I want to thank CCIA and AAI for the opportunity to open today’s very timely program on competition law and patent assertion entities. PAEs are relatively new players in the IP marketplace. To some, PAE activity was questionable from the start. And, the most recent evidence suggests PAEs are evolving in ways that raise red flags for competition and consumers. These entities are driving the increase in patent litigation and targeting firms in a growing slice of the economy. PAE lawsuits are no longer filed primarily against IT firms. Retailers and financial services providers that incorporate software into their products and services are now common targets. Even hotels and coffee shops are not immune. The costs to consumers from PAE activity appear increasingly tangible and direct.

Government and academics are paying attention. Of course, the issues associated with PAE activity are not new to the Federal Trade Commission. We first reported in detail on PAE activity in our March 2011 Report on the Evolving IP Marketplace.¹ Last December, we held a workshop with the Department of Justice to continue to further explore the issue.² There is also a growing body of academic literature evaluating the scope and impact of PAEs. The issue has even prompted the President to issue new directives to target PAE abuse, and Congress is exploring several legislative responses.

The question posed by today’s program is what antitrust enforcers can do. We have a role to play in advancing a greater understanding of the impact of PAE activity and using our enforcement authority where appropriate to curb anticompetitive and deceptive conduct. This afternoon I will discuss how the FTC can do that, but I also want to stress that PAE activity raises tough competition policy and enforcement issues that defy a one-dimensional answer. Protecting consumers from harmful PAE activities requires effort from various corners of government. The PTO and courts, in particular, have leading roles to play in protecting consumers from PAE abuse.

In my remarks today, I will provide an overview of the key competition policy issues associated with PAE activity and how that activity has changed since the Commission issued its 2011 Report. I will then share possible future steps that fall within the Commission’s competition and consumer protection authority. I will close by addressing the critical importance of continuing the effort on patent reform to limit the costs associated with some types of PAE activity.

I. **The Evolving IP Marketplace**

Let me start with terminology. The Commission defines a PAE as a firm with a business model focused primarily on purchasing and asserting patents, typically against operating companies with products currently on the market.3 Others use the term “patent monetizer” to describe firms that earn money primarily in the secondary market for patents.4

In a recent policy paper, the Council of Economic Advisers defined a PAE based on behavior. Under the CEA definition, a PAE is an entity that engages in a variety of aggressive

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3 2011 Report at 50, n.2.
litigation tactics, such as threatening to sue large numbers of companies at once and hiding its identity through shell corporations.\textsuperscript{5} I will be using the Commission’s definition of a PAE.

As I noted, the Commission took its first serious look at PAEs and their activities in our 2011 Report.\textsuperscript{6} We acknowledged the important role that patents play in encouraging invention and subsequent innovation. Rewarding genuine invention is good for competition and consumers. PAEs can serve that goal by reducing the enforcement hurdles facing small inventors and start-ups. The economics of asserting patents has traditionally weighed against enforcement by small companies. Large companies may be slow to respond to demand letters, and the cost of a lawsuit may be prohibitive for a small patent holder facing an uncertain payoff. PAEs can level the playing field by generating economies of scale in litigation and sharing risk with small companies.

PAEs may also increase liquidity in the secondary market for patents, which can drive funding to R&D. A start-up may succeed in developing patented technology, but fail in the marketplace. PAEs can make it easier for a failed start-up to monetize its patents, providing some insurance for venture capitalists. An operating company that exits a particular business may be more likely to invest in new R&D if it can more easily sell patents that no longer support its business model.

In short, there are plausible upsides to PAE activity in terms of encouraging investment in R&D, at least in principle. But when we issued our report two years ago, empirical evidence on the magnitude of the return to inventors and start-ups was largely absent.

Of course, from a competition policy perspective, any evidence of benefit from PAE activity has to be weighed against its costs. That includes the direct costs PAEs impose on

\textsuperscript{6} 2011 Report at 50-72.
targets through litigation, which shifts resources away from productive activities like R&D. When we issued our report, evidence suggested that PAE-driven litigation was rising at a steady pace and concentrated in the IT sector.

