PART 272—REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATING STATE AGENCIES

2. In §272.1, a new paragraph (g)(88) is added to read as follows:

§272.1 General terms and conditions.

(g) Implementation . . . .

(88) Amendment No. 292. (i) The effective date of the provisions of this amendment is retroactive to November 6, 1986.

(ii) The actual dates upon which aliens may become eligible under §§273.2 Application processing.

§273.2 Application processing.

(f) Verification. . . .

(1) Mandatory verification. . . .

(ii) Alien status. . . .

(D) Aliens in the categories specified in §273.4(a) (8) through (11) shall present documentation such as, but not limited to, a letter, notice of eligibility, or identification card which clearly identifies the alien has been granted legal status in one of those categories.

§273.4 Citizenship and alien status.

(a) Citizens and eligible aliens. . . .

(8) An alien who is defined as aged, blind or disabled in accordance with section 610(a)(1) of the Social Security Act and is considered to be lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 245A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Such aliens may obtain lawful permanent resident status pursuant to section 245A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act no earlier than November 7, 1986.

(9) An alien who is granted lawful temporary resident status pursuant to section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act at least five years prior to applying for permanent resident status pursuant to section 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

(10) An alien who is, as of June 1, 1987, or thereafter, a special agricultural worker and lawfully admitted for temporary residence no earlier than May 5, 1987.

(11) An alien who is lawfully admitted for temporary residence as an additional special agricultural worker as of October 1, 1989, in accordance with section 210(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.


John W. Bode,
Assistant Secretary for Food and Consumer Services.

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economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Section 603 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 603, requiring a final regulatory flexibility analysis of some rules, is therefore inapplicable.

**Paperwork Reduction Act**

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification rules and report form contain information collection requirements as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3518. Prior to promulgation, these requirements were reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget. The amendments contained in this Notice were approved by OMB on April 29, 1987, for use through March 31, 1990 (OMB Control No. 3094-0005).

**Background**

Section 7A of the Clayton Act ("the act"), 15 U.S.C. 18a, as added by sections 201 and 202 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, requires persons contemplating certain acquisitions of assets or voting securities to give advance notice to the Federal Trade Commission (hereafter referred to as "the Commission") and the Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (hereafter referred to as "the Assistant Attorney General"), and to wait certain designated periods before the consummation of such acquisitions. The transactions to which the advance notice requirement is applicable and the length of the waiting period required are set out respectively in subsections (a) and (b) of section 7A. This amendment to the Clayton Act does not change the standards used in determining the legality of mergers and acquisitions under the antitrust laws.

The legislative history suggests several purposes underlying the act. Congress wanted to assure that large acquisitions were subjected to meaningful scrutiny under the antitrust laws prior to consummation. To this end, Congress clearly intended to eliminate the large "midnight merger," which is negotiated in secret and is announced just before, or sometimes only after, the closing takes place. Congress also provided an opportunity for the Commission or the Assistant Attorney General (who are sometimes hereafter referred to collectively as the "antitrust agencies" or the "enforcement agencies") to seek a court order enjoining the completion of those transactions that the agencies deem to present significant antitrust problems. Finally, Congress sought to facilitate an effective remedy when a challenge by one of the enforcement agencies proved successful. Thus, the act requires that the antitrust agencies receive prior notification of significant acquisitions, provides that they undertake a prompt, thorough investigation of the competitive implications of these acquisitions, and assures the enforcement agencies an opportunity to seek a preliminary injunction before the parties to an acquisition are legally free to consummate it, reducing the problem of unscrambling the assets after the transaction has taken place.

Subsection 7A(d)(1) of the act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(d)(1), directs the Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553, to require that the notification be in such form and contain such information and documentary material as may be necessary and appropriate to determine whether the proposed transaction may, if consummated, violate the antitrust laws. Subsection 7A(d)(2) of the act, 15 U.S.C. 18a(d)(2), grants the Commission, with the concurrence of the Assistant Attorney General, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553, the authority (A) to define the terms used in the act, (B) to exempt additional persons or transactions from the act's notification and waiting period requirements, and (C) to prescribe such other rules as may be necessary and appropriate to carry out the purposes of section 7A.

