Robert Pitofsky, Chairman
Mary L. Azcuenaga
Sheila F. Anthony
Mozelle W. Thompson
Orson Swindle

In the Matter of




On November 5, 1997, Harold A. Honickman ("Honickman") filed a Petition To Modify Consent Order ("Petition") in Docket

No. 9233 ("Order") pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45(b), and Section 2.51 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 16 C.F.R. 2.51, and consistent with the Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Concerning Prior Approval And Prior Notice Provisions ("Prior Approval Policy Statement").(1) The Petition requests that the Commission reopen and modify the Order to terminate the prior approval provision set forth in Paragraph II of the Order. The Petition was placed on the public record for thirty days and no comments were received. The Commission has determined to terminate the prior approval provision of the Order by setting aside the Order.

The Commission, in its Prior Approval Policy Statement, "concluded that a general policy of requiring prior approval is no longer needed," citing the availability of the premerger notification and waiting period requirements of Section 7A of the Clayton Act, commonly referred to as the Hart-Scott-Rodino ("HSR") Act, 15 U.S.C. 18a, to protect the public interest in effective merger law enforcement.(2) The Commission announced that it will "henceforth rely on the HSR process as its principal means of learning about and reviewing mergers by companies as to which the Commission had previously found a reason to believe that the companies had engaged or attempted to engage in an illegal merger." As a general matter, "Commission orders in such cases will not include prior approval or prior notification requirements."(3)

The Commission stated that it will continue to fashion remedies as needed in the public interest, including ordering narrow prior approval or prior notification requirements in certain limited circumstances. The Commission said in its Prior Approval Policy Statement that "a narrow prior approval provision may be used where there is a credible risk that a company that engaged or attempted to engage in an anticompetitive merger would, but for the provision, attempt the same or approximately the same merger." The Commission also said that "a narrow prior notification provision may be used where there is a credible risk that a company that engaged or attempted to engage in an anticompetitive merger would, but for an order, engage in an otherwise unreportable anticompetitive merger."(4) As explained in the Prior Approval Policy Statement, the need for a prior notification requirement will depend on circumstances such as the structural characteristics of the relevant markets, the size and other characteristics of the market participants, and other relevant factors.

The Commission also announced, in its Prior Approval Policy Statement, its intention "to initiate a process for reviewing the retention or modification of these existing requirements" and invited respondents subject to such requirements "to submit a request to reopen the order."(5) The Commission determined that, "when a petition is filed to reopen and modify an order pursuant to . . . [the Prior Approval Policy Statement], the Commission will apply a rebuttable presumption that the public interest requires reopening of the order and modification of the prior approval requirement consistent with the policy announced" in the Statement.(6)

There is no evidence in the record that suggests that this matter presents any of the circumstances identified by the Prior Approval Policy Statement as appropriate for retaining a narrow prior approval provision, nor is there any indication of the circumstances that would warrant the substitution of a prior notice provision for the prior approval provision. There is nothing to suggest that Honickman would attempt the same or essentially the same acquisition that gave rise to the original complaint. In addition, it appears likely that future acquisitions that may have adverse competitive consequences within the relevant market would be HSR reportable. Nothing to overcome the presumption having been presented, the Commission has determined to reopen the proceeding and set aside the Order because deleting the prior approval requirement, in effect, would eliminate all of Honickman's future obligations under the Order.(7)

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that this matter be, and it hereby is, reopened, and that the Order be, and it hereby is, set aside as of the effective date of this order.

By the Commission, Commissioner Azcuenaga recused.

Donald S. Clark


ISSUED: March 31, 1998


(1)60 Fed. Reg. 39,745-47 (Aug. 3, 1995); 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,241.

(2)Prior Approval Policy Statement at 2.


(4)Id. at 3.

(5)Id. at 4.


(7)See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., Docket No. C-3418, Order Setting Aside Order (January 4, 1996).