 56-57. Respondent cites market data for the relevant period that reflect little or no growth in sales or market share and reasons that the superior efficacy claim, therefore, did not affect consumer purchase behavior.\(^\text{17}\) RAB 71.

In the first place, this claim is irrelevant even if it were true. Materiality is not a test of the effectiveness of the communication in reaching large numbers of consumers. It is a test of the likely effect of the claim on the conduct of a consumer who has been reached and deceived. See Deception Statement at 182-83. The materiality inquiry builds upon the findings from the prior two factors in the deception analysis -- that the claim was made and that it was likely to mislead at least a significant minority of reasonable consumers exposed to the ad. Materiality turns upon whether those consumers who have drawn the claim from the advertisement and been misled by it are also likely to have their conduct affected by the misrepresentation.

In any event, respondent's argument that it ran an eight-year multimillion dollar campaign of ineffective ads is contradicted by the

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\(^{16}\) Novartis also argues that the evidence shows that consumers did not find the challenged ads interesting or persuasive. RAB 57-59. Even if this were the case, in the context of the materiality inquiry, it is the challenged claim that is at issue and not the ad as a whole.

\(^{17}\) Along with its market performance arguments, Novartis advances a market positioning argument. Novartis contends that any superior efficacy belief that caused consumers to purchase the product was not the result of the misleading claim contained in the advertising, but rather was the result of product usage and Doan's historical market positioning as specifically for treating back pain. RAB 75-76. We reject this argument. The materiality inquiry focuses on the claim and its effect, not on other conceivable sources of consumer beliefs. Respondent's argument -- that if an advertiser is able to point to other possible sources for the misbelief engendered by its misrepresentation, it should be free to continue making its misrepresentation -- is untenable.
evidence. Market data demonstrate that the campaign produced positive results. Contrary to Novartis' assertions, Doan's maintained its market share in an extremely competitive environment and enjoyed an 80% increase in dollar sales during the relevant period.18 JX 2B ¶17. Because the number of consumers in the analgesics market in which Doan's competes is not growing appreciably (i.e., the market is "mature"), a business must take customers from another brand in order to increase market share. Stewart Tr. 3467; CX 597. In such markets, maintenance of market share, and not increasing sales, is the primary criterion of success. Id. Indeed, Doan's ability to maintain its market share in the mature OTC analgesics market notwithstanding the fact that its advertising budget was much less than those of its competitors, JX 2E ¶24, reveals that the challenged advertising campaign was successful. The fallacy of Novartis' market performance arguments is also shown by Doan's survival and prosperity while other products were introduced and later withdrawn.

Even if Novartis' characterization of the market data were accurate, a history of static performance alone does not support its contention that the challenged ads were ineffective. Market performance is governed by a host of variables, and the materiality inquiry focuses upon a single claim.19 Absent evidence, lacking here, that links market performance directly to the claim or controls for other variables influencing market performance, general market data is not particularly useful in assessing materiality.

b. Puffery

Novartis argues that the challenged claims were not material because they amounted to mere "puffing." RAB 61-64. Respondent posits that if consumers did not take the superiority

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18 Novartis argues that unit sales, and not dollar sales, is the more appropriate measure. Novartis contends that the strength of the dollar sales is misleading because it is attributable to the introduction of premium priced line extensions, namely Extra Strength Doan's and Doan's PM. These line extensions, however, were supported by the same advertising as regular Doan's and to the extent that the advertising was successful in convincing consumers to buy these premium-priced items, the profits made on these products suggest that the ads were having their desired effect.

19 For example, the existence and strength of competitors, the availability of substitute products, the maturity of the market, the state of domestic and foreign economies, general business cycles, distribution issues, and trends in consumer preferences, among other factors, can all affect market performance and do not relate to an unsubstantiated superior efficacy claim made in an advertising campaign.
claim seriously, the claim could not have misled them into buying the product. We reject this argument. 20

The claim that Doan's is more effective than other analgesic products for treating back pain is not a subjective opinion, a matter of personal taste, or a hyperbolic statement that might be deemed "puffery." Rather, it is an objective claim that can be scientifically tested. The implied claim at issue here not only asserts superiority, but specifies in what respect (back pain relief), why (its unique ingredient) and compared to whom (named competitors). CCAB 93-94. This is the opposite of puffery, and the exact type of claim that a consumer would reasonably expect to be substantiated by adequate clinical studies. See Pfizer, 81 FTC 23, 64 (1982) (puffing does not include "affirmative product claims for which either the Commission or the consumer would expect documentation").

Respondent also argues that approximately half of all consumers harbor a general belief that no analgesic is any more effective than any other in treating back pain. RAB 65-66. Presumably, respondent's point is that these skeptics would never be swayed by false efficacy claims. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, the accuracy of the statistic and the validity of the claim that a consumer's general belief could not be overcome by specific misrepresentations, the argument still fails. An advertiser does not have to fool all of the people to be found liable; a "significant minority" of consumers is sufficient. Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 177 n. 20. Nor does the existence of some hardened cynics free advertisers to make deceptive claims.

c. Consumer Surveys

Novartis offers various consumer survey results as support for its contention that the claim was not material. For the most part, the results touted by respondent, even assuming flawless methodology, are only marginally probative on the issue of materiality. With respect to the one survey that tested materiality, methodological flaws render its results unreliable.

Respondent first points to the ARS tests, which indicate a low consumer recall of superiority messages between one and three days

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20 In the first place, respondent's puffing argument goes to ad interpretation, an issue properly considered in connection with the second prong of the deception analysis, rather than to materiality. See Deception Statement, 103 FTC at 181 (puffing addressed as part of the discussion of the reasonable consumer's interpretation of the claim). As noted above, respondent has expressly waived any challenge to the second prong.
after seeing certain ads, as demonstrating that some of the challenged ads were not material. RAB 69-70. As discussed above, these tests asked only about express superiority claims, which were not made. Because the ARS tests did not even ask about implied claims (the only kind of claims at issue), they are hardly helpful. Moreover, materiality does not depend upon whether the claim is remembered by consumers days later. As discussed above, a claim does not have to be memorable to be material.

Novartis also claims that a study conducted by Dr. Jacob Jacoby in late 1996 shows that the superiority claim was not important to consumers and that the challenged ads were unlikely to cause consumers to purchase Doan’s. RAB 76-79; RRAB 23-25. In Dr. Jacoby's study, consumers were shown one of six commercials 21 and then questioned. Three of the questions (numbers 5a, 5b, and 5c) pertained to materiality. Question 5a asked: "Did seeing this commercial influence whether or not you would buy the advertised product in the future?" RX 5-z-112. Only those who responded affirmatively proceeded to question 5b: "Did it make you more likely to buy this product, or less likely to buy this product?" Id. Finally, those who responded "more likely," were asked 5c: "What is it about what the commercial said, showed or suggested that makes you more likely to buy it in the future?" RX 5-z-113. Dr. Jacoby contends that "only a trivial number" of those questioned indicated that the commercials made them more likely to buy the advertised product based upon a claim of superiority or because it had a special ingredient. RX 5-z-120.

Dr. Jacoby's test for materiality was flawed in several ways. First, by asking question 5c only of those who answered questions 5a and 5b in certain ways, Dr. Jacoby's study understated the number of respondents to whom the misrepresentation was material. Questions 5a and 5b ask about the commercial rather than the claim. Whether a commercial as a whole influences a consumer is not the same issue as whether a claim contained in the commercial is likely to do so. Despite the materiality of a given claim, the commercial containing that claim might fail to influence a consumer for any number of reasons. Because the claim need only be an important factor in the purchase decision, the results for questions 5a and 5b tell us little about the materiality of the superior efficacy claim.

21 Two of the six were challenged commercials, "Activity Playtime" and "Muscles." The remaining four were non-challenged controls. RX 5-z-101 n.1.
Moreover, once the pool of respondents had been inappropriately filtered through questions 5a and 5b, their number had been drastically reduced. Of the 142 people shown the challenged "Activity Playtime" ad, only 35 were asked question 5c. RX 6-z-39. Similarly, of the 129 people shown the challenged "Muscles" ad, only 36 were asked question 5c. RX 6-z-15. These numbers appear to be too small to be accorded significant evidentiary weight.

Dr. Jacoby's study also understated the number of respondents to whom the superiority claims were material by failing to ask directly whether the superiority claim was important to them. The open-ended nature of question 5c tended to yield a scattershot range of responses. E.g., RX 6-z-40. For each of the two challenged ads, seven of the approximately 35 people asked question 5c (roughly 20%) gave responses that Dr. Jacoby interpreted as indicating materiality. RX 6-z-16; RX 6-z-40. These results are almost certainly understated because Dr. Jacoby failed to ask follow-up questions to determine all of the aspects of the commercial that made consumers more likely to buy Doan's in the future. As previously noted, in order to be material, a claim does not have to be the only factor or the most important factor likely to affect a consumer's purchase decision, it simply has to be an important factor. By seeking only one response to question 5c for each consumer tested, Dr. Jacoby ignored this fact and thereby undermined his results.

During the administrative trial, Dr. Jacoby sought to buttress his results by performing calculations cross-referencing several other questions included in the survey. While Dr. Jacoby did not explain his methodology in detail, he apparently matched the consumers he interpreted as drawing a superior efficacy claim from the ads (in response to questions 6a, 6b, and 8b)22 with those who stated, in answer to question 5b, that the commercial made them "more likely" to buy the product. See RX 209-a. See Jacoby Tr. 3061, 3338-343. Based upon these calculations, Dr. Jacoby concluded that for the challenged commercials, the overlap was only 12.7 and 4.7%, respectively. See RX 209-a. He reduced these results further by subtracting the percentages obtained from the control ads. Id.

22 Question 6a asked the main idea of the commercial, and 6b asked about the other ideas the commercial was trying to get across. RX 5-z-96. Question 8a asked whether the commercial said, showed, or suggested that the advertised brand was more effective than other brands, and question 8b asked what the commercial said, showed or suggested that conveyed a superior efficacy claim. Id.; RX 5-z-139; RX 5-z-141. The results from these questions reveal a substantial communication rate for the challenged ads -- depending on the question, in the 30 to 50% range. RX 5-z-120-129; 139-148.
This procedure did not salvage Dr. Jacoby's study. The results of Dr. Jacoby's cross-referencing exercise derive from the results obtained from question 5b. That question only tells us which consumers found the commercial persuasive and does not reveal anything about what aspects of the commercial made it persuasive. As explained above, a claim by itself can be material and yet, when viewed in the context of a commercial, fail to persuade a consumer to buy the product. Therefore, question 5b improperly excluded many relevant respondents. As it is, Dr. Jacoby's results show that of the 35 consumers who indicated that they found "Activity Playtime" persuasive, 20 (57%) also drew a superior efficacy claim from the ad. See RX 209-a. While one might logically infer that the superior efficacy claim played an important role in making the ad persuasive to many of these consumers, the flaws in Dr. Jacoby's methodology preclude a definitive and quantified linkage.

Finally, Dr. Jacoby conceded that if a person suffers from back pain and is offered a product that is superior for the relief of back pain compared to other analgesics products, then that person would be motivated to purchase the product. Jacoby Tr. 3371. Thus, even Dr. Jacoby agrees that a superior efficacy claim is likely to affect consumers' purchase decisions.

**E. Conclusion**

Thus, although we have concluded that the evidence adduced by Novartis requires us to look beyond a simple presumption of materiality, our review of that evidence shows that it ultimately adds little to respondent's side of the scales. Weighing all of the available evidence -- including the basic and irrefutable fact that the misleading claims of superiority relate to the central characteristic of the product and involve health; the evidence that the claims were intended to affect consumer decisions; and the range of other evidence adduced by both sides -- we have no hesitation in concluding that the claims were material. The extensive record amassed in this proceeding strongly confirms the common-sense proposition that efficacy is a pivotal consideration for consumers in selecting an analgesic, and that claims of superior efficacy are highly material to those consumer choices.
IV. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING

A. Legal Framework For Imposing Corrective Advertising

Corrective advertising is an appropriate remedy if (1) the challenged ads have substantially created or reinforced a misbelief; and (2) the misbelief is likely to linger into the future. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. F.T.C., 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). In such cases, the lingering effects of a deceptive advertisement constitute a "clear and continuing injury to competition and to the consuming public" and justify the requirement of a corrective message. Warner-Lambert Co., 86 FTC 1387 (1975).

It is well settled that, in analyzing each of these two prongs, we may consider indirect evidence as well as direct evidence. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 762; American Home Prods., 98 FTC at 407; Statement in Regard to Corrective Advertising, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 39,046 (1979) (stating "that the absence of consumer research will not preclude a corrective advertising order if other factors in the evidentiary record indicate that the challenged advertising campaign has created or reinforced consumer beliefs"). Therefore, we reject Novartis' argument that reliance on inferences would be a departure from a "settled understanding" expressed in the corrective advertising case law. RRAB 53.

We also reject the ALJ's holding that corrective advertising is inappropriate absent "certainty" that the misbeliefs will otherwise linger. The proper standard is whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the misbelief is likely to linger. A requirement of certainty that a misbelief will linger would be impossible to satisfy, because certainty about the future is unattainable.23 The ALJ's finding that the false beliefs are not certain to linger applies the wrong legal standard.

Finally, we reject respondent's argument that corrective advertising can only be ordered if it is shown that such a remedy is the only way to eliminate consumer misperceptions. RRAB 94 (citing American Home Prods., 98 FTC at 411). Contrary to the ALJ's suggestion, corrective advertising is not a drastic remedy. ID at 65.

23 Warner-Lambert was a remarkable case. "Comparable proof of deception-perception-memory influence would be virtually impossible in most advertising cases.... corrective advertising must apply to more than the one-in-a-million type of ad campaign present in Warner-Lambert." R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 698 (1977) (footnote omitted).
Requiring the dissemination of a truthful message to counteract beliefs created or reinforced by a respondent's deceptive message is an appropriate method of restoring the status quo ante and denying a respondent the ability to continue to profit from its deception.

B. Methodology of Belief Studies

To support a corrective advertising remedy, complaint counsel relies on three consumer belief studies to demonstrate (1) that the challenged advertising campaign created or reinforced misbeliefs harbored by consumers about Doan's, and (2) that those misbeliefs are likely to linger. Complaint counsel claims: first, that the A&U Study demonstrated that Doan's had a weak image compared to the other leading brands of general purpose analgesics in 1987, before the challenged ads were aired; second, that a Brand Equity Study, conducted mid-way through the campaign in 1993, showed that Doan's was then viewed as particularly effective for back pain and as having a special ingredient -- two claims that were the focus of the new campaign; and third, that a 1996 NFO study, commissioned by complaint counsel for this litigation, showed that users of Doan's and non-users who were aware of Doan's continued to harbor misbeliefs about the superiority of Doan's for back pain six months after the campaign had ended and that the misbeliefs were disproportionately high compared to the beliefs held for other products. One of complaint counsel's experts, Dr. Michael Mazis, also compared the results of these three studies, concluding that Doan's ads created or reinforced a superiority belief.

To counter complaint counsel, Novartis relies on three separate belief studies conducted for this litigation by Mr. Robert Lavidge, Dr. Morris Whitcup, and Dr. Jacob Jacoby. Novartis contends that these studies show that consumers do not have misbeliefs about Doan's. In addition, Novartis contends that the ARS and ASI copy tests and an Aleve Tracking Study, conducted by Ciba when Aleve was introduced into the OTC analgesic market, demonstrate low levels of unaided recall for the Doan's products. Novartis argues that if consumers are unaware of Doan's, they cannot harbor misbeliefs of any kind, and, thus, corrective advertising would be an inappropriate remedy.
The methodology and results of each of these studies are described in Appendix I.24 The Brand Equity, Jacoby, and Lavidge studies used a mall intercept method. The A&U, Aleve Tracking, and Whitcup studies were conducted by telephone. Dr. Whitcup testified that telephone surveys are the most appropriate way of assessing consumer attitudes because their samples are most representative of the total population.25 Whitcup Tr. 2107. Finally, the NFO study used a mail panel method. Mail panel research involves mailing research instruments to individuals who previously have agreed to serve as survey participants. These individuals complete and return the research instrument. The mail panels used by NFO were designed to achieve demographic balance.26 Clarke Tr. 11. NFO panels are especially useful in identifying hard-to-reach consumers because of the large sample size. Id.

We initially discuss two criteria that affect the evidentiary value of the parties' consumer belief studies. First, consumer beliefs should be measured without exposing survey participants to the challenged ads. This is because such exposure may elicit the participant's interpretation of the ad rather than his or her beliefs. Second, the universe of participants surveyed should be properly selected to eliminate usage bias and to compare relevant groups. In testing for credence claims about a product, where consumers may have difficulty objectively evaluating the product's performance, the survey should insert controls to counter bias stemming from the use of the product.

1. Exposure to Advertising

All of the studies but one asked participants questions about their beliefs without exposing them to ads. Only the Lavidge study showed consumers television ads for four OTC products prior to questioning. Both complaint counsel's expert, Dr. Mazis, and respondent's expert, Dr. Jacoby, testified that the appropriate way to measure beliefs is

24 As the Commission stated in *Stouffer* "[p]erfection is not the prevailing standard for determining whether a copy test may be given any weight. The appropriate standard is whether the evidence is reliable and probative." 118 FTC at 807. While a given study may be flawed in some respects, it still can be probative, and any deficiencies simply will affect the weight given to the evidence. Id.

25 Random digit dialing reaches both listed and unlisted numbers. Whitcup Tr. 2108.

26 Mail panel participants may under-represent those with the lowest incomes (who may not have a permanent address or may be illiterate) and those with the highest incomes (who disproportionately decline to participate). Clarke Tr. 13.
without exposure to ads. Mazis Tr. 1276; Jacoby Tr. 2962, 2968, 3155. By exposing consumers to advertising before asking questions about their beliefs, it is difficult to determine whether the consumers' responses to questions designed to elicit their beliefs reflect their interpretation of the ad or, in fact, their beliefs. We find that the Lavidge study is not probative of consumer beliefs because, contrary to the first criterion, participants were exposed to advertising as part of the study.\(^{27}\) By contrast, the A&U, Brand Equity, NFO, and Whitcup, studies as well as the relevant portions of the Jacoby study were conducted in keeping with this criterion.

2. The Proper Universe

The appropriate universe is crucial to determine the probative value of any consumer survey. An improper universe can render a survey useless. Experts for both parties agreed that in a survey of consumers' beliefs regarding Doan's superior efficacy, the universe should be limited to those who suffer from and treat back pain. Mazis Tr. 1120; Lavidge Tr. 770; Whitcup Tr. 2109. All of the belief studies, with the exception of the Aleve Tracking Study, limited the universe of participants to those who suffered from back pain and had used an OTC analgesic product within the previous year. Because the Aleve Tracking Study was not confined to backache sufferers, the results are not particularly useful.\(^{28}\)

The experts part company on the question of whether the survey respondents should be aware of the product for which the beliefs are tested. Complaint counsel's expert, Dr. Mazis, concluded that the appropriate universe for testing consumer beliefs about Doan's would include both people who were users of Doan's and people who were aware of, but not users of, Doan's (aware non-users). With such a universe it would be possible to compare the beliefs of users of

\(^{27}\)There are other flaws in the Lavidge study which may tend to understimate the frequency of superior efficacy beliefs regarding Doan's. Dr. Mazis testified that it was difficult for consumers to answer the questions used in that study, because it required participants to sort through all the brands of which they were aware and then to make judgments about them. Mazis Tr. 1274-76. Moreover, Mr. Lavidge failed to control for usage bias; therefore, the fact that fewer of his participants used Doan's than used other products understated the superiority beliefs regarding Doan's. Mazis Tr. 1271. Mr. Lavidge even acknowledged that personal experience with a product is very important in shaping a consumer's beliefs about the product. Lavidge Tr. 750. The ALJ rejected the Lavidge study. IDF 310.

\(^{28}\)Admittedly, the purpose of the Aleve Tracking Study was to track the introduction of Aleve on the OTC market generally, although it did develop some information about Doan's. Dr. Mazis testified that the respondents in the Aleve Tracking Study were not focusing on back pain, so a back pain-specific product would be much less likely to be recalled. Mazis Tr. 2016.
Doan's to users of other products. In order to control for usage bias, it is also necessary to compare the beliefs of people who were aware of the product, but not users, with the beliefs of users of the product. Mazis Tr. 1122-23. On the other hand, Novartis' experts contend that a survey limited to participants who are aware of Doan's would not be representative of the relevant population, and would tend to overstate ratings for Doan's relative to other OTC analgesics. Whitcup Tr. 2182. In their belief studies, Novartis' experts included consumers who were unaware of Doan's. Dr. Jacoby testified that this was an important group of consumers because they were prospective consumers and they were the people to whom the advertising is directed. Jacoby Tr. 2937.

On balance, we conclude that the most reliable studies are those that focus on persons who have used Doan's or are aware of the product. Because our inquiry is whether the Doan's ad campaign has created or reinforced misimpressions about the product's efficacy, it makes sense to direct our attention to those consumers who, in fact, have an opinion about Doan's -- which will necessarily be those who are aware of the product.29

The soundness of this approach is confirmed by consideration of the problem of user bias. Users of a product tend to rate it more highly than do non-users. Mazis Tr. 992.30 This preference may be attributable, in part, to consumers' inability accurately to evaluate the efficacy of certain products -- such as analgesics -- relative to alternatives. See American Home Prods. Corp., 98 FTC at 282 (Initial Decision). Although the Whitcup and Jacoby consumer studies included consumers who were Doan's users (8% in Whitcup universe and 21% in Jacoby) the studies failed to ascertain the number of remaining consumers who were aware of Doan's, making it impossible to compare the beliefs of consumers who use the product to those who are aware of the product, but are not users. Accordingly, the most reliable assessments of consumer beliefs will be based on comparisons of like groups -- e.g., users of one brand to users of another brand; or aware non-users of one brand to aware non-users of another. Only the NFO belief study used such a methodology. The

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29 Indeed, when Ciba itself tested consumer beliefs in the regular course of business, it limited its samples to those who were aware of the product. The A&U Study and the Brand Equity Study were confined to consumers who were aware of Doan's.

30 See infra n.13.
NFO demonstrated that 77% of Doan’s users and 45% of aware non-users believed that Doan’s is superior to other brands.\(^{31}\)

**C. The Evidence Supports the Imposition of Corrective Advertising.**

Having found that the superior efficacy claim was deceptive, and that a relevant universe of consumers believe that Doan’s is superior, we must determine whether (1) the ads created or reinforced that misbelief; and, if so, whether (2) that misbelief is likely to linger. We address each of these issues in turn.

1. The Challenged Ads Created or Reinforced Misbeliefs.

A number of factors influence consumer beliefs about and attitudes toward a product, including advertising, use of the product, recommendations by doctors or others, and packaging. Mazis Tr. 1606-09; Lavidge Tr. 750-52. As a general matter, advertising and usage are among the most important of these factors.\(^{32}\) *American Home Prods.*, 98 FTC at 281. But product usage can be a primary source of a consumer’s product image “only if the consumer has the ability to discriminate objectively between various similar products. . . . Thus, if a consumer is unable to evaluate objectively a product’s actual efficacy, the role of advertising as a cause of the consumer image is enhanced.” 98 FTC at 410. Because consumers cannot objectively evaluate OTC analgesics, including Doan’s, advertising is an important factor in creating and reinforcing beliefs about such products. Mazis Tr. 1609. The Doan’s eight-year advertising campaign created and/or reinforced beliefs and made them more salient, understandable, and resistant to change. Mazis Tr. 1205-06. Indeed, such a long campaign could do both, having initially created and later reinforced beliefs.

After the 1987 A&U study showed that Doan’s had a weak image, CX 221-c,d, Ciba launched the challenged advertising campaign, claiming that Doan’s was superior to other general purpose analgesics for back pain and that Doan’s contained a special ingredient for that

\(^{31}\) The Jacoby study, as far as it goes, actually corroborates the results of the NFO study. For example, in the Jacoby study, 38% of Doan’s users reported Doan’s as “more effective” in contrast to 23% of Advil and 17% of Tylenol users who reported their brands as “more effective.” RX 5-z-105.

\(^{32}\) Indeed, word-of-mouth recommendations largely depend upon prior exposure to advertising and product usage. *American Home Prods.*, 98 FTC at 281.
purpose. Consumer survey data, conducted before final production of the ads, showed that consumers were drawing a superiority claim for back pain from the advertising. See ID at 62-63. The challenged superiority claims were consistent and made throughout the campaign. In fact, the eight-year campaign presented a focused message of comparative superiority.

The Brand Equity Study, conducted midway through the campaign, provides strong evidence that the advertising had already influenced consumer beliefs. Dr. Mazis’ summary of that study shows that users of Doan’s put Doan’s in the top category for back pain efficacy twice as often as users of Tylenol, Advil and Motrin gave such a rating to the products they used. CX 480-a. Non-users who were aware of the product also rated Doan’s more highly than the other brands (though less dramatically so). CX 480-c. Thus, in five years, the Doan’s brand developed from having a weak image to being viewed by users and those aware of the brand as particularly effective for back pain.

Moreover, changes in consumer beliefs during that five-year period closely tracked the claims made in the challenged advertising. Mazis Tr. 1057. Dr. Mazis’ summary sets out the percentage of users and non-users who were aware of Doan’s who believed two attributes claimed in the challenged ads (superiority for back pain and use of a special ingredient) and a third that was not advertised (superiority for all kinds of pain). CX 480-c. Consumers tended to perceive Doan’s as particularly effective for back pain and also as containing a unique ingredient. Mazis Tr. 1058. The non-advertised attribute (effectiveness for all kinds of pain), however, was not believed by many consumers. CX 480. Accordingly, the Brand Equity Study supports the conclusion that the challenged ads played a substantial role in creating or reinforcing consumer misbeliefs about Doan’s.

The results of the NFO belief study similarly show that in 1996, a disproportionately high percentage of Doan’s users and aware non-users believed that Doan’s was more effective than other OTC pain

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33 Respondent argues, and the ALJ found, that the attribute of "being particularly effective for back pain" does not necessarily imply that a product is "more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief," and thus that the Brand Equity Study is not probative of superiority beliefs. IDF 246. We disagree. A product that is no more effective than any other would not be "particulary" effective. The word "particularly" is inherently comparative. See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 1783 (2d ed. 1938) (defining "particularly" as "[e]specially, unusually").

34 Dr. Mazis testified that consumers would not infer that a product had a special ingredient for back pain simply from the fact it is only advertised and marketed for back pain. Mazis Tr. 1621.
relievers for back pain relief. CX 482. Dr. Mazis testified that the Doan's advertising played a significant role in creating or reinforcing the superiority belief. Mazis Tr. 1216-18.

Dr. Mazis also compared the results of the 1987 A&U Study with the 1996 NFO study. He testified that this analysis shows that "superior efficacy" beliefs for Doan's relative to Advil, Bayer, and Tylenol increased (between 0.5 and 1.25 scale points on a seven-point scale) between 1987 and 1996 relative to other brands, as did beliefs that Doan's has a "special ingredient" (between 0.75 and 1.875 points). At the same time, consumer beliefs that Doan's "is safe to use" -- a claim not made in its advertising campaign -- declined in rough proportion to the other products. CX 532-e, h, k; Mazis Tr. 1244-45. Dr. Mazis concluded that this striking pattern, in which changes in consumer beliefs mirrored advertising themes (or their absence), confirms that the ads created or reinforced the misbeliefs. Mazis Tr. 1246. The ALJ rejected Dr. Mazis' comparison of the studies because of the differences in their methodologies and questions asked. IDF 350. While we acknowledge the methodological differences between the studies, we believe that these data nonetheless corroborate the connection between the ads and the misbeliefs. See IDF 351, 352.

We reject respondent's contention that the Aleve Tracking Study and the Whitcup Study demonstrate a low unaided recall of Doan's advertising, so consumers cannot harbor misbeliefs about Doan's. RRAB 61, 62. We have already noted that because the Aleve Tracking Study was not confined to back pain-sufferers, its results are not useful. It tends to understate those consumers who may have beliefs about Doan's and did not ask back pain-specific questions. And the results of the Whitcup study are undermined by the small number of Doan's users sampled (35) in contrast to the number of Tylenol users (190) and Advil users (121). RX 2-z-49. Indeed, Dr.

35Contemporaneous documents further indicate that Ciba's ad agency, Jordan McGrath, recognized that the challenged advertising was affecting superiority beliefs about Doan's among consumers. One such document from 1994 stated that:

[The 1993 Brand Equity study showed that the specificity of Doan's positioning, as communicated by "The Back Specialist" campaign line has helped differentiate the Brand from other pain relievers. Clearly this unique positioning has contributed to this.]

CX 387-y. (Doan's FY '95 Marketing Plan Key Issues, July 25, 1994.)

Similarly, Jordan McGrath's Vice President Account Supervisor who worked on the Doan's account noted the effectiveness of the challenged claims: "The Back Specialist" we have kind of engraved that in the consumer's mind." CX 503 at 97 [Jackson Dep]. Other Ciba documents indicate the significant role that advertising played in driving Doan's sales. CX 404-a-b; CX 499-a.
Whitcup himself appended the letter "c" (designating "caution" due to a small base) to data regarding Doan’s user responses.

As in its attack on materiality, respondent argues that the Whitcup, Lavidge, and Jacoby studies show that a majority of consumers do not believe that any OTC analgesic brand was more effective than others for relieving back pain, RRAB 63, 64, presumably rendering advertising ineffectual in creating or reinforcing any superior efficacy beliefs. Even if those studies show that a majority of consumers so believe, a substantial number of respondents remain who believe that one brand may be more effective than others. See RX 23-j; RX 2-t; RX 6-j. The results do not shed light on whether the challenged ads created or reinforced misbeliefs in the minds of these remaining consumers.

Novartis also recycles its argument that, even if consumers harbor misimpressions about Doan’s, such beliefs are due to Doan’s ninety-year positioning as a back-specific analgesic and not to the challenged ads. RRAB 75-77. In fact, however, there is no record evidence to support respondent’s speculation. To the contrary, the A&U Study showed that Doan’s historical positioning did not have a major impact on consumer beliefs, and that the product’s image remained weak prior to the commencement of the ad campaign at issue here. CX 221-c. As the evidence discussed above shows, the ensuing multi-million dollar, eight-year campaign was successful in enhancing the product’s image by persuading consumers, incorrectly, of Doan’s superior efficacy. In any event, even if that misimpression existed to some degree prior to the ad campaign, the campaign at the very least had the effect of reinforcing such beliefs, which to supports a corrective advertising remedy. See Warner-Lambert Co., 562 F.2d at 762. In fact, the campaign could have both created and reinforced misbeliefs in that beliefs may have been created and later reinforced.

We likewise reject respondent’s argument that complaint counsel failed to establish a link between consumer beliefs and the challenged advertising. Respondent claims that the NFO study is flawed because Dr. Mazis did not ask survey participants whether they were aware of Doan’s advertising. RRAB 79. While a specific question asking whether participants recalled the challenged advertising might have

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36 Dr. Mazis testified that he did not ask whether people had seen advertising for Doan’s because at the time of the NFO study, the ads had not run for six or seven months, and people might not reliably recall ads that they did, in fact, see. Mazis Tr. 1797. He also testified that beliefs from ads may linger even though recall of specific ad claims may not. Mazis Tr. 1798, 1800.
been useful, we find that the failure to include such a question was not a fatal flaw. The evidence of parallel changes in consumers' beliefs about Doan's that track the course of the eight-year campaign sufficiently establishes the link between the challenged ads and the resultant misbeliefs.

Respondent further claims that the ads did not create or reinforce misbeliefs because the campaign was ineffective in communicating its superiority message (again repeating a claim employed to attack materiality). Novartis argues that Doan's used a small advertising budget and relied on "worn out" ads. See e.g., RAB 16, 23; RRAB 1. Such a campaign, it claims, would be incapable of creating misbeliefs in the minds of consumers that would justify corrective advertising. This line of argument, however, is not only inconsistent with the evidence already discussed regarding the campaign's actual effects but is also belied by Ciba's actions during the campaign, which evince its reliance on the campaign.

Ciba continually refined its marketing plans in response to changing demographic information. Ciba conducted research to define precisely the target audience of backache sufferers and revised its media plans accordingly. For example, after learning that its target audience was disproportionately female and Southern, the yearly marketing plans considered these factors in developing media strategies and ad placement. CX 335-z-14; CX 343-z-64. Ciba's decision to test Spanish radio ads in Houston during short periods in 1991 and 1993 is another example of Ciba's responsiveness to changing demographics. Similarly, when competitors entered the market, Doan's responded through defensive advertising. When Nuprin Backache was introduced in the first half of 1993, Ciba increased Doan's television advertising budget by approximately $500,000. CX 357-b. When Bayer Select Backache was introduced, Ciba increased its spending to run more advertising during the new product's introductory period. CX 378-k. A Marketing Director wrote that Doan's used "a consistent strong advertising campaign to defend and even build share in the face of these new competitors." CX 399-b.

Finally, Novartis' resort to market share data and statistics wholly fails to show that the ads could not have created or reinforced consumer misbeliefs. Respondent claims that Doan's unit sales actually declined during the relevant period; that even when measured against OTC analgesics used to treat backache, Doan's market share stood at 5%; that Doan's was unable to increase its sales and market
share even after dropping its price, and that any increases in factory or consumer dollar sales resulted from the introduction of the Extra Strength and PM lines. RAB 17-19. In fact, the sales volume fluctuated during these years rather than declining and Novartis' expert, Dr. Scheffman, relied upon incomplete data that did not extend beyond 1993. RX 189-a. Volume sales increased by 10% in 1995. CX 402-c; CX 408-h. Further, Doan's share of the total analgesic category grew from 0.8 to 0.9% between 1993 and August 1995, a 12.5% increase, and there was nearly an 80% increase in factory sales. JX 2B ¶17. Moreover, in a mature market, a key criterion for advertising success is maintenance of market share. Stewart Tr. 3467. And, a variety of marketing plans during the relevant period indicate that sales were responding well to ads. CX 360-z-43; CX 393-q; CX 408-i. Accordingly, we conclude that the challenged ad campaign was successful, and that the challenged ads created or reinforced misbeliefs among consumers regarding the superior efficacy of Doan's.

2. The Effects of the Challenged Ads Are Likely to Linger.

We next turn to the question whether the misimpressions caused or reinforced by the challenged advertisements are likely to linger in the absence of corrective advertising.

The NFO study, conducted six months after the ads ceased, demonstrates that 77% of Doan's users and 45% of those who were aware of but did not use Doan's believed that the product was superior to other brands for the treatment of back pain. These percentages are disproportionately high for both groups relative to other brands. Thus, the NFO study shows that, for at least six

37 Respondent also argues that the low share of usage, conversion rates, and advertising penetration data demonstrate that consumers do not believe that Doan's is more effective than other analgesics for the relief of back pain. RRAB 59-60. At best, these factors serve as an inexact proxy for consumer beliefs. The direct evidence shows that consumers believed that Doan's was superior to other OTC analgesic products.

38 Respondent's arguments that the NFO study is flawed, RRAB 67-71, are without merit. As noted above, the NFO study used an appropriately restricted universe, and its protocol was proper and provided reliable results. Respondent argues that the absence of follow-up validation procedures renders the data unreliable. But all experts agreed that the purpose of validation is to deter and detect interviewer misconduct, Mazis Tr. 1128; Lavidge Tr. 788; Jacoby Tr. 2950-51. We therefore find that this mail panel study (which did not utilize an interviewer) did not require validation. Respondent's concern that the wrong household members may have completed the survey questionnaires, thereby rendering the results unreliable, is unwarranted. The study employed mechanisms to account for this possibility, Clark Tr. 40-41, and eliminated questionable responses.
months after the challenged ads stopped being aired, their effect continued to linger.

A Novartis expert, Dr. James Jaccard, re-analyzed the NFO data, attempting to measure the magnitude of the differences in brand attribute ratings, RX 132 f-o, and to demonstrate that there likely are not meaningful differences in brand efficacy beliefs held by those who use or are aware of Doan’s and those who use or are aware of other OTC analgesics. Jaccard Tr. 1427. In fact, Dr. Jaccard’s testimony does not undermine the conclusions of Dr. Mazis and the NFO study.

First, Dr. Jaccard has no expertise regarding the OTC analgesic market and does not know whether any of the differences in effectiveness beliefs in the NFO study were significant. Jaccard Tr. 1523. Second, he conceded that traditional null hypothesis testing, as used by Dr. Mazis, is the dominant analytic technique, Jaccard Tr. 1510, and that his own approach is not common. Jaccard Tr. 1444-45. Third, Dr. Jaccard acknowledged that the differences observed in the NFO study might be practically significant. Jaccard Tr. 1450-51.

A number of factors that support the results of the NFO study also support an inference that consumers' false beliefs are likely to endure. See American Home Prods., 98 FTC at 411. Specifically, the challenged claims were (1) very salient to consumers (because superior efficacy is among the primary considerations for a consumer in selecting a back pain remedy), (2) clearly and consistently conveyed by the challenged ads, and (3) an integral part of an eight-year campaign. Respondent spent approximately $65,000,000 disseminating these claims, primarily in fifteen-second ads whose primary message was the false superiority claim. The ads reached between 80 and 90% of Doan’s target audience approximately 20 to 27 times each year. JX 2F ¶28. A likelihood of lingering effects can also be inferred from copy tests, which demonstrated that consumers drew a superiority claim from the Doan’s ads after just one or two exposures. 39 See Warner Lambert, 86 FTC at 1470.

Finally, Novartis questions the significance of the NFO study results. Dr. Mazis analyzed the different sets of ratings for joint users of Doan’s and one of the other five brands and found that, on average, 25% more people rated Doan’s as superior for back pain relief. IDF 263. The comparative analysis for non-users who were aware of several products revealed that, on average, 20% more people rated Doan’s superior. IDF 265. This demonstrates a strong difference in beliefs among these groups. Mazis Tr. 1196-1199.

39 Dr. Mazis testified that the beliefs are likely to linger in light of the length and effectiveness of the ads, the fact that they stressed the superiority claim repeatedly, and the recall evidence from the copy tests. Mazis Tr. 1255-56.
Novartis' expert, Dr. Scheffman, testified that any misimpression created by the Doan's ads is not likely to linger due to Doan's insignificant advertising spending and the placement, length, and frequency of the challenged advertising compared to the amount of advertising in the OTC analgesic marketplace. Scheffman Tr. 2612-13. We reject the argument that market share, total sales, or the relative size of the advertising budget determine whether a misbelief is likely to linger. All of these factors go primarily to the purported magnitude of the harm created by the deceptive ads and not to the likelihood that the misbelief will linger. Moreover, niche marketers who engage in deceptive campaigns should not be immune from a corrective advertising requirement simply because of the relative size of their advertising budget or market shares.

Respondent also contrasts the evidence of lingering misbeliefs in Warner-Lambert, in which we ordered corrective advertising, to that in cases where we declined to order corrective advertising. RRAB 96. Novartis argues that we have rejected corrective advertising in three cases where challenged ads were disseminated for a longer period of time than those in this case, where the advertising budget for the challenged campaign was larger, and where there was higher consumer recall of the specific challenged claims. RRAB 47.

