PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

Before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE, AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

on

PROTECTING CONSUMER ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS:
THE BENEFITS OF A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO ANTICOMPETITIVE PATENT SETTLEMENTS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

May 2, 2007
Summary

Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Stearns, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Jon Leibowitz, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Commission about an issue of great importance to consumers: the need to prevent anticompetitive agreements between branded and generic drug firms.¹

Protection of competition in the pharmaceutical sector has been and continues to be among the FTC’s highest priorities. As part of these efforts, the agency has brought antitrust challenges to what have come to be called “exclusion payment settlements” (or, by some, “reverse payments”), a term used to describe settlements of patent litigation in which the brand-name drug firm pays its potential generic competitor to abandon the patent challenge and delay entering the market. Such settlements restrict competition at the expense of consumers, whose access to lower-priced generic drugs is delayed, sometimes for many years.

Recent court decisions, however, have made it more difficult to bring antitrust cases to stop exclusion payment settlements, and the impact of those court rulings is becoming evident in the marketplace. These developments threaten substantial harm to consumers and others who pay for prescription drugs. For that reason, the Commission commends your efforts to prohibit these anticompetitive settlements.² We believe the bill introduced by Chairman Rush, Chairman Dingell, Chairman Waxman, and other members of the Committee, H.R. 1902, represents a fundamentally sound approach to eliminating the exclusion payment problem. We look forward to continuing to work with you to ensure that the legislation effectively bars anticompetitive

¹ This written statement represents the views of the Federal Trade Commission. My oral presentation and responses are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of any Commissioner.

² Legislation for this purpose has been introduced in the Senate as well as the House. The Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported S. 316, a bi-partisan measure, on February 27, 2007.
agreements but allows exceptions for those agreements that do not harm competition. In addition, we are pleased that the bill also addresses the “bottleneck” problem (described below), which allows the brand company to use its settlement with the first generic filer to prevent subsequent generic companies from entering the market and competing as well.

Generic drugs play a crucial role in containing rising prescription drug costs by offering consumers therapeutically-identical alternatives to brand-name drugs at a significantly reduced cost. To speed market entry of generic drugs, and to ensure that the benefits of pharmaceutical innovation would continue, in 1984 Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act.\(^3\) Hatch-Waxman established a regulatory framework that sought to balance two fundamental objectives: maintaining incentives for continued innovation by research-based pharmaceutical companies and encouraging market entry by generic drug manufacturers.\(^4\) One of the key steps Congress took to promote more rapid introduction of generics was establishing special rules and procedures to encourage firms seeking approval of generic drugs to challenge invalid or narrow patents on branded drugs. The Act likewise encourages brand-name drug companies to file infringement suits at an early stage.

In the late 1990s, the Commission began to bring antitrust challenges to some settlements reached under this patent challenge process that Hatch-Waxman established. To facilitate antitrust enforcement, in 2003 Congress enacted a requirement that all such settlements be filed

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\(^4\) See infra Section I.A. The Act also was intended to encourage pharmaceutical innovation through patent term extensions.
with the FTC and the Department of Justice. Because of this filing requirement, the FTC staff is able to review all settlements of patent cases brought under the Act.

Despite this important enforcement tool, however, the prospects for effective antitrust enforcement against anticompetitive agreements between branded and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers are substantially less encouraging today than they were in 2001. Two appellate court decisions handed down in 2005 took an extremely lenient view of exclusion payment settlements.\(^5\)

Pharmaceutical companies are responding to this change in the legal landscape. Although settlements with payments to the generic patent challenger had essentially stopped in the wake of antitrust enforcement by the FTC, state attorneys general, and private parties during 2000 through 2004, the recent court decisions have triggered a disturbing new trend. The staff’s analysis of settlements filed during the fiscal year ending in September 2006 found that half of all of the final patent settlements (14 of 28) involved compensation to the generic patent challenger and an agreement by the generic firm to refrain from launching its product for some period of time. In the current legal climate, there is every reason to expect the upsurge in such settlements to continue, and early entry of generics under Hatch-Waxman to decline. Why? Because exclusion payment settlements are highly profitable for brand-name and generic firms. If such payments are lawful, companies have compelling incentives to use them.

