

IN THE MATTER OF  
KELLOGG COMPANY, ET AL.

*Docket 8883. Interlocutory Order, Jan. 29, 1979*

Order denying motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, to withdraw the proceedings from adjudication and to hold an evidentiary hearing.

ORDER

On November 29, 1978, General Mills filed a motion and supporting memorandum seeking dismissal of the complaint, or alternative relief including withdrawal of the proceedings from adjudication and an evidentiary hearing on the negotiations with Judge Hinkes. Complaint counsel responded on December 12, 1978. The Commission has reviewed these submissions as well as the Order, separate statement of Chairman Pertschuk, and accompanying materials issued on December 8, 1978, and has determined that the relief requested by General Mills should be, and hereby is denied.

I

With respect to General Mills' assertion that the complaint must be dismissed because any continuation of the proceedings will violate General Mills' statutory and constitutional rights, the Commission has concluded that the grounds stated do not warrant the relief requested. In the first place, members of the Commission other than Chairman Pertschuk were unaware of the negotiations with Judge Hinkes at the time that they occurred. Hence, no basis exists in support of a claim that the Commission as a body violated General Mills' rights. Second, Chairman Pertschuk's conduct with respect to the Hinkes contract neither demonstrates a lack of impartiality nor creates an appearance thereof. On the contrary, his conduct was motivated solely by considerations of sound administration and a desire to accommodate the interests of all the parties in bringing these proceedings to an expeditious conclusion. Clearly, the circumstances surrounding his actions would not lead a reasonable person to conclude otherwise.

To the extent that General Mills' motion is based upon contacts between Chairman Pertschuk and Judge Hinkes, it is important to note that Chairman Pertschuk was not acting as an interested party or on behalf of an interested party, but as the "administrative head of the agency." Rules of Practice Section 0.8(a); Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, Section 1(a), 64 Stat. 1264, *reprinted in* 15 U.S.C. 41 App. Further, the Chairman's actions were not related to the merits

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of the proceeding in any way, nor did he discuss the merits with Judge Hinkes. In light of these facts, the Commission has concluded that there is no actual or apparent lack of impartiality on the part of the Chairman or of any other Commissioner, and that the course of negotiations did not prejudice General Mills' rights in any manner.

## II

While General Mills argues that the Commission has an "affirmative duty" to hold an evidentiary hearing, the authorities cited do not warrant such a conclusion. The facts here are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances involved in *United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB*, 281 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1960), and *Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States*, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Moreover, to the extent that the motion otherwise seeks the information contained in or appended to the Commission's order of December 8, it is dismissed as moot. To the extent that it seeks to probe beyond the explanation already offered, it is denied. General Mills seeks in effect, to probe the predecisional "mental processess" of an agency. Such probing of the mental processes is disfavored, especially where, as here, the reasons for an agency decision are stated. *United States v. Morgan*, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); *National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA*, 491 F.2d 1141, 1144-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974). In this case, the Chairman has given an ample statement concerning his actions, and related memoranda have been released. See Order of December 8, 1978. Nor has there been any showing of bad faith or improper behavior. On the contrary, the Commission believes that the documents in the record demonstrate the absence of improper behavior or bad faith.

## III

Finally, the Commission declines to entertain General Mills' request to withdraw this matter from adjudication and to consider the possibility of settlement. General Mills is entirely free to follow the procedures set forth in Rules of Practice Section 3.25, should it choose to do so.

## IV

*It is ordered*, That (1) General Mills' motion of November 29, 1978, is dismissed as moot to the extent it seeks relief already granted; and (2) To the extent it seeks relief not previously granted, it is denied in all respects.

Commissioner Pitofsky did not participate.

## IN THE MATTER OF

## KELLOGG COMPANY, ET AL.

*Docket 8883. Interlocutory Order, Jan. 29, 1979*

Order denying motion to disqualify FTC Chairman and each other Commissioner advised in advance of proposal to retain ALJ on contract basis.

