The Muris Legacy

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Early in the year 2001, when it became clear that Timothy Muris would be the new Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, there was considerable speculation about the impact that his appointment would have. Some predicted dramatic changes that would reverse the policies of his predecessor, Bob Pitofsky; others predicted continuity with the Pitofsky regime. I was one of the people who predicted continuity,1 and I am tempted to crow about it because Muris emphasized continuity throughout his thirty-eight months as chairman. But, my prediction was only half right because there were also a lot of surprises. Tim Muris did not reverse Robert Pitofsky’s policies but he did move the Commission in some new directions that no one had predicted.

Before I discuss what I believe are the highlights of the Muris legacy, I should address a preliminary caveat. The Commission is a multi-headed body, any chairman has only one vote in five, and the terms are staggered in a way that is designed to further dilute the influence of a newly-appointed chairman. For two of his three years in office, Muris served with four holdovers who were appointed by President Clinton.2 In his final year, there still were three. Muris did have two holdover members of the same political party throughout his term (Orson Swindle and I) but, in my experience, the Federal Trade Commission is not a place where party identification is emphasized at any level.3 Holdover commissioners, regardless of party, have reached a certain equilibrium in their interactions with one another. It is therefore appropriate to ask whether we can really identify “The Muris Legacy.”

I believe that we can, for reasons that will become clear. Although FTC chairmen are not comparable to unitary heads of other government bodies,4 they are not just one of a gang of five. It is appropriate to talk about the Muris legacy, and it is also appropriate to acknowledge up front the leadership skills that enabled him not just to put together a majority but generally to secure unanimous approval of his ambitious and sometimes risky agenda.

Before addressing the Muris contributions, it is also appropriate to acknowledge the substantial contributions of his predecessor, with whom I also was privileged to serve. In fact, I think much

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2 Holdovers from previous administrations are, of course, routine, but no chairman since 1950 has served for so long with so many as Muris. Caspar Weinberger served with four holdovers, but only for eight months. His successor, Miles Kirkpatrick served with four, for only one month. Kirkpatrick, Pitofsky, and Jim Miller did serve for an extended time with three holdovers.

3 The absence of strong party identification in the Commission means that a chairman does not have an automatic three votes, but it also means that there is no automatic resistance from the minority. Moreover, there seems to be a broad intellectual consensus in many areas of policy today.

4 This does not necessarily mean that chairmen ultimately have less discretionary power. Chairmen of an independent agency like the FTC may need to get the votes of their peers, but they are also relatively insulated from direction by the other branches of government. A chairman can also set the affirmative agenda through the power to appoint bureau heads and principal deputies.
of Tim Muris’s success is attributable to the fact that Bob Pitofsky left the agency in such fine shape—and I refer not only to the quality of the staff but also to the unprecedented level of public regard for the agency’s work. Muris could stand on some very broad shoulders, and he had one significant advantage that Pitofsky did not have—the resources to do what he wanted to do. It was Pitofsky’s fortune (or misfortune) to serve in the midst of the greatest merger wave in the history of this country. The Commission’s efforts to accommodate its shared responsibility for merger review consumed a disproportionate share of the agency’s resources and of its intellectual energies. It is hard to be innovative in other areas when you are struggling to keep your head above water.5

With these preliminary caveats and acknowledgments, I will turn to the subject at hand. I group Muris’ most significant initiatives into five broad categories, with full realization that the selection and the arrangement may be arbitrary.

Increased Visibility of the Consumer Protection Mission

Lawyers who attend ABA Antitrust Section meetings tend to practice primarily in areas covered by the Commission’s Bureau of Competition. As a result, the Section’s programs and publications have emphasized competition issues. Inside the Commission itself, the Bureaus of Competition and Consumer Protection have historically been treated as two separate principalities.

The barriers are now coming down.6 There is increasing appreciation of the fact that competition law and consumer protection law have a common core. Both are concerned with distortions in the free market. Both can be analyzed and addressed in economic terms. The difference is that competition offenses, like price-fixing or exclusionary conduct, tend to cause distortions on the supply side while consumer protection offenses, like deceptive advertising, tend to cause distortions on the demand side.