The implications of these developments for consumers, and for others who pay for prescription drugs, are serious. Although it is well known that the use of generic drugs – which

are priced 20 to 80 percent or more below the price of the branded drug\(^6\) – provides substantial savings, what is not so well known is the important role that generic drug firms’ patent challenges play in delivering savings to consumers. Generic competition following successful patent challenges involving just four major brand-name drugs is estimated to have saved consumers more than $9 billion.\(^7\) The cost savings that result from generic entry after successful patent challenges are lost, however, if branded drug firms are permitted to pay a generic applicant to defer entry. So are the savings to the federal government. In 2006, the federal government was projected to have accounted for 32% of the $214 billion spent on prescription drugs, and the federal government share is expected to rise to 42 percent by 2016.\(^8\)

Advances in the pharmaceutical industry bring enormous benefits to Americans. Because of pharmaceutical innovations, a growing number of medical conditions often can be treated more effectively with drugs than with alternative means, such as surgery. The development of new drugs is risky and costly, and preserving incentives to undertake this task is critically important. Due regard for patent rights is thus a fundamental premise of the Hatch-Waxman framework. But the court decisions allowing exclusion payments grant holders of drug patents the ability to buy more protection from competition than congressionally-granted patent rights


afford. These rulings disrupt the careful balance between patent protections and encouraging generic entry that Congress sought to achieve in the Hatch-Waxman Act.

The increased costs resulting from anticompetitive agreements that delay generic competition harm all those who pay for prescription drugs: individual consumers, the federal government, state governments trying to provide access to health care with limited public funds, and American businesses striving to compete in a global economy.

The Commission’s perspective on the important issue highlighted by this hearing is informed by extensive experience in examining competition in the pharmaceutical industry. The agency has undertaken numerous investigations and antitrust enforcement actions affecting both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers, empirical studies and economic analyses of the pharmaceutical industry, assessments of competitive issues in matters before the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regarding Hatch-Waxman implementation, testimony


before Congress, and amicus briefs in the courts. The Commission’s 2002 report entitled “Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration” (“Generic Drug Study”) was based on a detailed examination of experience under the Hatch-Waxman Act and recommended a number of the reforms that Congress adopted in 2003. The FTC staff’s ongoing review of drug company patent settlements and other agreements filed pursuant to the mandate in the 2003 reforms has


enabled the Commission to provide Congress and the public with annual reports on the types of patent settlements being undertaken.\(^\text{15}\)

Today’s testimony reviews the role of generic drugs in the pharmaceutical industry and the regulatory framework that governs their introduction, and then discusses the economics of exclusion payment settlements and their impact on consumers, the court rulings and industry response, and the reasons for a legislative remedy to the exclusion payment problem. The testimony also describes another strategy that brand-name drug firms can use to effectively block generic entry – by settling with the first generic applicant and declining to sue subsequent applicants – and the desirability of a legislative solution.

I. The Benefits of Generic Competition

Studies of the pharmaceutical industry indicate that the first generic competitor typically enters the market at a price that is 70 to 80 percent of the brand-name counterpart, and gains substantial share from the brand-name product in a short period of time.\(^\text{16}\) Subsequent generic entrants may enter at even lower prices – discounted as much as 80 percent or more off the price of the brand-name drug – and prompt the earlier generic entrants to reduce their prices. As a result of price competition, as well as the policies of public and private health plans and state laws that encourage the use of generic drugs, generic sellers typically capture anywhere from 44


to 80 percent of branded sales within the first full year after launch of a lower-priced generic product.\footnote{17}

\section*{A. Statutory Background}

Congress intended that the Hatch-Waxman Act would “make available more low cost generic drugs,” while fully protecting legitimate patent claims.\footnote{18} The Act allows for accelerated FDA approval of a drug through an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), upon showing, among other things, that the new drug is “bioequivalent” to an approved drug.\footnote{19}

A brand-name drug manufacturer seeking to market a new drug product must first obtain FDA approval by filing a New Drug Application (“NDA”) that, among other things, demonstrates the drug product’s safety and efficacy. At the time the NDA is filed, the NDA filer also must provide the FDA with certain categories of information regarding patents that cover the drug that is the subject of its NDA.\footnote{20} Upon receipt of the patent information, the FDA is required to list it in an agency publication entitled “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence,” commonly known as the “Orange Book.”\footnote{21}