## ORDER

On December 7, 1978, General Foods Corporation filed a motion to disqualify Chairman Pertschuk and each other Commissioner advised in advance of the proposal to retain Judge Hinkes on a contract basis. On January 11, 1979, the Chairman responded to General Foods' motion and refused to disqualify himself. That response was placed on the public docket and served on the parties.

In responding to General Foods' alternative motion that the Commission itself determine whether the Chairman should be disqualified from participating in these proceedings,<sup>1</sup> we see no reason to differ from the result reached by the Chairman. The Chairman's actions were undertaken pursuant to his administrative authority under Reorganization Plan No. 8 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1264. The documents which have been released, and the Chairman's statement of December 8, clearly indicate that his actions in this matter were taken without reference to the merits of the case. Under the circumstances we do not believe that any bias, prejudice or apparent unfairness has been demonstrated. *Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC*, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970); *Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC*, 306 F.2d 260, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

As to General Foods' motion to disqualify each of the Commissioners who had advance knowledge of the Hinkes contract, the record is clear that no such Commissioner was so advised. Accordingly,

*It is ordered*, That the motion of General Foods Corporation to disqualify FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk and each other Commissioner advised in advance of the proposal to retain Judge Hinkes on a contract basis be, and the same hereby is, denied.

Chairman Pertschuk and Commissioner Pitofsky did not participate.

<sup>1</sup> General Foods argues that the Chairman should be disqualified not only from participating in any decision with respect to the Hinkes contract, but also from participating in any future deliberations in this case.

Complaint

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IN THE MATTER OF

HARPER SALES, INC., ET AL.

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF  
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT*Docket 9070. Complaint, Dec. 19, 1975 — Decision, Feb. 1, 1979*

This consent order, among other things, requires a Rush, N.Y. mobile home dealer and its affiliates to cease conditioning the leasing or renting of space in their trailer parks to the purchase of mobile homes and accessories from Harper Sales, Inc. or other designated sources.

*Appearances*

For the Commission: *Henry R. Whitlock* and *Herbert S. Forsmith*.  
For the respondents: *John Stuart Smith, Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle*, Rochester, N.Y.

## COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission, having reason to believe that the parties identified in the caption hereof, and more particularly described and referred to hereinafter as respondents, have violated and are now violating the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and it appearing that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the public interest, hereby issues this complaint stating its charges as follows:

## I. DEFINITIONS

PARAGRAPH 1. For the purposes of this complaint, the following definitions shall apply:

(a) "Mobile home" means a transportable unit or units designed to be placed without a permanent foundation, connected to utilities, and used or capable of being used for year-round living.

(b) "Mobile home park" means a tract of land utilized specifically for the purpose of renting sites for the placement of mobile homes for residential purposes and in which utility connections and various communal services are commonly provided.

## II. RESPONDENTS

PAR. 2. Respondent Harper Sales, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal office located at 7500 West Henrietta Road, Rush, New York.

PAR. 3. Respondent Edgewood Park Estates, Inc. is a corporation

organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal place of business located at 4000 Brick Schoolhouse Road, Hamlin, New York.

PAR. 4. Respondent Harper Park-Avon is a partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal office located at 6150 East Avon-Lima Road, Avon, New York.

PAR. 5. Respondents Ralph R. Harper and John R. Harper are officers of corporate respondent Harper Sales, Inc. They formulate, direct, approve, authorize and control the acts and practices of the corporate respondent including the acts and practices hereinafter set forth. Said individual respondents also are partners in the partnership respondent, Harper Park-Avon. They formulate, direct, approve, authorize and control the acts and practices of the partnership respondent including the acts and practices hereinafter set forth. Their business address is the same as that of corporate respondent Harper Sales, Inc.

PAR. 6. Respondent Harper Sales, Inc. has been, and is now, engaged in the advertising, offering for sale, sale and distribution of mobile homes and mobile home accessories.

