



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

By Facsimile and First Class Mail

January 18, 2002

The Honorable Lisa Murkowski
Chair, House Labor and Commerce Committee
Alaska House of Representatives
Alaska State Capitol
Juneau, AK 99801-1182

Re: Alaska Senate Bill 37

Dear Representative Murkowski:

We write in response to your request for comment on Alaska Senate Bill 37, a bill that seeks to authorize competing physicians to engage in collective bargaining with health plans over fees and other terms.⁽¹⁾ As discussed below, the Commission has opposed legislation before the U.S. Congress that would create an antitrust exemption for physician collective bargaining, and the Commission staff has expressed similar concerns about bills before state legislatures. We continue to believe that the behavior authorized by the physician collective bargaining legislation would significantly increase health care costs and harm consumers.

You also specifically solicited our opinion on whether the bill meets the legal test of the state action doctrine. As you know, state economic regulation can immunize private parties from federal antitrust liability, but only where the displacement of competition furthers a clearly articulated policy of, and is actively supervised by, the state government. In the case of Senate Bill 37, the level of government involvement described falls far short of the level of "active supervision" required by the Supreme Court.

I. Physician Collective Bargaining

The Commission's opposition to legislation intended to create an antitrust exemption for physician collective bargaining has historically focused on two fundamental points, both of which are relevant to your consideration of Senate Bill 37:

(1) such legislation would likely harm consumers - an antitrust exemption would authorize price-fixing by physicians, which could be expected to result in increased consumer costs and decreased consumer access to care; and

(2) such legislation would not likely improve the quality of care - an antitrust exemption would not likely improve patient care, and there are other, more effective means of addressing quality of care issues that do not sacrifice the benefits of a competitive marketplace.

A. Consumer Harm

In testimony before Congress regarding a proposed federal antitrust exemption for physician collective bargaining,⁽²⁾ the Commission detailed the predictable impact on consumers that such legislation would have:

Without antitrust enforcement to block price fixing and boycotts designed to increase health plan payments to health care professionals, we can expect prices for health care services to rise substantially. Health plans would have few

alternatives to accepting the collective demands of health care providers for higher fees. The effect of the bill . . . can be expected to extend to various parties, and in various ways, throughout the health care system:

- Consumers and employers would face higher prices for health insurance coverage.
- Consumers also would face higher out-of-pocket expenses as copayments and other unreimbursed expenses increased.
- Consumers might face a reduction in benefits as costs increased.
- Senior citizens participating in Medicare HMOs would face reduced benefits
- The federal government would pay more for health coverage for its employees through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and military health programs.
- State and local governments would incur higher costs to provide health benefits to their employees.
- State Medicaid programs attempting to use managed care strategies to serve their beneficiaries could have to increase their budgets, cut optional benefits, or reduce the number of beneficiaries covered.
- State and local programs providing care for the uninsured would be further strained, because, by making health insurance coverage more costly, the bill threatens to increase the already sizable portion of the population that is uninsured.

These widespread effects are not simply theoretical possibilities. The record of antitrust law enforcement sets forth the impact of collective 'negotiations' on the public. For example, as described in the Commission's complaints, collective bargaining by anesthesiologists in Rochester, New York, and by obstetricians in Jacksonville, Florida, forced health plans to raise their reimbursement, and the result was increased premiums for the HMOs' subscribers.⁽³⁾ Other cases have challenged actions by associations of pharmacists who succeeded in forcing state and local governments to raise reimbursement levels paid under their employee prescription drug plans.⁽⁴⁾ In one such case, an administrative law judge found that the collective fee demands of pharmacists cost the State of New York an estimated \$7 million.⁽⁵⁾

Prior Commission cases illustrate the types of physician conduct that have raised problems. Price-fixing is one type of such conduct, and last year's *Alaska Health Network, Inc.*⁽⁶⁾ case is a prime example. In that case, the Commission alleged that competing physicians organized and conspired to fix the prices and other competitively significant terms on which they would deal with health plans in Fairbanks, Alaska. Another type of conduct is price-related group boycotts, such as the one addressed in the *M.D. Physicians of Southwest Louisiana, Inc.*⁽⁷⁾ case. There, the Commission charged a group of competing physicians with conspiring not to deal with certain third-party payers, as part of an unlawful enterprise designed to prevent managed care contracts from taking hold in the Lake Charles, Louisiana region.

