Section 2 and Standard Setting: 
Rambus, N-Data & The Role of Causation

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Arlington, VA
October 2, 2008

I had prepared some general remarks on the antitrust issues in standard setting and patent pools. But I will leave it to others to discuss the competitive benefits and risks of those practices. You are fortunate to have some great panelists here today and I know they plan on covering many of the issues outlined in my presentation. That gives me the liberty to focus on two Commission matters that have attracted a great deal of attention this year – Rambus and N-Data. Specifically, I will discuss the role of causation in these cases. Why? Because causation is important to understanding not only my vote in N-Data but also, I believe, the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rambus. I suggest that the Court’s analysis of causation, which was squarely contrary to its teaching in Microsoft, is the most fundamental reason that decision was flawed.

1 The views stated here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or other Commissioners. I am grateful to my attorney advisor Kyle Andeer for his invaluable assistance in preparing this paper.
As demonstrated by our enforcement actions in Dell Computer\textsuperscript{2}, Unocal\textsuperscript{3}, Rambus\textsuperscript{4}, and most recently N-Data\textsuperscript{5}, single firm conduct in the standard setting context has been a priority for the Commission for over a decade. In these and other matters, we have focused on allegations that a standard setting participant has manipulated the process so that its proprietary technology is incorporated into the standard. Often referred to as “patent hold-up” problem, a competitive problem may arise if the standard setting organization is deceived about the participant’s intellectual property ownership interest and the standard confers market power.

I. The D.C. Circuit’s Decision in Rambus: A Move Away from \textit{U.S. v. Microsoft}?

This won’t surprise anyone but let me say at the outset that I think the D.C. Circuit got it wrong in \textit{Rambus}.\textsuperscript{6} I, for one, hope that the Commission will file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court later this Fall. Before I turn to the role of the causation let me briefly discuss two \textit{sub silentio} concerns the court of appeals seemed to have with the Commission’s final order and decision.

First, the opinion seemed to suggest that much of the blame for the hold-up problem rested with the standard setting organization, JEDEC. The problem it seemed was not whether Rambus engaged in a deceptive course of conduct designed to manipulate the outcome of the


\textsuperscript{6} Rambus, 522 F.3d 456.
standard setting process. The D.C. appellate panel instead faulted the standard setting organization and suggested that JEDEC could have avoided the problem posed by Rambus with better patent disclosure policies. For example, the court echoed the Federal Circuit’s observation that “JEDEC’s patent disclosure policies suffered from a ‘staggering lack of defining details.’” With the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, the court observed that “one would expect that disclosure expectations ostensibly requiring competitors to share information that they would otherwise vigorously protect as trade secrets would provide ‘clear guidance’ and ‘define clearly, what, when, how, and to whom the members must disclose.’”

Second, I also think the court believed that the Commission’s approach would extend the reach of Section 2. More specifically, the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc. According to the court, the Supreme Court held in that case that although deceptive conduct by a monopolist designed to exploit its monopoly power might be tortious, it would not constitute monopolization or attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit seemed to suggest that the exploitation of monopoly power was a good thing, declaring that “high prices and constrained output tend to attract competitors, not to repel them.” As numerous other commentators have noted, the court’s reading of NYNEX was unwarranted because the defendant in that case acquired monopoly power lawfully

\footnote{Id. at 468.}
\footnote{Id. (quoting and citing Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).}
\footnote{NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998).}
\footnote{Rambus, 522 F.3d at 466.}
\footnote{Id.}
wheras the Commission found that Rambus’s acquisition of that power was unlawful. Moreover, the court’s latter observation seems to conflict with the views of the framers of Section 2 respecting the merits and demerits of monopoly power.

Yet the court’s holding was not based on the first of these two concerns. Nor can it be said that it was based exclusively on the second concern or the reasoning of the district court in the Qualcomm case where the judge there held that deceptive conduct in a standard setting context could not injure competition as a matter of law. No, the clearest key to understanding the appellate decision is causation.

