list of subjects in 14 CFR Part 71
Airspace, Incorporation by reference, Navigation (air).

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend 14 CFR Part 71 as follows:

PART 71—DESIGNATION OF CLASS A, B, C, D AND E AIRSPACE AREAS; AIR TRAFFIC SERVICE ROUTES; AND REPORTING POINTS

§ 71.1 [Amended]

2. The incorporation by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 of the Federal Aviation Administration Order 7400.9X, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, dated August 7, 2013, and effective September 15, 2013 is amended as follows:

Paragraph 6006  En route domestic airspace areas.

ASW NM E6  Tucumcari, NM [New]
Tucumcari VORTAC, NM
(Lat. 35°10'56" N., long. 103°35'55" W.)

That airspace extending upward from 1,200 feet above the surface within an area bounded by lat. 37°30'00" N., long. 102°33'00" W.; to lat. 36°30'00" N., long. 101°45'00" W.; to lat. 36°23'50" N., long. 101°28'20" W.; to lat. 35°49'45" N., long. 100°00'00" W.; to lat. 32°22'00" N., long. 100°00'00" W.; to lat. 34°52'00" N., long. 100°19'00" W.; to lat. 34°28'00" N., long. 100°45'00" W.; to lat. 34°29'30" N., long. 101°00'00" W.; to lat. 34°36'00" N., long. 100°00'00" W.; to lat. 34°33'00" N., long. 102°00'00" W.; to lat. 34°23'20" N., long. 102°39'45" W.; to lat. 34°19'00" N., long. 102°48'00" W.; to lat. 33°46'30" N., long. 103°22'00" W.; to lat. 33°43'10" N., long. 103°24'30" W.; to lat. 33°38'15" N., long. 103°29'15" W.; to lat. 34°06'45" N., long. 105°09'00" W.; to lat. 34°40'00" N., long. 105°04'00" W.; to lat. 36°12'30" N., long. 105°28'30" W.; to lat. 36°43'00" N., long. 105°20'30" W.; to lat. 36°45'30" N., long. 105°00'00" W.; thence to the point of beginning.

Issued in Seattle, Washington, on December 11, 2013.

Christopher Ramirez,
Acting Manager, Operations Support Group, Western Service Center.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: When the Commission amended the TSR in 2003, it added a requirement that telemarketers transmit identifying information to Caller ID services. Violations of this provision can lead to civil penalties of up to $16,000 per violation, in the case of unlawful conduct that has ended, or $10,000 per day, in the case of ongoing violations. The Commission explained that it added this prohibition to (1) promote consumer privacy by enabling consumers to know who is calling them at home; (2) encourage industry accountability and help legitimate businesses distinguish themselves from deceptive ones; and (3) assist law enforcement in identifying TSR violators. The use of Caller ID information, however, has changed

1Telemarketing Sales Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Final Amended Rule, 68 FR 4580, 4672 (Jan. 29, 2001) [then codified at 16 CFR 310.4(a)(7), now at 16 CFR 310.4(a)(8)].
2See 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)(A); see also Federal Trade Commission Civil Penalty Adjustments, 74 FR 857 (Jan. 9, 2009). In addition, the Truth in Trade Commission Civil Penalty Adjustments, 74 FR 857 (Jan. 9, 2009). In addition, the Truth in

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Telemarketing Sales Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose and Final Amended Rule, 68 FR 4580, 4672 (Jan. 29, 2001) [then codified at 16 CFR 310.4(a)(7), now at 16 CFR 310.4(a)(8)].
2See 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)(A); see also Federal Trade Commission Civil Penalty Adjustments, 74 FR 857 (Jan. 9, 2009). In addition, the Truth in
since 2003 with the growing availability of technologies that allow callers to alter or "spoof" the number and name that appear on the recipient's Caller ID display.4

On December 15, 2010, the Commission issued an ANPR requesting public comment on whether the TSR should be amended to help effectuate the objectives of the Rule’s Caller ID provisions, including, in particular, enabling consumers and law enforcement to use Caller ID information to identify entities responsible for illegal telemarketing practices.5 The Commission received public comments from 51 different individuals and entities in response to the ANPR.6 Of these, 28 came from consumers, 0 from a state attorney general,7 and the remainder from a standards organization,8 attorneys,9 trade associations,10 telemarketers,11 and telecommunications carriers12 and their service providers.13