There is widespread agreement that horizontal agreements among competitors can raise the most significant competitive concerns. The facilitation of naked horizontal price-fixing is among the most serious of these concerns, as such conduct predictably and consistently results in substantial consumer harm. Departing from the general rules of antitrust in such a competitively sensitive area presents substantial risks that would not be offset by procompetitive gains from physician collective bargaining.

The two arguments that have typically been presented to justify a departure from the general rules of antitrust in this context are that, given health plan concentration, physician collective bargaining would (1) increase patients' quality of care, and (2) allow physicians to bargain on a more "level playing field." The former argument is based on a misunderstanding of both current law and the effects of collective bargaining, as will be discussed in the next section.

The latter argument is more straightforward, but equally problematic. As the Commission explained in its testimony before Congress:

Arguments that consumers would not be harmed by an antitrust exemption for collective bargaining by independent health care professionals appear to rest on assertions that the [federal] bill would balance the bargaining power between health care professionals and health plans. These assertions, however, are incorrect. The bill would permit doctors to create monopolies. On the health plan side of the ledger, the evidence does not support the suggestion that most (or even many) areas have only one or two health plans.(8)

Furthermore, even if the assumption that physicians confront monopoly health plans were correct, authorizing collusive conduct by physicians would not necessarily serve the interests of consumers. The argument that physician collusion would merely counterbalance hypothetical monopsony power by health plans implicitly assumes that collective bargaining would generate physician fees no larger than the fees that would exist in a competitive market. However, there is little reason to believe that a successful physician cartel would settle for fees at the competitive level. If a health plan possessed actual market power, health care consumers could be doubly harmed by physician collective bargaining, because they could be forced to pay the health care plan's monopoly mark-up on top of the elevated fees charged by the physicians.

B. Quality of Care

Proponents of antitrust exemptions for physicians often suggest that greater physician bargaining power against health plans would result in increased quality of care for patients. This claim fails for two reasons: (1) physician collective bargaining has historically focused on physician compensation, rather than patient care; and (2) current antitrust law already permits physicians to work collectively on legitimate quality of care issues.

Immunizing collective bargaining imposes costs while providing little assurance that consumers' interest in quality care will be served. As the Commission stated before Congress:

Collective bargaining rights are designed to raise the incomes and improve the working conditions of union members. The law protects the United Auto Workers' right to bargain for higher wages and better working conditions, but we do not rely on the UAW to bargain for safer cars. Congress addressed those concerns in other ways.(9)

Moreover, discussions between physician groups and health plans are not illegal. Current antitrust law permits doctors to collectively negotiate with health plans in various circumstances in which consumers are likely to benefit. The Health Care Guidelines - jointly issued by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice - emphasize physicians' ability under the antitrust laws to organize networks, and other joint arrangements, to deal collectively with health plans and other purchasers.(10) In addition, through their professional societies and other groups, health care professionals can jointly provide information and express opinions to health plans.(11)

As the Commission explained in its congressional testimony:(12)

[T]he antitrust laws do not prohibit medical societies and other groups from engaging in collective discussions with health plans regarding issues of patient care. Among other things, physicians may collectively explain to a health plan why they think a particular policy or practice is medically unsound, and may present medical or scientific data to support their views(13)