On December 15, 1976, the Commission issued proposed rules and a proposed Notification and Report Form ("the Form") to implement the act. This proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register of December 20, 1976, 41 FR 55488. Because of the volume of public comment, it became clear to the Commission that some substantial revisions would have to be made in the original rules. On July 25, 1977, the Commission determined that additional public comment on the rules would be desirable and approved revised proposed rules and a revised proposed Notification and Report Form. The revised rules and Form were published in the Federal Register of August 1, 1977, 42 FR 39040. Additional changes in the revised rules and Form were made after the close of the comment period. The Commission formally promulgated the final rules and Form, and issued an accompanying Notice of Basis and Purpose on July 10, 1978. The Assistant Attorney General gave his formal concurrence on July 18, 1978. The final rules and Form and the Statement of Basis and Purpose were published in the Federal Register of July 31, 1978, 43 FR 33451, and became effective on September 5, 1978.

The rules are divided into three parts, which appear at 16 CFR Parts 801, 802, and 803. Part 801 defines a number of the terms used in the rules and explains which acquisitions are subject to the reporting and waiting period requirements. Part 802 contains a number of exemptions from these requirements. Part 803 explains the procedures for complying with the act. The Notification and Report Form, which is completed by persons required to file notification, is an appendix to Part 803 of the rules.

Changes of a substantive nature have been made in the premerger notification rules or Form on five occasions since they were first promulgated. The first was an increase in the minimum dollar value exemption contained in § 802.20 of the rules. This amendment was proposed in the Federal Register of August 10, 1979, 44 FR 47095, and was published in final form in the Federal Register of November 21, 1979, 44 FR 60781. The second amendment replaced the requirement that certain revenue data for the year 1972 be provided in the Notification and Report Form with a requirement that comparable data be provided for the year 1977. This change was made because total revenues for the year 1977 broken down by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes became available from the Bureau of the Census. The amendment appeared in the Federal Register of March 5, 1980, 45 FR 14203, and was effective March 5, 1980.

The third set of changes was published by the Federal Trade Commission as proposed rules changes in the Federal Register of July 29, 1981, 46 FR 36710. These revisions were designed to clarify and improve the effectiveness of the rules and of the Notification and Report Form as well as to reduce the burden of filing notification. Several comments on the proposed changes were received during the comment period. Final rules, which adopted some of the suggestions received during the comment period, but which were substantially the same as the proposed rules, were published in the Federal Register of July 29, 1983, 48 FR 34427, and became effective on August 29, 1983. The fourth change, replacing the requirement to provide 1977 revenue data with a requirement to provide 1982 data on the Form, was published in the Federal Register of March 26, 1986, 51 FR 10368. The fifth set of changes to the rules and the Notification and Report Form was published by the Federal Trade Commission as proposed rule changes in the Federal Register of September 24, 1985, 50 FR 36742. Those thirteen
proposed revisions were designed to reduce the cost to the public of complying with the rules and to improve the program's effectiveness. The Commission decided to adopt nine of the proposals, to reject one proposal and to defer action on the other three. Final rules, which adopted some of the suggestions received from public comments, were published in the Federal Register of March 6, 1987, 52 FR 7066 and became effective on April 10, 1987. These changes included revisions to the Notice and Report Form, found in 16 CFR Part 803 (Appendix). The Form had previously undergone minor revisions on two other occasions.

These amendments to the premerger notification rules grew out of the comments on Proposal 1 of the September 24, 1985, Federal Register notice, that proposed "acquisition vehicle" rules. The underlying problem that the "acquisition vehicle" approach was designed to solve is extensively discussed in that notice of proposed rulemaking. It explains both how in some circumstances an acquisition made by a partnership is not subject to the reporting and waiting obligations of the act, and how in similar circumstances an acquisition made by a newly-formed corporation that has no controlling owner is not subject to the obligations of the act. The proposed rules would have required both types of transactions to be reported.

