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16	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,			
17	Plaintiff,	Case no	. 2:08-cv-00620-P	PMP-PAL
18	V.		RANDUM OF PC	
19	PUBLISHERS BUSINESS SERVICES, IN	NC., PLAIN	ORITIES IN SUPH FIFF FTC'S MOT	TION FOR
20	a corporation; ED DANTUMA ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation, also	dba THE A	ARY JUDGMEN LTERNATIVE, S	ÚMMARY
21	PUBLISHERS DIRECT SERVICES and PUBLISHERS BUSINESS SERVICES;	ADJUD	DICATION OF ÍSS	SUES
22	PERSIS DANTUMA; EDWARD DANTUMA; BRENDA DANTUMA			
23	CHANG; DRIES DANTUMA; DIRK DANTUMA; AND JEFFREY DANTUMA	A .		
24	individually and as officers or managers of Publishers Business Services, Inc., or Ed			
25	Dantuma Enterprises, Inc.,			
26	Defendants.			
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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants **Publishers Business Services, Inc.** and **Ed Dantuma Enterprises, Inc.** are telemarketers selling magazine subscriptions. Their *modus operandi* is to target busy consumers at their place of employment, pretend they are conducting a telephone survey, lure the consumers into thinking that they will receive magazine subscriptions as a "thank you" for participating in the survey, and then demand hundreds of dollars in payment for the magazines afterward, upon threat of damaging the consumers' credit ratings. Defendants **Edward F. Dantuma** and **Persis Dantuma**, and their adult children **Dirk Dantuma, Jeffrey Dantuma, Brenda Dantuma Schang,** and **Dries Dantuma** have continued to operate this scam, in blatant disregard for two stipulated federal court injunctions that have been entered against them and a 1971 Federal Trade Commission Order expressly prohibiting this conduct, and despite thousands of consumer complaints and investigations by various state Attorneys General.

Plaintiff FTC respectfully requests that the Court enter summary judgment, or in the alternative summarily adjudicate issues for which there are no genuine issues of material fact, against Defendants, for their violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule. Because of Defendants' demonstrated unwillingness to telemarket in a legal manner, and to sell magazine subscriptions in a non-deceptive way, the FTC further requests that the Court exercise its equitable powers in granting final relief by permanently enjoining Defendants from engaging in telemarketing and in marketing magazine subscriptions, imposing a monetary judgment equal to the amount of money Defendants have taken from consumers pursuant to their deceptive and abusive telemarketing scheme, and imposing the other equitable relief requested in the proposed judgment which accompanies this motion.

II. FACTS

A. The Parties

1. <u>Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission</u>

Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") enforces Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce.
The FTC also enforces the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR"), 16 C.F.R. Part 310, as amended,

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promulgated pursuant to the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act ("Telemarketing Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 *et seq*. Sections 13(b) and 19 of the FTC Act authorize the FTC to initiate federal district court proceedings such as this case, to seek permanent relief to enjoin violations of the FTC Act and the TSR, and to secure such other equitable relief as may be appropriate, including consumer redress. 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) and 57b; *see also FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc.,* 668 F.2d 1107, 1110-13 (9th Cir. 1982).

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2. <u>The Corporate Defendants</u>

Defendant **Publishers Business Services, Inc.** ("**PBS, Inc.**") and Defendant **Ed Dantuma Enterprises, Inc.** ("**EDE**"), are operated together as one business under the trade names "Publishers Business Services," "Publishers Direct Services" ("**PDS**"), and "Subscription Order Services" ("**SOS**") (collectively, "**PBS**" or "**the companies**"). Undisputed Fact ("UF") 1, UF2.¹ The companies are owned, operated, and managed by the Dantuma family. UF3, UF4, UF5, UF6.

PBS maintains offices in Altamonte Springs (a suburb of Orlando), and Miami, Florida, and Toledo, Ohio. UF7. It also maintains a "virtual" office (receptionist and mail forwarding services) in Henderson, Nevada, and holds itself out to the public as operating from this Henderson address. UF8, UF9. Until around June 2008, PBS also maintained an office in St. Paul, Minnesota. UF11.

PBS has five sales departments devoted to making outbound telemarketing calls to consumers to sell *new* magazine subscription packages under the trade name "Publishers Business Services": three in its Altamonte Springs headquarters, one each in the Miami and Toledo offices, and until last year, one in St. Paul as well. UF12. PBS has two sales departments devoted to making outbound telemarketing calls to consumers to sell magazine subscription *renewals* under the trade name "Subscription Order Services": one in the Miami office and one in the Altamonte Springs headquarters. UF16. In addition, PBS has verification, collections, customer service, clerical, and administrative departments, all located at its Altamonte Springs headquarters. UF17.

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- 3. <u>The Individual Defendants</u>

Defendant Edward Dantuma, along with his wife, defendant Persis Dantuma, and their

¹ The FTC's Undisputed Facts are set forth in the "Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of the FTC's Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication of Issues," filed concurrently with this motion.

adult children, defendants Dirk Dantuma, Jeff Dantuma, Brenda Dantuma Schang, and Dries
 Dantuma (collectively, the "Dantuma family"), manage and direct PBS's business affairs and
 day-to-day operations.

Edward Dantuma is the sole owner and President of EDE. UF25. He has been in the magazine subscription sales business for over fifty years, starting in door-to-door sales, then owning a "Keystone Readers Service" franchise for twenty-five years, and later operating as EDE, PDS, and PBS. UF26. Each of the top-level PBS managers (his adult children Jeffrey Dantuma, Brenda Schang, and Dries Dantuma) reports to him, and all top-level decisions are either made by him or with his authorization. UF27, UF29. He is one of the four people (along with his wife Persis Dantuma, daughter Brenda Dantuma Schang, and son Dries Dantuma) who has signing authority over PBS's bank accounts. UF39. He has also signed numerous corporate filings on behalf of EDE. UF30.

Persis Dantuma is the Vice President of EDE, and the owner, President, and sole officer and director of PBS, Inc. UF32, UF33. As President of PBS, Inc., many consumers direct their complaints about PBS's business practices to her. UF34. Persis Dantuma handles the companies' corporate filings, manages their books and records, and is one of the four people who has signing authority over their bank accounts. UF35, UF36, UF39. Persis Dantuma is aware that the Corporate Defendants receive complaints from consumers. UF38. She has the authority to allow a customer order to be cancelled and to allow a refund to be given to a customer. UF37.

Dirk Dantuma is a Director of EDE and has been involved with his father's magazine subscription businesses for most of the past forty years. UF41, UF42. From 1968 through around 1980, he worked off and on for his father's magazine subscription businesses as a salesperson, "closer," collector, and customer service representative. UF43. From 1985 to around 2000 or 2001, he was the general manager of the companies' St. Paul sales office. UF44. He reviews the Corporate Defendants' scripts for compliance with court orders. UF47. He also provides the Corporate Defendants with the "lead" cards from which Defendants make their telemarketing calls. UF48. He is the person responsible for escalated customer complaints and is the point of contact for Corporate Defendants' legal issues. UF49, UF46. He is the person who deals with the

Corporate Defendants' audits for the Audit Bureau of Circulation. UF50. In all of these capacities, Dirk Dantuma has direct knowledge of both PBS's business practices and that many consumer complaints have been made against PBS about these business practices.

Jeffrey Dantuma is a Director of EDE and is the top-level manager in charge of the Corporate Defendants' three Altamonte Springs sales departments, as well as the sales offices in Toledo, and until the office was closed last year, St. Paul. UF56, UF57, UF58, UF59. He has worked for his father's magazine subscription businesses for most of the past forty years. UF62, UF59, UF57, UF58, UF60, UF63. Through the years, he has worked for EDE as a salesperson, and supervisor for the verification and collections departments. UF63.