The Commission has never brought a case based on physicians' collective advocacy with a health plan on an issue involving patient care. Our cases have addressed instances in which physician groups (1) negotiated collectively on fee levels or other price-related issues, or (2) collectively refused to contract with plans, either to gain acceptance of their price-related demands or to prevent or delay market entry by managed care plans generally. In all such cases, the Commission has been very careful to make sure that its orders do not interfere with the legitimate exchange of information and views between health plans and health care practitioners. Indeed, in the Commission's first litigated case involving collective negotiations by physicians - *Michigan State Medical Society* - the opinion emphasized that the antitrust laws do not prohibit health care providers' collective provision of information and views to health

plans.⁽¹⁴⁾ Specific language was inserted in that order, and in subsequent orders, to make it clear that bans on anticompetitive agreements among competing providers do not prohibit the provision of information and views to health plans concerning any issue, including reimbursement.⁽¹⁵⁾

Accordingly, blanket antitrust immunity for physician price-fixing is not necessary to protect patient welfare.

II. The Alaska Bill

Nonetheless, Senate Bill 37, like its federal and state counterparts, seeks to confer antitrust immunity with respect to collective physician conduct. To be sure, Senate Bill 37 also contains a number of provisions designed to protect consumers from the potential harms arising from a physician collective bargaining exemption. In some respects, these provisions resemble protections contained in physician collective bargaining bills introduced in Texas and the District of Columbia, on which the Commission staff also has commented.⁽¹⁶⁾ As with the protections in the Texas and District of Columbia bills, these provisions - addressing a health plan's market power, the size of the physician bargaining group, and potential boycott conduct - do not alleviate the risk of substantial consumer harm resulting from a collective bargaining exemption.

A. Minimum Threshold for Health Plan Market Power

Section (d)(1) of Senate Bill 37 states that physicians may "collectively negotiate with a health benefit plan the items described in (b)" - including fees or prices - provided that the health benefit plan has "substantial market power." "Substantial market power" is defined as "more than 15 percent of the market share." *Id.* at § (s)(4). Alternative formulas by which market power may be measured are set forth in Sections (f)(1) and (f)(2).

This market power screen is unlikely to guard against consumer harm.

First, the screen does not apply to all collective bargaining by physicians, or even to all price-related bargaining. Rather, it applies only to certain kinds of price-related matters. For example, the market share screen does not apply to negotiations concerning the formulation and application of reimbursement methodology. *Id.* at § (a)(6). The method a health plan uses to calculate its payments to providers for particular services, however, can have a direct and significant impact on the ultimate price that providers receive for their services, and thus such matters are also "price" terms. Moreover, even collective bargaining over other, more clearly "non-price" issues in a health plan contract can have a substantial effect on the ultimate costs paid by consumers.

Second, there are significant problems with the concept of health plan market power as defined in the bill. As the Commission staff noted in its comment on the District of Columbia bill:

Market power is, simply put, the power to raise prices above competitive levels, or in the case of buyers, the ability to reduce prices below competitive levels. Market share can indicate market power, but only if based upon a properly defined market. Even if the bill's categories correctly identified relevant markets, a 15% market share . . . is not a level ordinarily assumed to constitute market power.⁽¹⁷⁾

Although the Alaska bill's definition of "substantial market power" is not entirely clear, one thing is certain: it does not define antitrust markets in a legal or economic sense. For example, it uses as a proxy for a relevant geographic market the health plan's "service area," but this area does not necessarily correspond to a proper relevant antitrust geographic market, and could serve to overstate the market share of the plan.

Furthermore, by setting the market power threshold at a 15 percent market share, the bill would authorize anticompetitive behavior by physicians in many situations in which the health plan would not in fact possess market power. Indeed, 15 to 20 percent is below the level courts typically require before upholding a finding of market power.⁽¹⁸⁾ Finally, the bill does not take into account that even a plan with a large share of a market might be constrained from exercising market power if new entry by competing plans is easy.