Upon reviewing the comments on the "acquisition vehicle" proposal, the Commission concluded that that approach appeared likely to require filings in connection with numerous competitively insignificant transactions and that a less inclusive approach could accomplish the primary objective of the proposal: Covering acquisitions by partnerships that are controlled by another entity. In addition, it appears that there have been no problems associated with acquisitions by newly-formed corporations. The Commission therefore reconsidered its proposal and developed a new approach that applies only to partnerships and other entities that do not have outstanding voting securities. On March 6, 1987, the Commission proposed in the Federal Register, 52 FR 7066, amendments to its premerger notification rules to implement this approach.

Four comments were received.

Comments
1. Unocal Corporation
2. Latham & Watkins
3. American Bar Association Section on Antitrust Law


Statement of Basis and Purpose for the Commission's Revised Premerger Notification Rules

Section 801.1(b) Control

Under previous staff interpretations, acquisitions made by certain partnerships were not reportable under the act although acquisitions by similarly structured corporations were reportable. No report was required even if an acquisition was by a partnership that was owned and operated principally by one person, and even if that person was a competitor of the acquired person. Because that result is inconsistent with the treatment of corporations that are dominated by one person and with the objectives of the act and the rules, the Commission proposed amendments to its rules to alter that special treatment of partnerships. Having considered public comments on its proposals, the Commission now amends the definition of control in § 801.1(b) to provide that persons owning 50 percent or more of partnerships or other entities that do not have outstanding voting securities will control such entities. Those persons will now be required to report acquisitions by the entities they own, just as persons must report acquisitions by corporations if they own 50 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of those corporations. This proposal imposes no reporting obligation on owners of minority interests.

The Commission is also amending the alternative definition of control, which is based on the contractual power to designate members of an entity's board of directors or analogous body. The change—from the power to designate a majority to the power to designate 50 percent—results in a uniform 50 percent criterion for all three definitions of control in the rules.

The Purpose of the New Control Definition

Previously, acquisitions by partnerships and other entities that have no outstanding voting securities were frequently not subject to premerger review as a result of two principles of premerger reporting: One, a formal rule for calculating assets of an entity, 18 CFR 801.11(e), and the other, a Premerger Notification Office informal interpretation that a partnership is its own "ultimate parent entity" (that is, a partnership is not controlled by its partners). Section 801.11(e) directs that an entity without a balance sheet not include, in determining its size, any assets that are contributed to the entity for the purpose of making an acquisition. Thus, for example, assume that a partnership is formed to buy a $1 billion company and the partners contribute $1 billion in cash for the purpose of making the acquisition. If the partnership has no other assets (and no sales), the subsequent acquisition of the $1 billion company by the partnership is not reportable. The partnership does not meet the $10 million minimum asset criterion of section 7A(a)(2) of the act because § 801.11(e) directs the partnership not to count the $1 billion that will be used to pay for the acquisition. The informal interpretation deems the acquisition to have been made by the partnership itself, which has no other assets, rather than by its partners, who may well have other assets. Consequently, the size of the partnership is determined by valuing only the partnership's assets.

Of course, if the partnership were employed in the acquisition "for the purpose of avoiding the obligations to comply with the requirements of the act," its existence would be disregarded and the obligations of the act would be determined by applying the act and the rules to the substance of the transaction. 16 CFR 801.90. For example, some persons might be tempted to make an acquisition through a partnership for the purpose of avoiding reporting or delaying their premerger notifications to the antitrust agencies until they were required by the federal securities laws to announce their acquisition publicly. If a partnership were formed for the purpose of avoiding or delaying reporting, § 801.90 would base the reporting requirement on the substance of the transaction. If, for example, the substance is an acquisition by a single person, notwithstanding the structuring of the transaction in the form of a partnership, that person would be required to comply with the obligations of the act prior to consummating the transaction.

