July 8, 2009

The Honorable Christine Varney  
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust  
United States Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC  20530-0001


Dear Ms. Varney:

The American Medical Association (AMA) appreciates the opportunity to meet with you to discuss competition in health insurance and other antitrust matters of importance to physicians. In advance of our meeting, we are providing you with a copy of the AMA’s latest study entitled, “Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets (2008 update).”

The AMA commends the Obama administration for recognizing the threats that health insurer consolidations pose to the delivery of health care across the country. As then Senator Obama stated during his Presidential election campaign:

There have been over 400 health care mergers in the last 10 years. The American Medical Association reports that 95 percent of insurance markets in the United States are now highly concentrated and the number of insurers has fallen by just under 20 percent since 2000. …As president, I will direct my administration to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement. It will step up review of merger activity and take effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those that do not.1

The AMA would like to assist the Department of Justice (DOJ) as you move forward in this important effort, and we look forward to working with you and your staff. The following discussion provides more detail on these issues from the physician perspective.

I. Health Insurer Market Shares and Market Concentration

Every year for the past eight years, the AMA has conducted the most in-depth study of commercial health insurance markets in the country. The AMA’s most recently published study, “Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets (2008 update)” (the study), is intended to help researchers, policy makers, and federal and state regulators identify areas of the country where consolidation among health insurers may have harmful effects on consumers, on providers of care and on the economy. The study reports health insurer shares and Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) for combined HMO and PPO markets and separate HMO and PPO markets in 42 states and 314 smaller geographic areas across the United States (metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs).2,3

Based on the DOJ/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, key findings in this study are as follows. Considering combined HMO and PPO product markets:

- 94 percent (295) of the MSAs examined are highly concentrated.
- In nearly 90 percent (279) of MSAs, one or more insurers had a market share of 30 percent or greater.
- In more than 40 percent (138) of the MSAs, at least one insurer had a market share of 50 percent or greater.
- In 16 percent (49) of the MSAs, at least one insurer had a market share of 70 percent or greater.

Independent academic researchers, examining different data, have reached similar conclusions. For example, Dafny, Duggan and Ramanarayanan (2009) estimate that the fraction of local markets falling into the “highly concentrated” category (per the DOJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines) increased from 68 to 99 percent between 1998 and 2006.4

II. Health Insurer Market Power

The existence of health insurer market power may be inferred in most of the health insurance markets examined in the AMA’s study. United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966)(the existence of market power “ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market”). The AMA is aware that the influential Seventh Circuit opinion (Ball Memorial Hospital v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1325 (7th Cir. 1986)), authored 20 years ago by Judge Easterbrook, concluded that the health insurer defendant’s high market share did not establish market power because entry barriers in health insurance were low. All that was required, reasoned the court, was a license and money, “which may be supplied on a moment’s notice,” and “no firm has captive customers.” Id., at 1335-36.

The intervening 20 years have demonstrated that the Seventh Circuit in Ball Memorial did not consider the significant barriers that we now know exist, and the assumptions on which the court relied have proven false. It is now well understood that many barriers to entry exist, including: state regulatory requirements; brand name acceptance of established insurers; developing sufficient

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2 The product market excludes Medicare and Medicaid because a significant number of consumers are not eligible for these programs. Thus, Medicare and Medicaid are not substitutes for commercial insurance. The localized geographic market is supported by the observation that most health insurers market locally because employers, employees and other individuals purchase health insurance products that will serve them in proximity to where they work and live.

3 The smaller geographic areas include MSAs and metropolitan divisions as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. The vast majority of these are MSAs, while a few of them are metropolitan divisions, which are subcomponents of very large MSAs (e.g., New York, Chicago). For convenience, both of these smaller areas are referred to as MSAs throughout the report.


