Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment
The Federal Trade Commission has accepted, subject to final approval, an agreement
containing a proposed consent order with the Maine Health Alliance and its Executive Director, William
R. Diggins. The Alliance is an organization consisting of over 325 physicians and 11 hospitals in
northeastern Maine. The agreement settles charges that respondents violated Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, by facilitating and implementing agreements among physician
members and among hospital members of the Alliance to fix prices and other terms of dealing for
physician and hospital services with health insurance firms and other third-party payors, and to refuse to
deal with these payors except on collectively determined terms. These price-fixing agreements and
concerted refusals to deal among otherwise competing physicians and among otherwise competing
hospitals, in turn, have kept the price of health care in northeastern Maine above the level that would
have prevailed absent the illegal conduct. The proposed consent order has been placed on the public
record for 30 days to receive comments from interested persons. Comments received during this
period will become part of the public record. After 30 days, the Commission will review the agreement
and the comments received, and will decide whether it should withdraw from the agreement or make
the proposed order final.
The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the proposed order. The analysis
is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the agreement and proposed order, or to modify
their terms in any way. Further, the proposed consent order has been entered into for settlement
purposes only and does not constitute an admission by the respondents that they violated the law or that
the facts alleged in the complaint (other than jurisdictional facts) are true.
The Complaint Allegations
The Alliance was formed in 1995 by the vast majority of physicians and hospitals in five
counties in northeastern Maine to negotiate payor contracts that contained "higher compensation" and
more "advantageous" contract terms than the physicians and hospitals could obtain by dealing
individually with payors. More than 85% of the physicians on staff at Alliance member hospitals are
Alliance members, as are eleven of the sixteen hospitals in the five-county area. The physician and
hospital members designated the Alliance as their negotiating agent to contract with payors, and
authorized the Alliance to enter into, on their behalf, payor contracts.
Although the Alliance is a nonprofit corporation, and its member hospitals are tax-exempt
organizations, a substantial majority of its physician members are for-profit entities. These for-profit
physicians play a significant role in the governance of the Alliance and receive pecuniary benefits as a
result of their participation. Participating physicians select 11 of the 22 members of the Alliance's
Board of Directors and thus exercise substantial authority over the policies and actions of the Alliance.
The participating physicians are therefore "members" of the Alliance within the meaning of Section 4 of
the FTC Act, which grants the Commission jurisdiction over nonprofit organizations that carry on
business for the profit of their members. Because the Alliance engages in substantial activities that
confer pecuniary benefits on these for-profit members, its activities engaged in on behalf of the
physician and hospital members fall within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Alliance physician and hospital members have refused to contract with payors on an individual
basis. Instead, the Alliance's Board of Directors authorized Mr. Diggins to act as a principal
negotiating agent with payors on behalf of the collective membership of the Alliance. Mr. Diggins was
instrumental in forming the Alliance, coordinating the membership's collective bargaining activity, and
negotiating payor contracts on behalf of the collective membership.
As guidance for Mr. Diggins, the Board, in conjunction with its Contracts Committee, compiled
written "Contracting Guidelines and Parameters," setting forth price-related and other competitively
significant terms that the Alliance required in order to contract with payors. Mr. Diggins reported the
details of negotiations with payors to the Board and the Contracts Committee. Based on the
recommendations of Mr. Diggins, and the Contracts Committee, the Board decided whether to accept
or reject contracts with payors on behalf of the Alliance's physician and hospital members.
The Alliance and Mr. Diggins negotiated higher reimbursement for Alliance physician and
hospital members, and more advantageous contract language, than the physicians and hospitals could
have achieved through individual contracts with payors. Despite a written Alliance policy allowing
members to contract independently of the Alliance, in fact the Alliance and Mr. Diggins encouraged the
physician and hospital members to contract only through the Alliance, in order to maintain the Alliance's
leverage over payors. Mr. Diggins provided Alliance physician and hospital members with a model
letter for them to use to notify payors that they refused to negotiate individually, and that the Alliance
would negotiate on their behalf. In response to payors' requests to contract directly with Alliance
physician and hospital members, the members directed payors to the Alliance for contracting.
The Alliance's and Mr. Diggins' joint negotiation of fees and other competitively significant
terms has not been reasonably related to any efficiency-enhancing integration. Although the Alliance
has developed some clinical programs limited primarily to hospital members, none of the Alliance's
clinical activities create any significant degree of interdependence among the physician or hospital
participants, nor do the activities create sufficiently substantial potential efficiencies.
By orchestrating agreements among Alliance physician members, and hospital members, to deal
only on collectively-determined terms, together with refusals to deal with payors that would not meet
those terms, respondents have violated Section 5 of the FTC Act.