PAEs may generate even greater indirect costs by distorting incentives to innovate. Patents asserted against existing products raise the risk of patent hold-up, which can discourage investment in product development. Particularly in the high-tech sector, where patent notice is notoriously difficult, licensing fees are likely to reflect investments the implementer has made to bring a product to market, rather than the true economic value of the patent. And because licenses are always negotiated in the shadow of the law, the problems the Commission has previously identified with the framework for patent remedies – including the uncertainty associated with damage awards and the threat of an injunction or exclusion order – add to the risk of hold-up associated with PAE activities.

These direct and indirect costs, along with little evidence of benefits, led the Commission to view PAE activities with skepticism in our Report. At the same time, we also recognized that PAEs were largely a symptom of underlying flaws in the patent system, and our recommendations were directed at the courts and the patent system, not PAEs themselves.

II. Recent Developments

It has been two years since the Commission issued its 2011 Report, and things are moving fast in this arena. Since then, academics have released new data that sheds more light on the costs and benefits of PAEs. And last December, the FTC’s workshop with DOJ brought together leading academics and stakeholders to examine PAE activities.

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7 Id. at 71.
8 Id. at 71-72.
I want to take a few minutes to highlight some of what we learned. First, data shows that beginning in 2012, the majority of infringement lawsuits were filed by PAEs. The same study tells us that the share of all infringement lawsuits filed by PAEs tripled between 2007 and 2012. Studies using different data and definitions give us lower numbers. But the trend across studies is the same. PAEs have been responsible for an increasing share of patent lawsuits since at least 2006.

Lawsuits of course are only the beginning of the story. While data on activity outside the courtroom is sparse, some evidence, along with common sense, suggests that many more PAE lawsuits are threatened than filed.

Importantly, PAE activity is not just growing. It is also changing shape. PAEs are still fueled largely by software and IT-related patents. They still target IT firms more than companies in any other single sector. But data and anecdotal evidence suggest that PAEs now file half of all their lawsuits against firms outside the high-tech sector that merely incorporate IT into their products. Examples include retailers that do business online, restaurants with websites, and financial services companies that offer mobile banking applications. In 2005, about 40% of PAE lawsuits were filed against firms outside the high-tech sector. Today, that share has risen to 50%, with retailers the most common low-tech targets.

In fact, some of the loudest voices at our December workshop came from retailers. We heard complaints from internet retailers required to defend lawsuits simply because they offered common online shopping features on their web pages, such as drop down menus and electronic shopping carts.

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10 Id.  
11 See Jeruss et al., supra note 4.
Many retailers and small businesses now find themselves victims of nuisance suits that are far cheaper to settle than litigate. Some PAEs send thousands of demand letters to target businesses. The sender may claim the recipient is infringing one or more patents by using ordinary office electronics purchased at the local superstore. One panelist noted that a colleague advised “just hold your nose, settle early, and get out cheap. You’ll save a lot of money if you do.”12 Companies that choose not to settle are responding in other ways, such as pulling Wi-Fi from their stores or useful online tools like calorie counters from their websites.13

Another important development involves what was referred to in the workshop as “hybrid PAE” activity. A so-called “pure PAE” will assert its patents against any firm that is likely to be a good source of licensing fees. It has no particular financial incentive to target one firm versus another. In contrast, a hybrid PAE may have incentives aligned with those of the operating company from which it acquired the patents it is monetizing.14 For instance, we are now hearing a great deal more about sophisticated IPR strategies by operating companies, in particular a practice described as “privateering.”

Privateering, as used here, refers to a situation where an operating company transfers patents to a PAE that may read on a competitor’s products. The sale may be structured in a way that encourages the PAE to target the original owner’s downstream rivals. The operating company benefits indirectly if the PAE raises its rivals costs. There are variations on this theme, but that is the core fact pattern.

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13 Id.
Of course, portfolio transfers from operating companies to PAEs were happening before we heard the term privateer.15 But some commenters claim privateering is about more than monetizing patents. They assert that this emerging strategy allows operating companies to exploit the lack of transparency in patent ownership to win a tactical advantage in the marketplace that could not be gained with a direct attack.16 In some cases, an operating company may also split its portfolio across multiple PAEs, which may have the effect of increasing licensing fees and further burdening rivals.