The Commission carefully analyzed the link between the exclusionary conduct and the creation of Rambus’s monopoly power. In Rambus, there were two links in the causal chain – the first was the adoption of the standard by the standard setting organization and the second was the adoption of the standard by the marketplace. The Commission found that Rambus’s conduct caused JEDEC to unknowingly adopt standards that read on Rambus’s patents. That in turn led the Commission to conclude “that a properly informed JEDEC may have selected a substitute technology suggests a causal link between Rambus’s deceptive course of conduct and JEDEC’s decision making process.” The second link in the causal chain was the adoption of the standard by the marketplace. The Commission found that the market was likely to gravitate around a single standard given the strong need for interoperability with complementary products. Thus,

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12 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62090 (D.N.J. 2006) rev’d 501 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2007). It is far from clear, however, that the D.C. Circuit’s decision did not create a circuit split. It certainly can be read that way.


14 Id. at 77-79.
monopoly power accrued to Rambus only after the manufacturers had fully bought into the standard and begun to implement it.

In these cases, it is often difficult to definitively say what the world would have looked like “but for” the bad acts. The Rambus case was no different. The Commission in its liability decision, at the outset of its causation discussion, identified two possible outcomes in a hypothetical world free from Rambus’s deceptive conduct: “JEDEC either would have excluded Rambus’s patented technologies from the JEDEC DRAM standards, or would have demanded RAND assurances, with an opportunity for ex ante licensing negotiations.” The Commission did not opine which outcome was more likely. On the one hand, as I say, it did hold that the standardization of Rambus’s technologies was not inevitable. On the other hand, the Commission did not rule out the possibility that JEDEC may have standardized Rambus’s technologies even if it had known about its patents.

The D.C. Circuit opinion focused on the questions whether Rambus’s deceptive course of conduct enabled it to avoid a RAND commitment, and whether that was an antitrust violation. Relying on NYNEX, the court concluded that it was not an antitrust violation. I don’t agree with the court’s analysis or its conclusion. A RAND commitment would have checked Rambus’s

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16 Commission Liability Op. at 81-96 (Rambus had argued that JEDEC would have adopted its technologies even had full disclosure been made because its technologies were superior to alternatives.).

17 Rambus, 522 F.3d at 463 (“the Commission expressly left open the likelihood that JEDEC would have standardized Rambus’s technologies even if Rambus had disclosed its intellectual property.”).
monopoly power. It would have also signaled the marketplace that JEDEC’s standard required a licensing agreement from Rambus. Manufacturers and others practicing JEDEC’s standards would have had to decide whether they would implement a standard that required such a license. At the time the first JEDEC DRAM standard was published it was not the only alternative, and one cannot say that the market would have inevitably adopted JEDEC’s standard if it was subject to a Rambus license. JEDEC’s standards enjoyed widespread acceptance in part because the market believed they were relatively costless in terms of licensing. Like I said, I think the court got it wrong in its analysis of this question, but more importantly I think the question is beside the point.

Let me explain. Assume for the sake of argument that the court was right and that “JEDEC’s loss of an opportunity to seek favorable licensing terms is not . . . an antitrust harm.” That means the court was confronted with two possible scenarios – one in which it was willing to assume was an antitrust violation, and another, in which the court concluded there would not be an antitrust violation. As I said, in its liability decision the Commission did not say which scenario or outcome was more likely. Nor do I think the law required the Commission to make that determination. To understand the Commission’s analysis, one must first look to Microsoft, for that decision served as our touchstone.

The link between anticompetitive conduct on the one hand and the creation or acquisition of monopoly power as a basis for Section 2 liability is little explored in the case law and commentary. Microsoft is one of the few cases to analyze the issue head-on. In Microsoft, as

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18 *Id.* at 467.

I’m sure you remember, the monopoly maintenance claim rested on the theory that Microsoft sought to destroy Netscape and Java because they posed a potential threat to its operating system monopoly. However, the threat was nascent, and the theory that Netscape and Java would mature into a competitive alternative to Windows was fairly speculative. In its appeal, Microsoft argued that the government had failed to demonstrate that Microsoft’s campaign to destroy Netscape and Java had caused it to maintain its operating system monopoly.\(^{20}\) The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected Microsoft’s argument. It was willing to infer a causal connection between Microsoft’s exclusionary conduct and its continuing monopoly position in the operating system market.