The consumer comments generally favored any TSR revision that would make Caller ID services more accurate to help in identifying and halting unwanted telemarketing calls.14 The business and trade association comments largely opposed any modifications,15 arguing that additional restrictions would only burden legitimate businesses, and do nothing to halt Caller ID spoofing. Both consumer and business comments noted the harm each has incurred when spoofing has caused their telephone numbers to appear on consumers’ Caller ID displays, subjecting them to consumer complaints and the loss of business goodwill.16

None of the comments submitted in response to the ANPR suggested that any additions or modifications to the TSR could reduce the incidence of Caller ID spoofing. In fact, as previously indicated, Caller ID alteration unquestionably violates the prohibition added to the TSR in 2003 that bars telemarketers from “failing to transmit . . . the telephone number and . . . the name of the telemarketer to any caller identification service in use by a recipient of a telemarketing call.”17 By definition, a spoofed telephone number is not the number of the telemarketer, and the Commission can rely on this prohibition as enforcement action for violation of the TSR against a telemarketer that uses a spoofed number.

Moreover, any modification of the TSR likely would be circumvented by those intent on falsifying Caller ID information without detection because there is no apparent technical solution to the problem that is likely to be implemented in the near term. The comments in response to the ANPR and in presentations at the FTC’s 2012 Robocall Summit demonstrate that, as one commenter put it, “it is not technically feasible, by looking at the signaling data . . . to distinguish between a CPN [calling party number] that has been manipulated and one that has not.”19 This is because the telephone network originally was designed to transmit only basic information, including the CPN and name used for billing.20 Although CPN once sufficed to establish the identity of a caller, this is no longer the case. With the advent of such newer technologies as Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) and programmable autodialers that allow manipulation (and falsification) of the CPN, CPN can no longer function to authenticate the source of all calls.21 Thus, until future modifications to the telephone signaling system provide a more reliable authentication mechanism, prohibitions in the Caller ID provisions of the TSR can be technically evaded.22 Violators using spoofed numbers and names are difficult to track down and identify, and some are based in foreign countries to further complicate law enforcement by U.S. authorities.

Notwithstanding the likely persistence of the problem of Caller ID spoofing, market initiatives are underway to commercialize innovative new technologies that offer promise for curting the number of unwanted robocalls that consumers receive.23 These technologies rely on call filtering systems to help screen out unwanted robocalls, including those placed by telemarketers attempting to hide behind spoofed telephone numbers. The FTC’s

5 75 FR 78179 (Dec. 15, 2010).
6 The comments are available online at www.ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrcalleridnprm/index.shtml and are identified here by the commenter’s name and the document number. One comment was blank (Errickson, No. 00041), one was entered twice (AT&T Servs., Inc., Nos. 00040, 00057), and one added an addendum reiterating a prior comment (Smith, Nos. 00021, 00024).
8 Alliance for Telecom. Indus. Solutions, No. 00048.
9 Copilevitz & Canter, LLC, No. 00036; Heyman Law Office, No. 00038.
10 E.g., ACA Int’l, No. 00042; American Teleservices Ass’n, No. 00050; Direct Mktg, Ass’n, No. 00051.
11 E.g., InfoCision Mgmt. Corp., No. 00052; MDS Commc’n, No. 00046; Soundbite Commc’n, No. 00056.
12 AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 00040; NobleBiz, Inc., No. 00043; Verizon and Verizon Wireless, No. 00044.
13 E.g., Bent, No. 00045; Martino, No. 00022; Omega Servs., LLC, No. 00054.
14 E.g., Bos, No. 00016; Grout, No. 00034; Herrera, No. 00025; Michael, No. 00017; Smith, 00020. A few consumers advocated making Caller ID spoofing a criminal offense, which the Commission lacks the statutory authority to do. E.g., Fox, No. 00027; Messer, No. 00018; Shields, No. 00029.
15 E.g., American Teleservices Ass’n, No. 00050, at 5; AT&T Servs., Inc., No. 00040, at 3–4; Verizon and Verizon Wireless, No. 00044, at 3–4. Some of the comments supported proposals to give sellers and telemarketers greater flexibility in choosing what may appear in Caller ID name displays, such as authorization to use well-known product names. See, e.g., Teleperformance USA, No. 00037. These proposals may be raised by commenters in the forthcoming review.
16 The record indicates that at least one technical proposal has been advanced that might be able to solve the authentication problem, see Bent, No. 00045, but it appears that this or any other technical solution to Caller ID spoofing will not be available in the near term and would require modification of the current signaling system and likely action by the Federal Communications Commission. See Stopping Fraudulent Robocall Scams: Can More Be Done? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp. (July 16, 2013) at 21, n.74 [Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission (available at http://ftc.gov/os/testimony/130717 robocallstatement.pdf) (outlining the technical work to be done in the “coming months and years”).
17 See supra note 1.
18 The FTC 2012 Robocall Summit, convened with the goal of developing solutions to the rapid rise in illegal robocalls, included an update on the current state of robocall technology, a discussion of the laws surrounding the use of robocalls, and an exploration of potential technological solutions to the problem of illegal robocalls (including panels on caller-ID spoofing and call authentication technology, data mining and anomaly detection, and call-blocking technology).
Robocall Challenge was designed to help address unwanted robocalls by spurring innovation in the marketplace.\(^{24}\)