In fiscal year 1972, sales of mobile homes by respondent Harper Sales, Inc. were approximately \$1,600,000.

PAR. 7. Respondent Edgewood Park Estates, Inc. has been, and is now, engaged in the development and operation of a mobile home park known as Harper Park-Hamlin located at the same address as that of said corporate respondent.

PAR. 8. Respondent Harper Park-Avon has been and is now, engaged in the development and operation of a mobile home park located at 6150 East Avon-Lima Road, Avon, New York.

### III. JURISDICTION

PAR. 9. (a) In the course and conduct of its business as aforesaid, respondent Harper Sales, Inc. now causes, and for some time last past has caused, mobile homes and other products to be shipped to purchasers located in states other than New York.

(b) In the course and conduct of its business as aforesaid, respondent Harper Sales, Inc. has purchased and continues to regularly purchase mobile homes and other products from suppliers in states other than New York for the purpose of offering said products for sale, to maintain an available inventory for sale and to fill special purchase orders received from their customers.

(c) In the course and conduct of their business, respondents Edgewood Park Estates, Inc. and Harper Park-Avon have entered into agreements with respondent Harper Sales, Inc. which are

essential to make effective the restraints on interstate commerce alleged in Paragraph Eleven hereof.

(d) Respondents maintain, and at all times mentioned herein have maintained, a substantial course of trade in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.

PAR. 10. Except to the extent that competition has been hindered, frustrated, lessened and eliminated by the acts and practices alleged in this complaint, respondents have been and are in substantial competition in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, with persons or firms engaged in the sale of mobile homes and mobile home accessories and with persons or firms engaged in the operation and maintenance of mobile home parks.

#### IV. VIOLATIONS

PAR. 11. In the course and conduct of their business as aforesaid, respondents have refused to rent sites under the control of Edgewood Park Estates, Inc. and Harper Park-Avon for the accommodation of mobile homes which have not been purchased from Harper Sales, Inc. thereby making the rental of said sites conditional and dependent upon the purchase of mobile homes from Harper Sales, Inc.

#### V. EFFECTS

PAR. 12. The acts, practices and methods of competition engaged in, followed, pursued or adopted by respondents, as hereinabove alleged, have or tend to have the effect of:

- (a) reducing competition in the sale of mobile homes;
- (b) foreclosing potential competitors in the sale of mobile homes by raising entry barriers;
- (c) foreclosing substantial sales by dealers of mobile homes to actual or prospective tenants of sites in respondents' mobile home parks;
- (d) inflating the prices of mobile homes purchased from respondents;
- (e) depriving consumers of the benefits of competition.

PAR. 13. The aforesaid acts, practices and methods of competition, constitute unreasonable restraints of trade and unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce within the intent and meaning of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and constitute unfair acts and practices in or affecting commerce in

violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended.

#### DECISION AND ORDER

The Commission having issued its complaint on December 19, 1975, charging that the respondents named in the caption hereof have violated the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, (15 U.S.C. 45); and

Respondents and complaint counsel, by joint motion filed December 16, 1976, having moved to have this matter withdrawn from adjudication for the purpose of submitting an executed consent agreement; and

The Commission, by order issued January 11, 1977, having withdrawn this matter from adjudication pursuant to Section 3.25(c) of its Rules; and

Each of the respondents and counsel supporting the complaint having executed an agreement containing a consent order, which includes an admission by the respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the complaint, a statement that the signing of said agreement is for settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by respondents that the law has been violated as alleged in the complaint, and waivers as required by the Commission's Rules; and

The Commission having considered the matter and having thereupon accepted the executed consent agreement and placed such agreement on the public record for a period of one hundred and eighty (180) days, and having duly considered the comments filed thereafter by interested persons pursuant to Section 2.34 of its Rules, now in further conformity with the procedure prescribed in Section 2.34 of its Rules, the Commission hereby makes the following jurisdictional findings and enters the following order:

1. Respondent Harper Sales, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, with its principal office located at 7500 West Henrietta Road, Rush, New York.