Third, in practice, the market share screen appears unlikely to provide any limitation at all. That is because the bill would create a presumption that a health plan has substantial market power (Section (f)), unless the health plan persuades the Attorney General that it does not meet the 15 percent threshold. It seems unlikely that a health plan would seek to offer such proof, however, because the kind of price-related collective bargaining to which the market share screen applies can occur only if the health plan agrees to engage in such negotiations. See Section (d)(3). Thus, it appears that a health plan could simply decline to negotiate with physician collective bargaining groups, without making any showing regarding market share.

In addition, it should be noted that the bill's restrictions on collective fee negotiation to situations where the health plan consents to such negotiations would offer only limited protection to consumers. Such a restriction could limit certain kinds of anticompetitive effects, by preventing groups without health plan consent from engaging in even preliminary bargaining activities (such as physicians entering into agreements on the fee levels to be sought) that could facilitate anticompetitive agreements with respect to physicians' individual dealings with health plans. Nonetheless, a variety of risks remain. First, although participation is voluntary, some health plans may feel compelled to deal with a group if it includes most of the physicians in a particular specialty or many physicians with large numbers of loyal patients. Second, even absent any implicit coercion, in some circumstances a health plan may find it less troublesome to simply accede to price-setting by physicians and then pass the higher costs on to consumers. In either case, such behavior presents a risk not only to the enrollees of the particular plan in question, but also to other consumers, because a group of physicians organized to bargain with one health plan could more easily collude in its dealings with other health plans that eschew collective bargaining.

B. Limitations on Size of Physician Negotiating Group

Section (g)(6) of the Senate Bill 37 states that an authorized third party "may not represent more than 30 percent of the market of practicing physicians in the geographic service area or proposed geographic service area if the health benefit plan has less than a five percent market share." In addition, Section (g)(7) authorizes the Attorney General to limit the percentage of practicing physicians represented by an authorized third party. However, the Attorney General may not impose a limit of "less than 30 percent of the market of practicing physicians" and may not impose any limit at all if "the market of practicing physicians . . . consists of 40 or fewer individuals." *Id.*

These limitations on the size of the physician group authorized to collectively bargain are also unlikely to adequately protect consumers. First, the 30 percent limitation applies only in those cases in which the health plan has a very small share of the (potentially ill-defined) market. Furthermore, the 30 percent limit appears to contemplate a percentage of all physicians and, if so, it would not necessarily prevent aggregation of a large portion of the physicians in a given specialty. Given the high level of specialization among physicians, and the fact that different medical specialty services often are not substitutable, the relevant market for antitrust purposes may be a particular specialty or specialties rather than physicians as a whole. And just as individual specialties may constitute different product markets, relevant geographic markets may differ by specialty.

C. Exclusion of Physician Boycott Conduct

Section (m) of the bill states that the antitrust exemption for physician collective bargaining does not extend to boycott conduct. Specifically, Section (m) states that no provision of the bill should be construed as authorizing "competing physicians to act in concert in response to a report issued by an authorized third party related to the authorized third party's discussion or negotiations with a health benefit plan." It further notes that authorized third parties "shall" inform physicians of Section (m) and "warn them of the potential for legal action against those who violate state or federal antitrust laws." *Id.*

Although this provision is likely to prevent Senate Bill 37 from being used as legal cover for explicit boycott threats, it does not protect consumers from all boycott-related concerns arising from physician collective bargaining. As the Commission has previously observed, collective negotiations can by their very nature convey an implicit threat that, if the health plan does not agree to terms acceptable to the physician group as a whole, it will be prevented from

successfully negotiating agreements with the members of the group separately.⁽¹⁹⁾ Furthermore, by immunizing agreements among competing physicians on the fees and other terms they will accept from health plans, the bill facilitates coordinated conduct - such as collusive refusals to deal - that, even though not immune, would be difficult to detect and prosecute.