The Hatch-Waxman Act establishes certain rights and procedures in situations where a company seeks FDA approval to market a generic product prior to the expiration of a patent or patents relating to a brand-name drug upon which the generic is based. In such cases, the applicant must: (1) certify to the FDA that the patent in question is invalid or is not infringed by

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[17]{CBO Study, xiii.}
\footnotetext[19]{21 U.S.C. § 355(j).}
\footnotetext[20]{21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).}
\footnotetext[21]{\textit{Id.} § 355(j)(7)(A).}
\end{footnotes}
the generic product (known as a “Paragraph IV certification”); and (2) notify the patent holder of the filing of the certification. If the holder of patent rights files a patent infringement suit within 45 days, FDA approval to market the generic drug is automatically stayed for 30 months, unless before that time the patent expires or is judicially determined to be invalid or not infringed.

To encourage generic drug manufacturers to challenge questionable patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification is awarded 180 days of marketing exclusivity, during which the FDA may not approve a potential competitor’s ANDA. Although a first-filer can forfeit its exclusivity under certain conditions, ordinarily it will be entitled to 180 days of exclusivity beginning on the date of the first commercial marketing of the generic drug product. Even if the first filer substantially delays marketing its product, under the prevailing interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act, a later ANDA filer may not enter the market until the first filer’s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity has expired.

B. Consumer Savings from Challenges to Drug Patents

Experience has borne out the efficacy of the Hatch-Waxman process and the correctness of its premises: that many patents, if challenged, will not stand in the way of generic entry, and that successful challenges can yield enormous benefits to consumers. The Commission studied

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23 Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
24 Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)
25 Id.
26 See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
Examples of Generic Entry Prior to Patent Expiration from Successful Patent Challenges

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Drug</th>
<th>First Generic Entrant</th>
<th>Generic Entry Date</th>
<th>Annual Brand Sales Prior to Generic Entry</th>
<th>Expiration Date of Last Patent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zantac</td>
<td>Granutec</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$1.6 billion</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxol</td>
<td>Baker Norton</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>$1.6 billion</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prozac</td>
<td>Barr</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>$2.5 billion</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prilosec</td>
<td>Kudco</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$3.7 billion</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paxil</td>
<td>Apotex</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$2.2 billion</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

all patent litigation initiated between 1992 and 2000 between brand-name drug manufacturers and Paragraph IV generic challengers, and found that the generics prevailed in cases involving 73 percent of the challenged drug products.\(^{27}\) Many of these successes involved blockbuster drugs and allowed generic competition years before patent expiration (see chart).\(^{28}\)

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\(^{27}\) *Generic Drug Study*, at 19-20.

II. The Economics of Exclusion Payment Settlements and the Role of Antitrust Enforcement

Although patent challenges have the potential for substantial consumer savings, the competitive dynamic between brand-name drugs and their generic equivalents creates an incentive for brand and generic manufacturers to conspire to avoid competition and share the resulting profits. The reason is simple: in nearly any case in which generic entry is contemplated, the profit that the generic anticipates will be much less than the amount of profit the brand-name drug company stands to lose from the same sales. This is because the generic firm sells at a significant discount off the price of the brand-name product. The difference between the brand’s loss and the generic’s gain is the money consumers save.

Consequently, it will typically be more profitable for both parties if the brand-name manufacturer pays the generic manufacturer to settle the patent dispute and agree to defer entry. As is illustrated below, by eliminating the potential for competition, the parties can share the consumer savings that would result if they were to compete. In other words, these settlements are harmful because the parties are resolving their dispute at the expense of consumers. Although both the brand-name companies and generic firms are better off with such settlements, consumers lose the possibility of earlier generic entry, which may occur either because the generic company would have prevailed in the lawsuit (as noted, the FTC’s Generic Drug Study found generic challengers enjoyed a success rate in excess of 70 percent), or because the parties would have negotiated a settlement with an earlier entry date absent the payment. Instead, consumers pay higher prices because such early generic entry is delayed.
Incentives to Pay for Delay

Pre-Generic Filing

Brand's Profits

Competition

Generic's Profits

Brand's Profits

Consumer Savings

Exclusion Payment

Payment to Generic

Brand's Profits

Generic's

Profits
Several years ago, this Committee recognized the threat that such agreements pose, and, to promote effective antitrust enforcement, Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003 to require brand-name companies and generic applicants to file patent settlement agreements with the Commission and the Department of Justice. As the Senate Report explained, those amendments sought in part to stamp out the “abuse” of Hatch-Waxman law resulting from “pacts between big pharmaceutical firms and makers of generic versions of brand-name drugs, that are intended to keep lower cost drugs off the market.”