These amendments require controlling partners, rather than partnerships, to report transactions in certain other circumstances. Section 801.1(b)(1)(ii) provides that a partnership or other unincorporated entity is deemed to be controlled by any person who owns 50 percent or more of the entity. Thus, a partner who meets the statutory $10 million minimum size criteria and owns
50 percent or more of the partnership would be required to file the notification for an otherwise reportable acquisition by the partnership. The amendments abolish the overly general presumption that partnerships are always independent entities.

These amendments mean, in the example of the acquisition of the $1 billion company discussed above, that the transaction would be reportable if one of the partners were entitled to fifty percent or more of the partnership's profits (or, upon dissolution, of its assets), and that partner's total assets or annual net sales were $10 million or more. That controlling partner, or its parent, would be the "ultimate parent entity" pursuant to § 801.1(a)(3). It would therefore be deemed to be the person making the acquisition.

This broad control to persons owning such large economic interests is appropriate, because, as a general rule, they control these entities in the common sense of that word. The antitrust review should therefore include a comparison of the business holdings of the acquired entity with the business holdings of both the partnership and the controlling partner. By requiring the controlling partner to file, the premerger antitrust review will automatically consider both. While not perfect, this concept, which relies on the entitlement to profits or to assets in the event of dissolution, seems an adequate indicator of control where one person has a right to 50 percent or more of the profits or is entitled to 50 percent or more of the assets upon dissolution. At the very least, it seems unlikely that such an entity would be permitted to continue its existence if it operated in any way that was adverse to the wishes of the 50 percent owner. Consequently, the Commission considers this proposal to be an appropriate supplement to its existing definition of control.

The 50 percent ownership requirement parallels in important respects the treatment of corporations under the existing control rule. Although effective or working control of a corporation can exist as a practical matter with a smaller percentage of shares, § 801.1(b) deems a corporation to be a controlled entity only if one person owns "50 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities" or has a right "presently to designate a majority of the board of directors." While this 50 percent requirement understates actual control of many corporations, the rule is clear and easily determinable.

The rule is arguably overinclusive because one corporation with two 50 percent owners is deemed to have two ultimate parent entities. Nevertheless, this rule correctly reflects the joint control that generally exists in such circumstances. By the Commission's experience, this requirement that both controlling entities file has neither prevented persons from fulfilling the premerger notification requirements nor had a negative impact on business decisions. The 50 percent ownership criterion serves similar functions for determining control of unincorporated entities. It is an objective and predictable standard. Moreover, the degree of ownership is sufficient to ensure in almost all instances that the entities and those deemed to be controlling owners will act in concert to comply with the act's obligations.

In formulating the 50 percent ownership criterion, consideration was given to whether indicators of control should be included. For example, the Commission might have proposed treating all general partners or the sole general partner of a limited partnership as controlling the partnership. While the Commission did not doubt its authority to attribute control on the basis of this and other criteria, the Commission declined to utilize that authority at this time because it might require many unnecessary filings. For example, limited partnerships with sole general partners are common entities whose investments often have little competitive significance. Moreover, if a rule required sole general partners to file notifications, it could easily be avoided by appointing a second or third general partner. At present, a rule requiring all general partners to file seems unnecessary and therefore unduly burdensome, but the Commission retains the option of promulgating such a rule should underreporting of significant acquisitions occur under the rule promulgated here.

Each of the four comments received addresses whether the amendments as proposed are adequate to remedy the underreporting problem caused by the interpretation that makes some acquisitions by partnerships and certain other entities not subject to reporting requirements. All four support "the concepts underlying these proposals" and consider them to be "a considerable improvement over the present Rules" (See Comment 3). The comments neither suggest that these amendments would not have required all the publicized unreported partnership transactions to have been reported, nor criticize the workability of the amendments. Three of the comments noted that partnerships could be set up in such a manner that no partner would control it under the amendments as proposed. Accordingly, these comments favor some action in addition to the proposed rule, but each makes a different suggestion.