The D.C. Circuit in *Microsoft* refused to require the government “to reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defendant’s anticompetitive conduct.”\(^{21}\) Instead, it was willing to “infer causation” if exclusionary conduct “reasonably appear[s] capable of making a significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power.”\(^{22}\) The court explained that it drew this inference because “to some degree the defendant is made to suffer the uncertain

\(^{20}\) *See* Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 115, United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“plaintiffs relied on a speculative chain of causation consisting of at least three steps: (i) Netscape would successfully develop Navigator into a platform that exposed enough high quality APIs to allow ISVs to write full-fledged applications; (ii) large numbers of ISVs would write applications that relied solely on APIs exposed by Navigator (or other middleware like Sun’s Java technologies) without making calls to the underlying operating system, thus eliminating the ‘applications barrier to entry’; and (iii) the business of providing Intel-compatible PC operating systems that provide low-level support for this middleware—essentially an operating system kernel—would be sufficiently attractive commercially to entice new entrants into the market, even though the principal value of an operating system would have been usurped by the middleware layer.”).

\(^{21}\) *Microsoft*, 253 F.3d at 79.

\(^{22}\) *Id.*
consequences of its own undesirable conduct.”23 The court did not hold that in the hypothetical but for world that Navigator and Java would have evolved into a threat. It merely said that it was possible (and left unsaid that it was also possible that they would have simply fizzled out).24 A lesson to be drawn from Microsoft is that uncertainty cuts against the defendant when it comes to causation . . . at least when it comes to liability.

Like Microsoft, the “but for” world in Rambus was uncertain. In both cases, one could reasonably find that the conduct may have caused the defendant to acquire or maintain its monopoly power. Of course, at the same time, it was also possible that the defendants in those cases would have acquired or maintained their monopoly power even absent the anticompetitive behavior. The question is who bears the brunt of that uncertainty. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit said it was the defendant. Seven years later, in Rambus, the same court said it was the government plaintiff.

So far I’ve limited my discussion to the Commission’s liability decision. Let me take a moment to address the significance of the remedial opinions. The D.C. Circuit read the Commission majority’s remedial decision to opine that a “RAND” outcome was more likely here, and that clinched its decision that a Section 2 violation could not be found.25 However, its

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23 Id.

24 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit noted that the District Court explicitly did not adopt the position that Microsoft would have lost its position in the operating system market but for its anticompetitive behavior. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 78 and 107 (citing the District Court’s Findings of Fact ¶ 411, “There is insufficient evidence to find that, absent Microsoft’s actions, Navigator and Java . . . would have ignited genuine competition in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems.”).

25 Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464 (“the Commission made it clear in its remedial opinion that there was insufficient evidence that JEDEC would have standardized other technologies had it known the full scope of Rambus’s intellectual property.”).
conclusion *ignored* the difference in the analysis between liability and remedy. Ironically, it was a difference the D.C. Circuit *itself* emphasized in *Microsoft*. There, the court held the burden on a Section 2 plaintiff seeking a structural remedy is *heavier* in terms of causation than the burden on the plaintiff at the liability stage of the proceedings.\textsuperscript{26} Indeed, Rambus itself acknowledged the point when it argued that “the burden to justify a remedy that would restrict Rambus’s ability to license its patents is heavier than the burden to establish liability.”\textsuperscript{27} The Commission heeded these admonitions in analyzing Complaint Counsel’s royalty-free licensing proposal. It held that Complaint Counsel’s proposal for royalty-free licensing was a structural remedy that required “special proof” that it was necessary “to restore the competitive conditions that would have prevailed absent Rambus’s misconduct.”\textsuperscript{28}

A majority of the Commission found that Complaint Counsel had failed in its proof.\textsuperscript{29} Along with Commissioner Harbour, I dissented on this point. Both of us felt that there was “strong evidence . . . that if JEDEC had been aware of the potential scope of Rambus’s patent portfolio, it would have adopted standards that would have avoided Rambus’s patents.”\textsuperscript{30} Based