We disagree that such a comparison counsels against corrective advertising here. First, we have frequently noted that the amount of evidence in Warner Lambert was unusually strong and far exceeded the threshold needed to impose corrective advertising. "We emphasize that we do not believe corrective advertising may only be imposed where there is an evidentiary basis like that in Warner-Lambert." American Home Prods., 98 FTC at 408 n.93 (citations omitted.). Second, none of the three cases relied upon by respondent involved comparable evidence to support a corrective advertising remedy. In Bristol-Myers Co., 102 FTC 21 (1983), complaint counsel introduced "no evidence" that misbeliefs would likely linger. Id. at 380. We declined to infer a likelihood of lingering solely from the face of the challenged ads. Id. Similarly, in American Home Products

In any event, in a mature market, such as OTC analgesics, a central purpose of advertising is to retain current users and a key criterion for an ad campaign's success is whether it is succeeding in maintaining share, particularly in the face of a competitive onslaught. IDF 335; Stewart Tr. 3467. We find that Doan's was able to maintain and even increase its sales in light of the competitive pressures of new entrants in the back pain category and affirm the ALJ's finding on this point. IDF 336.

See, supra, footnote 23.
we refused to infer a likelihood of lingering merely from the nature of the ads notwithstanding a total absence of evidence on that issue in the record.\textsuperscript{42} 98 FTC at 409. In \textit{Sterling Drug, Inc.}, 102 FTC 395 (1983), we found that the misrepresentations had not created or reinforced misbeliefs in light of studies conducted both before and after the challenged campaign revealing the same levels of consumer misbeliefs.\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.} at 798. These cases are easily distinguished from this one, where extensive evidence supports each prong of the corrective advertisement test.\textsuperscript{44}

Respondent next contends that low unaided brand awareness, evinced by consumer survey testing, demonstrates that the ads did not convince consumers that Doan's is more effective than other brands,\textsuperscript{45} RAB 39-40, 73-75; RRAB 59, and thus no misbeliefs can linger. The advertising penetration data are not probative. Apart from the serious methodological flaws with the belief studies noted above,\textsuperscript{46} this low brand awareness -- even assuming it exists -- is relevant only to the magnitude of the harm that respondent's false ads caused, and not to the likelihood that such harm as was caused will linger.

The ALJ found that the ARS and ASI studies, revealing 2 to 8\% recall of a "more effective" or a "good product/better/best" message after 24 and 72 hours, suggest that any misbelief may be transitory. \textit{Id} at 64. We disagree. These were communication studies that asked what the ad said or showed, not what consumers believed about the product. The data from these tests thus do not establish the nonexistence of consumer misbeliefs. Consumers may hold beliefs about a product without recalling advertising that contributed to such

\textsuperscript{42} Some of the claims in that case were also secondary to the main message of the ads. 98 FTC at 408.

\textsuperscript{43} Complaint Counsel in that case conceded that the frequency of misbeliefs was not altered by the challenged ad campaign, but argued that the misbeliefs "nonetheless became 'sharper'" as a result thereof. 102 FTC at 799.

\textsuperscript{44} The dissent's emphasis upon the duration of the advertising campaign and dollars spent in these cases neglects the absence in those cases of sufficient evidence demonstrating a likelihood of lingering misbeliefs. This analysis cannot be reduced to a rigid algorithmic inquiry.

\textsuperscript{45} The Aleve Tracking Study indicates that Doan's had a 2 to 3\% unaided brand awareness in December 1994 and June 1995, respectively. RX 101-t. None of the 423 respondents in the Whitcup belief study reported "top-of-mind" awareness of Doan's advertising. RX 2-0.

\textsuperscript{46} For example, the Aleve Tracking Study focused on general analgesics and was not confined to backache sufferers; thus, it is not surprising that consumers did not mention Doan's, which is not marketed as a general analgesic. Moreover, Novartis' own expert, Dr. Jacoby, conceded that penetration studies are of questionable value in measuring consumer beliefs about a product. People can form and retain beliefs based upon an ad without recalling it. Jacoby Tr. 3201.
beliefs. See Jacoby Tr. 3201. This is especially true with respect to a credence good, such as an OTC analgesic, for which consumers cannot easily evaluate the truth or falsity of claims. Moreover, the studies do not even purport to measure the duration of misbeliefs among those who were, in fact, misled, which is, after all, the relevant inquiry.

The record establishes that consumers held misbeliefs about Doan's superior efficacy, that such beliefs were created by or substantially reinforced by the challenged advertising campaign, and that those beliefs are likely to linger into the future. Therefore, we find that the elements for corrective advertising are satisfied, and that corrective advertising is appropriate and necessary.

Corrective advertising is appropriate for an additional reason. We previously discussed the factors which, separate from the NFO study, support an inference that misbeliefs about the superior claim are likely to linger. Another inference arises under these facts. We cannot turn a blind eye to the obvious relationship between an absolute efficacy claim ("this product works"), which Doan's has been running for ninety years, and a comparative efficacy claim ("this product works better than others"). Given that Novartis' advertising campaign fostered a symbiotic relationship between these two claims, simply to permit Novartis to return to its ninety-year old positioning of Doan's as a backache product makes it all the more likely the misbeliefs will linger -- absent some corrective action.

3. Content of the Corrective Message

Dr. Mazis testified that, as a general matter, proper corrective advertising accomplishes its intended effect of dissipating misbeliefs over time. IDF 358-59. Studies designed to track the impact of corrective advertising imposed in RJR Foods, Inc., 83 FTC 7 (1973) and Warner Lambert support this conclusion. IDF 360.

The corrective message should (1) state that Doan's products are effective; (2) correct the lingering misbelief that Doan's products are superior to other products; and (3) permit respondent to continue to advertise Doan's specifically for back pain.47 The following corrective message proposed by complaint counsel satisfies all of these requirements: "Although Doan's is an effective pain reliever,

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47 The FDA monograph allows pain-specific advertising, and Novartis is free to make claims specifically allowed by FDA.
there is no evidence that Doan's is more effective than other pain relievers for back pain." We find that this slightly longer version of the corrective message is more balanced than the suggested alternatives for shorter television or radio ads. We recognize the FDA monograph allows pain specific advertising and do not want to impede Novartis' ability to make claims specifically allowed by FDA. For all these reasons, the corrective message in the present matter is inevitably somewhat complex.

Both parties conducted studies to test the effectiveness of this corrective message. Dr. Mazis tested the message in FSIs in a telephone survey involving 370 consumers. Dr. Mazis concluded that the corrective message was effectively communicated with a very low level of miscommunication of the unintended message that Doan's is less effective. Dr. Jacoby criticized the study because he did not believe that a mail panel method was appropriate to test the corrective message as a general matter. He also criticized the use of FSIs to test the corrective message since FSIs were not a large part of the advertising campaign.

Dr. Whitcup conducted a study of the same corrective message using a mall intercept methodology with the corrective message placed on the product package. Dr. Whitcup concluded that the corrective message did not convey the intended message to consumers -- of the 35% who saw the disclaimer, 10% got it wrong. Dr. Whitcup argued that number to be high given the small number who recalled the disclaimer at all. Accordingly, he concluded that the corrective message did not do a good job of communicating its message. Dr. Mazis criticized the Whitcup study, noting that the

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48 Of the respondents, 145 were Doan's users and 225 were non-users who were aware of Doan's. CX 489.

49 In response to the question, "What did the ad say or imply about Doan's?" 38% of the participants indicated that Doan's was the same as or was not proven to be better than other medicines. Only 3 to 4% indicated that it was better or worse. CX 489-p. In response to closed-ended questions regarding what the ad said or implied about Doan's effectiveness for back pain in comparison to other medicines, 69% replied that it was the same or not proven to be better. Between 5 and 8.8% reported that it was better or worse. CX 489-x. Finally, in response to closed-ended questions about what was implied or stated, 75% agreed that the ad implied that Doan's is about as effective for back pain as other OTC pain relievers. None said it was less effective and 17% said it was more effective. CX 489-z.

50 In response to an opened-ended question asking what the package said, showed or implied about the product, 15% responded that they understood that Doan's was not more effective than other pain relievers. RX 110-q. In response to a closed-ended question as to whether the package compared effectiveness of the product to the effectiveness of other pain relievers, 35% said yes, but 6% said the product was better and 4% said it was worse and 24% said it was the same. RX 110-v.
corrective message appeared in a cluttered context. He found that the message was inconspicuous and difficult to read. Mazis Tr. 1353-56.

We find that the Mazis study is probative of the effectiveness of the corrective message. We also find that the Whitcup package study actually confirms the effectiveness of the corrective message. We believe that the different levels of communication between the Whitcup product package study and the Mazis FSI study result from their differences in the conspicuousness of the disclosure and the fact that packages contain a great deal more information than advertising.

Although we have no data to determine at what level the message would be communicated in a 15-second television or radio ad, we believe that the corrective message would be difficult to communicate in such a short ad without unduly restricting respondent's ability to also convey its advertising message. Accordingly, we require that the corrective message appear on all advertising except television and radio ads that are 15 seconds or less in duration. The corrective message must also appear on the product package. Including the corrective message on the product packaging is especially important because, as Dr. Whitcup testified, packaging is a particularly ubiquitous form of advertising in that people have to pick up the product in order to purchase it. Dr. Whitcup also noted that in deciding what product to buy, consumers may compare packages. See Whitcup Tr. 2286.

We reject complaint counsel's recommendation that the duration of the corrective message be determined by a performance standard. In Egglands Best, we required the corrective message to appear on the package for one year. 118 FTC 340, 357. In Warner Lambert, we required the corrective message to appear in all advertising until the respondent had expended a sum equal to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for a ten-year period. 86 FTC 1514-1515. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating: "[T]he corrective advertising order in this case, by tying the quantity of correction required to the investment in deception, is tailored to serve the legitimate governmental interest in correcting public misimpressions as to the value of Listerine and no more." In a footnote, the court went on to say: "As a result, any imprecision in the order's scope would seem likely to inure to Warner-Lambert's benefit." 562 F.2d 771.

We believe that a hybrid approach -- advertising expenditures and specific length of time -- is the best method for determining when the
corrective message should terminate. If we were to require that the corrective message appear in advertising until Novartis has expended a specific amount of money on advertising, Novartis could choose to advertise for a short period of time in an expensive way. If we were to require the corrective message to appear only for a specific period of time, then Novartis could choose not to advertise for that period of time.\(^{51}\) Accordingly, we order that the corrective message appear for one year on all packaging and advertising, except radio and television ads of 15 seconds or less in duration, and until Novartis has expended on Doan's advertising an amount equal to the average spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign.\(^{52}\) In contrast to complaint counsel's proposed performance standard, as the Court of Appeals found in the \textit{Warner Lambert} matter, any imprecision in the scope of the order is likely to inure to Novartis' benefit.\(^{53}\)

Respondent argues that complaint counsel's proposed corrective advertising order violates the First Amendment. RRAB 106. Respondent argues that the corrective message does not convey the intended message and may be confusing. In addition, it argues that the corrective notice will be punitive because it will have a negative influence on consumers' beliefs about Doan's. RRAB 104. Further, it argues that the message would force it to abandon the 15-second ad format. RRAB 110. Finally, it argues that the corrective message "carries an unacceptable risk of forcing Doan's to abandon its back pain specific positioning and thus forcing Doan's off the market." RRAB 106. These arguments rely on respondent's assumption that the corrective message could be perpetual because of the performance standard suggested by complaint counsel.

We reject these arguments. First, the corrective remedy is of a finite duration. Second, it will not force respondent to abandon 15-second ads because it does not apply to such ads. Third, the corrective message was effectively communicated and is not unduly confusing or misleading. Finally, it is not punitive to require respondent to tell the truth.

\(^{51}\) Indeed, an internal Novartis document suggests that if we order corrective advertising, they could stop advertising for three years. \textit{See CX 110-c}.

\(^{52}\) Respondents spent $65.3 million on advertising between 1988 and 1996. \textit{JX 2d ¶ 21}. The average annual expenditure on advertising is $8 million.

\(^{53}\) Dr. Mazis' expert testimony was that the belief that Doan's is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain will likely linger for a long time after the claim is no longer disseminated. \textit{Mazis Tr. 1255-56}. Dr. Mazis' expert opinion is supported by three empirical studies that evaluated the effects of Commission corrective advertising orders. \textit{IDF 359}. 


We now turn to the specific First Amendment arguments. Respondent asserts that complaint counsel's proposed corrective advertising provision would prevent it from truthful speech and require it to underwrite speech about the merits of other brands. RRAB 107-108. It relies on *Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation*, 512 U.S. 136 (1994). That case involved a reprimand by the Florida Board of Accountancy ("Board") of a Florida attorney for including her Certified Public Accountant and Certified Financial Planner credentials in her advertising and other communication to the public. *Id.* at 139-41. The United States Supreme Court noted that the challenged statements were true and that the government had nothing more than speculation or conjecture to support its fear that the listing of her credentials would, in fact, mislead consumers, by implying compliance with the relevant state accountancy regulations. *Id.* at 143, 144-47. In the present matter, we are not dealing with an across-the-board ban on truthful speech as was the case in *Ibanez*, but with commercial speech which was subject to an adjudicative proceeding and was found to be deceptive.

While commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, misleading speech is not protected and may be banned entirely. *Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n*, 477 U.S. 557 (1980). Nonmisleading commercial speech may be regulated if the regulation meets a three-prong test: (1) the government's interest in regulating the speech must be substantial; (2) the regulation must materially and directly advance these interests; and (3) the regulation must be no more extensive than is necessary. 54 *Id.* at 566.

We apply the *Central Hudson* test to the facts of this case. First, the government has a substantial interest in protecting consumers from deception. *See Warner Lambert*, 562 F.2d at 771. Thus, the first prong of the test is satisfied.

With respect to the second prong, we find that the corrective advertising remedy directly and materially advances the aforementioned governmental interest. We have determined that the challenged advertising has created or substantially reinforced misbeliefs in the minds of consumers and that those beliefs are likely to linger into the future. As discussed above, the corrective

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54 Although decided before *Central Hudson*, *Warner-Lambert* addressed the First Amendment issue and concluded that the First Amendment did not bar a corrective advertising order. 562 F.2d 768-71 (supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing).
advertising remedy we order has been copy tested by both parties, and the results show that it effectively communicates the desired message. Accordingly, we conclude that the corrective advertising remedy advances the governmental interest in preventing future deception by correcting the lingering effects of Doan’s past false advertising.

Finally, we conclude that the remedy is no more extensive than necessary. Our order is narrowly drafted to correct the misbelief at issue. We have balanced the need for correcting the lingering misbeliefs of consumers against Novartis’ ability to advertise effectively. In doing so, we have been mindful of imposing less restrictive alternatives where appropriate. Therefore, we have specifically exempted television and radio ads whose duration is 15 seconds or less to achieve the proper balance. Accordingly, we find that the last prong of Central Hudson has been satisfied.

V. CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the entire record and after consideration of all the arguments made by the parties, we believe that Doan’s advertising claims were material, the required elements of corrective advertising have been satisfied, and a corrective advertising remedy is appropriate.

APPENDIX

I. THE ATTITUDE & USAGE STUDY

After acquiring the Doan’s brand, Ciba wanted to gain a better understanding of the backache category and engaged Arbor, Inc. to conduct an Attitude & Usage Study ("A&U"). CX 221. The specific goals of the 1987 A&U study were to determine awareness and use of Doan’s user profiles, brand perception, and reactions to a new Doan’s concept.\(^1\) CX 221-h. A total of 390 telephone interviews were conducted.\(^2\) Almost all respondents were aware of Doan’s. CX 221-t. Despite Doan’s high brand and advertising awareness, Doan’s has been tried by less than one third of backache sufferers. CX 221-v.

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\(^1\) The new concept was an extra strength product.

\(^2\) Respondents were qualified if they were 18 years or older, suffered from backaches in an average six month period, usually treat backaches with either prescription or non prescription products, and either purchase the products themselves or decide what product is to be bought. An additional 45 consumer who had used Doan’s in the past six months were included in the study in order to have 75 users. CX 221-i.
In the portion of the study relating to brand perception, one question asked the respondents to rate the brands they were aware of on 14 different attributes. One of the attributes listed was: "Is the most effective pain reliever you can buy for backaches." CX 221-x. The results for this question show that on mean values, Doan's was at 4.4, which was third after Extra-Strength Tylenol, 5.1, and Advil, 4.8. Bayer was fourth at 4.2. CX 221-z-72.

A summary memorandum from the Ciba consumer research department regarding the A&U study to Hal Russo, a member of the marketing department, described the results of the study by saying:

Overall, Doan's competes in a broad arena, dominated by general purpose analgesics. Doan's has a weak image in comparison to the leading brands of analgesics and would benefit from positioning itself as a more effective product that is strong enough for the types of backache sufferers usually get. Care must be taken in positioning the brand as efficacious so that Doan's is not perceived to be only for very bad back pain. Being seen as for only back pain appears to limit usage occasions and may cause the product to be seen as too strong for frequent use. (emphasis in the original) CX 221-c,d.

The study also noted: STRONG ENOUGH FOR ME is the most important dimension tested and was almost twice as important as the next most important dimension GOOD VALUE. MAXIMUM STRENGTH AND SAFE are the next most important. If a brand is perceived as being for BAD PAIN ONLY, it loses on preferences. Being BACKACHE SPECIFIC is not important. (emphasis in the original) CX 221-z-7.

The study also revealed that Doan’s users are more likely to claim to use Extra-Strength Tylenol more often than they are to use Doan’s. CX 221-z-21.

The results of the A&U study were used to help create new Doan’s advertising. The first new Doan’s ad that was created and disseminated after this study was the "Graph" ad. Peabody Tr. 146.

II. BRAND EQUITY STUDY

Five years later, in 1993, Ciba conducted the Brand Equity Study—CX 256. The goal of the study was to establish the current equity and brand image of Doan’s and its major competitors in the backache category, to explore how the Doan’s position might be optimized versus the incumbent competition, and to establish if there were any other categories where there might be an opportunity for Doan’s. CX 256-f. The study was conducted via mall intercept in 10 locations. A total of 336 interviews were conducted among males and females.
who suffer from back pain and treat their back pain with OTC products in pill form. All of the respondents were aware of Doan's.

One aspect of the Brand Equity study was to evaluate how Doan's was perceived on a set of attributes compared to other analgesics used to treat back pain. Specifically, one question listed 21 attributes and used a grid of six boxes adjacent to each of the attributes. The left hand box was labeled "Unacceptable, brand couldn't be worse." The right hand box was labeled "Ideal, nothing could make brand better." In the middle, above the dividing line on the grid, was the label "Good." Respondents were asked to rate each of a group of analgesics products they were aware of for the treatment of back pain on each of the 21 attributes.

Dr. Mazis created a summary of some of the data obtained from this question because the report itself did not contain a detailed discussion of the results. The data for both users and aware non-users are presented both in terms of "top box" - the right hand box rated "ideal" -- and the "top two box" results -- the boxes to the left of "Ideal." For users of the products, about twice as many people put Doan's in the top box of being particularly effective for back pain as compared to the three all-purpose analgesics -- Tylenol, Advil, and Motrin. For Doan's aware non-users, the results were also higher than for the other brands, albeit at a lower level.

An Executive Summary describing the study to Ciba management highlights one of the key findings as: "The brand is seen as particularly effective for back pain, and as having a special ingredient." The FY '95 Marketing Plan suggests continuing to build on Doan's heritage as "The Back Specialist." It noted that the '93 Brand Equity Study that showed the specificity of Doan's positioning as communicated by the "Back Specialist" has helped differentiate the brand from other pain relievers. It went on to note that: "Clearly this unique positioning has contributed to this as the Equity Study showed the top two attribute ratings for Doan's were ingredients especially for back pain (49%) and Effective for back pain (44%)".

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3 Twenty percent of aware non-users rated Doan's top box for the attribute particularly effective for back pain, while 7.1% put Extra Strength Tylenol in the Top Box category, 5.3% did for Advil, 6.6% for Motrin IB.
III. NFO STUDY

Dr. Mazis conducted a belief study for this litigation using National Family Opinion, Inc. ("NFO") a marketing research company which provides mail panel research. Mail panel research involves mailing research instruments to individuals who have previously agreed to serve as survey respondents. These individuals then complete and return the research instrument to NFO by mail. NFO sent a screener questionnaire to 40,000 households in October 1996 to identify back pain sufferers/treaters who were Doan's users or aware non-users. CX 420-h. In December 1996, NFO conducted a follow-up survey consisting of 400 Doan's users and 400 Doan's aware non-users selected on a random basis from the larger population of both groups identified on the multi-card screening survey. CX 421-h.

Dr. Mazis concluded that users and aware non-users constituted the appropriate universe for testing beliefs because those who had never heard of the product could not have beliefs about the product. Mazis Tr. 1122. The purpose of the study was to assess beliefs on a number of attributes, but in particular, the "more effective for back pain" attribute and to compare the beliefs of users of Doan's to users of other analgesics for back pain relief, and aware non-users of Doan's to aware non-users of other analgesics. Mazis Tr. 1129-30. The purpose of comparing users and aware non-users was to take into account and control for usage effect. Mazis Tr. 1199-1201.

A total of 549 households returned surveys. CX 421-h. The results of the NFO belief study summarized in CX 482 show that over three-

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4 The mail panel NFO maintains is a bank of over 500,000 households who have agreed, in advance, to participate in research projects. Clarke Tr. 9.

5 The questionnaire presented ten attribute statements and asked respondents to rate each statement on a seven-point scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. CX 421-z-12. The list of ten belief attributes was chosen to include the belief of primary interest in this case, "Is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief," as well as two other belief statements that tracked claims made in Doan's advertising: "Has an ingredient especially for back pain" and "Is just for back pain." Mazis Tr. 1133. The other attributes were: (1) Is just for headaches, (2) Is safe to use, (3) Has an ingredient especially for headaches, (4) Is gentle on the stomach, (5) Is effective for all kinds of pain, (6) Is more effective than other OTC pain relievers for back pain relief, and (7) Is safer to use than other OTC pain relievers. CX 421-z-12. In addition, each questionnaire also asked respondents to write in their age and sex in spaces provided at the end of the questionnaire as a control procedure to guard against the possibility that the wrong member of the household completed the questionnaire. When the questionnaires were returned, NFO cross-checked this age and sex information against their records. Clarke Tr. 40.

6 The marketing phenomenon called "usage effect" is the tendency of users of a product to give the product a higher rating than non-users of the product. Mazis Tr. 992.
quarters (77%) of the Doan’s users believe Doan’s is superior. Between 41 and 62% of users of other brands reported superiority beliefs about their brands. Forty-five percent of Doan’s aware non-users held a superiority belief about Doan’s, whereas only 17 to 35% of aware non-users of the comparison brands believed those products to be superior to other analgesics. Dr. Mazis concluded that the data for both Doan’s users and aware non-users compared to users or aware non-users of each of the five other OTC analgesic products\(^7\) show that the level of superiority beliefs for Doan’s is substantially higher than it is for any of the competing products. Mazis Tr. 1151.

Dr. Mazis also undertook an analysis of joint users and joint aware non-users of the various products in order to compare their beliefs about Doan’s and their beliefs about other products. Mazis Tr. 1159. This analysis shows disproportionate percentages of both Doan’s users and aware non-users believing that Doan’s is more effective for back pain. For example, Dr. Mazis looked at individuals who used both Advil and Doan’s and compared their beliefs about Advil to their beliefs about Doan’s. On average, the proportion of joint users agreeing that Doan’s is more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics was 26% higher than those agreeing that the other brands were more effective. IDF 262, 263; Mazis Tr. 1171-74. This analysis was done for each set of products for aware non-users. On average the proportion of joint aware non-users agreeing that Doan’s was more effective for back pain than other OTC analgesics is almost 20% higher than the proportion agreeing that the other brands were more effective. IDF 264, 265; Mazis Tr. 1175-76. Using a two-tailed test, Dr. Mazis calculated that all of the observed differences in the user-to-user comparison for the attribute "more effective for back pain" were statistically significant at the .05 level, as were four of the five\(^8\) aware non-user to aware non-user comparisons for the same attribute. Mazis Tr. 1187-89. Dr. Mazis also analyzed the NFO data by applying the Bonferroni adjustment to correct for experiment-wise error. Even after making these adjustments, the results remained statistically significant. Mazis Tr. 1190-96.

\(^7\) Advil, Aleve, Bayer, Motrin, and Tylenol.

\(^8\) The Motrin non-user non-user comparison was not statistically significant at the .05 level. Mazis Tr. 1189.
IV. ALEVE TRACKING STUDY

In 1994, Procter & Gamble introduced Aleve. Weeks after introduction, Aleve became the number 3 brand with a 6.5% share of the $2.6 billion general analgesic category. RX 101-c. The advertising compared Aleve to other brands directly by name. In 1995, Ciba conducted the Aleve Tracking Study with the objective of monitoring the first year's progress of Aleve's national introduction in order to determine the impact on the OTC analgesic category generally, on major brands, and on the backache segment in particular. RX 101-d. Telephone interviews were conducted in two waves among nationally-projectable samples of those 18 years of age or older who used an analgesic product in the past year. RX 101-e.

In connection with the study, Ciba obtained information about Doan's. The results of this study indicate that Doan's had between a 2 and 3% unaided brand awareness among the respondents. RX 101-t. However, on an aided basis, the results were higher at between 71 and 75%. RX 101-u.

V. JACOBY STUDY

Dr. Jacoby's study, conducted in late 1996, for this litigation, sought to measure both the materiality of the challenged claim as well as the beliefs created or reinforced by the Doan's campaign. Specifically, he sought to determine whether consumers exposed to the challenged Doan's advertising extracted a "more effective" claim, the basis for such a claim, and whether any such "more effective" claim was material to consumers. In addition, Dr. Jacoby also sought to determine whether there were any lingering effects of the implied superiority claim RX 5-z-82, 83. The study tested consumer beliefs first, without exposure to the challenged ads.

Dr. Jacoby's universe included 684 men and women, at least 18 years old, who in the past year had purchased, or in the past six months had used, a non-prescription medicine to relieve backache or back pain. RX 5-z-85, 87. Dr. Jacoby specifically included consumers who were not aware of Doan's as long as they satisfied the other criteria. Jacoby Tr. 2936. The study was conducted via mall

9 Of the respondents, between 39 and 42% had used an OTC pain reliever in the past year to treat a backache. RX 101-z-33.

10 Dr. Jacoby's universe included people who may not have suffered from back pain, but purchased the product. Dr. Jacoby reanalyzed the data after becoming aware of this fact and concluded that 95% of his survey respondents were themselves backache sufferers/treaters. Jacoby Tr. 3140.
intercept in sixteen geographically dispersed markets, in each U.S. Census Division. RX 5-z-89.

The first three questions asked the respondents which products they had used during the past year. By aggregating the answers to these questions, the data show that 21%, or 123 respondents had used Doan’s; 71% had used Tylenol; 58% Advil; 31% Aleve; 28% Motrin; and 21% Bayer. RX 5-z-104. There is no information in the study as to what percent of the respondents were aware of Doan’s. Next, respondents were asked whether certain brands were more effective. Seven percent of the 684 respondents rated Doan’s as more effective, compared to 13% who reported Advil more effective, and 12% who reported that Tylenol is more effective. RX 5-z-105. When analyzing the data further, 38% of the Doan’s users reported Doan’s as "more effective" in contrast to 23% of Advil and 17% of Tylenol users who reported their brands as more effective. *Id.* The study also showed that many more respondents attributed their usage of Doan’s to personal experience (42%) than to advertising (11%).RX 5-z-108-09. Dr. Jacoby also asked whether the respondents recalled any advertising and what it is they recalled from the advertising. The results indicate that for Doan’s users, 48% did not recall any ads and that of those who did recall advertising, 44% remember a visual about the ad, 36% mentioned relief of back pain, and 3% mentioned superiority.12 RX 5-z-110.

VI. WHITCUP STUDY

Dr. Whitcup’s belief study was conducted, for this litigation, between February and April 1996. RX 2. It attempted to measure consumer awareness of Doan’s and of Doan’s advertising. Specifically, Dr. Whitcup attempted to access consumer beliefs about Doan’s concerning its effectiveness for relief of back pain that may be the results of prior advertising, product usage, word of mouth, and other factors, as well as to ascertain whether or not Doan’s is perceived by relevant consumers as containing a special ingredient for back pain that other OTC analgesics do not contain. RX 2-c.

There were a total of 423 respondents who were men and women aged 18 or older, who have used an OTC analgesic in pill form in the

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11 Interestingly, only users of Doan’s reported that advertising was the basis for their belief.

12 The ALJ stated that it was agreed at trial that the fact that respondents played back a general recall of Doan’s ads, does not establish that they did not form a superiority belief from their exposure to Doan’s ads. IDF 288.
past year, taken an OTC pain reliever in the past year for back pain, and have no one in their household employed in an industry or with atypical knowledge of pain relievers. Interviewing was conducted by telephone using random digit dialing. RX 2-e. The study was administered under "double blind" conditions where neither respondents nor interviewers were aware of the identity of the sponsor nor the true purpose of the study. RX 2-g. Only 35 respondents had used Doan’s RX 2-z-49. In contrast, 190 of the respondents had used Tylenol and 121 had used Advil. Id. As a result of the small number of Doan’s users in this study, Dr. Whitcup added the letter "c" ("caution small base") whenever he presented data based on their responses. See e.g. RX 2-q, s.

After screening for qualifications, respondents were asked a series of questions designed to measure their awareness and use of OTC analgesic brands and their advertising. RX 2-e. Specifically, the first question asked what brand of OTC pain relievers first came to mind. In response to this question 1% of the 423 respondents reported awareness of Doan’s in comparison to 51 and 18% of the 423 respondents who mentioned Tylenol and Advil. RX 2-n. Other questions asked respondents to recollect which OTC pain relievers they have seen or heard ads for. No respondents reported top-of-mind awareness of Doan’s advertising, in comparison to 36% and 20% who reported top-of-mind awareness for Tylenol and Advil respectively. RX 2-o. Other questions asked what brands respondents used in the past year to treat back pain. Eight percent indicated that they used Doan’s in comparison to 45% and 29% who indicated that they used Tylenol and Advil respectively. RX 2-p. Finally, in response to a question asking which brands were most effective, 8% believed Doan’s was more effective. RX 2-u. Dr. Whitcup acknowledged that the 8% superior efficacy belief measured for Doan’s is at about the same level as Tylenol and Advil. Whitcup Tr. 2816.

VII. THE LAVIDGE STUDY

The Lavidge Study was conducted from October 1996 through January 1997. RX 23-a. It was designed for this litigation with the purpose of determining both what claims the "muscles" ads conveyed and whether consumers held a belief that Doan’s contains an ingredient the other products do not have. RX 23-e. The universe included people 18 - 34 years of age who had experienced back pain
within the past 2 months and had taken OTC pain relievers for back pain within the past year. RX 23-f. Seventy one percent of the sample were unaware of Doan’s. RX 182.

The Lavidge study was divided into three tests with a total of 750 respondents. RX 23-b. This test was also conducted under double blind conditions using a mall intercept approach in ten cities throughout the U.S. RX 23-e. The respondents were shown TV ads for four OTC products marketed for the relief of back pain -- Advil, Bufferin, Doan’s and Tylenol. The Doan’s ad used in Tests 1 and 3 was the challenged Muscle’s ad, and the Doan’s ad used in Test 2 was an unchallenged Doan’s ad. Immediately after viewing the ads in Test 1 and Test 2, consumers were asked questions to evaluate the impact of the advertising on their beliefs. The Test 3 participants were asked follow-up questions 11 days later.

The study asked respondents questions about their beliefs after exposure to a clutter tape of ads which included both challenged and unchallenged Doan’s ads as well as three other 15 second ads for other analgesic products promoted for back pain relief. Immediately after viewing the ads, 57% of the 499 respondents in two of the tests indicated that they did not believe that any OTC analgesic was more effective than others for the relief of back pain RX 23-j; RX 181. After exposure to the challenged Muscle's ad, 5.2% of 249 respondents indicated that they believed that Doan’s was more effective for relieving back pain. RX 23-j. Six percent of 250 respondents who saw the unchallenged Muscle ad believed that Doan’s was more effective. RX 23-j; RX 181. In comparison, 10.6% of the 499 respondents believed that Tylenol was more effective and 9.6% believed that Advil was more effective. Id. Of those who saw the challenged Muscle’s ad and were questioned eleven days later, 3.1% believed that Doan’s was more effective. Id.
For purposes of this Order:

1. "Doan's" shall mean any over-the-counter analgesic drug, as "drug" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, bearing the Doan's brand name; including, but not limited to, Regular Strength Doan's analgesic, Extra Strength Doan's analgesic, and Extra Strength Doan's P.M. analgesic.

2. "Competent and reliable scientific evidence" shall mean tests, analyses, research, studies, or other evidence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that has been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.

3. "Advertisement" shall mean any written, oral or electronic statement, illustration or depiction which is designed to create interest in the purchasing of, impart information about the attitudes of, publicize the availability of, or affect the sale or use of goods or services, whether it appears in a brochure, newspaper, magazine, free standing insert, marketing kit, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert, letter, catalogue, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card, point-of-purchase display, package insert, package label, product instructions, electronic mail, website, homepage, film, slide, radio, television, cable television, program-length commercial or "infomercial," or in any other medium.

I.

It is ordered, That respondents Novartis Corporation, and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., corporations, their successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of Doan's or any other over-the-counter analgesic drug, in or affecting commerce, as "drug" and "commerce" are defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, do forthwith cease and desist from representing, in any manner, directly or by implication, that such product is more effective than other over-the-counter analgesic drugs for relieving back pain or any other particular kind of pain, unless, at the time of making such
representation, respondents possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation. For purposes of Part I of this Order, "competent and reliable scientific evidence" shall include at least two adequate and well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies which conform to acceptable designs and protocols and are conducted by different persons, each of whom is qualified by training and experience to conduct such studies, independently of each other.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondents Novartis Corporation, and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., corporations, their successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sales or distribution of Doan's or any over-the-counter analgesic drugs in or affecting commerce, as "drug" and "commerce" are defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, do forthwith cease and desist from making any representation, in any manner, directly or by implication, regarding such product's efficacy, safety, benefits, or performance, unless, at the time of making such representation, respondents possess and rely upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation.

III.

Nothing in this Order shall prohibit respondents from making any representation for any drug that is permitted in labeling for any such drug under any tentative final or final standard promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration, or under any new drug application approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondents Novartis Corporation, and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc., corporations, their successors and assigns, and their officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division or any device, do forthwith cease and desist from disseminating or causing the dissemination of any advertisement for Doan's in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, unless the advertising includes the following corrective notice, clearly and prominently, in the exact language that follows:

“Although Doan's is an effective pain reliever, there is no evidence that Doan's is more effective than other pain relievers for back pain.”

Provided, that respondents' obligation to include the corrective notice shall not be required for any television or radio advertisement of 15 seconds or less in duration.

Provided further, that respondents' obligation to include the corrective notice in all advertising shall continue for one year and until respondent has expended on Doan's advertising a sum equal to the average spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign.

V.

It is further ordered, That for a period of five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this Order, respondents or their successors and assigns, shall maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating such representation; and

B. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question such representation, or the basis relied upon for such representation, including complaints from consumers.

VI.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall:

A. Within thirty (30) days from the date this Order becomes effective, provide a copy of this Order to each of their current principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all personnel, agents, and representatives having sales, advertising, or policy responsibility with respect to the subject matter of this Order; and

B. For a period of ten (10) years from the date this Order becomes effective, provide a copy of this Order to each of their future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all personnel,
agents, and representatives having sales, advertising, or policy responsibility with respect to the subject matter of this Order who are associated with them or any subsidiary, successor, or assign, within three (3) days after the person assumes his or her position.

VII.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in their corporate structures, including, but not limited to, dissolution, assignment, or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or affiliates, or any other corporate change that may affect compliance obligations arising out of this Order.

VIII.

It is further ordered, That this Order will terminate twenty (20) years from the date this Order becomes effective, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the Order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any paragraph in this Order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This Order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This Order if such complaint is filed after the Order has terminated pursuant to this paragraph.

Provided further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondents did not violate any provision of the Order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the Order will terminate according to this paragraph as though the complaint was never filed, except that the Order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling, and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IX.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall, within sixty (60) days from the date this Order becomes effective, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied with this Order.

STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER ORSON SWINDELE
CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART

Today, the Commission has decided to order corrective advertising based on a full adjudicative record for the first time in nearly 25 years. I agree with my colleagues that respondents Novartis and Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. (collectively "Novartis" or "respondents") made the unsubstantiated claim that their Doan's analgesic product is superior to other over-the-counter ("OTC") analgesics in treating back pain ("the superior efficacy claim"). I also agree that the traditional cease-and-desist provisions contained in Parts I and II of the Order, which would prohibit Novartis from making the same or similar deceptive claims in the future, are necessary and appropriate. Unlike my colleagues, however, I conclude that the evidence does not support the imposition of the corrective advertising remedy contained in Part IV of the Order.

Corrective advertising is intended to prevent the harm to consumers and competition that is caused when a false belief engendered by prior deceptive advertising lingers. Novartis made an implied superior efficacy claim for Doan's through short television advertisements that have not been disseminated since May 1996. The majority concludes that these advertisements caused a false superior efficacy belief that has lingered and is likely to continue to linger until the corrective advertising provision terminates in July 2000 or beyond. I disagree with this conclusion, because the evidence offered to prove lingering effect is extremely weak, consisting mainly of inconclusive extrinsic evidence, indefinite expert testimony and broad inferences. This evidence is certainly far weaker than the evidence that proved the existence of a lingering effect in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977), modifying and enforcing 86 FTC 1398 (1975). I conclude that this weak evidence does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the false superior
efficacy belief is likely to linger until July 2000 or beyond. Therefore, the Commission cannot order corrective advertising in this case.

I also conclude that the corrective advertising requirement, which is a form of compelled speech, infringes on Novartis's right to engage in commercial speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Commission may compel Novartis to engage in corrective advertising only if the remedy "directly advances a substantial governmental interest" and is "no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest." *Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y.*, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Because it has not been proven that the false superior efficacy belief in this case is likely to linger, there is no false belief that needs to be corrected to prevent deception; therefore, corrective advertising cannot directly advance any substantial governmental interest. In addition, because the majority opinion has not given adequate consideration to alternatives to corrective advertising or to less restrictive alternatives to the all-media corrective advertising remedy imposed (such as a corrective statement on the product label or point-of-sale materials), the Commission has not shown that the prescribed corrective advertising requirement here is no more extensive than necessary to prevent deception.

Corrective advertising is an extraordinary remedy that can serve the salutary purpose of preventing harm to consumers and competition. I have supported the imposition of corrective advertising provisions in those rare instances where the legal standard for its imposition has been satisfied and the remedy was otherwise warranted. I will continue to support the use of corrective advertising remedies in appropriate cases. But I am not willing to support a corrective advertising remedy in this case because the adjudicated record does not prove that any false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger and because the imposition of the remedy would be unconstitutional.

I. DECEPTION AND TRADITIONAL RELIEF

Before I turn to the question of corrective advertising, let me make clear that I concur in the majority's conclusions that Novartis's superior efficacy claim was deceptive and that the traditional cease-and-desist relief imposed by the order is necessary and appropriate. Administrative Law Judge Lewis F. Parker ("the ALJ") concluded that Novartis had violated Sections 5 and 12 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, 52, by making the unsubstantiated claim that Doan's was superior to other OTC analgesics in treating back pain. Initial Decision ("ID") at 63-64. In its appeal from the ALJ's conclusion that the superior efficacy claim was deceptive, Novartis argued only that the claim was not material to consumers. I agree with the majority's conclusion that the superior efficacy claim was material, Majority Op. at 11-20, although not with all of the reasoning that supports this conclusion. Accordingly, I agree that Novartis engaged in deception in violation of Sections 5 and 12 of the FTC Act.

