



April 13, 2010

Federal Trade Commission  
Office of the Secretary, Room H-135 (Annex P)  
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20580

Dear Commission,

Mihajlo Zeljkovic and myself submit the following comment in regard to “Privacy Roundtables – Comment, Project No. P095416.” The substance of this comment is a recently completed report on “A Personalized Approach to Web Privacy—Awareness, Attitudes and Actions” co-authored by us. This report addresses user awareness, attitudes and actions towards behavioral advertising, which is a key component of the Commission’s Privacy Roundtable series.

The report and its abstract:

Craig E. Wills and Mihajlo Zeljkovic. A personalized approach to web privacy—awareness, attitudes and actions. Technical Report WPI-CS-TR-10-07, Computer Science Department, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, April 2010.

This work takes a novel approach to help users better understand and be more aware of what third-parties are learning about them as they browse the Web. The approach we take is to personalize the awareness by using JavaScript embedded in a Web page to examine portions of a user’s Web browser history in order to ascertain Web sites that the user has visited. We then personalize information reported to the user about what third-party sites are tracking the user’s behavior along with demographic information these sites may be inferring from these visited sites and the user’s geographic location.

Results from nearly 4000 users were obtained with about half of these users also responding to a survey to gauge attitudes towards the availability of this information to third parties as well as find out what actions users take to protect their privacy. We found that 63% of users agreed with a statement of concern for third parties monitoring activities while 12% disagreed and the remainder were not sure. About half of our respondents agreed with a concern for knowledge about a user’s location with a little more than half agreeing to concern about inference of demographic

information. In examining these responses based on specific user characteristics we found that females are more concerned about these issues than males.

In terms of possible actions, a majority of users report using an ad blocker tool and even more delete cookies at least some amount of time. Using an opt-out mechanism or removing browser history is done by less than 20% of users. Despite expressing more concern for information known by third-parties, females are not significantly more likely to take actions that may limit what is leaked to these third parties. A contributor to this discrepancy is that females were much less likely to know their settings for many of the actions indicating less familiarity with them. Males were much more likely to use the so-called “porn mode” private browsing feature of browsers.

We appreciate the consideration of this comment by the Commission and would be happy to answer any questions raised by it.

Sincerely,

Craig E. Wills,  
Professor of Computer Science

WPI-CS-TR-10-07

April 2010

A Personalized Approach to Web Privacy—Awareness,  
Attitudes and Actions

by

Craig E. Wills and Mihajlo Zeljkovic

Computer Science  
Technical Report  
Series



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WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

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Computer Science Department

## Abstract

This work takes a novel approach to help users better understand and be more aware of what third-parties are learning about them as they browse the Web. The approach we take is to personalize the awareness by using JavaScript embedded in a Web page to examine portions of a user's Web browser history in order to ascertain Web sites that the user has visited. We then personalize information reported to the user about what third-party sites are tracking the user's behavior along with demographic information these sites may be inferring from these visited sites and the user's geographic location.

Results from nearly 4000 users were obtained with about half of these users also responding to a survey to gauge attitudes towards the availability of this information to third parties as well as find out what actions users take to protect their privacy. We found that 63% of users agreed with a statement of concern for third parties monitoring activities while 12% disagreed and the remainder were not sure. About half of our respondents agreed with a concern for knowledge about a user's location with a little more than half agreeing to concern about inference of demographic information. In examining these responses based on specific user characteristics we found that females are more concerned about these issues than males.

In terms of possible actions, a majority of users report using an ad blocker tool and even more delete cookies at least some amount of time. Using an opt-out mechanism or removing browser history is done by less than 20% of users. Despite expressing more concern for information known by third-parties, females are not significantly more likely to take actions that may limit what is leaked to these third parties. A contributor to this discrepancy is that females were much less likely to know their settings for many of the actions indicating less familiarity with them. Males were much more likely to use the so-called "porn mode" private browsing feature of browsers.

# 1 Introduction

As the Web has evolved, the use of “third-party” sites to serve advertisements on “first-party” sites that users choose to visit has continued to grow. The work of these third-party sites also has evolved as they move from *contextual* advertising where ads are served only on the basis of the first-party site that a user has visited to *behavioral* advertising where advertisers seek to track the behavior of users across first-party sites to build up a “profile” of user activity and interests. Tracking of a user’s browsing behavior raises privacy concerns, particularly if such a profile can be linked with a user’s identity. These concerns have become a public issue and are being examined in the media, by privacy rights groups and by governmental agencies concerned with consumer rights.

In this environment, our work takes a novel approach to help users better understand and be more aware of what third-parties are learning about them as they browse the Web. The approach we take is to personalize the awareness by using JavaScript embedded in a Web page in which a user visits to examine portions of the user’s Web browser history in order to ascertain Web sites that the user has visited. We then personalize information reported to the user about what third-party sites are tracking the user’s behavior along with demographic information these sites may be inferring from these visited sites and the user’s geographic location. Our project is called “WhatTheyKnow” because it helps users understand what “they” (the third-parties) know about them.

Previous work has examined user attitudes towards behavioral advertising [15, 23, 24]. This work has primarily been done through surveys and interviews of user opinions. A survey of Americans indicates that 68% would “use a browser feature that blocks ads, content and tracking code that doesn’t originate from the site they’re visiting” [23]. Tools have been created that show users what third-party sites are present on Web pages that they visit [7, 1]. However these tools are available as extensions to the Firefox browser and hence not widely available to users of other browser platforms. They also require installation by a user, which is an impediment to use for many users.

