



BUREAU OF COMPETITION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

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Mr. Glen McKay
Assistant Director
Division of State Audit, Department of Audit
Comptroller of the Treasury
State of Tennessee
Suite 1500, James K. Polk Office Building
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0264

Dear Mr. McKay:

The staff of the Federal Trade Commission¹ is pleased to respond to the invitation of the Division of State Audit of the State of Tennessee to comment on the possible restrictive or anticompetitive effects of statutes governing fourteen state agencies attached to the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment.² The analysis below discusses provisions governing nine of the agencies that may have anticompetitive effects and thereby injure consumers.³ Those agencies are the Boards of Chiropractic Examiners, Dentistry, Dispensing Opticians, Examiners in Psychology, Medical Examiners, Optometry,

¹ These comments are the views of the staff of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition. They are not necessarily the views of the Commission itself or of any individual Commissioner.

² The agencies are the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, the Board of Dentistry, the Board of Dietician/Nutritionist Examiners, the Board of Dispensing Opticians, the Board for Nursing Home Administrators, the Board of Examiners in Psychology, the Board of Examiners in Speech Pathology and Audiology, the Board of Medical Examiners, the Board of Nursing, the Board of Optometry, the Board of Osteopathic Examiners, the Board of Registration in Podiatry, the Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners and the State Board of Examiners for Registered Professional Environmentalists.

³ The statute governing the Division of Health Related Boards within the Department of Health and Environment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-101 et seq., also contains provisions that appear to impose restraints on licensees of the above boards. We have included comments on these provisions, as well, in the following analysis.

Osteopathic Examiners, Registration in Podiatry and Veterinary Medical Examiners.⁴

I. Interest and Experience of the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission

The Federal Trade Commission is charged by statute with preventing unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 45. Under this statutory mandate, the Commission seeks to identify both private and public restraints that impede competition and thus reduce output and increase prices without offering countervailing benefits to consumers. In the area of professional services, as elsewhere, the Commission's traditional approach to removing such restraints has been the initiation of antitrust enforcement proceedings.⁵ In addition, however, the staff of the Commission has studied various facets of the regulation of licensed

⁴ It should be noted that these comments are limited in scope in several respects. First, your invitation was for us to comment on the above statutes. In light of this, as well as the volume of materials involved, we have limited our comments to these statutes; we have not addressed the rules and regulations promulgated by the professional boards, except where necessary to explain or illustrate comments regarding statutory provisions.

Second, the staff has reviewed the statutes governing the fourteen regulatory boards and the Division of Health Related Boards. Given the volume of the materials involved, we have focused on the provisions that we believe have the greatest potential for anticompetitive effects. However, the fact that we do not address certain statutory provisions does not imply that none of those provisions may have anticompetitive effects.

Third, we do not intend, by these comments, to offer advice regarding quality of care or medical safety questions. We do urge, however, that restraints and requirements related to these areas be no more restrictive of competition than necessary to protect the public.

⁵ See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549 (1988); Rhode Island Board of Accountancy, 107 F.T.C. 293 (1986) (consent order); Louisiana State Board of Dentistry, 106 F.T.C. 65 (1985) (consent order); American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982); American Dental Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 403 (1979), modified, 100 F.T.C. 448 (1982), 101 F.T.C. 34 (1983) (consent order).

professions,⁶ and has, upon request, submitted comments on various issues of professional licensing and regulation to state legislatures and administrative agencies,⁷ including the Tennessee Board of Dentistry.⁸ It is within this latter context that we respond to your invitation.

II. Analysis of Statutory Restraints

A. Commercial Practice

The statutes governing various Tennessee health profession regulatory boards restrict a number of forms of commercial practice by professional licensees. As discussed below, such restrictions can cause significant injury to consumers by raising prices of professional services and products, depriving consumers of necessary care, restricting consumer choice, and impeding innovation and competition in the health care industry.⁹

⁶ See, e.g., Cleveland Regional Office and Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Advertising (1984); Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Economics, Federal Trade Commission, A Comparative Analysis of Cosmetic Lens Fitting by Ophthalmologists, Optometrists, and Opticians (1983); Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (1980).