The Commission has wide discretion in choosing a remedy to prevent Novartis from engaging in the same or similar deception in the future. The Commission may include provisions in its cease-and-desist orders that go beyond prohibiting the repetition of the deception that has been found, so long as such "fencing-in" relief bears a "reasonable relation" to the unlawful practices found. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946). In determining the appropriate extent of fencing-in relief to remedy a law violation, the Commission considers the seriousness and deliberateness of the violations; the ease with which the unlawful conduct could be transferred to other products; and the respondent's history of violations. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC 40, 139-40 (1991), aff'd, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992); Thompson Medical Co., 104 FTC 648, 833 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

The Order here includes both core relief prohibiting Novartis from repeating its deceptive superior efficacy claim for Doan's and traditional fencing-in relief preventing similar violations. Part I prohibits Novartis from making any unsubstantiated claim that Doan's or any other OTC analgesic is more efficacious than other OTC analgesics for relieving back pain or any other particular type of pain. Part II also bars Novartis from making any unsubstantiated claim regarding the efficacy, safety, benefits, or performance of Doan's or any other OTC analgesic. Given the seriousness of

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1 The evidence does not prove that Novartis intended to make the claim or that it was able to charge a premium because of the challenged advertisements, Majority Op. at 13-15, and therefore I do not join in the majority's conclusion as to materiality to the extent that it relies on these findings. I agree with the majority that the effectiveness of the deceptive advertising campaign is not relevant to the issue of materiality, id. at 16-17, but I do not join in the majority's additional determination that the campaign was effective.
deceptive health claims and the ease with which Novartis could make similar unsubstantiated claims for Doan's or other OTC analgesics, both the core relief and the fencing-in relief included in Parts I and II of the Order are necessary and appropriate.

II. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING

The majority also would require Novartis to undertake corrective advertising. Part IV of the Order mandates that Novartis make a specified corrective statement in all of its "advertising"2 (except television or radio advertisements of 15 seconds or less in duration) for "one year and until the respondents have expended on Doan's advertising a sum equal to the average amount spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign." The prescribed corrective statement is: "Although Doan's is an effective pain reliever, there is no evidence that Doan's is more effective than other pain relievers for back pain."

A. Legal Standard

Corrective advertising is a type of fencing-in relief for which the court in Warner-Lambert adopted a higher standard than the "reasonably related" standard applicable to traditional forms of fencing-in relief. Warner-Lambert, 562 F. 2d at 762.3 In Warner-Lambert, the respondent spent "vast sums" on a 51-year advertising campaign making the false claim that Listerine mouthwash was effective in treating colds and sore throats. 86 FTC at 1468, 1502. In affirming the Commission's imposition of an approximately one-year corrective advertising requirement, the court held the Commission could impose a corrective advertising requirement if it concluded that "Listerine's advertisements play[ed] a substantial role in creating or reinforcing in the public's mind a false belief about the product" and "this belief [would] linger on after the false advertising ceases." 562 F. 2d at 762. The court relied on consumer surveys over many years.

2 "Advertising" is defined in the Order to include claims made in a brochure, newspaper, magazine, free standing insert, marketing kit, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert, letter, catalog, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card, point-of-purchase display, package insert, package label, product instructions, electronic mail, website, homepage, film, slide, radio, television, cable television, program-length commercial or infomercial, or in any other medium.

3 See California SunCare, Inc., 123 FTC 332, 391 (1997) (Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek. III. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Warner-Lambert imposes a "more demanding standard for corrective advertising" than traditional fencing-in relief, such as affirmative disclosure requirements.).
and expert testimony in concluding that there was substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support these two factual prerequisites. Id. at 762 n.65. The Warner-Lambert court also concluded that the approximately one-year time period for the corrective advertising requirement was not "an unreasonably long time in which to correct a hundred years of cold claims." Id. at 764.

Since it decided Warner-Lambert, the Commission has considered the imposition of corrective advertising in three adjudicated cases, all of them involving claims made for OTC analgesics. Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 FTC 395 (1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984); Bristol-Myers Co., 102 FTC 21 (1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1984); American Home Products Corp., 98 FTC 136 (1981), aff'd as modified, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). In none of these cases, however, did complaint counsel prove the factual prerequisites for ordering corrective advertising -- that the deceptive advertisements substantially created or reinforced a false belief and that the belief was likely to linger -- and thus the Commission declined in each case to order corrective advertising. Because Warner-Lambert is the only adjudicated case in more than two decades in which the Commission has ordered corrective advertising, it provides the benchmark for determining whether the evidence proves the factual prerequisites for corrective advertising. I do not think that the evidence here proves these prerequisites.

B. Lingering Effect

In my view, corrective advertising cannot be ordered in this case because the evidence does not prove that any false superior efficacy

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4 The majority states that the Commission "has frequently noted that the amount of evidence in Warner-Lambert was unusually strong and far exceeded the threshold needed to impose corrective advertising." Majority Op. at 30. As discussed below in the text, the Commission has simply recognized that inference, not direct evidence, may be used in appropriate cases. The availability of inference does not relieve complaint counsel of the burden of proving lingering effect by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, Warner-Lambert did set the standard for corrective advertising, and the evidence in that case is the only benchmark that we have for assessing the sufficiency of evidence supporting corrective advertising. See E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 2 (1949) (the extension of a rule of law to new facts "depends upon a determination of what facts will be considered similar to those present when the rule was first announced").

5 Complaint counsel has the burden of proving facts in Commission adjudications by a preponderance of the evidence. Carter Products, Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 487 (9th Cir. 1959); ABA Antitrust Section, Antitrust Law Developments 617 (4th ed. 1997) ("The burden of proof in a Commission proceeding is on complaint counsel to establish its case by a preponderance of the evidence.") (footnotes omitted); see 5 U.S.C. 556(d) ("[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a[n] *** order has the burden of proof.").
belief substantially caused by the deceptive advertising campaign is likely to linger.\(^6\) The majority concludes that the false superior efficacy belief will linger, but fails to address or even identify how long the belief must be likely to linger to support the corrective advertising remedy in this case. A false superior efficacy belief will not support corrective advertising unless it is likely to linger throughout the period during which the corrective advertising provision will be in effect. Without a lingering false belief, there is no more reason to impose a corrective advertising remedy than there is for a doctor to prescribe a remedy for a patient who has already recovered. Specifically, the false superior efficacy belief must exist at the time that the Commission's order becomes final -- that is, the date on which the corrective advertising provision must commence -- and must continue, albeit presumably at a decreasing level due to the effects of the provision, at least until the corrective advertising requirement expires.\(^7\) Hence, for the Commission to order corrective advertising in this case, the false superior efficacy belief would have to exist when the Order becomes final (in July 1999\(^8\)) and would have to continue to exist until the corrective advertising requirement terminates (in July 2000 or beyond).\(^9\)

The ALJ did not order corrective advertising because he was not persuaded that the evidence in the record proved that the false

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\(^6\) I am assuming for the sake of argument that the majority is correct that the false superior efficacy belief was caused substantially by the deceptive advertising at issue, rather than by some other entirely plausible factor such as the introduction of new, extra strength Doan's products or the nine decades of positioning Doan's product as an effective remedy for back pain. Compare Sterling Drug Co., 102 FTC at 798-99 (concluding that it was not clear that deceptive advertising campaign was a substantial cause of false efficacy belief because "the longer a brand has been in existence, the less its image stems from one particular advertising campaign," since "[f]or a brand like Bayer, which has been on the market for years, familiarity is the primary influence on brand image").

\(^7\) See R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 697 (1977) (hereinafter "Pitofsky, Beyond Nader") (false belief must continue to influence purchasing decisions up to the date of the entry of a final Commission order, and be likely to continue to be influential for a substantial segment of potential purchasers even if the false claims are no longer disseminated by the seller").

\(^8\) Commission cease and desist orders, including their corrective advertising provisions, become final 60 days after service unless the Commission or a court has granted a stay. Section 5(g) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(g).

\(^9\) The corrective advertising provision could last substantially longer than one year because it is required to continue for "one year and at least until the respondent has expended on Doan's advertising a sum equal to the average amount spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign" (emphasis added). For instance, although the corrective advertising provision in Warner-Lambert was similarly prescribed to last until the respondent had spent the same amount on advertising as its average recent annual advertising expenditure, the provision was in effect for at least 18 months. Mazis Tr. at 1798.
superior efficacy belief would linger. ID at 63-64. According to the ALJ, the evidence revealed that it is uncertain\(^{10}\) that the false belief is likely to linger, given that the advertisements in Warner-Lambert ran for 51 years while the advertisements here ran for only 8 years. ID. at 64. The ALJ also found unpersuasive the testimony of Dr. Michael Mazis, complaint counsel's marketing expert, that the false superior efficacy belief would linger. ID. at 63. Finally, the ALJ not only rejected complaint counsel's argument that a lingering effect can be inferred from other facts, but also found "indications in the record that the belief in Doan's superiority may be transitory," id., including evidence that the deceptive advertisements were not memorable and did not cause any increase in product sales. ID. at 64-65. A careful review of the evidence persuades me that the ALJ correctly concluded that the requisite lingering effect has not been proven.

1. Direct Evidence of Lingering Effect

The majority first relies on extrinsic evidence for its conclusion that the false superior efficacy belief will linger. In December 1996, National Family Opinion, Inc. ("NFO") conducted a mail panel research study of consumer beliefs (the "1996 NFO Study"). CX-421. The 1996 NFO Study tested the efficacy beliefs of users and aware non-users of six OTC analgesics -- Advil, Aleve, Bayer, Doan's, Motrin, and Tylenol. For each of these OTC analgesics, users and aware non-users were asked whether they strongly agreed, agreed, somewhat agreed, neither agreed nor disagreed, somewhat disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement that the OTC analgesic was "more effective than other over-the-counter pain relievers for back pain." CX 421-V. For each of these six OTC analgesics, a significant proportion of the users and aware non-users had a false superior efficacy belief,\(^{11}\) even though none of the OTC

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\(^{10}\) The majority takes the ALJ to task for purportedly requiring that the lingering effect must be proven with certainty. Majority Op. at 21. The ALJ stated that "there is no certainty that the belief at issue requires corrective advertising." ID at 64. While the ALJ's language could have been more precise, the more reasonable understanding of his statement is that the evidence presented as to lingering effect was too uncertain, not that complaint counsel have not accomplished the obviously impossible task of proving lingering effect with certainty.

\(^{11}\) Among users, 62.3% of Advil users, 51.4% of Aleve users, 41.3% of Bayer users, 78.9% of Doan's users, 61.4% of Motrin users, and 43.8% of Tylenol users stated that their own brand was superior for back pain relief. CX-421-V. Among aware non-users, 31.2% of Advil aware non-users, 19.9% of Aleve aware non-users, 27.1% of Bayer aware non-users, 44.6% of Doan's aware non-users, 35% of Motrin aware non-users, and 22.4% of Tylenol aware non-users stated that the brand that they were aware of (but did not use) was superior for back pain relief. Id.
analgesics other than Doan's had been advertised specifically as a back pain medication. Even though many users and aware non-users held the false superior efficacy belief for all of the OTC analgesics, Dr. Mazis testified that, following statistical adjustments, on average 20 to 25% more users and aware non-users of Doan's had a false superior efficacy belief than did the users and aware non-users of the other OTC analgesics tested. Mazis Tr. at 1385. Given a statistical confidence level of approximately 5%, Dr. Mazis testified that when a 20% reduction (i.e., only a reduction of one in five of the relevant consumers) occurred, there would no longer be a lingering false superior efficacy belief to be corrected. Id. at 1385, 1386-87.

While the 1996 NFO Study shows that 20% more Doan's users and aware non-users have the false superior efficacy belief than the users and aware non-users of other OTC analgesics, it does not prove that this level of beliefs about Doan’s is the lingering effect of the deceptive advertising. Study participants were simply never asked whether they had ever seen any Doan’s advertising, much less the particular deceptive advertisements at issue here. Mazis Tr. at 1642, 1644, 1786. It is not impossible that study participants saw the deceptive advertising before it was discontinued in May 1996 and formed the false superior efficacy belief as a result of exposure to this advertising, and that this belief lingered until December 1996. However, a variety of influences -- other than any particular advertising campaign -- create, reinforce, and change consumer beliefs about a product. Given that other, entirely plausible influences could well be responsible for the belief reported in the 1996 NFO Study (such as historic positioning and the introduction of new extra strength Doan’s products), I am not willing to infer that the belief is the enduring effect of the discontinued deceptive advertising. Jacoby Tr. at 3005-06; Scheffman Tr. at 2618.

Even if the 1996 NFO Study had established that the false superior efficacy belief had lingered, it would prove only that the belief had lingered until December 1996 -- not that it was likely to linger until July 2000 or beyond. Persuasive expert testimony is one possible method of proving that the false superior efficacy belief

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12 Another possible method of proving lingering effect would be through a series of comparable consumer surveys conducted over the course of years demonstrating that the belief is durable. In Warner-Lambert, for example, the Commission concluded that a false cold and sore throat efficacy belief concerning Listerine would persist based on numerous, identical quarterly market research reports over an eight-year period demonstrating that consumers had consistent levels of the belief and that the belief did not diminish substantially during periodic cessations of the advertising during the summer.
would continue to linger from December 1996 until July 2000 or beyond. Dr. Mazis, complaint counsel's expert, did testify that the heightened false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger, but his testimony on lingering effect is not persuasive. In support of his conclusion, Dr. Mazis briefly mentioned the length and effectiveness of the advertisements, the emphasis in the advertisements on the superior efficacy claim, and the results of copy tests. But he provided no analysis of the reasons that each of these factors demonstrates that a lingering effect is likely under the particular facts of this case. Mazis Tr. at 1255-56. In the absence of a thorough analysis as to why these considerations mean that the false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger, the unsupported conclusion of Dr. Mazis that the false belief will linger is no more persuasive than the conclusions of Novartis' experts that it will not. See Whitcup Tr. at 2336; Scheffman Tr. at 2536; Jacoby Tr. at 3201.¹³

Moreover, even assuming that Dr. Mazis had testified persuasively that the false superior efficacy belief generally is likely to linger, his testimony is flawed because it is extraordinarily indefinite as to how long the belief is likely to linger. Dr. Mazis variously phrased the length of the likely lingering effect as that it would "last for quite some time," it would "go on for years," it would "not go away quickly," it would linger for a "very, very long time," it would linger a "considerable length of time," and it would be "hard to know" how long it would linger, but "beliefs tend to dissipate slowly." Mazis Tr. at 1254, 1256, 1263, 1798, 1975. Dr. Mazis's testimony thus does

¹³ Dr. Mazis also relied on consumer research studies purportedly showing lingering false beliefs about Listerine mouthwash and Hawaiian Punch fruit drink in the 1970s. He provided no analysis of the reasons why the results of these studies are applicable to the specific facts of this case -- false superior efficacy beliefs about an OTC analgesic in the 1990s. Mazis Tr. at 1256-63. Consumers of OTC analgesics may well be subject to significantly different influences than consumers of mouthwash or fruit punch; for example, advertising for OTC analgesics is much more competitive than advertising for mouthwash or fruit punch. Scheffman Tr. at 2603-04, 2626, 2647. Consumers of products in the 1990s also may well be subject to significantly different influences than in the 1970s because of new media, such as cable television, electronic mail, and websites. Without a cogent analysis of why the results of these consumer research studies are applicable to current consumer beliefs about Doan's, I am not persuaded by Dr. Mazis's testimony that these studies prove lingering effect.
not address with any specificity how long the false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger. 14

Dr. Mazis's expert testimony is far weaker than the expert testimony that has been offered in other Commission corrective advertising cases on the issue of how long the false belief will linger. For example, in Warner-Lambert, one marketing expert testified that the levels of false cold and sore throat efficacy beliefs for Listerine "would continue at the 1971 rate (59 percent) for about two years after colds advertising ceased and would remain high even after five years," while another marketing expert opined that "in the absence of colds advertising consumer beliefs would decline at no greater a rate than 5 percent a year." 86 FTC at 1503-04 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in American Home Products, experts testified that after deceptive advertising making a false superior efficacy claim about Anacin ceased, the false belief created would linger among non-users for "approximately one year" and among users for more than one year. 98 FTC at 283-84.

Some quantitative assessment is needed in this case if expert testimony is going to support the imposition of corrective advertising. After all, because the deceptive advertising here ceased three years ago, corrective advertising cannot be ordered as a matter of law if the false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger for three years or less, while it could be ordered if the belief is likely to linger for approximately four years or more. Expert testimony that the false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger for some indeterminate period of time is of little probative value when the Commission must decide whether the belief is likely to linger for a particular period of time. Given Dr. Mazis's lack of analysis in support of his opinion that the false belief is likely to linger and his inability to identify with any specificity how long the false belief will linger, I conclude, like the ALJ, that his testimony is not persuasive.

2. Inference of Lingering Effect

Absent a basis in the direct evidence, the majority turns to inference as an additional ground for its conclusion that the

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14 As an example of how indefinite are Dr. Mazis's testimony and the other evidence on the issue of the duration of the false superior efficacy belief, one need look no further than the disagreement between the majority and complaint counsel over the suitable length of the corrective advertising remedy: the majority has concluded that the evidence warrants a one-year period for corrective advertising, while complaint counsel have argued that (if a fixed period is imposed) the evidence warrants an eight-year period for corrective advertising. CCRB at 40 n. 55.
heightened level of false superior efficacy beliefs among Doan's users and aware non-users will linger. Majority Op. at 30-31. The majority infers a lingering effect from the fact that the deceptive superior efficacy claim was very salient to consumers. Id. at 30. The majority also draws such an inference from the fact that the deceptive superior efficacy claim was clearly and consistently conveyed to consumers, as revealed by copy tests. Id. at 30-31. Finally, the majority infers lingering effect from the fact that the deceptive advertising campaign was an integral part of an eight-year advertising campaign that cost $65 million. Id. at 30.

The Commission has said that inferences drawn from other facts may be used to prove the requisite lingering effect in some circumstances. "[A]bsent probative evidence one way or the other, [the Commission may] infer that a deceptive advertisement will leave a lingering deceptive impression in consumers' minds." American Home Products Corp., 98 FTC at 408 n.93; see Bristol-Myers, 102 FTC at 380 n.102 ("survey evidence is only one factor to be considered in determining whether corrective advertising is appropriate in a particular case"); Statement in Regard to Corrective Advertising, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 39,046 at 41,705 (1979) ("In some cases, the [Commission] might conclude that corrective advertising is necessary without formal surveys to show that consumers have lasting wrong impressions about the product."). While an inference from other facts may be employed in appropriate cases, such an inference generally will have less probative value than direct evidence because inference is by nature an indirect and imprecise method of proof. 15 Indeed, it is important to emphasize that the only time that the Commission has ordered corrective advertising in an adjudicated case in more than two decades, it relied on direct evidence in the form of persuasive extrinsic evidence and expert testimony, not simply on inferences. Warner-Lambert, 86 FTC at 1501-04.

15 It is extremely difficult to infer any particular duration of a lingering effect from other facts. For example, in this case, what are the differences in length of lingering effect among a material claim, a salient claim, and a very salient claim? What are the differences in length of lingering effect for an implied claim, a nearly express claim, a clear and consistent claim, and an express claim? What are the differences in length of lingering effect among a ten-year, $45 million advertising campaign; an eight-year, $65 million advertising campaign; and a five-year, $75 million advertising campaign? The indeterminate duration of any inferred lingering effect indicates that the case in which inference will support corrective advertising is likely to be the exception, not the rule.
While inference of lingering effect may be considered in this case, the particular inferences that the majority seeks to draw are not persuasive. The majority first infers a lingering effect from the purported powerful impact of the deceptive advertising on consumers, which, in turn, is based on the majority's conclusions that the superior efficacy claim was "very salient" and was made "clearly and consistently." Consumers may have taken away the implied claim immediately after seeing the deceptive advertisements, but only a minimal proportion (between 1% and 8%) of test participants recalled the claim 24 hours or 72 hours after viewing the advertisements along with programming and other advertisements. Similarly, only a minimal proportion (0% top-of-the-mind and 2% total unaided) of consumers recalled any advertising for Doan's, including the deceptive advertisements. RX 2-0. Although consumers could conceivably form a belief about a product based on a deceptive advertisement without being able to recall the claim shortly thereafter or without being able to recall any advertising for the product, the far more plausible conclusion is that the extremely low recall of the deceptive claim and of Doan's advertising means that the deceptive advertisements had no real lasting impact because they were not memorable. Whitcup Tr. at 2123. Indeed, the conclusion that the deceptive advertisements did not have a powerful impact on consumer beliefs is corroborated by the fact that unit sales of Doan's declined during 1988 to 1993, the first five years in which the deceptive advertisements were being disseminated. RX-189-A; Scheffman Tr. at 2550-51; Stewart Tr. at 3487. I am not persuaded that an inference can be drawn that this ineffective advertising campaign caused a false belief that is likely to linger until July 2000 or beyond, more than four years after Novartis ceased disseminating the deceptive advertisements.

The majority, emphasizing that the campaign lasted eight years, cost $65 million, and reached 80 to 90% of the target audience 20 to 27 times per year, also would infer a lingering effect from the purported extensiveness of the advertising campaign. Majority Op. at 30-31. But reaching 80 to 90% of one's target audience 20 to 27 times per year pales in comparison to the level of advertising by Novartis's

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16 FF 141, 148, 153, 157, 164. While these studies may underestimate the level of advertising claim communication because they are designed primarily to test the memorability of advertisements, not claims in advertisements, see Kraft, Inc., 114 FTC at 126 n.13, they nevertheless raise serious doubt as to whether the deceptive advertisements had the claimed powerful impact on consumer beliefs.
competitors, who reach 98 to 99% of their target audience between 32.5 and 121.2 times per year. JX 2-H, ¶ 32; RX 36-M, Z-27. Moreover, Novartis was primarily using short television advertisements (15 seconds in duration), while its competitors generally were using much longer advertisements (30 seconds and 45 seconds in duration). IDF 318; Peabody Tr. at 465. Given that Novartis competes with other OTC analgesic advertisers for the limited attention of OTC analgesic customers, I am not persuaded that the relatively infrequent and short advertisements here captured the limited attention that consumers devote to considering information about OTC analgesics so as to have caused strong beliefs that are likely to linger for years. 17

A comparison to prior Commission cases in which corrective advertising has been considered and rejected also persuades me that a lingering effect cannot be inferred from the fact that Novartis clearly and consistently made a very salient superior efficacy claim for Doan’s during an eight-year, $65 million advertising campaign. The deceptive advertising campaign here pales in comparison with other deceptive advertising campaigns (especially when advertising expenditures are measured in constant dollars) that have not resulted in the Commission imposing corrective advertising. See Appendix A. 18 For example, in *American Home Products*, the respondent had made, expressly and by clear implication, a false superior efficacy claim for Anacin during a more than 12-year, $204 million advertising campaign. 98 FTC at 151. The Commission did not order a statement to correct any resulting false superior efficacy establishment belief because there was "little likelihood that a false or unsubstantiated image of proven superiority [would] survive" in

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17 In determining whether the deceptive advertisements were so extensive that an inference of lingering false belief can be drawn, the majority rejects any consideration of the extent of advertising by other competitors in the marketplace. Majority Op. at 31. However, in assessing the effects of a deceptive advertising campaign, the Commission should not treat deceptive advertising, especially comparative deceptive advertising, as if it takes place in a vacuum. For instance, assume that Company A spent $20 million over five years on advertisements making the deceptive claim that Product A is better than Product B, while Company B spent $500 million over the same five years on advertisements making the claim that Product B is better than Product A. In determining if it can be inferred that Company A’s campaign is likely to create the lingering false belief that Product A is superior, the Commission should consider the nature and extent of the advertising campaigns of both Company A and Company B.

18 The majority states that I am emphasizing "the duration of the advertising campaign and the dollars spent in these cases." Majority Op. at 32 n.44. I have addressed the length of deceptive advertising campaigns and the amounts spent during these campaigns simply because they are some of the facts from which the majority is drawing an inference of lingering effect.
light of the traditional relief contained in the Commission's cease-and-desist order. *Id.* at 411.

Similarly, in *Bristol-Myers*, the respondent had made, expressly and by clear implication, false superior efficacy claims for Bufferin and Excedrin that were important to consumers. These claims were made during a 13-year, $171 million advertising campaign for Bufferin, and a 13-year, $98 million advertising campaign for Excedrin. 102 FTC at 21, 104-06, 254, 260. The Commission did not order a statement to correct any resulting false superior efficacy establishment claims for either Bufferin or Excedrin. The Commission concluded that such a remedy was not warranted because there was "no evidence that consumers will retain an image that this superiority has been established," *id.* at 380, and in the absence of such evidence the Commission was unwilling to infer the existence of such an enduring image from the superior efficacy belief held and the extent and nature of the deceptive advertising campaign. *Id.* at 380 n.102. Accordingly, *Bristol-Myers* and *American Home Products* provide no support for the inference that the majority draws in this case.

In contrast, it might be instructive to consider a recent case in which I drew an inference of lingering effect. *R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co*, FTC File No. 992-3025 (Mar. 1, 1999). In August 1997, R.J. Reynolds ("Reynolds") commenced a massive national advertising campaign running innovative print, billboard, and point-of-sale advertisements for Winston cigarettes that made an express "No Additives" representation. The advertising campaign was so successful that by the end of 1997, Reynolds had already increased its volume of Winston sales by 9%. *1997 RJR Nabisco Annual Report* 24 (1997). In March 1999, when the advertising campaign was ongoing, the Commission accepted for public comment a consent

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19 In *Sterling Drug*, the Commission did not order corrective advertising because "it ha[d] not been shown that [the deceptive] advertising created or reinforced the public's image of Bayer," 102 FTC at 799, and, therefore, the Commission did not reach the issue of lingering effect.

agreement with Reynolds accompanied by a complaint alleging that the "No Additives" representation made the implied claim that Winston cigarettes are safer to smoke because they contain no additives. The proposed order would require that Reynolds make a corrective statement in its advertising for one year. I was willing to infer that the false belief would linger in the minds of consumers for one year "[b]ased on the extent and magnitude of the ongoing ad campaign and the demonstrated strength of the implied health claim." Inferring a one-year lingering effect from the ongoing, massive, and innovative advertising campaign in R.J. Reynolds for purposes of accepting a consent agreement for public comment, however, is a far cry from the present case, in which a more than four-year lingering effect is being inferred from a long-discontinued, limited, and uncreative advertising campaign.

In my view, complaint counsel have not met their burden of proving that the false superior efficacy belief concerning Doan's is likely to linger. The direct evidence in the record on the issue of lingering effect -- the 1996 NFO Study and Dr. Mazis's testimony -- is far weaker than the direct evidence of lingering effect that justified corrective advertising in Warner-Lambert, and it does not persuade me that the false superior efficacy belief is likely to linger. The inference as to lingering effect that the majority seeks to draw is not persuasive, and the Commission did not draw such an inference from even stronger facts in American Home Products and Bristol-Myers. Complaint counsel's failure to meet their burden of proof on the issue of lingering effect should not be surprising, given how rarely complaint counsel will be able to prove this effect. See R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 697 (if the burden of proving lingering effect remains with complaint counsel -- so that complaint counsel is not simply entitled to a presumption on this issue -- then corrective advertising will be "imposed rarely"). Without stronger evidence of lingering effect, the Commission cannot order corrective advertising.

21 Resort to inference is more likely in the context of consent agreements than in adjudicated cases. Extrinsic evidence and expert testimony often are not available to the Commission when it considers a consent agreement, which makes the use of inference more probable. See Eggland's Best, 118 FTC 340, 365 n.3 (1994) (Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, concurring) ("It is certainly unrealistic to think that we will have [extrinsic evidence of lingering effect] when the respondents enter into a consent agreement before a complaint is filed."). Moreover, because the Commission applies a "reason to believe" standard to consent agreements and a "preponderance of the evidence" standard to adjudicated cases, inference is more likely to suffice in connection with consent agreements than adjudicated cases.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING REQUIREMENT

I also believe that the corrective advertising provision is a form of compelled speech that infringes Novartis's constitutional right to engage in commercial speech. The Supreme Court has recognized that advertising is a form of commercial speech entitled to protection under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The free flow of commercial information through advertising is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system" because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976). Advertising is critical to consumers because a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763. Corrective advertising requirements disrupt the free flow of information from advertisers to consumers because they compel advertisers to make statements that they would not otherwise make, sometimes having adverse incidental consequences for those advertisers. See Sterling Drug, Inc., 102 FTC at 723 (Initial Decision); see also R. Pitofsky, Beyond Nader, 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 698 ("The purchase of advertising space or time for the corrective message is expensive, and the remedy is unusually embarrassing to the false advertiser."); Note, Corrective Advertising -- The New Response to Consumer Deception, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 415, 429, 431 (1972) (remedy is "severe" and "dramatic").

Notwithstanding the fact that corrective advertising remedies disrupt the free flow of information from advertisers to consumers and may otherwise harm advertisers, the burdens associated with such compelled speech pass constitutional muster if they meet the test first enunciated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson set out a framework for determining whether a regulation of commercial speech (or compelled speech in the commercial speech context22) survives First Amendment scrutiny:

22 The corrective advertising remedy mandates that Novartis make a statement that it finds objectionable in part because its competitors in the highly competitive OTC analgesic market do not have to make such statements. Therefore, the corrective advertising remedy here is a form of compelled speech that is to be analyzed under the Central Hudson test. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2139 (1997) (Central Hudson test applies to compelled commercial speech that requires advertisers to "repeat an objectional [sic] message out of their own mouths").
For commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

447 U.S. at 566.

I agree with my colleagues that the initial portions of the Central Hudson test have been satisfied, see Warner-Lambert, 562 F. 2d at 771 (corrective advertising is intended to serve the substantial governmental interest of protecting citizens against deception), but I disagree that the corrective advertising provision here "directly advances the governmental interest asserted" and is "not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."

A. Direct Advancement of Substantial Governmental Interest

Central Hudson requires that the restriction on commercial speech "directly advance [ ] the governmental interest asserted." 477 U.S. at 566. This "is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather [the government] must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restrictions will in fact alleviate them to a material degree." Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1509 (1996) ("some impact" in redressing harm is not enough; ban on alcohol price advertising must "significantly reduce alcohol consumption") (emphasis in original). A restriction thus will not be sustained if "it provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose." Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770, quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; see also City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).

Corrective advertising is intended to prevent deception by curing the lingering false beliefs of consumers that were caused by deceptive advertising. The record before us does not demonstrate that the false superior efficacy belief here is likely to linger through the time that the corrective advertising provision will be in effect. As explained above, the only evidence that a heightened level of false superior efficacy beliefs is likely to linger until July 2000 or beyond is the

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23 The government has the burden of proving that a corrective advertising requirement meets the Central Hudson standard because "[i]t is well-established that '[t]he party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it." Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993), quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 n. 20 (1983); see also Ibanez v. Fla. Dept. of Bus. & Pro. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142 n.7 (1994).
inconclusive 1996 NFO Study, the unsupported and indefinite testimony of Dr. Mazis, and the unwarranted broad inferences that the majority draws. This weak evidence of lingering effect does not satisfy the Commission's burden of showing direct advancement of a substantial governmental interest, because a corrective advertising provision cannot prevent deception arising from false superior efficacy beliefs in the absence of proof that such lingering beliefs are likely to exist. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 490 (1995) ("anecdotal evidence" and "educated guesses" are not sufficient); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (conclusory testimony is not sufficient). 24

B. No More Extensive Than Necessary

The corrective advertising requirement also violates the last prong of Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566, which requires that the governmental restriction be no more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted governmental interest. See also Warner-Lambert, 562 F.2d at 758 (Commission has a "special responsibility to . . . order corrective advertising only if the restriction inherent in its order is no greater than necessary to serve the interest involved"). This means that there must be a "reasonable fit" between the restriction imposed and the government interest sought to be advanced. Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). "[I]f there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether the 'fit' between ends and means is reasonable." City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 417 n.13; see also Rubin, 514 U.S. at 490-91 (no reasonable fit between restriction and governmental interest existed because less restrictive options were available). In analyzing the fit between the restriction and the governmental interest, the government must carefully calculate the costs and benefits associated with the restriction. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 417-18; Fox, 492 U.S. at 480.

The majority addresses in one short paragraph whether the corrective advertising provision here is a reasonable fit with the

24 Similarly, it is unclear that the corrective advertising provision will in fact correct any remaining false superior efficacy beliefs (and thereby prevent deception) to any material degree in the approximately one year that it will be in effect. While testifying that the remedy will correct beliefs much more quickly than if it were not imposed, Dr. Mazis also acknowledged that "[w]e don't know how much faster" and no one "can measure with any precision how long a corrective notice for this particular case should be run." Mazis Tr. at 1975, 1382.
asserted governmental interest in preventing deception. The paragraph states that the Commission has balanced the need for correcting lingering false beliefs against Novartis's ability to broadcast effectively, the upshot of which is to exempt short television and radio advertisements from the corrective advertising requirement. Majority Op. at 37. Thus, except for not applying the corrective advertising requirement to short television and radio advertisements, the majority does not consider any less restrictive alternatives. This minimal analysis is not the careful calculation of the costs and benefits associated with alternatives that *Central Hudson* requires.

First, the majority does not analyze whether there are any narrower alternatives to imposing corrective advertising, including considering whether traditional cease-and-desist order provisions (such as those contained in Parts I and II of the Order, or triggered disclosure requirements) could be adequate to address future deception.25 Second, assuming that some corrective advertising provision is warranted, the majority does not address in any detail whether there are narrower alternatives to this particular corrective advertising provision. The corrective advertising requirement in this case apparently is intended to closely track the requirement imposed in *Warner-Lambert*. The respondent in *Warner-Lambert* was required to make a corrective statement in all advertising until it had "expend on Listerine advertising a sum equal to the average annual Listerine advertising budget for the period of April 1962 to March 1972." 86 FTC at 1515.26 Here, Novartis is required to make a corrective statement in all of its "advertising" (except short television and radio advertisements) for "one year and until the respondents have expended on Doan's advertising a sum equal to the average amount spent annually during the eight years of the challenged campaign." The Order defines an "advertisement" broadly to include any intended inducement to sale that appears in:

---

25 In other cases, the Commission analyzed whether other cease-and-desist provisions would substantially prevent deception before concluding that corrective advertising was the "least restrictive means of achieving a substantial and important governmental objective." *Warner-Lambert*, 562 F. 2d at 770-71; see also *American Home Products Corp.*, 98 FTC at 411 (corrective advertising was not needed in part because a triggered efficacy disclosure would be sufficient to prevent deception).

26 When it issued its decision in 1975, the Commission concluded that the false belief about Listerine would linger "well into the 1980's," 86 FTC at 1504, that is, at least five years after the Commission's order became final. The Commission imposed an approximately one-year corrective advertising requirement to address this lingering effect. This demonstrates an effort to carefully craft a remedy that was not overbroad.
a brochure, newspaper, magazine, free standing insert, marketing kit, leaflet, circular, mailer, book insert, letter, catalog, poster, chart, billboard, public transit card, point-of-purchase display, package insert, package label, product instructions, electronic mail, website, homepage, film, slide, radio, television, cable television, program-length commercial or infomercial, or in any other medium.

Part IV thus imposes a corrective advertising requirement that is nearly identical to the one-year, all-media requirement that the Commission imposed in *Warner-Lambert*.

While applying the corrective requirement to all media may have been a reasonable fit with the objective of correcting false beliefs in *Warner-Lambert*, it is not a reasonable fit in this case. In *Warner-Lambert*, the Commission was trying to correct false beliefs among the general public concerning Listerine mouthwash, and so an all-media corrective advertising provision was consistent with that objective. See *Warner-Lambert*, 86 FTC at 1501, 1503 (false beliefs exist among "Listerine users as well as nonusers"; "long after Listerine cold efficacy advertising ceased, a substantial portion of the public would continue to believe") (emphasis added). In contrast, the Commission here is trying to correct false superior efficacy beliefs among Doan's users and aware non-users. Mazis Tr. at 1385, 1805 (back pain sufferers who are neither Doan's users nor aware non-users have no need to receive the corrective statement). Therefore, the media chosen for the dissemination of the corrective message here must be targeted to Doan's users and aware non-users if the Commission's remedy is to achieve the reasonable fit that is constitutionally required. See *44 Liquormart, Inc.*, 517 U.S. 484, 529 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The scope of the restriction on speech must be reasonably, though it need not be perfectly, targeted to address the harm intended to be regulated.") (emphasis added). Significantly, the difference between the general public as a target audience and Doan's users and aware non-users as a target audience is quite substantial, given that 31% of back pain sufferers (itself a subset of the general public) are neither Doan's users nor aware non-users. Mazis Tr. at 1793.

The corrective advertising requirement here is in no way limited to media that are likely to target Doan's users and aware non-users. One narrower alternative that would more accurately target Doan's users and aware non-users is to require the corrective statement only on product labeling and in packaging. Product labeling and packaging are sources of critical safety and efficacy information for users and
potential users of Doan’s, such as indications for use, directions, warnings, drug interactions, active ingredients, and inactive ingredients. See Mazis Tr. at 1607-08 (product package can affect beliefs; consumers look at the product package immediately at the point of purchase). Another narrower alternative is brochures with corrective information that would be made available to Doan’s users and aware non-users through prominent displays on the drug store shelves and other locations at which Doan’s and other OTC analgesics are sold. Indeed, the Commission has used similar media to target a particular group of consumers who have false beliefs to be corrected.27 Although dissemination of a corrective statement through product packaging and point-of-sale displays, either separately or combined, is a less restrictive alternative that may well be adequate to correct the false belief among Doan’s users and aware non-users, the majority does not consider the imposition of such alternatives -- much less conduct a careful calculation of their costs and benefits. Therefore, the corrective advertising requirement imposed here has not been demonstrated to be no more extensive than necessary, as Central Hudson requires.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the evidence in the record does not prove that the false superior efficacy belief will linger for the requisite period of time for imposing corrective advertising under the standard set forth in Warner-Lambert, and also because the corrective advertising provision is an unconstitutional infringement on Novartis’s right to engage in commercial speech under the First Amendment, I dissent from Part IV of the Order.

27 See, e.g., Eggland’s Best, 118 FTC at 366 (Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, concurring) (corrective statement on egg cartons was “carefully crafted” to “reach consumers likely to have been misled by Eggland’s ads (those who are preparing to purchase the product), rather than the population at large”); Unocal Corp., 117 FTC 500, 511 (1994) (corrective brochure required to be mailed to customers who had company credit cards and who lived in one of five specified states in which deceptive claims were disseminated).
### APPENDIX A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Type of Claim</th>
<th>Type of Belief</th>
<th>Time of Ad Campaign</th>
<th>Length of Ad Campaign</th>
<th>Current Dollars Spent</th>
<th>Constant Dollars Spent (May 1992)*</th>
<th>Corrective Advertising Imposed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warner-Lambert</td>
<td>Listerine</td>
<td>Express and Clearly Implied Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Cold and Sore Throat Efficacy</td>
<td>1921-1973</td>
<td>31 Years</td>
<td>“Vast Suma”</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
<td>Approx. 1 Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1972)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>American Home</td>
<td>Anacin</td>
<td>Express and Clearly Implied Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Superior Efficacy Establishment Claim</td>
<td>1965-1977</td>
<td>12 Years</td>
<td>$204 Million</td>
<td>$716 Million (est.)</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Products (1981)</td>
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<td>Bristol Myers</td>
<td>Bufferin</td>
<td>Express and Clearly Implied Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Superior Efficacy Establishment Claim</td>
<td>1960-1973</td>
<td>13 Years</td>
<td>$171 Million</td>
<td>$600 Million (est.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sterling</td>
<td>Excedrin</td>
<td>Express and Clearly Implied Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Superior Efficacy Establishment Claim</td>
<td>1960-1973</td>
<td>13 Years</td>
<td>$98 Million</td>
<td>$344 Million (est.)</td>
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<td>Sterling</td>
<td>Bayer</td>
<td>Clear and Unambiguous Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>1969-1973</td>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>$86 Million</td>
<td>$365 Million (est.)</td>
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<td>Novartis</td>
<td>Doan's</td>
<td>Clearly Implied Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>Superior Efficacy Claim</td>
<td>1988-1996</td>
<td>8 Years</td>
<td>$65 Million</td>
<td>$65 Million</td>
<td>Approx. 1 Year</td>
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</table>

* I have assumed that each advertising campaign spent the entire amount at the midpoint of the campaign (Bristol Myers, January 1967; American Home Products, January 1971; Sterling, January 1971). Because May 1992 is the midpoint of the deceptive advertising campaign at issue in this case, I have used the United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Product Index to convert the current dollars spent at the midpoint in each of these campaigns to May 1992 dollars.
Consent Order, Etc., in regard to alleged violation of sec. 7 of the Clayton Act and sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act


This consent order, among other things, requires the respondents, producers of concrete roofing tile, who have established a joint venture, to divest certain tile manufacturing assets and to provide written notification to the Commission prior to acquiring any stock, share capital or equity in any concern engaged in the manufacturing of concrete roofing tile in Southern California, Arizona, Nevada or Florida.