Brenda Dantuma Schang is a Director of EDE and is the top-level manager in charge of the Corporate Defendants' Miami sales office. UF65, UF66. Her responsibilities include handling the Corporate Defendants' account payable, overseeing the Corporate Defendants' payroll, handling the Corporate Defendants' books and records, supervising the Corporate Defendants' Miami sales office, and handling correspondence between the Corporate Defendants and magazine publishers. UF67. She has worked for EDE and its predecessor for over thirty years. UF68. Brenda Dantuma Schang has also worked in the Corporate Defendants' clerical department. UF70. She has signed numerous corporate filings on behalf of EDE, and is one of the four people who has signing authority over the companies' bank accounts. UF69, UF39.

Dries Dantuma is a Director and the General Manager of EDE's Altamonte Springs office. UF73, UF74. He is the top-level manager in charge of the companies' verification, collections, and customer service departments. He is one of the four people who has signing authority over the companies' bank accounts. UF39. He has worked for the Corporate Defendants (and their predecessor) for over twenty years. UF77. In these capacities, he has directly participated in every aspect of the companies' deceptive and abusive practices. UF 73, UF74, UF 75, UF76, UF78, UF79, UF80.

B.

- Defendants use deceptive and abusive business practices to telemarket new magazine subscriptions

Defendants' salespeople misrepresent that the purpose of their telemarketing 1. call is to conduct a survey

Defendants' salespeople, representing themselves as "Publishers Business Services,"

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contact consumers by calling hundreds of thousands of businesses each month and engaging
whoever answers the phone. UF81, UF83, UF84, UF85. Defendants' sales pitch, read from a sales
script which Defendants have authorized, is riddled with deceptive representations. The pitch
starts with a request to take part in a short "survey." UF88. Consumers are told that if they
participate in the survey, "we have a small surprise for you, nothing big[,] but it's nice." UF89.
The "survey," purportedly made on behalf of PBS's "advertisers," consists of five questions:
How long have you been employed at _ [name of employer inserted here,] more or less than 1year? Now just for our advertisers information, may I ask your age & what you do at _? What do you most often use money order, credit card, or check? Do you do much reading in your spare time? Which publications are you currently receiving? UF90. Contrary to the salesperson's representation that the survey questions are being asked "for our
advertisers [sic] information," Defendants are not asking these survey questions on behalf of any
advertiser or publisher. UF91.
2. <u>Defendants' salespeople say that they are offering magazines to consumers</u> as a "thank you" for participating in the survey
At the end of the survey, the consumer is told, "I want to thank you for helping me and with
our best wishes you will receive the next 60 issues of [5 magazines identified here]." UF92. The
salesperson then assures the consumer of the legitimacy of this offer, saying:
Now, let me assure you that there is no catch involved, however, [sic] there is an sound business reason behind the whole thing. The publishers have authorized us to send the magazines I have mentioned to assure their advertisers that their ads will be read. UF93.
The salesperson then provides further assurance, stating: "Now you will receive a guarantee
stating that everything I am promising you is correct" and "Now we're not going to ask you to buy
[] any cash subscriptions or anything like that." UF94. Defendants' telemarketing pitch leaves
consumers with the impression that they are being offered a "free gift." UF95.
3. <u>After luring consumers with free magazines as "bait," Defendants begin</u> their deceptive "switch" – introducing the idea that the consumer will need
to pay a nominal shipping and handling cost – as part of their multi-step attempt to trap consumers into non-cancellable, long-term magazine
subscription contracts After these deceptive assurances, the script shifts in direction and begins to introduce the
idea that the consumer will need to pay a nominal amount to "defray" or "cover" Defendants' cost
in providing what are otherwise free subscriptions:
Now the only thing we have been asking people like yourself is to thank us in return by

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helping defray the cost of getting them out to you, and I'm sure that you wouldn't mind 1 that, because it's only \$2.76 cents [sic] a week which covers all 6 of the publications and there is absolutely no other charge and it's payable by the month. UF96. 2 The salesperson then reinforces the idea how great Defendants' offer is by pointing out that, "Most 3 people I've talked to today have been more than happy to go along with this and I'm sure that you 4 too will agree that 6 magazines is quite a lot for just \$2.76 cents [sic] a week, right! [sic]" UF97. 5 Defendants' salespeople make this representation to the consumer regardless of whether the 6 salesperson has actually spoken to any other consumers that day, and regardless of how many 7 consumers have actually accepted Defendants' offer. UF98. 8 Defendants' representations leave consumers with the net impression that the magazines 9 they are being offered are "free," and that they are being asked to pay only a nominal fee to cover 10 "shipping and handling." UF99. 11 Defendants continue their confusing and deceptive "switch" – suggesting 4. 12 that the nominal shipping and handling payments be paid on a monthly, rather than weekly, basis – to trap consumers into non-cancellable, long-13 term magazine subscription contracts Up to this point, the salesperson's discussion of "cost" has been couched in terms of pocket 14 change - two or three dollars per week. UF100. At this point, the salesperson introduces the idea 15 that Defendants will allow the consumer, for the consumer's convenience, to lump these small 16 weekly amounts together and make the payments on a monthly basis: 17 "Now we don't collect the \$2.76 cents [sic] each week[. T] hat would be sort of a nuisance[. 18 S]o what we do is send you a small supply of self-addressed envelopes and you can send it in by our monthly honor plan, or faster if you like. Most people send it in two months at a 19 time since it is such a small amount." UF100. Defendants convey the impression that the consumer will only be making a small number of 20 payments, since the consumer will only be receiving a "small supply" of return envelopes. UF101. 21 Further, in invoking a "monthly honor plan" and allowing the consumer to "send it in ... faster if 22 you like," Defendants convey the impression that they are extending their trust to the consumer in 23 allowing the consumer to make the payments only once a month, rather than every week, and that 24 this suggested payment plan is both desirable to the consumer and to be undertaken on a voluntary 25 basis. UF101. Defendants' salespeople's statement, that "most people send it in two months at a 26 time since it is such a small amount," reinforces the idea that the amount that Defendants are 27 asking the consumer to "defray" or "cover" is "such a small amount" and that "most people" find 28

Defendants' payment suggestions acceptable. In what sounds like the end of the sales pitch, and as further assurance as to the above-board nature of Defendants' offer, the salesperson represents next that *"you will receive a written guarantee to assure you what I have told you is correct."* UF102.

5.

Consumers think that the end of this call is the end of the transaction, but it is actually only the first part of Defendants' careful plan to trap consumers into non-cancellable, long-term magazine subscription contracts

After this, the salesperson wraps up her portion of the call by asking for the consumer's non-work telephone number, *"in case we cannot contact you at work,"* and offering two additional free magazines (*"we are sending out [Details/Gourmet] to your business at no extra charge"*). UF103.

Consumers believe that this call represents the entire understanding (or agreement) between them and Defendants: that this involves pocket change each week, to be paid monthly, and that there is either no long-term obligation or no obligation at all. UF104.

There are three key points to note about Defendants' business practices up to this point in the transaction: First, by design, Defendants' telemarketing scheme typically reaches busy multitasking workers – such as the office receptionist whose job is to field numerous calls or the store clerk tasked with greeting walk-in customers or ringing up purchases – who may not be in a position to be in hyper-vigilant mode during Defendants' telephone call, ready to detect Defendants' bait and switch tactics. UF105.

Second, at no point during this transaction does Defendants' salesperson disclose to the consumer: (1) the total amount of money (hundred of dollars, but most commonly \$717.60) that Defendants will later claim the consumer agreed to pay; (2) the monthly payment (varies, but most commonly around \$29) that Defendants will later claim the consumer agreed to pay; (3) the number of months (varies, but most commonly 24 months) for which Defendants will later claim the consumer agreed to pay; (4) the length of the magazine subscription term (five years' worth of magazines); or (5) that the subscription offer is not cancellable. UF106.