Tim Muris deserves much of the credit for this development. He was interested in consumer protection issues to a greater degree than any chairman in recent memory and had focused on this area in his previous academic publications. Many of these publications were co-authored with his colleague, Howard Beales, an economist by training, who came on board with Muris as Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection. Together, they sought to apply a more sophisticated economic analysis to consumer protection problems.

For example, economic realities suggest that the best way to reduce the harmful effects of fraudulent promotions is to shut down the operations as quickly as possible. The optimal strategy generally is to pare the case down to its essentials and obtain prompt injunctive relief. Therefore, the speed of settlement (and most cases are settled) may ultimately be more important than the breadth of the relief or the size of the dollar judgments, which are often uncollectible anyway. The optimal strategy for a particular case must be balanced, however, against the need for general deterrence and the potentially subversive message conveyed by relatively mild negotiated settlements. These sometimes conflicting objectives were often candidly addressed when particular complaints or settlements were presented for a vote.

5 The impact of the merger wave can be demonstrated by objective data. There also may be subjective factors at work. My impression, after some period of close association with both, is that Pitofsky was temperamentally more cautious and risk averse than Muris. (In this sense, the Democrat was more “conservative” than the Republican.) This is not a judgmental assessment. It may be easier to take risks when you have an existing reservoir of good will, husbanded by a more cautious conservator.

6 One striking indication is the fact that the most recent edition of the Section’s Antitrust magazine, devoted almost the entire issue to consumer protection matters. See ANTITRUST, Summer 2004.
I do not mean to suggest that sophisticated economic considerations were ignored before the Muris years. For example, Bob Pitofsky and his Bureau Director, Jodie Bernstein, launched extensive and innovative consumer education programs, in a variety of areas, in recognition of the simple economic fact that the Commission cannot be everywhere and that, to a large extent, consumers have to be educated to look out for themselves. All I am saying is that economic analysis was employed more extensively under Muris and Beales than had been done before.

One particularly imaginative Muris initiative was the campaign against deceptive advertisements of worthless weight-loss products. Part of the campaign followed traditional lines: bring some high-visibility cases and publicize them widely, in order to deter future wrongdoing and to alert consumers. The imaginative part was the effort to persuade responsible media representatives that they should screen out the most blatantly fraudulent advertising on their own initiative—just as they screen out ads that are obscene or otherwise offensive.

This initiative was not only imaginative but daring because media people, who dispense advice so readily, are not comfortable on the receiving end. They complained that we were asking them to decide complicated scientific questions, although the Commission had already published a brochure that identified the most fraudulent claims, in order to make the job easy.7 They complained that it would be costly to act alone and that collective action to cut off fraudulent advertisers could be construed as an illegal “boycott.” The response was that the agency would make no such claim and that the antitrust risks were minimal.8 In fact, despite public objections, there has been substantial quiet compliance with the Commission’s request.

The most noteworthy achievement on the consumer protection side was, of course, the publication of the “Do Not Call” Rule,9 which now benefits over 60 million households (with thousands still added every day). This has turned out to be the most popular initiative in the Commission’s history. In fact, it is so popular that when implementation was temporarily stalled by an unfavorable court decision,10 corrective legislation passed both houses of Congress and was signed by the President within a day!11

People may not fully appreciate that the Do Not Call Rule was also an imaginative way for Muris to avoid a divisive pre-existing debate over “privacy” legislation and to re-channel the agency’s energies in a way that could command unanimous support internally and externally. The previous debate had focused on one aspect of consumer privacy—the protection of personal information obtained in e-commerce transactions—and the subject was controversial both in the Commission

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10 Mainstream Mkgt. Servs. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp. 2d. 1151 (D. Colo. 2003). This case was consolidated with three other cases that also challenged the National Do Not Call Registry. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the judgments in two of the cases, and denied review of the other two cases. Mainstream Mkgt. Servs., 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2004. Mainstream Mkgt. Servs., 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5564.

and in the Congress. Muris shifted the focus to another aspect of consumer privacy—the reduction of unwanted commercial intrusions into the home—and the entire nation applauded.