The presence of significant entry barriers in health insurance markets was demonstrated in the recent hearings before the Pennsylvania Insurance Department on the competition ramifications of the proposed merger between Highmark Inc. and Independence Blue Cross. The AMA testified at these hearings in opposition to the proposed merger and our submission to the Insurance Department is included for your review. Significant evidence was introduced in those hearings, showing that replicating the Blues’ extensive provider networks constituted a major barrier to entry. The evidence further demonstrated that there has been very little in the way of new entry that might compete with the dominant Blues Plans in the Pennsylvania health insurance markets. In a report commissioned by the Department, LECG concluded that it was unlikely that any competitor would be able to step into the market after a Highmark/IBC merger:

[B]ased on our interviews of market participants and other evidence, there are a number of barriers to entry—including the provider cost advantage enjoyed by the dominant firms in those areas and the strength of the Blue brand in those areas.... On balance, the evidence suggests that to the extent the proposed consolidation reduces competition, it is unlikely that other health insurance firms will be able to step in and replace the loss in competition.

LECG’s conclusion is consistent with the federal antitrust enforcement agencies’ observation that national insurers have been unsuccessful in entering some of the Blue Cross-dominant markets in recent years. For instance, Rob McCann reports that Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan has had “market dominance for decades.” Robert W. McCann, Field of Dreams: Dominant Health Plans and the Search for a “Level Playing Field,” Health Law Handbook, p.42 (Thomson West 2007).

Some market barriers are created by contracting practices used by dominant health insurers. These include most favored nations clauses whereby physicians must agree to give the dominant payor at least as favorable a rate as they give to any other insurer. Other problematic contracting practices

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5 The Department held three public hearings, in which 101 interested parties offered comments, and compiled a Web site that hosted nearly 50,000 pages of commentary. The proposed merger was also the subject of two United States Senate Judiciary Committee hearings. The extensive record included the analysis of financial and economic experts such as LECG, Monica Noether of CRA International, the Blackstone Grays and others. See http://www.ins.state.pa.us/ins/lib/ins/whats_new/Excerpts_from_PA_Insurance_Dept_Expert_Reports.pdf for background information, including excerpts from the experts’ reports.


8 “Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition, Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice” (July 2004) at pp. 8-11.
include all products clauses, anti-assignment provisions and minimum enrollment assurances. See *Id.*, at pp.46-49. The Highmark/IBC hearings also highlighted how market division arrangements prevent entry and allow entrenched firms to maintain market power.

There is a consensus among health economists that most health insurance markets are not perfectly competitive, and as a result, large insurers can exercise market power. A new research study by Northwestern University Professor Leemore Dafny, PhD, to be published by the prestigious *American Economic Review*, finds evidence that health insurers exercise at least some market power in an increasing number of geographic markets. Enclosed is a copy of Dr. Dafny’s study for your review. Dr. Dafny concludes that it takes at least six insurers in a market before market power is eliminated. A study by Dranove *et al.* published in the *Journal of Industrial Economics* reaches similar conclusions.

**III. Health Insurers Possess and Exercise Monopsony Power**

Concentration data reported in the AMA’s study can be used to study health insurer monopsony power. One reason is that the geographic market in which an insurer sells its services to consumers coincides with the geographic market from which it secures services from physicians and other health care providers. Supporting this conclusion is the observation that patients will travel for hospital and physician services only within narrow geographic limits. Therefore, employers want health insurance coverage for their employees in each of the locales where the employees reside or work. Responding to this preference, health insurers must obtain physician coverage in each locale. Moreover, physicians invest and develop their practices locally. Physicians are not mobile and must sell their services to health insurers controlling any significant portion of their practices.

The AMA’s study indicates that numerous insurers possess the sort of monopsony power in physician markets that the DOJ claimed to exist in its challenges of UnitedHealthcare’s acquisition of PacifiCare and Aetna’s acquisition of Prudential’s national health insurance lines. In those cases, the DOJ embraced the notion of a localized market in which health insurers purchase physician services.