⁷ See, e.g., Comments of Federal Trade Commission Staff to Pennsylvania Regulatory Review Commission on Advertising Rules of Pennsylvania State Board of Dentistry (April 24, 1989); Comments of Federal Trade Commission Staff to South Carolina Legislative Audit Council (comments provided on seven occasions from February 1987 through November 1989, regarding more than twenty state agencies).

⁸ Comments of Federal Trade Commission Staff on Advertising Rules of Tennessee Board of Dentistry (April 30, 1987).

⁹ The Federal Trade Commission recently reiterated these conclusions in the course of adopting a Trade Regulation Rule regarding state restrictions on commercial practice by optometrists. See generally Federal Trade Commission, Trade Regulation Rule, Ophthalmic Practice Rules and Statement of Basis and Purpose ("FTC Ophthalmic Practice Rules"), 54 Fed. Reg. 10285 (March 13, 1989) (appeal docketed sub nom. California State Board of Optometry v. FTC, No. 89-1190 (D.C. Cir., filed March 17, 1989)).

1. Lay Affiliations

Statutes governing several boards contain provisions that restrict business associations between licensees and non-licensees. These restrictions take the form of restraints on employment of licensees by non-licensees, and ownership or exercise of control over the business aspects of professional practices by non-licensees.¹⁰

Employment of licensees by persons or entities not engaged primarily in the same profession, or in "health care delivery," is prohibited or restricted by statutes governing the boards of Dentistry, Dispensing Opticians, Optometry and Veterinary Medical Examiners. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-5-121(1); 63-14-103(d); 63-8-113(c)(2); 63-8-120(13); 63-12-137.¹¹ Ownership and control over business aspects of professional practices by non-licensees are restricted by statutes governing the boards of Dentistry, Dispensing Opticians and Veterinary Medicine.¹²

¹⁰ Restraints on the division of licensees' professional fees with non-licensees can also restrict business associations between licensees and non-licensees. See Part II.B., infra (Fee Splitting/Referral Fees).

¹¹ Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(d) also provides that licensed opticians may not practice under the "actual and personal supervision" of a non-optician. In addition, § 63-14-104 prohibits opticians from acting as "agent[s] or representative[s] of any physician or optometrist on any account"; and § 63-14-103(e) makes it unlawful for an optician "to be employed by, perform any work in, or have any financial interest" in "any establishment ... engage[d] in the business of a dispensing optician in violation of this chapter"

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-12-103(12) prohibits licensed veterinarians from "sharing office space with any person illegally practicing veterinary medicine." We would be concerned if "illegal practice" included, for example, practice by a veterinarian as an employee of a non-veterinarian.

¹² Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-121(2) prohibits ownership of an active dental practice by other than a licensed dentist.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(e) prohibits dispensing opticians from having a direct or indirect financial interest in any establishment that "undertakes ... the business of a dispensing optician in violation of this chapter" We would be concerned if activities "in violation of this chapter" included, for example, ownership of a dispensing optician practice by a non-optician.

Such restrictions¹³ can prevent licensed professionals from obtaining capital from non-licensees by entering into partnership and joint ownership agreements, or other associations with such persons or entities. Constraints on capital formation, in turn, may impede the development of large-scale practices that can take advantage of volume purchase discounts and realize other economies of scale. By excluding or deterring larger scale practitioners from entering the market and by preventing practitioners in the market from operating at the most efficient level, such restraints may contribute to higher prices to consumers. Specifically, such restrictions can reduce competition in health care markets by preventing the formation and development of innovative forms of professional practice, such as chain stores, health maintenance organizations ("HMOs") and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), that offer competition to, and may be more efficient and provide comparable or higher quality services than, traditional providers. As a result, these restrictions, to the extent they go beyond protecting a patient's privilege of confidentiality with the health care professional, can harm consumers by raising prices for professional services and impeding competition from commercial firms.¹⁴

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-12-137 requires that owners of veterinary practices must be veterinarians licensed in the State of Tennessee. The in-state licensure requirement for owners further restricts competition by restricting entry into the market for veterinary medical services, not only by non-licensees, but by veterinarians licensed in other states. Restrictions on the opportunity for new suppliers to enter the market can increase prices to consumers, reduce the output of services provided and limit access to those services by consumers.