In the afterglow of success, we should not forget that “do-not-call” could have been a disaster for the Commission, and particularly the Chairman. For example, I believed that First Amendment objections would ultimately be rejected (as they were), but the objections were not frivolous. Moreover, there was a substantial risk that the immediate rush to sign on would overwhelm the capabilities of the system or, alternatively, that massive non-compliance by telemarketers would overwhelm our limited prosecutorial resources. Muris was daring.

A Structure for Rule of Reason Analysis

The longstanding dichotomy between rule of reason and per se offenses had become blurred at the edges. Some so-called per se offenses can only be resolved after a considerable factual inquiry, yet it also had been said that a rule of reason review could sometimes be done “in the twinkling of an eye.” An already clouded picture became further clouded following the Supreme Court’s 5–4 opinion in the 1999 California Dental case. In particular, there were questions about the parameters of so-called “quick look” or truncated analyses. Two ambitious opinions during the Muris years attempted to re-introduce some clarity and precision.

I do not believe it is appropriate to discuss the Polygram (3-Tenors) and Schering decisions in any depth because they both are now on appeal, and it is possible that they could be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. I can say, however, that the two opinions were similar in that they each rejected a per se label, but factual differences prompted different analytical approaches. The Muris opinion for the Commission in Polygram focused on the nature of the restraint in issue, found that it was “inherently suspect,” and concluded that the issues could be resolved in a truncated proceeding. My own opinion for the Commission in Schering, by contrast, applied a full rule of reason analysis. The Schering opinion also found, however, that the traditional method of proving market shares and then drawing inferences about competitive effects was not necessary when more direct proof of competitive effects was available. The two opinions set out some guideposts for rule of reason analysis, in an effort to resolve some questions left open in California Dental.

Some may wonder why the Schering case is included in a discussion of the Muris legacy, since the case was brought in the Pitofsky years and I signed the opinion for the Commission. The reason is that the Schering case was initially brought as part of a family of cases that dealt with set-

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tlement agreements between the manufacturers of patented drugs and potential generic challengers. These cases collectively presented, and still present, a number of challenging issues at the intersection of patent law and antitrust law, and these were the issues that we all focused on when the *Schering* complaint was voted out and that I focused on in the first draft of the opinion. It was Muris who saw most clearly the similarities and the differences between *Schering* and *Polygram*, purely as a matter of legal structure, wholly apart from the widely divergent factual issues in the two cases. The *Schering* words may be mine but I acknowledge his unique contributions to the analysis in the opinion.

We do not know right now what will happen in the courts of appeal, so it is premature to speculate on the influence, if any, that these opinions will have. However, Tim Muris deserves a large measure of credit for the effort to bring some clarity to a muddy area of law—and the fact that both the *Polygram* and the *Schering* opinions were unanimous also says a lot about the atmosphere of the Commission under his leadership.

**Narrowing Antitrust Exemptions**

Many students of antitrust believe that the most effective and durable restraints on competition are those that are mandated, or at least tolerated, by governments. For this reason, they also believe that the so-called “state action” or *Noerr* defenses should be narrowly construed. When Muris found himself in a position to do something about it, he took full advantage of the opportunity. This is noteworthy in itself but equally interesting is the way he went about it.

The first thing that he did was prepare the ground carefully by ordering an extensive internal evaluation of existing law on the state action and the *Noerr* defenses. Successive drafts of these evaluations were shared with his fellow commissioners, who had the opportunity to comment. In this way, Muris was able to achieve a broad internal consensus on principles and objectives before there were any public expressions of opinion. He also then had in place an extensive body of scholarship, which facilitated prompt and principled Commission responses as opportunities arose.