Finally, a number of consumers inform Defendants' salesperson during this initial call that
they are *not* agreeing to accept the magazines or to make any payments, but instead, will review
the written materials that the salesperson stated would be sent to the consumer. UF107. Moreover,

in some instances, Defendants' salespeople make misrepresentations which are not contained in the script, such as stating that the consumer may review the written materials before committing to anything, or that the subscriptions may be cancelled. UF108.

6. <u>After the end of this conversation, Defendants lull the consumer in two</u> <u>follow-up conversations under the guise of "double-checking" the</u> <u>consumer's information, and then "spring" their trap – selectively recording</u> <u>only part of the second conversation – which Defendants later use, out of</u> <u>context, to make it appear that the consumer has agreed to a non-cancellable,</u> <u>long-term magazine subscription contract</u>

At the end of this conversation, consumers believe they have been told all of the terms of Defendants' offer. UF109. In fact, however, Defendants lead consumers through two more steps to accomplish the "switch" portion of their "bait and switch": first, "double-checking" information with the salesperson's "supervisor," and second, "verifying" the information with an "account manager" in a follow-up call, only a portion of which is tape-recorded. UF110. In characterizing these two steps as "confirmation" and "verification" calls, Defendants lead the consumers to believe that these are ministerial steps in which Defendants will *reiterate* what the consumers have already been told, and to *confirm* the information that the consumers have already provided. In reality, Defendants have carefully designed these two steps to maximize the likelihood of creating an audio-recording in which the consumer appears to be agreeing to onerous new material terms, even though, in reality, they are not.

In the first step, the salesperson's supervisor states the purpose of her involvement as "double-check[ing] all of the information we have on your order to make sure everything is correct." UF113. She reviews the consumer's address information, and then, under the pretext of "reviewing" the "order" information, states – for the first time – the monthly cost: "Now, just as [salesperson's name] told you, it's all [#] publications for just \$____ cents [sic] a week, which is [___] a month." UF114. The supervisor discloses the subscription term length for the first time as well ("Now instead of paying [\$] each month for the full [] months, "). UF115. In addition, the supervisor makes a "soft" request for "doubled-up" payments ("we ask that you send it in two months at a time, which is \$[] for the first [] and nothing the remaining [] months, do you see how that works?"), which echoes a throw-away comment that the initial salesperson made earlier ("most people send it in two months at a time since it is such a small amount"). UF116.

Consumer declarations show that Defendants proceed with the "sale" even when consumers explicitly refuse to accept Defendants' subscription offer. UF117. Further, they show that the supervisor's portion of the call reinforces the impression the consumers form, based on the initial salesperson's earlier representations, that the magazines are free upon payment of nominal shipping and handling charges, and that any "new" terms that the supervisor mentions in this part of the call are voluntary and not a mandatory part of Defendants' offer. UF118.

At the conclusion of this conversation, the supervisor tells the consumer that "we'll be calling you back shortly to confirm this with you." UF119. Within a day or two after that, the consumer typically receives that call – the second half of Defendants' "switch" – also at the consumer's place of business while the consumer is working, from a verification department employee, who identifies herself as a "Publishers Business Services account manager." UF120. The "account manager" thanks the consumer that the purpose of recording the magazine order with us a little while ago, " and tells the consumer that the purpose of recording the conversation is to "quickly tape verify the information with you." UF121. These representations not only fail to alert the consumer that new material terms are about to be introduced by the supervisor or the account manager, but in fact *lull* the consumer into thinking that no new material terms will be introduced.

Defendants' company-authorized verification scripts show that only part of the account manager's call with the consumer is recorded. UF112, UF122. Notably, the first part of the account manager's spiel, in which she lulls the consumer into thinking no new terms will be introduced, is *not* recorded. UF112, UF122.

In this second call, the account manager converts the sales supervisor's "soft" request for the consumer to *voluntarily* "double up" his monthly payments into a material *mandatory* term, which Defendants later try to hold over consumers in their attempts to collect payment:

Your payment plan and total cost as explained to you and also listed on your order will be \$_/per month for only the first __ months and you will pay nothing the remaining __ months. Do you see how that works Mr./Mrs. _? UF123.

This account manager "verification" call is also the first time that Defendants make any

attempt to disclose that they have a non-cancellation policy:

It does cost our company a great deal of time and money to enter the order for you, and because of this we do ask that you will take the magazines for the full term and make the

monthly payments as agreed. This order cannot be cancelled during the term of the agreement, however it will cancel automatically after that, is that acceptable to you *Mr./Mrs.* _? UF124.

The pacing of the verification call is rapid-fire, approximately 90 seconds in duration, and includes verification of the consumer's address, a listing of magazines, a repeat of the survey (*"and how long have you been employed at* __? *And would you say that your monthly income is more than* \$1,000 per month? And your home phone # is __. Are you renting, buying? Are you married or single?"), and the introduction of the new material terms. UF125. Many consumers, having been told that the purpose of this call is nothing more than to "verify" information that was previously provided, do not realize that this is an attempt by Defendants to bind them to new, previously undisclosed, material terms. UF126.

Defendants' verification employees speak so quickly that to the extent a listener is looking out for disclosure of new terms, these new terms are, at best, difficult to absorb, and at worst, unintelligible. UF128, UF129. Further, like the first call (in which the consumer speaks with the salesperson and supervisor), the verification call is made to the consumer at his or her place of employment, where the consumer is juggling between performing his or her work-related tasks and taking Defendants' calls, and many consumers are consequently unable to listen to Defendants' verification employee with the heightened attentiveness required to detect Defendants' bait and switch. UF130.

These verification recordings comprise of only a portion of the telephone conversations between Defendants' employees and the consumers. The recordings do *not* include the assurances by the salesperson, supervisor, and "account manager" that the two follow-up conversations are only for the purpose of "verifying" previously-discussed information. UF111, UF112, UF122. They also do *not* include the consumer's conversation with the salesperson, the consumer's followup conversation with the sales supervisor to "confirm" information, and any questions asked or offscript statements made during these two conversations. UF111, UF112, UF122.

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C. Consumers do not learn that they have been ensnared until Defendants confront them with the "verification recordings" which Defendants have carefully engineered to make it sound like the consumer has agreed to the new onerous and material terms

Defendants send written information about the subscription package, including an "invoice" demanding payment, to the consumer approximately one day after their "verifier" obtains the verification recording from the consumer. UF131. Consumers typically respond to the written invoice by either, (1) ignoring the invoice, since it is so different from what the consumer agreed to that it obviously must have been a clerical error on PBS's part, or (2) contacting PBS to fix the obvious error. UF132. Those who ignore the invoice soon receive a call from PBS's "Collections Department," and both categories of consumers soon learn – for the first time – PBS is trying to force them to accept onerous new material terms (non-cancellable, five-year contract for hundreds of dollars with mandatory "doubled-up" monthly payments). UF133.

Whether it is the consumers or PBS who initiates the follow-up call, the consumers soon learn that they have been ensnared by Defendants' bait and switch scam. UF134. PBS tells the consumers they must pay because PBS has a "verification recording" "proving" the consumer agreed to a non-cancellable 60 month magazine subscription contract for hundreds of dollars (most commonly, \$717.60). UF135. PBS makes this misrepresentation even though: the initial sales call made no mention of the non-cancellable nature of the offer, the 60 month subscription term, and the total price; the initial sales call portrayed the cost as a nominal shipping and handling charge; and PBS's employees have repeatedly represented to the consumer that the verification call is nothing more that "verifying" the information discussed in the initial sales call.