¹³ Requirements designed to provide consumers with information such as the licensure status of persons or entities involved in professional-lay affiliations would not be of concern to us, unless such requirements imposed unreasonable burdens on the formation or operation of such associations. See Part II.C.3., *infra* (Affirmative Disclosures).

¹⁴ FTC Ophthalmic Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. at 10288-89. The Commission also considered the effects of restrictions on associations between professionals and non-professionals in American Medical Association, 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982). There the Commission examined the AMA rules prohibiting physicians from working on a salaried basis with hospitals or other lay entities (such as HMOs), and from entering into partnerships or similar business arrangements with non-

2. Practice in Mercantile Locations

Optometrists are prohibited from practicing or offering to practice "in, or in conjunction with, any retail store or other commercial establishment where merchandise is displayed or offered for sale" Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(c)(6). Such restrictions prevent optometrists and other practitioners from locating their practices inside large retail stores where, because of the convenience of the location to consumers and a high number of "walk-in" patients, they could establish and maintain a high volume of patients. In addition, the above provision could be interpreted to preclude optometrists from associating with retail optical firms where they can see a high volume of patients because of the "one-stop-shopping" that such firms may offer. A high volume may allow practitioners to realize economies of scale that may be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. In addition, these restraints may limit the sources of equity capital for professional practices, increase the cost of obtaining capital, and further hinder the development of high-volume practices that may be able to reduce costs through economies of scale. Such restrictions may also impose unnecessary space, construction or personnel costs (e.g., where an optometrist must maintain an office that is physically separate from a retail establishment with which he or she wishes to affiliate) that will be passed on to consumers.¹⁵

3. Trade Names

The statute governing the Board of Registration in Podiatry prohibits practice "under any trade name or a name designating a given location or the name of another podiatrist or any name other than that which appears on the practitioner's license." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-3-119(15). The statutes of the boards of Examiners in Psychology, Medical Examiners, Optometry, Osteopathic Examiners, and Veterinary Medical Examiners prohibit practice under a "false or assumed name." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-215(13); 63-6-214(17); 63-8-113(b)(2); 63-9-111(14); 63-12-

physicians. The Commission concluded that those restrictions unreasonably restrained competition and thereby violated the antitrust laws. It reasoned that the AMA's restrictions kept physicians from adopting more economically efficient business formats and that, in particular, those restrictions precluded competition from organizations not directly and completely under the control of physicians. The Commission also found no countervailing procompetitive justifications for the restraints.

¹⁵ FTC Ophthalmic Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. at 10289.

124(a)(20).¹⁶ If interpreted to preclude the use of trade names, these provisions would also raise concerns.

Provisions that restrict professionals from practicing under non-deceptive trade names can have significant anticompetitive effects. Trade names can be essential to the establishment of large group practices and chain operations that can offer lower prices. Trade names can be chosen because they are easy to remember and because they can convey useful information, such as the location or other characteristics of a practice. Over time, trade names can come to be associated with a certain level of quality, service and price, thus facilitating consumer search. If trade names are forbidden, some practices lose an important marketing tool; they must use lengthy and difficult-to-remember names that include the individual names of all the practitioners or owners of the practice, resulting in less information being communicated to consumers. This could also make advertising, which is essential to most large group practices and chains, prohibitively expensive, particularly on television or radio.

Restrictions on trade names are often intended to ensure the identification and accountability of the individual licensees who practice under a trade name. However, there may be other ways to achieve this goal. For example, the state could require that the names of individual practitioners be conspicuously posted in the reception area of the practices' offices, or noted on bills, receipts, or patient records. Restrictions on the use of trade names should be narrowly drawn to prohibit only fraud or deception.