Our work is distinctive in that we seek to minimize impediments to participation and provide incentives on personalized awareness and sharing of results. Our approach is to create a Web site to increase the awareness of users on how their specific Web browsing habits are being tracked by third-

party sites. These third-party sites are often not even visible to users on the pages they visit.

Our work has three goals:

1. make personalized privacy *awareness* easy by providing users a view of third-parties tracking their viewing habits simply by visiting a Web site without any need for users to install software or browser extensions;
2. seek feedback on users *attitudes* on this tracking and other information inferred about them when surfing the Web; and
3. understand what, if any, *actions* users are taking to prevent tracking of their behavior.

These goals are accomplished in a two-step process for users visiting our Web site. In the first step, a user reads about the site and then clicks on a button, which invokes JavaScript code that probes the history of the browser for the presence of a list of popular Web sites. This list is then sent to our server where the third-parties used for each of the Web sites in the list is determined. A server-side script also uses demographic information about each site in the list to predict the gender and age range of the user. The JavaScript code is also used to determine a user's location via a service that maps Internet addresses to geographic locations. All of this information is then displayed to the user as a personalized summary of what information is known and inferred about the user's behavior on the Web.

Once the information is shown to a user, then the user has the choice to complete a second step. This step seeks feedback on the accuracy of age, gender and location information inferred about them as well as seeking feedback on the user's attitudes towards tracking and the user's use of actions that may prevent third-party sites from monitoring the user's browsing behavior. As an incentive for the user to complete this second step, the user can see the results for all users upon submission of results.

The remainder of this paper describes our work beginning with a discussion of related work in Section 2. We go on to discuss more details of our approach in Section 3 and the results that we obtain from it in Section 4. We conclude with a summary and future directions for our work in Section 5.

## 2 Related Work

The increasing presence of third-party sites used for advertising and analytics has been documented in a longitudinal study showing the penetration of the top-10 third-parties amongst popular growing from 40% in 2005 to 70% in 2008 [13]. Updated results, filed with the Federal Trade Commission [14], show this penetration has increased to over 70% in September 2009. This filing also shows the penetration of the top-10 “families” of third-parties (a family are all sites under the same ownership) has increased to over 80%. A separate study shows that these third-parties are not only increasing their tracking of users, but the browsing behavior of users can be linked to personal information and identifiers via online social networking sites [12], which also employ these same third parties.

As previously indicated, a number of studies have been published that examine user attitudes concerning tracking by third-party aggregators for behavioral advertising [15, 23, 24]. Other work has focused on developing tools that help users understand the extent of this tracking and provide means to limit or prevent it. This work is discussed in the following.

Making a single request to a third-party server may leak private information by encoding the information in the URL. Tools such as Adblock Plus [1] or Ghostery [7] allow syntactic string matching of the URL for monitoring and blocking requests from known aggregators. RequestPolicy [21] takes a white-listing approach. However these tools do not always detect hidden third-party servers that appear to be part of the first-party domain [13].

Browsers do provide means for users to control the sending of first- and third-party cookies, and extensions such as Extended Cookie Manager [5] give users greater control over cookie preferences. However, the removal of cookies, particularly first-party, can lead to errors on some sites [11].

A number of third-party sites now provide a mechanism for users to opt-out of targeted advertisements via third-party cookies. Some of these sites are part of the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI), a cooperative of online marketing and analytics companies [18]. Users can opt-out of receiving targeted ads by any or all of the NAI members through the creation of an “opt-out” cookie. One weakness in this approach is that if a user removes all their cookies, the opt-out cookies are lost. The Firefox TACO extension [22] makes these opt-out cookies persistent.

It is possible for a Web site to determine if a browser has visited any given

URL using a combination of CSS and JavaScript [25]. This technique can produce a partial browsing history without the use of cookies, and may reveal private information, such as which banks sites and OSN pages a user visited. Users can prevent such attacks with the SafeHistory Firefox extension [9].

Modern browsers have added features, such as InPrivate Browsing for Internet Explorer 8 [2], incognito mode for Chrome [8], and Firefox Private Browsing [17]. These features allow users to create a “private” browsing session, also known as “porn mode” for its suspected use [10], where no history is recorded. In addition, Internet Explorer 8’s InPrivate Filtering blocks requests to embedded objects that it encounters multiple times.

### 3 Approach

A key goal of our work is to personalize the experience for each user by identifying actual sites visited by the user and showing what third-party sites are used to track users each of these sites. To accomplish this goal we access the browser history of the user via a piece of JavaScript code to check if various popular and specific types of Web sites are included in the browser’s history.

Browsers maintain history information by default so that previously visited sites can be seen and their link color can be changed from the default when a page containing such a link is shown. It is not possible to list the contents of the history via such a script, but only to query whether or not specific URLs are contained within the history. For example, one of the sites in our list is `cnn.com`. If either the URL `http://cnn.com/` or `http://www.cnn.com/` is found in the browser history then the site `cnn.com` is marked as visited. The script works similarly for all other sites in our list.

The existence of such a scripting capability has been previously publicized for determining a user’s social sites [20] or a user’s gender [16]. A more recent site [25], checks a user’s browser history against an extensive set of site lists from many categories of sites.