III. State Action Immunity

Under the judicially-created "state action" doctrine, a state may override the national policy favoring competition only where it expressly decides to govern aspects of its economy by state regulation rather than market forces. A state may not simply authorize private parties to violate the antitrust laws.⁽²⁰⁾ Instead, it must actually substitute its own active control for the discipline that competition would otherwise provide. To that end, the state legislature must clearly articulate a policy to displace competition with regulation, and state officials must actively supervise the private anticompetitive conduct.⁽²¹⁾

Senate Bill 37 faces severe difficulties under the "active supervision" prong of that test. In order for state supervision to be adequate for state action purposes, state officials must "have and exercise ultimate authority over the challenged anticompetitive conduct."⁽²²⁾ Senate Bill 37 falls far short of providing the "pointed reexamination"⁽²³⁾ of private anticompetitive conduct necessary to confer antitrust immunity.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that the active supervision standard is a rigorous one, designed to ensure that an anticompetitive act of a private party is shielded from antitrust liability only when "the State has effectively made [the challenged] conduct its own."⁽²⁴⁾ Active supervision requires that the state exercise "sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details of the rates or prices have been established as a product of deliberate state intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties."⁽²⁵⁾ In this instance, the bill does not appear to provide the Attorney General with the means to exercise sufficient independent judgment and control.

Lack of Active Supervision

The regulatory scheme established by Senate Bill 37 endeavors to provide state supervision of physician collective bargaining by authorizing the Attorney General to approve or disapprove: (1) the composition of a physician collective bargaining group, (2) a brief report on any proposed collective negotiations, and (3) a contract that was the subject of collective bargaining. The Attorney General's role is limited in significant respects, however, making it unlikely that the regulatory scheme would be found to provide the level of active supervision required to confer antitrust immunity.

1. Review of Composition of Physician Groups

The power to approve or disapprove the composition of a physician collective bargaining group is provided by Section (g)(7). This provision states that the Attorney General may limit the percentage of physicians represented by an authorized third party, but that the limitation "may not be less than 30 percent of the market." Furthermore, the Attorney General "shall" consider the potential competitive benefits and anticompetitive effects described in Sections (k) and (l). The Attorney General has no power to impose such limitations when the market of practicing physicians consists of "40 or fewer individuals."

The Supreme Court has emphasized that active supervision requires that state officials "*have and exercise power to review particular anticompetitive acts* of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy."⁽²⁶⁾ The Attorney General's limited review of bargaining groups at the formation stage, under Section (g)(7), would not amount to active supervision of "particular anticompetitive acts." Indeed, in a market of "40 or fewer individuals," the Attorney General has no authority whatsoever to review the composition of physician groups. This loophole may be particularly significant in a state like Alaska which, due to its population and its large geographic area, may have a large number of physician specialty markets consisting of 40 or fewer providers.

2. Review of "Brief Report" on Proposed Negotiations

The power to approve or disapprove a "brief report" on any proposed collective negotiations is provided by Section (h)(1)(B). This provision appears to provide the Attorney General with authority to disapprove proposed negotiations if the physician group is found to be "not appropriate to represent the interests involved in the proposed negotiations."⁽²⁷⁾ It is unclear, however, what authority this actually would confer, or how the Attorney General could make such an assessment on the basis of the limited information that the third party representative is required to submit. The report would describe the proposed subject matter of the negotiations and a statement of the expected efficiencies or benefits, but it would not supply a wide variety of information that would enable the Attorney General to assess the likely competitive effects of the negotiations. Further, there is no provision for the Attorney General to require submission of additional information, nor any mechanism by which to receive input from other physicians, affected health plans, or patients.

3. Review of Collectively Negotiated Contracts

The power to approve or disapprove a contract that was the subject of collective bargaining is provided by Sections (i) and (j). Section (i) states that the Attorney General "shall" either approve or disapprove a contract "within 30 days after receiving the reports required under (h)." During that brief period of time, the Attorney General is to attempt to ascertain whether "the competitive and other benefits of the contract terms outweigh any anticompetitive effects." Lists of competitive benefits and anticompetitive effects that the Attorney General "may" consider are provided in Sections (k) and (1), respectively.