4. Mobile Offices

Optometrists may not "practice in any temporary or mobile office except as authorized by the board" Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(c)(7). The broad language of this provision could allow for the imposition of anticompetitive restrictions on the

¹⁶ In addition to the above potential restrictions on trade names, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(d)(1)(D) allows optometrists to practice under a corporate name that has been approved by the board, provided that such corporate name does not "permit or imply action, advertising, services, or practices" forbidden by the optometry statute or board regulations. See also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-8-113(c)(3); 63-8-120(6). The meaning of this phrase is unclear. While registration and board approval of corporate names would serve the legitimate state interest in assuring accountability and preventing deception by providers, we would be concerned if this provision were interpreted to prohibit a corporate name that, for example, explicitly or implicitly made a truthful, nondeceptive claim of a type addressed in these comments (e.g., superiority claims).

operation of mobile offices. For example, the Board of Optometry has promulgated regulations regarding "itinerant offices," which require board approval of an itinerant location before a licensee may begin practice there. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 1045-2-.05. Such a provision could be interpreted to require a licensee operating a mobile office to obtain separate board approval for each location at which the mobile office would be providing services.

Such an interpretation could severely hamper the efficient operation of mobile offices. Mobile offices, however, can be of great benefit to consumers, particularly in geographic areas, or for certain populations, that traditionally have been underserved by health care providers. Restrictions on mobile offices can reduce access to health care services for such consumers. Such restrictions also create barriers to expansion both by individual practitioners and by large commercial practices. These restrictions reduce the total volume of patients that a practice might otherwise be able to serve. This, in turn, may prevent practitioners from taking advantage of economies of scale that might arise from treating a greater number of patients, such as through volume purchasing discounts and reduced per office advertising costs.¹⁷

The state has a legitimate interest in assuring that mobile offices are adequately staffed, equipped and available to consumers and in ensuring the accountability of persons associated with such operations. However, such requirements should not unreasonably restrain practitioners from providing health care services through this method to consumers who otherwise might pay more for such services, or not obtain the services at all.¹⁸

Commercial practice restraints, such as those discussed above, are often based on the belief that business relationships between professionals and non-professionals are undesirable because they permit lay interference with the professional judgment of licensees; and on concerns that, while firms engaged in commercial practice might offer lower prices, they might also be motivated to offer lower quality services to maintain profits.

¹⁷ If mobile offices were prohibited, licensees who wished to provide service in multiple locations would be required to open fixed-site branch offices at each such location. The cost of this alternative might result in fewer locations, and fewer patients, being served by providers.

¹⁸ Indeed, because of the greater per-location cost of fixed offices, for some areas of low population density, a mobile office practice may provide more fully staffed and equipped facilities to that population than could a fixed office practice.

Professionals who practice in traditional, non-commercial settings would then, in this view, be forced to lower the quality of their services in order to meet the prices of their commercial competitors.

The available empirical evidence, however, contradicts these contentions. Two empirical studies related to optometry, conducted by the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, indicate that restrictions on commercial practice, including restraints on corporate employment and other business associations between professionals and lay entities, may in fact harm consumers by increasing prices without providing any quality-related benefits.¹⁹ Other evidence, including survey evidence, indicates that state restrictions on commercial practice may actually result in decreasing the quality of care in the market by decreasing the frequency with which consumers obtain care. As a result of the higher prices associated with the restrictions, consumers tend to purchase eyecare less frequently and may even forego care altogether.²⁰

¹⁹ Bureaus of Economics and Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, A Comparative Analysis of Cosmetic Lens Fitting by Ophthalmologists, Optometrists, and Opticians (1983) (This study showed that commercial optometrists charged significantly lower prices for fitting cosmetic contact lenses and fitted such lenses at least as well as other fitters of contact lenses); Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (1980) (This study showed that commercial practice restrictions resulted in higher prices for eyeglasses and eye examinations, but did not increase their quality). Although these studies deal specifically with restrictions on optometric practice, the results may be applicable to analogous restrictions in other professions.