The Commission welcomes the suggestions, which relate to abuses that may occur in the future. For the present, the Commission believes its proposed amendments are sufficient, and that the public interest will be served best by their immediate adoption. The amendments as proposed place acquisitions undertaken by partnerships on equal footing with acquisitions undertaken by corporations, and the Commission is not aware of any problem with the existing definition of control as it pertains to corporations. The Commission is not persuaded of the need to expand the reporting obligation to cover numerous competitively insignificant transactions in anticipation of avoidance devices that may never be used.

However, the Commission is considering whether, in light of its adoption of the "partnership control" rule, it should also revise its rules to require reporting the acquisition of control of a partnership. Currently, the staff interpretation makes acquisition of less than a 100 percent interest in a partnership not reportable, because a partnership interest is deemed to be neither a voting security nor an asset. The Commission is also considering the suggestion of Comment 3 from the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law that the economic incentive not to observe premerger reporting obligations might be eliminated by adopting a blanket exemption for all transactions in which an acquiring person would hold less than 5 percent of the voting securities of an issuer. That comment suggests that such acquisitions are unlikely to have antitrust implications.

Changing the Majority Control Criterion

Prior to these amendments, an entity was deemed controlled by a person that had the contractual power to designate a majority of the entity's board of directors. That rule reflects the Commission's belief that such a person should be deemed to control the entity whether or not that entity also is deemed to be controlled according to other criteria. Thus, under the existing rules, a single entity may be deemed controlled by one person that holds 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities of the entity and also by another person who has a contractual right to appoint a majority (i.e., more than 50 percent) of that entity's board of directors (or of individuals exercising similar functions). The Commission has
concluded, however, that no purpose was served and some confusion was generated by inferring control by virtue of ability to appoint directors only when one person may appoint more than 50 percent of the directors. It has therefore revised this criterion to parallel the other control concepts that are based on 50 percent ownership. Under this amendment, an entity is deemed to be controlled by a person with the right to appoint exactly 50 percent, as well as more than 50 percent, of the entity’s directors.

The basis of this decision is illustrated by the following example. Consider a nonprofit joint venture corporation created by two persons that is not deemed to be controlled under § 801.1(b)(1) because it does not issue voting securities, it does not distribute profits and it would disburse assets widely in the event of dissolution. If the power to appoint directors of this venture is split evenly between the two persons that formed the entity, such an entity can be deemed controlled solely as a result of the contractual right to appoint directors. There is no reason to treat the corporate entity differently from a corporation in which the voting shares are split evenly. Both rights are likely to result in an evenly divided board of directors. Accordingly, the amended rule deems an entity to be controlled by a person that has a contractual right to appoint 50 percent or more of the “directors of a corporation, or in the case of unincorporated entities, of individuals exercising similar functions.”

As noted in the discussion above, the Commission has experienced no problems administering its “50 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities” criterion. Even though that requires in appropriate circumstances more than one person to file as the ultimate parent entity of a single issuer, all persons required to file have been able to supply the information required. This experience appears to confirm the Commission’s premise that if one person owns 50 percent of an entity it is at least in joint control of the entity. In the case of a person able to appoint 50 percent of a board of directors (or individuals exercising similar functions), it is even clearer that the entity cannot act without that person’s assent. The Commission therefore has amended its rules so as to deem a person to control an entity if that person has the contractual right to appoint 50 percent or more of the board of directors (or of individuals exercising similar functions) of the entity.

This amendment similarly modifies a Commission staff informal interpretation of § 801.1(b). The Premerger Notification Office deems a corporation controlled if a person can designate a majority of the board as a result of both holding voting securities and having a contractual power to designate directors. In other words, in determining whether an entity is controlled pursuant to § 801.1(b)(2), the staff adds directors elected to the board as a result of holding voting securities to directors designated as a result of a contractual power. Under the amendment, the staff will deem the entity controlled by a person who, as a result of such combined rights, has the power to designate 50 percent or more of the directors.