These responses have included statements to state legislatures on pending bills, amicus briefs in pending cases in other jurisdictions, as well as the initiation of administrative complaints. The Commission’s efforts to limit the scope of antitrust exemptions and immunities has focused on matters like restrictions on the provision of professional services, maximum or minimum price fixing, and bans on Internet sales. The bottom line results have been mixed—for the most part, other decision makers have agreed with the Commission but sometimes they have not

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and, of course, the Commission’s own administrative complaints may or may not be supported when all the facts are in. It is noteworthy, however, that all of these initiatives were approved unanimously, and I predict that—regardless of individual outcomes—the cumulative effect will be an important part of the Muris legacy.

Restoration of the Commission’s Traditional Functions

The Federal Trade Commission was originally designed to be a deliberative agency that could provide expert guidance for the future, rather than a prosecutorial agency that would focus on punishment for past offenses. For a variety of reasons, that deliberative and future-oriented role of the FTC had been neglected. The ability to get prompt injunctions and ancillary equitable relief like asset freezes and disgorgement orders under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act\(^\text{23}\) meant that most consumer protection cases migrated into federal courts. At roughly the same time, pre-merger notification under Hart-Scott-Rodino had shifted the focus away from administrative proceedings and toward preliminary injunction actions in federal courts. The Commission was just one more prosecutor.

Tim Muris took a number of actions designed to restore the agency’s special role.

Revival of Administrative Litigation. During Muris’s tenure, there was a marked increase in administrative litigation. Some twenty-two cases were brought or decided in the three years that he served—a dramatic increase over the immediately preceding years.\(^\text{24}\) Most of the cases settled, as might be expected, but currently there are thirteen cases pending. Two are now pending in federal courts of appeal and eleven are pending in various stages of the Commission’s administrative process.

A few years ago, we were concerned that our Administrative Law Judges were not fully utilized. Today, we are concerned that they may be overburdened. Other commissioners endorsed these initiatives with near unanimity, but it was Muris who drove them.

Transparency. “Transparency” is a fancy word for the agency’s effort to explain its actions, even when it is not required to do so. In particular, the term has been applied to voluntary explanations of decisions not to act. Agencies have traditionally been reluctant to volunteer these explanations—in part, because they impose additional burdens on limited resources and, in part, because there always is the fear that explanations for non-action in some situations will provide ammunition for parties who are resisting action in other situations that may superficially appear comparable.

On the other hand, an agency like the FTC, with an overtly educational mission, does have a greater than normal obligation to explain itself. In the Muris years, the Commission has done so to a greater degree than ever before. The effort has been noted and favorably received, even by people who may have disagreed with the underlying substantive decision.\(^\text{25}\)

The almost uniform unanimity that we observe when cases are brought seems to break down when the Commission undertakes to explain why cases were not brought or settlements accept-


\(^{24}\) The Commission’s Web site, http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/index.htm, lists all Part 3 Commission complaints issued over the last eight years.

ed.\textsuperscript{26} It may be that the samples are just too small to support any conclusions, or it may be that commissioners feel greater freedom to express individual views when matters are terminated, one way or another, and there is no risk that these views will affect later litigation in the matter.

\textbf{Emphasis on Research and Education.} The Commission was not created just to bring cases. A study of the legislative history of the FTC Act demonstrates that the Commission was intended primarily to fill an educational role. The Supreme Court decided the \textit{Standard Oil} case in 1911 and held, among other things, that the antitrust laws were subject to a so-called “rule of reason.”\textsuperscript{27} Congress believed that people in the business community needed some guidance on what would be considered reasonable and what would not, and that it would be better if they could find out before they were sued. The Clayton Act\textsuperscript{28} and the FTC Act\textsuperscript{29} were considered and passed as a package to meet this need. The Clayton Act had more specific provisions on matters like exclusive dealing, mergers and director interlocks; the FTC Act created an administrative body to provide informed guidance.