The nature of the health care industry facilitates the potential for a health insurer possessing any significant market share to exercise monopsony power over physicians selling health care services within the health insurer’s market. If physicians were to refuse the terms of the dominant buyer, they would likely suffer an irretrievable loss of revenue. Medical services can neither be stored nor exported, and it is difficult to convince consumers (which in many cases are employers) to switch to
different health insurers. Consequently, a physician’s ability to consider realistically terminating a relationship with a health insurer because of low reimbursement rates depends on that physician’s ability to make up lost business by immediately switching to an alternative health insurer. Where those alternatives are lacking, a health insurer will have the ability to reimburse physicians at rates that are below a true competitive level. Health economist Cory Capps, PhD has concluded that this monopsony injury can occur at a health insurer market share of less than 35 percent. Given that in nearly 90 percent of MSAs one or more insurers possess a market share of 30 percent or greater (see summary of study findings at page 2 supra), it is critical for antitrust enforcers to maintain a competitive market in which physicians have adequate competitive alternatives.

IV. Consumer Injury

In an era of spiraling costs, it is tempting to conclude that anything that drives down medical fees, such as monopsony, is a good thing for consumers. But it is a mistake to assume that when insurers push down the cost of physician services, insurers’ interests are perfectly aligned with those of consumers.

Health insurer monopsonists typically are also monopolists. Therefore, their lower input prices (for physician services) do not necessarily lead to lower consumer output prices (for health insurance premiums). As a general proposition, monopsonists drive down their buying price by purchasing fewer products. Because there is less product purchased, there is, in turn, less product sold, which leads to higher output prices. That lower physician fees paid by monopsonist insurers may result in higher premiums to patients was emphasized by R. Hewitt Pate, a former Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, in a 2003 statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee:

A casual observer might believe that if a merger lowers the price the merged firm pays for its inputs, consumers will necessarily benefit. The logic seems to be that because the input purchaser is paying less, the input purchaser’s customers should expect to pay less also. But that is not necessarily the case. Input prices can fall for two entirely different reasons, one of which arises from a true economic efficiency that will tend to result

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15 As alleged in the United/PacifiCare complaint, physicians encouraging patients to change plans “is particularly difficult for patients employed by companies that sponsor only one plan because the patient would need to persuade the employer to sponsor an additional plan with the desired physician in the plan’s network” or the patient would have to use the physician on an out-of-network basis at a higher cost. Complaint at paragraph 37.


17 Bearing in mind that the concentration data cited earlier only consider commercial insurance, some have argued that physicians who are unhappy with the fees they receive from a powerful insurer could turn away from that insurer and instead treat more Medicare and Medicaid patients. However, health economist, David Dranove, PhD, the Walter Mc Nerney Distinguished Professor of Health Industry Management at Northwestern’s Kellogg of Management, explains why Medicare and Medicaid do not make good alternatives for physicians dealing with a monopsonist insurer. (See affidavit of Professor David Dranove in United States v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., and Sierra Health Services, Inc. (attached)). According to Professor Dranove, physicians cannot increase their revenue from Medicare and Medicaid in response to a decrease in commercial health insurer reimbursement. Enrollment in these programs is limited to special populations, and these populations only have a fixed number of patients. Moreover, Medicaid reimbursements to physicians are significantly less than those from commercial health insurers. Professor Dranove concludes: “Medicare and Medicaid do not represent viable alternatives for physicians who face lower fees from a monopsonist insurer. Because Medicare and Medicaid are large purchasers of physician services, excluding them from market share calculations will profoundly change inferences about market shares and monopsony power. Medicare and Medicaid should therefore be excluded when computing shares in the market for the purchase of physician services.”

in lower prices for final consumers. The other, in contrast, represents an efficiency-reducing exercise of market power that will reduce economic welfare, lower prices for suppliers, and may well result in higher prices charged to final consumers.