21 PBS also tells the consumers that the order may not be cancelled because it has already paid 22 the magazine publishers for the consumers' subscriptions. UF136. This representation is false 23 because: (1) PBS are only authorized to order shorter-term subscriptions for their customers (they 24 later *extend* the subscriptions for only those consumers whom they are able to successfully trick or 25 scare into paying), (2) Defendants do not even submit the shorter-term subscription orders to the 26 magazine publishers until two weeks after they mail the invoices to the consumers, and (3) 27 Defendants pay only a small percentage of the subscription price to the magazine publishers (and 28 keep most of the subscription fee as profit). UF137. UF138. UF139.

D. Defendants' collectors and customer service employees harass and threaten consumers in an attempt to extort hundreds of dollars for the magazine subscriptions

Regardless of whether or not PBS is able to scare a consumer into paying right away, it will not cancel an account, or the consumer's financial "obligation" on the account, and will continue to demand payment from the consumer. The only circumstance under which PBS will cancel an account and release the consumer from his or her financial "obligation" is if PBS learns that the consumer has filed a complaint with the Better Business Bureau, a state Attorney General, or another consumer advocacy agency. UF140. Otherwise, Defendants have their collections department employees follow up on the invoices with a two-front attack: frequent abusive and harassing telephone calls and threatening demand letters to get consumers to pay.

1.

Defendants make abusive and harassing collection calls

Defendants subject consumers who continue to refuse to pay or insist on their right to cancel to frequent abusive and harassing phone calls at work, even after the consumers tell Defendants not to call them at their place of work. UF141. They call the consumers at home and at work, daily, sometimes for several weeks in a row. UF142. The collectors harass consumers on these collection calls. UF143. In the collection calls, Defendants' collection and customer service employees verbally threaten consumers with lawsuits, garnishments, other collection actions, and damage to their credit histories, to scare the consumers into paying all or some part of the total "contract" price. UF144. In some of these collection calls, Defendants' employees represent or imply that they are calling from a law firm or other outside collection agency. UF145.

2. Defendants send consumers threatening demand letters

In their demand letters, Defendants make repeated threats to report the consumer's purported "delinquencies" to the credit reporting agencies bureaus, including:

- "Your credit is your most valued possession. As a member of credit bureaus, we have agreed to report all serious delinquencies! ... If payment is received immediately, we will not be forced to submit your name to your Local Credit Bureau." UF146.

- "In as much as their [sic] previous attempts to make satisfactory arrangements for payment on your account, you leave us no alterative but to ask for the balance of your account as stated on your contract with us. ... If we do not hear from you we must proceed. Very truly yours, James Laurence, Credit Supervisor ... CREDIT BUREAU MEMBER" UF147.

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1 2 3 4 5 6	 - "Your account is seriously past due, and must be paid in full immediately. <i>If you fail pay this account in full, we will move forward reviewing our rights against you for all monies due plus interest and costs,</i> as provided by the agreement <i>PLEASE GOVERI YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY.</i> Very truly yours, John Carlton Please note: Pursuant the provisions of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, you are advised that unless you dispute the validity of the foregoing debt or any portion thereof within thirty (30) days after receipt of this letter, we will assume the debt to be valid." UF148. - "we will cease collection activity on this account [if you make the requested payment UF149.
7 8	- "In the event you should choose not to accept this settlement, we will move forward reviewing our rights against you for all monies due plus interest and costs, as provided the agreement. Bob Callahan, Publishers Business Services Legal Department" UF150
9 10	Many consumers end up paying PBS for the magazine subscriptions, not because they t they owe the debt, but because they see it as the only way to stop PBS's threats and/or to prese
11 12 13	their credit. UF151. 3. <u>Defendants' threats are material misrepresentations</u>
14 15	Defendants are not a member of any credit bureau. UF152. In addition, Defendants do submit consumer account "delinquencies" to any credit bureau, send delinquent accounts to an outside collection agencies, take any steps to garnish a consumer's wages, or sue consumers fo
16 17 18	non-payment. UF153, UF154, UF155, UF156. "James Laurence," "Bob Callahan," and the or names signed on Defendants' collection letters are not real people; they are all "desk names" so
19 20	that Defendants' collectors will know the account status (e.g., 2-month "delinquency," 3-mont "delinquency," etc.) of the consumer who is calling. UF157. Defendants do not have a "legal department" or "Credit Supervisor." UF158, UF159. Finally, Defendants misrepresent the
21 22 23	applicability and import of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. ² UF160. In short, Defendation threats are also material misrepresentations designed to trick the consumers into paying.
24 25	E. Consumers suffer both monetary and non-monetary injury as a result of Defendants' conduct Individual consumers have paid hundreds of dollars to Defendants in an attempt to stop
26 27 28	² The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides that if a consumer sends a third-party debt collector a letter, within 30 days after receiving the written notice of the debt, stating that he do not owe any or all of the money, or asking for verification of the debt, that collector must stop contacting the consumer. The collector can begin contacting the consumer again if it sends the consumer written verification of the debt, like a copy of a bill for the amount the consumer ow

account is seriously past due, and must be paid in full immediately. If you fail to account in full, we will move forward reviewing our rights against you for all due plus interest and costs, as provided by the agreement. ... PLEASE GOVERN ELF ACCORDINGLY. Very truly yours, John Carlton ... Please note: Pursuant to visions of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, ... you are advised that, ou dispute the validity of the foregoing debt or any portion thereof within thirty vs after receipt of this letter, we will assume the debt to be valid." UF148.

onsumers end up paying PBS for the magazine subscriptions, not because they think bt, but because they see it as the only way to stop PBS's threats and/or to preserve 7151.

ints are not a member of any credit bureau. UF152. In addition, Defendants do not: er account "delinquencies" to any credit bureau, send delinquent accounts to any on agencies, take any steps to garnish a consumer's wages, or sue consumers for UF153, UF154, UF155, UF156. "James Laurence," "Bob Callahan," and the other n Defendants' collection letters are not real people; they are all "desk names" so collectors will know the account status (e.g., 2-month "delinquency," 3-month etc.) of the consumer who is calling. UF157. Defendants do not have a "legal "Credit Supervisor." UF158, UF159. Finally, Defendants misrepresent the d import of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.² UF160. In short, Defendants' material misrepresentations designed to trick the consumers into paying.

Consumers suffer both monetary and non-monetary injury as a result of Defendants' conduct

bt Collection Practices Act provides that if a consumer sends a third-party debt r, within 30 days after receiving the written notice of the debt, stating that he does all of the money, or asking for verification of the debt, that collector must stop consumer. The collector can begin contacting the consumer again if it sends the en verification of the debt, like a copy of a bill for the amount the consumer owes.