III. Commission Challenges to Exclusion Payment Settlements

The Commission has challenged patent settlements in which brand-name and generic companies have eliminated the potential competition between them and shared the resulting profits. All settlements include some form of consideration flowing between the parties; it is the type of consideration that matters in the antitrust analysis. Some types of consideration, such as an early entry date, a royalty to the patent-holder, or compromising on a damage claim, do not generally involve sharing the benefits that come from eliminating potential competition. But the sharing of profits achieved by eliminating competition is at the core of what Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes.


Initially, the Commission’s enforcement efforts in this area appeared to be a significant deterrent to anticompetitive behavior. In the late 1990s, the Commission learned of exclusion payments arising in Hatch-Waxman patent litigation and began to investigate.³ Public reports of those investigations began to appear in 1999, and the Commission brought a number of enforcement actions beginning in 2000. For several years, such agreements essentially stopped. The Commission is not aware of any pharmaceutical settlement between a brand-name manufacturer and a generic filer that included both a payment to the generic company and an agreement by the generic company to defer marketing its product between 2000 and the end of 2004.

During the same period, however, patent settlements did not disappear. To the contrary, in less than five years, there were at least as many settlements as there were in the seven years in which pharmaceutical companies were settling litigation with payments and restrictions on generic entry.⁴ Parties simply found different ways to resolve their disputes, presumably on the basis of the relative strength of their cases.

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⁴ We lack data for the approximately three year period between the end of the Generic Drug Study and the beginning of the MMA reporting period. It is quite likely that there are additional settlements that occurred during this period for which we do not have information.
IV. The Current Threat to Consumers from Exclusion Payment Settlements

In 2005, two appellate courts adopted a permissive – and, respectfully, in our view, incorrect – position on exclusion payment settlements. After years of active antitrust enforcement, including the Sixth Circuit’s decision in the Cardizem case holding a challenged exclusion payment arrangement unlawful, these two rulings have prompted a resurgence of settlements in which the parties settle with a payment to the generic company and an agreement by the generic company not to market its product.

In the Schering case, the Eleventh Circuit vacated a decision in which the Commission found two patent settlements violated the FTC Act. Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”), the manufacturer of a brand-name drug called “K-Dur 20,” settled patent litigation with two manufacturers of generic counterparts, Upsher-Smith Laboratories, Inc. (“Upsher”) and American Home Products Corporation (“AHP”). The two generic manufacturers agreed to forbear marketing their generic drugs until specified dates in exchange for guaranteed cash payments totaling $60 million to Upsher and $15 million to AHP. A full trial was held before an administrative law judge, and the Commission reviewed the entire record de novo. The Commission concluded that in each settlement, Schering had paid its generic competitors to accept the settlement and that the settlements provided Schering with more protection from competition than a settlement without a payment or simply proceeding with litigation. As a

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5 Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 403 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005) (Pooler, J., dissenting).

6 In re Cardizem Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).

result of these agreements, Schering continued to enjoy supracompetitive profits from K-Dur 20 for several more years, at the expense of consumers.

The court of appeals set aside the Commission’s decision.\(^8\) The court purported to assess whether the agreement exceeded the exclusionary potential of Schering’s patent. In so doing, the court relied on the incorrect supposition that the patent provided Schering with “the legal right to exclude Upsher and [AHP] from the market until they proved either that the . . . patent was invalid or that their products . . . did not infringe Schering’s patent,”\(^9\) and noted that there was no allegation that the patent claim was a “sham.”\(^10\) In particular, the court ruled that a payment by the patent holder, accompanied by an agreement by the challenger to defer entry, could not support an inference that the challenger agreed to a later entry date in return for such payment, even if there was no other plausible explanation for the payment.\(^11\)

The Commission sought Supreme Court review. Thirty-six states, AARP, and a patent policy think tank supported the Commission’s petition. The Solicitor General filed a brief in opposition, acknowledging the importance of the issues presented, but arguing that the case was not the right vehicle for the Court to address them. In June 2006, the Supreme Court declined to review the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling.