The success of hybrid PAE transactions typically rests on a lack of transparency. Otherwise the patentee is likely to accomplish little more than mutually assured destruction by proxy. But to the extent privateering and other hybrid PAE strategies rely on a lack of transparency to reduce competition, this of course adds to the costs of PAE activities.

On the benefits side of the equation, we know little more today than we did in 2011. One recent widely cited study claims PAE’s return approximately 25% of the costs imposed on defendants back to inventors.17 We also know that most PAE lawsuits allege infringement of software patents, which often include broad functional claims.18 And evidence suggests that PAEs are less successful than other plaintiffs when their claims are litigated to judgment.19 Thus, the limited evidence we have today tends to support the Commission’s concern that PAEs may do more to distort than improve incentives to invent.

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15 2011 Report at 64.
18 Shapiro, supra note 14, at 15.
But while we know somewhat more today than we did in 2011, we still have only snapshots of the costs and benefits of PAE activity. If we want to see the full competitive picture, we will need to learn a lot more.

III. **What the FTC Can Do**

The FTC can play a significant role in filling out this picture. I am committed to ensuring that the Commission will continue to lead on research and advocacy to inform the policy debate on PAE activity.

In particular, I would like the Commission to help develop a better understanding of the PAE business model, which would inform many of the key cost-benefit questions associated with PAE activity. The Commission has authority under Section 6(b) of the FTC Act to conduct industry studies. We have used that authority in the past to gather information to inform important competition and consumer protection issues. For example, the Commission used its 6(b) authority to investigate practices associated with generic drug entry prior to patent expiration under the Hatch-Waxman framework. That investigation led to a report in 2002 that influenced reforms included in the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003.20

Given the developments in PAE activity and the need for more evidence to inform appropriate policy responses, I believe that the Commission should use its 6(b) authority to study the costs and benefits of PAE activity. Academics doing work in this area have already put forward suggestions for a study that the agency is reviewing. I look forward to continuing to hear from relevant stakeholders as to how the FTC could most productively use its 6(b) authority.21

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21 Several of the comments that were filed in collection with our workshop include a recommendation for a Commission 6(b) study. See Comment of Coalition for Patent Fairness (CPF); Comment of Computer &
The Commission also stands ready to enforce the antitrust laws. As the Commission and DOJ have stated before, standard antitrust analysis applies to issues involving intellectual property rights.\(^\text{22}\) Accordingly, in considering whether action may be appropriate, we will focus on scenarios in which there may be competitive harm, taking into account any cognizable justifications.

With respect to PAEs, antitrust concerns may arise with respect to their formation – the assembly of a patent portfolio through one or more acquisitions – or the assertion of a portfolio once assembled. Portfolio acquisitions that combine substitute patents, for example, may raise the risk of harming competition. The assertion of patent rights by a PAE may also raise antitrust concerns, especially if the PAE is effectively acting as a clandestine surrogate for competitors. The antitrust analysis of agreements involving PAEs and operating companies will of course need to be fact specific, and the issue of market power will likely be key to any evaluation. But hybrid PAE activities may fall within the scope of antitrust enforcement where there is evidence of harm to competition and consumers.

The Commission is also committed to protecting small businesses from deceptive PAE practices using its Section 5 authority under the FTC Act. We are on the watch for PAEs that target small businesses with false claims made to induce the payment of illegitimate licensing fees. This would include telling a small business that it owes money to a PAE for a patent license when the PAE has no ownership interest in, or standing to assert, any patent rights; has only an expired patent; or makes false threats of litigation.

To be sure, problematic PAE activity may not lend itself to an antitrust or a consumer protection law enforcement solution. But I am committed to ensuring that the FTC uses its enforcement power in this area where appropriate.