Participants


For the respondents: Tom Smith, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, D.C. and Randall Allen, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, GA.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that Boral Ltd., a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, and Redland PLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lafarge S.A., a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, acquired shares in and contributed assets to a joint venture limited liability corporation, Monier Lifetile LLC, a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45; and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:

I. RESPONDENTS

1. Respondent Monier Lifetile LLC is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located at One
Park Place, Suite 900, Irvine, California. Monier Lifetile LLC is owned by Lafarge S.A. and Boral Ltd.

2. Respondent Boral Ltd. is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the Country of Australia, with its principal place of business located at 50 Bridge Street, Sydney, NSW, Australia 2000. Boral Ltd., which had total sales of approximately $3.6 billion in 1996, manufactures a diversified group of construction products. Prior to the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Boral Ltd. manufactured and sold concrete roofing tile in the United States through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Boral Lifetile, Inc. Prior to the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Boral Lifetile was the second largest producer of concrete roofing tile in the United States.

3. Respondent Lafarge S.A. is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the Country of France, with its office and principal place of business located at 61 Rue des Belles Feuilles, Paris, France. Lafarge S.A., which had total sales of approximately $7 billion in 1997, produces cement and construction materials. Following the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Lafarge S.A. acquired Redland PLC. Prior to the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Redland PLC manufactured and sold concrete roofing tile in the United States through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Monier, Inc. Prior to the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Monier, Inc. was the largest producer of concrete roofing tile in the United States.

II. THE JOINT VENTURE

4. On or about August 15, 1997, Boral Ltd. and Redland PLC acquired stock in and contributed the assets of their respective United States concrete roofing tile operations to a joint venture limited liability corporation, named Monier Lifetile LLC. Monier Lifetile LLC was formed as a limited liability company under Delaware state law.

III. JURISDICTION

5. Monier Lifetile LLC, Boral Ltd. and Lafarge S.A. are, and at all times relevant herein have been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and are corporations whose business is in or affects commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.
IV. THE RELEVANT MARKETS

6. The relevant line of commerce in which to analyze the effects of the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC is the market for standard-weight concrete roofing tile. Standard-weight concrete roofing tile is used predominately in new home construction.

7. The relevant geographic markets in which to analyze the effects of the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC are the Southwestern United States (consisting of California, Arizona and Nevada) and Florida and/or narrower areas within the Southwestern United States and Florida including, but not limited to: Southern California (all of the state of California south of, and including, Bakersfield); Nevada; Arizona; and Southern Florida (all of the state of Florida south of Lake Okeechobee).

V. STRUCTURE OF THE MARKETS

8. Prior to the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC, Boral Lifetile, Inc. and Monier, Inc. were the two largest producers of concrete roofing tile in the United States. Only one other manufacturer, Pioneer Roofing Tile, Inc., operates in both the Southwestern United States and Florida. In California and Nevada, the only other significant competitor in concrete roofing tile is Burlingame Industries. In Arizona, Monier Lifetile LLC and Pioneer Roofing Tile, Inc. are the only significant competitors in concrete roofing tile. In Florida, the only other significant producer of concrete roofing tile is Entegra Roof Tile Corp.

9. Each of the relevant markets is highly concentrated whether measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or the two-firm and four-firm concentration ratios. The formation of Monier Lifetile LLC has greatly increased concentration in each of the already concentrated markets.

VI. ENTRY CONDITIONS

10. The threat of entry has not deterred Boral Lifetile, Inc.'s and Monier, Inc.'s attempts to raise prices for concrete roofing tile in the past. The threat of entry has not deterred anticompetitive effects resulting from the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC. It is unlikely the threat of entry will deter additional anticompetitive effects likely to result from the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC.
11. It is unlikely that an entrant would achieve a significant market impact within two years and deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects likely to result from the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC.

12. Because the cost of entering and producing concrete roofing tile is relatively high compared to the potential sales revenues available to an entrant, new entry into the relevant markets is not likely to be profitable. Consequently, entry into the production of concrete roofing tile is not likely to occur in a timely manner to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects likely to result from the formation of Monier Lifetile LLC.

VII. EFFECTS OF THE ACQUISITION

13. The formation of Monier Lifetile LLC has substantially lessened, or may substantially lessen, competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others, by:

a. Eliminating Boral Ltd. and Redland PLC as independent competitors with significant capacity in the relevant markets;

b. Eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between Boral Ltd. and Redland PLC, both of which had the ability and incentive to compete on price, in the relevant markets;

c. Increasing the likelihood of coordinated interaction in the relevant markets;

d. Increasing the likelihood of unilateral anticompetitive effects in the relevant markets;

e. Having led, or leading, to a reduction in likely price decreases or an increase in prices in the relevant markets;

f. Having led, or leading, to a reduction in service in the relevant markets; and/or

g. Having led, or leading, to a reduction in quality in the relevant markets.

VIII. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

DECISION AND ORDER

The Commission having heretofore issued its complaint charging the respondents named in the caption hereof with violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and the respondents having been served with a copy of that complaint, together with a notice of contemplated relief; and

The respondents, their attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Secretary of the Commission having thereafter withdrawn this matter from adjudication in accordance with Section 3.25(c) of its Rules; and

The Commission having considered the matter and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having duly considered the comments filed thereafter by interested persons pursuant to Section 3.25(f) of its Rules, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 3.25(f) of its Rules, the Commission hereby makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Monier Lifetile LLC is a limited liability company organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Delaware, with its office and principal place of business located at One Park Plaza, Suite 900, Irvine, California.

2. Respondent Boral Ltd. is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Australia, with its office and principal place of business located at 50 Bridge Street, Sydney, NSW 2000, Australia.

3. Respondent Lafarge S.A. is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of France, with its office and principal place of business located at 61 rue des Belles Feuilles, Paris, France.
4. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Monier Lifetile" means Monier Lifetile LLC, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Monier Lifetile, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "Boral" means Boral Ltd., its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Boral, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

C. "Lafarge" means Lafarge S.A., its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Lafarge, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

D. "Respondents" means Monier Lifetile, Boral and Lafarge, individually and collectively.

E. "CRH" means CRH PLC, a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Ireland, with its office and principal place of business located at Belgard Castle, Clondalkin, Dublin 22, Ireland; and its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by CRH, including Oldcastle, Inc.


G. "Joint Venture" means the formation of the limited liability company, Monier Lifetile, on or about August 15, 1997, through the issuance of membership interest and coownership of assets of the respective United States concrete roofing tile operations of Boral and Redland PLC, now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lafarge.

H. "Acquirer" means CRH or the entity/entities to whom respondents divest the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested.
I. "Concrete Roofing Tile" means concrete tile designed primarily to cover the roofs of residential and commercial structures.

J. "Field Tile" means Concrete Roofing Tile that is used to cover the face of a roof.

K. "Field Tile Line" means a delivered, assembled, installed, and functioning production line that produces Field Tile.

L. "Trim Tile" means Concrete Roofing Tile that is used to cover the crest and soffit of a roof.

M. "Trim Line" means a delivered, assembled, installed, and functioning production line that has the capacity to produce Trim Tile at a level of at least ten (10) per cent of the overall Field Tile production capacity of the tile manufacturing facility in which the Trim Line is located.

N. "Divestiture Agreement" means the Acquisition Agreement between Monier Lifetile and Oldcastle, Inc., dated January 21, 1999, and all exhibits thereof, incorporated by reference into this order and made a part hereof as a Confidential Appendix, regardless of whether the purchase and sale of assets contemplated by such agreement is consummated.

O. "Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested" means the following:

1. The Corona tile manufacturing facility, located at 1745 Sampson Avenue, Corona, California, including: two (2) Field Tile Lines and one (1) Trim Line, with a minimum annual production capacity of 600,000 squares of Concrete Roofing Tile; and all assets related to the production of Concrete Roofing Tile at the Corona tile manufacturing facility included in the Divestiture Agreement.

2. The Casa Grande tile manufacturing facility, located at 1742 South Rooftile Road, Casa Grande, Arizona, including: two (2) Field Tile Lines and one (1) Trim Line, with a minimum annual production capacity of 700,000 squares of Concrete Roofing Tile; and all assets related to the production of Concrete Roofing Tile at the Casa Grande tile manufacturing facility included in the Divestiture Agreement.

3. The Ft. Lauderdale tile manufacturing facility, located at 1900 N.W. 21st Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, as a functioning facility producing Concrete Roofing Tile, including: one (1) Field Tile Line and one Trim Line, with a minimum annual production capacity of 300,000 squares of Concrete Roofing Tile; and all assets related to the production of Concrete Roofing Tile at the
Ft. Lauderdale tile manufacturing facility included in the Divestiture Agreement.

4. All covenants; undertakings; representations; warranties; guarantees; indemnifications; marketing information; product development information; research materials; technical information; inventions; trade secrets; technology; know-how; intellectual property rights; patents; patent applications; formulas; copyrights; licenses; trademarks; trade names; and rights, expressed or implied, included in the Divestiture Agreement.

P. "Cost" means direct cash cost of labor.

Q. "Non-Public Acquirer Information" means any information not in the public domain obtained by respondents directly or indirectly from the Acquirer prior to the effective date, or during the term, of the provision of assistance to the Acquirer as required by paragraph II.C. of this order. Non-Public Acquirer Information shall not include information that subsequently falls within the public domain through no violation of this order by respondents.

R. "Southern California" means all of the state of California south of, and including, Bakersfield.

II.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondents shall divest absolutely and in good faith the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested to CRH in accordance with the Divestiture Agreement within five (5) days of the date the Commission serves its final decision containing the order herein on respondents' counsel, in disposition of this matter.

B. The purpose of the divestiture of the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested is to ensure that the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested are used to produce and sell Concrete Roofing Tile of commercial quality similar to that currently produced by Monier Lifetile and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Joint Venture as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

C. Respondents shall commit to provide at Cost upon reasonable notice and request by the Acquirer, for a period not to exceed six (6) months from the date each divestiture is completed: (a) such assistance, personnel and training as are reasonably necessary to enable the Acquirer to manufacture Concrete Roofing Tile in
substantially the same manner and quality employed or achieved by Monier Lifetile; and (b) such assistance, personnel and training as are reasonably necessary to enable the Acquirer to obtain any necessary governmental approvals to manufacture Concrete Roofing Tile at the current location of the tile manufacturing facility acquired by the Acquirer and to sell Concrete Roofing Tile in each of the counties in which Monier Lifetile currently sells Concrete Roofing Tile in the state where the tile manufacturing facility acquired by the Acquirer is located.

D. Respondents shall not provide, disclose or otherwise make available to any of their employees not involved in providing assistance any Non-Public Acquirer Information, nor shall respondents use any Non-Public Acquirer Information obtained or derived by respondents in their capacity as providers of assistance pursuant to paragraph II.C., except for the sole purpose of providing assistance pursuant to paragraph II.C.

E. Pending divestiture of the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested, respondents shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability, marketability and competitiveness of the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested, and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration or impairment of any of the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested except for ordinary wear and tear.

F. Respondents shall comply with the terms of the Divestiture Agreement and such agreement is incorporated by reference into this order and made a part hereof as a Confidential Appendix. Any failure by respondents to comply with the terms of the Divestiture Agreement shall constitute a failure to comply with this order.

G. Respondents shall take all steps necessary to restore the Ft. Lauderdale tile manufacturing facility, located at 1900 N.W. 21st Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, as a functioning facility, capable of producing at least 300,000 squares annually of Concrete Roofing Tile of commercial quality similar to that currently produced by Monier Lifetile, and respondents shall complete all restoration work, including addition of the Trim Line, by April 30, 1999, or within two (2) months of the date respondents signed the agreement containing consent order in this matter, whichever is later.
It is further ordered, That:

A. If respondents fail to divest absolutely and in good faith all of the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested pursuant to paragraph II.A. of this order, the Commission may appoint a trustee to divest the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested. In the event that the Commission or the Attorney General brings an action pursuant to Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(l), or any other statute enforced by the Commission, respondents shall consent to the appointment of a trustee in such action. Neither the appointment of a trustee nor a decision not to appoint a trustee under this paragraph shall preclude the Commission or the Attorney General from seeking civil penalties or any other relief available to it, including a court-appointed trustee pursuant to Section 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or any other statute enforced by the Commission, for any failure by respondents to comply with this order.

B. If a trustee is appointed by the Commission or a court pursuant to paragraph III.A. of this order, respondents shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the trustee's powers, duties, authority and responsibilities:

1. The Commission shall select the trustee, subject to the consent of respondents, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. The trustee shall be a person with experience and expertise in acquisitions and divestitures. If Monier Lifetile has not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any proposed trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to Monier Lifetile of the identity of any proposed trustee, respondents shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed trustee.

2. Subject to the prior approval of the Commission, the trustee shall have the exclusive power and authority to accomplish the divestitures described in paragraph III.A. of the order.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the trustee, respondents shall execute a trust agreement that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission, and in the case of a court-appointed trustee, of the court, transfers to the trustee all rights and powers necessary to permit the trustee to effect the divestitures required by this order.
4. The trustee shall have twelve (12) months from the date the Commission approves the trust agreement described in paragraph III.B.3. to accomplish the divestitures, which shall be subject to the prior approval of the Commission. If, however, at the end of the twelve (12) month period, the trustee has submitted a plan for the divestitures required by this order or believes that the divestitures required by this order can be achieved within a reasonable time, then the divestiture period may be extended by the Commission, or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court; provided, however, the Commission may extend the period for the divestitures only two (2) times.

5. The trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records and facilities related to the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested or to any other relevant information, as the trustee may request. Respondents shall develop such financial or other information as the trustee may request and shall cooperate with the trustee. Respondents shall take no action to interfere with or impede the trustee's accomplishment of the divestitures. Any delays in any divestiture caused by respondents shall extend the time for that divestiture under this paragraph in an amount equal to the delay, as determined by the Commission or, for a court-appointed trustee, by the court.

6. The trustee shall use his or her best efforts to negotiate the most favorable price and terms available in each contract that is submitted to the Commission, subject to respondents' absolute and unconditional obligation to divest expeditiously at no minimum price. The divestitures shall be made in a manner consistent with the terms of this order; provided, however, if the trustee receives bona fide offers for a Tile Manufacturing Facility from more than one acquiring entity, and if the Commission determines to approve more than one such acquiring entity, the trustee shall divest to the acquiring entity or entities selected by respondents from among those approved by the Commission; provided further, however, that respondents shall select such entity within five (5) days of receiving notification of the Commission's approval.

7. The trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the cost and expense of respondents, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission or a court may set. The trustee shall have the authority to employ, at the cost and expense of
respondents, and at reasonable fees, such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers and other representatives and assistants as are necessary to carry out the trustee's duties and responsibilities. The trustee shall account for all monies derived from the divestitures and all expenses incurred. After approval by the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court, of the account of the trustee, including fees for his or her services, all remaining monies shall be paid at the direction of the respondents, and the trustee's power shall be terminated. The trustee's compensation shall be based at least in significant part on a commission arrangement contingent on the trustee's accomplishing the divestitures required by paragraph III.A. of this order.

8. Respondents shall indemnify the trustee and hold the trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the trustee's duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses incurred in connection with the preparation for, or defense of, any claim whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts or bad faith by the trustee.

9. If the trustee ceases to act or fails to act diligently, a substitute trustee shall be appointed in the same manner as provided in this paragraph.

10. The Commission or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, the court, may on its own initiative or at the request of the trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be reasonably necessary or appropriate to accomplish the divestitures required by this order.

11. The trustee may divest such additional ancillary assets related to the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested and effect such ancillary arrangements as are necessary to satisfy the requirements or purposes of this order.

12. The trustee shall have no obligation or authority to operate or maintain the Tile Manufacturing Assets To Be Divested.

13. The trustee shall report in writing to respondents and the Commission every sixty (60) days concerning the trustee's efforts to accomplish the divestitures required by this order.
IV.

It is further ordered, That within thirty (30) days after the date this order becomes final, and every sixty (60) days thereafter until respondents have fully complied with the provisions of paragraphs II. and III. of this order, respondents shall submit to the Commission verified written reports setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they intend to comply, are complying, and have complied with the requirements of this order. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full description of the efforts being made to comply with paragraphs II. and III. of the order. Respondents shall include in their compliance reports copies of all written communications to and from any Acquirer, all internal documents (except privileged documents), and all reports and recommendations, concerning the divestitures.

V.

It is further ordered, That, for a period of ten (10) years from the date this order becomes final, respondents shall not, without providing advance written notification to the Commission, directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries, partnerships, joint ventures, or otherwise:

A. Acquire any stock, share capital, equity, partnership, membership or other interest in, any concern, corporate or noncorporate, engaged in, at the time of such acquisition or within the year preceding such acquisition, the manufacture of Concrete Roofing Tile in Southern California, Arizona, Nevada or Florida; or

B. Acquire any assets used at the time of such acquisition or within the year preceding such acquisition in the manufacture of Concrete Roofing Tile in Southern California, Arizona, Nevada or Florida.

Said notification shall be given on the Notification and Report Form set forth in the Appendix to Part 803 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Notification"), and shall be prepared and transmitted in accordance with the requirements of that part, except that no filing fee will be required for any such notification. The Notification shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, notification need not be made to the United States Department of Justice, and notification is required only of respondents and not of any other party to the transaction.
Respondents shall provide the Notification to the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to consummating the transaction (hereinafter referred to as the "first waiting period"). If, within the first waiting period, representatives of the Commission make a written request for additional information or documentary material (within the meaning of 16 CFR 803.20), respondents shall not consummate the transaction until twenty (20) days after submitting such additional information or documentary material. Early termination of the waiting periods in this paragraph may be requested and, where appropriate, granted by letter from the Bureau of Competition. Provided, however, that prior notification shall not be required by this paragraph for a transaction for which notification is required to be made, and has been made, pursuant to Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a.

VI.

It is further ordered, That respondents shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the corporate respondents such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of successor corporations, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporations or Joint Venture that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

VII.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, respondents shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to all facilities and access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondents relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five (5) days' notice to respondents and without restraint or interference from respondents, to interview officers, directors or employees of respondents, who may have counsel present, regarding such matters.

[CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX REDACTED]
ORDER WITH RESPECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER

On March 29, 1999, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company ("Reynolds") filed a motion requesting that the Commission either clarify or modify the Protective Order Governing Confidential Material (dated July 18, 1997), which was entered in Docket No. 9285. Reynolds filed the motion in an effort to establish a right to retain confidential materials it obtained in discovery from Dr. John Pierce ("Pierce") and from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation ("Foundation"), and to retain work product created by Reynolds' experts incorporating information contained in those materials. Pierce and the Foundation opposed the motion and asked that the Commission impose sanctions against Reynolds.

For the reasons set forth below, we deny Reynolds' request and order that it comply in full with Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order within 15 days of the issuance of this Order.\(^1\) We also deny the Pierce and Foundation requests for sanctions.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 28, 1997, the Commission voted to issue an administrative complaint alleging that Reynolds' Joe Camel advertising campaign violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. During the discovery phase of the administrative proceeding, complaint counsel and counsel for Reynolds jointly moved that the administrative law judge enter a Protective Order Governing Confidential Material ("Protective Order"). The purpose of this order was to control the use and disposition of confidential materials submitted during the course of the proceeding. The Protective Order defined "confidential material" to include, \textit{inter alia}, "documents

\(^1\) Reynolds directed its motion to Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") James P. Timony, who presided over the adjudicative proceeding in Docket No. 9285. However, because that proceeding has been concluded, see \textit{infra}, the Commission resolves this motion. \textit{See, e.g., General Motors Corp.}, 103 FTC 105 (1984).
provided in compliance with informal discovery or discovery requests pursuant to the Commission's Rules of Practice that are designated [by either party or the submitter] 'confidential material.' * * *.

The Protective Order restricted the disclosure of confidential material to eight categories of individuals, including complaint counsel, Reynolds' counsel, and experts retained by either party to assist at, or in preparing for, trial. Protective Order at ¶ 10. Paragraph 11 further restricted disclosure by stating that confidential material could be disclosed to individuals listed in Paragraph 10 "only for the purposes of the preparation, hearing, and any appeal of this proceeding and any subsequent administrative proceeding and for no other purpose whatsoever." Paragraph 11 also provided that before any expert could receive confidential material, the expert would have to sign the Agreement to Maintain Confidentiality ("Paragraph 11 Agreement") that was attached to the Protective Order. Signers of the Paragraph 11 Agreement pledged not to disclose confidential material to anyone not entitled to receive it, and "that upon the termination of my participation in this proceeding I will promptly return all copies of documents, or portions thereof, containing confidential material, and all notes, memoranda, or other papers containing confidential material, to complaint counsel or respondent's counsel."

Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order specifically governs the ultimate disposition of confidential materials received by any counsel, or expert, for Reynolds. It states that:

[When any such person] ceases to participate in this proceeding, all copies of documents or portions thereof designated confidential that are in the possession of such person, together with all notes, memoranda or other papers containing confidential information, shall be returned by such person to counsel for respondent, who in turn shall, at the conclusion of this proceeding, (a) return all original confidential material in his or her possession, custody, or control, to the submitter; and (b) destroy all remaining non-original confidential material. (emphasis added)

On May 5, 1998, during the course of administrative discovery, Reynolds served Pierce with a subpoena seeking materials related to his article entitled "Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking." The article appeared in the February 1998 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association and reported the results of a study conducted by Pierce et al. On July 1, 1998, Pierce complied with the subpoena. Included among the
responsive material were unpublished background data from Pierce's study, which Pierce designated as confidential.

Pierce's study was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and on May 8, 1998, Reynolds served the Foundation with a subpoena seeking all documents in its possession regarding the study. On May 21, 1998, the Foundation complied with the subpoena. Among the documents submitted by the Foundation were 20 pages of peer review materials. Although Reynolds was obligated under Paragraph 5 of the Protective Order to provide the Foundation a copy of the Protective Order, it failed to do so. As a result, counsel for the Foundation did not learn of the Protective Order until November 1998, and at that time, it designated the peer review materials as confidential.

Trial against Reynolds began on November 9, 1998. However, on November 23, 1998, before the trial concluded, Reynolds (and other cigarette manufacturers) entered into an agreement with the attorneys general of 46 states and five other jurisdictions. Pursuant to this settlement, Reynolds agreed, inter alia, to cease using all cartoon characters (including Joe Camel) in advertising, and to help fund a public education campaign designed to discourage underage usage of tobacco. The following day, complaint counsel filed a motion to dismiss the Commission's administrative litigation on the grounds that the relief it was seeking had been achieved as a result of the multi-state settlement. Reynolds agreed that the case should be dismissed but urged that it be dismissed with prejudice.

The ALJ thereafter certified complaint counsel's motion to dismiss to the Commission, and on January 26, 1999, the Commission granted the motion ("Dismissal Order"). In the Dismissal Order, we concluded that the public interest warranted dismissal of the complaint because the multi-state settlement achieved the most important elements of the relief that the Commission sought. However, we denied Reynolds' request that the dismissal be with prejudice, noting that we have "consistently refrained from dismissing a complaint with prejudice absent a substantive ruling. Without such a ruling by the ALJ or the Commission, it is not appropriate to foreclose the possibility of further litigation where unanticipated problems might develop with one or more of the relevant remedies." Dismissal Order at 4.

In addition to complaint counsel's motion to dismiss, the Commission had before it Reynolds' request that certain materials
received from Pierce and the Foundation be placed on the public record, and the Foundation's request that the materials it had submitted be accorded in camera treatment. We denied both motions and noted that Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order "prohibits respondent from disclosing the documents outside of this litigation and Paragraph 14 requires respondent to return the documents upon dismissal of the proceeding." Dismissal Order at 6.

On January 27, 1999, counsel for both Pierce and the Foundation sent letters to Reynolds' counsel requesting that, pursuant to the terms of the Protective Order and the Dismissal Order, Reynolds return all original confidential materials to the submitters and retrieve and destroy all copies, notes, memoranda or other papers containing confidential material. On March 5, 1999, Reynolds separately responded to Pierce and the Foundation with identically worded letters. Reynolds stated that it did not believe it was yet required by the Protective Order to retrieve, destroy and return confidential materials. Reynolds further stated that it:

may seek review of the Commission's action in this litigation and may retain the materials pending the review period. Additionally, the Commission's order leaves open the possibility of a subsequent administrative proceeding.

On March 29, 1999, Reynolds filed a Motion for Clarification or Modification of the Protective Order ("Reynolds' Motion"), seeking a right under the Protective Order to retain confidential material subpoenaed from Pierce and the Foundation. This motion is before the Commission now. The motion argues that Reynolds is entitled to retain the material for two reasons. First, Reynolds contends that the Protective Order permits it to retain materials until the expiration of the review period for the proceeding, Reynolds' Motion at 17-20, and argues that this period is six years - the time within which it could challenge the dismissal pursuant to Section 2401 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401. Accordingly, Reynolds argues that it should not be required to return any materials at least until January 2005.

Reynolds' second argument is based on Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order. Reynolds' Motion at 20-21, which states that confidential materials may be disclosed to the eight categories of individuals listed in Paragraph 10 "for the purposes of the preparation, hearing, and any appeal of this proceeding and any subsequent administrative proceeding ***." Reynolds claims that,
because it is entitled to disclose the materials to counsel and experts for the purpose of defending itself in "any subsequent administrative proceeding," and because the Commission dismissed the complaint without prejudice, it should not be required to return documents "until there no longer exists the threat of a 'subsequent administrative proceeding' concerning the issues litigated this past November." Reynolds does not indicate when it believes such a threat would no longer exist. These arguments, according to Reynolds, are also supported by notions of equity, fairness, and due process. Finally, Reynolds requests that "[i]f it is deemed necessary," the Protective Order be modified consistent with its arguments. Reynolds' Motion at 21-24.

Both Pierce and the Foundation filed oppositions to Reynolds' motion. Pierce claims that he disclosed confidential material relying on the Protective Order, that the Protective Order clearly requires Reynolds to return confidential materials immediately, and that no modification of its provisions is appropriate. He also asks that the Commission sanction Reynolds and its counsel for their failure to comply with the Protective Order. The Foundation argues that the Protective Order requires the immediate return of the confidential material, that no order modification is appropriate, and that Reynolds and its counsel should be sanctioned.

II. DISCUSSION

After reviewing the submissions of Reynolds, Pierce, and the Foundation, we find that the Protective Order needs no clarification, nor should it be modified. Accordingly, we order that Reynolds and its counsel comply in full with Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order within 15 days of the issuance of this Order. We also reject the requests made by both Pierce and the Foundation that Reynolds and its counsel be sanctioned.

A. Reynolds' Motion for Clarification of Protective Order

The confidentiality obligations of the parties are clearly set forth in Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order which not only governs confidential information from the parties, but also their counsel,
experts, and others retained to assist in the litigation. As previously noted, Paragraph 14 requires that when any such person "ceases to participate in this proceeding," that person shall return all confidential documents (or portions thereof) and "all notes, memoranda or other papers containing confidential information" to Reynolds' counsel. The paragraph further requires that "at the conclusion of this proceeding," Reynolds' counsel shall return all original confidential materials to the submitter, and shall destroy all other documents containing confidential material. The relevant issue here is whether "this proceeding" has been "concluded."

This proceeding commenced on May 28, 1997, when the Commission issued its complaint challenging Reynolds' Joe Camel advertising campaign, and continued until January 26, 1999, when the Commission dismissed its complaint against Reynolds. Just as issuance of the complaint marked the commencement of the "proceeding," dismissal of that complaint marked its conclusion. After dismissal, Reynolds had only one avenue for extending the proceeding -- a petition for reconsideration filed within 14 days pursuant to Commission Rule 3.55, 16 CFR 3.55. Reynolds filed no such petition. Therefore, "this proceeding" concluded on January 26, 1999 and Reynolds is required to return original confidential material to submitters and to destroy all copies.

Reynolds claims that the Protective Order entitles it to retain confidential material at least until the expiration of its right to seek judicial review of the Dismissal Order. It further contends that it has six years within which to seek review -- the time within which it claims it could challenge the Dismissal Order under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Reynolds' Motion at 19-20. But, the Protective Order creates no such entitlement. The relevant obligations of Paragraph 14 are triggered when the "proceeding" concludes, and, as explained, this proceeding concluded when the complaint was dismissed. While it is possible to argue that if the complaint had not been dismissed and if the Commission had issued

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2 Reynolds does not dispute that the documents requested by Pierce and the Foundation are "confidential material," as defined in Paragraph 1 of the Protective Order. Nor does Reynolds dispute that its obligations regarding those documents are governed by the Protective Order.

3 See Commission Rule 3.11(a), 16 CFR 3.11(a) ("an adjudicative proceeding is commenced when an affirmative vote is taken by the Commission to issue a complaint.").
a final cease and desist order, and then the "proceeding" would have continued until the expiration of Reynolds' right to petition for review of such an order by the court of appeals, as set forth in Section 5(c) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(c), these hypothetical conditions do not exist here. In this case, the possibility of further proceedings pursuant to the May 28, 1997 complaint was extinguished once the complaint was dismissed and Reynolds failed to petition for reconsideration under Rule 3.55.

Moreover, even if, as Reynolds contends, it could still challenge the Commission's decision to dismiss the complaint under the APA, the challenge would become a new action, not a continuation, appeal, or recommencement, of this proceeding, since Reynolds would have to argue that the Commission's order of dismissal constituted final action, not otherwise directly reviewable. See 5 U.S.C. 704. In doing so, Reynolds would be conceding that the action before the Commission had concluded, thereby compelling it to comply with Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order.

The second argument advanced by Reynolds in support of its "right" to retain confidential material is that Reynolds could be subject to some future hypothetical legal action because the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. Reynolds' Motion at 21-24. Although the Commission could, at least theoretically, bring such an

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4 In that situation, the complaint would retain its vitality throughout the review period, and the matter could be remanded to the Commission for further administrative litigation pursuant to the complaint.

5 Although Reynolds contends that Pierce and the Foundation have conceded that it could have extended the proceeding by filing a petition for review within 60 days pursuant to Section 5(c) of the FTC Act, this is incorrect. Section 5(c) provides for petitions for review only when the Commission issues a cease and desist order. Here, the Commission issued no such order and Section 5(c) does not apply.

6 Significantly, Reynolds does not argue that it can seek direct review of the Commission's January 26 order, only that APA review is still available to it. Because such review is not direct review but is dependent upon the conclusion of the proceeding before the Commission, Reynolds' right to seek APA review does not affect its obligation under Paragraph 14.

7 Reynolds claims that Richards v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1991) holds that a case dismissed without prejudice is not concluded on the merits. Reynolds' Opposition to John Pierce's and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's Cross-Motions for Enforcement of the Protective Order ("Reynolds' Opposition") at 4. However, the court in Richards reached no such sweeping conclusion. The court held instead that Richards' case against Firestone had not concluded because the plaintiff had sought dismissal without prejudice merely as a ruse to avoid an unfavorable discovery order from the trial court. It was clear that the plaintiff intended to refile the case once it was dismissed. By contrast, in this case, complaint counsel sought dismissal because it believed that the relief it was seeking was already achieved in another forum.
action, the Protective Order does not permit Reynolds to retain confidential material pending such a possibility.  

Reynolds further claims that it may retain the materials at issue because Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order provides that confidential materials may be given to certain individuals specified in Paragraph 10 "for the purposes of the preparation, hearing, and any appeal of this proceeding and any subsequent administrative proceeding..." and that the possibility of a "subsequent administrative proceeding" has not dissipated. Reynolds' Motion at 21.

We reject this interpretation of the Protective Order because, in our view, it would make the Order internally inconsistent; more specifically, the plain wording of Paragraph 14 would clash with that of Paragraph 11. It is well established that courts should interpret the provisions of an order consistently, giving full application to each provision as written, See United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 233-241 (1975). We reject an interpretation that creates an inconsistency and interprets one provision at the expense of another.

Instead, we believe that the terms of Paragraph 11 must be read as a logical progression. "Any subsequent administrative proceeding" immediately follows "any appeal of this proceeding." That is, Reynolds may retain and disclose confidential materials not just in preparation for the administrative trial, but also in preparation for a petition for review of the trial and for any subsequent administrative proceeding that might result from appellate disposition of such a petition. Thus, the "subsequent administrative proceeding" referred to in Paragraph 11 allows for the possibility of an administrative proceeding that stems from a remand after appeal, a situation that has not occurred here. Paragraph 11 was not intended to provide an open-ended grant of authority for Reynolds to retain confidential material from this proceeding for later use in some entirely separate, subsequent administrative proceeding.

In sum, Paragraph 11 of the Protective Order assures Reynolds that it may retain and disclose confidential material to its experts during all phases of the proceeding, including any possible

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8 Reynolds also claims that if the Commission, in the future, again challenges its Joe Camel campaign, it needs the confidential material not only to defend itself but also to challenge the Commission's issuance of a complaint. Reynolds' Opposition at 5. However, as Reynolds learned in challenging the Commission's 1997 complaint, there is no subject matter jurisdiction for such an action. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FTC, 14 F. Supp. 2d 757 (M.D.N.C. 1998).
subsequent administrative proceeding that may result from a remand on appeal of a Commission order to cease and desist (if there were such an order). However, nothing in Paragraph 11 describes Reynolds' obligation to return confidential material. That obligation is set forth exclusively in Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order which makes clear that Reynolds' possession of the confidential material must end when the proceeding ends. Based on the plain reading of Paragraph 14, and as described in our Dismissal Order, we reject Reynolds' contention that the Protective Order permits it to retain confidential material.

B. Reynolds' Motion for Modification of Protective Order

As an alternative means of retaining confidential discovery materials, Reynolds seeks modification of the Protective Order. But, like Reynolds' request for clarification, its alternative request is also deficient. Hence, we conclude that there is insufficient basis for modifying the Order.

Reynolds asks the Commission to exercise its discretion to modify the Protective Order to permit it to retain confidential material "in order to defend itself against the plaintiff (the Commission) in a future action, an action clearly contemplated by the Commission when it dismissed the Joe Camel complaint without prejudice." Reynolds' Motion at 23. Reynolds contends that it "should not be required to fight the same costly discovery battles again, and incur the same significant costs in retaining experts to duplicate work that has already been accomplished. Requiring Reynolds to return these materials and destroy the fruits of its experts' labor at this juncture would be highly prejudicial." Reynolds' Motion at 22. Accordingly, Reynolds' request raises the question of whether the circumstances presented here form an appropriate basis for the exercise of Commission discretion.

A protective order may be modified only where the party seeking modification shows good cause for the modification. See Lee Shuknecht & Sons, Inc. v. P. Vigneri & Sons, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 610, 614-16 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). To determine whether good cause has been shown, courts consider such factors as the nature of the protective order and the modification that is sought, the foreseeability at the time the order was entered of the modification that is now requested, and
the extent to which a party or a third party will be prejudiced by the modification or by the retention of the status quo. Id.

Here, the Protective Order was not imposed on the parties, it was instead sought jointly by complaint counsel and by counsel for Reynolds. Moreover, the modification sought by Reynolds, the authority to retain confidential material beyond the conclusion of the proceeding, goes to the heart of the scheme contemplated by the Protective Order. Because Reynolds sought issuance of the Protective Order, and because the provision Reynolds seeks to modify is a central one, Reynolds bears a heavy burden in seeking this modification.

First, Reynolds has not made a sufficient showing that its present situation was not foreseeable at the time it agreed to entry of the Protective Order. It was foreseeable that, at the conclusion of the Commission's proceeding, Reynolds would be in possession of confidential material that it might want to retain.

Nor has Reynolds made the sort of showing of prejudice that justifies the modification it seeks. Reynolds claims that if the Commission initiates another case against its Joe Camel advertising campaign, it will be required "to fight the same costly discovery battles again, and incur the same significant costs in retaining experts to duplicate work that has already been accomplished." Motion at 22. Although Reynolds claims that "the Commission contemplates a proceeding covering the same issues litigated this past November," Motion at 20, this is pure speculation on Reynolds' part. When the Commission dismissed the complaint without prejudice, it did so because it did not resolve the merits of the matter, not because it contemplated any further proceeding against Reynolds' Joe Camel campaign. Indeed, the multi-state settlement provides adequate relief regarding the campaign, and the Commission has no reason to believe that Reynolds will fail to comply with that settlement. Since Reynolds' claim of prejudice is based solely upon a hypothetical future Commission action, Reynolds has failed to make a sufficient showing that it will be prejudiced by the absence of the modification it seeks.

9 "Where a protective order is agreed to by the parties before its presentation to the court, there is a higher burden on the movant to justify the modification of the order." AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979). See also Omega Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393 (W.D. Va. 1987).
Moreover, Pierce and the Foundation credibly claim that they will be prejudiced if the Protective Order is modified. They assert that if Reynolds retains the confidential material, the material may be improperly disclosed to unauthorized persons and that Reynolds may seek to use the material to discredit Pierce's study. They further argue that, given the length of time Reynolds seeks to retain the material, they will be unable to monitor or restrict further dissemination of the material. The Foundation argues that additional disclosure of the peer review material it has provided may damage the Foundation's peer review process. As explained in the Agreement to Maintain Confidentiality (which is attached to the Protective Order), Pierce and the Foundation are intended beneficiaries of the Protective Order. We agree that if Reynolds is permitted to retain the confidential material for at least six years beyond the conclusion of the Commission's proceeding, there is an increased risk that the material will be disclosed to others not originally contemplated by the Protective Order. This may result from inadvertent disclosure, or as the result of compulsory process issued to Reynolds. Given the nature of the material, we believe that both Pierce and the Foundation are more likely to be prejudiced by the modification than Reynolds is prejudiced by the status quo.

For these reasons, we do not find good cause for the modification Reynolds seeks and we decline to exercise our discretion to grant its motion.10

C. Pierce and Foundation Requests for Sanctions Against Reynolds

As previously discussed, both Pierce and the Foundation opposed Reynolds' motion and requested sanctions against Reynolds and its

10 Reynolds' position is not similar to that of the third party seeking modification of the protective order in Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1980); see Reynolds' Motion at 23. In that case, a third party (the State of New York) sought modification of a protective order so that it could discover AMA documents that were in Wilk's possession. New York was already engaged in litigation with the AMA and the court concluded that it would be wasteful to force New York to duplicate discovery already made during the AMA's litigation with Wilk. 635 F.2d at 1299. Although Reynolds believes that the Commission "clearly contemplate[s]" another challenge to the Joe Camel campaign, see Reynolds' Motion at 23, there is no basis for this belief and no reasonable likelihood that Reynolds will have to engage in any duplication of discovery.