While the Commission has concluded that modification of the existing Caller ID requirements of the TSR would not serve any useful purpose at this time, it remains fully committed to combatting illegal telemarketing and Caller ID spoofing. In addition to the recent Robocall Challenge and Robocall Summit,\(^{25}\) the Commission will continue to vigorously enforce the TSR, including its prohibition on spoofing, and the 2009 rule amendments that prohibit the vast majority of robocalls.\(^{26}\) Since the creation of the national Do Not Call Registry in 2003, the FTC has brought 110 cases alleging Do Not Call privacy violations against 320 companies and 263 individuals. The 86 cases that have concluded thus far have resulted in orders totaling over $126 million in civil penalties and $793 million in restitution or disgorgement. Under the 2009 amendments, the FTC has brought 110 robocall cases against 103 companies and 80 individuals,\(^{27}\) including a number of cases that have alleged TSR Caller ID spoofing violations.\(^{28}\) As technology changes, the Commission will continue to evaluate if and when amending the TSR to specifically address Caller ID spoofing would further assist in the Commission’s enforcement efforts.

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2013–30290 Filed 12–19–13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750–01–P

**FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION**

16 CFR Part 312

RIN 3084–AB20

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule Proposed Parental Consent Method; iVeriFly, Inc., Application for Approval of Parental Consent Method

**AGENCY:** Federal Trade Commission (FTC or Commission).

**ACTION:** Request for public comment.

**SUMMARY:** The Federal Trade Commission requests public comment concerning the proposed parental consent method submitted by iVeriFly, Inc. (“iVeriFly”) under the Voluntary Commission Approval Processes provision of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.

**DATES:** Written comments must be received on or before January 21, 2014.

**ADDRESSES:** Interested parties may file a comment online or on paper, by following the instructions in the Request for Comment Part of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Write “iVeriFly Application for Parental Consent Method, Project No. P–135420” on your comment and file your comment online at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/04/robochallenge.shtm. The Commission’s rulemaking files related to the proposed parental consent method, together with the rule, all documents and comments submitted to the Commission, and the Commission’s related decisions, are available on the Commission’s Web site at www.ftc.gov.

**Section B. Questions on the Parental Consent Method**

The Commission is seeking comment on the proposed parental consent method, and is particularly interested in receiving comment on the questions that follow. These questions are designed to assist the Commission’s consideration of the petition and should not be construed as a limitation on the issues on which public comment may be submitted. Responses to these questions should cite the number of the question being answered. For all comments submitted, please provide any relevant data, statistics, or any other evidence, upon which those comments are based.

1. Is this method, both with respect to the process for obtaining consent for an initial operator and any subsequent operators, already covered by existing methods enumerated in Section 312.5(b)(1) of the Rule?

2. If this is a new method, provide comments on whether the proposed parental consent method, both with respect to an initial operator and any subsequent operators, meets the requirements for parental consent laid out in 16 CFR 312.5(b)(1). Specifically,

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\(^{25}\) See note 18, supra.

\(^{26}\) See Telemarketing Sales Rule, Final Rule Amendments, 73 FR 51164 (Aug. 29, 2008). The amendments, codified at 16 CFR 310.4(b)(1)(v), prohibit prerecorded message calls without a consumer’s prior written agreement to receive them, and require that such messages tell consumers at the outset of the message how to activate an automated interactive opt-out mechanism that will place them on the marketer’s do-not-call list and terminate the call. The Federal Communications Commission has adopted corresponding requirements that took effect on October 16, 2013. See Telephone Consumer Protection Action of 1991, Final Rule, 77 FR 34233 (June 11, 2012), and Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Final Rule and Announcement of Effective Date, 77 FR 63240 (Oct. 16, 2012).