²⁰ Public Health Service, Eyeglasses and Contact Lenses: Purchases, Expenditures, and Sources of Payment, National Health Care Expenditures Study 4 (1979); Benham and Benham, Regulating through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. L. & Econ. 421, 438 (1975); Kernan, U.S. Health Profile, Washington Post, Apr. 26, 1979, at p. C-1, col. 4.

Commercial practice restrictions also affect consumers' access to health care by restricting the places where licensees may locate. Commercial practices may be more conveniently located than traditional practices, and may be more frequently available, such as on weekends and evenings. Restrictions on such firms tend to reduce accessibility and the frequency of purchase of health care. FTC Ophthalmic Practice Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. at 10290.

In sum, the commercial practice restrictions discussed above may impose substantial costs on health care providers and hinder the development of high-volume practices, resulting in fewer such firms in the market, higher prices to consumers, and decreased access to health care.

B. Fee Splitting/Referral Fees

Licensees are prohibited from dividing or agreeing to divide fees with any person for bringing or referring patients under the statutes governing the boards of Chiropractic Examiners, Dentistry, Dispensing Opticians, Optometry and Registration in Podiatry, and the Division of Health Related Boards. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-4-114(6); 63-5-124(11); 63-14-104(8); 63-8-120(14); 63-3-119(6); 63-1-120(12).²¹ Prohibitions such as these can be of benefit to patients by preventing deception or abuse of the provider-patient relationship. However, such restrictions also can interfere with legitimate business affiliations between practitioners and other persons or entities, and with the flow of useful, nondeceptive information about providers to consumers. Restrictions on referral fees should not be broader than necessary to protect the public from harm.

Whether restrictions on referral fees are overbroad would depend upon the potential for harm in their absence. For example, the primary justification for such prohibitions is that they prevent abuse of the special trust that a patient places in a practitioner to make appropriate referrals based on his or her independent professional judgment of the patient's best interest. A practitioner who stands to receive a referral fee from another

²¹ In addition, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-124(15) prohibits dentists from paying or accepting "commissions ... on fees for professional services, references, ... or on other services or articles supplied to patients." Like the above provisions that bar referral fees, this provision would be of concern if, as discussed, infra, it was interpreted to prohibit all divisions of fees or referral fees.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(c)(5) prohibits optometrists' splitting fees with any organization in return for solicitation of customers by that firm or organization. This provision could limit the ability of optometrists to form business associations with non-optometrists if it were to be interpreted as barring, for example, a commercial optical establishment or an HMO or PPO with which a licensed optometrist was associated from advertising that association. The statute could also be interpreted to prohibit optometrists from hiring third parties such as advertising agencies or public relations firms to assist in marketing vision care services and products. See Part II.D., infra (Solicitation).

provider may refer the patient for unnecessary health care to the provider who pays the highest referral fees, rather than to the most competent one. In markets for services other than health care, to the extent that consumers are sufficiently knowledgeable to assess the need for and quality of services, disclosure of the referral fee may be sufficient to prevent abuse or deception -- although the possibility of a conflict of interest between the referring practitioner's financial interest and his or her duty to the consumer remains. In health care markets, however, the patient's greater dependency on the provider may warrant restrictions on referral fees beyond mere disclosure requirements in cases of interprofessional referrals.

The considerations may be different, however, in situations where referrals are not made directly between independent providers. For example, harm to patients is less likely to occur when referrals are made among providers in a more integrated operation, such as an HMO or PPO, or by a commercial referral service. Fees paid to these entities are unlikely to provide an incentive for anyone to refer patients for unnecessary care, since the entity receiving the fee -- the HMO or referral service -- does not recommend or suggest that any patient obtain health care.