Respondent Edgewood Park Estates, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, with its principal place of business located at 4000 Brick Schoolhouse Road, Hamlin, New York.

Respondent Harper Park-Avon is a partnership organized under the laws of the State of New York with its principal office located at 6150 East Avon-Lima Road, Avon, New York.

Respondents Ralph R. Harper and John R. Harper are officers of corporate respondents Harper Sales, Inc. and Edgewood Park

Estates, Inc. They formulate, direct, approve, authorize and control the acts and practices of Harper Sales, Inc. Said individual respondents are also partners in the partnership respondent, Harper Park-Avon. They formulate, direct, approve, authorize and control the acts and practices of the partnership respondent. Their business address is the same as that of corporate respondent Harper Sales, Inc.

2. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding and of the respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.

#### ORDER

*It is ordered*, That Harper Sales, Inc. and Edgewood Park Estates, Inc., corporations, and Harper Park-Avon, a partnership, their successors and assigns, and their officers and partners and Ralph R. Harper and John R. Harper, individually and as officers of said corporations and as partners in said partnership, and respondents' agents, representatives and employees, directly or through any corporation, subsidiary, partnership, division or other device, in connection with the sale of mobile homes or the rental or lease of mobile home sites, in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, do forthwith cease and desist from:

The offering, execution, maintenance or enforcement of any lease, agreement, understanding or other arrangement which, directly or indirectly, conditions the lease or rental of a mobile home site upon the purchase of a mobile home from a respondent, or a source designated by a respondent. For the purposes of the foregoing sentence a transfer or conveyance of a mobile home site by any respondent to anyone not a respondent which grants any respondent the option or right to purchase such site, shall be deemed to be a lease; and the lease or rental of a mobile home under which the lessor has the option or right to require the lessee to purchase such mobile home as a condition for the continued use of such mobile home, shall be deemed to be a purchase.

*Provided, however*, that respondents may freely exercise their rights as businessmen, including the right to set reasonable rules, regulations and standards concerning the appearance of mobile homes and acceptance of tenants in respondents' mobile home parks and the operation, maintenance and appearance of mobile homes, mobile home parks and mobile home sites, except insofar as limited by the provisions of this order; and

*Provided further*, that nothing in this order shall exempt any



person or firm from the duty to comply with all applicable laws or regulations which are consistent with the provisions of this order.

*It is further ordered.* That respondents shall, within thirty (30) days of service of this order, distribute, and obtain a signed receipt therefor, a copy of this order to each of their operating divisions and respondents' employees engaged in the sale or rental of mobile homes or mobile home sites.

*It is further ordered.* That each individual respondent named herein promptly notify the Commission of the discontinuance of his present business or employment, and of his affiliation with a new business or employment. In addition, for a period of ten years from the effective date of this order, each individual respondent shall promptly notify the Commission of each affiliation with a new business or employment whose activities include the sale of mobile homes or the rental or lease of mobile home sites or of his affiliation with a new business or employment in which his own duties and responsibilities involve the sale of mobile homes or the rental or lease of mobile home sites. Such notice shall include this respondent's new business address and a statement of the nature of the business or employment in which the respondent is newly engaged, as well as a description of respondent's duties and responsibilities in connection with the business or employment.

The expiration of the notice provision of this paragraph shall not affect any other obligation arising under this order.

*It is further ordered.* That respondents notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in any corporate respondent, or the partnership respondent, such as dissolution, assignment, or sale resulting in the emergence of a successor corporation or partnership, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries or any other change in the corporation or partnership which may affect compliance obligations arising out of the order.

*It is further ordered.* That respondents maintain complete business records relative to the manner and form of their continuing compliance with the terms and provisions of this order. Each record shall be retained by respondents for at least three years after it is made.