Nor does Reynolds have any right to retain confidential material. Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1984), and the other cases cited by Reynolds in its Opposition at 8, merely state that a defendant may use material discovered from the plaintiff in subsequent litigation brought by the same plaintiff. Those cases are all irrelevant to Reynolds' motion because in none of those cases was there either a protective order or any agreement by the parties to return or destroy confidential material at the conclusion of litigation.
counsel for failing to comply with Paragraph 14 of the Protective Order. Although we are sympathetic to the arguments advanced by Pierce and the Foundation, we decline at this time to impose any sanctions. However, we note with serious concern that Reynolds and its counsel have thus far failed to comply with their obligations regarding confidential materials -- obligations that were clearly set forth in the Protective Order and repeated in our Dismissal Order ("Paragraph 14 requires Respondent to return the documents upon dismissal of the proceeding.").

We do not support Reynolds' resort to self-help in order to implement a two month delay in complying with the Protective Order. Any objection that Reynolds had to the terms of the Protective Order or the Dismissal Order could and should have been raised during the period for reconsideration of the Dismissal Order. See Commission Rule 3.55, 16 CFR 3.55. Instead, Reynolds failed to raise any issue until March 29, 1999, more than two months following the issuance of the Dismissal Order. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed above, we find no merit whatsoever to the arguments Reynolds has advanced to excuse or delay its counsel's compliance.11

Notwithstanding these concerns, we seek to give Reynolds one final opportunity to comply with its Order obligations,12 and fully expect Reynolds' counsel to meet their present obligation under this and prior orders regarding the confidential materials at issue.

Accordingly, It is ordered, That Reynolds' Motion for Clarification or Modification of the Protective Order is denied. It is further ordered, That within 15 days of the date this Order is issued, Reynolds' counsel of record in Docket No. 9285 shall comply in full with the Provisions of Paragraph 14 of the July 18, 1997, Protective Order entered in Docket No. 9285. Upon completion of that compliance, Reynolds' counsel of record shall file with the Secretary of the Commission a Certification detailing that compliance.

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11 We believe it is also appropriate to note that Reynolds' failure to return or destroy confidential discovery material may not be the only case where it violated the Protective Order.

12 We also note that counsel appearing before the Commission have a solemn duty to comport themselves in accordance with professional standards, and to comply with orders of the Commission. See generally 16 CFR 4.1(e).
WAL-MART STORES, INC.

Complaint

IN THE MATTER OF
WAL-MART STORES, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT, WOOL PRODUCTS
LABELING ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3870. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision--June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., an
Arkansas-based retailer, from advertising any textile fiber product or any wool
product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material without
disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A.,
imported, or both.

Participants

For the Commission: Carol Jennings and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Irving Scher, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New
York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("respondent") has violated the provisions of
the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 (Textile
Act), and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 (Wool Act),
and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the
public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a Delaware corporation with its principal office
   or place of business at 702 S.W. 8th Street, Bentonville, Arkansas.

2. Respondent is a retail seller that has advertised, offered for sale,
   sold, and distributed to the public various products, including textile
   products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool
   products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint
   have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in
   Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online
   shopping service or catalog on the Internet, various products,
   including products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and
   the Wool Act.
5. Since March 16, 1998, respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

Commissioner Anthony recused.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed
consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal office or place of business at 702 S.W. 8th Street, Bentonville, Arkansas.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not advertise any textile fiber product or any wool product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material, as those terms are defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 300.1(h), respectively, or as they may hereafter be amended, without disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A., imported, or both.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format, provided that it is accessible or printable.
B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.

III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in
writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.

VI.

This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;

B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and

C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.

Commissioner Anthony recused.
IN THE MATTER OF

BUGLE BOY INDUSTRIES, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT
AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3871. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., a California-based clothing retailer, from violating any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act in the advertising, promotion and sale of clothing for men and boys.

Participants

For the Commission: Carol Jennings and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Linda Subias, in-house counsel, Simi Valley, CA.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Bugle Boy Industries, Inc. ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq. (FTC Act) and the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 (Textile Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 2900 North Madera Road, Simi Valley, California.

2. Respondent is a manufacturer and retail seller of clothing for men and boys. Respondent has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to the public textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act.
5. Since March 16, 1998, respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act.

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:
1. Respondent is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 2900 North Madera Road, Simi Valley, California.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not violate any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70, and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 303, or as they may hereafter be amended.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u), that offer textile products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format, provided that it is accessible or printable.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile products.

III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current
and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the publication or dissemination of mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u), and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Bugle Boy Industries, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
VI.

This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
   B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
   C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF
BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE CORPORATION

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT, WOOL PRODUCTS
LABELING ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3872. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, a New Jersey-based retailer, from advertising any textile fiber product or any wool product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material without disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A., imported, or both.

Participants

For the Commission: Eleanor Durham, Charles Harwood, Carol Jennings, and Elaine Kolish.

For the respondent: Ron Bloch, McDermott, Will & Emery, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq. (FTC Act), the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 (Textile Act), and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 (Wool Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1830 Route 130 N., Burlington, New Jersey.

2. Respondent is a retail seller that has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to the public various products, including textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act, and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, various products, including products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and the Wool Act.
5. Since April 1, 1998, respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the
procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1830 Route 130 N., Burlington, New Jersey.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not advertise any textile fiber product or any wool product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material, as those terms are defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 300.1(h), respectively, or as they may hereafter be amended, without disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A., imported, or both.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.
III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation, and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
VI.

This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
This consent order, among other things, prohibits Woolrich, Inc., a Pennsylvania-based retailer, from violating any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act or the Wool Products Labeling Act.

Participants

For the Commission: Eleanor Durham, Charles Harwood, Carol Jennings, and Elaine Kolish.

For the respondent: Howell Mette, Mette, Evans & Woodside, Harrisburg, PA.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Woolrich, Inc., ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq. (FTC Act), the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 (Textile Act), and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 (Wool Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office or place of business at Woolrich, Pennsylvania.

2. Respondent is a retail seller that has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to the public various products, including textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act, and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, various products, including products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and the Wool Act.

5. Since September 22, 1998, respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the
Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Seattle Regional Office proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:
1. Respondent Woolrich, Inc. is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal office or place of business at Woolrich, Pennsylvania.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Woolrich, Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not violate any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70, and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 303, or as they may hereafter be amended, or the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68, and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 300, or as they may hereafter be amended.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Woolrich, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.

III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Woolrich, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all
current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Woolrich, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Woolrich, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.

VI.

This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order,
whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;

B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and

C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
In the Matter of
ABERCROMBIE & FITCH, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT, WOOL PRODUCTS
LABELING ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3874. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., an
Ohio-based clothing retailer, from violating any provision of the Textile Fiber
Products Identification Act or the Wool Products Labeling Act in the advertising,
promotion and sale of clothing for men and women.

Participants
For the Commission: Carol Jennings and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: James Wilson, Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, Columbus, OH.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that
Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc. ("respondent") has violated the provisions
Act), the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 et
seq. (Textile Act), and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68
et seq. (Wool Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this
proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a Delaware corporation with its principal office
or place of business at 4 Limited Parkway East, Reynoldsburg, Ohio.
2. Respondent is a retail seller of clothing for men and women. Respondent has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to
the public textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile
Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.
3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint
have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in
Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of a print
catalog, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act
and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.
5. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of a print
catalog, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act
and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:
1. Respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal office or place of business at 4 Limited Parkway East, Reynoldsburg, Ohio.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not violate any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 et seq., and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 303, or as they may hereafter be amended, or the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 et seq., and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 300, or as they may hereafter be amended.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format, provided that it is accessible or printable.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.
It is further ordered, That respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, and directors, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities for preparation of the content of any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the filing of a plan of reorganization or dissolution pursuant to a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF

DELIA'S INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT, WOOL PRODUCTS
LABELING ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3875. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Delia's, Inc., a New York-based
clothing retailer, from violating any provision of the Textile Fiber Products
Identification Act or the Wool Products Labeling Act in the advertising, promotion
and sale of clothing for girls and women.

Participants

For the Commission: Carol Jennings and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Alexander Navarro, in-house counsel, New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that
Delia's Inc. ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal
Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 et seq. (Textile Act),
and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 et seq. (Wool
Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the
public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a Delaware corporation with its principal office
or place of business at 435 Hudson Street, New York, New York.
2. Respondent is a retail seller of clothing for women and girls.
Respondent has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to
the public textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile
Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.
3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint
have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in
Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of both a
print catalog and an online shopping service or Internet catalog,
textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and
wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.
5. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of both a print catalog and an online shopping service or Internet catalog, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the
procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Delia’s Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal office or place of business at 435 Hudson Street, New York, New York.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Delia’s Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not violate any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 et seq., and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 303, or as they may hereafter be amended, or the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 et seq., and any of the Rules promulgated pursuant to the Act, 16 CFR Part 300, or as they may hereafter be amended.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Delia’s Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format, provided that it is accessible or printable.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.
III.

*It is further ordered* That respondent Delia's Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent Delia's Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent Delia's Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF
THE STANLEY WORKS

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3876. Compliant, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits The Stanley Works, a Connecticut-based manufacturer and distributor of mechanics tools, from misrepresenting the extent to which any mechanics tool is made in the United States.

Participants

For the Commission: Kent Howerton, Laura Koss, and Elaine Kalish.

For the respondent: John Harkrider, Axinn, Veltrop & Harkrider, New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that The Stanley Works ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent The Stanley Works is a Connecticut corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1000 Stanley Drive, New Britain, Connecticut.

2. Respondent has manufactured, advertised, labeled, offered for sale, sold, and distributed products to the public, including mechanics tools.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

HUSKY MECHANICS TOOLS

4. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated advertisements, catalogs, packaging, labeling, in-store displays, and other promotional materials for certain of its Husky combination wrenches and sockets, including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibits A through J. These advertisements, catalogs, packaging, labeling, in-store displays, and other promotional materials contain the following statements or depictions:
A. Television Advertisement, Exhibit A:
Shows mechanics at work using Husky combination wrenches and standard sockets. Voice-over states: "We told these mechanics that Husky tools were American made and guaranteed forever."

B. Print Advertisement, Exhibit B:
A photograph of a man holding a combination wrench while working on his car. The words "Made in U.S.A." appear on the combination wrench.

C. Catalog, Exhibit C:
"The Husky name was first registered back in 1924 for use on quality US made Mechanics Tools .... Husky tools are made to exact standards in state of the art manufacturing plants in Dallas, Texas"; and A logo consisting of an American flag with the phrases "Made in U.S.A." and "Guaranteed Forever" ("U.S. flag logo").

D. Catalog, Exhibit D:
"American Made to Meet or Exceed ANSI Specifications"; and "Made in the USA."

E. Catalog, Exhibit E:
"Made in the USA"; and U.S. flag logo.

F. Catalog, Exhibit F:
U.S. flag logo.

G. Packaging and Labeling, Exhibit G:
"Made in U.S.A." in black and white; and U.S. flag logo.

H. Packaging and Labeling, Exhibit H:
"Made in U.S.A." in red, white, and blue; and "Made in U.S.A." in black and white.

I. In-store Display, Exhibit I:
"All Husky Tools Made in USA"; and U.S. flag logo.

J. Product Registration Card, Exhibit J:
A depiction of a U.S. flag.

5. Respondent has distributed or has caused to be distributed certain of its Husky combination wrenches and sockets marked with the following statements: "U.S.A."; or "Made in U.S.A."

PROTO MECHANICS TOOLS

6. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated advertisements, catalogs, packaging, labeling, and other promotional materials for certain of its Proto combination wrenches and teardrop ratchets, including but not necessarily limited to Exhibits K through L, that contain the following statements or depictions:

A. Catalog, Exhibit K:
Logo consisting of the words "Made in U.S.A.," appearing next to a silhouette of the continental United States that is covered by the U.S. flag.
THE STANLEY WORKS

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Complaint

B. Stanley Catalog, Exhibit L:
"Proto was the first hand tool manufacturer to produce and market the combination wrench in the United States"; and
Photographs of combination wrenches marked "U.S.A."

C. Packaging and labeling:
"Made in the U.S.A."

7. Respondent has distributed or has caused to be distributed certain of its Proto combination wrenches and teardrop ratchets marked with the following statements: "U.S.A."; or "Mfg. U.S.A."

BLACKHAWK MECHANICS TOOLS

8. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated promotional materials for certain of its Blackhawk combination wrenches, open end wrenches, box end wrenches, flare nut wrenches, sockets, ratchets, flex handles, wrench sets, and socket sets that contain the following statements or depictions:

"America's Best";
Photographs of certain tools marked "U.S.A.";
"Made in America"; or "American-Made."

9. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain of its Blackhawk combination wrenches, sockets, flex handles, box end wrenches, flare nut wrenches, and open end wrenches marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

CHALLENGER MECHANICS TOOLS

10. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated promotional materials for certain of its Challenger combination wrenches, sockets, combination wrench sets, box end wrench sets, open end wrench sets, and cold chisel sets that contain the following statements or depictions:

Photographs of a combination wrench marked "U.S.A.";
Photographs of sockets marked "Proto U.S.A.";
Photographs of cold chisels marked "U.S.A."; or
Photographs of combination wrench sets, box end wrench sets, an open end wrench set, and a cold chisel set in roll-up pouches that state "Made in U.S.A."

11. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain of its Challenger sockets, combination wrenches, open end wrenches,
box end wrenches, flare nut wrenches, and cold chisels marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

MASTER MECHANIC MECHANICS TOOLS

12. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated certain of its Master Mechanic combination wrenches, sockets, and socket sets with labeling or other promotional materials that contain the following statement: "Made in U.S.A."

13. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated certain of its Master Mechanic combination wrench sets and socket sets with packaging, labeling, or other promotional materials that contain the following statement and depiction:

"Made in U.S.A." next to an American flag.

14. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain of its Master Mechanic combination wrenches, flex handles, and sockets marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

STANLEY MECHANICS TOOLS

15. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed packaging, labeling, or other promotional materials for certain of its Stanley combination wrenches, box end wrenches, open end wrenches, ratchets, combination wrench sets, and socket sets that contain the following statements or depictions:

"Made in U.S.A."; "U.S.A.";
"Tools made in U.S.A. Case made in Taiwan.";
A logo consisting of an eagle head on an American flag and the words "Made in U.S.A.";
Photographs of combination wrench sets and an open end wrench set with "Made in U.S.A." on their packaging; or
A silhouette of the United States showing Stanley plant locations.

16. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain of its Stanley combination wrenches, open end wrenches, and box end wrenches marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

CATERPILLAR MECHANICS TOOLS

17. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain combination wrenches and cold chisels that it manufactures for Caterpillar marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."
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JOHN DEERE MECHANICS TOOLS

18. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain combination wrenches and sockets that it manufactures for John Deere marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

MARTIN MECHANICS TOOLS

19. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain ratchets, flex handles, and sockets that it manufactures for Martin marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

WILDE MECHANICS TOOLS

20. Respondent has distributed or caused to be distributed certain sockets that it manufactures for Wilde marked with the following statement: "U.S.A."

21. Through the means described in paragraphs 4 through 20, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that certain of its mechanics tools are made in the United States, i.e., that all, or virtually all, of the component parts of such mechanics tools are made in the United States, and that all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing such mechanics tools is performed in the United States.

22. In truth and in fact, a significant portion of the components of certain of respondent's mechanics tools is, or has been, of foreign origin. Therefore, the representation set forth in paragraph 21 was, and is, false or misleading.

23. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

EXHIBIT A

Exhibit A consists of a video tape of a television advertisement. It has been placed on the public record of this proceeding.
1. Always use the best tool for the job.

2. The best isn't always the most expensive.

3. The best isn't always the most well known.

4. Buy Husky and forget the other rules.

The toughest name in tools.
Guaranteed for life and only at The Home Depot.
The Husky name was first registered back in 1924 for use on quality US made Mechanics Tools. Now, over 70 years later, the name stands for a new line of professional-quality wrenches, sockets, ratchets and accessories...some of the most reliable, most durable, most versatile and functional tools on the market - at prices you can afford. Husky Tools are made to exact standards in state of the art manufacturing plants in Dallas, Texas. These factories are considered by many to be the most efficient tool making facilities anywhere in the world.

Throughout this catalog, you will see a wide selection of quality mechanics tools so tough, they are sure to please any professional. Made from select steel to resist brittleness they are heat-treated, oil quenched and tempered

All Husky Mechanics Tools are Guaranteed Forever by The Home Depot Worldwide.
Husky Tools And Chests

254-PIECE MECHANICS TOOL SET
- Standard and metric
- 1/4", 3/8" and 1/2" drive
Exhibit (867-033)

$197

52-PIECE MECHANICS TOOL SET
Exhibit (867-031)

63-PIECE SOCKET SET with SOFT SIDE CASE
- Standard and metric
- Includes standard metric, 1/4" and 3/8" drive sockets, box keys, screwdriver bits
Exhibit (813-307)

$29.72

11 DRAWER COMBO HOMEOWNER TOOL CHEST/CABINET
- Drawer liner not included in combo price

$196

ITEMS SOLD SEPARATELY:
- 8 DRAWER CHEST
  - 88.00
- 5-DRAWER CABINET
  - Red baked enamel finish
  - 250 cu. in. capacity
  - Embossed tool and bottom for increased strength
  - 88.00
- CHEST DRAwer LINER
  - 7.44

$37.10

2-DRAWER PORTABLE TOOL CHEST
- 11"Wx12"Dx17.5"H
- 13 lbs.
Exhibit (867-044)

$44.97

7 DRAWER COMBO HOMEOWNER TOOL CHEST/CABINET
- Drawer divider not included in combo price

$146

ITEMS SOLD SEPARATELY:
- 4 DRAWER CHEST
  - 81.70
  - 81.70
- 3-DRAWER CABINET
  - Red baked enamel finish
  - 250 cu. in. capacity
  - Embossed top and bottom for increased strength
  - 81.70
- CABINET DRAwer DIVIDE
  - 7.44

$37.10

24" PROFESSIONAL TOOL BOX
- 24"Wx12"Dx17.5"H
- 11 lbs.
Exhibit (867-044)
EXHIBIT G
EXHIBIT H

6PC. COMBINATION WRENCH SET
FULL LIFETIME WARRANTY
3/8" 7/16" 1/2" 9/16" 5/8" 3/4"

Forged
Alloy
Steel

MADE IN U.S.A
Husky
PROFESSIONAL
6 PC. COMBINATION
WRENCH SET

- 3/8"
- 7/16"
- 1/2"
- 9/16"
- 5/8"
- 3/4"

• Forged alloy steel for long life
• Chrome plated to resist rust

FULLLIFETIME WARRANTY

Husky Professional Tools warrants this product against defects in material and workmanship and if defective will replace it free of charge. Simply return it to any HOME DEPOT or to Husky Professional Tools, 1304 Champion Circle, Carrollton, Texas 75006. This warranty excludes incidental/consequential damages which exclusion is not allowed in some states and may not apply to you. This warranty gives you specific legal rights and possibly others which vary from state to state.

WORK SAFELY WITH TOOLS BY WEARING SAFETY GOGGLES
WRENCHES SHOULD NEVER BE USED AS A HAMMER OR STRUCK WITH A HAMMER
WHENEVER POSSIBLE PUSH, DON'T PULL ON A WRENCH HANDLE.

MADE IN U.S.A.
© 1992 Husky Professional Tools

EXHIBIT H
EXHIBIT I
Please complete and return this information card.
Upon receipt, you will be entered in our
QUARTERLY PRIZE DRAWING!
Full completion of this card is required for entry into the drawing.
Winner will be awarded one:
10 drawer Husky Tool Chest
10 drawer Husky Roller Cabinet
and 175 piece Husky Tool set
(Valued at over $600)
Winners will be selected from entries received during the 4 calendar quarters ending March 31, June 30, September 30 and December 31.
All entries for each drawing must be received no later than the last day of the quarter.

Summary of Rules
No purchase is necessary to win. Facsimiles,入学 containing the name, address, city, state and ZIP code of the person and the phrase "Husky Professional Tools" will be accepted and should be mailed to Husky Professional Tools, 1084 Champion Cir., Carrollton, Texas 75006. Only one entry per person. Prizes are limited to one per family or per household for each quarterly drawing. Any applicable taxes are the responsibility of the winner. Offer open to residents of the U.S. 18 years of age and older, except employees of the judging and/or promotion agencies. Void where prohibited. Limit one entry per envelope. The odds of winning will be determined by the number of eligible entries received. The drawing is open only to U.S. residents who are 18 years of age or older. For a list of prize winners, include the drawing information on the back of your card and send it to Husky Professional Tools, 1084 Champion Cir., Carrollton, Texas 75006. Ask Husky Prize winner.

Husky Professional Tools

PRODUCT REGISTRATION CARD
DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and

The respondent, its attorney, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Act, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having duly considered the comments received from interested persons pursuant to Section 2.34 of its Rules, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent The Stanley Works is a Connecticut corporation with its principal office or place of business at 1000 Stanley Drive, New Britain, Connecticut.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent, The Stanley Works, a corporation, its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, marking, labeling, packaging, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any mechanics tool in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44, shall not misrepresent, in any manner, directly or by implication, the extent to which any such mechanics tool is made in the United States. For purposes of this order, mechanics tools means professional grade hand tools (other than carpentry tools) used by consumers or professionals in the assembly, repair, or maintenance of machinery or vehicles, or for other purposes. Such tools include, but are not limited to, wrenches, ratchets, sockets, and chisels.

Provided, however, that a representation that any mechanics tool is made in the United States will not be in violation of this order so long as all, or virtually all, of the component parts of the mechanics tool are made in the United States and all, or virtually all, of the labor in manufacturing the mechanics tool is performed in the United States.

Provided, further, that this order shall not apply to the marking of mechanics tools or components of mechanics tools forged, machined, or cast before the date that the complaint and order became final.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent The Stanley Works and its successors and assigns, shall, for five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All labeling, packaging, advertisements and promotional materials containing the representation;

B. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating the representation; and
C. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations, or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question the representation, or the basis relied upon for the representation, including complaints and other communications with consumers or with governmental or consumer protection organizations.

III.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent The Stanley Works, and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent The Stanley Works, and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

*It is further ordered,* That respondent The Stanley Works, and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of
service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.

VI.

This order will terminate on June 2, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of this order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part. Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF

CMS ENERGY CORPORATION

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SEC. 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3877. Complaint, June 2, 1999--Decision, June 2, 1999

This consent order, among other things, permits CMS Energy Corporation’s acquisition of natural gas pipelines from Pan Energy Corp. and Texas Eastern Corp., subsidiaries of Duke Energy Company, prohibits CMS from restricting or eliminating interconnection capacity available to the pipelines that compete with Panhandle and Trunkline, and requires CMS to post information regarding the capacity, shipments and throughput of the system on an electronic bulletin board.

Participants


For the respondent: C. Benjamin Crisman, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Acts, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission"), having reason to believe that respondent CMS Energy Corporation ("CMS"), a corporation, and Duke Energy Company ("Duke"), a corporation, have entered into a stock purchase agreement whereby CMS proposes to acquire all voting securities of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company ("Panhandle"), Panhandle Storage Company, and Trunkline LNG Company ("Trunkline"), now held by Duke, its subsidiaries or affiliates, that such agreement violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and that such agreement, if consummated, would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:
I. RESPONDENT

1. Respondent CMS is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, with its office and principal place of business at 330 Town Center Drive, Dearborn, Michigan.


3. Respondent CMS is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in interstate commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affects commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

II. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION

4. Respondent CMS entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement dated as of October 31, 1998, with Pan Energy Corp. and Texas Eastern Corp., subsidiaries of Duke, to acquire voting securities currently held by Duke for $1.9 billion plus the assumption of $300 million in debt.

III. TRADE AND COMMERCE

5. A relevant line of commerce in which to analyze the effects of the acquisition is the pipeline transportation of natural gas into Consumers Energy's natural gas service area (the "Service Area"). The Service Area includes all or portions of 54 counties in the lower peninsula of Michigan. Principal cites served include Bay City, Flint, Jackson, Kalamazoo, Lansing, Pontiac, and Saginaw.

6. Consumers Energy owns and operates an intra-state natural gas transmission system that delivers natural gas to residential, commercial and industrial customers in the Service Area. Consumers Energy is required by the Michigan Public Service Commission to transport gas for others on its transmission system.

7. Consumers Energy's intra-state natural gas transmission system is the only transmission system from which customers in the Service Area receive natural gas. Many customers within the Service Area...
can buy their own natural gas from suppliers, but need access to Consumers Energy's transmission system.

8. Natural gas consumed in the Service Area is transported to Consumers Energy's natural gas transmission system by pipelines owned by Duke (Trunkline and Panhandle), ANR Pipeline Co. ("ANR"), Great Lakes Transmission, L.P. ("Great Lakes"), Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. ("MichCon") and other companies. Each of these pipelines has one or more points of interconnection with Consumers Energy's transmission system.

9. The maximum rates that can be charged by Trunkline, Panhandle, ANR, Great Lakes, and MichCon to transport gas to interconnection points with Consumers Energy are established by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") or the Michigan Public Service Commission ("MPSC"). Competition between these pipelines has resulted in actual prices for transportation significantly below the maximum established rates.

10. It is within Consumers Energy's discretion to establish an interconnection with another pipeline or to terminate, or reduce the capacity of, existing pipeline interconnections.

11. The cost for the pipeline transportation of gas into Consumers Energy's transmission system is a significant component in the cost of natural gas sold to customers in the Service Area.

12. Consumers Energy, as an electric utility, competes with self-generators of electricity in the Service Area who depend upon natural gas as a feedstock. An increase in the cost of gas transportation would increase the cost of self-generation of electricity.

IV. EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED TRANSACTION

13. After the acquisition set forth in paragraph four, CMS would have an incentive to terminate, or reduce the capacity of, the interconnections with non-CMS pipelines. CMS would have such an incentive because the likely results of such action would be to increase volume and tariffs on Panhandle and Trunkline pipelines.

14. An anticompetitive effect of the acquisition set forth in paragraph four is to increase the likelihood that Panhandle and Trunkline will charge higher tariffs to shippers.

15. A second anticompetitive effect of the acquisition set forth in paragraph four is to increase the likelihood that natural gas prices will increase to customers in the Service Area.
16. A third anticompetitive effect of the acquisition set forth in paragraph four is to increase the likelihood that the price of electricity will increase for industrial customers located in the Service Area that can self-generate electricity.

17. It is unlikely that regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Michigan Public Service Commission could prevent the likely anticompetitive effects of the acquisition.

V. STATUTES VIOLATED

18. The Stock Purchase Agreement described in paragraph four constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45.


DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having initiated an investigation of the proposed acquisition of the voting securities of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company ("Panhandle"), Panhandle Storage Company, and Trunkline LNG Company ("Trunkline"), now held by Duke Energy Company, its subsidiaries or affiliates, by CMS Energy Corporation ("CMS"), and it now appearing that CMS, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "respondent," having been furnished with a copy of a draft complaint that the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18; and

Respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and
The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent has violated the said Acts, and that complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent CMS is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Michigan, with its office and principal place of business at 330 Town Center Drive, Dearborn, Michigan.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Respondent" or "CMS" means CMS Energy Corporation, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, and assigns; its joint ventures, subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by CMS, including but not limited to Consumers Energy Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CMS Energy Corporation, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "Adjusted Designated Capacity" means Designated Capacity less the amount by which capacity is reduced for maintenance or force majeure.

C. "Amount Confirmed" means the Amount Nominated that Consumers Energy Company matches to corresponding recipients (i.e., customers, brokers, marketers, or storage accounts) at an Interconnection Point.

D. "Amount Nominated" means the amount of natural gas that a shipper proposes to deliver to Consumers Energy Company at an Interconnection Point.
E. "Available Interconnection Capacity" means the amount of natural gas that Consumers Energy Company is ready, willing, and able to receive at an Interconnection Point.


G. "Consumers Energy System" means the natural gas transmission system of Consumers Energy Company.

H. "Designated Capacity" means the capacity for each Interconnection Point as stated in Exhibit A.

I. "Interconnection Point" means the eight interconnection points listed in Exhibit A, as points where Consumers Energy Company receives gas into its system.

J. "MPSC" means the Michigan Public Service Commission.

K. "Recorded Throughput" means the data obtained electronically by Consumers Energy Company from its Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition system units located at each Interconnection Point.

II.

_It is further ordered, That:_

A. Respondent shall provide information on an electronic bulletin board showing for each Interconnection Point: (i) the Designated Capacity; (ii) the Adjusted Designated Capacity, identifying the cause of the adjustment and the planned date the adjustment is expected to end; (iii) the Available Interconnection Capacity; (iv) no later than the second business day of each month (a) the Amounts Nominated and (b) the Amounts Confirmed; and (v) the Recorded Throughput for the previous month.

B. If respondent declines any shipper's nomination of gas into the Consumers Energy System at any Interconnection Point because Available Interconnection Capacity is less than Adjusted Designated Capacity, respondent shall afford the shipper two alternatives: (i) if the shipper is able to nominate its shipments to another pipeline interconnection point into the Consumers Energy System at no additional cost to the shipper, respondent will accept the gas at such other pipeline interconnection point; (ii) if the shipper provides a certification in the form set forth in Exhibit B hereto stating that the shipper is unable to nominate its shipments to another pipeline interconnection point into the Consumers Energy System at no additional cost to the shipper, then respondent shall provide gas from its own supply of gas and without interruption on the Consumers
Energy System for the shipper's account equal to the volume of gas nominated by the shipper that could not be transferred through any of the Interconnection Points by reason of the Available Interconnection Capacity being less than Adjusted Designated Capacity.

C. If the shipper exercises the option set out in paragraph II.B. (ii), respondent may require the shipper to return to respondent the volume of gas respondent had provided on the shipper's behalf, but no earlier than the end of the calendar month following the month in which Available Interconnection Capacity was less than the Adjusted Designated Capacity. Respondent shall give shipper the option to return the gas at any pipeline interconnection point into the Consumers Energy System. Respondent shall not charge an unauthorized gas usage charge to any shipper who replaces the gas by the end of the calendar month following the month in which the shipper's Amount Confirmed was less than the shipper's Amount Nominated because the Available Interconnection Capacity was less than the Adjusted Designated Capacity.

D. If respondent declines a shipper's nomination of gas that the shipper is obligated to return to respondent under paragraph II.C. because the Available Interconnection Capacity is less than Adjusted Designated Capacity, respondent shall again afford the shipper options (i) and (ii) in paragraph II.B., including the provision in paragraph II.C. regarding suspension of the unauthorized gas usage charge.

E. Respondent shall amend the tariffs it has filed with the MPSC to incorporate its obligations under paragraph II. of this order. Respondent shall incorporate its obligations under paragraph II. into any of its contracts with shippers.

F. The purpose of this paragraph II. of this order is to prevent the substantial lessening of competition from the acquisition, as alleged in the complaint.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

Ninety (90) days from the date this order becomes final, annually for the next nine (9) years on the anniversary of the date this order becomes final, and at other times as the Commission may require, respondent shall file a verified written report with the Commission setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied and is complying with paragraph II. of this order.
IV.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Respondent shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days before any proposed change in the corporate respondent such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

B. Upon consummation of the acquisition, respondent shall cause the merged entity to be bound by the terms of this order.

V.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, upon written request, respondent shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to all facilities and access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondent relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five days' notice to respondent and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of respondent.

VI.

It is further ordered, That this order shall terminate on June 2, 2009.
## CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY
**DESIGNATED CAPACITY BY INTERCONNECT BY MONTH**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>INTERCONNECT LOCATION</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
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1 Goose Creek has capacity of 130 MMcf/d, and Kalkaska has capacity of 160 MMcf/d. The total simultaneous capacity of these interconnects cannot exceed 160 MMcf/d. The Kalkaska interconnect is not currently being used.
CERTIFICATION OF (Name)

hereby certifies:

1. I am ___ at ___ ("Shipper")
   (Title) (Name of company)

2. With respect to Shipper's nomination on ___ of ___
   (Date)

______ MMbtu of natural gas into Consumers Energy Company's ("Consumers Energy") gas transmission system at ___
   (Name of Interconnection Point)*

Shipper is unable to nominate the quantity of natural gas not accepted by Consumers Energy to another interconnection point into Consumers Energy's gas transmission system without incurring additional cost to Shipper.

(NAME)

Listed in Original Sheet No. F-7.00, Subsection F11, M.P.S.C. No. 1 - Gas, Consumers Energy Company
IN THE MATTER OF

GOTTSCALKS, INC.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
TEXTILE FIBER PRODUCTS IDENTIFICATION ACT, WOOL PRODUCTS
LABELING ACT AND SEC. 5 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3878. Complaint, June 3, 1999--Decision, June 3, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Gottschalks, Inc., a California-based retailer, from advertising any textile fiber product or wool product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material without disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A., imported, or both.

Participants
For the Commission: Eleanor Durham, Charles Harwood, Carol Jennings, and Elaine Kalish.
For the respondent: Warren Williams, in-house counsel, Fresno, CA.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Gottschalks, Inc., ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 41 et seq. (FTC Act), the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70 (Textile Act), and the Wool Products Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. 68 (Wool Act), and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 7 River Park Place E., Fresno, California.
2. Respondent is a retail seller that has advertised, offered for sale, sold, and distributed to the public various products, including textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act, and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act.
3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
4. Respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, various products, including products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and the Wool Act.
5. Since October 1, 1998, respondent has offered for sale and sold, by means of an online shopping service or catalog on the Internet, textile products subject to the requirements of the Textile Act and wool products subject to the requirements of the Wool Act, without disclosing in its product descriptions whether such products were made in the U.S.A., imported, or both, thus violating 15 U.S.C. 70b(i), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 303.34 (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7518 (Feb. 13, 1998)), and 15 U.S.C. 68b(e), and implementing regulations in 16 CFR 300.25a (as amended 63 Fed. Reg. 7508, 7516, 7517 (Feb. 13, 1998)).

6. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(a).

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Seattle Regional Office proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, and the Wool Products Labeling Act; and

The respondent and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, and admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the
procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Gottschalks, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 7 River Park Place E., Fresno, CA.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Gottschalks, Inc., its successors and assigns, and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, shall not advertise any textile fiber product or any wool product in any mail order catalog or mail order promotional material, as those terms are defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 300.1(h), respectively, or as they may hereafter be amended, without disclosing clearly and conspicuously that the product was either made in the U.S.A., imported, or both.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Gottschalks, Inc., and its successors and assigns, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, shall maintain, and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission, business records demonstrating compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but not limited to:

A. Copies of all mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials, as defined in 16 CFR 303.1(u) and 16 CFR 300.1(h), that offer textile and/or wool products for direct sale to consumers. If such mail order catalogs and mail order promotional materials are disseminated to consumers in electronic form, copies may also be maintained in an electronic format.

B. All complaints and other communications with consumers, or with governmental or consumer protection organizations, that pertain to country of origin disclosures for textile and/or wool products.
It is further ordered, That respondent Gottschalks, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Gottschalks, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Gottschalks, Inc., and its successors and assigns, shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
This order will terminate on June 3, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
This consent order, among other things, requires Medtronic, Inc., a Minnesota-based corporation engaged in the research, development, manufacture and sale of medical devices, to divest Avecor's non-occlusive arterial pump assets to Baxter Healthcare Corporation or another Commission-approved buyer. The consent order also requires Medtronic to provide substantial assistance to enable the buyer to obtain FDA approval to manufacture and market Avecor pumps and reservoirs to use with the pump.

Participants
For the Commission: Stephen Riddell, Mark Menna, Paul Frangie, Phillip Broyles, Kenneth Davidson, Roberta Baruch, William Baer, Louis Silvia, Roy Levy, and Christopher Taylor.
For the respondent: Philip Larson, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C.

COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act, and by virtue of the authority vested in it by said Acts, the Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that respondent Medtronic, Inc. ("Medtronic"), a corporation, has entered into an agreement and plan of merger with Avecor Cardiovascular, Inc. ("Avecor"), a corporation, whereby Medtronic proposes to acquire all of the outstanding common stock of Avecor, that such agreement and plan of merger violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, as amended, and that such agreement and plan of merger, if consummated would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18, as amended, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, as amended, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:
I. RESPONDENT

1. Respondent Medtronic, Inc., is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Minnesota, with its office and principal place of business located at 7000 Central Avenue, Northeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2. Respondent Medtronic is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in the research, development, manufacture and sale of medical devices, including implantable devices, such as pacemakers and defibrillators, that regulate heart rhythm, tissue and mechanical heart valves, coronary stents, and perfusion devices that are used in heart/lung machines. Medtronic's perfusion devices include non-occlusive arterial pumps.

3. Respondent is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44.

II. THE ACQUIRED COMPANY

4. Avecor is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under the laws of the State of Minnesota with its office and principal place of business located at 7611 Northland Drive, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

5. Avecor is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in, the research, development, manufacture and sale of perfusion devices used in heart/lung machines, including non-occlusive arterial pumps.

6. Avecor is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

III. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION

7. Pursuant to an agreement and plan of merger, dated July 12, 1998, as amended, Medtronic intends to acquire all of the outstanding common voting stock of Avecor in exchange for stock of Medtronic valued at approximately $106 million.
IV. TRADE AND COMMERCE

8. Perfusion devices are the blood-handling products used in heart/lung machines. These devices circulate and oxygenate the blood and regulate body temperature during heart bypass surgery and other procedures where the heart must be relieved of its pumping function. Arterial pumps are the devices that circulate the blood. Non-occlusive arterial pumps are safer and less damaging than occlusive arterial pumps. There are no close substitutes for non-occlusive arterial pumps.

9. The research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps is a relevant line of commerce in which to evaluate the effects of this proposed acquisition.

10. The United States as a whole is the relevant section of the country in which to evaluate the effects of this proposed acquisition on the research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps.

11. The United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps is highly concentrated and would become significantly more concentrated as a result of the proposed acquisition. Premerger concentration in the research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is over 5700, and as a result of the proposed acquisition concentration would increase by more than 340 points to a level of more than 6050.

12. Entry into the United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps is difficult and would not be timely, likely or sufficient to prevent anticompetitive effects that may result from the proposed acquisition.

V. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

13. Respondent Medtronic and Avecor are actual competitors in the United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps.

14. The effects of the proposed acquisition, if consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in the United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others:
a. By eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between Medtronic and Avecor in the United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps;

b. By increasing the likelihood that Medtronic would unilaterally exercise market power in the United States market for research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps;

c. By increasing the likelihood that consumers in the United States will be charged higher prices for non-occlusive arterial pumps; and

d. By reducing the likelihood of innovation in the United States market for the research, development, manufacture and sale of non-occlusive arterial pumps.

VI. STATUTES VIOLATIONS


DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") having initiated an investigation of the acquisition of all of the voting stock of Avecor Cardiovascular, Inc. ("Avecor") by Medtronic, Inc. ("Medtronic"), hereinafter sometimes referred to as "respondent," and respondent having been furnished with a copy of a draft complaint that the Bureau of Competition proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration, and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18; and

Respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an
admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent has violated the said Acts, and that complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Medtronic, Inc. is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Minnesota, with its principal executive offices located at 7000 Central Avenue, Northeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Medtronic" or "respondent" means Medtronic, Inc., its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns; its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Medtronic, Inc, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "Avecor" means Avecor Cardiovascular, Inc., a corporation organized, existing and doing business under the laws of Minnesota with its headquarters located at 7611 Northland Drive, Minneapolis, Minnesota, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns; its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Avecor Cardiovascular, Inc., and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.
C. "Proposed Acquisition" means the proposed acquisition by Medtronic of 100% of the voting stock of Avecor pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated July 12, 1998, as amended.

