Since our Constitutional founding, political power has been divided between the federal government on the one hand and the states on the other. The basic principle of American federalism is fixed in the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, which states that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” In the early years of our Republic, the federal government focused on a handful of functions, including defense, foreign affairs, collection of tariffs, control of currency, and public works. Over time, the federal government’s role has expanded and now touches on nearly all aspects of life for American citizens. This has
hardly ended the debate, however. As the current Presidential campaign makes clear, our country continues to weigh the proper division between federal government and states in a variety of areas, including health care, education, and immigration.

On many occasions, the Supreme Court has been called on to adjudicate this division of power. Since the New Deal, the Court has almost always sided with the federal government over the states. This began to change in the 1990s, however, as the Court declared that several laws enacted by Congress violated the rights of states or exceeded its Article I powers.

For example, in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Congress cannot compel states to enforce federal regulations. The New York v. United States case involved a 1985 federal statute that obligated states to be responsible for any low-level radioactive waste within their borders. The Printz case involved the “Brady Act,” which required state and local law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on persons attempting to purchase handguns. The Court held that the relevant provisions of these statutes violated the Tenth Amendment because they forced the states to administer a federal program. The Court commented that the federal government could, however, encourage states to adopt certain regulations by attaching conditions to federal funding or by pre-empting state law.

Starting in the 1990s, the Court also put limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. In 1995, the Court handed down Lopez, which held that a federal criminal statute prohibiting the possession of a firearm near a school was beyond Congress’s commerce power. The Court explained that the “possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of

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interstate commerce.”³ Then, five years later in the *Morrison* case,⁴ the Court concluded that a statute providing for a federal cause of action for the victims of gender-motivated violence was also beyond Congress’s commerce power. The Court explained that “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”⁵ Nevertheless, in its 2005 opinion in *Gonzales v. Raich*,⁶ the Court held that growing marijuana for personal medical use was sufficiently close to “commerce” to justify a federal ban. Most recently, the Court held that the individual mandate in ObamaCare exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause (but upheld it under Congress’s taxing power).⁷ As the Court explained, the “individual mandate cannot be upheld as an exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. That Clause authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, not to order individuals to engage in it.”⁸

**The State Action Doctrine**

Recognition of the limits of federal power over the states can also be seen in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal antitrust laws. This line drawing between state and federal power is necessary in the area of antitrust enforcement because state and local governments often enact statutes that restrict competition and would violate the antitrust laws if done by a private entity. New York City’s cap on the number of taxi medallions it issues is one example; another example you should all be able to relate to are state bar associations, because these restrict the number of people that can practice law.

³ *Id.* at 567.
⁵ *Id.* at 613.
⁶ 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
⁸ *Id.* at 2608.
In its 1943 *Parker v. Brown* decision, the Supreme Court recognized the potential constitutional concerns raised by interpreting the federal antitrust laws to reach actions of states. The *Parker* case involved a challenge to a California regulatory system that restricted competition among growers of certain agricultural products for the express purpose of increasing prices and increasing the agricultural wealth of the state. Although such a program would undoubtedly violate the Sherman Act if done by private persons, the Court held that California’s program was not a conspiracy in restraint of trade because the antitrust laws did not “restrain state action or official action directed by a state.” As the Court explained, “[w]e find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature.” Thus, under *Parker*, anticompetitive regulation will survive antitrust challenge as long as a court is satisfied that the restraint at issue is truly state action. This has come to be known as the state action doctrine, or *Parker* immunity.

Subsequent Supreme Court cases have expanded the reach of the state action doctrine beyond state legislatures to other public entities and even private entities. In *Hoover v. Ronwin*, the Court held that the decisions of a state’s highest court are actions are those of the state and

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10 *Id.* at 351.

11 *Id.* at 350-51.

12 See *Hoover v. Ronwin*, 466 U.S. 558, 574 (1984) (the litmus test of the state action exemption has always been whether the conduct at issue can be deemed to be “that of the State acting as a sovereign”).