Each of these pieces of work influenced our work, but what is unique about the Web site we created is it not only shows a user sites that the user has visited, but also shows the list of third-party sites that track the user’s behavior across these visited sites. This tracking is done in order to build up a profile of the user’s Internet activities so that the user’s interests and

other demographics can be inferred thus allowing targeted advertisements to be served. Our Web site shows a user’s inferred demographics of age range and gender based on the set of sites that are visited. It also shows a user’s location based on the Internet address of the user’s machine.

### 3.1 Gathering User Data

The architecture of our Web site is illustrated in Figure 1. In step 1, we use modified JavaScript code from the work in [20] with a different list of sites. We check each user’s history for the top 1000 sites obtained from Quantcast [19] in July 2009 as well as additional lists of the most popular search engine, social networking and adult entertainment sites. To obtain a user’s location we use a script from [6] to embed location data in the user’s page based upon the Internet address from which the JavaScript code extracts country, state and city information. If the user agrees to participate in our study, then as shown in step 2 of the figure, the list of visited sites and location are submitted to our Web server via a HTTP POST command. We also send the browser type and list of browser plug-ins to understand how well these values uniquely identify a browser. We observe these values are gathered by the JavaScript code of a major third-party site ostensibly for Web analytics. The use of browser type, plug-ins and similar information for fingerprinting a browser is also being studied extensively in another project [4].

### 3.2 Processing User Data

Once the user data is received by our server it is processed by a Perl script to first determine the user’s gender and age based upon demographic data obtained from Quantcast for each of the sites in the list we obtained. The gender data contains the probability of being a male visitor for each site. If  $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n$  represent the probability of a user being male for each of  $n$  sites visited then similar to [16] we use the formula that the probability of the user being male is

$$P(\text{male}) = \frac{1}{1 + \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{1-p_i}{p_i}}$$




Figure 1: Site Architecture

Similar age-based data is available for ten age groups: 3-12, 13-17, 18-20, 21-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65+. To determine the probability for each age range we use a similar calculation as done for gender except we do not include sites for which data from more than one age group is missing.

The Perl script also uses the list of visited sites to approximate the set of third-party sites that know about each site a user has visited. The Perl script uses third-party data that was obtained separately with the Pagestats Firefox extension [3], which is used to visit the home page of each site in our list and record all third-party servers accessed for each page. Once the Perl script obtains the list of visited sites then it simply looks up the stored third-party information for each site. It is important to understand that the set of third-party sites determined for a list of visited sites is intended for awareness and is likely only an approximation for any user. There a number of reasons that it is only an approximation:

1. The script cannot examine a user's entire history, but only query for specific sites. Therefore not all Web sites visited by a user containing third parties are likely to be queried by the script.
2. The set of third-party sites present on a visited site may change over time. The third-parties shown in the results were determined in Octo-

ber 2009.

3. Third-party sites typically use cookies to track users. If a user removes cookie information or blocks advertisements then the determined list of third-parties will not be accurate for the user.
4. While this script uses browser history to determine some of the sites a user visits, third-party tracking sites do not (to our knowledge) use browsing history to track a user's behavior, although [20] suggests using it to determine a user's social networks. If a user periodically removes history then the list of visited sites determined by our JavaScript code may be smaller than the list of tracked sites.

Despite these approximations, the calculated set of third-party sites does provide a user with information on which the third parties are tracking the user's Web browsing behavior. As shown in step 3 of Figure 1, the list of visited sites, location, the calculated gender, age and third-party sites, as well as the browser type and list of plug-ins are stored in a MySQL database.

### **3.3 Presenting Information to Users and Obtaining Feedback**

In step 4 of Figure 1 the list of visited sites along with the known third-party sites for each visited site is shown to the user. A sample of this output is shown in Figure 2 where a user has visited two search engines, a social networking site and three other popular sites.

In addition to the list of visited sites and associated third-parties, a user is also shown the inferred location, gender and age. At this point the user can choose to stop or provide additional information as a follow-up to the reported data. We seek feedback via a survey from the user on three related aspects. First, we ask the user if the inferred location, gender and age range are "correct", "close to correct" or "incorrect". Second, we survey users about their attitudes concerning the information presented to them. We ask them to indicate if they "agree", are "not sure" or "disagree" with specific statements about concern for third-party monitoring of activities, concern that a user's location is known and concern that third-parties can infer demographic information.

Here is the list of **2 search engines** you have visited along with count and list of third-party tracking sites that know about you ([list of site abbreviations](#)).

Visited site	Count	Third-party sites
google.com	1	google
yahoo.com	3	yahoo, yimg, mplex

Here is the list of **1 social network** you have visited along with count and list of third-party tracking sites that know about you ([list of site abbreviations](#)).

Visited site	Count	Third-party sites
facebook.com	3	dblclick, atdnt, adv

Here is the list of **3 other popular sites** you have visited along with count and list of third-party tracking sites that know about you ([list of site abbreviations](#)).

Visited site	Count	Third-party sites
mail.yahoo.com	1	yimg
maps.google.com	0	
cnn.com	8	dblclick, omniture, serearch, g-syndication, revsci, aol, dl-rms, vfive

Figure 2: Sample List of Visited Sites Along with Associated Third-Party Sites Reported to WhatTheyKnow Users

Finally, we ask users what, if any, actions they take to prevent or limit tracking of their browsing behavior. These six questions ask about use of ad blocker tools, cookie blocking, cookie deletion, opt-out mechanisms provided by third-party sites, browser history removal and private browsing session features.