D. "Acquirer" means Baxter Healthcare Corporation, a corporation organized, existing and doing business under the laws of Delaware with its principal place of business located at One Baxter Parkway, Deerfield, Illinois, or the entity to whom Medtronic shall divest the Avecor Pump Assets pursuant to paragraph II. of this order, as applicable.

E. "Associated Reservoirs" means a family of venous reservoirs for use with the Avecor Blood Pump System that includes both a hard shell and a venous reservoir bag and a reservoir holder.

F. "Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs" means the Associated Reservoirs manufactured and sold by Avecor.

G. "Avecor Blood Pump System" means the arterial pump system manufactured and sold by Avecor, used for pumping blood during cardiopulmonary bypass procedures and consisting of a pump console (controller, rotor housing, and flow meter), and associated pump disposables (pump chamber and pump tubing).

H. "Avecor Pump Assets" means all Avecor's assets, business, goodwill and rights, other than real property, as of the date this agreement containing consent order is accepted for public comment, relating to the research, development, manufacture, and sale of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the products included therein throughout the world, including, but not limited to:

1. All machinery, fixtures, equipment, and other tangible property, trade names, trademarks, brand names, formulations, inventory, Patents, trade secrets, technology, know-how, specifications, designs, drawings, processes, production information, manufacturing information, testing and quality control data, research materials, technical information, marketing and distribution information, customer lists, software, information stored on management information systems (and specifications sufficient for the Acquirer or New Acquirer to use such information) and all data, contractual rights, materials and information relating to FDA and other governmental or regulatory approvals relating to the Avecor Blood Pump System and the products included therein;

2. The MC3 License Agreement;
3. An exclusive, royalty-free, transferrable, worldwide license, in perpetuity, to Avecor's Patents, trade secrets and know-how in the field of use of making, using, exporting, importing and selling Associated Reservoirs for use in connection with the Avecor Blood Pump System and any improvements thereto, provided however, that the foregoing license shall be non-exclusive as to:

   a. Hard shell reservoirs and venous reservoir bags with an outlet size other than 5/8 inch; and
   b. The reservoir holders;

and all as subject to the applicable provisions of the Divestiture Agreement approved by the Commission.

I. "Avecor's Costs" means Avecor's cost of manufacturing such item, as determined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, including the actual cost of raw materials, direct labor and reasonable, actual contracted services, but excluding factory overhead used in manufacturing the item. Raw materials and direct labor are the actual cost of materials and labor consumed to manufacture the item.

J. "Contract Manufacture" means the manufacture of Avecor Blood Pump Systems and Associated Reservoirs supplied pursuant to a Divestiture Agreement by Medtronic for sale to the Acquirer or New Acquirer, as applicable.

K. "Divestiture Trustee" means the trustee(s) appointed pursuant to paragraph IV. of this order, as applicable.

L. "FDA" means the United States Food and Drug Administration.

M. "Interim Trustee" means the trustee(s) appointed pursuant to paragraph III. of this order, as applicable.

N. "Commercial Capability to Manufacture" means the practical ability to manufacture (including by subcontracting other than by respondent or Avecor) the Avecor Blood Pump System and Associated Reservoirs whether or not any have actually been sold.

O. "MC3 Agreement" means the license agreement, dated January 16, 1995, as amended between Michigan Critical Care Consultants and Avecor.

P. "New Acquirer" means the entity to whom the Divestiture Trustee shall divest the Avecor Pump Assets pursuant to paragraph IV. of this order.

Q. "Patents" means any patent and patent right, patent applications, patents of addition, re-examination, reissues, extensions,
granted supplementary protection certificates, substitutions, confirmations, registrations, revalidations, revisions, additions and the like, of or to said patent and patent right and any and all continuations and continuations-in-part and divisionals.

R. "Reimbursable Costs" means the reasonable, direct, out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Avecor in providing referenced assistance.

II.

*It is further ordered*, That:

A. Respondent shall divest, absolutely and in good faith, the Avecor Pump Assets as a competitively viable, on-going product line to: (1) an Acquirer, in accordance with the Asset Purchase Agreement, dated February 5, 1999; or (2) within ninety (90) days of the date on which this order becomes final and at no minimum price, to an Acquirer that receives the prior approval of the Commission and only in a manner that receives the prior approval of the Commission. The purpose of the divestiture of the Avecor Pump Assets is to ensure their continued use in the research, design, development, manufacture, marketing and sale for use in cardiopulmonary bypass procedures and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Proposed Acquisition as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

B. Respondent's agreement with the Acquirer (hereinafter "Divestiture Agreement") shall include the following provisions, and respondent shall commit to satisfy the following:

1. Respondent shall Contract Manufacture and deliver to the Acquirer or the New Acquirer in a timely manner and under reasonable terms and conditions, a supply of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs, specified in the Divestiture Agreement at Avecor's Cost or such other price specified in the Divestiture Agreement with the approval of the Commission for a period not to exceed one (1) year from the date of the Divestiture; provided, however, that the one (1) year period may be extended by the Acquirer or New Acquirer with respect to the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs for a period not to exceed one (1) year at prices that are 15% higher than those in effect during the first year of Contract Manufacture. In the event that the Acquirer does not choose to have all of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood
Pump Reservoirs Contract Manufactured because the Acquirer does not require such supply in order to manufacture or sell the Avcor Blood Pump System in a competitive manner, respondent shall not be required to Contract Manufacture those Avcor Blood Pump Systems and Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs the Acquirer does not require.

2. After respondent commences delivery of the Avcor Blood Pump System and the Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs to the Acquirer or the New Acquirer pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement and for the term of the Contract Manufacturing arrangement for the Avcor Blood Pump System and the Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs, referred to in paragraph II.B. of this order, respondent will produce the Avcor Blood Pump System and the Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs only for sale to the Acquirer or the New Acquirer; provided, however, respondent is in no way limited in its production of the reservoir holder or of hard shell reservoirs and venous reservoir bags with an outlet size other than 5/8 inch.

3. Respondent shall make representations and warranties that the Avcor Blood Pump System and the Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs supplied pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement meet the FDA approved specifications. Respondent shall agree to indemnify, defend and hold the Acquirer or the New Acquirer harmless from any and all suits, claims, actions, demands, liabilities, expenses or losses resulting from the failure of the Avcor Blood Pump System and the Avcor Blood Pump Reservoirs supplied to the Acquirer or New Acquirer pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement by respondent to meet FDA specifications. This obligation shall be contingent upon the Acquirer or the New Acquirer giving respondent prompt, adequate notice of such claim, cooperating fully in the defense of such claim, and permitting respondent to assume the sole control of all phases of the defense and/or settlement of such claim, including the selection of counsel; provided, however, any such defense and/or settlement shall be consistent with the obligations assumed by respondent under this order. This obligation shall not require respondent to be liable for any negligent act or omission of the Acquirer or the New Acquirer or for any representations and warranties, express or implied, made by the Acquirer or the New Acquirer that exceed the representations and warranties made by respondent to the Acquirer or the New Acquirer.

4. Respondent shall make representations and warranties that respondent will hold harmless and indemnify the Acquirer or New Acquirer for any liabilities or loss of profits resulting from the failure
by respondent to deliver the Avecor Blood Pump System and the
Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs in a timely manner as required by the
Divestiture Agreement unless respondent can demonstrate that its
failure was entirely beyond the control of respondent and in no part
the result of negligence or willful misconduct on respondent's part.

5. During the term of the Contract Manufacturing between
respondent and the Acquirer or the New Acquirer, upon request by
the Acquirer, New Acquirer or the Interim Trustee, respondent shall
make available to the Interim Trustee all records that relate to the
manufacture of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor
Blood Pump Reservoirs.

6. Upon reasonable notice and request from the Acquirer or the
New Acquirer to respondent, respondent shall use all commercially
reasonable efforts to provide in a timely manner: (a) assistance and
advice to enable the Acquirer or the New Acquirer (or the Designees
of the Acquirer or New Acquirer) to obtain all necessary FDA
approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System
and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs; (b) assistance to the
Acquirer or New Acquirer (or the Designee thereof) as is necessary
to enable the Acquirer or New Acquirer (or the Designee thereof) to
obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Avecor Blood
Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs; and (c) consultation
with knowledgeable employees of respondent and training, at the
request of and at the facility of the Acquirer’s or the New Acquirer’s
choosing, until the Acquirer or New Acquirer (or the Designee thereof)
receives certification from the FDA or abandons its efforts
for certification from the FDA and until the Acquirer or the New
Acquirer has the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Avecor
Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs or abandons its
efforts to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such
products, reasonably sufficient to satisfy the management of the
Acquirer or New Acquirer that its personnel (or the Designee’s
personnel) are adequately trained in the manufacture of the Avecor
Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs. Such
assistance shall include on-site inspections of the Northland Plant (or
inspections of whatever facility to which respondent may have
transferred the manufacture of the Avecor Blood Pump System or the
Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs), at the Acquirer’s or New Acquirer’s
request, which is the specified source of supply of the Contract
Manufacturing. Respondent may require reimbursement from the Acquirer or New Acquirer for all its Reimbursable Costs incurred in providing the services required by this paragraph II.B.6.

7. The Divestiture Agreement shall require the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to submit to the Commission within 10 days of signing the Divestiture Agreement a certification attesting to the good faith intention of the Acquirer or the New Acquirer, including a plan by the Acquirer or the New Acquirer, to obtain in an expeditious manner all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products.

8. The Divestiture Agreement shall require the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to submit to the Commission and Interim Trustee periodic verified written reports, setting forth in detail the efforts of the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and A vecor Blood Pump Reservoirs obtained pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement and to obtain all FDA approvals necessary to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and the efforts of the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. The Divestiture Agreement shall require the first such report to be submitted 60 days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public comment by the Commission and every 60 days thereafter until all necessary FDA approvals are obtained by the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and until the Acquirer or the New Acquirer has obtained the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. The Divestiture Agreement shall also require the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to report to the Commission and the Interim Trustee within ten (10) days of its ceasing the sale in the United States of the A vecor Blood Pump System and the A vecor Blood Pump Reservoirs obtained pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement for any time period exceeding sixty (60) days or abandoning its efforts to obtain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs or to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. The Acquirer or New Acquirer shall provide the Interim Trustee access to all records and all facilities that relate to its efforts, pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement, to sell or
manufacture the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs or obtain FDA approvals.

9. The Divestiture Agreement shall provide that the Commission may terminate the Divestiture Agreement if the Acquirer or the New Acquirer: (a) voluntarily ceases for sixty (60) days or more the sale of, or otherwise fails to pursue good faith efforts to sell, the Avecor Blood Pump System in the United States prior to obtaining all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and to obtaining the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products; (b) fails to pursue good faith efforts to obtain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs in the United States; or (c) fails to obtain all necessary FDA approvals of its own to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products within one (1) year from the date the Commission approves the Divestiture Agreement between respondent and the Acquirer or the New Acquirer; provided, however, that the one (1) year period may be extended by the Commission in three (3) month increments for a period not to exceed an additional one (1) year if it appears that such FDA approvals are likely to be obtained or the Acquirer or the New Acquirer is likely to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products within such extended time period.

10. The Divestiture Agreement shall provide that if it is terminated, the Avecor Blood Pump Assets shall revert back to Medtronic and the Avecor Pump Assets shall be divested by the Divestiture Trustee to a New Acquirer pursuant to the provisions of paragraph IV. of this order.

C. During the pendency of any patent dispute that: (1) challenges or seeks to render invalid any of the patents divested or licensed pursuant to paragraph II.A.; and (2) could affect the manufacture or sale of the Avecor Blood Pump System and Associated Reservoirs, respondent shall cooperate, at its own expense, in the defense of rights it has transferred to the Acquirer or New Acquirer.

D. By the time the Divestiture Agreement between respondent and the Acquirer or New Acquirer of the Avecor Pump Assets is signed, respondent shall provide the Acquirer or New Acquirer with a complete list of all employees who were then engaged (or were
engaged at any time subsequent to July 12, 1998, the date of the Proposed Acquisition agreement) in the research, development, manufacture or marketing of the Avecor Blood Pump System or the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoirs and shall supplement that list on the date this order is accepted for public comment with the names of any additional employees who then meet these definitions. Such list(s) shall state each such individual's name, position, address, business telephone number, or if no business telephone number exists, a home telephone number, if available and with the consent of the employee, and a description of the duties and work performed by the individual in connection with the Avecor Pump Assets. Respondent shall provide the Acquirer or New Acquirer the opportunity to enter into employment contracts with such individuals provided that such contracts are contingent upon the Commission's approval of the Divestiture Agreement.

E. Within no more than five (5) business days after the respondent and the Acquirer or New Acquirer have signed the Divestiture Agreement and subject to the consent of the employees, respondent shall provide the Acquirer or New Acquirer with an opportunity to inspect the personnel files and other documentation relating to the individuals identified in paragraph II.D. of this order to the extent possible under applicable laws. For a period of two (2) months following the divestiture, respondent shall provide the Acquirer or New Acquirer with a further opportunity to interview such individuals and negotiate employment contracts with them.

F. Respondent shall provide all employees identified in paragraph II.D. of this order with reasonable financial incentives to continue in their employment positions pending divestiture of the Avecor Pump Assets in order that such employees may be in a position to accept employment with the Acquirer or New Acquirer at the time of the divestiture. Such incentives shall include continuation of all employee benefits offered by respondent until the date of the divestiture, and vesting of all pension benefits (as permitted by law) for each such employee who accepts an offer of employment from the Acquirer or New Acquirer within one hundred and eighty (180) days after the Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public comment by the Commission. In addition, respondent shall not enforce any confidentiality or non-compete restrictions relating to the Avecor Pump Assets that apply to any employee identified in paragraph II.D. who accepts employment with any Acquirer or New Acquirer, but
respondent may enforce all other rights thereunder relating to any other products or services.

G. For a period of one (1) year commencing on the date of the individual's employment by the Acquirer or New Acquirer, respondent shall not solicit for employment any of the individuals identified in paragraph II.D. of this order who accept employment with the Acquirer or New Acquirer, unless such individual has been separated from employment by the Acquirer or New Acquirer against that individual's wishes.

H. Prior to divestiture, respondent shall not transfer, without consent of the Acquirer or New Acquirer, any of the individuals identified in paragraph II.D. of this order to any other position.

I. Nothing in paragraphs II.D. through II.H. shall apply with respect to Anthony Badolato, William Haworth and Al Seck.

J. While the obligations imposed by paragraphs II., III. or IV. of this order are in effect, respondent shall take such actions as are necessary: (1) to maintain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the A vecor Blood Pump Reservoir; (2) to maintain the viability and marketability of the A vecor Pump Assets consistent with general practices in the medical devices industry, as well as all tangible assets, including respondent's facilities, used to manufacture and sell the A vecor Blood Pump System and the A vecor Blood Pump Reservoir; and (3) to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration or impairment of the A vecor Pump Assets and the Northland Plant, except for ordinary wear and tear.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

A. At any time after respondent signs the Agreement Containing Consent Order in this matter, the Commission may appoint an Interim Trustee to ensure that respondent and the Acquirer or New Acquirer expeditiously perform their respective responsibilities as required by this order and the Divestiture Agreement approved by the Commission. Respondent shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the powers, duties, authorities, and responsibilities of the Interim Trustee appointed pursuant to this paragraph III.:
1. The Commission shall select the Interim Trustee, subject to the consent of respondent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If respondent has not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any proposed trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to respondent of the identity of any proposed trustee, respondent shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed trustee.

2. The Interim Trustee shall have the power and authority to monitor respondent's compliance with the terms of this order and with the terms of the Divestiture Agreement with the Acquirer or New Acquirer.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the Interim Trustee, respondent shall execute a trust agreement (in the form attached) that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission, confers on the Interim Trustee all the rights and powers necessary to permit the Interim Trustee to monitor respondent's compliance with the terms of this order and with the Divestiture Agreement with the Acquirer or New Acquirer, and to monitor the compliance of the Acquirer or New Acquirer under the Divestiture Agreement.

4. The Interim Trustee shall serve for two (2) years from the date the respondent and the Acquirer have signed the Divestiture Agreement, or in the event that there is a New Acquirer pursuant to the provisions of paragraph IV. of this order, the Interim Trustee shall serve for two (2) years from date the respondent and the New Acquirer have signed the Divestiture Agreement; provided however, that the term shall end earlier if the Interim Trustee has reported that the Acquirer or New Acquirer has received all necessary FDA approvals and has obtained the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and the Commission has accepted that report.

5. The Interim Trustee shall have full and complete access to respondent's personnel, books, records, documents, facilities and technical information relating to the research, design, development, manufacture, importation, marketing, distribution and sale of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoir, or to any other relevant information, as the Interim Trustee may reasonably request, including, but not limited to, all documents and records kept in the normal course of business that relate to the manufacture of the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoir. Respondent shall cooperate with any
reasonable request of the Interim Trustee. Respondent shall take no action to interfere with or impede the Interim Trustee’s ability to monitor respondent’s compliance with paragraphs II., III. and IV. of this order and the Divestiture Agreement between respondent and the Acquirer or New Acquirer.

6. The Interim Trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the expense of respondent, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission may set. The Interim Trustee shall have authority to employ, at the expense of respondent, such consultants, accountants, attorneys and other representatives and assistants as are reasonably necessary to carry out the Interim Trustee’s duties and responsibilities. The Interim Trustee shall account for all expenses incurred, including fees for his or her services, subject to the approval of the Commission.

7. Respondent shall indemnify the Interim Trustee and hold the Interim Trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the Interim Trustee’s duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses incurred in connection with the preparations for, or defense of, any claim whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the Interim Trustee.

8. If the Commission determines that the Interim Trustee has ceased to act or failed to act diligently, the Commission may appoint a substitute trustee in the same manner as provided in paragraph III.A.1. of this order.

9. The Commission may on its own initiative or at the request of the Interim Trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to assure compliance with the requirements of this order and the Divestiture Agreement with the Acquirer or New Acquirer.

10. The Interim Trustee shall evaluate reports submitted to it by the Acquirer or the New Acquirer with respect to the efforts of the Acquirer or the New Acquirer to obtain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Aveco Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. The Interim Trustee shall report in writing, concerning compliance by respondent and the Acquirer or
New Acquirer with the provisions of paragraphs II. and III. to the Commission within ten (10) days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is approved and every sixty (60) days thereafter until the Acquirer or New Acquirer obtains, or abandons efforts to obtain, all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. Such reports shall include at least the following:

   a. Whether respondent has supplied The Avecor Blood Pump System and the Avecor Blood Pump Reservoir in conformity with the requirements of paragraph II.B. of this order;
   b. Whether respondent has given the Interim Trustee access to records pursuant to paragraph II.B.5. of this order;
   c. Whether the Acquirer or New Acquirer has given the Interim Trustee reports and access pursuant to paragraph II.B.8. of this order;
   d. Whether the Acquirer or New Acquirer is making good faith efforts to sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs, to obtain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs, and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products and whether these actions meet the projections of the business plan of the Acquirer or New Acquirer as required by paragraphs II.B.7. and II.B.8. of this order;
   e. If six (6) months have elapsed from the date of approval of the Divestiture Agreement and the Acquirer or New Acquirer has not obtained all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Avecor Blood Pump System the Associated Reservoirs, and the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products, whether such approvals and such Capability are likely to be obtained if the Commission extends the one (1) year period specified in paragraph II.B.9. of this order; and
   f. Whether respondent has maintained the Avecor Pump Assets as required in paragraph II.J. of this order.

B. If the Commission terminates the Divestiture Agreement pursuant to paragraph II.B.9. of this order, the Commission may direct the Divestiture Trustee to seek a New Acquirer, as provided for in paragraph IV. of this order.
IV.

It is further ordered, That:

A. If respondent fails to divest absolutely and in good faith, and with the Commission's prior approval, the A vecor Pump Assets and to comply with the requirements of paragraph II. of this order, or if the Acquirer abandons its efforts or fails to obtain all necessary regulatory approvals and the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the A vecor Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs in the manner set out in paragraph II.B.9., then any executed Divestiture Agreement between respondent and the Acquirer shall be terminated and the Commission may appoint a Divestiture Trustee to divest the A vecor Pump Assets and execute a new Divestiture Agreement that satisfies the requirements of paragraph II. of this order. The Divestiture Trustee may be the same person as the Interim Trustee and will have the authority and responsibility to divest the A vecor Pump Assets absolutely and in good faith, and with the Commission's prior approval. Neither the decision of the Commission to appoint the Divestiture Trustee, nor the decision of the Commission not to appoint the Divestiture Trustee, to divest any of the assets under this paragraph IV.A. shall preclude the Commission or the Attorney General from seeking civil penalties or any other relief available to it, including a court-appointed trustee, pursuant to Section 5(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, or any other statute enforced by the Commission, for any failure by the respondent to comply with this order.

B. If a Divestiture Trustee is appointed by the Commission or a court pursuant to paragraph IV.A. to divest the A vecor Pump Assets to a New Acquirer, respondent shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the Divestiture Trustee's powers, duties, authority, and responsibilities:

1. The Commission shall select the Divestiture Trustee, subject to the consent of respondent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If respondent has not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any proposed Divestiture Trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to respondent of the identity of any proposed Divestiture Trustee, respondent shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed Divestiture Trustee.
2. Subject to the prior approval of the Commission, the Divestiture Trustee shall have the exclusive power and authority to divest the Avecor Pump Assets to a New Acquirer pursuant to the terms of this order and to enter into a Divestiture Agreement with the New Acquirer pursuant to the terms of this order, which Divestiture Agreement shall be subject to the prior approval of the Commission.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the Divestiture Trustee, respondent shall execute a (or amend the existing) trust agreement that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, of the court, transfers to the Divestiture Trustee all rights and powers necessary to permit the Divestiture Trustee to divest the Avecor Pump Assets to a New Acquirer and to enter into a Divestiture Agreement with the New Acquirer.

4. The Divestiture Trustee shall have twelve (12) months from the date the Commission approves the trust agreement described in paragraph IV.B.3. of this order to divest the Avecor Pump Assets and to enter into a Divestiture Agreement with the New Acquirer that satisfies the requirements of paragraph II. of this order. If, however, at the end of the applicable twelve (12) month period, the Divestiture Trustee has submitted to the Commission a plan of divestiture or believes that divestiture can be achieved within a reasonable time, such divestiture period may be extended by the Commission, or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court; provided, however, the Commission may extend such divestiture period only two (2) times.

5. The Divestiture Trustee shall have full and complete access to the personnel, books, records and facilities of respondent related to the manufacture, distribution, or sale of the Avecor Pump Assets or to any other relevant information, as the Divestiture Trustee may request. Respondent shall develop such financial or other information as the Divestiture Trustee may request and shall cooperate with the Divestiture Trustee. Respondent shall take no action to interfere with or impede the Divestiture Trustee’s accomplishment of his or her responsibilities.

6. The Divestiture Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to negotiate the most favorable price and terms available in each contract that is submitted to the Commission, subject to respondent’s absolute and unconditional obligation to divest at no minimum price and the Divestiture Trustee’s obligation to expeditiously accomplish the
remedial purpose of the order; to assure that respondent enters into a Divestiture Agreement that complies with the provisions of paragraph II.B.; to assure that respondent complies with the remaining provisions of paragraph IV. of this order; and to assure that the New Acquirer obtains all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Aveco Blood Pump System and the Associated Reservoirs and the Commercial Capability to Manufacture such products. The divestiture shall be made to, and the Divestiture Agreement executed with, the New Acquirer in the manner set forth in paragraph II. of this order; provided, however, if the Divestiture Trustee receives bona fide offers from more than one acquiring entity, and if the Commission determines to approve more than one (1) such acquiring entity, the Divestiture Trustee shall divest to the acquiring entity selected by respondent from among those approved by the Commission.

7. The Divestiture Trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the expense of respondent, on such reasonable and customary terms and conditions as the Commission or a court may set. The Divestiture Trustee shall have the authority to employ, at the expense of respondent, such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers, and other representatives and assistants as are necessary to carry out the Divestiture Trustee’s duties and responsibilities. The Divestiture Trustee shall account for all monies derived from the divestiture and all expenses incurred. After approval by the Commission and, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, by the court, of the account of the trustee, including fees for his or her services, all remaining monies shall be paid at the direction of respondent. The Divestiture Trustee’s compensation shall be based at least in significant part on a commission arrangement contingent on the Divestiture Trustee’s locating a New Acquirer and assuring compliance with this order.

8. Respondent shall indemnify the Divestiture Trustee and hold the Divestiture Trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities, or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the Divestiture Trustee’s duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses incurred in connection with the preparation for, or defense of, any claim, whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross
negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the Divestiture Trustee.

9. If the Commission determines that the Divestiture Trustee has ceased to act or failed to act diligently, the Commission may appoint a substitute trustee in the same manner as provided in paragraph IV. of this order.

10. The Commission or, in the case of a court-appointed trustee, the court, may on its own initiative or at the request of the Divestiture Trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to comply with the terms of this order.

11. The Divestiture Trustee shall have no obligation or authority to operate or maintain the Avecor Pump Assets.

12. The Divestiture Trustee shall report in writing to respondent and the Commission every two (2) months concerning his or her efforts to divest the relevant assets and respondent's compliance with the terms of this order.

V.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Within sixty (60) days of the date this order becomes final and every ninety (90) days thereafter until respondent has fully complied with the provisions of paragraphs II. through IV. of this order, respondent shall submit to the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it intends to comply, is complying, and has complied with these paragraphs of this order; provided, however, that respondent shall not be obligated to continue to submit such reports regarding its compliance with its obligations under paragraphs II.C, II.F. (the last sentence only), II.G. and IV.B.8. of this order once respondent has complied with the other provisions of paragraphs II. through IV. Respondent shall include in its compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full description of the efforts being made to comply with these paragraphs of this order, including a description of all substantive contacts or negotiations for accomplishing the divestitures and entering into the Divestiture Agreements required by this order, including the identity of all parties contacted. Respondent shall include in its compliance reports copies of all written communications to and from such parties, all internal memoranda, and all reports and recommendations concerning the Divestiture Agreements
required by paragraph II. of this order, subject to any legally recognized privilege.

B. One (1) year from the date this order becomes final and annually thereafter until respondent has complied with all of the terms of this order, and at such other times as the Commission may require, respondent shall file a verified written report with the Commission setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied and is complying with this order.

VI.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, and subject to any legally recognized privilege, upon written request and on reasonable notice to respondent, respondent shall permit any duly authorized representatives of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to any facilities and access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondent, relating to any matters contained in this consent order; and

B. Upon five (5) days' notice to respondent, and without restraint or interference from respondent, to interview officers or employees of respondent, who may have counsel present, regarding such matters.

VII.

It is further ordered, That respondent shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in respondent such as dissolution, assignment or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

VIII.

It is further ordered, That this order shall terminate on June 3, 2009.
This Trust Agreement (the "Trust Agreement") entered into this ______ day of __________, 1999, between ______________________ and Medtronic, Inc. ("Medtronic"), provides as follows:

WHEREAS, the United States Federal Trade Commission (the "Commission") has accepted or will shortly accept for Public Comment an Agreement containing Consent Order with Medtronic (the "Order"), which provides, among other things, for the appointment of an Interim Trustee to ensure that Medtronic and any acquirer of certain defined assets perform their respective obligations with respect to those assets under the Order, and

WHEREAS, the Commission may appoint ______________ as such trustee (the "Interim Trustee") in connection with the divestiture of certain defined assets (the "Assets") used in the business of producing and selling certain products formerly produced and sold by AVecor Cardiovascular, Inc. ("AVecor") as part of its Blood Pump System Business (the "Business") as defined in the Agreement between AVecor, Medtronic and Baxter Healthcare Corporation ("Baxter") dated February ____, 1999, (the "Divestiture Agreement"), and also including the supply of associated reservoirs with a 5/8 inch outlet and a reservoir holder for use with those products (collectively the "Products") and __________________ has consented to that appointment;

WHEREAS, the Order further provides or will provide that Medtronic shall execute a trust agreement, subject to prior approval of the Commission, conferring all the rights and powers necessary to permit the Interim Trustee to monitor Medtronic's compliance with the terms of the Order and with the Divestiture Agreement referenced in the Order and to monitor the compliance of the Acquirer as defined in the Order;

WHEREAS, this Trust Agreement, although executed by the Interim Trustee and Medtronic is not effective for any purpose, including but not limited to imposing rights and responsibilities on Medtronic or the Interim Trustee under the Order, until it has been approved by the Commission;

WHEREAS, the parties to this Trust Agreement intend to be legally bound;

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

1. Capitalized terms used herein and not specifically defined herein shall have the respective definitions given to them in the Order. The term Medtronic as used herein
shall mean and include all of the parties included within the definition of Respondent in subparagraph A of Paragraph I of the Order. The term "Assets to be Divested" means the Assets to be transferred relating to the Business as provided for in the Divestiture Agreement.

2. The Interim Trustee shall have all of the powers and responsibilities conferred upon the Interim Trustee by the Order.

3. Medtronic hereby agrees that it will fully and promptly comply with all of the terms of the Order conferring any rights, powers or privileges upon the Interim Trustee, or imposing any duties or obligations upon itself with respect to the Interim Trustee or the performance by the Interim Trustee of its responsibilities thereunder. In particular, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing Medtronic agrees that:

(a) it will use its best efforts to ensure that any Acquirer enters into an agreement in the form set out in Attachment I with the Interim Trustee prior to the divestiture by Medtronic to the Acquirer of the Assets to be Divested;

(b) it will promptly provide the Interim Trustee with:

(1) a complete inventory of the Assets to be Divested identifying in particular those Assets which require actions to maintain their viability and marketability and who is responsible for taking those actions;

(2) a complete inventory of all existing FDA approvals and pending FDA approvals for the Products identifying actions required to maintain or complete such approvals and identifying who is responsible for taking such actions;

(3) a complete inventory of all activities or operations worldwide which relate to the manufacture of any of the Assets to be Divested and which relate to Medtronic’s compliance with the Order including processes and process validations which are under development, identify who is responsible for maintaining or pursuing such activities and giving an inventory of materials and records relating to such manufacture;

(4) full and complete details of all dealings with any future Acquirer (other than Baxter) including copies of all correspondence and written reports of all contacts and discussions with any Acquirer and any draft and complete agreements;

(5) a complete inventory of all Patents related to the manufacture or sale of the Products in the U.S., identifying actions needed to maintain such Patents and who is responsible for such actions;

(c) it will provide a written list of the principal individuals involved in the transitioning of the Assets to be Divested to the Acquirer, together with their location and role; and will provide the Trustee with written notice of any changes in such personnel occurring thereafter.
TRUST AGREEMENT

(d) it will provide the Interim Trustee with copies of all reports submitted to the Commission pursuant to Paragraph V of the Order, simultaneous with the submission of such reports to the Commission;

(e) to the extent not reflected in the reports submitted to the Commission pursuant to Paragraph V of the Order, it will provide every two months commencing 60 days after the Divestiture Agreement is accepted by the Commission for public comment, or as requested by the Interim Trustee full and detailed reports to the Interim Trustee as to all of its activities and obligations under the Order concerning the Business including, without limitation to the extent applicable:

1. all activities involving the research and development, pre-clinical and clinical studies and the pursuit and maintenance of FDA clearance of any of the Assets to be Divested;

2. all activities concerned with Contract Manufacture as referenced in Paragraph II of the Order, including, without limitation, negotiation and operation of supply agreements, actual supply and inventory;

3. all activities concerning the assistance, advice and consultation provided to any Acquirer generally as provided in Paragraph II of the Order;

(f) it will comply with the Interim Trustee's reasonable requests for follow-up discussions or supplementary information concerning any reports provided to or requested by the Interim Trustee pursuant to this Agreement, including meetings and discussions with the principal staff involved in any activities relating to the research, development, manufacture and/or sale of the Assets to be Divested or any product comprised therein or concerned with the maintenance of the Business and, further including, actions necessary to maintain all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell any of the Assets to be Divested, to maintain the viability and marketability of the Assets to be Divested, as well as the tangible assets of the A Vecor facilities used to manufacture and sell all of the Assets to be Divested, and to prevent the destruction, removal, wasting, deterioration or impairment of the Assets to be Divested, and will provide the Interim Trustee with access to and copies of all other data, records or other information that the Trustee reasonably believes are necessary to the proper discharge of his responsibilities under the Order;

(g) it will provide notice of any activities or events affecting or likely to affect the maintenance of the Business;

4. Medtronic shall promptly notify the Interim Trustee of any written or oral communication that occurs after the date of this Trust Agreement between the Commission and
TRUST AGREEMENT

Medtronic related to the Order or this Trust Agreement, together with copies (or, in the case of oral communications, summaries) of such communications.

5. The Interim Trustee shall maintain the confidentiality of all information provided to the Interim Trustee by Medtronic. Such information may be disclosed only to:

(a) persons employed by, or working with, the Interim Trustee under this Agreement, or

(b) persons employed at the Commission and working on this matter;

(c) Upon termination of the Interim Trustee's duties under this agreement, the Interim Trustee shall promptly return to Medtronic all material provided to the Interim Trustee by Medtronic and shall destroy any material prepared by the Interim Trustee that contains or reflects any confidential Medtronic information. Nothing herein shall abrogate the Interim Trustee's duty of confidentiality, including the obligation to keep such information confidential after the termination of this agreement;

(d) In addition, the Interim Trustee shall keep confidential all other aspects of the performance of his duties under this agreement and shall not disclose any confidential or proprietary information relating thereto. To the extent that the Interim Trustee wishes to retain any employee, agent, consultant or any other third party to assist the Interim Trustee in accordance with Paragraph III of the Order, the Interim Trustee shall ensure that, prior to being retained, such persons execute a confidentiality agreement in a form agreed upon by the Interim Trustee and Medtronic.

For the purposes of this Section, information shall not be considered confidential or proprietary to the extent that it is or becomes part of the public domain (other than as the result of any action by the Interim Trustee or by any employee, agent, affiliate or consultant of the Interim Trustee), or to the extent that the recipient of such information can demonstrate that such information was already known to the recipient at the time of receipt from a source other than Medtronic or any director, officer, employee, agent, consultant or affiliate of Medtronic when such source is entitled to make such disclosure to such recipient.

6. Nothing in this agreement shall require Medtronic to disclose any material or information that is subject to a legally recognized privilege or that Medtronic is prohibited from disclosing by reason of law or an agreement with a third party.

7. The Interim Trustee shall be reasonably available to Medtronic to discuss any questions or issues that Medtronic may have concerning compliance with the Order as it relates to Medtronic.

8. Medtronic will pay the Interim Trustee $___ per hour for all reasonable time spent in the performance of the Interim Trustee's duties including all work in connection with the negotiation and preparation of this Trust Agreement. Such hourly rates may be adjusted from time to time by agreement with Medtronic. In addition, Medtronic will pay (i) all out-of-
pocket expenses reasonably incurred by the Interim Trustee in the performance of the Interim Trustee's duties, including any air travel at business class rates, and (ii) all fees and disbursements reasonably incurred by such consultants, accountants, attorneys, investment bankers, business brokers, appraisers and other representatives and assistants as are reasonably necessary to carry out the Interim Trustee's duties and responsibilities. Medtronic acknowledges that the Interim Trustee may need to travel to and from Baxter's and AVecor's facilities for the purpose of fulfilling these duties. The Interim Trustee shall provide details and an explanation of all matters for which the Interim Trustee submits an invoice to Medtronic. At its own expense, Medtronic may retain an independent auditor to verify such invoices.

9. Medtronic hereby confirms its obligation to indemnify the Interim Trustee and hold the Interim Trustee harmless in accordance with and to the extent required by Paragraph III (and, upon direction by the Commission to the Interim Trustee to divest any Asset to be Divested) of the Order.

10. Upon this Trust Agreement becoming effective, the Interim Trustee shall be permitted, and Medtronic shall be required, to notify Baxter or, if applicable, all potential future Acquirers with respect to his appointment as Interim Trustee.

11. In the event of a disagreement or dispute between Medtronic and the Interim Trustee concerning Medtronic's obligations under the Order, and in the event that such disagreement or dispute cannot be resolved by the parties, either party may seek the assistance of the individual in charge of the Commission's Compliance Division to resolve the issue. In the event of any disagreement or dispute between Medtronic and the Interim Trustee not relating to Medtronic's obligations under the Order, and in the event that such disagreement or dispute cannot be resolved by the parties, the parties shall submit the matter to binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association.

12. This agreement shall be subject to the substantive law of the State of Minnesota (regardless of any other jurisdiction's choice of law principles).

13. This agreement shall terminate two (2) years from the date Medtronic and Acquirer signed the Divestiture Agreement; provided, however, that the Agreement shall end earlier if the Interim Trustee reports to the Commission that the Acquirer has received all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Products and has the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products and the Commission has accepted that report, or the Commission has appointed a substitute trustee pursuant to paragraph III. A. 8. of the Order.

14. In the event that, during the term of this agreement, the Interim Trustee becomes aware that he has or may have a conflict of interest that may affect or could have the appearance of affecting the performance by the Interim Trustee of any of his duties under this agreement, the Interim Trustee shall promptly inform both Medtronic and the Commission of such conflict or potential conflict.
15. In the performance of his functions and duties under this agreement, the Interim Trustee shall exercise the standard of care and diligence that would be expected of a reasonable person in the conduct of his own business affairs.

16. Any notices or other communication required to be given hereunder shall be deemed to have been properly given if sent by mail or fax (with acknowledgment of receipt of such fax having been received), to the applicable party at its address below (or to such other address as to which such party shall hereafter notify the other party):

If to the Interim Trustee, to:

If Medtronic, to:

Medtronic, Inc.
Corporate Center
7000 Central avenue N.E.
Minneapolis, MN 55432
Attention: Vice President and Chief Development Officer
FAX (612) 572-5404

and:

Attention: General Counsel
FAX (612) 572-5459

17. This agreement shall not become binding until it has been approved by the Commission and the Order has been accepted for public comment.

18. As used in this Agreement, "Commercial Capability to Manufacture" is defined in the manner set forth in Paragraph I of the Order.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Trust Agreement as of the date first above written.