The Pennsylvania experience is consistent with economic theory. At the conclusion of the Highmark/IBC hearings, the Pennsylvania Insurance Department was prepared to find the proposed merger to be anticompetitive in large part because it would grant the merged health insurer undue leverage over physicians and other health care providers. The Department released the following statement:

Our nationally renowned economic expert, LECG, rejected the idea that using market leverage to reduce provider reimbursements below competitive levels will translate into lower premiums, calling this an “economic fallacy” and noting that the clear weight of economic opinion is that consumers do best when there is a competitive market for purchasing provider services. LECG also found this theory to be borne out by the experience in central Pennsylvania, where competition between Highmark and Capital Blue Cross has been good for providers and good for consumers.

There may be antitrust concerns if a health insurer can lower compensation to physicians even if it cannot raise prices to patients. For example, in the United/PacifiCare merger, the DOJ required a divestiture based on monopsony concerns in Boulder, Colorado, even though United/PacifiCare would not necessarily have had market power in the sale of health insurance. The reason is straightforward: the reduction in compensation would lead to diminished service and quality of care, which harms consumers even though the direct prices paid by subscribers do not increase. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light, 74 Antitrust L.J 707 (2007) (explaining reasons to challenge monopsony power even where there is no immediate impact on consumers). Marius Schwartz, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Address before the 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at Northwestern University School of Law 4-6 (October 20, 1999) (noting that anticompetitive effects can occur even if the conduct does not adversely affect the ultimate consumers who purchase the end-product), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/spceches/3924.wpd.

Reductions in service levels and quality of care cause immediate harm to consumers. In the long run, we must also consider whether monopsony power will harm consumers by driving physicians from the market. Recent projections by the Health Resources and Services Administration suggest a looming shortage of physicians in the United States. Moreover, a recent study by Merritt Hawkins and Associates tracked the viewpoints of physicians between the ages of 50 and 65 (which comprise 36 percent of the physicians in the United States, according to the AMA). The survey found that more than 49 percent of physicians in this population are planning to make a change in their practices that will either eliminate or reduce the number of patients they treat due to frustrations with

19 See Health Resources and Services Administration, Physician Supply and Demand: Projections to 2020 (Oct 2006) (projecting a shortfall of approximately 55,000 physicians in 2020); see also Merritt, Hawkins, et al., Will the Last Physician in America Please Turn Off the Lights? A Look at America’s Looming Doctor Shortage (2004) (predicting a shortage of 90,000 to 200,000 physicians and that average wait times for medical specialties is likely to increase dramatically beyond the current range of two to five weeks).

inadequate reimbursement in the face of continually increasing overhead and administrative and regulatory burdens that detract from actual patient care. The continued exercise of monopsony power will exacerbate this looming shortage.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations for Additional Studies

The AMA hopes that you will find its “Competition in Health Insurance: A Comprehensive Study of U.S. Markets (2008 update)” helpful in fulfilling President Obama’s promise of more rigorous antitrust enforcement in health insurance markets. Restoring competition in the marketplace for the purchase of physician services will improve the quality of care, redress the looming shortage of physicians and lower premiums. The AMA suggests a number of steps that the DOJ should consider in connection with this effort:

1) perform a retrospective study of health insurance mergers analogous to that performed by the Federal Trade Commission on hospital mergers;
2) commission new research to identify causes and consequences of health insurer market power;
3) create a framework for predicting the effects health insurer mergers will have on consumer and provider markets; and
4) gather information that would facilitate additional systematic studies.

The AMA looks forward to working with you and your staff in this important effort. If you have any questions or would like any additional information, please do not hesitate to contact Carol Vargo, Assistant Director, Federal Affairs, (202) 789-7492 or email her at carol.vargo@ama-assn.org.

Sincerely,

Michael D. Maves, MD, MBA

Attachment
The American Medical Association (“AMA”) submits the following comments on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in connection with the public workshop addressing a possible update of those guidelines.

The AMA applauds the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) for undertaking a comprehensive review of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines and appreciates the opportunity to provide comment. This effort is an opportunity to address important matters facing the health care industry, including that of competition in the health insurance industry. In July, 2009, the AMA submitted a letter to Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney outlining the physician’s perspective on health insurance consolidation. For your information, we have attached this letter to provide context to our following comments on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.