**IV. PAE Harm is a Symptom of a Larger Problem**

But Commission activity should be just one piece of a broader response. Flaws in the patent system are likely fueling much of the real costs associated with PAE activities. PAEs are good at monetizing patents. But effective monetization of low quality patents imposes a de facto tax on productive economic activity with little or nooffsetting benefit for consumers. High litigation costs add to the problem by allowing PAEs to coerce targets to pay license or settlement fees that are detached from the economic value of the patents at issue. In short, PAEs exploit underlying problems in the patent system to the detriment of innovation and consumers.

There has been significant progress in addressing this core problem. For example, the America Invents Act included reforms directed to improving patent quality and expanding mechanisms to challenge patent validity, both of which are essential to reducing weak IP.23 Third parties may now submit prior art in another’s patent application. Similarly, post-grant review procedures create expedited and cost-effective alternatives to challenge patent validity. This makes it less costly for challengers to weed out weak patents. At the same time, courts have strengthened the non-obviousness requirement for patentability,24 moved towards a more economically rational basis to award patent damages,25 and eliminated the presumption in favor of injunctive relief.26 But as the Obama Administration and Congress have recently recognized, more can and should be done.

25 See, e.g., *Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 632 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
The PTO can adopt rules to require greater transparency concerning ownership of patents and patent applications. This effort is already underway. Earlier this week, the PTO announced that it will begin a rulemaking to require patent applicants and owners to regularly update patent ownership information.\textsuperscript{27} This follows the PTO’s January roundtable to discuss how it could collect and publish real-party-in-interest (RPI) information during patent prosecution and after patents have issued.\textsuperscript{28}

The FTC and DOJ submitted joint comments in connection with the January roundtable supporting the PTO’s proposed regulations.\textsuperscript{29} Insufficient or opaque ownership information increases the opportunity for gamesmanship in PAE licensing strategies. Publication of RPI information, on the other hand, will allow potential licensees to easily identify a patent owner and use this information when deciding whether to seek a license, design around, or avoid marketing the patented technology. Recordation of RPI information also will help the antitrust agencies monitor the competitive impact of patent acquisitions, including serial acquisitions in the same market by the same purchaser, as well as hybrid PAE activities.\textsuperscript{30} We therefore encourage the PTO to promptly adopt requirements for timely recordation of RPI information.

I am pleased that the PTO is also taking steps to address software patent issues. In its recently-announced “Software Partnership,” the PTO has joined with the software community to discuss improvements in the quality of software-related patents. And last week, the

\textsuperscript{27} Teresa Stanek Rea, Acting Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, \textit{USPTO and the Obama Administration Taking Action to Improve Incentives for Future Innovation via High Tech Patents}, \textsc{Director's Forum: A Blog from USPTO's Leadership} (June 17, 2013, 10:27 AM), \url{http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/uspto_and_the_obama_administration} (“Better information on ownership will increase transparency, reduce abusive litigation, and enable more efficient licensing of patented technology.”).


\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Id.} at 5.
Administration announced that the PTO will provide new training to examiners on functional claiming and will develop strategies to improve claim clarity.31

Courts are also a key part in any solution. Meaningful use of Rule 11 to weed out plaintiffs who have not undertaken even simple investigations before filing suit can help punish and deter frivolous claims.32 Similarly, Section 285 of the Patent Act allows courts to shift the costs of litigation in exceptional cases, including when there is evidence of misconduct. Because PAEs can have especially low litigation costs compared to defendants, vigorous fee shifting can discourage abusive litigation practices. Taken together, strong enforcement of Rule 11 and Section 285 will reduce incentives for massive nuisance suit campaigns.

IV. Conclusion

Let me conclude by noting we should be careful not to approach PAEs with one broad brush. There is mounting evidence that PAE activities may have an adverse impact on competition and consumers. But, at this stage, analysis of the costs and benefits of PAE activities remains limited.

The Commission can contribute to a broad policy response to PAEs by using its Section 6(b) authority to collect more comprehensive information on the variety of PAE business models and the scope of their activities. Antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, where warranted, can also have important roles to play in reducing the harm associated with certain PAE conduct. But patent reform and efforts by both the PTO and the courts, are critical to any effort to move the consumer welfare dial on PAEs from cost to benefit.

Thank you, and I look forward to an interesting program.