13 Technically, the state action doctrine is an exemption to the antitrust laws—not an immunity—that must be raised as an affirmative defense by the party asserting it, who also bears the burden of proof. See *FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.*, 504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992); *Yeager’s Fuel v. Pa. Power & Light Co.*, 22 F.3d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994).
exempt from the federal antitrust laws.\textsuperscript{14} The same decision suggested, but did not decide, that decisions by a state’s governor may be actions of the state and likewise exempt.\textsuperscript{15}

When private actors engage in conduct that otherwise would violate the antitrust laws, they too can avail themselves of state action protection as long as the state has put into place sufficient safeguards to assure that the private actors are pursuing state goals rather than their own.\textsuperscript{16} In \textit{Midcal}, the Supreme Court held that the state action defense is available to private parties if they can show that the challenged restraint is (1) pursuant to a “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed [] state policy” and (2) “actively supervised by the State itself.”\textsuperscript{17} The clear articulation requirement is “directed at ensuring that particular anticompetitive mechanisms operate because of a deliberate and intended state policy,”\textsuperscript{18} while “the requirement of active state supervision serves essentially an evidentiary function: it is one way of ensuring that the actor is engaging in the challenged conduct pursuant to state policy.”\textsuperscript{19}

The Court in \textit{Ticor} explained that the two-part \textit{Midcal} test had its origins in federalism concerns:

\begin{quote}
States must accept political responsibility for actions they intend to undertake. . . . Federalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to obscure it. Neither federalism nor political responsibility is well served by a rule that essential national policies are displaced by state regulations intended to achieve more limited ends. For States which do choose to displace the free market with regulation, our insistence on real compliance with both parts of the \textit{Midcal} test
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{14} 466 U.S. at 567-68.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Id. at 567-68 n.17.
\item \textsuperscript{16} See id. at 568 (when the activity at issue is carried out by someone other than the sovereign, “closer analysis is required” because “it becomes important to ensure that the anticompetitive conduct of the State’s representative was contemplated by the State”).
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum}, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.}, 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992).
\item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire}, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985).
\end{itemize}
will serve to make clear that the State is responsible for the price fixing it has
sanctioned and undertaking to control.20

The state action doctrine is also available to municipalities. For a municipality to qualify
for the state action defense, it must “demonstrate that it is engaging in the challenged activity
pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy.”21 Unlike the state itself, municipalities are not
entitled to automatic state action protection because municipalities are not sovereign and do not
receive the same degree of federal deference given to the states that create them. Municipalities
are not, however, subject to Midcal’s active supervision prong.22 Unlike the case of a private
party where “there is a real danger that he is acting to further his own interests, . . . there is little
or no danger that [a municipality] is involved in a private price-fixing agreement.”23

The Supreme Court has not ruled on the circumstances under which state action
protection is available to state agencies. In a footnote, the Court suggested that clear articulation
but not active supervision would be required for state agencies.24 Nevertheless, several courts of
appeals have held that acts of executive departments and state agencies are those of the sovereign
and therefore are exempt from the antitrust laws without further inquiry.25 The courts have been
less than consistent with respect to the treatment of special-purpose regulatory agencies, such as
professional licensing boards. Some appellate courts have held that these entities are entitled to

20 Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
21 Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40.
22 Id. at 46.
23 Id. at 47 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 45 (“We may presume, absent a showing to
the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand,
may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.”).
24 Id. at 46 n.10.
25 See, e.g., Sanders v. Brown, 504 F.3d 903, 918 (9th Cir. 2007) (state attorney general); Neo
Gen Screening, Inc. v. New England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir.
1999) (officials of the executive branch).
Parker immunity, regardless of whether their actions were contemplated by the legislature.\(^{26}\)

Other decisions require the agency’s actions to be pursuant to state policy in order for the exemption to apply.\(^{27}\)

So to summarize, the actions of the sovereign – meaning the legislature, state supreme court, and perhaps the governor and executive agencies – are entitled to immunity under the state action, or Parker, doctrine without further inquiry. Municipalities qualify for the state action defense if the challenged restraint satisfies the clear articulation requirement. Private conduct qualifies as state action only if both the clear articulation and active supervision requirements are met. The standards for subordinate state entities to qualify for the state action defense are less clear and may depend on the particular characteristics of the entity.

The FTC’s State Action Report

Over a decade ago, the FTC became concerned that the lower courts had expanded the scope of the state action doctrine beyond what the Supreme Court had intended. In 2001, the FTC established a State Action Task Force, which issued a Report two years later that analyzed the current state of the law, identified areas of concern, and recommended clarifications to the law.\(^{28}\) The Report observed that the scope of the state action doctrine had expanded dramatically since first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1943. The doctrine had become unmoored from

\(^{26}\) See, e.g., Green v. State Bar, 27 F.3d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1994) (state committee on unauthorized practice of law); Berger v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 1993) (state bar association); Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810 F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1987) (state department of transportation).

\(^{27}\) See, e.g., Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1040-41 (5th Cir. 1998) (state regulatory board for accountants); FTC v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987) (state pharmacy board); Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988) (state optometry board).

its original objectives, the report concluded, and was frequently invoked to protect private commercial interests with no relation to state policy.

The report identified a number of specific concerns with the way in which some lower courts had applied the state action doctrine. Chief among these was a persistent weakening of the clear articulation and active supervision requirements.

In particular, some courts had found that a legislative grant of general corporate powers satisfied the clear articulation requirement. Although the exercise of these powers in the private sector had no particular antitrust significance, some courts had reached the opposite conclusion when the powers were granted through legislation.

The Report also found that there was a lack of clear standards to guide the application of the active supervision requirement. Without guidance on how to implement the various formulations of the requirement articulated by the lower courts, the active supervision requirement had had a minimal impact.

The Task Force raised several other concerns. Some courts, according to the Report, had interpreted the state action doctrine in a manner that ignored interstate spillovers, which forced the citizens of one state to absorb the costs imposed by another state’s regulations. In addition, some courts had interpreted the doctrine to shield virtually any municipal activity, despite the fact that municipalities were increasingly engaging in business on a for-profit basis, while simultaneously using their law-making power to block competitive challenges.

To address these concerns, the Report recommended a number of specific clarifications to the doctrine. First, the clear articulation standard should be tailored to its original purposes and goals. An appropriate clear articulation standard would ask both whether the state authorized the conduct at issue and whether the state deliberately adopted a policy to displace
competition in the manner at issue. This approach would help make clear that mere authorization is not enough.

Second, the standards for active supervision should be clarified and strengthened. The Supreme Court provided little guidance on the kind of review of private actions that would constitute “active” supervision. The Report recommended a number of factors for the courts to consider when determining whether private conduct should be attributed to the state.29

Third, the criteria for identifying the entities that should be subject to active supervision should be clarified. The Report recommended that the active supervision requirement apply to any entity consisting of market participants or to any situation with an appreciable risk that the challenged conduct resulted from private actors’ pursuing private interests.

Fourth, courts should recognize the problems associated with interstate spillovers, and consider such spillovers as a factor. When one state regulates activities in a way that imposes most of the costs of regulation on citizens of other states, both economic efficiency and the political participation goal of federalism are impaired. The Report recognized that this recommendation was more aspirational than the others because the Supreme Court’s Parker decision shielded conduct that resulted in substantial interstate spillover.

FTC Enforcement Actions Involving the State Action Doctrine

Both before and after the issuance of the State Action Report, the FTC has sought to clarify the state action doctrine by bringing administrative and federal court cases, filing amicus briefs, and engaging in competition advocacy efforts at the state level. Three litigated FTC cases

29 The key factors identified were (1) the development of an adequate factual record, including notice and an opportunity to be heard; (2) a written decision on the merits; (3) and a specific assessment of how private action comports with the substantive standards established by the state legislature. See id. at 55.
stand out as particularly noteworthy: *South Carolina Dental*, *North Carolina Dental*, and *Phoebe Putney*.

The *South Carolina Dental* case involved efforts by the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry to restrict competition for dental hygienist services. In 2000, the South Carolina legislature eliminated a statutory requirement that a dentist examine a child before a hygienist could perform preventive dental care in a public health setting. The goal was to increase access to preventive dental care, particularly for low-income families.

In July 2001, however, the Dental Board adopted an emergency regulation that reimposed the dentist examination requirement. The Board then published a proposal to adopt the dentist examination requirement as a permanent regulation.\(^{30}\)

In September 2003 – the same month that the FTC released its State Action Report – the FTC issued an administrative complaint against the Dental Board alleging that it violated the antitrust laws by restricting the ability of dental hygienists to provide preventive dental services to children in South Carolina schools.\(^{31}\) Through its actions, the Dental Board deprived thousands of school children – particularly poor children – of preventive oral health care.

The Dental Board filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that its actions were protected by the state action doctrine.\(^{32}\) Although the Dental Board was an instrumentality of the

\(^{30}\) A South Carolina administrative law judge determined that the Board’s dentist examination requirement was unreasonable and contravened state policy because it reinstated requirements that the General Assembly had removed. The General Assembly also passed a new statute effectively reversing the Dental Board’s regulation. After the ALJ’s decision, the Board abandoned its attempt to make the regulation permanent.


\(^{32}\) The Board also argued that the Commission’s case was moot because the 2001 emergency regulation had expired and that the 2003 amendments to the state law barred the reimposition of the preexamination requirement. The Commission concluded that whether the Board may engage in such anticompetitive conduct again raised factual issues that could not be resolved in a motion.
state, the FTC held that it did not qualify for the state action doctrine because it was not acting pursuant to any clearly articulated state policy to displace competition.33 To the contrary, its actions contravened the clear legislative intent in the 2000 legislation to eliminate the preexamination requirement. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission held that “subordinate” special-purpose agencies or industry regulatory bodies, like the Dental Board, must satisfy the clear articulation requirement to qualify for state action immunity.34 The Commission also observed that the courts had consistently declined to afford automatic state action status to state licensing or regulatory boards that, like the Dental Board, were composed of members of the regulated industry. (This observation will play center stage in the next FTC state action case.)

The Board filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit seeking an interlocutory review of the Commission’s state action ruling. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court denied the Board’s petition for certiorari.

Not long after exhausting its appeals, the Dental Board entered into a consent decree with the FTC settling the agency’s charges.35 The FTC’s consent order required the Dental Board to affirm and publicize its support for the state legislative policy that a dentist examination is not a

to dismiss. Accordingly, the Commission retained jurisdiction but referred the case to an administrative law judge for limited discovery on the issue of whether the Board was likely to engage in unlawful conduct under the 2003 statute.


34 The Commission Opinion did not take a position on the need to satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement. See id. at 20 n.9 (“Because our analysis of the clear articulation requirement provides sufficient reason to deny the Board’s motion to dismiss, we need not address whether active supervision is required under these circumstances.”).

condition for dental hygienists to provide dental care in public health settings. To prevent similar anticompetitive conduct in the future, the order required the Dental Board to provide written notice to the FTC prior to any action of the Board relating to the provision of preventive dental services by dental hygienists in public health settings.

The next state action case the FTC brought also involved the actions of a state dental board. In July 2010, the Commission filed an administrative complaint against the North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, alleging that it had harmed competition by blocking non-dentists from providing teeth-whitening services in the state. The FTC alleged that, in response to complaints by dentists, the Board had issued cease and desist letters to several dozen non-dentist teeth whitening service providers and distributors of teeth whitening products and equipment. In addition, the Board sent letters to mall owners and operators urging them not to lease space to non-dentist teeth whitening providers.

As a result of the Board’s actions, many non-dentists stopped providing teeth whitening services and several marketers of teeth whitening systems stopped selling their products and equipment in North Carolina. In addition, several mall operators refused to lease space to, or cancelled existing leases with, non-dentist teeth whitening providers.

Prior to the start of the trial, Complaint Counsel and the Dental Board filed cross motions on the applicability of the state action doctrine to the Board’s conduct. In a February 2011 Opinion and Order, the Commission rejected the Board’s invocation of the state action doctrine.

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36 The order required the Board to post the announcement on its website and publish it in its newsletter. It also requires the Board to send the announcement to every licensed dentist and dental hygienist in South Carolina and all school district superintendents within the state.

as a basis for exempting its challenged conduct from the FTC Act.38 The Commission held that because the Board was controlled by practicing dentists, the Board’s challenged conduct must be actively supervised by the State for it to claim state action exemption from the antitrust laws. The Opinion explained that “when determining whether the state’s active supervision is required, the operative factor is a tribunal’s degree of confidence that the entity’s decision-making process is sufficiently independent from the interests of those being regulated.”39 Requiring active supervision for a state regulatory body controlled by market participants, according to the Commission, “acts as a check to prevent conduct that is not in the public interest; absent antitrust to police their actions, unsupervised self-interested boards would be subject to neither political nor market discipline to serve consumers’ best interests.”40

There was little debate that the Dental Board was controlled by participants in the very industry it purported to regulate. Six of the eight Board members were practicing dentists, and many of these whitened teeth as part of their practices.41 According to the Commission, both “common sense and economic theory . . . dictate[d] the conclusion that Board actions in this area could be self interested.”42 Thus, the Dental Board would have to satisfy both prongs of Midcal to be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine.

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39 Id. at 9.

40 Id. at 11.

41 In its subsequent opinion on liability, the Commission found that “[a]t least eight of the ten dentist Board members serving from 2005 to 2010 (Drs. Allen, Burnham, Feingold, Hardesty, Holland, Morgan, Owens, and Wester) provided teeth whitening services in their private practices.” Opinion of the Commission at 14-15, North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, Docket No. 9343 (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9343/111207ncdentalopinion.pdf (decision on liability).

42 NC Dental State Action Decision, supra note 38, at 13.
Applying the *Midcal* test, the Commission concluded that the State had not actively supervised the challenged conduct of the Dental Board. As the Commission Opinion pointed out, there was no evidence that “a state actor was even aware of the Board’s policy toward non-dentist teeth whitening, let alone reviewed or approved it.”\(^{43}\) The Commission rejected the Dental Board’s argument that the filing of annual reports and financial disclosures with various state agencies was sufficient because “[t]his sort of generic oversight . . . does not substitute for the required review and approval of the ‘particular anticompetitive acts’ that the complaint challenges.”\(^{44}\)

Of course, the Commission’s decision that the Dental Board did not qualify for the state action defense was not a decision on the merits. Whether the Board’s conduct violated the antitrust laws was an issue for trial before an Administrative Law Judge. After a month-long hearing, an ALJ concluded that the Board’s conduct violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. The ALJ, in a 122 page decision, found that the Board’s conduct had harmed competition and that the Board had failed to advance a legitimate procompetitive justification for its conduct. The Board appealed the ALJ’s decision to the full Commission, which affirmed.\(^{45}\)

In February of this year, the Dental Board appealed the Commission’s decision to the Fourth Circuit.\(^{46}\) The appeal has been fully briefed but oral argument has not yet been scheduled. Although there are a variety of issues on appeal, in my view, the court’s decision is

\(^{43}\) *Id.* at 16. The Commission Opinion stated that “we have assumed, but not decided, that the Board has satisfied the clear articulation requirement.” *See id.* at 7 n.8.

\(^{44}\) *Id.* at 16 (quoting *Patrick*, 486 U.S. at 101).


\(^{46}\) The case on appeal is North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, No. 12-1172 (4th Cir.)
likely to turn on whether the court agrees with the Commission that a state regulatory body
controlled by market participants must satisfy both prongs of *Midcal* to be entitled to state action
immunity. A number of amicus briefs have been submitted to the court, including from other
state licensing boards.

The third and most important recent FTC state action case is *Phoebe Putney*. In 2011, the
FTC and the Attorney General of the State of Georgia challenged Phoebe Putney Health
System’s agreement to acquire Palmyra Park Hospital. For all practical purposes, the transaction
was a merger to monopoly because Phoebe and Palmyra operated the only two significant
hospitals in the Albany, Georgia area.\footnote{Specifically, the FTC’s complaint alleged that the transaction would eliminate competition
between Phoebe and Palmyra in the market for inpatient general acute-care hospital services sold
to commercial health plans in Albany and the surrounding six-county area. Palmyra Medical
Center is now known as Phoebe North.}

According to the FTC’s complaint, Phoebe had structured the deal in a way that used the
local Hospital Authority in an attempt to shield the acquisition from federal antitrust scrutiny
under the state action doctrine. Specifically, Phoebe developed a plan under which the Hospital
Authority would acquire Palmyra and then lease it to a corporation controlled by Phoebe. The
Hospital Authority is an arm of the State of Georgia and already held title to, but did not operate
or actively supervise, Phoebe’s hospital.

The FTC alleged that notwithstanding the Hospital Authority’s nominal involvement in
the transaction, the state action doctrine did not apply. The transaction was conceived,
structured, financed, and guaranteed by Phoebe, for its private pecuniary interest, with the
ultimate purpose of gaining full economic and operational control over Palmyra. The Hospital
Authority’s role, according to the FTC’s complaint, was that of a “strawman.” The FTC argued
that the transaction was presented to the Hospital Authority at the eleventh hour and that the
Hospital Authority did not engage in any independent analysis or supervision of the proposed acquisition.

The FTC filed an administrative complaint challenging the transaction. In addition, it sought a preliminary injunction blocking consummation of the transaction in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

The respondents filed separate motions to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Their primary argument was that the proposed transaction was immunized from the federal antitrust laws by operation of the state action doctrine. The district court granted the motions to dismiss, holding that anticompetitive acquisitions and leases by the Hospital Authority were reasonably foreseeable under the Georgia Hospital Authorities Law. The court then proceeded to find that Phoebe qualified for the state action defense because – contrary to numerous complaint allegations – the Hospital Authority directed the transaction and because Phoebe was “an agent of the Authority.” Perhaps the only positive aspect of the district court’s decision was its recognition that Section 7 of the Clayton Act applied not only to the Hospital Authority’s acquisition of Palmyra, but also the Authority’s planned lease to Phoebe.

The FTC appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that because of Phoebe’s role in the transaction, both prongs of *Midcal* applied. In addition, there was no clear articulation of state policy to displace competition and no active supervision by the state itself.

In December of last year, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the FTC’s complaint. The court “agree[d] with the Commission that, on the facts alleged, the joint operation of [Phoebe] and Palmyra would substantially lessen competition or tend to create,

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49 *Id.* at 1380 (quotations omitted).
50 *FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.*, 663 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2011).
if not create, a monopoly." The court concluded, however, that the state action doctrine
exempted the transaction from antitrust scrutiny because “anticompetitive consequences were a
foreseeable result of the statute authorizing the Authority’s conduct.” The court stated that in
the Eleventh Circuit, the clear articulation requirement can be satisfied with a showing that the
anticompetitive conduct is a “‘foreseeable result’ of the legislation” and explained that “a
‘foreseeable anticompetitive effect’ need not be ‘one that ordinarily occurs, routinely occurs, or
is inherently likely to occur as a result of the empowering legislation.” The court reasoned that
because “the Georgia legislature granted powers of impressive breadth to the hospital
authorities” – including, in particular, the power to acquire and lease hospitals – “the legislature
must have anticipated that such acquisitions would produce anticompetitive effects.”

That was the end of the court’s analysis. There was no discussion – or even mention – of
the FTC’s other argument on appeal, namely, that Midcal’s active supervision test must be
satisfied because Phoebe is a private party.

A few days later, the Court of Appeals dissolved the injunction it had granted pending the
appeal, and the transaction closed.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision was problematic on several levels. Not only did it depart
from several decisions of the Supreme Court (and several decisions from other circuit courts),

51 Id. at 1375.
52 Id. at 1376.
53 Id. at 1375-76 (quoting FTC v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cnty, 38 F.3d 1184, 1188 (11th Cir. 1994)).
54 Id. at 1376-77.
55 This argument – along with the related argument that there was no active supervision of
Phoebe by the state – constituted the bulk of the FTC’s appellate brief. The court’s silence in
these areas was particularly odd, given that the court acknowledged in a footnote that Phoebe’s
acquisition of Palmyra’s assets through the lease was subject to the Clayton Act. See id. at 1376
n.11.
but it also potentially exempted a wide swath of the economy from the federal antitrust laws. Bear in mind that there are tens of thousands of political subdivisions in the country to which the court of appeals’ corporate powers logic could apply. It would not take clever antitrust lawyers long to find ways to exempt a variety of other hospital and non-hospital acquisitions and other business activity from the antitrust laws through some nominal involvement or approval of these entities.

In part for this reason, the FTC, joined by the Solicitor General, filed a petition for writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which – I’m pleased to say – granted the petition.56

In its opening brief on the merits,57 the FTC argued that the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of the clear articulation test, which involves examining whether the anticompetitive conduct was “foreseeable,” is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court’s decisions make clear that a broad, neutral conferral of powers that can be exercised in either procompetitive or anticompetitive ways do not provide a “clear articulation” of a state policy to displace competition. Rather, the displacement of competition must be the “inherent” or “necessary” result of the state’s regulations. As the Supreme Court said in its Boulder decision: “A State that allows its municipalities to do as they please can hardly be said to have ‘contemplated’ the specific anticompetitive actions for which municipal liability is sought.”58

Under the correct standard, Georgia’s Hospital Authorities Law does not clearly articulate a state policy to displace competition in the provision of hospital services. The law

56 The case is FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., No. 11-1160 (U.S.).
grants local hospital authorities general corporate powers but does not suggest a state intent to consolidate hospital ownership and displace competition. The powers the statute confers on local hospital authorities are very similar to those possessed by most private corporations, which of course, are subject to the federal antitrust laws. The Hospital Authorities Law should therefore be viewed as the type of “neutral” law that the Supreme Court has held does not qualify as clear articulation.

The FTC’s brief also argues that, even if the parties had satisfied the clear articulation requirement, the lack of active supervision doomed their state action defense. Because the transaction’s ultimate effect was to create a private monopoly, the State must provide active supervision to exempt the transaction from federal antitrust liability. The respondents argue that no active supervision is required because Phoebe and the Hospital Authority have a unity of interest. However, this claim is contradicted by the complaint allegations, as well as public statements by the Hospital Authority, that the two were distinct entities with distinct interests.

Finally, the FTC’s brief takes the position that active supervision was lacking in this case. As to the acquisition itself, the Hospital Authority did not exert any measure of control over any step in the process. As previously mentioned, Phoebe conceived, structured, financed, and guaranteed the acquisition without any input from the Hospital Authority. Furthermore, there was little, if any, likelihood that the State would supervise Phoebe’s operation of Palmyra after the transaction closed. The Hospital Authority’s Chairman acknowledged that “the Authority really has no authority as far as running the hospital.” As the FTC’s brief concluded, “[t]he

59 In its first Sherman Act merger case, the Supreme Court held that the authorization for merger transactions conferred by state corporation law did not exempt a merger from federal antitrust scrutiny. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345-46 (1904) (plurality opinion).

60 Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 57, at 49 (quoting Joint Appendix 135).
mere possibility that the Authority might someday play a more active role in overseeing [Phoebe] is no reason to regard the transaction at issue here as anything but an unsupervised private merger to monopoly."

Oral argument before the Court will take place on November 26, and a decision is likely in the Spring.

**Conclusion**

As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, antitrust enforcement is one of the few areas where the federal courts have been curtailing the reach of federal power out of a claimed deference to state sovereignty. I have no objection to circumscribing the federal antitrust laws to take legitimate federalism concerns into consideration. However, when courts apply the state action doctrine with little or no evidence that the state intended to restrain competition, national competition goals are sacrificed in a way not required by principles of federalism. We have increasingly seen courts apply the doctrine without serious consideration of whether doing so will protect the deliberate policy choices of sovereign states.

The FTC has sought for over a decade to return the state action doctrine to its moorings – with little success. The *Phoebe Putney* case offers a means of correcting some of the principal problems in the case law identified in the FTC’s State Action Report, including an overbroad application of the clear articulation standard. In addition, with the *North Carolina Dental* case, the FTC has the opportunity to advance its view that state boards controlled by market participants must satisfy both prongs of *Midcal* to have a state action defense. With these two cases, I am optimistic for the first time that our agency’s concerns regarding the ever-expanding coverage of the state action doctrine may be vindicated by the courts.

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61 *Id.* at 51.