Once a user has responded to each question (or chosen not to respond) and supplied “any additional comments about what you learned” in a text box then the user submits their responses to another Perl script on our site as shown in step 5 of Figure 1. This script locates the user’s prior database record from step 3 by matching a recent record containing the same location, visited sites, browser type and list of plug-ins to update the record in step 6. The user is thanked with a confirmation in step 7 and as an enticement to participation the user is given a link to see the results of all participants in step 8.

### **3.4 Limiting Privacy Concerns**

In order to reduce concerns about participating in our work we deliberately avoid taking actions or asking for information that might raise privacy concerns. Thus we do not use cookies to track user responses nor do we store Internet addresses. Users are explicitly told this with the message “We DO NOT set any cookies, record your IP address or store any information that could identify you.” We also do not explicitly ask for user demographic information, although by correlating user responses on the correctness of location, gender and age inferences we can determine information about user demographics.

## **4 Results**

The Web site at <http://whattheyknow.cs.wpi.edu/> went public in January 2010 with initial announcement of it to faculty, students (primarily undergraduates) and staff at our institution. WPI is a private university with approximately 4000 full-time students and 300 faculty primarily in fields of science and engineering. Subsequently, we followed up this announcement to users and mailing lists outside of WPI and have evidence that the existence of the site spread to many others that were never directly contacted by us.

Near the end of February 2010 we had 3749 users that had visited the site and completed the first step of running the JavaScript program to see their personalized results. 1853 (49%) of these users then followed up these results by completing the survey step, although most questions were answered by between 1750 and 1800 users. Reported results from our analysis are for these roughly 1800 users unless otherwise noted.

## 4.1 Profile of Respondents

As indicted in Section 3.4 we correlate user responses on the correctness of location, gender and age inferences to determine information about user demographics. We also characterize our set of users based upon the set of sites that they visit.

### 4.1.1 Location

Users were asked about the correctness of their location inferred from their Internet address. 64% responded that their location was correct, 23% indicated it was “close to correct” and 13% responded that it was incorrect. Although we choose the particular IP location service because it provided a script that integrated with our JavaScript code, we note that it provided reasonable performance given that 87% of users responded with correct or close to correct location.

Focusing on these users responding with correct or close to correct location, we find that 10% of our respondents are located in Worcester, the city in which WPI is located, 26% were in the state of Massachusetts, the state in which WPI is located, and 87% were in the United States. These results indicate a good representation of users in and around WPI, but with the majority of users beyond WPI.

### 4.1.2 Gender

As part of the results, we displayed the gender predicted based upon the set of sites found in the browser history along with a confidence on the correctness of the prediction. For example, such a result might be “Based upon the sites you visit there is a 62% chance that you are male.” In the case that there was equal chance of male and female, such as when no sites could be found

in the browser history, then we arbitrarily reported “Based upon the sites you visit there is a 50% chance that you are female.” By indicating a gender even if uncertain allows us to ask the user if it is correct.

Overall, we reported that 52% of users were more likely to be male, 33% of users were more likely to be female and 15% were of equal likelihood. Based on user feedback, our predicted gender was correct for 64% of the users. As expected, we observe better correctness values if more sites are detected in a browser’s history and if there is greater confidence in the predicted gender. Combining the results on predicted gender and user feedback on the correctness, we determine that 72% of our respondents are male while 28% are female.

### 4.1.3 Age

We made a similar prediction on the age range of a user based on the set of sites visited where a result such as “Based upon the sites you visit there is a 45% chance that your age range is 35-44” was shown to the user. Unfortunately the predicted age range of users was skewed to only four (out of the possible ten) predicted ranges: 42% for 25-34, 39% for 35-44, 4% for 13-17 and 15% for 3-12 where this latter value was the default (with 10% confidence) when no visited sites could be found in the browser history. We conjecture this skewness occurs for a couple reasons. First, because there are more categories the confidence in each prediction is less than for the gender prediction. Second, because the age ranges in the demographic data were not uniform in size, the two 10-year ranges consistently had the highest predicted confidence values. In hindsight, it would have been better to combine some of the ten age ranges to have more uniform sizes for each.

Overall, the age range was predicted correctly for 19% of users while being “close to correct” for 23% and incorrect for 58%—again these results improve when more sites are detected in the browser history. These results do not provide a means to obtain the age-range breakdown of all users in our data set as was possible for gender. However in subsequent analysis, we do examine responses from users in the 25-34 and 35-44 age ranges who reported that their age range is correct or close to correct.

#### 4.1.4 Visited Sites

Another means of characterization that our data set affords is to examine the set of sites visited by our set of users. The mean number of visited sites for all 3749 users was 15 while the median was 8. Table 1 shows the top-10 most visited sites where `google.com` was found in the browser history for 59% of the users. In 13% of the cases, no sites from our list were found in the browser history. If we only consider cases where at least one site was found in the history then `google.com` was found 68% of the time.

