


# Discussion of “Competition of Spatially Differentiated Firms: An Estimator with an Application to Cement”

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November 16, 2010

# Spatial Markets



Counties

- Market Segmentation is difficult problem with overlapping markets.
- Neighbour's Neighbour problem shows up, and soon the entire country is in the state space.
- Spatial Segmentation is a big issue in Cement, and other bulk commodities; e.g. chemicals, electricity and coal.

# Spatial Price Discrimination

- Global Model of Shipments: each plant ships a certain fraction of cement to each market.
- What makes this model different is the focus on spatial price discrimination:  $p_{jn}$  instead of  $p_j$ .
- Huge Increase in the number of prices in this model  $J \times N$  versus  $J$ .
- Fixed Point of the FOC with respect to price are solvable because of:
  - Logit shocks  $\nu_{nij}$  to smooth the demand system.
  - High performance solvers.
- Not clear what the difference in the predictions of the model look like between the spatial price discrimination versus no discrimination.

# Demand Estimates

Improvement on elasticity over Ryan (2009):

- Aggregate:  $\varepsilon = -0.16$  versus  $\varepsilon = -2.96$ .
- Firm Level:  $\varepsilon_i = -5.70$ .

## Aggregate Model

- Note that this model is very flexible on the exact data required for estimation: minimum distance estimator.
- Intersection of Trade and Industrial Organization: who ships where.
- Topology of trade costs is not only measured in distance: water bulk cargo is much cheaper than land transportation.

# Future Work

- Hard to take this to the dynamics: the state space became the configuration of the entire southwest.
- Look at issues at how we deal with spatial price discrimination:
  - Welfare of price discrimination versus no spatial discrimination.
  - Basing point controversy: price from a common location Ia Steel in the 1950s.
- Issue of the role of international competition in cement.