Defendants' extortionate conduct. UF161. Defendants have had hundreds of thousands of 1 2 "customers" since January 1, 2004. UF162. From 2004 through 2008, the Corporate Defendants 3 collected \$ from consumers in connection with "Publishers Business Services" "sales" of new magazine subscriptions, and \$ in connection with "Subscription Order 4 Services" "sales" of magazine subscription renewals, for a total of \$ UF163. 5 During that same time period, the Corporate Defendants have issued refunds in the total amount of 6 \$265,244.25. UF163. 7 Defendants' frequent and harassing telemarketing and collection calls have also caused 8 other adverse consequences for consumers at work and at home. Consumers have reported that 9 Defendants' frequent sales calls to them at their place of business were annoying and negatively 10 distracted them from their work. UF170. Consumers have also reported that Defendants' 11 collection calls to their home or cell phone numbers were frequent and annoying, and made outside 12 of the permissible daytime hours in which collection calls may legally be made. UF171. 13 Moreover, in order to extricate themselves from Defendants' scam, consumers must devote a 14 significant amount of time contacting the company and filing complaints to get Defendants' 15 abusive collection efforts to stop. UF172. 16 F. Defendants knowingly operate their business as a deceptive and abusive "bait-17 and-switch" scam Defendants intentionally make misrepresentations in their initial sales pitch 18 1 to consumers 19 Many of the statements in the script that Defendants use for the initial sales pitch are false. 20 UF173. Defendants know that these statements are false but direct their employees to read these 21 scripts "word-for-word" anyway. UF174, UF178. Defendants are also aware that their salespeople 22 make misrepresentations that are not on the scripts (UF179) and condone these practices (UF193). 23 Defendants intentionally design their sales pitch so that it will be confusing 2. to consumers 24 Defendants enforce a policy of dodging consumers' questions with non-sequitur responses 25 or repeating earlier portions of the script in order to avoid directly answering the consumers' 26 questions. UF194. Defendants' intentionally confusing statements, coupled with the fact that the 27 "account manager" speaks so fast during the verification recording, makes it difficult for 28 consumers to "catch" the new terms that Defendants are trying to sneak by them. UF195, UF128.

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3. Defendants target consumers who are more likely to be too busy or too inexperienced to realize they are being scammed

By design, Defendants' telemarketing scheme reaches consumers at work to maximize the likelihood that the consumers will be too busy to pay close attention to Defendants' sales pitch. UF196. Defendants further hone their mark by targeting consumers who are receptionists, store clerks, and other types of employees who must handle their office's telephone calls while also juggling face-to-face customer interactions. UF197. They also intentionally target companies whose employees are more likely to be younger and less experienced. UF198.

4. Defendants make repeated calls to consumers to harass them into listening to the sales pitch

Defendants' employees call the same consumers over and over until they agree to accept magazine subscriptions. UF199. Both the salespeople, who make the initial telemarketing call, and the verifiers, who make the follow-up partially-recorded call, routinely engage in this practice. UF200. Consumers continue to receive calls even after clearly stating they are refusing the offer. UF201. Some consumers agree to accept magazines because it is the only way they can get PBS to stop calling them. UF202.

5. Defendants lie to consumer protection agencies and other consumer advocates about their business practices

16 Only when consumer protection agencies and the Better Business Bureau contact 17 Defendants to mediate a consumer complaint do Defendants stop their collection activity. UF140. 18 PBS routinely responds to these complaints by sending the mediating agency a computer-generated 19 form letter which falsely claims that the terms of the order were clearly explained, that the 20 consumer agreed to those terms, and that the consumer agreed to pay by check, but which 21 nonetheless agrees to cancel the consumer's account. UF203. Defendants use the same form letter 22 to respond to most consumer complaints, even though Defendants' own business records show that 23 the letter grossly misrepresents the consumer's experience with PBS. UF204.

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6. Defendants continue their deceptive and abusive business practices despite court orders which prohibited them from engaging in these practices

Defendants continue to use the same sales practices that Edward Dantuma used in the 1960s when he sold magazine subscriptions through his "Keystone Readers' Service" franchise. *These sales practices were specifically prohibited* in a 1971 Federal Trade Commission decision and order issued against Perfect Film and Chemical Corporation, Perfect Subscription Company, and Keystone Readers' Service, Inc., and a related 1980 modifying order. UF205, UF206, UF207.

In addition, Defendants have continued these deceptive and abusive business practices despite settlements with the States of Idaho, Wisconsin, and Illinois, in which Defendants agreed to stop the same deceptive and abusive business practices at issue in this FTC lawsuit, as well as the stipulated preliminary injunction entered into in this case. UF208, UF209. Several states have also investigated Defendants' business practices. UF210.

Rather than correct their deceptive and abusive business practices, Defendants' response to these injunctions and settlements has been to make false assurances that they will stop their illegal conduct and to continue their deceptive and abusive business practices through new corporate entities. UF211, UF212, UF213.

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7. Defendants condone, and even reward, employees who engage in deceptive and abusive practices

Defendants reward employees who generate high sales, even if the employees engaged in even more egregious deceptive and abusive practices (such as making misrepresentations, dodging consumers' questions, and going "off-script") to generate those sales. UF215. This is the case even where Defendants have documented proof of an employee's violations over the course of years. UF216. The fact that an employee can engage in the same violative conduct year after year shows that Defendants condone these business practices. UF217. The fact that Defendants pay employees more for generating high sales, and ignore the fact that their employees engaged in deception to achieve those high sales, shows that they not only condone, but actually reward, these bad business practices. UF219.

G. Defendants' "Subscription Order Service" is also a scam

In addition to the new magazine subscriptions that Defendants sell through "PBS,"
Defendants also sell subscription "renewals" under the fictitious business names "Subscription
Order Service" and "SOS." UF220. Defendants use deceptive business practices to generate these
subscription renewal sales as well. UF221, UF222, UF223. Defendants start with information
they collect from their PBS "survey" calls (*"Which publications are you currently receiving?"*).
UF221. Defendants' SOS employees then call consumers who have provided information about

the magazines they are already receiving, and read the SOS script. UF222. The script implies that the SOS salesperson is an employee of the magazine publisher or an employee of the company that originally sold the subscription to the consumer and that SOS has a pre-existing business relationship with the consumer (*"I'm with the company that services [the particular magazine] ….. and because we consider you to be a preferred customer we are going to extend your [magazine name] at today's rate. "*). UF223. From 2004 through 2008, Defendants have collected from consumers in connection with their "Subscription Order Services" "sales" of

8 magazine subscription renewals. UF163.

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H. Defendants are engaging in these deceptive and abusive practices as a "common enterprise"

10 The Dantuma family operates the Corporate Defendants, EDE and PBS, Inc., together as a common enterprise. UF229. Both are controlled by Edward Dantuma and operated with the 11 12 assistance of his wife Persis Dantuma and children (Dirk, Jeffrey, and Dries Dantuma, and Brenda Dantuma Schang). UF230. UF3-6. UF25-80. All of PBS, Inc.'s work is performed by EDE 13 14 employees. UF231, UF234. The two companies share office space, a common officer, trade names, business telephone numbers, and business website. UF233. As discussed in Section III.D., 15 16 *infra*, the legal effect of their operation of the two corporate Defendants as a common enterprise is 17 that each Defendant should be held liable for the deceptive acts and practices of the others.

18 III. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL COUNTS OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 19 A. Legal standard for granting summary judgment

20 As the moving party, the FTC "must initially identify those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 21 22 which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." FTC v. Stefanchik, 23 559 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in 25 favor of the non-moving party. See F.D.I.C. v. O'Melveny & Mevers, 969 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). The moving party has the burden of 26 27 demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty 28 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

"Once the moving party meets its initial burden, ... the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stefanchik, 559 F.3d at 927-28 (quoting Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "[M]ere disagreement or the bald assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists" does not preclude the use of summary judgment. Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing California Architectural Building Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, conclusory or speculative testimony is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact to defeat summary judgment. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 345 (9th Cir. 1995). "Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine issue for trial." Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d at 1468 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).

В.

The Court should enter summary judgment on Counts One and Two (alleging violations of the FTC Act)
1. Legal standard for finding representations, omissions, or practices deceptive

Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive acts and practices in or affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C § 45. "An act or practice is deceptive if 'first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material." *FTC v. Gill*, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

"A solicitation may be likely to mislead by virtue of the net impression it creates even
though the solicitation also contains truthful disclosures." *FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC*, 453 F.3d
1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, in *FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 778 F.2d 35
(D.C. Cir. 1985), the Court found an advertisement's description of cigarette tar content to be
deceptive even though fine print in the corner of the advertisement truthfully explained how the tar
content was measured. The Brown & Williamson court reasoned that, under the circumstances,
consumers were unlikely to read the fine print in the corner of the ad. *Id.* at 42-43. Similarly, in

Floersheim v. FTC, 411 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969), the Court found that substantial evidence supported the FTC's determination that the appearance and prominent repetition of the words "Washington D.C." on debt-collecting forms from a private collections company created the deceptive impression that the forms were a demand from the government even though the forms contained a small print disclaimer informing recipients that such was not the case. *Id.* at 876-78.

