McCormick & Co., Inc.

File No. 961-0050

The Analysis to Aid Public Comment fully describes the Commission action in this matter. Some comments by our dissenting colleagues, however, require a brief response.

The Commission has accepted for public comment a consent order from McCormick & Company Inc. ("McCormick") in which the company has agreed to cease and desist granting discounts (partly in the form of up-front shelf-allocation payments) to large chains without making comparable payments available to other chains and independents that compete with the favored chains. Under the Supreme Court's controlling decision in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,(1) injury to competition at the retailer (i.e., "secondary") level can be inferred where substantial and durable price discrimination exists between competing purchasers who operate in a market with low profit margins and keen competition.

McCormick is far and away the largest manufacturer and supplier of full lines of spices to grocery stores in the United States. In the early 1990s, it found itself in a price war with Burns-Philp Food Inc. ("Burns-Philp"), its only full-line competitor. Substantial discriminatory discounts were granted to favored chains, often accounting for many individual stores, and not to competing retailers.

In examining McCormick's discounts, the Commission did not simply apply the Morton Salt presumption in finding injury to competition, but examined other factors, including the market power of McCormick and the fact that discounts to favored chains were conditioned on an agreement to devote all or a substantial portion of shelf space to the McCormick line of products. Our dissenting colleagues applaud the fact that the Commission is willing to examine injury to competition by looking at factors beyond those narrowly described in the Morton Salt approach, but conclude that those factors do not justify a secondary-line price discrimination case here. We do not find their arguments persuasive.

1. The dissenting Commissioners observe that the discriminatory discounts were granted in the midst of, and possibly because of, a price war. But the Robinson-Patman Act limits on discriminatory pricing - including the rule that a seller can meet but not exceed prices offered by a competitor(2) - are not suspended during price wars.

2. Our colleagues suggest that this is a primary-line case (i.e., injury at the producer level) masquerading as a secondary line (injury at the retailer level) enforcement action. But that kind of distinction between primary-line and secondary-line anti-competitive effects is unduly rigid and mechanical -- particularly in light of the facts of this matter. It is true that part of the injury at the secondary level occurred because McCormick's behavior injured its only full-line competitor. But that is just one part of the secondary-line case. The fact remains that favored chain store buyers received from a dominant seller substantially better discounts than disfavored buyers, and they were injured, and competition at the secondary line was injured, as a result. Moreover, with Burns-Philp out of the picture as an aggressive competitor, chain stores and other retailers at the secondary level will be denied benefits of future competition.

3. The Commission was influenced in the decision to enforce the Robinson-Patman Act here because McCormick is a dominant seller. Our colleagues' conclusion -- that market dominance by the discriminating seller should be irrelevant to secondary-line price discrimination -- flies in the face of commentary by leading scholars such as Herbert Hovenkamp suggesting that the dominance of the seller is exactly the factor that should be examined in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.(3)

The essential feature of Commission action here should not be lost in a quarrel over particular facts. As the Analysis to Aid Public Comment points out, there will be circumstances in which the Morton Salt presumption is appropriate and dispositive. There may be other market settings in which it makes sense for the Commission, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, or the Commission and Courts, in the process of considering whether there has been a violation, to look past the Morton Salt factors to a broader range of market conditions to determine whether there has been real injury to competition. Taking those additional factors into account, the majority concluded that there was injury not just to the disfavored buyers, but to secondary-line competition generally.

1. 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (Morton Salt).

2. See Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 446 (1983) ("a seller's response must be defensive, in the sense that the lower price must be calculated and offered in good faith to 'meet not beat' the competitor's low price.")

3. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power and Secondary-Line Differential Pricing, 71 Geo. L.J. 1157, 1170 (1983) ("Systematic, long-term price discrimination can be achieved only by a seller with market power. If the seller does not have market power, purchasers asked to pay the higher price will purchase from another seller willing to sell at a more competitive price.")