These provisions have two principal defects that are likely to vitiate the active supervision required by the state action doctrine: (1) the Attorney General is presented with insufficient information, and (2) the Attorney General is given insufficient time. Additionally, a provision requiring a written decision for both contract approvals and disapprovals would help to ensure that adequate information is both sought and reviewed.

(a) Insufficient Information

In order for state action immunity to apply, Supreme Court precedent requires the State to "undertake[] the necessary steps to determine the specifics of the ratesetting scheme."⁽²⁸⁾ Senate Bill 37 falls far short of providing the information necessary for state officials to make such a determination. Moreover, what little information is provided is all at the initiative of third parties. The bill does not authorize the Attorney General to request or gather specific additional information of any kind.⁽²⁹⁾

The "brief report" would contain the "proposed subject matter" of the negotiations and one party's "explanation of the [expected] efficiencies or benefits." Notably absent from the "brief report" is a wide variety of information that would assist the Attorney General in assessing the likely competitive effects of the negotiations. An Attorney General armed with greater information - including, for example, information concerning product and geographic market definition, current price levels, availability of substitutes, or ease of entry for new competing physicians - would, of course, be better able to make appropriate determinations. An equally troubling omission from the process is any mechanism by which to receive input from other physicians, affected health benefit plans, or patients. Indeed, the process provides no notice to any of these groups, and so no means for them even to be aware of the potential value of their input.

To attempt to ascertain credibly whether "the competitive and other benefits of the contract terms outweigh any anticompetitive effects" - the core stated criterion of the Attorney General's review - without sufficient data, or adequate input from other parties, would be extremely difficult. Making judgments about competitive effects is the Commission's core function. To carry out this function, the Commission employs a large staff of lawyers and economists, who rely on information gathered from the careful review of a complete documentary record and interviews of numerous key witnesses. "Active supervision" need not necessarily entail the same exhaustive examination but, at the very least, it should constitute a pointed and meaningful review.

In addition, Section (h)(3) requires an authorized third party to provide the Attorney General with all communications "to be made to physicians" related to negotiations. This requirement, however, omits at least four additional

categories of potentially critical competitive information: (1) communications from physicians to authorized third parties, (2) communications from authorized third parties to health plans, (3) communications between physicians, and (4) communications between authorized third parties.

It is worth noting that the core conduct at issue here, naked price-fixing among horizontal competitors, is deemed to be per se illegal precisely because the law presumes that in almost no circumstances imaginable will the benefits "outweigh any anticompetitive effects."⁽³⁰⁾ To be able to attempt such a judgment, the Attorney General needs to be able to review the relevant information.

(b) Insufficient Time

The law of active supervision requires that the Attorney General have and exercise "independent judgment and control" sufficient to render the challenged conduct effectively that of the State and not that of private parties. Yet Section (i) allows only 30 days for the Attorney General to review the facts and render a decision about the anticompetitive effects of a given contract. The time period is mandatory ("shall either approve or disapprove . . . within 30 days") and there is no provision for extension.⁽³¹⁾ It is by no means clear that the Attorney General could complete the "pointed reexamination" required to immunize the underlying physician conduct in such a short time.

IV. Transparency

Section (i) of Senate Bill 37 provides that "[i]f the contract is disapproved, the attorney general shall furnish a written explanation of any deficiencies along with a statement of specific remedial measures that would correct any identified deficiencies." Notably, the bill contains no complementary provision requiring a written decision to approve a proposed contract. A written decision, expressly considering the potentially anticompetitive implications of a proposed contract and attempting to quantify the consumer impact and expected effect on consumer prices, would serve a number of salutary purposes. First, it would inform affected parties of the levels at which prices were being fixed, and so provide an opportunity for comment or challenge as to the appropriateness of those levels. Second, it would help inform the public of the likely impact of the proposed contract on their health care costs.