Table 1: Top-10 Visited Sites

Rank	Visited Site	% of All Users	% with History
1	google.com	59	68
2	facebook.com	51	58
3	youtube.com	42	48
4	maps.google.com	31	36
5	cnn.com	24	28
6	weather.com	24	28
7	yahoo.com	24	27
8	ebay.com	23	27
9	twitter.com	20	23
10	apple.com	19	22

While this set of visited sites is interesting, a more important question is how this set compares with the set for a broader range of users. Such a comparison would allow us to understand how the characteristics of our users compare with this broader range. We make such a comparison in Figure 3 where we compare the proportion of WhatTheyKnow users who visit popular sites with the same percentages as reported by Quantcast for these same sites in January 2010. The sites are listed in order of popularity according to Quantcast. The list of sites includes the top-20 Quantcast sites that were in the list of sites we checked along with any remaining sites in the top-20 sites for our set of users.

The list of visited sites is shown for four sets of users in Figure 3. The




Figure 3: WhatTheyKnow User Profiles Relative to Published Profile

WhatTheyKnow results are for all 3749 users. The Survey results are for only the set of users that submitted the survey. The closeness in results between these two sets of users is meaningful because most of our analysis is done for this smaller set. The results show that sites such as `yahoo.com`, `msn.com`, `live.com` have much less of a presence amongst our set of users. One reason for this discrepancy could be that our set of users simply do not have the same profile as those measured by Quantcast. Another reason might have to do with our methodology where we only test the presence of a site's home page in the browser history. If a user does not visit the home page of a site then our JavaScript code does not detect it. Despite this limitation, Figure 3 shows some sites detected at higher rates than observed by Quantcast. These sites include `maps.google.com`, `cnn.com` and `hulu.com`.

The figure also shows results for male and female users where males consistently have larger representation than females for the list of sites. The largest differences between the two genders are for the sites `craigslist.org`, `maps.google.com` and `apple.com`.

#### 4.1.5 Third-Party Sites

We also determined the third-party sites that were most prevalent for our set of users. These results are shown in Table 2 where `doubleclick.net` was present on an average of 7.8 visited sites per user. As a comparison, in March 2010 we made use of the same methodology as described in [13] to obtain the list of third-parties used by a set of over 1000 popular sites. The rank ordering based on these separate results is shown for each site in Table 2.

As expected, the table shows much similarity between the top third-party sites for our WhatTheyKnow users and those sites found for a large list of popular sites. The lists contain seven common third-parties with the three other third-party sites falling just out of the top-10 in the other ranking.

## 4.2 User Attitudes on Tracking

Users were shown their list of detected visited sites and associated third-parties such as shown in Figure 2. We then asked users a number of questions, including three questions regarding user attitudes on various aspects of tracking. The results for all WhatTheyKnow users completing the survey and answering these three questions are:

Table 2: Top-10 Observed Third-Party Sites

Rank	Third-Party	Ave. # of Sites Per User	Rank in March'10 for Methodology of [13]
1	doubleclick.net	7.8	1
2	atdmt.com	3.9	6
3	google-analytics.com	3.9	2
4	omniture.com	3.8	7
5	quantserve.com	3.4	4
6	scorecardresearch.com	2.6	5
7	advertising.com	2.6	14
8	yieldmanager.com	2.1	9
9	revsci.net	1.7	11
10	yimg.com	1.6	13

1. I am concerned that third-party tracking sites have this level of monitoring of my activities.
  - 63% Agree
  - 25% Not sure
  - 12% Disagree
  
2. I am concerned that Web sites have this level of information about my location.
  - 48% Agree
  - 27% Not sure
  - 26% Disagree
  
3. I am concerned that third-party tracking sites can infer information about demographic information such as age and gender based on the sites I visit.
  - 54% Agree
  - 25% Not sure
  - 21% Disagree

With a sampling error of  $\pm 2\%$  (95% confidence interval), these results show statistical significant differences between the three responses. Users

are most concerned about monitoring of activities with 63% agreeing to a statement of concern on this issue and only 12% disagreeing. This result is similar to a survey by Turow et al. where 66% of Americans do not want behavioral advertising [24].

There is less concern about revealing a user’s location, which is determined based upon the Internet address of the user’s machine, although only 26% indicate no concern for this information. Concern for inference of demographic information lies between the other two pieces of information.

In the next step of our work we took these three questions and analyzed their results based upon four independent characteristics about a user: gender, age range (limited to a subset of users as described in Section 4.1.3), location and concern about monitoring of activities. This last characteristic is based on a user’s response to the first question and is intended to understand how a user’s level of concern correlates to other concerns and actions. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Attitudes Based on Four User Characteristics

Attitude	All	Gender		Age		Location			Concerned	
		M	F	25-34	35-44	US- Worc	non US	w/ Monitoring	Agree	Disagree
Concerned that third-party tracking sites monitor activities.										
Agree	63	<i>61</i>	<i>67</i>	63	<b>69</b>	<b>54</b>	65	65	100	0
Disagree	12	<i>14</i>	<i>7</i>	15	10	17	11	13	0	100
Concerned that Web sites have information about location.										
Agree	48	<b>45</b>	<b>55</b>	47	44	47	49	52	<b>69</b>	<b>5</b>
Disagree	26	<b>29</b>	<b>17</b>	30	27	30	24	23	<b>11</b>	<b>88</b>
Concerned that tracking sites can infer demographic info.										
Agree	54	<i>52</i>	<i>58</i>	53	53	48	54	57	<b>76</b>	<b>10</b>
Disagree	21	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	26	21	25	21	23	<b>7</b>	<b>81</b>

The table drops the “not sure” responses for each question and focuses on respondents that agree or disagree with each statement. The second column in Table 3 simply repeats the result of all users for easier comparison. Responses that are statistically significant at the 95% level in comparison

with responses from users not with the given characteristic are shown in **bold** font. Statistically significant results at the 90% level are shown in *italics* font.

The results show that for all three questions females have more concern about the information than males. In all cases this difference is statistically significant at the 90% or 95% level. Recent studies [23, 24] did not specifically report differences in attitudes between male and female users.

There are not strong distinctions in results based on the 21% of users we could identify as in or close to the 25-34 age range or the 19% of users in or close to the 35-44 age range. We did observe a statistically significant difference for the 35-44 age-range users that showed a concern for monitoring of activities by third parties.

In analyzing the results based on location we separated the users for whom the location was correct or close to correct into three groups: those located in Worcester, MA; those located outside of Worcester, but in the United States; and those located outside of the United States. We expect the Worcester results to exclusively represent students, faculty and staff at WPI and thus wanted to explicitly separate out this population for study. As shown, the only statistically significant result is that Worcester users are less concerned with monitoring of activities than all other respondents. Although we do not know the age composition of WPI respondents we do know that 70% of the email messages sent to initially publicize the site went to undergraduate WPI students and results in [24] found this age group the most accepting of tailored ads. This finding likely explains the result we obtained.

Finally, we characterized users by their concern for monitoring of activities to see if this concern correlated to other concerns. By definition, the first result shows 100% values, but as expected the responses for the other two questions correlate to the answer for the first question.

We next used our data set to understand the variation in user response according to the sites they visit. For this portion of the analysis we examined the characteristics for the set of users confirmed to have visited the most popular sites of our set of users in Figure 3. Table 4 shows selected results for the top few sites as well as other sites exhibiting significant differences for these responses or in the set of actions taken in the following section.

These results show few significant results for concern on the monitoring of activities with only CNN users more likely to agree with concern and

Table 4: Attitudes Based on a Sampling of Visited Sites

Action	Visited Site								
	Goo gle	Face book	CNN	Weat her	Ya hoo	Twit ter	Hulu	Pan dora	USPS
Concerned that third-party tracking sites monitor activities.									
Agree	63	63	<b>72</b>	62	65	62	61	<b>56</b>	60
NS	24	24	19	26	23	24	25	30	27
Disagree	12	13	9	12	12	14	14	14	14
Concerned that Web sites have information about location.									
Agree	47	46	48	43	46	<b>42</b>	42	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>
NS	25	25	27	29	29	24	24	26	<b>32</b>
Disagree	28	29	25	28	25	<b>34</b>	<i>34</i>	<b>36</b>	30
Concerned that tracking sites can infer demographic info.									
Agree	52	50	55	49	54	<b>48</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>43</b>	47
NS	26	26	25	26	23	26	28	31	28
Disagree	23	24	20	25	23	26	28	26	24

Pandora users less likely to agree with concern. Users of a number of sites were significantly less concerned that Web sites have information about their location. These sites include Twitter, Hulu, Pandora and USPS (United States Postal Service). Users of three of these sites—Twitter, Hulu and Pandora—were also significantly less likely to be concerned about inference of demographic information.

### 4.3 User Actions on Tracking

In the next portion of our analysis, we examined how these attitudes towards privacy tracking translated into actions taken by users to control it. Preventing the disclosure of location based upon Internet address is difficult because a user’s Internet address is contained in each Web request. One prevention method is to use a Web proxy that services requests from users in a number of locations and consequently anonymizes the location of users making use of it. Similarly preventing tracking sites from inferring demographic information once they know the set of sites a user visits is even more difficult. Other than preventing tracking altogether, users could try to “pollute” their profile by intentionally visiting sites that would cause their inferred profile to be inaccurate. While possible, we did not survey users if they took any of these actions

Rather we focused on six questions regarding actions discussed in Section 2 that users can take regarding blocking ads, blocking and deleting cookies, opting out of targeted ads, removing history and using private browsing. The specific questions and survey results for possible answers are as follows:

1. Use of ad blocker tools will prevent some tracking by third-parties identified for your set of visited sites. Do you use any ad blocker tools to prevent the display of advertisements in Web pages?  
55% Yes  
33% No  
11% Don’t know
2. Use of cookie blocking by your browser will prevent some tracking by third-parties identified for your set of visited sites. Do you:

- 37% Allow all cookies (Internet Explorer and Firefox default)
- 43% Allow cookies for only sites I visit (block cookies to third-party sites)
- 3% Allow no cookies (block cookies for all sites)
- 17% Don't know

3. How often do you delete cookies?

- 21% Often
- 52% Sometimes
- 21% Never
- 6% Don't know

4. Some third-party sites provide an “opt-out” mechanism to avoid receiving targeted ads. The Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) is a cooperative of such sites. Do you use opt-out cookies for third-party sites?

- 16% Yes
- 55% No
- 29% Don't know

5. Periodic removal of browser history prevents scripts like this one from detecting what sites you visit, but will not prevent third-party sites from tracking your behavior (they typically use cookies). What browser history settings do you use:

- 68% Use browser default for managing history
- 15% Clear history when browser closes
- 4% Set browser to not remember history
- 12% Don't know

6. Newer versions of browsers have features to create a “private” browsing session where history is not recorded. These include InPrivate Browsing for Internet Explorer, incognito mode for Chrome and Firefox Private Browsing. Do you use any of these features?

- 33% Yes
- 57% No
- 10% Don't know

The results show that a majority of users report using an ad blocker tool and nearly three-quarters of users delete cookies at least some amount of

time. In contrast, less than 20% of users report using an opt-out mechanism or removing browser history.

For easier comparison across the set of possible actions, we determine the percentage of users that have changed from the default for each. For some actions, we compute the percentage based on one possible answer while for other actions we sum across two possible answers. In all cases, we treat an answer of “don’t know” as using the default for the action. Using this approach, the six possible actions by a user and answers contributing to the percentage for each are: use ad blocker (“yes”), block cookies (“block cookies to third-party sites” + “block to all sites”), delete cookies (“often” + “sometimes”), use opt-out (“yes”), remove history (“clear history on close” + “not remember history”), and use private (“yes”). The second column in Table 5 summarizes the results for all users for these six actions. In addition, the table shows the results based on the same four user characteristics used for analysis in the previous section plus one additional characteristic.

Table 5: Actions Taken Based on Five User Characteristics

Action	All	Gender		Age		Location			Concerned		Use Ad Block
		M	F	25-34	35-44	US-Work	non-US	w/ Monitoring	Agree	Disagree	
Use Ad Blocker	56	55	56	52	<b>48</b>	61	55	53	56	53	100
Block Cookies	46	46	44	<b>39</b>	43	42	46	48	47	40	<b>54</b>
Delete Cookies	73	74	71	69	71	67	75	70	74	70	<b>79</b>
Use Opt-Out	16	15	20	12	11	16	17	13	16	15	<i>19</i>
Remove History	19	20	19	14	9	13	19	19	21	17	<b>24</b>
Use Private	33	<b>40</b>	<b>13</b>	<i>39</i>	32	39	32	38	32	<b>42</b>	35

In examining each of the characteristics there are no significant differences between male and female users except for the use of browsers’ private browsing modes. Males are substantially more likely to use this feature than females, which may be explained by the “porn mode” nickname for this feature [10]. The lack of statistical difference for the other five privacy-related actions is notable because females were much more likely to express concern for leakage of information in the results shown in Table 3. One possible

explanation for this discrepancy is that for all six actions, females were significantly (at 95%-level for five, at 90%-level for one) more likely to answer “don’t know” as to their use of an action. These significant differences (not shown in the table) suggest less familiarity with these actions by females thus limiting their use in translating concern into actions.

Looking at age ranges, we see that in all cases except one, users in the two age ranges are less likely than all of our users to use the available actions and in two of these cases the differences are significant. However, the results show where users ages 25-34 are more likely to use the private browsing feature.

There were no significant differences found due to location. However as expected there is generally a weak correlation between user concern for monitoring and actions taken. For all actions, users agreeing with concern for monitoring report using actions at the same or slightly higher levels than average for all users. Similarly, users disagreeing with this concern use actions at a lower level than average except for the private browsing mechanism where its use is at a significantly *higher* level than average. These overall results indicate that the use of the private browsing feature is not well correlated with other possible actions available to users.

The last column in Table 5 includes all users that report using an ad blocker. This characterization is introduced to understand whether the use of one action correlates with the use of other possible actions. The results show there is such a correlation for all other actions except for private browsing. The correlation for most actions confirms what we would expect to be the case.

We next analyzed differences in preventive actions taken compared with the same set of visited sites used in Table 4. These results are shown for five of the possible actions in Table 6. The sixth action, removal of history, is not shown because its results for all sites is relatively low due to our approach of using browser history to determine if users visit a site. It means that if we detect a site *is* visited then it is less likely that a user has removed history.

The most popular sites, such as Google and Facebook, are less likely to show distinguishing characteristics since they encompass a majority of WhatTheyKnow users. The remaining sites tend to have some actions that show significantly less use than the average for all sites, although again the private browsing feature is reported to be used significantly more for users of Twitter and Hulu.

Table 6: Actions Taken Based on a Sampling of Visited Sites

Action	Visited Site								
	Goo gle	Face book	CNN	Weat her	Ya hoo	Twit ter	Hulu	Pan dora	USPS
Use Ad Blocker	54	55	53	53	56	54	58	53	56
Block Cookies	42	44	46	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>	44	44	<b>37</b>	41
Delete Cookies	71	71	71	<b>65</b>	<b>69</b>	71	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>65</b>
Use Opt-Out	14	14	16	13	15	<b>12</b>	13	14	16
Use Private	35	36	33	31	32	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	36	35

## 4.4 Additional Results

We also examined information regarding accuracy of the determined location, different categories of sites, potential fingerprinting of browsers based upon browser type and plug-ins and user written comments. Results for each of these additional examinations are provided in the following.

### 4.4.1 Location Correctness

We asked respondents in our survey about the type of their location and found 56% at work/school, 40% at home and 4% at a public location. While not explicitly a privacy concern, we also looked at the correctness of the location information based on the type of their location. Focusing on incorrect location, we previously reported that 13% of respondents indicated their location was incorrect. However in correlating this figure with location type we found that 12% of work/school and 12% of home users reported an incorrect location while 33% of public location users reported an incorrect location. This significant difference indicates that at least the IP location service we employed yields much poorer performance for public locations. We also compared the correctness of locations known to be in the U.S. and outside of the U.S. finding that 11% of each type were incorrect for no net difference.