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\item[26] Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80 (“Microsoft’s concerns over causation have more purchase in connection with the appropriate remedy issue, i.e., whether the court should impose a structural remedy or merely enjoin the offensive conduct at issue”); Id. at 107 (“In devising an appropriate remedy, the District court also should consider the strength of the causal connection between Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct and its dominant position in the OS market.”); *see also* Massachusetts v. Microsoft, 373 F.3d 1199, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
\item[28] Remedy Op. at 10.
\item[29] *Id.* at 16.
\item[30] In re Rambus, FTC Dkt. No. 9302, Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part from the Commission Opinion on Remedy (Feb. 5,
on that finding, we would have imposed a royalty-free licensing remedy. If that had been the majority opinion, arguably the D.C. Circuit would have upheld the Commission’s decision. But like I said earlier, I think the court missed the point in its analysis. The question, at least in terms of liability, is not whether a “but for” world with a RAND assurance was an antitrust violation. Based on the commentary and the D.C. Circuit’s own landmark decision in Microsoft, the fact that the Commission found that at least one potential outcome in a “but for” world would have been a violation should have been sufficient. Nor should the analysis turn on the Commission majority’s remedy decision as to which outcome was more likely. Microsoft made it clear that when the issue is whether or not a structural remedy is appropriate, the brunt of uncertainty is borne by the plaintiff, not the defendant, and there must be “special proof” of the causal link. The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rambus is a potentially dramatic shift away from Microsoft and towards a much more demanding standard in terms of establishing causation.

II. N-Data

Let me turn to another standard setting matter that has attracted a great deal of attention this year – N-Data. In a consent decree that was finalized just last week, the Commission condemned a breach of a licensing commitment made to a standard setting organization and subsequently relied upon by the market as both unfair method of competition and an unfair act or practice. Although I am sure many of you are familiar with the matter, let me briefly sketch out the facts.

The case involved proprietary technology that was included in the IEEE’s Ethernet standard. In 1994, the IEEE standard setting body voted to include National Semiconductor’s
NWay technology in the Ethernet standard. The decision was made, at least in part, because National offered to license its technology for a onetime paid-up royalty of $1000 per licensee to manufacturers and sellers of products that use the IEEE standard. Several years later, National transferred the patents to a third party for use in applications that did not implicate the IEEE Ethernet standard. The third party was fully aware of the licensing commitment and made no effort to enforce the patents against firms practicing the IEEE standard or change the terms of the licensing commitment. N-Data acquired the relevant patents in 2001. By that time, virtually every computer in the United States read on the IEEE Ethernet standard and the patents conferred potentially significant monopoly power. Soon after its acquisition of the patents, N-Data sought to renegotiate the terms of a licensing commitment with IEEE and impose the new terms on dozens of firms practicing the IEEE Ethernet standard. That’s when the Commission stepped in. As I said, a majority of the Commission condemned N-Data’s conduct as both an unfair method of competition and an unfair act or practice.

I felt N-Data’s conduct was an “unfair act or practice” under the Commission’s *Orkin* decision, which was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit. There, you will recall, the Commission (and the Eleventh Circuit) found an unfair act or practice when *Orkin* unilaterally breached a contract, resulting in the exploitation of consumers who could not adequately defend themselves. I also believed it was appropriate to condemn N-Data’s conduct as an unfair method of competition based on my reading of the relevant case law. The Supreme Court in *FTC v.*

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32. Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch, “Perspectives on Three Recent Votes: the Closing of the Adelphia Communications Investigation, the Issuance of the Valassis Complaint & the Weyerhaeuser Amicus Brief,” before the National Economic Research Associates 2006 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Seminar, Santa Fe, New Mexico at 5-12 (July 6, 2006) available at
*Sperry & Hutchinson Co.* endorsed an expansive reading of the “unfair method of competition” prong of Section 5.\(^{33}\)

To be sure, both of these prongs of Section 5 are subject to limiting principles, as subsequent appellate decisions have made clear. One limiting principle relates to the nature of the conduct. In *OAG*, the Second Circuit held that such a violation could not be found where the respondent “does not act coercively.”\(^{34}\) I felt the standard setting context in which the conduct occurred here was critically important. N-Data’s efforts to exploit the power it enjoyed over those practicing the Fast Ethernet standard satisfied this requirement because the market lacked any practical alternatives. I felt that this form of patent hold-up was inherently “coercive” and “oppressive” with respect to firms that were practically locked into a standard.