Under the current draft, an explanation is required only when the Attorney General disapproves a contract. From a consumer perspective, however, disapproval of a contract is the less troubling result. Disapproval indicates that market forces will continue to govern, whereas approval indicates that they will be temporarily suspended, with a potentially adverse impact on price and access. It is the latter situation that more clearly warrants an explanation and is more properly subject to consumer scrutiny.

* * *

In sum, the proposed antitrust exemption for physician collective bargaining is likely to result in increased consumer costs and threatens to reduce access to care. Furthermore, the risk of consumer harm does not appear to be offset by any substantial procompetitive benefits or increased quality of care.

Parties claiming immunity under the state action doctrine bear the burden of establishing their entitlement to such immunity. If the Alaska Legislature were to enact a bill that fails to provide for the level of active supervision required by Supreme Court precedent, physicians relying on the bill's provisions to confer antitrust immunity would risk exposure to potentially significant financial liability for their actions.

Thank you for your inquiry. We hope you find these comments helpful. Should you have any additional questions, please feel free to contact Jeff Brennan at (202) 326-3688.

Sincerely,

Joseph J. Simons, Director
Jeffrey W. Brennan, Assistant Director
Bureau of Competition
R. Ted Cruz, Director
John T. Delacourt, Attorney
Office of Policy Planning

Endnotes:

1. These comments are views of the staff of the Bureau of Competition and of the Office of Policy Planning of the Federal Trade Commission. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or of any individual Commissioner. The Commission has, however, voted to authorize the Bureau of Competition and the Office of Policy Planning to submit these comments.
2. Testimony of Federal Trade Commission before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 1304 (June 22, 1999) ("FTC Testimony on H.R. 1304") at 5-6 *available at* <http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/06/healthcaretestimony.htm> (Attachment A) (footnotes 3-5 in original).
3. Southbank IPA, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 783 (1991) (consent order); Rochester Anesthesiologists, 110 F.T.C. 175 (1988) (consent order).
4. See, e.g., Baltimore Metropolitan Pharmaceutical Assoc., Inc. and Maryland Pharmacists Assoc., 117 F.T.C. 95 (1994) (consent order); Pharmaceutical Society of the State of New York, Inc., 113 F.T.C. 661 (1990) (consent order).
5. See Peterson Drug Company, 115 F.T.C. 492, 540 (1992). See also Pharmaceutical Society of the State of New York, Inc., 113 F.T.C. 661 (1990) (consent order).
6. Docket No. C-4007, 2001 WL 443471 (F.T.C. April 25, 2001) (consent order).
7. Docket No. C-3824, 1998 WL 566834 (F.T.C. August 31, 1998) (consent order).
8. FTC Testimony on H.R. 1304, *supra* note 2, at 6-7.
9. FTC Testimony on H.R. 1304, *supra* note 2, at 10.
10. See Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,151 (Aug. 1996) ("Health Care Guidelines") *available at* <http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.pdf> The Health Care Guidelines discuss "messenger model" arrangements designed to minimize the costs associated with the contracting process.
11. See, e.g., Schachar v. American Academy of Ophthalmology, 870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989); Statements 4-5 of Health Care Guidelines, *supra* note 10.
12. FTC Testimony on H.R. 1304, *supra* note 2, at 7-8 (footnotes 13-15 in original).
13. [The Health Care Guidelines] create an antitrust safety zone for health care providers' collective provision of non-fee-related information to health plans. . . . [See Statement 4 of Health Care Guidelines, *supra* note 10.]
14. 101 F.T.C. [191,] at 302-09 [(1983)].
15. *Id.* at 314; see also Southbank IPA, 114 F.T.C. 783 (1991) (consent order); Rochester Anesthesiologists, 110 F.T.C. 175 (1988) (consent order).