Operation of the Control Rules

Amended § 801.1(b)(1)(ii) deems an entity to be controlled by a person entitled to 50 percent or more of the entity’s profits, or by a person entitled, upon dissolution, to 50 percent or more of the entity’s assets. This provision does not apply if the entity has outstanding voting securities. The amendment thus creates two systems for determining control: One for entities that have outstanding voting securities, and another for all other entities. These non-overlapping rules for determining control are each supplemented by the alternative—contractual power to designate—control concept. In other words, § 801.1(b)(1)(i) and § 801.1(b)(1)(iii) are mutually exclusive; an entity cannot be controlled both under paragraph (b)(1)(i) by a person that holds 50 percent of the voting securities issued by the entity and under paragraph (b)(1)(iii) by another person that has a right to 50 percent of the entity’s profits. Because the entity had outstanding voting securities, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) does not apply; thus the entity would not be controlled on the basis of a right to profits or to assets upon dissolution. In contrast, under proposed paragraph (b)(2) the entity deemed controlled under (b)(1)(i) as a result of voting securities held by one person would be deemed also controlled under proposed paragraph (b)(2) by another person that had a contractual right to appoint 50 percent or more of the entity’s board of directors.

Similarly, an entity that was deemed controlled under paragraph (b)(1)(ii), because a person had a right to 50 percent of its profits or assets, would also be deemed controlled under (b)(2) if another person had the right to appoint at least 50 percent of that entity’s board of directors (or analogous body). This overlap would be quite rare, however.

As explained above, the Commission staff concluded that partnerships do not possess “individuals exercising similar functions” to directors; therefore, paragraph (b)(2) applies only to other entities that do not have outstanding voting securities.

In addition, the 50 percent or more criteria in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (b)(2) means that under each paragraph two persons can be deemed to control an entity; and under paragraph (b)(1)(iii), four persons could conceivably control an entity, as two persons could each be entitled to 50 percent of the entity’s profits and two different persons each be entitled to 50 percent of the entity’s assets upon dissolution. It is, thus, theoretically possible that as many as six persons could be deemed to control one entity (four under (b)(1)(iii) plus two under (b)(2)). However, as Comment 3 notes, it would be extraordinary for an entity to allocate those incidents of ownership in such different percentages.

As described above, paragraph (b)(1)(ii) is intended to apply only in circumstances in which paragraph (b)(1)(i) does not apply; that is, it applies only to entities that have no outstanding voting securities. Typically, this means paragraph (b)(1)(ii) applies to corporations and paragraph (b)(1)(iii) applies to non-corporate entities. It should be noted, however, that some corporations (for example, entities incorporated under not-for-profit statutes that do not issue voting securities) are subject to paragraph (b)(1)(ii). Similarly, some unincorporated entities (for example, joint stock companies) may have outstanding voting securities. For them, control is determined by paragraph (b)(1)(i).

For purposes of these rules, the fact that an entity issues securities that have some voting rights is not sufficient to deem them voting securities. Limited partnerships commonly issue certificates subject to the Securities Act of 1933 to limited partners. These partnership shares may be transferable and may entitle their holders to vote on a variety of matters, but typically the entities would not be subject to paragraph (b)(1)(i). The definition of “voting security” in § 801.1(f)(1) states that the holder of the security must be entitled “to vote for the election of directors of the issuer, or with respect to unincorporated entities, individuals exercising similar functions.” Because most unincorporated entities do not have bodies analogous to boards of directors or do not elect the membership of such bodies, the securities are not “voting securities” within the meaning of the rules.
The rights to profits and to assets, upon dissolution, described in paragraph (b)(1)(ii) are ownership rights and not creditor rights. Thus, the right to assets, upon dissolution, means after all debt obligations have been satisfied. The right to profits is calculated after payment of any royalty, franchise fee or other expense based on income. Also, as Comment 3 notes, there may be instances in which profits are shared with employees in lieu of compensation, rather than as a return on investment. These compensation distributions should not be included in calculating the right to profits under paragraph (b)(1)(ii). Where parties are in doubt as to the manner in which they should calculate percentage rights to profits or to assets, upon dissolution, they should seek the advice of the Premerger Notification Office.