The AMA believes that the Merger Guidelines should be revised to take into account developments in antitrust law since 1992. First, the market definition section of the Merger Guidelines should (a) more accurately reflect how market definition is actually performed, and (b) explain the relationship of market definition to the theories of anticompetitive harm identified by the DOJ and FTC (the “Agencies”) in their “Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” Second, the Merger Guidelines should address the issue of monopsony power and how it can injure competition.

A. Geographic Market Definition

The Merger Guidelines devote less than two pages to geographic market definition. As a result, the Merger Guidelines provide only the most superficial statement as to how geographic markets are defined, and supply inadequate guidance as to how the Agencies actually define geographic markets.

The Merger Guidelines’ current approach is to start with the locations at which the two merging firms operate and ask what would happen if the new entity were to raise its prices by a small but significant and nontransitory amount. If “buyers would respond to a price increase on products produced within the tentatively identified region only by shifting to products produced at locations of production outside the region” the hypothetical market is too narrow. The question then becomes whether the price increase
would result in a large enough diversion of sales to the outside producers so as to make the price increase unprofitable. This entire approach is fundamentally asking whether firms outside the hypothetical market exert some form of competitive discipline on the merging firms.

The problem with the summary contained in the Merger Guidelines is that it ignores important differences between markets. Experience has shown that differences between markets require different types of analysis and the evaluation of different types of information. For example, significant differences exist between product markets and service markets, and mergers within these types of markets raise different analytical questions. The Merger Guidelines’ having one method of analysis for product markets and service markets has caused confusion on the proper method of delineating geographic markets and has impaired the Agencies efforts to block certain anticompetitive mergers.

When two manufactures merge, the primary questions are whether consumers can turn to other products that are functionally similar and where consumers can find those products. If the merged entity’s products are sold to consumers in retail locations, an initial step in the process is determining whether functionally similar products are sold in the same retail locations. This information helps identify realistic alternative products for consumers, as well as identifying the general contours of the geographic market. A second step involves determining if functionally similar products are sold in retail locations that are relatively close to the retail locations in which the merged entity’s products are sold. The inquiry then turns to whether functionally similar products could easily enter the hypothetical geographic area, and, thus, become viable alternatives for consumers.  

When focusing on the scope of a product’s geographic market (in a merger involving manufacturers), a critical issue is the way in which the relevant products are distributed and the ways in which these distribution arrangements will change in response to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in price. Attention is given to issues such as shipping methods and the cost of shipping the relevant products over varying distances. The focus is on the movement of the product and not the movement of the ultimate consumer.

Service markets have a dynamic that is very different from the competitive dynamic in markets for manufactured products. In service markets, consumers typically have to travel to a specific location to obtain the service. This is certainly true, for example, with respect to the provision of hospital services. The focus of a geographic market analysis is not the current distribution patterns for a product in the hypothetical market but the preferences and travel patterns of consumers. For various medical services, consumers will not travel long distances because of the nature of the service or

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1 Defining product markets and geographic markets is an interrelated process. Two products are in the same product market if consumers would switch to the different product in response to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in the price of the other product. That question cannot be answered without first having a hypothetical geographic market in which consumers can make that choice. The Merger Guidelines should address this interrelationship.
the repetitive nature of the service. For example, consumers typically cannot travel long
distances for emergency services. Consumers will not travel long distances for services
such as physical therapy or kidney dialysis. Under these conditions, the proximity of
consumers to possible service locations is an important factor, as well as any
impediments that may exist on their ability to travel to a facility. The road network,
quality of the roads, and amount of traffic all become important questions.

Under these conditions, the Merger Guidelines’ focus on the locations of the
service centers (like in a manufacturing case) is misplaced. It is more appropriate to
focus on the locations of the consumers that actually purchase the relevant services.

The locations and travel patterns of consumers in health care markets, however, is
only part of the analysis. With respect to medical and hospital services, a geographic
market analysis has to consider how these services are actually purchased. Focusing on
how these services are consumed leaves out a critical dimension of the competitive
process and results in poorly delineated geographic markets.