The second limiting principle relates to the effects of the conduct. Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that the respondent’s conduct need not violate the letter (or even the spirit) of the antitrust laws to fall under Section 5, that does not mean that conduct can be considered an unfair method of competition if it has no adverse effect at all on competition. I felt that requirement was also satisfied here, given the importance of the breached commitment to the *ex ante* competition that precedes the adoption of a standard like the standard at issue in that case.


\(^{34}\) Official Airline Guides v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (“OAG”); see also E.I. Du Pont v. de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Ethyl”). Similar to OAG, the Second Circuit held that “at least some indicia of oppressiveness must exist….”)
The third limiting principle relates to the ability of the “victims” of the conduct to defend themselves. The commitment here extended not to a single firm, but rather to an industry-wide standard setting organization. Indeed, in the standard-setting context – with numerous, injured third parties, big and small, who lack privity with the patentee and with the mixed incentives generated when members must decide whether to pass on royalties that raise costs market-wide – contract remedies may prove ineffective, and Section 5 intervention may serve an unusually important role. Indeed, the SEC reporting requirements, which would require the biggest businesses to acknowledge that they were potential infringers, and hence subject to multiple damages and attorney fees if they planned to defend infringement claims by N-Data, tended to inhibit even those firms from defending themselves as easily they could if they faced mere breach of conduct claims.

The Commission did not allege that N-Data’s conduct violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Speaking only for myself, I did not believe the facts supported a viable Section 2 claim. The facts in N-Data were different from those of the Commission’s earlier standard setting cases. For example, unlike in Rambus, there were no allegations of misconduct or anti-competitive behavior at the time the standard was adopted by the IEEE. Nor were there any allegations of anticompetitive behavior that led the market to subsequently implement IEEE’s standard. The conduct in the case – the breach of the licensing commitment – did not cause N-Data to either acquire or maintain its monopoly power. The monopoly power exploited by N-Data was conferred by the standard setting organization and the subsequent marketplace adoption of the standard.

Put different, it might be argued that N-Data’s renege on the original commitment made
by National Semiconductor constituted an “exclusionary” act or practice. However, I doubted that the renege could be considered “exclusionary” in any meaningful sense of that term. It had nothing to do with the *ex ante* competition that occurred before the standard at issue was adopted, and it could not be said that there was any causal connection between that act or practice and the adoption of the standard (which allegedly produced monopoly power in the “autonegotiation technology market.”) That act or practice occurred years after the standard was adopted and the market was “locked in” to the technology.

**III. Concluding Remarks: What’s Next?**

So what’s next for the Commission? First and most immediately there is a decision to be made on whether to pursue an appeal in Rambus. As I said earlier, I personally support a petition for certiorari in Rambus. I think the D.C. Circuit’s decision is wrong and given the fact that it rests on important legal principles respecting causation in Section 2 cases. I think its implications are much broader than the standard setting context. The petition is due in mid-November and it is my hope that the Solicitor General weighs in to support us on this important effort.

Second, the Commission will have to decide whether it will continue to prioritize these cases if the D.C. Circuit’s decision is allowed to stand. Again, personally I continue to favor aggressive enforcement in this area. To be sure, in future cases, the Commission will have to focus even more attention on causation. The added burden may add some challenges but the stakes are high. It is important to remember that the costs will be borne by consumers. A patent holder engaged in deceptive or manipulative conduct that enable it to capture a market standard may distort the competitive process and injure consumers. Standard setting in some industries
may eliminate competition but we are willing to sacrifice that competition because it also promises great efficiency. However, if we allow firms to manipulate or distort the process then we risk the very efficiencies we are looking to capture.

Third, I think it is safe to say that Section 5 is on the table. N-Data may only be the beginning. The Commission is holding hearings on uses of Section 5, and at least one of the panels will consider Section 5 in the standard setting context. I hope you will offer your comments on the future scope of Section 5.