In addition, under the FTC Act, a principal is liable for misrepresentations made by its agents regardless of any efforts of the principal to prevent such misrepresentations. *FTC v. Southwest Sunsites*, 785 F.2d 1431, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1986), *Goodman v. FTC*, 244 F.2d 584, 592-93 (9th Cir. 1957). Thus, Defendants are liable for misrepresentations that their salespeople, sales supervisors, verifiers ("account managers"), and collectors make, even if these misrepresentations were not authorized.

If consumers are likely to have chosen differently but for the deception, the misrepresentation is material. *In the matter of Southwest Sunsites Inc.*, 105 F.T.C. 7, 149 (1985), *aff*'d, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 828 (1986). "Express claims or deliberately-made implied claims used to induce the purchase of a particular product or service are presumed to be material." *FTC v. SlimAmerica, Inc.*, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing *FTC v. Pantron I Corp.*, 33 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995).

The FTC is not required to prove that individual consumers relied on the deceptive acts or practices. *FTC v. Figgie Int'l*, 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993). It is also not required that Defendants made the misrepresentations with an intent to defraud or deceive, or in bad faith. *See, e.g., Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC*, 884 F.2d 1489, 1495 (1st Cir. 1989); *FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.*, 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988).

2. Defendants have made material misrepresentations in violation of the FTC Act in their initial telemarketing calls (Count One)

The undisputed facts show that Defendants induce consumers to agree to accept magazine subscriptions by making numerous misrepresentations which, taken together, create the net impression that the magazine subscriptions are free, upon payment of nominal shipping and handling charges. *See* Sections II.B. and II.G., *supra*. As discussed in Section II.B., *supra*,

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Defendants do this by targeting consumers whose job responsibilities include answering busy 1 phone lines, making calls to the consumers while the consumers are at work, pretending that they 2 3 are calling to conduct a survey, and tricking the consumers into agreeing to the second follow-up 4 conversation, of which only part is recorded, which purports to bind the consumers to an onerous long-term, non-cancellable contract for hundreds of dollars. Like the deceptive advertising in 5 Brown & Williamson, 778 F.2d at 42-43, and Floersheim, 411 F.2d at 876-78, Defendants' 6 telephone solicitation is designed to *minimize* the likelihood that consumers will understand the 7 material terms. By making these misrepresentations, Defendants have engaged in deceptive acts or 8 practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Thus, summary judgment should be granted in 9 the FTC's favor on Count One of the Amended Complaint. 10

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3. Defendants have made material misrepresentations in violation of the FTC Act in their subsequent communications with consumers (Count Two)

As discussed in Sections II.C. and II.D., *supra*, after the telephone solicitation, Defendants make additional misrepresentations to scare consumers into paying hundreds of dollars for what were supposed to be free magazines:

 Defendants send consumers invoices which claim that the consumers owe hundreds of dollars (typically \$717.60) for the magazine subscriptions. This representation is false; consumers agreed to receive magazine subscriptions based on the belief that they were free or being offered for a nominal cost.

19 - When consumers contact Defendants to contest the invoice, Defendants represent that the
20 consumers entered into "binding contracts" to purchase the magazines at the high prices, and that
21 they have verification recordings which "prove" that the consumers agreed to the charges. These
22 representations are also false; the recordings capture only a small part of the conversations between
23 PBS and the consumers, and the consumer's statements on the recording are taken out of context.

Defendants represent that they have already submitted orders for the five-year
subscriptions to the magazine publishers and have already paid hundreds of dollars to the magazine
publishers for these subscriptions, and thus, the subscriptions cannot be cancelled. In fact,
Defendants enter only one- or two-year subscriptions, and pay only a small percentage of the
subscription fee to the publishers. Defendants keep most of the subscription fee as profit.

- Defendants claim that the only way for the consumers to be release from the "binding contract" is to pay a "cancellation fee," which has typically been in the range of \$125-\$150. In fact. Defendants routinely release consumers from their obligations under the "contract" if the consumers have submitted or threaten to submit written complaints to consumer protection agencies.

- Defendants threaten consumers with additional misrepresentations in their collection calls, including that they have a "legal department" and "credit supervisor," that they are members of and will send derogatory information about a consumer's credit to the credit reporting agencies, that they will take steps to garnish a consumer's wages or arrest a consumer, and that they will send delinquent accounts to any outside collection agencies. As discussed in Section II.D., supra, these are representations are all false.

These misrepresentations have caused many consumers to pay money to Defendants. Defendants are liable for these misrepresentations whether or not they authorized their employees to make them. In routinely making these material misrepresentations, Defendants have engaged in deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Thus, summary judgment should be granted in the FTC's favor on Count Two of the Amended Complaint.

C.

- 1.
- The Court should enter summary judgment as to Counts Three through Six (alleging violations of the TSR)
 - Defendants are subject to the TSR because they are "sellers" and 'telemarketers" engaged in "telemarketing" to "customers," as those terms are defined in the TSR

Counts Three through Six of the Complaint allege that Defendants violated various provisions of the TSR, as discussed in greater detail below. These provisions of the TSR apply to the Defendants because they are "sellers" or "telemarketers" engaged in "telemarketing" to "customers" as those terms are defined in the TSR.

"Telemarketing" is "a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(cc).³ Defendants' business is a plan, program, or campaign to induce consumers to purchase magazine subscriptions

This definition excludes certain catalog sales, not applicable here.

through the use of one or more telephones and involves more than one interstate telephone call.Defendants are thus engaged in "telemarketing."

A "person" is "any individual, group, unincorporated association, limited or general partnership, corporation, or other business entity." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(v). A "customer" is "any person who is or may be required to pay for goods or services offered through telemarketing." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(l). Every consumer that Defendants solicits by telephone is a "customer."

A "seller" is "any person who, in connection with a telemarketing transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide goods or services to the customer in exchange for consideration." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(z). Each Defendant is a "person" who has provided or offered to provide, or arranged for others to provide, magazine subscriptions to a customer in exchange for consideration. Both corporate Defendants provide and offer to provide magazine subscriptions to customers in exchange for consideration. All of the Individual Defendants have arranged for the Corporate Defendants to provide these subscriptions to customers in exchange for consideration. Each of the Defendants is thus a "seller."

A "telemarketer" is "any person [including corporate entities] who, in connection with telemarketing, initiates or receives telephone calls to or from a customer or donor." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(bb). Both corporate Defendants are thus "telemarketers."

2. Defendants are subject to the TSR because they do not fall within the TSR's <u>"business-to-business" exemption</u>

Defendants have structured their business so that they call consumers *at work* in an attempt to fall within the "business-to-business" exemption of the TSR. That exemption provides that the TSR does not apply to *"telephone calls between a telemarketer and any business, except calls to induce the retail sale of nondurable office or cleaning supplies."* 16 C.F.R. § 310.6(b)(7). As discussed in Sections II.B.1., II.B.6., and II.F.3., *supra*, however, Defendants' telemarketing calls target the individual consumers themselves, not the businesses that the consumers work for. Thus, Defendants' telemarketing activity does not fall within the TSR's "business-to-business" exemption, and Defendants are required to comply with the TSR.