Medtronic, Inc. Interim Trustee

By ____________________________ ____________________________

Its ____________________________
This Agreement entered into this ___ day of __________ between __________ and Baxter Healthcare Corporation (the "Acquirer"), provides as follows:

WHEREAS the Federal Trade Commission (the "Commission") has accepted or will shortly accept for Public Comment an Agreement containing a Consent Order (the "Order") between Medtronic, Inc. ("Medtronic"), which provides, among other things, for the appointment of an Interim Trustee to ensure that Medtronic and any acquirer of certain defined assets (the "Assets") used in the business of producing and selling certain products formerly produced and sold by AVecor Cardiovascular, Inc. ("Avecor") as part of its Blood Pump System Business (the "Business") as defined in the Agreement between AVecor, Medtronic and Acquirer dated February ___, 1999 (the "Divestiture Agreement"), and also including the supply of associated reservoirs with a 5/8 inch outlet for use and a reservoir holder with those products (collectively, the "Products") perform their respective obligations with respect to those Assets and the Business under the Order, and

WHEREAS, the Commission may appoint an individual of its own choosing, subject to Medtronic's consent, as such trustee in connection with the divestiture of the Assets (the "Interim Trustee") to Acquirer;

WHEREAS the Order further provides that Medtronic shall execute a trust agreement, subject to prior approval of the Commission, conferring all the rights and powers necessary to permit the Interim Trustee to monitor the Acquirer's compliance with the terms of the Order;

WHEREAS, the parties to this Agreement intend to be legally bound;

NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

Acquirer shall:

1. Provide to the Interim Trustee a copy of the certification of its good faith intention, including a plan, to obtain in an expeditious manner all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Products and to obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products as submitted to the Commission pursuant to the Order;

2. Submit to the Interim Trustee verified written reports every two (2) months or as directed by the Interim Trustee setting forth in detail the efforts of the Acquirer to sell the Products connected with the Business obtained pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement and to obtain all FDA approvals necessary to manufacture and sell the Products and to obtain the
Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products. The first such report shall be submitted to
the Interim Trustee 60 days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public
comment by the Commission. The Acquirer shall report to the Interim Trustee within ten (10)
days of its ceasing the sale in the United States of the Products connected with the Business
obtained pursuant to the Divestiture Agreement for any time period exceeding sixty (60) days or
abandoning its efforts to obtain any FDA approvals to manufacture and/or sell the Products or to
obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products;

3. Provide the Interim Trustee with access upon reasonable notice and during
regular business hours to all records and all facilities that relate to Acquirer’s efforts, pursuant to
the Divestiture Agreement, to sell or manufacture the Products, to obtain FDA approvals, or to
obtain the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products;

4. Submit to the Interim Trustee verified written reports every two (2)
months of its effort to prepare for and carry out marketing and sales with respect to the Products
commencing 60 days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public comment by
the Commission;

5. Submit to the Interim Trustee verified written reports every two (2)
months of its activities and planned activities relating to manufacture with respect to the Products
including any such activities contracted to a third party commencing 60 days from the date the “
Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public comment by the Commission;

6. Submit to the Interim Trustee verified written reports every two (2)
months of the number of staff devoted to the marketing and sale of the Products including any
staff recruited from Avecor commencing 60 days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is
accepted for public comment by the Commission;

7. Submit to the Interim Trustee verified written reports every two (2)
months regarding the Products’ market performance against competitive products commencing
60 days from the date the Divestiture Agreement is accepted for public comment by the
Commission;

8. Arrange at the Interim Trustee’s request, upon reasonable notice, a
reasonable number of meetings or discussions, during normal business hours at a reasonable
location designated by Acquirer, and provide additional information in response to reasonable
requests of the Interim Trustee, relating to the reports and activities set forth in Paragraphs 2-7
above; and allow the Interim Trustee to have sufficient access, during normal business hours and
after reasonable notice to Acquirer’s senior manager designated for that purpose, to Acquirer’s
activities and staff to determine whether Acquirer is making appropriate efforts to meet the
projections of Acquirer’s business plan and to fulfill its responsibilities as contemplated by the
Order and the Divestiture Agreement;

9. Cooperate fully in any respect reasonably required by the Interim Trustee
to allow him to fulfill his obligations as they relate to Acquirer under the Order;
The Interim Trustee shall maintain the confidentiality of all information provided to the Interim Trustee by Acquirer and shall use such information only for the purpose of discharging his obligations as Interim Trustee and not for any other purpose, including, without limitation, any other business, scientific, technological, or personal purpose. Such information may be disclosed only to:

(a) persons employed by or working with the Interim Trustee under this Agreement and the Trust Agreement,

(b) persons employed at the Commission and working on this matter.

Upon the termination of the Interim Trustee's duties under the Trust Agreement to which this Agreement is an attachment, the Interim Trustee shall promptly return to Acquirer all materials provided to the Interim Trustee by Acquirer and shall destroy any material prepared by the Interim Trustee that contains or reflects any confidential Acquirer information. Nothing herein shall abrogate the Interim Trustee's duty of confidentiality, including the obligation to keep such information confidential after the termination of this Agreement.

In addition, the Interim Trustee shall keep confidential all other aspects of the performance of his duties under this Agreement and shall not disclose any confidential or proprietary information relating thereto. To the extent that the Interim Trustee wishes to retain any employee, agent, consultant or other third party to assist the Interim Trustee in accordance with the Order, the Interim Trustee shall ensure that prior to being retained, such persons execute a confidentiality agreement in a form agreed upon by the Interim Trustee and Acquirer.

For the purposes of this Section, information shall not be considered confidential or proprietary to the extent that it is or becomes part of the public domain (other than as the result of any action by the Interim Trustee or by any employee, agent, affiliate or consultant of the Interim Trustee), or to the extent that the recipient of such information can demonstrate that such information was already known to the recipient at the time of receipt from a source other than Acquirer or any director, officer, employee, agent, consultant or affiliate of Acquirer when such source is entitled to make such disclosure to such recipient.

This Agreement and the rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall in all respects be governed by the substantive Law of the State of Minnesota, including all matters of construction, validity and performance.

This agreement shall terminate two (2) years from the date Medtronic and Acquirer signed the Divestiture Agreement, provided, however, that the Agreement shall end earlier if the Interim Trustee reports to the Commission that the Acquirer has received all necessary FDA approvals to manufacture and sell the Products and has obtained the Commercial Capability to Manufacture the Products and the Commission has accepted that report, or the Commission has appointed a substitute trustee pursuant to paragraph III. A. 8. of the Order.
13. The Acquirer shall submit copies of all reports submitted to the Interim Trustee pursuant to this Agreement to the Commission simultaneously with the submission of such reports to the Interim Trustee.

14. As used in this Agreement, "Commercial Capability to Manufacture" is defined in the manner set forth in Paragraph I of the Order.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the date first above written.

Interim Trustee

Baxter Healthcare Corporation

By __________________________

Its __________________________

In the Matter of
ZENECA GROUP PLC

Consent Order, Etc., in regard to Alleged Violation of Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act and Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

Docket C-3880. Complaint, June 7, 1999—Decision, June 7, 1999

This consent order, among other things, requires Zeneca, a corporation engaged in the research and development of long-acting local anesthetics, to transfer and surrender certain assets in accordance with the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement, and to divest the Chiroscience shares.

Participants


For the respondent: Ronan Harty, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York, N.Y.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission"), having reason to believe that respondent Zeneca Group PLC ("Zeneca"), a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, has proposed to merge with Astra AB ("Astra"), a corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:

I. DEFINITIONS

1. "Long-Acting Local Anesthetics" means pharmaceutical products used to relieve pain during the course of surgical or other medical procedures by blocking pain impulses from reaching the central nervous system. Long-Acting Local Anesthetics have an effective duration of up to six to seven hours, and allow patients to remain awake and conscious throughout the medical procedure.

Complaint


II. RESPONDENT

4. Respondent Zeneca is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England, with its office and principal place of business located at 15 Stanhope Gate, London W1Y 6LN, England.

5. Respondent Zeneca, through the Zeneca/Chirosience License Agreement, is engaged in the research and development of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics.

6. Respondent is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affects commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

III. THE ACQUIRED COMPANY

7. Astra is a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Sweden, with its office and principal place of business located at S-151 85 Södertälje, Sweden.

8. Astra is engaged in, among other things, the research, development, manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics.

9. Astra is, and at all times relevant herein has been, engaged in commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 12, and is a corporation whose business is in or affects commerce as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 44.

IV. THE MERGER

10. On or about December 9, 1998, Zeneca and Astra entered into a Merger Agreement and Plan of Merger, whereby Zeneca agreed to acquire 100 percent of all issued shares of Astra stock for
approximately $30.5 billion ("Merger"). Upon completion of the Merger, Zeneca will be renamed AstraZeneca.

V. THE RELEVANT MARKET

11. For purposes of this complaint, the relevant line of commerce in which to analyze the effects of the Merger is the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics.

12. For purposes of this complaint, the United States is the relevant geographic area in which to analyze the effects of the Merger in the relevant line of commerce.

VI. STRUCTURE OF THE MARKET

13. The market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics is highly concentrated as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI"). The pre-merger HHI is 6,682 points. Astra is the leading supplier of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics in the United States and worldwide, and is one of only two companies with Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics in the United States. Abbott Laboratories is the only other company with FDA approval for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics in the United States.

14. Zeneca does not currently compete in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics. However, through the Zeneca/Chiroscience License Agreement, Zeneca is engaged in the research and development of a new Long-Acting Local Anesthetic, which it plans to begin marketing and selling in the United States in 1999.

15. Astra is an actual competitor in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics. Zeneca, through the Zeneca/Chiroscience License Agreement, is an actual potential competitor in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics.

VII. BARRIERS TO ENTRY

16. Entry into the relevant market, other than the expected introduction of a new Long-Acting Local Anesthetic product by Zeneca and Chiroscience, would not be timely, likely, or sufficient to deter or counteract the adverse competitive effects described in paragraph 17 because of, among other things, the difficulty of
researching and developing a new product, obtaining FDA approval and gaining customer acceptance.

VIII. EFFECTS OF THE MERGER

17. The effects of the Merger, if consummated, may be substantially to lessen competition and to tend to create a monopoly in the relevant market in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, in the following ways, among others:

(a) By eliminating actual potential competition between Zeneca and Astra in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics;

(b) By increasing the likelihood that customers of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics would be forced to pay higher prices, or by reducing the likelihood that customers of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics would benefit from price reductions; and

(c) By reducing innovation in the relevant market for the manufacture and sale of Long-Acting Local Anesthetics.

IX. VIOLATIONS CHARGED

18. The Merger agreement described in paragraph 10 constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45.


DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of the proposed merger of Zeneca Group PLC ("Zeneca") and Astra AB ("Astra"), and Zeneca, hereinafter sometimes referred to as "respondent," having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint that the Bureau of Competition presented to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45; and
Respondent, its attorneys, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing consent order, an admission by respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent has violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed agreement containing consent order and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure described in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Zeneca is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of England, with its office and principal place of business located at 15 Stanhope Gate, London W1Y 6LN, England.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That, as used in this order, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Zeneca" means Zeneca Group PLC, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors (including but not limited to AstraZeneca) and assigns; its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Zeneca Group PLC (including but not limited to Zeneca Limited) and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each. Following the Merger, Zeneca includes Astra AB, its directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns;
its subsidiaries, divisions, groups and affiliates controlled by Astra AB, and the respective directors, officers, employees, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.

B. "Astra" means Astra AB, a corporation organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of Sweden, with its office and principal place of business located at S151 85 Södertälje, Sweden.

C. "Respondent" means Zeneca.


I. "Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement End Date" means the "End Date" as defined in clause 11.3 of the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

J. "FDA" means the United States Food and Drug Administration.

K. "Chirocaine™" means the chemical compound (S)-1-butyl-(N)-(2,6-dimethylphenyl)-2-piperidinecarboxamide known as levobupivacaine and having CAS registration number 27262-47-1 in all its forms including base and hydrochloride salt.

L. "Chirocaine™ Product" means Chirocaine™ and any "Licensed Products" as defined in the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

M. "Chirocaine™ Improvements" means any "Improvement" as defined in the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

N. "Chirocaine™ Information" means all "Chirocaine Know-how" as defined in the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

O. "Chirocaine™ Intellectual Property Rights" means the "Intellectual Property Rights" as defined in the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

P. "Chirocaine™ Assets" means:

1. The Chirocaine™ Product;
2. The Chirocaine™ Improvements;
3. The Chirocaine™ Information;
4. The Chirocaine™ Intellectual Property Rights; and
5. The Chirocaine™ License.

Q. "Chiroscience Shares" means all of the stock, share capital, equity or other interest of Chiroscience owned by respondent.

R. "Merger" means the acquisition by Zeneca of all or substantially all of the share capital of Astra.

II.

It is further ordered, That:

A. Within ten (10) business days after the date the Commission accepts this agreement containing consent order for public comment, respondent shall transfer and surrender, absolutely and in good faith, all the Chirocaine™ Assets, in accordance with the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

B. Within four (4) months after the expiration of the Agreement Amending Share Subscription Agreement, respondent shall divest, absolutely and in good faith, the Chiroscience Shares. Pending such divestiture, respondent shall not, directly or indirectly: (i) exercise
dominion or control over, or otherwise seek to influence, the management, direction or supervision of the business of Chiroscience; (ii) seek or obtain representation on the Board of Directors of Chiroscience; (iii) exercise any voting rights attached to the Chiroscience Shares; (iv) seek or obtain access to any confidential or proprietary information of Chiroscience; or (v) take any action or omit to take any action in a manner that would be incompatible with the status of respondent as a passive investor in Chiroscience.

C. Pending the transfer and surrender of the Chirocaine™ Assets, respondent shall take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of the Chirocaine™ Assets, and to prevent the destruction, deterioration, or impairment of any of the Chirocaine™ Assets. Respondent shall also take such actions as are necessary to maintain the viability and marketability of the Chirocaine™ Assets, and to prevent the destruction, deterioration, or impairment of any of the Chirocaine™ Assets, in accordance with the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

D. Respondent shall comply with all terms of the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement, and such agreement is incorporated by reference into this order and made part hereof as Confidential Appendix I. Any failure by respondent to comply with the requirements of such agreement may constitute a failure to comply with this order.

E. The purpose of this order is to ensure the continued use of the Chirocaine™ Assets in the same business in which the Chirocaine™ Assets are engaged at the time of the Merger, and to remedy the lessening of competition resulting from the Merger as alleged in the Commission's complaint.

III.

It is further ordered, That:

A. At any time after respondent signs the agreement containing consent order in this matter, the Commission may appoint an Interim Trustee to assure that respondent expeditiously performs its responsibilities as required by this order and the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

B. If an Interim Trustee is appointed pursuant to paragraph III.A. of this order, respondent shall consent to the following terms and conditions regarding the powers, duties, authorities, and responsibilities of the Interim Trustee:
The Commission shall select the Interim Trustee, subject to the consent of respondent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If respondent has not opposed, in writing, including the reasons for opposing, the selection of any proposed trustee within ten (10) days after notice by the staff of the Commission to respondent of the identity of any proposed trustee, respondent shall be deemed to have consented to the selection of the proposed trustee.

2. The Interim Trustee shall have the power and authority to monitor respondent's compliance with the terms of this order and with the terms of the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement, and shall exercise such power and authority and carry out the duties and responsibilities of the Interim Trustee in a manner consistent with the purposes of this order and in consultation with the Commission.

3. Within ten (10) days after appointment of the Interim Trustee, respondent shall execute a trust agreement that, subject to the prior approval of the Commission, confers on the Interim Trustee all the rights and powers necessary to permit the Interim Trustee to monitor respondent's compliance with the terms of this order and with the terms of the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement in a manner consistent with the purposes of this order.

4. The Interim Trustee shall serve until the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement End Date; provided, however, the Commission may extend this period as may be necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purposes of this order.

5. The Interim Trustee shall have full and complete access to respondent's personnel, books, records, documents, facilities and technical information relating to the research, development, manufacture, importation, distribution and sale of Chirocaine™ and any Chirocaine™ Product, or to any other relevant information, as the Interim Trustee may reasonably request, including, but not limited to, all documents and records kept in the normal course of business that relate to the manufacture of Chirocaine™ or any Chirocaine™ Product and all materials and information relating to FDA and other government or regulatory approvals. Respondent shall cooperate with any reasonable request of the Interim Trustee. Respondent shall take no action to interfere with or impede the Interim Trustee's ability to monitor respondent's compliance with this order and the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

6. The Interim Trustee shall serve, without bond or other security, at the expense of respondent, on such reasonable and customary terms.
and conditions as the Commission may set. The Commission may, among other things, require the Interim Trustee to sign an appropriate confidentiality agreement relating to Commission materials and information received in connection with performance of the Interim Trustee's duties. The Interim Trustee shall have authority to employ, at the expense of respondent, such consultants, accountants, attorneys and other representatives and assistants as are reasonably necessary to carry out the Interim Trustee's duties and responsibilities. The Interim Trustee shall account for all expenses incurred, including fees for his or her services, subject to the approval of the Commission.

7. Respondent shall indemnify the Interim Trustee and hold the Interim Trustee harmless against any losses, claims, damages, liabilities or expenses arising out of, or in connection with, the performance of the Interim Trustee's duties, including all reasonable fees of counsel and other expenses incurred in connection with the preparations for, or defense of, any claim whether or not resulting in any liability, except to the extent that such liabilities, losses, damages, claims, or expenses result from misfeasance, gross negligence, willful or wanton acts, or bad faith by the Interim Trustee.

8. If the Commission determines that the Interim Trustee has ceased to act or failed to act diligently, the Commission may appoint a substitute Interim Trustee in the same manner as provided in paragraph III.A.1. of this order.

9. The Commission may on its own initiative or at the request of the Interim Trustee issue such additional orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to assure compliance with the requirements of this order and the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement.

10. The Interim Trustee shall obtain and evaluate reports submitted to it by Chiroscience with respect to the performance of respondent's obligations under the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement. The Interim Trustee shall report in writing to the Commission every two (2) months from the date the Interim Trustee is appointed concerning compliance by respondent and Chiroscience with the provisions of this order and the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement until the Chiroscience/Zeneca Agreement End Date.

IV.

It is further ordered, That within thirty (30) days after the date this order becomes final and every ninety (90) days thereafter until
respondent has fully complied with the provisions of this order, respondent shall submit to the Commission a verified written report setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it intends to comply, is complying, and has complied with this order. Respondent shall include in such compliance reports, among other things that are required from time to time, a full description of the efforts being made to comply with the order.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in the corporate respondent that may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order, such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation, or the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation.

VI.

It is further ordered, That, for the purpose of determining or securing compliance with this order, upon written request, respondent shall permit any duly authorized representative of the Commission:

A. Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to all facilities and access to inspect and copy all books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other records and documents in the possession or under the control of respondent relating to any matters contained in this order; and

B. Upon five days' notice to any respondent and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, employees, agents or independent contractors of respondent, who may have counsel present, regarding such matters.

[Confidential Appendix I Redacted from Public Version of Decision & Order]
In the Matter of
Design Zone, Inc.

Consent Order, etc., in regard to alleged violation of
Textile Fiber Products Identification Act
and Sec. 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act

Docket C-3881. Complaint, June 10, 1999—Decision, June 10, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits Design Zone, Inc., a California-based manufacturer and distributor of t-shirts and other textile wearing apparel, from misrepresenting the extent to which any t-shirt or other textile wearing apparel is made in the United States or any other country.

Participants
For the Commission: Robert E. Easton, Sr., Mary Engle, and Elaine Kolish.
For the respondent: Donald Stein, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Washington, D.C.

Complaint

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that Design Zone, Inc., a corporation ("respondent"), has violated the provisions of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act and of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent Design Zone, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 337 South Anderson Street, Los Angeles, California.

2. Respondent has manufactured, assembled, labeled, and offered for sale, sold, and distributed t-shirts and other textile wearing apparel that are sold through retailers to consumers. Such t-shirts and other textile wearing apparel are textile fiber products as the term "textile fiber product" is defined in the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. 70.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has sold and distributed, or has caused to be sold and distributed, certain t-shirts manufactured in China. In at least one instance, respondent removed the foreign country-of-origin labels
from these t-shirts and affixed labels containing the statement "Made in USA," or affixed labels to these t-shirts containing the statement "Made in USA" without removing the foreign country-of-origin labels.

5. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that respondent's t-shirts referred to in paragraph four were made in the United States.

6. In truth and in fact, the t-shirts referred to in paragraph four were manufactured in a foreign country with foreign component parts. Therefore, the representation set forth in paragraph five was, and is, false or misleading.

7. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint in misrepresenting foreign-manufactured t-shirts as made in the United States constitute a violation of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act and the Commission's Rules and Regulations promulgated thereunder, and constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondent named in the caption hereof, and the respondent having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondent with violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act; and the Commission's Rules adopted thereunder; and

The respondent, its attorney, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by the respondent of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the draft complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondent that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and
The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent violated the said Acts, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings, and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Design Zone, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 337 South Anderson Street, Los Angeles, California.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondent, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

ORDER

I.

It is ordered, That respondent Design Zone, Inc., a corporation, its successors and assigns and its officers, agents, representatives, and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the manufacturing, labeling, advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any t-shirt or other item of textile wearing apparel in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall not violate any provision of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (15 U.S.C. 70) and the Commission's Rules adopted thereunder (16 CFR Part 303), and shall not misrepresent in any manner, directly or by implication, the extent to which any such t-shirt or other item of textile wearing apparel is made in the United States or any other country.

II.

It is further ordered, That respondent Design Zone, Inc. and its successors and assigns shall, for five (5) years after the date of issuance of this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission business records demonstrating its compliance with the terms and provisions of this order, including but

...
not limited to records demonstrating the country of origin of any textile wearing apparel subject to Part I of this order.

III.

It is further ordered, That respondent Design Zone, Inc. and its successors and assigns shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent Design Zone, Inc. and its successors and assigns shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learn less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent Design Zone, Inc. and its successors and assigns shall, within sixty (60) days after service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
VI.

This order will terminate on June 10, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
IN THE MATTER OF
AMERICAN COLLEGE FOR ADVANCEMENT IN MEDICINE

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
SECS. 5 AND 12 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

Docket C-3882. Complaint, June 22, 1999--Decision, June 22, 1999

This consent order, among other things, prohibits the American College for Advancement in Medicine, a California-based association of physicians, from representing, in advertising, promotion, sale, or distribution, that chelation therapy is effective treatment for atherosclerosis without possessing and relying upon competent and reliable scientific evidence to support the representation. In addition, the consent order prohibits the respondent from making any representation regarding the efficacy of chelation therapy for any disease of the human circulatory system unless substantiated by competent and reliable scientific evidence.

Participants

For the Commission: Walter Gross, Dean Graybill and Russell Porter.


COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that the American College for Advancement in Medicine ("respondent") has violated the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that this proceeding is in the public interest, alleges:

1. Respondent American College for Advancement in Medicine (ACAM) is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 23121 Verdugo Drive, Suite 204, Laguna Hills, California. ACAM is a nonprofit professional association comprised principally of physicians who administer traditional and complementary/alternative medical therapies including chelation therapy.

2. Respondent has disseminated to the public brochures and other written materials that constitute advertising under the Federal Trade Commission Act. These materials contain statements about a treatment modality identified as "chelation therapy," which involves the use of "drugs," within the meaning of Sections 12 and 15 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. Chelation therapy consists of the intravenous injection into the body of a substance which, after bonding with metals and minerals in the bloodstream, is expelled through the body's excretory functions. The principal bonding substance called for in the ACAM treatment protocols, and used generally by practitioners is a synthetic amino acid called ethylene diamine tetraacetic acid (EDTA). Respondent distributes its brochures and other written materials to its members who disseminate the material to consumers. Additionally, respondent disseminates its material to consumers through an Internet Web Page and to consumers who contacted respondent through its toll-free telephone number.

3. The acts and practices of respondent alleged in this complaint have been in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

4. Respondent has disseminated or has caused to be disseminated advertising for chelation therapy including but not necessarily limited to the attached Exhibits A (an Internet Web Page) and B (a pamphlet), which contain identical text. These advertisements contain the following statements, among others:

A. "Chelation therapy is a safe, effective and relatively inexpensive treatment to restore blood flow in victims of atherosclerosis without surgery."

B. "EDTA improves calcium and cholesterol metabolism by eliminating metallic catalysts which cause damage to cell membranes by producing 'oxygen free radicals.' Free radical pathology is now believed by many scientists to be an important contributing cause of atherosclerosis, cancer, diabetes and other diseases of aging. EDTA helps to prevent the production of harmful free radicals."

C. "Chelation therapy is used to reverse symptoms of hardening of the arteries, also known as atherosclerosis or arteriosclerosis."

D. "Every single study of the use of chelation therapy for atherosclerosis which has ever been published, without exception, has described an improvement in blood flow and symptoms."

E. "Chelation therapy promotes health by correcting the major underlying cause of arterial blockage. Damaging oxygen free radicals are increased by the presence of metallic elements and act as a chronic irritant to blood vessel walls and cell membranes. EDTA removes those metallic irritants, allowing leaky and damaged cell walls to heal. Plaques smooth over and shrink, allowing more blood to pass. Arterial walls become softer and more pliable, allowing easier expansion. Scientific studies have proven that blood flow increases after chelation therapy."

F. "Chelation therapy is an office treatment which improves blood flow throughout the entire vascular system ...."
G. "The reader is advised that varying and even conflicting views are held by other segments of the medical profession .... This information represents the current opinion of independent physician consultants to ACAM at the time of publication."

5. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that EDTA chelation therapy is an effective treatment for atherosclerosis.

6. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that it possessed and relied upon a reasonable basis that substantiated the representation set forth in paragraph five, at the time the representation was made.

7. In truth and in fact, respondent did not possess and rely upon a reasonable basis that substantiated the representation set forth in paragraph five, at the time the representation was made. Therefore, the representation set forth in paragraph six was, and is, false or misleading.

8. Through the means described in paragraph four, respondent has represented, expressly or by implication, that scientific studies prove that EDTA chelation therapy is an effective treatment for atherosclerosis.

9. In truth and in fact, scientific studies do not prove that EDTA chelation therapy is an effective treatment for atherosclerosis. Therefore, the representation set forth paragraph eight was, and is, false or misleading.

10. The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and the making of false advertisements, in or affecting commerce in violation of Sections 5(a) and 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
WHAT IS CHELATION THERAPY?

Chelation therapy is a safe, effective and relatively inexpensive treatment to restore blood flow in victims of atherosclerosis without surgery. Chelation therapy involves the intravenous infusion of a prescription medicine called ethylene diamine tetra-acetic acid (EDTA).

WHAT IS EDTA?

EDTA is a substance which removes undesirable metals from the body. Some metals, such as lead, mercury and cadmium are poisons. Lead and cadmium levels correlate with high blood pressure. All metals, even essential nutritional elements, are toxic in excess or when abnormally situated. EDTA normalizes the distribution of most metallic elements in the body. EDTA improves calcium and cholesterol metabolism by eliminating metallic elements in the body. EDTA improves calcium and cholesterol metabolism by eliminating metallic catalysts which cause damage to cell membranes by producing “oxygen free radicals.” Free radical pathology is now believed by many scientists to be an important contributing cause of atherosclerosis, cancer, diabetes and other diseases of aging. EDTA helps to prevent the production of harmful free radicals.

WHAT IS IT USED FOR?

Chelation therapy is used to reverse symptoms of hardening of the arteries, also known as atherosclerosis or arteriosclerosis. Atherosclerosis is caused by multiple complex factors, including abnormal accumulations of metallic elements. The end result is plaque formation within arteries which blocks the flow of blood. Plaques are composed of fibrous tissue, cholesterol and calcium. Atherosclerosis leads to heart attack, stroke, senility and may lead to amputation of extremities. Every single study of the use of chelation therapy for atherosclerosis which has ever been published, without exception, has described an improvement in blood flow and symptoms. Adverse editorial comment to the contrary lacks evidence and stems primarily from physicians with a vested interest in catheterization and surgery.

HOW DOES ARTERY DISEASE AFFECT HEALTH?

Blockage of blood vessels by plaque (atheroma) reduces the flow of blood, starving vital organs for oxygen and other nutrients. Cell walls then become leaky, allowing excessive calcium, sodium and other elements to enter. When calcium accumulates to a critical point, deposits form, like concretes. These calcifications can often be seen on x-ray. Disordered calcium metabolism can also cause coronary and other arteries to go into spasm, further reducing blood to vital organs.

HOW DOES CHELATION THERAPY AFFECT HEALTH?

Chelation therapy promotes health by correcting the major underlying cause of arterial blockage. Damaging oxygen free radicals are increased by the presence of metallic elements and act as a chronic irritant to blood vessel walls and cell membranes. EDTA removes those metallic irritants, allowing heal and damaged cell walls to heal. Plaques smooth over and shrink, allowing more blood to pass. Arterial walls become softer and more pliable, allowing easier expansion. Scientific studies have proven that blood flow increases after chelation therapy. A complete program of chelation therapy involves a broad-based health care program of regular exercise, proper nutrition, vitamin and mineral supplementation and avoidance of tobacco and other damaging habits.
WHAT IS THE COST COMPARISON?

Bypass surgery is the mechanical repair of only a small portion of the arterial tree. Total costs average about $45,000 and can be as high as $60,000 or even more. Chelation therapy is an office treatment which improves blood flow throughout the entire vascular system at a fraction of the cost of bypass surgery. For example, if 20 to 40 four-hour chelation treatments in a physician's office were required for a given patient, it would cost an estimated $2000-$4000.

WHAT ABOUT SAFETY AND SIDE EFFECTS?

Chelation therapy is among the safest of medical procedures. More than 400,000 patients have received over four million treatments during the past 30 years. Not one death has been directly caused by chelation therapy, when properly administered by a physician who was fully trained and competent in the use of this therapy. Side effects are possible, as with any drug therapy. Vein irritation, mild pain, headache and fatigue may occur. Occasionally a mild and transient fever occurs. These and other minor side effects, if they occur, are easily controlled by adjusting the duration and frequency of treatment, or with the use of other simple measures. Side effects tend to diminish after the first few treatments. Most patients experience few or no side effects.

HOW DO I KNOW IF I NEED OR CAN BENEFIT FROM CHELATION THERAPY?

If you have chest pain or leg pain on walking; shortness of breath; painful, discolored feet; transient loss of vision; paralysis; or rapidly failing memory, see a physician! Any unexplained or persistent symptoms which affect your heart, head or limbs should be explored for circulatory blockage.

HOW WILL I BE ABLE TO TELL IF CHELATION THERAPY HAS HELPED ME?

Patients routinely report reduction or elimination of their symptoms with an increasing sense of well being after chelation therapy. Family and friends are often the first to notice and report improvement in appearance, behavior and performance. Comparison of pre- and post-therapy diagnostic tests can provide objective evidence of effectiveness.

CAN MY PERSONAL PHYSICIAN GIVE THIS TREATMENT?

Any licensed physician can legally administer this treatment. Courses to train physicians in the safe use of chelation therapy are offered twice yearly by the American College for Advancement in Medicine. Interested physicians should contact ACAM for information about training and certification in this important type of medical therapy.

CAN CHELATION THERAPY BE USED AFTER BYPASS SURGERY?

Yes! Although chelation therapy is best utilized to avoid bypass surgery, many patients who have previously undergone one or more bypass procedures, often with little or no benefit, have subsequently benefited greatly from chelation therapy. Treatment for each patient must be individualized. If all else fails, including chelation therapy, bypass remains available as a last resort.

IS CHELATION THERAPY A LEGAL TREATMENT?

Yes!
DO MEDICAL INSURANCE COMPANIES PAY FOR CHELATION THERAPY?

Most medical insurance companies, including Medicare, have been financially depleted by paying for so many expensive surgeries. Segments of the health care industry which profit greatly from surgical procedures are politically powerful. Physicians who review claims for medical insurance companies often favor the extremely expensive and risky procedures, such as bypass surgery, while refusing payment for equally beneficial, far less expensive and immeasurably safer chelation therapy. While insurance policies do not specifically exclude chelation therapy in their policies, patients have often had to resort to the courts in order to collect their insurance benefits.

HOW DO I FIND A PHYSICIAN WHO IS TRAINED AND COMPETENT IN CHELATION THERAPY?

The American College for Advancement in Medicine provides a free national listing of its member doctors, most of whom include chelation therapy in their practice. To receive this list, send a self-addressed, business-size (#10) envelope with 35 cents postage to:

American College for Advancement in Medicine
P. O. Box 3427
Laguna Hills, CA 92654

The reader is advised that varying and even conflicting views are held by other segments of the medical profession. The information presented here is educational in nature and is not intended as a basis for diagnosis or treatment.

This information represents the current opinion of independent physicians consultant to ACAM at the time of publication.

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Consumer Information

CHELATION THERAPY

A Comprehensive Approach to the Treatment of Epidemic Heart and Artery Disease and Related Disorders
WHAT IS CHELATION THERAPY?

Chelation therapy is a safe, effective and relatively inexpensive treatment to restore blood flow in victims of atherosclerosis without surgery. Chelation therapy involves the intravenous infusion of a prescription medicine called ethylene diamine tetra-acetic acid (EDTA).

WHAT IS EDTA?

EDTA is a substance which removes undesirable metals from the body. Some metals, such as lead, mercury and cadmium are poisons. Lead and cadmium levels correlate with high blood pressure. All metals, even essential nutritional elements, are toxic in excess or when abnormally situated. EDTA normalizes the distribution of most metallic elements in the body. EDTA improves calcium and cholesterol metabolism by eliminating metallic catalysts which cause damage to cell membranes by producing "oxygen free radicals." Free radical pathology is now believed by many scientists to be an important contributing cause of atherosclerosis, cancer, diabetes and other diseases of aging. EDTA helps to prevent the production of harmful free radicals.

WHAT IS IT USED FOR?

Chelation therapy is used to reverse symptoms of hardening of the arteries, also known as atherosclerosis or arteriosclerosis. Atherosclerosis is caused by multiple complex factors, including abnormal accumulations of metallic elements. The end result
EXHIBIT B

is plaque formation within arteries which blocks the flow of blood. Plaques are composed of fibrous tissue, cholesterol and calcium. Atherosclerosis leads to heart attack, stroke, senility and may lead to amputation of extremities. Every single study of the use of chelation therapy for atherosclerosis which has ever been published, without exception, has described an improvement in blood flow and symptoms. Adverse editorial comment to the contrary lacks evidence and stems primarily from physicians with a vested interest in catheterization and surgery.

HOW DOES ARTERY DISEASE AFFECT HEALTH?

Blockage of blood vessels by plaque (atheroma) reduces the flow of blood, starving vital organs for oxygen and other nutrients. Cell walls then become leaky, allowing excessive calcium, sodium and other elements to enter. When calcium accumulates to a critical point, deposits form, like concrete. These calcifications can often be seen on xray. Disordered calcium metabolism can also cause coronaries and other arteries to go into spasm, further reducing blood to vital organs.

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over and shrink, allowing more blood to pass. Arterial walls become softer and more pliable, allowing easier expansion. Scientific studies have proven that blood flow increases after chelation therapy. A complete program of chelation therapy involves a broad-based health care program of regular exercise, proper nutrition, vitamin and mineral supplementation and avoidance of tobacco and other damaging habits.

WHAT ARE THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CHELATION THERAPY AND OTHER TREATMENTS FOR ARTERY DISEASE?

Chelation therapy can be utilized in conjunction with most other therapies for cardio-vascular disease. EDTA is compatible with blood thinners, blood vessel dilators, medicines for blood pressure and heart arrhythmias, calcium blockers and beta blockers. The need for drugs is often reduced or eliminated after a course of chelation therapy.

WHAT IS THE COST COMPARISON?

Bypass surgery is the mechanical repair of only a small portion of the arterial tree. Total costs average about $45,000 and can be as high as $60,000 or even more. Chelation therapy is an office treatment which improves blood flow throughout the entire vascular system at a fraction of the cost of bypass surgery. For example, if 20 to 40 four-hour chelation treatments in a physician’s office were required for a given patient, it would cost an estimated $2000-$4000.
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IS CHELATION THERAPY A LEGAL TREATMENT?

Yes! Chelation therapy is completely legal. A licensed physician is free to utilize any therapy of acceptable risk which, in his or her professional judgement, is of potential benefit — even if advertising
claims for treatment are not yet approved by the FDA. The FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine but only limits marketing and advertising claims for drugs. The FDA has approved marketing claims for the use of EDTA to treat lead poisoning and several other conditions. Treatment of atherosclerosis is not yet an allowable claim for inclusion in the marketing literature of EDTA.

DO MEDICAL INSURANCE COMPANIES PAY FOR CHELATION THERAPY?

Most medical insurance companies, including Medicare, have been financially depleted by paying for so many expensive surgeries. Segments of the health care industry which profit greatly from surgical procedures are politically powerful. Physicians who review claims for medical insurance companies often favor the extremely expensive and risky procedures, such as bypass surgery, while refusing payment for equally beneficial, far less expensive and immeasurably safer chelation therapy. While insurance policies do not specifically exclude chelation therapy in their policies, patients have often had to resort to the courts in order to collect their insurance benefits.
EXHIBIT B

HOW DO I FIND A PHYSICIAN WHO IS TRAINED AND COMPETENT IN CHELATION THERAPY?

For further information contact the American College for Advancement in Medicine.

AMERICAN COLLEGE FOR ADVANCEMENT IN MEDICINE
23121 Verdugo Drive, Suite 204
Laguna Hills, California 92653

Telephone: (714) 583-7666
Toll Free Outside CA: (800) 532-3688

The reader is advised that varying and even conflicting views are held by other segments of the medical profession. The information presented in this pamphlet is educational in nature and is not intended as a basis for diagnosis or treatment.

This information represents the current opinion of independent physician consultants to ACAM at the time of publication.

ACAM publishes and distributes this information as a courtesy to the public.
DECISION AND ORDER

The Federal Trade Commission having initiated an investigation of certain acts and practices of the respondents named in the caption hereof, and the respondents having been furnished thereafter with a copy of a draft of complaint which the Bureau of Consumer Protection proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued by the Commission, would charge respondents with violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act; and

The respondents and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed an agreement containing a consent order, an admission by the respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid draft of complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in such complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it had reason to believe that the respondents have violated the said Act, and that a complaint should issue stating its charges in that respect, and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of sixty (60) days, and having duly considered the comments filed thereafter by interested persons pursuant to Section 2.34 of its Rules, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby issues its complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent American College for Advancement in Medicine is a California corporation with its principal office or place of business at 23121 Verdugo Drive, Suite 204, Laguna Hills, California.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER
DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of this order:

1. Unless otherwise specified, "respondent" shall mean American College for Advancement in Medicine, its agents, representatives and employees.
2. "EDTA" shall mean the drug, ethylenediamine tetraacetic acid.
3. "Chelation therapy" shall mean the introduction into the human body of any agent for the purpose of bonding with and removing any compound or chemical element from the body. "EDTA chelation therapy" means that EDTA is the bonding agent used.
4. "Competent and reliable scientific evidence" shall mean tests, analyses, research, studies, or other evidence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that has been conducted and evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualified to do so, using procedures generally accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.
5. "In or affecting commerce" shall mean as defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 44.

I.

It is ordered, That respondent, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution, in or affecting commerce, of chelation therapy, shall not make any representation, in any manner, expressly or by implication:

A. That EDTA chelation therapy is an effective treatment for atherosclerosis, or

B. About the effectiveness or comparative effectiveness of chelation therapy for treating or preventing any disease or condition related to the human circulatory system,

unless, at the time the representation is made, respondent possesses and relies upon competent and reliable scientific evidence that substantiates the representation.
It is further ordered, That respondent, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, division, or other device, in connection with the advertising, promotion, offering for sale, sale, or distribution, in or affecting commerce, of chelation therapy, shall not misrepresent, in any manner, expressly or by implication, the existence, contents, validity, results, conclusions or interpretations of any test, study, or research.

III.

Nothing in this order shall prohibit respondent from making any representation for any drug that is specifically permitted in labeling for such drug under any tentative final or final standard promulgated by the U. S. Food and Drug Administration, or under any new drug application approved by the Food and Drug Administration.

IV.

It is further ordered, That respondent and its successors and assigns, shall mail, or otherwise deliver, a copy of this order and an exact copy of the letter attached hereto as Attachment A to each member of respondent within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order.

V.

It is further ordered, That respondent and its successors and assigns shall, for five (5) years after the last date of dissemination of any representation covered by this order, maintain and upon request make available to the Federal Trade Commission for inspection and copying:

A. All advertisements and promotional materials containing the representation;

B. All materials that were relied upon in disseminating the representation; and

C. All tests, reports, studies, surveys, demonstrations, or other evidence in their possession or control that contradict, qualify, or call into question the representation, or the basis relied upon for the representation, including complaints and other communications with consumers or with governmental or consumer protection organizations.
VI.

_It is further ordered_, That respondent and its successors and assigns, shall deliver a copy of this order to all current and future principals, officers, directors, and managers, and to all current and future employees, agents, and representatives having responsibilities with respect to the subject matter of this order, and shall secure from each such person a signed and dated statement acknowledging receipt of the order. Respondent shall deliver this order to current personnel within thirty (30) days after the date of service of this order, and to future personnel within thirty (30) days after the person assumes such position or responsibilities.