Most health services are purchased by health insurance companies that sign
participation agreements with the providers and facilities their policyholders desire. A
health insurance plan needs to offer its policyholders health care providers that fall within
the area in which its policyholders want to go for health care services. A plan, for
example, that does not include a hospital used by a large number of its policyholders will
face substantial difficulties marketing its plan to those consumers. A reduced premium is
economically how a plan would typically have to address the reduced quality of the plan
to consumers by its not having the necessary hospital. A plan’s reducing its premiums,
however, is almost certainly an unrealistic response. If a health insurance plan cannot
price discriminate, it would almost certainly lose significantly more in reduced premiums
than the revenue it would lose if it were forced to swallow entirely a price increase
caused by a merger.

The FTC’s enforcement action in In re Matter of Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare Corporation shows that the Merger Guidelines market definition approach as
presently stated is not useable in many health care markets. The analysis in Evanston Northwestern showed that a direct focus on patient travel patterns and defining the
geographic scope of the market through the iteration process contained in the Merger
Guidelines would have indicated an overly large geographic market that would
significantly understate the merged entities’ market power.

More importantly, in Evanston Northwestern the market definition process was
fundamentally connected to the analysis of competitive harm. Trying to sequentially
identify a geographic market and then evaluate competitive harm would have probably
caused a different conclusion in Evanston Northwestern. This is not a trivial issue. The
FTC’s record challenging hospital mergers in the 1990s probably has much to do with the
separation of market definition from competitive effects analysis.
The same principles and problems apply to mergers of health insurance companies. For similar reasons, the market definition principles in the Merger Guidelines do not provide adequate guidance for health insurance company mergers. Health insurance companies provide consumers with coverage options and a network of providers. Extensive coverage options lose significant value to consumers if the health insurance plan does not have a suitable network of health care providers. Accordingly, plans offering the same coverage options may have dramatically different value to consumers in a particular area because of differences in their provider networks. Framing the issue as what would happen in response to a small but significant and nontransitory increase in the price of a health insurance premium could create improperly large health insurance markets.

B. Monopsony

The Merger Guidelines devote one paragraph to the problem of monopsony power in the section of the Merger Guidelines entitled “Purpose and Underlying Policy Assumptions of the Guidelines.” Section 0.1. Specifically, the Merger Guidelines recognize that the “exercise of market power by buyers (‘monopsony power’) has adverse effects on competition comparable to those associated with the exercise of market power by sellers.” The Merger Guidelines then state that the “Agencies will apply an analytical framework analogous to the framework of these Guidelines.”

The Merger Guidelines do not contain an adequate discussion of how a merger that raises monopsony problems should be analyzed. More importantly, the Merger Guidelines fail to address the issue of monopsony power, even though the Agencies recognize that the analytical frameworks for monopsony power and seller power are not identical; they are only “analogous.” Analyzing monopsony power and its creation or enhancement through a merger requires the adaptation of merger analysis, currently geared toward the selling side of the market, to the buying side.

Since the Merger Guidelines were last revised, monopsony power created by health insurance company mergers has become a serious problem. Today, in 279 metropolitan statistical areas analyzed by the AMA, one or more insurers has a market share of 30 percent or greater. In 138 metropolitan statistical areas analyzed by the AMA, at least one health insurer has a market share of 50 percent or greater. Much of this concentration has occurred as result of mergers of health insurance companies over the last 15 years. As a result of these mergers and the resulting concentration of health insurance markets, most physicians face take it or leave it negotiations when health insurance companies offer reimbursement rates.

When evaluating mergers, the Merger Guidelines identify two broad theories for identifying anticompetitive effects: (a) coordinated interaction, and (b) unilateral effects. The Merger Guidelines and the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines show that coordinated interaction is a greater risk in markets involving homogeneous products; unilateral effects are more likely in markets for differentiated products. Given the
realities of health insurance markets, it is possible that the effect of a merger between health insurers on consumers requires an analysis under a unilateral effects theory, while the analysis of its impact on physician markets requires a coordinated interaction theory. This two tier analysis should be addressed in the Merger Guidelines.

From the perspective of a consumer, health insurance policies look like differentiated products. They may cover different medical services, have different reimbursement rules, and have different provider networks. From a physician’s perspective, although differences exist between health insurance companies, health insurance companies look more like homogeneous entities to physicians with respect to reimbursement. All health insurers provide access to a potentially large pool of patients. When physicians agree to provide their services at a discounted rate, they are essentially purchasing access to the health insurance company’s patient pool. The access that health insurance companies are offering physicians is more akin to a homogeneous product than the health insurance policies sold to consumers. Therefore, while coordinated interaction may not occur on the policyholder (output) side of the market, it could take place on the physician (input) side of the market.

The setting of reimbursement rates is highly susceptible to coordinated interaction by health insurance companies. For example, the reimbursement rates offered to large numbers of physicians by a single health plan are fairly uniform. Health insurance companies also have a strong incentive to follow a price leader when it comes to reimbursement rates. When health insurance firms cannot coordinate on the output side of the market, they have a strong incentive to coordinate on the cost or input side of the market. Further, physicians cannot easily switch to different provider networks in response to the reduction of their reimbursement rate. This reality allows durable price coordination.

When faced with a reduction in reimbursement rates, a physician must make a business decision to determine whether he or she can seek more sustainable reimbursements at a rival health insurance company (assuming that the rival plan pays a higher reimbursement rate). If enough physicians drop out of the plan offering reduced reimbursement, that plan may become less competitive because it has a more limited provider panel than its rivals. A physician’s dropping a plan, however, will cause the physician to incur significant switching costs. The physician will lose patients from the dropped plan, and will have to make up the lost revenue from the other plans in which the physician participates. The number of patients a physician will have to gain from another plan to break even will turn on the differential between the two reimbursement rates. This differential, however, has to be discounted by the risk a physician faces that he or she will not be able to replace patients lost by dropping the lower paying plan. Overall, in most cases, a physician will incur positive switching costs that the physician will not be able to offset with sufficient increased revenues.

Further, switching health plans is a very difficult decision for physicians that impacts their patients and disrupts their practice. The physician-patient relationship is a very important aspect to the delivery of high quality health care and it is a very serious
decision both personally and professionally for physicians to disrupt this relationship by dropping a health plan.

Under this analysis, cheating on a tacit reimbursement rate by a health insurance company is highly unlikely. First, a plan would have to significantly raise reimbursement rates in order to lure physicians away from a rival health network, and they will have to limit the number of physicians they add. Second, this type of cheating will be easily and quickly spotted by the rival plan. Health care plans will know, therefore, that the only probable outcome of cheating is to raise costs.

Unilateral effects theory may also show monopsony power. In the Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Agencies discussed the DOJ’s challenging the merger between Aetna and Prudential. The DOJ concluded that:

the proposed merger would have allowed Aetna to reduce physician reimbursement rates because it would have significantly increased the number of patients enrolled in Aetna health plans and therefore also the number of patients a physician would have lost by terminating participation in Aetna health plans.

Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, p. 36.

Mergers that give health insurance plans monopsony power hurt physicians and consumers. Physicians face the immediate loss of revenue in the form of reduced reimbursement rates. The reduced reimbursement rates, however, will, over time, reduce the quantity of physician services. While this may not result in increased premiums, it will reduce the quality of the health care services available to consumers.

By not addressing the monoposny issue in the Merger Guidelines, the Agencies send a message that this is not an important issue. The Agencies also make it impossible to determine how the agencies will evaluate health insurance mergers and the types of data the Agencies consider important.

Conclusion

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment. The AMA believes that the Horizontal Merger Guidelines should be revised to take into account the developments in antitrust law described above. The AMA looks forward to working with the FTC and DOJ on this important effort.