 3. Defendants have failed to disclose to consumers the purpose of their telemarketing calls (Count Three)

Section $310.4(\overline{d})(2)$ of the Telemarketing Sales Rule requires telemarketers, in an outbound

telephone call to induce the purchase of goods or services, to disclose truthfully, promptly, and in a
clear and conspicuous manner to the person receiving the call, that the purpose of the call is to sell
goods or services. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(d)(2). As discussed in Sections II.B. and II.G., *supra*,
Defendants fail to disclose the true purpose of the call – to sell non-cancellable, long-term
magazine subscriptions – at any point during the initial telemarketing call. In fact, Defendants
expressly misrepresent that the purpose of the call is to conduct a "survey." Thus, the Corporate
Defendants are in violation of TSR Section 310.4(d)(2), and summary judgment should be granted
in the FTC's favor on Count Three of the Amended Complaint.

4. <u>Defendants have misrepresented the total cost of their magazine</u> subscriptions (Count Four)

Section 310.3(a)(2)(i) of the TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, the total costs to purchase, receive, or use, and the quantity of, any goods or services that are the subject of a sales offer. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(i). On its face, this rule requires that the "total cost" of the magazine subscription package be disclosed.

As discussed in Section II.B.5., *supra*, Defendants do not disclose at any point during the Defendants' initial telemarketing call the total cost (hundreds of dollars, and most commonly, \$717.60) of the magazine subscription package. Moreover, Defendants do not disclose information that consumers would need (not only the weekly cost, but also the number of weeks or months of payment and the fact that the "contract" will be non-cancellable) to calculate the total cost. Thus, it is not possible for even a consumer capable of lightning-fast math calculations to figure out the total cost during the initial telemarketing call.

As discussed in Section II.B.6., *supra*, even in the follow-up conversation that consumers have with the salesperson's "supervisor," there is no disclosure that the total cost is hundreds of dollars (most commonly, \$717.60), that the consumer is being asked to enter into a "contract," or that the contract is "non-cancellable." Morever, assuming *arguendo*, that the supervisor's disclosures did somehow provide enough information for a consumer to calculate the total cost, these disclosures must be viewed as legally insufficient because the disclosures come after Defendants misrepresent that the purpose of this "supervisor" call is solely to "verify" previously-

1 discussed information.

Finally, as discussed in Sections II.B.6. and II.C., *supra*, the follow-up verification call with the "account manager" also fails to adequately disclose total cost. Defendants' "account managers" did not disclose the total cost to consumers prior to June 2008. Even for those "sales" made after June 2008 (when Defendants modified their verification call scripts to disclose the total cost), however, these disclosures are legally insufficient because the disclosures are preceded by Defendants' misrepresentation that the purpose of this "verification call" is only to "verify" previously-discussed information. In short, Defendants systematically fail to disclose total cost in violation of TSR Section 310.3(a)(2)(i), and summary judgment should be granted in the FTC's favor on Count Four of the Amended Complaint.

5. Defendants have made false and misleading statements to induce payment for goods or services (Count Five)

Section 310.3(a)(4) of the TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from making a false or misleading statement to induce any person to pay for goods or services. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(4). As discussed in Sections II.B., II.C., and II.D., *supra*, Defendants make numerous misrepresentations, including lying about the purpose of the telemarketing call, falsely implying that the magazine subscriptions are free and consumers will pay only a nominal amount, falsely claiming that the consumers must pay Defendants because the consumers entered into a "contract," and falsely claiming that consumers must pay for all of the magazines for the entire five-year term because Defendants have already paid that amount to the magazine publishers. These misrepresentations are violations of TSR Section 310.3(a)(4). Thus, summary judgment should be granted in the FTC's favor on Count Five of the Amended Complaint.

6. Defendants have engaged in a pattern of abusive calls (Count Six)

Section 310.4(b)(1)(i) of the TSR prohibits telemarketers from causing any telephone to ring, or engaging any person in telephone conversation, repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(i). As discussed in Section II.F.4., *supra*, Defendants' employees are not trained on how to properly handle consumers' do-not-call requests, and in fact are told to ignore such requests. Defendants' salespeople call the same consumers over and over again with their fake "survey" call until they

get the consumer to agree to accept magazines. Likewise, Defendants' verification department 1 employees call consumers over and over again until the consumer agrees to go through the 2 3 verification recording process. Even worse, Defendants' collections department employees call 4 consumers repeatedly, threatening collection lawsuits, garnishment, and even arrest, in order to scare the consumers into agreeing to pay. Consumer declarations corroborate that consumers 5 received these repeated abusive telephone calls, and that Defendants' employees were rude and 6 abusive. Defendants engage in these practices in violation of TSR Section 310.4(b)(1)(i), and the 7 Court should grant summary judgment in the FTC's favor on Count Six of the Amended 8 Complaint. 9

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D.

As a common enterprise, the Corporate Defendants are liable for the deceptive and abusive acts and practices of each other

11 Defendants which act jointly as a common enterprise are jointly liable for the violations of each other. Courts have found common enterprises in a variety of FTC actions under Section 13(b) 12 13 where there has been common corporate control, shared office space, shared employees and officers, interrelated funds, and other factors. See, e.g., FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 14 15 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Wolf, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1760 at *8, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 16 ¶ 71,713 (S.D. Fla. 1996). Indeed, where "the same individuals were transacting an integrated business through a maze of interrelated companies[,] . . . 'the pattern and frame-work of the whole 17 enterprise must be taken into consideration" and the companies may be held jointly liable as a 18 19 common enterprise. J.K. Publ'ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (quoting Delaware Watch Co. v. FTC, 332 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1964)). As discussed in Section II.H., supra, Defendants are operating 20 as a common enterprise. Thus, the Defendants should be held jointly liable for each other's 21 violations of the FTC Act and TSR. 22

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IV.

1.

DEFENDANT A. Relief against the Corporate Defendants

The proposed permanent injunctions which prohibit the Corporate Defendants from engaging in telemarketing and the sale of magazine subscriptions are appropriate

This Court has the authority to grant the permanent injunction and other equitable relief

sought by the FTC. The second proviso of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), states

THE COURT SHOULD ORDER EQUITABLE RELIEF, INCLUDING

PERMANENT BANS AND A MONETARY JUDGMENT, AGAINST EACH

that "in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction" against violations of "any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission." Any matter involving a violation of a law that the FTC enforces qualifies as a "proper case" for injunctive relief under Section 13(b). FTC v. H.N. Singer, 668 F.2d at 1112-13.

Strong injunctive provisions are necessary to protect the public against future fraud by 5 Defendants. They have demonstrated an unwillingness to change their magazine sales practices to comply with the law, despite court injunctions dating back to 1971. They have demonstrated the same unwillingness to change their telemarketing practices to comply with the law, choosing 8 instead to continue their same deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices through new 9 corporate entities. Their illegal conduct has cheated thousands of consumers out of millions of 10 dollars. To prevent such illegal acts in the future, Section I of the proposed "Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief" lodged concurrently herewith ("proposed Final Judgment"), would permanently ban Defendants from engaging in telemarketing. Section II of the proposed Final Judgment would permanently ban Defendants from selling magazine subscriptions. Section III of the proposed Final Judgment would prohibit Defendants from misrepresenting, or assisting others in making material misrepresentations in connection with the sale of magazine subscriptions, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Section IV of the proposed Final Judgment would prohibit Defendants from violating the TSR, 16 C.F.R. Part 310.

2. The proposed compliance monitoring and record keeping provisions are appropriate

Sections IX through XIII of the proposed Final Judgment contain compliance monitoring and record keeping provisions that are necessary for the FTC to monitor and ensure compliance with the order. Courts have routinely included such provisions in permanent injunctions issued under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act. See e.g., FTC v. Think Achievement, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1018 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (records retention, notification of changed employment or residence, access to premises and monitoring), aff'd, 312 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 2002); SlimAmerica, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1276 (holding that record keeping and monitoring provisions were appropriate to permit Commission to police defendants' compliance with order); FTC v. US Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp.