During Muris’s tenure, the Commission was in an almost continuous hearing or “workshop” mode on subjects ranging from basic patent/antitrust issues to Internet privacy, with input from all spectra of opinion. As time passed, the educational role of the FTC was progressively de-emphasized. The impact of Hart-Scott-Rodino and the particularly attractive remedies under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act have already been mentioned. Other factors include the ponderous nature of “notice and comment rule making” and the hostile reaction to some Commission rule making efforts in the late 1970s, as well as the evolution of a rich “rule of reason” jurisprudence in the courts, which mitigated the need for administrative guidance.

In more recent years, however, it has become evident that some issues were a lot more complicated than we had believed—we really did not know as much as we thought we did. Bob Pitofsky first recognized this in 1995 and held extensive hearings, which focused on complex high-tech problems in an international setting but also ranged much further afield.\textsuperscript{30} During Muris’s tenure, the Commission was in an almost continuous hearing or “workshop” mode on subjects ranging from basic patent/antitrust issues to Internet privacy, with input from all spectra of opinion. There is now available an immense body of learning that will be an invaluable resource for decision makers and other interested groups for many years to come. Tim Muris cannot be credited with the original idea but he can fairly be given credit for adopting it and expanding it.

\textsuperscript{27} Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
Unfinished Business

Tim Muris, like any other chairman, inevitably leaves some unfinished business behind. Some of the landmark cases brought during his term are still in active litigation;\(^{32}\) very recently the Commission lost its application for a preliminary injunction in a case that raised significant issues in the analysis of coordinated effects;\(^ {33}\) and the effort to eliminate case-by-case clearance battles with the Department of Justice had to be abandoned after the then-Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee raised vehement objections.\(^ {34}\)

It obviously would not be appropriate to express an individual opinion on the merits of any pending cases that may still require Commission action and it would be even more inappropriate to speculate on what Muris’s opinions would be if he were still on board. The legal standard for voting out a complaint is very different from the standard we apply when judging the merits and, equally important, the post-trial record often differs substantially from the facts available to us when the complaint is brought. The most important point is that Muris was not afraid to lead the Commission into uncharted waters—and his meticulous preparation and powers of persuasion were sufficient to secure the near-unanimous approval of his peers.\(^ {35}\)

In my opinion, the clearance agreement that was negotiated by Muris and Charles James, then head of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, was a superb and mutually unselfish act of statesmanship—and its coerced abandonment was a serious setback for rational government.\(^ {36}\) The problem was that critics mischaracterized the agreement as a fundamental realignment of responsibilities when it really did nothing more than institutionalize the most likely outcomes of the traditionally private and ad hoc determinations made by the two agency heads. In retrospect, Muris and James probably should have just implemented their agreement quietly, instead of announcing it with fanfare. Perhaps, with luck and some lawmaker retirements, two successors down the road will be able to strike a deal that will survive political scrutiny.

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\(^{35}\) In the Arch Coal matter, the Commission vote to authorize the preliminary injunction was 4–1. I dissented from the decision to seek a preliminary injunction, and would have preferred to proceed directly to an administrative trial. See FTC Press Release, FTC To Challenge Arch Coal’s Proposed Acquisition of Triton Coal Company (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/03/archcoal.htm; Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, Arch Coal Inc., available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0310191/040407learystatement0310191.pdf. In the Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation and ENH Medical Group matter, the Commission vote to authorize an administrative complaint was 4–1, with Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour dissenting. See FTC Press Release, FTC Challenges Hospital Merger That Allegedly Led to Anticompetitive Price Increases (Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/02/enh.htm.

Conclusion
It has been a privilege to serve with Bob Pitofsky and Tim Muris, two of the finest chairmen in the history of the Federal Trade Commission. When I celebrate the significant contributions that Muris made, I do not mean to neglect the significant contributions of his predecessor. Each had different areas of primary interest and each faced a different external environment. They each left behind an agency that was even stronger and more esteemed than the agency that they inherited. The bar continues to be raised—and that is a formidable legacy and a challenge for those of us who remain.