16. Letter to the Texas Legislature on Senate Bill 1468 (May 13, 1999) *available at* <http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990009.htm> (Attachment B); Letter to the District of Columbia Office of Corporation Counsel on Bill No. 13-333 (Oct. 29, 1999) ("District of Columbia Letter") *available at* <http://www.ftc.gov/be/rigsby.htm> (Attachment C).

17. District of Columbia Letter, *supra* note 16, at 3-4.

18. Although the federal courts have not identified a precise market share figure that constitutes market power, the guidance they have provided strongly suggests that 15 to 20 percent is not sufficient. In *Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde*, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), for example, the Supreme Court rejected the possibility that the defendant hospital had market power in spite of the fact that it serviced roughly 30 percent of the relevant market. Subsequent opinions from lower courts have tended to adhere to this 30 percent "rule of thumb." See, e.g., *United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995) (30 percent share of U.S. photocopying market too small to give rise to inference of market power); *New York v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.*, 811 F. Supp. 848 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (40 percent market share insufficient to show market power in light of low barriers to entry); *Manufacturer's Supply Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.*, 688 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (25.8 percent market share insufficient to show market power).

19. See *Alaska Healthcare Network, Inc.*, Docket No. C-4007, 2001 WL 443471 (F.T.C. Apr. 25, 2001) ("Payors believed that they could not go around [Alaska Healthcare Network] to contract individually with physicians in Fairbanks, and thus that they had no alternative but to reach agreement with AHN or to give up their planned entry into Fairbanks."). See also *Michigan State Medical Society*, 101 F.T.C. 191, 296 n.32 (1983) ("the bargaining process itself carries the implication of adverse consequences if a satisfactory agreement cannot be obtained"); *Preferred Physicians Inc.*, 110 F.T.C. 157, 160 (1988) (consent order) (threat of adverse consequences inherent in collective negotiations).

20. See *Parker v. Brown*, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) ("a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or declaring that their action is lawful").

21. See *California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.*, 445 U.S. 92 (1980).

22. *Patrick v. Burget*, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).

23. *Midcal*, 445 U.S. at 105-06.

24. *Patrick*, 486 U.S. at 106.

25. *Federal Trade Commission v. Tigor Title Insurance Co.*, 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992).

26. *Id.* at 634 (emphases added).

27. The Attorney General may not approve the report if: (1) the group of physicians "is not appropriate to represent the interests involved in the negotiations" (a provision seemingly redundant with Section (g)(7), discussed above), or (2) the proposed negotiations "exceed the authority granted in this chapter." If either of these conditions is satisfied, the Attorney General "shall" enter an order "prohibiting the collective negotiations from proceeding."

28. *Tigor*, 504 U.S. at 638.

29. Courts have tended to reject claims of state action immunity where state officials lacked sufficient information to conduct a meaningful review of the private conduct. See, e.g., *Tigor Title Insurance Co. v. Federal Trade Commission*, 998 F.2d 1129, 1140 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding lack of state supervision where Connecticut never obtained necessary information that would have enabled it to assess the appropriateness of filed rates). In contrast, courts

have tended to accept such claims where the review included hearings and an opportunity for potentially affected parties to be heard. See, e.g., *TEC Cogeneration Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.*, 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir.), amended in part, 86 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1996) (rates determined by Public Service Commission rulemaking and subject to extensive agency proceedings); *DFW Metro Line Services v. Southwestern Bell Telephone*, 988 F.2d 601, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1993) (Public Utility Commission conducted both broad-based ratemaking proceedings and adjudications of specific complaints about the reasonableness of rates); *Lease Lights, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co.*, 849 F.2d 1330, 1334-35 (10th Cir. 1988) (state held public hearings to assess reasonableness of rates).

30. See *Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society*, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding naked horizontal price-fixing among physicians to be per se illegal).

31. In addition, the current legislative draft is ambiguous as to when the 30-day clock commences. Section (i) allows 30 days from receipt of "the reports required under section (h)," without specifying which report - the "brief report," the "copy of all communications," or the contract itself.