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737, 753-54 (N.D. III. 1992) (monitoring); *FTC v. Sharp*, 782 F. Supp. 1445, 1456-57 (D. Nev.
 1991) (monitoring provisions); *FTC v. Alliance Communications, Inc.*, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS
 20373 at *5-7, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,685 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (monitoring and reporting
 requirements).

3. <u>The Court should order the Corporate Defendants to pay equitable monetary</u> relief in an amount equal to their gross revenues

Plaintiff also seeks monetary restitution for consumers injured by defendants' deceptive
practices. This court has broad authority under the FTC Act to "grant any ancillary relief
necessary to accomplish complete justice," including the power to order restitution. *Stefanchik*,
559 F.3d at 931 (quoting *Pantron I*, 33 F.3d at 1102). The Court has also broad discretion in
granting equitable monetary relief. *Id.* (citing *Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.*, 237
F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001)). In addition, Section 19(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b,
authorizes this Court to grant relief as it finds necessary to redress injury to consumers resulting
from violations of a Trade Regulation Rule, including the FTC's TSR. Congress provided that
such relief may include, but should not be limited to, "rescission or reformation of contracts, the
refund of money [and] return of property." *Id.* at 57b(b).

The proper measure of recovery for defrauded consumers is the full amount of the purchase price or payment — less any refunds — even though that amount may exceed the amount of the defendants' unjust enrichment. *Figgie Int'l*, 994 F.2d at 606-07; *US Sales Corp.*, 785 F. Supp. at 753. Furthermore, for the reasons set forth below, defendants should be held jointly and severally liable for the amount of consumer injury in this case, as provided in Section VIII of the proposed Final Judgment. *See Sharp*, 782 F. Supp. at 1449. As discussed in Section II.E., *supra*, from 2004 to 2008, the Corporate Defendants took a total of **Section 11** from consumers through their deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices. During the same time period, the Corporate Defendants is not a total of **Section 11**.

B.

Relief against the Individual Defendants

1. The Court should impose the same permanent bans, injunctions, compliance monitoring, and record keeping provisions, against the Individual Defendants because they directly participated in or had authority to control the companies' deceptive and abusive acts and practices

Each of the Individual Defendants are also liable for injunctive relief for the law violations committed by the Corporate Defendants because of their roles as corporate officers, directors, and top-level managers, and their day-to-day involvement in running the companies.

"An individual will be liable for corporate violations of the FTC Act if (1) he participated directly in the deceptive acts or had the authority to control them and (2) he had knowledge of the misrepresentations, was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of the misrepresentations, or was aware of a high probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the truth." *Stefanchik*, 559 F.3d at 931 (citing *Cyberspace.com*, 453 F.3d at 1202). An individual's status as a corporate officer gives rise to a presumption of liability to control a small, closely held corporation. *Standard Educators, Inc. v. FTC*, 475 F.2d 401, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In particular, assuming the duties of a corporate officer is probative of an individual's participation or authority. *FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc.*, 104 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1997); *FTC v. Amy Travel*, 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989); *FTC v. Medicor*, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2002); *J.K. Publ'ns*, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1203-4.

That each of the Individual Defendants is aware that PBS is engaged in deceptive and abusive practices is evidenced by the fact that each was named as a defendant in the Illinois Attorney General's 1991 federal court action alleging the same deceptive and abusive business practices at issue here, and that each of them was a party to the settlement of that action, in which they agreed to stop the deceptive and abusive practices. Moreover, they continue to operate PBS using the same deceptive and abusive practices despite their agreement, in the stipulated preliminary injunction that Defendants entered into with the FTC in this case, to stop.

Moreover, as the companies' top-level managers, the Individual Defendants have the authority to control PBS's deceptive and abusive acts and practices.

Defendants' knowledge of the deceptive and abusive nature of PBS's practices is also evidenced by the fact that they have their employees use the deceptive sales scripts. These scripts

are used at Edward Dantuma's direction. As top-level managers for the PBS's sales departments, 1 2 defendants Dirk and Jeffrey Dantuma, and Brenda Dantuma Schang have each instructed the 3 salespeople under their supervision to read the deceptive sales scripts "word-for-word." As the top-4 level manager for PBS's verification department, Dries Dantuma has likewise instructed the verifiers under his supervision to read the deceptive verification scripts "word-for-word." This 5 alone establishes that the Individual Defendants directly participated in the deceptive acts and 6 practices. In addition, they structured their employees' compensation to reward high sales volume 7 with no penalty for making additional misrepresentations; by doing so, they have allowed, and 8 even encouraged, their employees to make even more egregious misrepresentations to generate 9 sales. 10

The Individual Defendants' intimate and direct participation in the companies' affairs and their continued refusal to correct their bad practices, coupled with either their knowledge of the bad acts and practices or their authority to control them, provides overwhelming justification for holding them liable for the companies' bad practices and imposing the permanent injunctive relief requested by the FTC.

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The Court should impose the same monetary judgment on the Individual Defendants as the Corporate Defendants

Individual corporate officers and owners may be held personally liable for redress if they 17 "had knowledge that the corporation or one of its agents engaged in dishonest or fraudulent 18 19 conduct, that the misrepresentations were the type upon which a reasonable and prudent person would rely, and that consumer injury resulted." FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 20 1234 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171). The knowledge 21 requirement can be satisfied if "the individuals had actual knowledge of material 22 misrepresentations, [were] recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of a misrepresentation, or 23 had awareness of a high probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the truth." Id. 24 25 Accordingly, an individual may be held personally liable for restitution without a showing of an 26 actual intent to defraud consumers. Id.

27 Courts have considered a variety of factors in determining whether an individual defendant
28 had knowledge of the underlying corporate fraud. Such factors include an individual's active role

in developing deceptive materials used to market to consumers, such as telemarketing scripts, and 1 2 responsibility for corporate financial matters. See, e.g., FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC, 2002 U.S. 3 Dist LEXIS 25565 at *17-19, 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 73,960 (W.D. Wash. 2002), aff'd, 453 4 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2006); Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574 (telemarketing scripts); FTC v. Am. Standard Credit Sys., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1089 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (developing deceptive marketing 5 materials); FTC v. World Media Brokers, 415 F.3d 758, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2005) (responsibility for 6 corporate financial matters). Knowledge may also be inferred in part from an individual's 7 awareness of consumer complaints. Cyberspace.com, 453 F.3d at 1202; FTC v. Bay Area Bus. 8 Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 637-38 (7th Cir. 2005); Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574. 9

As discussed in Section II.F., *supra*, each of the Individual Defendants knows that PBS's acts and practices are deceptive and abusive. As discussed in Section III.B., *supra*, the misrepresentations are the type upon which a reasonable and prudent person would rely, and consumer injury has resulted. Thus, the Court should hold the Individual Defendants personally liable for redress, and they should be held jointly and severally liable with the Corporate Defendants for the **Section III.B.**

V. CONCLUSION

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The uncontroverted facts show that Defendants knowingly sell magazine subscriptions to consumers through the use of deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices in violation of both the FTC Act and the FTC's Telemarketing Sales Rule. The Court should thus grant summary judgment and the relief requested in the proposed Final Judgment. To the extent that the Court determines that summary judgment resolving all issues is not appropriate, Plaintiff requests that the Court summarily adjudicate all issues for which it finds no genuine issue of material fact.

Dated: July 31, 2009

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Faye Chen Barnouw FAYE CHEN BARNOUW RAYMOND E. McKOWN MARICELA SEGURA Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission