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October 12, 2008 AL TRADE COMM RECEIVED DOCUMENTS nct 1 5 2000

SECRETARY

Attention: Donald S. Clark

Re: Lexis-Nexis - ChoicePoint Merger

Dear Sir:

The proposed merger between the two providers of information to the credit, collection and private investigation industries is very worrisome. We rely extensively on services provided by both Reed Elsevier and ChoicePoint and their subsidiaries to assist us in serving our clients.

The resulting lack of competition, potential limiting of access to essential information necessary to fight fraud, provides for an effective criminal defense and concentration of personal information to, essentially, one source has very dangerous personal information implications.

If, as proposed, this merger is completed there will not be any necessary check or balance on false information entered into the vast database created. There will be no method for a person whose identity has been stolen to counter that incorrect data with information from competing sources.

What the proponents of this merger are not stating is that both Lexis-Nexis and ChoicePoint are in direct competition with the thousands of Professional Investigators across the nation in performing background checks. The merge of these two companies would allow one all-powerful and all-knowing company to exist in a monopoly with access to public records denied to the little businessman. One company setting one price and release what date they feel they should. That is not free enterprise and it is not conducive to an open society.

As far as fighting identity theft, the creation of one unchecked database would make it much more difficult for those who help the victims identify and find the perpetrators of the criminal action.

The propensity of a monopoly of data and resulting monopoly on release of data would create an

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