#### 4.4.2 Categories of Visited Sites

In putting together the list of sites to check in the history of each browser, we included sites from three categories: search engines, social networks, and adult entertainment. We added sites from each of these categories to the list if not already included as popular. We found that 66% of WhatTheyKnow users visited at least one search engine, 56% visited at least one social networking site and only 1% visited an adult entertainment site. However, given that 33% of users reported using private browsing, which does not save history, this last figure may not reflect the actual browsing habits of our users. The first two categories did not reveal any interesting data regarding user attitudes or actions and while the last category might reveal interesting results, only 12 such users filled out the survey making any results statistically insignificant.

#### 4.4.3 Browser Fingerprinting

We also examined the uniqueness of browser configurations by computing a fingerprint of the browser type and list of installed plug-ins. The values not only contain names, but also version numbers, which help to make these strings distinct for each browser. In computing this fingerprint for our 3749 users we found 3166 (84%) unique browser fingerprints. These results indicate that such a fingerprint is not unique, but it is a possible means to track users, particularly when combined with other information such as IP address, even if users employ preventive measures. These results are similar in tone with a related project [4].

#### 4.4.4 Written Responses

135 (7%) of the respondents who took the survey added a written response when submitting their answers. A noticeable number of comments were about the age or gender being incorrect, which is not surprising as these demographics were intended more to get people's attention than to necessarily make accurate predictions with what was limited data in many cases. The most common comment was an appreciation for the site and the awareness it brought to users. The following are a sample of comments submitted by users.

“I think the privacy issue is overrated. The age distribution about me was a joke.”

“Curious where your demographics data come from? Also, would like to have more choices on the multiple choice. I just picked ”not sure” because either answer is not what I want to say. That is, I am concerned at a broad level about the way that we categorize people into statistical buckets, but I also recognize that my use of free services on the internet - gmail, wowwiki, google, etc... - demands that those companies make some money off of me - and so I have come to the decision that I will to some extent pay for these services via my data, so I am not sortof angry/grumpy/concerned/surprised. Also wish the private browsing mode was more nuanced-I have used before, but very rarely. I answered no.”

“I used to limit cookies from non-third party sites, but found too many sites broke if I did that. I often use NoScript as a privacy measure (but have found it causes problems since many legit sites forward traffic elsewhere). I would use these features more if the controls were more accurate.”

“Thanks for the info. I’m changing some of my settings!”

“Made me realize that I ought to think more about my privacy settings and cookie settings.”

“Nice tool”

“Interesting (and timely) idea. I look forward to hearing more about this project.”

“this is a great program and I hope it gets lots of use by many people and raises awareness of the issues!!”

“Your questions opened my eyes to new features and protection mechanisms available. Thank you!”

“Very interesting and yet disturbing!”

## 5 Conclusions

In this work we have developed an approach that helps users better understand what information about their browsing behavior is sent to third-party aggregators and the information that is inferred based upon their behavior. Our approach can be used by any user from any browser simply by visiting our Web site where JavaScript code probes a browser’s history to determine popular Web sites that have been visited. We then map the known third-parties of these visited sites, determine age and gender demographics based upon the list of visited sites and use an IP location service to look up a user’s location. This information is shown to users with a follow-up survey used to gauge user attitudes towards the availability of this information to third-parties as well as find out what actions users take to protect their privacy.

We found that 63% of users agreed with concern for third parties monitoring activities while 12% disagreed and the remainder were not sure. This level of concern is comparable to other studies that have been done. About half of our respondents agreed with a concern for knowledge about a user’s location with a little more than half agreeing to concern about inference of demographic information. In examining these responses based on specific user characteristics we found that females are more concerned about these issues than males. We also found strong correlation between the responses of a user for each of these three issues. We found that users of sites such as Twitter and Pandora showed less concern for Web sites having location information or being able to infer demographics.

In terms of possible actions, a majority of users report using an ad blocker tool and even more report deleting cookies at least some amount of time. Using an opt-out mechanism or removing browser history is done by less than 20% of users.

Despite expressing more concern for information known by third-parties, females are not significantly more likely to take actions that may limit what is leaked to these third parties. A contributor to this discrepancy is that females were much less likely to know their settings for many of the actions indicating less familiarity with them. Males were much more likely to use the so-called “porn mode” private browsing feature of browsers.

Overall, users expressing concern for monitoring were only slightly more likely to take preventive actions. Users who blocked ads were more likely to

take other actions. Written feedback from users yielded a number who found the site helpful and interesting.

Moving forward, there are a number of directions for future work. First, we could improve our ability for analysis by directly asking users for demographic information instead of trying to infer it. We could also improve our calculation of the age range and allow users to provide sites instead of only relying on browser history. We would also like to extend the scope of the survey to gather data from a broader spectrum of users.

Another direction is to use ideas from this tool to explore how users make privacy-related decisions. Instead of asking users about the privacy protection actions they take, we are also looking to develop a tool that can directly determine what actions are used and provide users personalized recommendations on what actions they could take.

Finally, there are a number of geo-location services on the Internet of which we used one. While not directly a privacy issue, we are interested in examining the relative accuracy of these services.

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