The Proposed Consent Order
The proposed order is designed to prevent recurrence of the illegal conduct charged in the
complaint, while allowing respondents to engage in legitimate conduct that does not impair competition.
The proposed order's specific provisions are as follows:
The proposed order's core prohibitions are contained in Paragraphs II, III, and V. Paragraph
II is intended to prevent the Respondents from participating in, or creating, future unlawful agreements
for physician services. Paragraph II.A prohibits the Alliance and Mr. Diggins from entering into or
facilitating any agreement between or among any physicians: (1) to negotiate with payors on any
physician's behalf; (2) to deal, not to deal, or threaten not to deal with payors; (3) on what terms to
deal with any payor; or (4) not to deal individually with any payor, or to deal with any payor only
through the Alliance.
Other parts of Paragraph II reinforce these general prohibitions. Paragraph II.B prohibits the
respondents from facilitating exchanges of information among physicians concerning whether, or on
what terms, to contract with a payor. Paragraph II.C bars attempts to engage in any action prohibited
by Paragraph II.A or II.B. Paragraph II.D proscribes inducing anyone to engage in any action
prohibited by Paragraphs II.A through II.C.
Paragraph III is intended to prevent the Respondents from participating in, or creating, future
unlawful agreements for hospital services. Paragraphs III.A through D are identical to Paragraphs II.A
through D, except that they apply to the Alliance's or Mr. Diggins' actions regarding the provision of
hospital, rather than physician, services. This matter is the Commission's first law enforcement action
charging an organization with price-fixing and other anticompetitive collusive conduct in the market for
hospital services, in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Thus, unlike previous orders involving
collective bargaining with health plans, this order bars agreements relating to both physicians and
As in other orders addressing providers' collective bargaining
with health care purchasers, certain kinds of agreements are excluded from
the general bar on joint negotiations. Respondents
would not be precluded from engaging in conduct that is reasonably necessary
to form or participate in legitimate joint contracting arrangements among
competing physicians or competing hospitals, whether a "qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement" or a "qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement."
As defined in the proposed order, a "qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement" possesses
two key characteristics. First, all physician or all hospital participants
must share substantial financial risk
through the arrangement, such that the arrangement creates incentives for
the participants to control costs and improve quality by managing the provision
of services. Second, any agreement concerning
reimbursement or other terms or conditions of dealing must be reasonably
necessary to obtain significant efficiencies through the joint arrangement.
A "qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement," on
the other hand, need not involve any sharing of financial risk. Instead,
as defined in the proposed order, all physician participants must
participate in active and ongoing programs to evaluate and modify their clinical
practice patterns in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services
provided, and the arrangement must create a
high degree of interdependence and cooperation among physicians. As with
qualified risk-sharing arrangements, any agreement concerning price or other
terms of dealing must be reasonably necessary
to achieve the efficiency goals of the joint arrangement.
In the event that the Alliance forms a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or a qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, Paragraph IV requires the Alliance to notify the Commission at
least 60 days prior to negotiating or entering into agreements with payors, or discussing price or related
terms among the participants of the arrangement. Notification is not required for negotiations or
agreements with subsequent payors pursuant to any arrangement for which notice was given under
Paragraph IV. Paragraph IV.B sets out the information necessary to make the notification complete.
Paragraph IV.C establishes the Commission's right to obtain additional information regarding the
Paragraph V prohibits Mr. Diggins, for three years, from negotiating with any payor on behalf
of any Alliance physician or hospital member, and from advising any Alliance physician or hospital
member to accept or reject any term, condition, or requirement of dealing with any payor. Mr. Diggins,
however, is permitted to form, participate in, or take any action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing
joint arrangement or qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement on behalf of the Alliance.
Paragraph VI.A requires the Alliance to distribute the complaint and order to all physicians and
hospitals who have participated in the Alliance, and to payors that contract with the Alliance.
Paragraph VI.B requires the Alliance, at any payor's request and without penalty, to terminate its
current contracts with respect to providing physician services. If a payor does request termination,
Paragraph VI.B requires the Alliance to terminate the contract on its earliest termination or renewal
date. Paragraph VI.B also provides that a contract may extend up to one year beyond the termination
or renewal date if the payor affirms the contract in writing and the Alliance does not exercise its right to
terminate the contract.
Paragraph VII.A requires Mr. Diggins to distribute the complaint and order to physician and
hospital groups he represents in contracting with payors, and to payors with which he has dealt in
contracting while representing any physician or hospital groups.
Paragraphs VII.B through IX of the proposed order impose various obligations on respondents
to report or provide access to information to the Commission to facilitate monitoring respondents'
compliance with the order.
The proposed order will expire in 20 years.