The impact of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision – in the courts and in the pharmaceutical industry – has been evident. Other courts have understood that decision to require only an inquiry into the nominal reach of the patent, and not (as some have suggested) a direct

\(^{8}\) Schering, 402 F.3d at 1058.

\(^{9}\) Id. at 1066-67.

\(^{10}\) Id. at 1068.

\(^{11}\) Id. at 1076.
assessment of the likelihood that the patent holder could successfully exclude the generic through patent litigation.\(^\text{12}\) A divided panel of the Second Circuit, ruling on an antitrust challenge to a patent settlement involving the anti-cancer drug Tamoxifen, followed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding.\(^\text{13}\) The plaintiffs in the Tamoxifen case have asked the Supreme Court to review the Second Circuit’s ruling, and their petition for certiorari is pending.\(^\text{14}\)

The response of pharmaceutical companies to these developments in the courts is reflected in the changing nature of patent settlements since the Schering decision. One investment analyst report described the Eleventh Circuit’s Schering decision as having “opened a Pandora’s box of settlements.”\(^\text{15}\) After a five-year hiatus in payments to generics following the initiation of Commission enforcement actions aimed at exclusion payment settlements, pharmaceutical companies have once again started entering into settlement agreements that include both compensation in various forms to generic challengers and restrictions on generic market entry.\(^\text{16}\) By the end of fiscal year 2005, the year of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Schering, there were three such settlements. In fiscal year 2006 – the Tamoxifen ruling came early that year – there were significantly more:

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\(^{12}\) See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-2851 (2d Cir. June 7, 2005) (“Cipro”) (the ruling below “is more fairly read as requiring an evaluation of the scope of the patent’s claims, and not a post hoc analysis of the patent’s validity”).


\(^{14}\) The Court has invited the Solicitor General to submit a brief expressing the views of the United States.


• Fifty percent (14 of 28) of the FY 2006 final settlement agreements between brand-name and generic companies included both an agreement to defer generic entry and some form of payment from the brand-name firm to the generic challenger.

• The findings concerning settlements with first generic filers – that is, settlements that can serve to block FDA approval of later applicants – are even more striking. More than 80 percent (9 of 11) of the settlements with first generic filers involved a payment to the generic challenger and a restriction on generic entry.  

• The compensation conveyed to the generic firm under the settlements takes various forms, and frequently includes agreements involving a product other than the one at issue in the patent litigation.

• Notably, we have observed so-called “side deals,” such as purchasing rights to unrelated products and co-promotion arrangements, in settlements that restrained generic entry, but virtually never in settlements that did not. This pattern indicates that such “side agreements” may be serving as a vehicle to compensate a generic challenger for its agreement to a later entry date than the generic firm would otherwise accept.

The economic implications of the courts of appeals’ rulings are substantial. Americans spent $200.7 billion on prescription drugs in 2005. Many of the top-selling prescription drugs in the U.S. – including such blockbusters as the ulcer drug Nexium, the anti-psychotic Seroquel, and the cancer treatment Gemzar – are currently the subject of patent challenges by generic firms seeking to enter the market under the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act. The prospect of consumer benefit from such challenges is enormous, to the extent that they lead to early, non-

17 One of the two first filer settlements that did not follow the trend involved a case in which the patent was due to expire within the year. In that case, the generic abandoned the patent challenge without compensation. The other settlement is currently being investigated by FTC staff.

18 This pattern was observed in the FTC staff’s review of Hatch-Waxman settlements from 1993 through 2000, which were collected in the Generic Drug Study, as well as all the settlements filed under the MMA. There were two exceptions to the observation that side deals do not occur in settlements that do not explicitly restrict entry. One of these settlements is under investigation. In the other, the generic was on the market at the time of the agreement; the generic company acquired the brand product, thus eliminating independent competition between the brand and generic; and the generic company continues to sell both the brand and generic version of the product.

infringing generic entry. Indeed, generic competition following successful patent challenges involving just four major brand-name drugs (Prozac, Zantac, Taxol, and Platinol) is estimated to have saved consumers more than $9 billion. Under the courts of appeals’ lenient rulings, however, the parties in such cases have the strong economic incentive, discussed above, to enter into anticompetitive settlements that deprive consumers of the benefit of low-cost, non-infringing generic drugs.

Where a patent holder makes a payment to a challenger to induce it to agree to a later entry than it would otherwise agree to, consumers are harmed – either because a settlement with an earlier entry date might have been reached, or because continuation of the litigation without settlement would yield a greater prospect of competition. Some who disagree with the Commission’s position argue that, rather than treat the outcome of the patent suit as uncertain (as it often is), antitrust analysis must presume the patent is valid and infringed unless patent litigation proves otherwise. This argument, however, ignores both the law and the facts. The antitrust laws prohibit paying a potential competitor to stay out of the market, even if its entry is uncertain. Indeed, the position that antitrust law would bar a brand-name drug firm from paying a generic filer to withdraw its application for FDA approval should be uncontroversial, even though the potential generic competitor’s application might not be approved. The suggestion that

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20 See supra note 9.

21 For example, for a hypothetical patent infringement claim with a 50% chance of success, with 10 years remaining in the patent term, continued litigation between the parties affords consumers an overall expected value of 5 years of competition, taking into account the likelihood of the two possible outcomes. If the parties instead reach a settlement in which the patent holder makes a payment to the challenger, and the challenger agrees to enter only one year prior to the expiration date, consumers are worse off, on average, than had the litigation gone forward. The appellate courts’ approach, by contrast, would automatically endorse such a settlement because it is within the outer, nominal bounds of the patentee’s claims.

generic entry before the end of a patent term is too uncertain to be of competitive concern is likewise untenable. It is contradicted both by the Hatch-Waxman framework, which encourages patent challenges, and by the empirical evidence that generic applicants have enjoyed a nearly 75 percent success rate in patent litigation initiated under Hatch-Waxman. Finally, the argument that prohibiting exclusion payments will prevent legitimate settlements is contradicted by experience during the period from 2000 through 2004. Patent settlements – using means other than exclusion payments – continued to occur. And patent settlements will continue if Congress enacts legislation that prohibits anticompetitive payments in settlements of Hatch-Waxman patent cases.

In sum, the majority opinion in *Tamoxifen* and the court of appeals ruling in *Schering* take an extremely lenient view of exclusion payment settlements. Given that the brand-name and generic company are both better off avoiding the possibility of competition and sharing the resulting profits, there can be little doubt that, should those rulings become the controlling law, we will see more exclusion payment settlements and less generic entry. Although the Commission will continue to be vigilant in this area, litigating another case to conclusion will take years, the outcome of such litigation is uncertain given the *Schering* and *Tamoxifen* decisions, and in any event such litigation will provide little relief for those harmed in the interim. The cost to consumers, employers, and government programs will be substantial.

Prozac provides a telling example. In the course of patent litigation, the brand-name company, asked if it would pay the generic challenger $200 million to drop the patent challenge,
rejected the idea, stating that such a settlement would violate the antitrust laws. The generic ultimately won that patent litigation, and consumers – and federal and state governments – saved over two billion dollars. Under the legal standard articulated in the *Schering* and *Tamoxifen* cases, however, the proposed settlement would have been legal, generic entry would not have occurred, and consumers would have had to pay higher prices until the patent expired.

V. Addressing Anticompetitive Hatch-Waxman Settlements through Legislation

The Commission believes that H.R. 1902 is a fundamentally sound approach to solving the problem of exclusion payment settlements between branded pharmaceutical firms and would-be generic entrants.

Congressional action on this issue is warranted for several reasons. First, the threat that such agreements pose to our nation’s health care system is a matter of pressing national concern. The enormous costs that result from unwarranted delays in generic entry burden consumers, employers, state and local governments, and federal programs already struggling to contain spiraling costs.

Second, the problem is prevalent. Because exclusion payment settlements are so profitable for both branded and generic firms, if they are considered legal they would threaten to eliminate most pre-patent-expiration generic competition. The settlements filed with the FTC in 2006 demonstrate that it is now common for settlements of Hatch-Waxman patent litigation to involve compensation to the generic drug applicant and an agreement by the generic to stay off the market, typically for several years.

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Third, the problem of exclusion payment patent settlements has arisen in – and, to our knowledge, only in – the context of the special statutory framework that Congress created with the Hatch-Waxman Act. The special rules that apply in this area were designed to balance the two policy goals that are of critical significance in the pharmaceutical industry: speeding generic drugs to market and maintaining incentives for new drug development. Legislative action concerning exclusion payment settlements can be tailored to the special circumstances of pharmaceutical patent settlements and help to ensure that this unique framework works as Congress intends.

Fourth, the reasoning underlying the recent appellate court rulings underscores the need for action by Congress. These decisions reflect judicial judgments about the policy choice that Congress made in Hatch-Waxman. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit’s Schering opinion emphasized that its decision was based on “policy.” As the court saw it, the Hatch-Waxman framework Congress created gave generic firms “considerable leverage in patent litigation,” and could therefore “cost Schering its patent.” Congress, however, is the body with constitutional responsibility to set patent policy. Striking the balance so as to promote innovation while also promoting generic entry is fundamentally a legislative choice. Accordingly, it is fitting that Congress address the use of exclusion payments in drug patent settlements.

Finally, a legislative remedy offers the prospect of a relatively swift solution to this important issue. While the Commission’s enforcement activities are continuing, we recognize the time and uncertainty involved in litigation challenges to anticompetitive settlements.

\[26\text{ }402\text{ F.3d at 1076.}\]

\[27\text{ }Id.\text{ at 1074.}\]
Legislation could provide a speedier and more comprehensive way to address this pressing concern.

As the Commission has said elsewhere, certain principles are important in crafting the precise form and scope of a legislative remedy. The fundamental concern underlying exclusion payment settlements is the sharing of profits preserved by an agreement not to compete, whatever form the compensation to the generic takes. Thus, legislation must be sufficiently broad to encompass the various ways that a branded firm may share its profits with the generic, including not only the ways we have seen to date, but also those that may arise in the future. At the same time, legislation should be designed to avoid unwarranted deterrence of settlements that present no competitive problem.

H.R. 1902 provides two mechanisms to prevent settlement avenues from being unduly limited. First, it contains express exclusions from the general prohibition on settlements in which the generic firm receives something of value and agrees to refrain from selling its product. When the value received by the generic applicant amounts to nothing more than the right to sell a generic version of the branded drug the innovator firm is seeking to protect – whether it be the right to sell the generic drug product before patent expiration, a waiver of the brand’s market exclusivity based on testing of a drug for pediatric use, or a waiver of patent infringement damages against a generic for entry that has already occurred – the settlement is unlikely to involve a sharing of profits preserved by avoiding competition. The bill properly exempts such settlements. We look forward to working with you to ensure that, if other exemptions are warranted, they are included in the legislation. It may be appropriate, for example, to include some form of exemption related to reasonable costs of litigation.
Second, the bill provides flexibility by authorizing the FTC to adopt rules to exempt certain agreements from the general prohibition. With this authority, the Commission can ensure that the law remains flexible and keeps pace with changes in patent settlement terms: by continuing to review the diverse ways in which value is being transferred, the Commission can identify those exchanges that are not harmful to competition and consumers, and exempt them from the prohibition.

In sum, H.R. 1902 offers a straightforward means to quickly combat conduct that is costly to consumers, provides drug companies with certainty about what conduct is prohibited, and provides flexibility to protect procompetitive arrangements. We would welcome the opportunity to work with the Subcommittee as it continues to consider the bill.

VI. The 180-Day Exclusivity as a Bottleneck to Prevent Generic Entry

Hatch-Waxman patent settlements present an additional issue that warrants a legislative remedy. The operation of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 180-day exclusivity creates the potential for a settlement between a brand-name company and a first generic filer to generate a bottleneck that prevents any generic competition. When they enter into an agreement for the generic to delay market entry, whether with or without an accompanying payment, the agreement does not trigger the running of the exclusivity period. Although Hatch-Waxman was designed to provide a mechanism to eliminate the bottleneck when the later filer can get a court ruling that it does not infringe, forcing the first filer to “use or lose” its exclusivity period, court decisions have

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28 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, § 1102(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457 (“MMA”) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)) makes settlement of patent litigation a forfeiture event only if “a court signs a settlement order or consent decree that enters a final judgment that includes a finding the patent is invalid or not infringed.” If the parties request and the court enters a settlement order that does not include such a finding, as is usually the case in this context, the settlement will not constitute a forfeiture event.
prevented generic firms from using this mechanism. Consequently, the exclusivity creates a bottleneck that prevents any subsequent generic applicant from entering the market until after the first generic enters and the period runs.\textsuperscript{29}

A subsequent generic can relieve the bottleneck only by obtaining a court decision that the patent supporting the 180-day exclusivity period is invalid or not infringed.\textsuperscript{30} That decision acts as a forfeiture event that forces the first filer to either use or lose its exclusivity period within 75 days.\textsuperscript{31} A problem arises if the brand-name company does not sue the subsequent generic filer on every patent supporting the exclusivity, thereby eliminating the possibility that the generic company will obtain a favorable court decision on every patent and relieve the bottleneck.

Having settled with the first challenger, perhaps for delayed entry, a brand-name company can preempt all subsequent generic challenges and the chance of any earlier generic entry by declining to sue subsequent filers.

A brand-name drug firm has a significant incentive to use this strategy, and a trend by brand-name companies to do so is increasingly evident.\textsuperscript{32} Generic companies facing this scenario that have attempted to bring declaratory judgment actions of non-infringement and invalidity have so far been unsuccessful, because the courts have dismissed those actions for lack of a

\textsuperscript{29} See Generic Drug Study at vii-xi, 57-58, 62-63.

\textsuperscript{30} The decision must be “a final decision from which no appeal (other than a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari) has been or can be taken that the patent is invalid or not infringed.” MMA, § 1102(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2457 (“MMA”) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)).

\textsuperscript{31} The other forfeiture events established by the Medicare Modernization Act are a court-entered settlement that the patents are invalid or not infringed, or withdrawal of the patents from the Orange Book by the brand company. MMA, § 1102(a)(21), Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. At 2457 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)). Both require action by the brand company.

Constitutionally-required “case or controversy.” Although recent developments in the case law governing the availability of declaratory judgment actions in patent cases suggest that branded drug firms will no longer be able to avoid a declaratory judgment action merely by failing to sue the generic applicant, these developments will not cure the bottleneck problem. That is because the brand company can still have the generic’s declaratory judgment action dismissed, and thereby prevent an adjudicated court decision on the patent merits, by granting the generic a covenant not to sue. Dismissal of a declaratory judgment action, even when based on a covenant not to sue, is not a “court decision” sufficient to trigger a forfeiture event.

As a result, a subsequent generic filer that faces a bottleneck but has been given a covenant not to sue has no mechanism to relieve that bottleneck. Even if the subsequent filer has a strong case for noninfringement, the bottleneck postpones consumer access to any lower-priced generic version of the drug. In such circumstances, it is contrary to the Hatch-Waxman Act’s purposes of encouraging meritorious patent challenges and promoting generic entry to delay market entry by later applicants when the brand-name manufacturer and first generic applicant


34 The Supreme Court recently examined the availability of declaratory judgment jurisdiction in patent cases in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 127 S.C. 764 (2007). The Court held that the case or controversy requirement did not require a patent licensee to breach its license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid or not infringed. In Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 2007 WL 942201 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2007) the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed the analysis in Medimmune and held that an ANDA applicant could bring a declaratory judgment action challenging patents listed in the Orange Book where the brand company had sued on some but not all of the listed patents. The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the question of whether an ANDA applicant can bring a declaratory judgment action when the brand company has not sued for infringement of any listed patent.


36 Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding FDA’s decision to treat only an adjudicated holding on the patent merits as a “court decision” for purposes of triggering the 180-day exclusivity).
are involved in protracted litigation or have settled their litigation without resolving the issues of validity or infringement.

H.R. 1902, however, would make dismissal of a generic applicant’s declaratory judgment action of non-infringement or invalidity for lack of subject matter jurisdiction a forfeiture event for the 180-day exclusivity period. The brand’s grant of a covenant not to sue the generic applicant and the generic’s filing of the covenant with the FDA would also constitute a forfeiture event, so that a generic in possession of a covenant need not file an unnecessary declaratory judgment action in order to obtain a dismissal. These provisions will give a generic applicant that has raised strong non-infringement or invalidity arguments that a brand company does not wish to litigate a mechanism for removing the bottleneck.

**Conclusion**

Thank you for this opportunity to share the Commission’s views. The Commission looks forward to working with the Subcommittee to protect consumers in this critical sector of the economy.

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37 The Commission made a similar recommendation in its 2002 Generic Drug Study at x-xi.