Prohibitions on referral fees, and on division of fees generally, however, may interfere with the operation of alternative health care delivery systems (such as HMOs and PPOs) that may have incentive arrangements with health care professionals in which fees are divided between the medical plan and the professional.²² Such restrictions may also prevent practitioners from participating in commercial referral services that charge a fee for participation. Referral services can be valuable in helping consumers locate appropriate health care and, by facilitating the gathering of information, such services can increase competition among health care professionals. In such situations, requiring disclosure of the fact that the provider will pay or receive a fee in consideration for a referral may be sufficient to prevent abuse or deception and to protect patients from harm. Such a requirement would also provide patients with

²² For example, some PPO programs require participating providers to remit to the PPO a percentage of the fees earned from treating PPO patients referred to them through the PPO. Under the above statutory provisions, such a payment might be construed as a fee in consideration for the referral of a patient.

information to aid in their decision whether to use the recommended provider.²³

Restrictions on the division of fees can also harm competition and consumers by interfering both with lease arrangements in which a provider's rent is based on a percentage of gross revenues, and with certain franchise arrangements whereby providers pay a percentage of their fees to a franchisor in return for marketing and advertising services, and the use of a trade name. Such practice arrangements may help to lower the cost of health care services, without posing an inherent danger of reducing the quality of services provided.

C. Price Advertising

The Supreme Court has emphasized the vital role that advertising plays in promoting the efficient allocation of society's scarce resources.²⁴ As part of the Commission's effort to foster competition among licensed professionals, it has examined the effects of public and private restrictions that limit the ability of professionals to engage in nondeceptive advertising. For example, the Commission's Bureau of Economics has published a study showing that advertising does not lead to a reduction of quality of vision care but does lead to a decrease in prices.²⁵ Other empirical studies have confirmed the relationship between advertising and lower prices in markets for

²³ See generally Comments of Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission before Department of Housing and Urban Development, Proposals to Relax the Interpretation of Section 8 with Regard to Home Mortgages 8-14 (Docket R-88-1256, July 15, 1988) (general discussion of circumstances under which referral fees could tend to enhance or harm market performance).

²⁴ See, e.g., *Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel*, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985) ("the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the cost of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful"); *Bates v. State Bar of Arizona*, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) ("commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of resources in a free enterprise system").

²⁵ Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Effects of Restrictions on Advertising and Commercial Practice in the Professions: The Case of Optometry (1980).

professional services.²⁶ Therefore, to the extent that truthful, nondeceptive advertising is restricted, higher prices and a decrease in consumer welfare may result.²⁷

We believe that false or deceptive advertising should be prohibited.²⁸ Any other standard is likely to suppress the dissemination of potentially useful information and may contribute to an increase in prices. State legislatures increasingly have amended laws regulating professionals to bring statutory restrictions on advertising into closer conformity with the Commission's "false or deceptive" standard.

Various of the Tennessee statutes, as discussed below, appear to place broad prohibitions or restrictions on the communication of price information. As the Supreme Court has

²⁶ See, e.g., Bureau of Economics and Cleveland Regional Office, Federal Trade Commission, Improving Consumer Access to Legal Services: The Case for Removing Restrictions on Truthful Advertising (1984); Benham, Regulating through the Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J. Law & Econ. 421 (1975); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J. Law & Econ. 337 (1972). See also J.R. Schroeter, S.L. Smith and S.R. Cox, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Service Markets, 36 J. Industrial Econ. 49 (1987); T. Calvani, J. Langenfeld and G. Shuford, Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 761 (1988).

²⁷ The Tennessee Court of Appeals also recognized the value of advertising when it held unconstitutional provisions of the statute and rules regulating dispensing opticians that prohibited most forms of advertising, including advertising of prices of professional services, free professional services and guarantees of professional services. Horner-Rausch Optical Co. v. Ashley, 547 S.W.2d 577, 579-80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977). Although the court distinguished dispensing opticians from other professionals with respect to the validity of advertising restrictions, we believe, as discussed below, that the court's analysis of the effects on competition and consumers of such prohibitions is applicable to other professions as well.