*It is further ordered.* That the respondents herein shall within sixty (60) days after service upon them of this order, file with the Commission a report, in writing, setting forth in detail the manner and form in which they have complied with this order.

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IN THE MATTER OF

THE KROGER COMPANY

*Docket 9102. Interlocutory Order, Feb. 1, 1979*ORDER AFFIRMING ORDER RULING ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION  
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO § 3.36

Administrative Law Judge Montgomery K. Hyun (the "ALJ") has *sua sponte* certified to the Commission for discretionary review certain of his rulings in connection with respondent's motion for *in camera* production of documents in the files of the Commission. We decline to disturb the ALJ's discovery rulings and, accordingly, we affirm. Our disposition of this matter also moots respondent's application for a stay of further proceedings before the ALJ and for oral argument before the Commission.

The ALJ certified his rulings only because of suggestions by respondent that his continued participation in this matter might be inappropriate in light of the Commission's refusal to grant clearance to one of respondent's attorneys, Mr. Mark Tuller, notwithstanding that both previously served at different times as attorney-advisors to former Chairman Engman.

The standards governing the appearance of former agency employees in Commission proceedings address issues different from those concerning the propriety of participation by administrative law judges. The clearance rules concern impropriety resulting from access to inside information whereas the principal question involving an ALJ's participation is one of bias or prejudice. Thus, application of these standards may lead to differing results concerning the continued participation of Mr. Tuller and Judge Hyun in this proceeding, notwithstanding that each avers that during his tenure with Chairman Engman he did not participate in any matter pertaining to the respondent.

Here, no question of possible bias or prejudice by the ALJ has been raised by the respondent and we can perceive none. Certainly mere access to information in the possession of the Commission casts no shadow on Judge Hyun's ability to render an impartial decision in this matter. Indeed, to suggest otherwise would call into question a judge's ability to review assertedly privileged information *in camera* for the purpose of determining whether the attorney requesting the information is entitled to see it. For these reasons, we find nothing inconsistent about the fact that Mr. Tuller

has been denied clearance in this proceeding while Judge Hyun may continue to serve in his altogether different role.

*It is ordered*, That the ALJ's rulings of January 15, 1979 be, and they hereby are, affirmed; and

*It is further ordered*, That respondent's motions for a stay and for oral argument, dated January 30, 1979, be, and they hereby are, denied.

Commissioner Pitofsky did not participate.

IN THE MATTER OF  
FEDERAL SIGNAL CORPORATION

CONSENT ORDER, ETC., IN REGARD TO ALLEGED VIOLATION OF  
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT

*Docket C-2953. Complaint, Feb. 1, 1979 — Decision, Feb. 1, 1979*

This consent order, among other things, requires a Chicago, Ill. manufacturer and seller of public safety and communication equipment to cease, in connection with the sale of such products to governmental entities, from exchanging bidding information with its distributors prior to submission of competitive bids, submitting or soliciting the submission of collusive bids, or employing any other business practice that may hinder or prevent competitors from bidding successfully. The firm is also required to cease furnishing governmental bodies seeking to purchase civil defense warning systems with advertisements or specifications that might induce such bodies to limit distribution of invitations to bid; incorporate the name or model number of firm's products into advertisements for bids or specifications; or draft specifications that would restrain, lessen, or prevent the sale of such devices by others.

*Appearances*

For the Commission: *John T. Hankins and David J. Richman.*

For the respondent: *Gary L. Mowder, Schiff, Hardin & Waiter,*  
Chicago, Ill.

COMPLAINT

The Federal Trade Commission having reason to believe that Federal Signal Corporation has violated the provisions of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it appearing to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in the interest of the public, hereby issues its complaint, stating its charges as follows:

PARAGRAPH 1. For the purpose of construing this complaint, the following definitions shall apply:

A. "Signal Division products" means any products, or component or accessory thereof, presently or in the future sold by the Signal Division of Federal Signal Corporation, including but not limited to radio equipment, vehicle lights and sirens, speed detecting devices, helmets, visual and audible warning and signaling devices such as lights, sirens, horns and bells, and civil defense warning systems.

B. "Civil defense warning systems" means outdoor warning sirens and components and accessories thereof, which are designed to warn the public of impending enemy attack, storms or other emergency situations. The term includes sirens, activating devices,

timers, telephone relays, and other equipment customarily used in connection with the operation of the sirens.

C. "Distributor" shall mean any person, company or other entity purchasing Signal Division products for resale.

D. "Competitive bidding" means the process by which any bid or quotation is made concerning or in response to any solicitation, announcement, advertisement or request by a public body.

E. "Public body" means any unit of federal, state, county or municipal government, or any other organization funded primarily from tax revenues. The term shall include, but not be limited to police departments, fire departments, highway departments and civil defense organizations.

PAR. 2. Federal Signal Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Federal or respondent, is a corporation organized and doing business under the laws of the State of Delaware with its principal office at 120 S. Riverside Plaza, Chicago, Illinois. Federal's sales in 1975 were in excess of \$68,000,000.

PAR. 3. Federal, through its Signal Division, is engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of public safety and communications equipment for commercial and governmental markets. Federal's sales of Signal Division products were in excess of \$29,000,000 in 1975.

PAR. 4. In the course and conduct of its business as aforesaid, respondent causes and has caused its Signal Division products to be shipped from the state in which they are manufactured to distributors and other customers located in other states. Respondent maintains, and at all times mentioned herein has maintained, a substantial course of trade in such products, in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

PAR. 5. Except to the extent that competition has been hindered or restrained by the acts and practices alleged herein, respondent has been and is now in substantial competition, in or affecting commerce, with its own distributors in the offering for sale and sale of Signal Division products and with other manufacturers and distributors in their offering for sale and sale of similar products.

PAR. 6. Federal sells its Signal Division products to distributors located throughout the United States. Federal also sells such products directly to the using customers. Customers of Federal and its distributors include fire departments, police departments, civil defense and disaster warning agencies, and commercial enterprises. In many instances customers purchasing from Federal and its distributors utilize competitive bidding procedures in the purchase of

Signal Division products. In some instances the process of inviting competitive bids is required by law.

PAR. 7. In the course and conduct of its business as aforesaid, respondent, in combination with its distributors, has engaged in the following unfair methods of competition, in or affecting commerce, in connection with the offering for sale, sale and distribution of Signal Division products on a competitive bidding basis:

A) Respondent has exchanged information with its distributors, prior to the submission of bids by respondent and its distributors on particular projects, concerning:

- (1) the intent to submit or not to submit a bid;
- (2) the prices that will be bid.

B) Respondent has entered into agreements with its distributors, prior to the submission of bids by respondent and its distributors on particular projects, concerning:

- (1) whether a bid will be submitted;
- (2) which type of equipment will be bid;
- (3) what prices will be bid; and
- (4) which party will submit the low bid.

C) Respondent has submitted and solicited the submission of collusive bids on particular projects; and

D) Respondent has entered into agreements with its distributors allocating customers among respondent and its distributors.

PAR. 8. The manufacture, distribution and sale of civil defense warning systems constitutes a separate and distinct market. The market for civil defense warning systems is highly concentrated. Federal is the dominant manufacturer in this market and produced more than 70 percent of the civil defense warning systems installed during 1975. Federal has used its dominant position, size and economic power to hinder and frustrate the ability of smaller manufacturers to compete in this market, and to hinder, prevent or lessen competition in the manufacturing and sale of civil defense warning systems. Thus, Federal has been and is now engaged in various monopolistic or other unfair acts, practices, or methods of competition in maintaining a monopoly in the manufacture and sale of civil defense warning systems.

More particularly, Federal has, since at least 1972, adopted and maintained various business practices to restrain, lessen or prevent the sale of civil defense warning systems by others engaged in the