VII.

_It is further ordered_, That respondent and its successors and assigns shall notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any change in the corporation(s) that may affect compliance obligations arising under this order, including but not limited to a dissolution, assignment, sale, merger, or other action that would result in the emergence of a successor corporation; the creation or dissolution of a subsidiary, parent, or affiliate that engages in any acts or practices subject to this order; the proposed filing of a bankruptcy petition; or a change in the corporate name or address. Provided, however, that, with respect to any proposed change in the corporation about which respondent learns less than thirty (30) days prior to the date such action is to take place, respondent shall notify the Commission as soon as is practicable after obtaining such knowledge. All notices required by this Part shall be sent by certified mail to the Associate Director, Division of Enforcement, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.

VIII.

_It is further ordered_, That respondent and its successors and assigns shall, within sixty (60) days after the date of service of this order, and at such other times as the Federal Trade Commission may require, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which it has complied with this order.
This order will terminate on June 22, 2019, or twenty (20) years from the most recent date that the United States or the Federal Trade Commission files a complaint (with or without an accompanying consent decree) in federal court alleging any violation of the order, whichever comes later; provided, however, that the filing of such a complaint will not affect the duration of:

A. Any Part in this order that terminates in less than twenty (20) years;
B. This order's application to any respondent that is not named as a defendant in such complaint; and
C. This order if such complaint is filed after the order has terminated pursuant to this Part.

Provided, further, that if such complaint is dismissed or a federal court rules that the respondent did not violate any provision of the order, and the dismissal or ruling is either not appealed or upheld on appeal, then the order will terminate according to this Part as though the complaint had never been filed, except that the order will not terminate between the date such complaint is filed and the later of the deadline for appealing such dismissal or ruling and the date such dismissal or ruling is upheld on appeal.
Dear [recipient]:

ACAM has agreed to settle a civil dispute with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) involving information we disseminated to the public about chelation therapy. A copy of the complaint and order is enclosed. The FTC alleged that we did not have a reasonable basis for certain statements we made concerning the efficacy of chelation therapy as a treatment for atherosclerosis. The FTC also alleged that we misrepresented that chelation therapy had been proven to be effective in treating atherosclerosis. The complaint and consent agreement in this matter address issues raised by certain statements that we made in promotional brochures and other materials that were distributed to the public. The Commission's action should not be construed to regulate how doctors use or prescribe drugs in the course of treating their patients or other choice of therapy issues.

Although we do not admit that the FTC's allegations are true, we have agreed not to make unsubstantiated claims, not to misrepresent the implications of any tests or studies, and to send this letter as part of our settlement with FTC. Individual members of ACAM, when acting in their individual capacities, are not parties to this settlement. Nevertheless, the FTC has advised that if you disseminate advertising or promotional materials that contain unsubstantiated claims for the efficacy of chelation therapy in treating diseases of the human circulatory system, or that make misrepresentations about any tests or studies, you could be subject to investigation and possible enforcement action by the FTC.

Sincerely yours,
January 12, 1999

Dear Messrs. Sandler and Klubes and Ms. Steptoe:

This letter advises you of the Federal Trade Commission's ruling on the above-referenced Petition to Quash or Limit and for a protective Order ("Petition"). The decision was made by Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony, acting as the Commission's delegate. See 16 CFR 2.7(d)(4).

The Petition is denied for the reasons stated below. In light of this ruling, the new deadline for Associates First Capital Corporation ("Petitioner" or "Associates") to respond and otherwise comply with the Civil Investigative Demands ("CID") for written interrogatories and documentary material is Tuesday, January 26, 1999. The CIDs for oral testimony are rescheduled as follows: Michael J. Gade - February 8, 1999; Gil Schielbalhut - February 9, 1999; Gavin P. Goss - February 10, 1999; Owen P. Davis, February 11, 1999; Ken Mize - February 16, 1999; H.J. Fullen - February 18, 1999; Timothy W. Bellows - February 22, 1999; Stephanie C. Rumph - February 23, 1999; Mary Kinsey - February 24, 1999. Each hearing will begin at 9:30 a.m. and take place at the Commission's Dallas Regional Office, as previously scheduled.

Petitioner has the right to request review of this matter by the full Commission. Such a request must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission within three days after service of this letter. Filing of a request for such a review does not stay or otherwise affect the new return date – January 26, 1999 – unless the Commission rules otherwise. See 16 CFR 2.7(f) (1998).

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1 This letter is being delivered by facsimile transmission and by express U.S. mail service. The facsimile is provided only as a courtesy. Computation of the time for appeal, therefore, should be calculated from the date on which you receive the express mail copy of this letter.
I. BACKGROUND


On October 6, 1998, after months of attempting to obtain information necessary to its investigation through the voluntary cooperation of Petitioner, the Commission issued eleven CIDs to Petitioner pursuant to two omnibus compulsory process resolutions (File Nos. 982 3506 and P944809). The two resolutions collectively authorize the use of compulsory process to determine whether subprime lenders or others may be violating the TILA, including the HOEPA, the ECOA, or Section 5 of the FTC Act, as well as the relevant implementing regulations; and to determine whether Commission action to obtain consumer redress would be in the public interest.

The eleven issued CIDs include one for documents, one for written interrogatories, and nine for oral testimony. The CIDs seek information related to Petitioner's corporate structure, affiliates,

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2 See Heather Timmons, Finance Firm Mergers Heat Up As Associates Nab Avco for $3.9B, AMER. BANKER, Aug. 12, 1998, at 1 (noting Petitioner's "long held position as the largest consumer finance company in the United States").
business plans, and annual reports; loan products; computer systems; employee training, performance, evaluation, and compensation; audits; marketing; pricing policies; appraisals; underwriting criteria; payment procedures; insurance sales; record retention and destruction policies; and consumer complaints, lawsuits, and internal investigations. They also seek mortgage and other consumer loan data, as well as the identity of current and former employees.

On November 4, 1998, Petitioner's counsel met Commission staff to raise concerns about the compliance burden of several CID specifications. Following the meeting, pursuant to 16 CFR 2.7(c), the Associate Director for the Commission's Division of Financial Practices ("DFP") agreed by letter to modify the CIDs in an effort to reduce Petitioner's production burden. The CIDs were modified to exclude a national bank and its credit card operations; to narrow several specifications to cover only branches within certain designated geographic areas and the chains of command within those areas, thereby reducing the search burden from 1,350 branches to only 30 branches; to exclude open-end loans and two subsidiary companies from the universe of loans to be searched for certain loan data; and, contingent upon Petitioner fully complying with the CIDs, to end the continuing obligation to produce newly-generated documents. On November 10, 1998, Petitioner filed the Petition that is the subject of this opinion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Scope of Commission's Legal Authority to Conduct Investigations

The Federal Trade Commission Act grants the Commission extensive investigatory powers. See Sections 6, 9, 10, and 20 of the FTC Act (codified as amended at 15. U.S.C. 46, 49, 50, and 57b-1). These powers are essential to allow the Commission to carry out its broad mandate. As the Supreme Court explained almost fifty years ago, the Commission in its investigatory power is analogous to "the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too, may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950).
Among the Commission's investigatory powers is the ability to use CIDs to gather information and the concomitant right to enforce those demands in the federal district courts. See 15 U.S.C. 57b-1. The federal courts apply a deferential standard in deciding whether to enforce compulsory process issued by the Commission. See FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rehearing en banc denied (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 910 (1993) (quoting FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting FTC v. Lanning, 539 F.2d 202, 210 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). Generally, the federal court ask only whether: 1) the information sought is within the Commission's authority, see U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 643; 2) the information sought is reasonably relevant to the investigation, see Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1089 (quoting FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872, 873n.23 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)), cert. denied, burdensome, see e.g., Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1090.

B. Statutory Compliance of Civil Investigative Demands

Petitioner argues that the CIDs do not comport with legal requirements because they do not identify the nature of the conduct under investigation. See Petition at 1, 3; Pet. Mem. at 1 (citing 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(c)(2) (1997), 3 16 CFR 2.6 (1998)); id. at 2, 35 (quoting S. Rep. No. 96-500, at 23 (1979)); id. at 3, 36 (quoting now Chairman Pitofsky) (citing S. Rep. No. 96-500, at 23-24); id. at

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3 Petitioner cites to 15 U.S.C. 45(c)(2) as statutory authority requiring CIDs to identify the nature of conduct under investigation. Pet. Mem. at 1. No such section exists. Corrected in the text above, the properly cited authority provides, "Each (CID) ... shall state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation which is under investigation and the provision of the law applicable to such violation." 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(c)(2) (1997).

4 Petitioner cites to non-existent pages in S. Rep. No. 96-500, which numbers to page 64. The correct citation for quoted material excerpted in Pet. Mem. is found in the text above. The complete language of the material excerpted from the cited Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 1991, the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1979, reads, "The adoption of this provision is intended to limit the practice of the Commission of giving vague description of the general subject matter of the inquiry and provides a standard by which relevance may be determined." S. Rep. No. 96-500, at 23 (1979). Petitioner, however, fails to point out an important qualification that follows this excerpted sentence, which reads, "However, this requirement is not intended to be overly strict so as to defeat the purpose of the [FTC Act] or to breed litigation and encourage parties investigated to challenge the sufficiency of the notice." Id.

5 Petitioner cites to non-existent pages in S. Rep. No. 96-500. Chairman Pitofsky's comments are found properly as cited in the text above.
33n.5 (quoting FTC Act § 20(c)(2) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(c)(2) (1997); id. at 34n.6 (quoting 16CFR 2.6 (1998)).

Petitioner further cites FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1980), for the proposition that references to "statutes that are the basis for the investigation" do not constitute statements as to the nature of conduct under investigation. Petitioner avers that the subject CIDs do not adequately notify it of the precise conduct under investigation but merely cite to the two omnibus resolutions, dated August 1, 1994 and June 1, 1998, which collectively refer to the ECOA and its implementing rule, Reg. B; the TILA, including the HOEPA and its implementing rule, Reg. Z; and Section 5 of the FTC Act. Pet. at 2; Pet. Mem. at 33-35 & 34n.7 (citing Exs. 41-42).

Petitioner also complains that the Commission has rejected its repeated requests during more than two years to identify the conduct under investigation. See Pet. Mem. at 3-4.

Petitioner's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the CIDs fails in two points. First, the CIDs recitation of statutory authorities provides adequate notice to Petitioner as to purposes of the investigation. In fact, Carter, the very case cited by Petitioner for the proposition that recitation of statutory authorities is insufficient, holds the opposite. In Carter the court upheld the Commission's subpoenas, noting that although Section 5's prohibitions standing alone might not serve very specific notice, when it was defined by its relationship to a more specific statute, (i.e., Section 8(b) of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act), notice was sufficient. Carter, 636 F.2d at 788. In Carter the Court stated that "an agency will be deemed to have given adequate notice of the purposes of the investigation by reciting its statutory duties when the statutes themselves alert the parties to the purposes of the investigation." Id. at 787. Similarly, the statutes recited in the Resolutions at issue in this matter provide adequate notice as to the nature of the conduct under investigation. In another case on point, FTC v. O'Connell Assocs., 828 F. Supp. 165, 170-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), the court upheld the standard of notice as being satisfied where the FTC resolution in that case stated its purpose as being to determine whether violations of specified laws were occurring or had occurred. In O'Connell, the court struck down an argument virtually identical to that of Petitioner here and held that even though the Commission's resolution did not state the nature of conduct under investigation, the corresponding CIDs were legal, given the breadth of the resolution in that case. Id. Petitioner
concedes that the subject CIDs identify the statutes upon which the investigation is based. Pet. Mem. at 1, 34 & 34n.7. Moreover, the resolution issued in connection with File No. P944809 lists specific conduct that may constitute a violation of the ECOA or Reg. B.

Second, even if notification of the statutory bases for the Commission's investigation provides insufficient notice as to the nature of conduct under investigation, Petitioner has had more than ample notice as to the nature of that conduct, given the omnibus resolutions and CIDs; correspondence, conversations, and requests leading up to the CIDs; and broad press coverage, Congressional testimony, and private lawsuits regarding Petitioner's alleged abusive home equity lending practices. See supra Part I; see also supra note 4 ("sufficiency of notice"). Petitioner also received notice by way of a joint access letter on or about April 24, 1998 from the Commission and the Department of Justice, which requested specific information related to both mortgage and non-mortgage consumer lending. See Pet. Mem. at 16-25. In addition, in several meetings with Commission and Department of Justice staff, Petitioner received notice as to the nature of the conduct under investigation. In a follow-up letter to one meeting, staff specifically requested information related to Petitioner's credit insurance penetration rates, among other topics. In sum, the notice provided in the compulsory process resolutions, CIDs, and other communications with Petitioner more than meets the Commission's obligation of providing notice of the conduct and the potential statutory violations under investigation.

C. Breadth of, and Burden of Compliance with, Civil Investigative Demands

Petitioner contends that the CIDs are unreasonably broad and would impose an undue burden on its operations. Petition at 1, 3; see Pet. Mem. at 2, 3-4, 41-44, 50. Petitioner also argues that CIDs for oral testimony target its senior executives based on their position rather than on an articulated rationale that these executives possess the sought-after information. Petition at 3; Pet. Mem. at 4-5, 52-54 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6) compared with 15 U.S.C. 57b-1(c)(14)).

For its showing of undue burden, Petitioner provides statistics projecting 16,100 labor hours for compliance with all CIDs. Pet. Mem. at 2, 40. Petitioner also advances operational impact statements

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6 Two of these meetings were held on May 22, 1998 and May 27, 1998. Pet. Mem. at 20-22.
Response to Petition


Finally, Petitioner characterizes the Commission's DFP as having acted in bad faith, asserting that DFP has been unwilling to compromise and respond to reasonable proposals by Petitioner, despite extensive voluntary cooperation by Petitioner to Commission and Department of Justice requests. See Petition at 2-3; Pet. Mem. at 9-24, 31-33. Petitioner points out that the Department of Justice agreed to identify former Petitioner's employees whom it had interviewed and to describe the information received during those interviews, while the Commission has refused this request by Petitioner. Pet. Mem. at 33.

All of Petitioner's arguments fail. First, Petitioner completely ignores that the burden of compliance is relative to the capacity to comply. Thus, Petitioner exaggerates its compliance burden, given its capacity to comply in light of the size of its domestic operations, i.e., some 1,350 branches; its loan portfolio of more than 3 million loans valued in excess of $26 billion; and, given the limited scope of its operations encompassed in the Commission's investigation relative to Petitioner's overall corporate size and structure including 246 subsidiaries. Pet. Mem. at 6-7.

Here, no undue burden exists for Petitioner where the CIDs are confined, as feasible, to four designated areas, i.e., specified counties in four states ("designated areas"), particularly given Petitioner's own characterization that its operations are highly dispersed and decentralized across the United States and abroad. Pet. Mem. at 44.

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7 In addition, Petitioner asserts that its compliance with documentary CIDs would: 1) include or likely include numerous privileged documents beyond those listed in Petitioner's submitted Preliminary Schedule of Privileged Documents Pursuant to Commission Rule 2.8A, Pet. Mem. at 50; and 2) require the production of documents related to the securitization or initial public offering, which are not significantly related to Petitioner's lending practices and protected by attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, id. at 50-51 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir. 1979)). To the extent that documents are legitimately privileged, Petitioner may withhold such documents, as long as it lists such documents on a privilege log.
Petitioner's estimate of some 16,100 labor hours for compliance with all CIDs and other estimates, likewise, fail to constitute any undue burden of compliance, where Petitioner employs approximately 22,600 employees and managers. Pet. Mem. at 6. Petitioner also is vague as to whether the estimate of 16,100 hours takes into account the modifications to the CIDs agreed to by FTC staff. Moreover, elsewhere in its petition, the Petitioner suggests that a search pursuant to the modified CIDs "may require as many as 400 managers and executives to search their files, and that such a search could take a day ...." Pet. Mem. at 44. The estimate would lead to a calculation of only 3,200 labor hours.

Second, Petitioner's argument ignores the Commission's agreement to modify the CIDs and so reduce Petitioner's compliance burden by excluding a national bank and its credit card operations; to narrow several specifications to cover only branches within the "designated areas" and the chains of command within those areas, thereby reducing the search burden from 1,350 branches to only 30 branches; to exclude open-end loans and two subsidiary companies from the universe of loans to be searched for certain loan data; and, contingent upon Petitioner fully complying with the CIDs, to end the continuing obligation to produce newly-generated documents. See supra Part I.

The Commission's issuance of CIDs or subpoenas to high-level executives such as corporate presidents and vice presidents has been upheld in a number of cases. Cf. Carter, 636 F.2d at 789-90 (upholding subpoenas duces tecum issued to corporate officers based on "strong likelihood" that their testimony would be required); FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding subpoena duces tecum to company vice president). The executives identified in the CIDs for oral testimony likely are in a position to address investigative inquiries concerning Petitioner's corporate policies and procedures and their implementation. Nonetheless, if Petitioner believes that other corporate officials would be more knowledgeable about the issues under investigation, Petitioner should make such a proffer to the Commission staff.

Third, although Petitioner objects to several CID specifications, it has not advanced any specific proposals for modifying the CIDs. Finally, even if the CIDs could properly be characterized as "broad," breadth alone is insufficient reason to refuse their enforcement. See
In sum, given the context of the investigations and Petitioner's far-flung and massive operations, the CIDs are properly tailored to elicit necessary information and do not impose undue compliance burdens.

**D. Time Period Permitted for Compliance with Civil Investigative Demands**

Petitioner complains that the CIDs provide an unreasonable short time period to comply with the amount of information requested. Petitioner also suggests that the time period should not be considered reasonable because it has produces at least some documents voluntarily and that its voluntary cooperation should be considered in reviewing its petition. Petition at 3; Pet. Mem. at 9-16, 51-52. Further, Petitioner contends that the time period is unbounded as to the continuing compliance obligation, i.e., until "the date of full and complete compliance." Pet. Mem. at 47-49 (quoting CIDs Instruction 3); id. at 48-49 & 48n.16 (acknowledging that a continuing obligation to FTC can be imposed if limited to a reasonable, defined time period) (quoting United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950)) (citing Invention Submission Corp., File No. 882 3060, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,068 (Oct. 4, 1991); In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury Numbers S286-4-7, 630 F. Supp. 235, 236 (N.D. Ind. 1986); In re Heuwetter, 584 F. Supp. 119, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).

Petitioner's arguments are unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, the CIDs, in fact, specify a finite date and time for compliance. Second, the use of the phrase "full and complete compliance" is customary Commission language to communicate that the compliance obligation does not terminate until all responsive information is produced.

Third, although Petitioner points to numerous exhibits filed with its petition as being related to its voluntary cooperation, these exhibits relate to an investigation (referred to by Petitioner as the "Detroit investigation") that is separate and apart from the investigation at issue in connection with these CIDs. See Pet. Mem. at 9-16. While

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8 Petitioner is well aware that these are separate investigations, having received notice of this investigation through a 1997 Commission letter that provided reference to the nature of the conduct under investigation by stating that the Commission was conducting an investigation to determine whether Petitioner's lending practices violate or have violated the ECOA or Regulation B, the TILA, as amended by the HOEPA, or Regulation Z, Section 5, or other laws enforced by the Commission. Interestingly, Petitioner failed to include this letter among its 54 exhibits in support of its Petition.
Petitioner states that it cooperated voluntarily with the Commission in the Detroit investigation, Petitioner ceased all voluntary cooperation in that investigation at the same time it did in the investigation that is the subject of this Petition. Further, voluntarily producing some requested documents does not excuse the Petitioner from producing all documents responsive to Commission issued CID.

Fourth, Petitioner has had virtually identical document and information requests in its possession since its receipt of the April 24, 1998 joint Commission and Department of Justice access letter and has precipitated by its own actions and undue delay the Commission's issuance of the CID. Thus, the time-frame set forth in the CID as originally issued was not unreasonable under the circumstances of this investigation.

E. Request for Four-Part Order

Petitioner requests that, in the event the Commission elects to limit, rather than quash, the CID, the Commission issue a four-part order to preserve the confidentiality of this non-public investigation. First, Petitioner renews a previously denied request that DFP intervene in Stewart v. Associates Consumer Discount Company, in which Petitioner, pursuant to a federal court order, must produce to class-action plaintiffs' counsel the government's CID and must identify all documents produced in response to the CID. Petitioner claims that DFP's failure to intervene in the Stewart case is prejudicial to its interests in that case. Petition at 4 (citing Stewart, No. 97-CV-4678 (E.D. Pa.)); Pet. Mem. at 27-31 (citing Exs. 35-39) (quoting FTC Operating Manual 16.9.3.4); see id. at 57 (asserting that DFP did not advise the Stewart court as to the need for maintaining confidentiality of the investigation). Petitioner also requests that the Commission issue an order prohibiting the company from providing to any third party any documents received from or provided to DFP in this investigation. Petition at 3; Pet. Mem. at 57-58.

Petitioner's repeated request for the Commission's intervention in Stewart is denied. The Commission has an interest in protecting its investigations from public disclosure, and our Rules of Practice and Statutes restrict the disclosure by the agency of confidential information received during and investigation. However, no statutory or regulatory basis exists for Commission intervention in private lawsuits to shield an FTC investigatory target from discovery requests.
for government-issued CIDs and documents produced pursuant thereto. If a protective order is warranted, it should be requested from the court hearing the private case, rather than involving this agency in discovery matters concerning other cases. See FTC v. Anderson, 442 F. Supp. 1118, 1124 (D.D.C. 1977), aff'd, 631 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Moreover, there is no basis for the Commission to issue an order contravening the express order of a federal district court, and, in any event, the Commission declines to do so here.

Second, Petitioner requests a copy of any certificate filed by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and an opportunity to challenge such a DOJ request prior to disclosure of any information in the Commission's possession to the DOJ. Pet. Mem. at 55-56 (asserting certification procedure inadequate) (citing Commission Rule 4.11(c), contending that such an order is necessary to protect transfer of any provided confidential information to DOJ, where such information is beyond DOJ's jurisdiction, Petition at 4 (citing ECOA and Reg. B); Pet. Mem. at 54-56 (citing 16 CFR 4.11(c) (1998); 15 U.S.C. 46(f), 57b-2(b)(6) (1997)), and time-barred, id. at 55 (noting without citing ECOA's two-year statute of limitations).

Again, Petitioner's request is denied. Indeed, the Commission's procedures for disclosing information to other law enforcement agencies specifically prohibit the Commission from disclosing the request for such information to the owner of the information if the other law enforcement agency requests that the owner not be notified. 16 CFR 4.11(c) (1998). The Commission has refused a request for such an order under similar circumstances. See Brana Publishing, Inc. 115 FTC 1297, 1305 (1992) (Petition to Limit or Quash CID, File No. 872-3209). It is within the Commission's discretion to determine what information may be provided lawfully by one law enforcement agency to another. As the federal courts have stated, "agencies are entitled to a presumption of administrative regularity and good faith,' and '[w]ith no indication that the Commission will act cavalierly or in bad faith,' its assertions with respect to the treatment of subpoenaed material should be accepted at face value." FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d at 1091 (quoting FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).

Third, Petitioner alleges that DFP's pattern of investigatory conduct violates the Commission's statutes and regulations governing the confidentiality of a nonpublic investigation and the information
obtained during such an investigation. Petitioner alleges that staff has engaged in at least three courses of conduct that violate Commission confidentiality restrictions: 1) staff aired a network television segment involving the company's alleged practices in connection with training seminars; 2) staff may have revealed the existence of the Commission's investigation to a private plaintiffs' attorney involved in litigation with one of the Petitioner's subsidiaries; and 3) staff sent letters to state attorneys general seeking consumer complaints about Petitioner without explicitly requesting that this information be kept confidential. See Pet. Mem. at 29-30. As a result of these allegedly improper disclosures, Petitioner requests that DFP staff be ordered to comply with such rules and regulations. Petition at 5; Pet. Mem. at 58-59. There is no evidence to suggest that Commission staff has violated the FTC statutes and rules governing confidentiality.

As the alleged violative conduct of DFP, staff routinely conducts seminars and training sessions to alert businesses, consumers, and state authorities to various industry practices that may be injurious to consumers. In connection with some seminars, the staff did use a video of a *Primetime Live* television story (ABC News television broadcast, Apr. 23, 1997), as well as other videos and oral presentations, to illustrate some of the abusive practices allegedly occurring in the home equity lending industry. Although the *Primetime Live* tape discussed Petitioner's business practices, staff conducting the seminars did not mention Petitioner or indicate that the Commission was investigating the company. In fact, the *Primetime Live* program had been publicly broadcast prior to the seminars, and was thus public knowledge.

Similarly, although staff did contact the private plaintiffs' attorney to seek information about the private lawsuit, staff did not reveal the existence of the Commission's investigation. In conducting nonpublic investigations, it is standard practice for Commission staff to contact third parties for information. The disclosure of limited information in the context of such an investigatory inquiry does not violate the statutes or rules governing the confidentiality of Commission investigations. Moreover, to the extent that the Commission staff does obtain information from third parties during the course of an investigation, such information and the sources thereof are protected by a number of privileges, including the work product doctrine and, depending upon circumstances, the informant's privilege. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 57b-2(f); 16 CFR 4.10(a)(8).
Finally, it is routine for staff to contact state attorneys general for consumer complaints. The Commission's statutes and rules contemplate that the Commission will work closely with the states on matters of mutual concern. The states are aware that the Commission's investigations are almost always nonpublic, and staff's letter soliciting complaints specifically stated that the investigation is nonpublic.

The Commission takes the confidentiality of its investigations very seriously. However, in the absence of any evidence that the staff has failed to abide by the Commission's policies and procedures, an order commanding staff to follow such procedures is unjustified. See Michael DiMattina, FTC Letter Ruling Re: Petition to Limit or Quash Civil Investigative Demands, 118 FTC 1248, 1254 (Oct. 21, 1994) ("it is the Commission's policy that staff should take care to avoid undue harm to a company’s legitimate business interests; absent specific evidence to the contrary, it is assumed that staff will act in a manner consistent with this policy"); see also HTI/ORHS South Seminole Joint Venture, Re: Petition to Quash or Limit Civil Investigative Demand, 118 FTC 1229, 1234 (Aug. 12, 1994) ("The Commission must, however, balance the potential that its investigation may cause injury against the potential that its investigation may enable the Commission to uncover and remedy what are alleged to have been very serious violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act").

F. Request for a Copy of Staff's Response to Associates' Petition and Oral Argument

Finally, Petitioner requests a copy of DFP's response to its Petition and the right to file a reply to any DFP response to the Petition, as well as a hearing on the matter. Petitioner argues that these opportunities would afford it due process. Petition at 5-6. These requests are denied. First, under Commission's rules, staff is permitted to communicate on a nonpublic basis with Commissioners during Part II investigations and the disclosure of such communications may undermine the deliberative privilege afforded government agencies. See 16 CFR 4.7(f). Moreover, such information is exempt from disclosure under Rule 4.10(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice. 16 CFR 4.10(a) (1998). Given the exhaustive nature of the Associates' Petition, Memorandum, and Exhibits, Commissioner Anthony has determined that due process does not require either the
release of an otherwise nonpublic staff memorandum or a hearing on the merits of the Associates' Petition to Quash or Limit the CID.

III. CONCLUSION

This is a proper and statutorily authorized investigation. The CID seeks information that is plainly relevant to that investigation and have been crafted and modified by Commission staff to avoid placing an undue burden on Petitioner.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is denied, and pursuant to Rule 2.7(e), 16 CFR 2.7(e) (1998), Petitioner is directed to comply with the Civil Investigative Demands for written interrogatories and documentary material on or before Tuesday, January 26, 1999, and to comply with the oral CID as rescheduled above.
Dear Messrs. Sandler and Klubes and Ms. Steptoe:

The Commission has considered: (1) the Petition and supporting documentation filed on behalf of Associates First Capital Corporation ("Petitioner") to quash the pending Civil Investigative Demands ("CIDs") for documents and oral testimony; (2) the Request for Full Commission Review and Stay of CID Return Date ("Review Request") filed on behalf of Petitioner on January 20, 1999,1 (3) Petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Petition to Quash or Limit Civil Investigative Demands and for an Order Establishing Safeguards for the Handling of Confidential Information ("Supplemental Memorandum") filed with the Review Request; (4) the January 12, 1999 ruling by Compulsory Process Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony, denying in full Petitioner's Petition to Quash or Limit Civil Investigative Demands and to Establish Order Safeguarding Handling of Confidential Information ("Petition"), and establishing new deadlines for full and complete compliance with the subject CIDs ("January 12th Ruling"); and (5) the specifications of the CIDs.

Upon review of the materials noted above, the Commission has determined that the Review Request raises no issues that were not fully considered and discussed in the January 12th Ruling. Accordingly, the Commission concurs in and adopts the January 12th Ruling.

Petitioner's arguments in its Review Request and Supplemental Memorandum merely recast the assertions previously raised in its Petition. In doing so, Petitioner mischaracterizes the legal precedent in FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and FTC v. O'Connell Assocs., 828 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Thus, the Commission agrees with the January 12th Ruling that sufficient notice was provided through recitation of the statutory bases, as well as through the omnibus resolutions, CIDs, and correspondence, conversations, and requests leading up to the CIDs. Furthermore, the

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1 The Commission served Petitioner with its January 12th Ruling on January 14, 1999 and received the Review Request on January 20, 1999, or within 3 working days (6 calendar days) of date of service of the Ruling. See 16 CFR 2.7(f) (1998).
Commission rejects Petitioner's argument that the January 12th Ruling as to burden of CID compliance is contrary to the record. The Commission believes that such burden is not undue in light of the nature and extent of the investigation and the expansive nature of Petitioner's business operations. Finally, Petitioner's argument that certain organizations may be impacted more than others belies its contention that the Commission's CIDs are merely a "fishing expedition."

By letter dated January 25, 1999, the Commission granted Petitioner's request to briefly stay its compliance obligations pending a ruling by the full Commission. That stay is hereby terminated. The Commission hereby directs that on or before February 26, 1999, Petitioner comply with the CIDs for written interrogatories and documentary material. As to compliance with the CIDs for oral testimony, the Commissioner hereby directs that such compliance be carried out according to the following schedule: Michael J. Gade - March 15, 1999; Gil Schielbalhut - March 16, 1999; Gavin P. Goss - March 17, 1999; Owen P. Davis - March 18, 1999; Ken Mize - March 22, 1999; H.J. Fullen - March 24, 1999; Timothy W. Bellows - March 29, 1999; Stephanie C. Rumph - March 30, 1999; and Mary Kinsey - March 31, 1999. As previously scheduled, each hearing for oral testimony will begin at 9:30 a.m. (CST) and take place at the Commission's Dallas Regional Office.
Dear Messrs. Coston and Saad:

This letter advises you of the Federal Trade Commission's ruling on the above-referenced Petition to Quash ("Petition"). The Petition is denied for the reasons set forth in the attached memorandum. The new deadline for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Petitioner"), to respond to the Civil Investigative Demand is Monday, March 8, 1999, and to appear and give testimony as required by the Subpoena Ad Tercificandum is Thursday, March 11, 1999 at 9:00 a.m. Eastern time. Petitioner has the right to request review of this matter by the full Commission. Such a request must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission within three days after service of this letter. The filing of a request for review by the full Commission does not stay or otherwise affect the new return dates unless the Commission rules otherwise. See 16 CFR 2.7(f).

MEMORANDUM

Pursuant to its authority under Sections 6, 9, and 20 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. 46, 49, 57b-1, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") is conducting a non-public investigation of a proposed acquisition. In furtherance of this investigation, the Commission has sought certain information required for it to ensure that full and fair competition markets exist in places where consumers and, indeed Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart" or "Petitioner"), can benefit. On December 18, 1998, the Commission issued a resolution authorizing the use of compulsory process to obtain information necessary to evaluate the proposed transaction. Pursuant to the resolution, on February 5, 1999, the Commission issued a civil investigative demand, returnable on February 17, 1999, (the "CID") and a subpoena Ad Tercificandum, returnable on February 23, 1999, (the "Subpoena") to Wal-Mart, a

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1 The decision was made by Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, acting as the Commission's delegate. See 16 CFR 2.7(d)(4).

2 This ruling is being delivered by both facsimile and express mail. The facsimile copy is being provided only as a courtesy. Computation of the time for appeal, therefore, should be calculated from the date you receive the original by express mail.
non-party, seeking, among other things, information regarding Wal-Mart's future business plans in certain geographic areas. The Commission staff contends this information is needed to evaluate the potential effects of the proposed acquisition. However, Wal-Mart objected, refused to provide the information, and, on February 16, 1999, filed a petition to quash the Subpoena and CID (the "Petition").

In support of its Petition, Wal-Mart essentially argues that the information sought by the Commission is extremely sensitive, proprietary information, and Wal-Mart does not trust the Commission to protect its confidentiality. While Wal-Mart suggests it might reveal the information sought if the Commission makes an "additional showing of need" and provides "additional guarantees of confidentiality," Petition at 1, Wal-Mart adds: "If the FTC persists in seeking this information, Wal-Mart will have no choice but to litigate every process it receives until a cooperative protocol is developed." Petition at 5.

After reviewing the Subpoena, CID, Petition, and FTC Staff's recommendation in this matter, I find that none of Petitioner's arguments provide sufficient basis for quashing the process.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Confidentiality

Section 21 of the Act, entitled "Confidentiality," 15 U.S.C. 57b-2, sets forth detailed procedures for protecting sensitive information. The statute requires the Commission to designate an agent to act as the custodian for information obtained through compulsory process and provides that none of the information provided "shall be available for examination by any individual other than a duly authorized officer or employee of the Commission without the consent of the person who produced the material ...." 15 U.S.C. 57b-2(b). Information received in the course of an investigation is also exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. 15 U.S.C. 57b-2(f). However, the Commission may use such information "as may be required for official use by any duly authorized officer or employee of the Commission under regulations which shall be promulgated by the Commission." 15 U.S.C. 57b-2(b)(3)(B).

Rule 4.10 of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 4.10, also restricts disclosure of information received in response to

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3 Subject to certain notice and certification requirements, the Commission may also share the information with the Congress and with other law enforcement agencies. 15 U.S.C. 57b-2(b).
compulsory process to those outside the Commission without the prior consent of the person who produced the material. 16 CFR 4.10(d). If the Commission intends to disclose confidential information to persons other than the submitter in connection with the taking of oral testimony, the Commission must provide "10 days' notice of the intended disclosure" or afford "an opportunity to seek an appropriate protective order." 16 CFR 4.10(f). The Commission may disclose confidential information obtained through compulsory process, or voluntarily in lieu thereof, "in Commission administrative or court proceedings subject to Commission or court protective or in camera orders as appropriate. Prior to disclosure of such material in a proceeding, the submitter will be afforded an opportunity to seek an appropriate protective or in camera order." 16 CFR 4.10(g). These statutory and regulatory requirements are further backed by criminal sanctions.

In this case, Wal-Mart claims that it seeks to avoid compliance with the Subpoena and CID because due to past experience, it does not have sufficient confidence in the Commission's ability to protect sensitive business data. While there is reason to be concerned about claims regarding an alleged past failure of Commission Staff to take reasonable care to protect sensitive business information, the appropriate response to subsequent process is not self-help by the recipient. As outlined above, the FTC Act and the Commission's rules provide a sufficient protocol for dealing with the confidential information the Commission has requested from Wal-Mart.

As the court in FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., so succinctly explained:

"Congress, in authorizing the Commission's investigatory power, did not condition the right to subpoena information on the sensitivity of the information sought. So long as the subpoena meets the requirements of the FTC Act, is properly authorized, and within the bounds of relevance and reasonableness, the confidential information is properly requested and must be complied with."


4 Under Section 10 of the FTC Act and Section 4.10(c) of the Commission's regulations, "Any officer or employee of the Commission who shall make public any information obtained by the Commission without its authority, unless directed by a court, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court." 15 U.S.C. 50; 16 CFR 4.10(c).
B. Alleged Past Breach of Confidentiality

In an attempt to avoid compliance with the Subpoena and CID issued in this investigation, Wal-Mart cites an incident that allegedly took place during the Commission's suit to block the Staples/Office Depot merger. Wal-Mart claims that at that time it provided an employee affidavit to the Commission with the understanding that the Commission would "keep it confidential unless Wal-Mart consented to its release." Petition at 4. Wal-Mart further contends that without Wal-Mart's consent, "the affidavit ended up in publicly filed court papers." *Id.*

These claims, if true, would warrant concern. However, Commission staff gives a very different account of the alleged incident. Even assuming Wal-Mart's version of events is correct, the incident would have no bearing on Wal-Mart's current obligation to comply with the Subpoena and CID at issue here. As detailed above, the FTC Act and the Commission's rules spell out the rights and obligations of both the Commission and those served with compulsory process by the Commission. *If* Wal-Mart believed that the Commission's actions during the Staples/Office Depot matter violated the law, Wal-Mart should have sought remedial action at that time. But, it did not. Consequently, it is not appropriate for Wal-Mart, or any other compulsory process recipient, to unilaterally refuse to comply with its legal obligations based on its own perception of its past treatment at the hands of the Commission.

C. Unfair Burden

As an additional defense to non-compliance with its Subpoena and CID obligations, Wal-Mart complains that due to the "breadth of goods it sells" and its nationwide presence, Wal-Mart receives numerous requests for information from the FTC each year. Petition at 3. Wal-Mart continues that it "cannot be expected to disclose highly confidential information and expend large amounts of time and resources each time the agency reviews a merger relating in some way to Wal-Mart's business." *Id.* While the Commission is willing to hear any claim of undue burden, there is no evidence of such burden here.

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5 We would reemphasize that the Commission is permitted to disclose information designated confidential in court proceedings so long as it affords the submitter an opportunity to seek or avail itself of an appropriate protective or in camera order. 16 CFR 4.10(g). Wal-Mart does not contend that it was denied such an opportunity in connection with the Staples/Office Depot proceedings.
For example, there is no evidence that the Commission has repeatedly directed compulsory process requests to Wal-Mart on a whim. Rather, the actions of third-parties in proposing transactions and the facts of geography and the products Wal-Mart sells have apparently required that the FTC collect information from Wal-Mart. Thus, the Commission has previously sought precisely the information required for it to ensure that full and fair competition markets exist in places where consumers and indeed, Wal-Mart can benefit.

D. Claim of Compromise

Wal-Mart argues that it has sought to compromise with the FTC by providing some general information such as "the number of stores to be opened in Arizona over the next three years and has confirmed that it has no plans to construct stores in certain cities." Petition at 4. Commission Staff claims this "general information" is insufficient, and the Commission needs substantially more detail in order to evaluate the potential effects of the proposed transaction. I find Staff's argument more persuasive.

E. Threat of Future Resistance

As set forth above, I have seen nothing in the record to justify Wal-Mart's refusal to comply with its legal obligation. But, Wal-Mart closes its Petition by stating: "if the FTC persists in seeking this information, Wal-Mart will have no choice but to litigate every process it receives until a cooperative protocol is developed." Petition at 5. I am concerned when anyone, including Wal-Mart, threatens to take unilateral action to resist legal obligations without regard to judicial economy or, for that matter, the very real need that the Commission has for this information in order to fulfill its obligation to protect the public interest. While the Commission will be disappointed if Wal-Mart were to resist all process in the future, apparently regardless of merit, its threats do not provide a basis for according Wal-Mart special treatment.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that: (1) the FTC is conducting a proper and statutorily authorized investigation, and (2) the information sought by the Commission is relevant to that investigation. Wal-Mart's justification for not producing the requested information are either meritless or irrelevant to this case.
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### DECISIONS AND ORDERS

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