As is the case with other control provisions, a person deemed to control an entity under paragraph (b)(1)(ii) has attributed to it all the assets of the controlled entity. See § 801.1(c)(8). Thus if “A” controls pursuant to paragraph (b)(1)(ii) a partnership B (because “A” is entitled to 50 percent of B’s profits, or 50 percent of B’s assets upon dissolution), “A” must include the value of all of B’s assets in determining the total assets of “A.” “A” must include all of B’s assets to determine whether it meets the minimum size criteria of section 7A(a)(2) of the act, even though “A” does not have a right to the other 50 percent of B’s profits or assets. Furthermore, if B is entitled to 50 percent of the profits of partnership C, “A” will be deemed to control C also and also must include all the assets of C in determining the size of “A.”

Finally, Comment 3 from the ABA Section of Antitrust Law raises three additional questions about these amendments: First, it asks whether the following transaction is exempt from reporting obligations: A person that controls a partnership acquisitions, assets, from the partnership. As a general matter, the Commission agrees it would be logical to exempt such transactions if acquisition of control of the partnership were a reportable event. However, as noted above, under current staff interpretations, acquisition of control is not normally a reportable event. Consequently, the Commission is not prepared now to exempt the asset acquisition. It will consider such an exemption as it considers making the acquisition of control of a partnership a reportable event.

Second, Comment 3 asks how to resolve the apparent conflict between the amended definition of control and the definition in § 801.1(c)(5), which states that the beneficiary of a trust (regardless of the percentage of its profits to which he is entitled) does not hold the assets of the trust. It is the Commission’s intention that the control amendments, although adopted more recently, do not supersede the more specific treatment of trust assets mandated by § 801.1(c).

The Section of Antitrust Law also raises concerns that rapid implementation of the amendments might disrupt transactions that are nearing completion. For these reasons the section suggests the effective date of the amendments should be delayed for 60 or even 90 days after promulgation of the amendments. The Commission believes that its 35 day period is adequate to prevent disruption and that a longer period might invite the very abuses these amendments are intended to eliminate.

List of Subjects in 16 CFR Part 801

Antitrust.

Accordingly 16 CFR Part 801 is amended as set out below.

PART 801—COVERAGE RULES

1. Authority. The authority for Part 801 continues to read as follows:


2. Section 801.1 is amended by revising the introductory text of paragraph (b), paragraphs (b) (1) and (2), and by designating the existing example as example (1), and adding new examples (2) through (4), as set forth below.

§ 801.1. Definitions.

(b) Control. The term “control” (as used in the terms “control(s),” “controlling,” “controlled by” and “under common control with”) means:

(1) Either: (i) Holding 50 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of an issuer or (ii) in the case of an entity that has no outstanding voting securities, having the right to 50 percent or more of the profits of the entity, or having the right in the event of dissolution to 50 percent or more of the assets of the entity; or
(2) Having the contractual power presently to designate 50 percent or more of the directors of a corporation, or in the case of a nonprofit corporation, the assets of which are to be contributed to a local charitable medical facility, “A” and “B” would each be deemed to control C, pursuant to § 801.1(b)(1)(ii), because each is entitled to 50 percent of the excess of the hospital’s revenues over expenditures.

4. “A” is entitled to 50 percent of the profits of partnership B and 50 percent of the profits of partnership C. B and C form a partnership E with “D” in which each entity has a right to one-third of the profits. When E acquires company X, “A” must report the transaction (assuming it is otherwise reportable).

Pursuant to § 801.1(b)(1)(ii), E is deemed to be controlled by “A,” even though “A” ultimately will receive only one-third of the profits of E. Because B and C are considered as part of “A,” the rules apply to the profits to which B and C are entitled (two-thirds of the profits of E in this example) to “A.”

By direction of the Commission.

Benjamin I. Berman,
Acting Secretary.