²⁸ See the FTC Policy Statement on Deceptive Acts and Practices, attached to the Commission decision in Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984). The Commission also regulates unfair advertising on a case-by-case basis. For a discussion of what the Commission considers in evaluating whether an advertisement is unfair, see International Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1060-62 (1984), and the attached Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction, 104 F.T.C. at 1072.

noted in Bates, the lack of such information "serves to increase the [consumer's] difficulty of discovering the lowest cost seller of acceptable ability. As a result ... [professionals] are isolated from competition and the incentive to price competitively is reduced." The absence of such information also "serve[s] to perpetuate the market position of established [parties]." 433 U.S. at 377-78.

Price advertising informs the public of the availability of price alternatives, places pressure on sellers to reduce prices, and instills cost consciousness in both consumers and providers. Restraints on price advertising, therefore, should be narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily suppressing this important means of communication.

1. Discount Advertising

Dispensing opticians are prohibited from "[o]ffering discounts or inducements to prospective patrons by means of coupons or otherwise to perform professional services" Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-104(7).²⁹ A different section of the relevant statute, however, authorizes advertising of discount prices for optical products by dispensing opticians under certain conditions, discussed below. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(h)(3). Although the latter section permits some advertising of discount prices, we are concerned about the effects of the restrictions it imposes.³⁰

²⁹ See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-120(18) (Division of Health Related Boards) (offering of discounts prohibited). In view of the possible constitutional problems with such bans on advertising, see, e.g., Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (ban on offers of discounts and rebates), as well as their anticompetitive effects, we assume that the Legislature does not intend this result and would wish to eliminate or clarify these provisions.

³⁰ In addition, statutes governing the boards of Examiners in Psychology and Medical Examiners, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-11-215(12); 63-6-214(16), prohibit "giving or receiving, or aiding or abetting the giving or receiving, of rebates, either directly or indirectly." The meaning of "rebate" under these provisions is unclear. However, if the provisions are interpreted to prohibit advertising of certain kinds of price discounts, see Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 0480-8-.01 (Board of Dispensing Opticians prohibits "[r]ebates and discounts of any kind," apparently equating the two), this would raise the same concerns as other restrictions on discount advertising.

First, it provides that advertised discounts are not to be "limited to any particular group or classification but shall be advertised as being available to all persons." This restriction, in precluding the advertising of discounts directed at specific groups such as students or senior citizens, appears overbroad and unnecessary to prevent consumers from being misled. Such a restriction does not appear to benefit the consumer. Senior citizens in particular may benefit substantially from advertising of available discounts. Truthful, nondeceptive advertising of discounts directed at particular groups is in the consumer's interest; it encourages price competition, gives such consumers a greater choice of providers, and may contribute to price reductions.

Second, this section prohibits a practitioner from offering a discount for less than a seven-day period. It is not clear why this requirement is necessary to protect consumers, provided the length of the offer is specified. A truthful advertisement offering a discount that states that the discount is available only, for example, the weekend before school begins does not appear to be inherently deceptive, and may benefit consumers and increase price competition among opticians.

Although optometrists apparently may advertise price discounts, they may not discount optometric services "contingent upon the purchase of ophthalmic materials." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(b)(7). This would, for example, prohibit an optometrist from truthfully offering an eye examination at a discount, or presumably at no cost, providing that the consumer purchases one or more pairs of glasses. The ability to make such an offer provides an incentive for a practitioner to lower the cost of a service in order to sell more ophthalmic goods. Moreover, it is not clear that such offers inherently are deceptive. While such an offer could be deceptive -- for example, if the seller raised the "regular" price of the article to be purchased at full price, or the consumer was misled as to the terms or conditions of the offer -- the above provision is broader than necessary to prevent such deception. On balance, we believe this restriction may unnecessarily limit competition among optometrists, and deprive consumers of a valuable choice that has the potential to lower the cost to them of ophthalmic goods and services.

2. Free Goods or Services

Dispensing opticians are prohibited from advertising that they offer "premiums" or "gifts" on the basis that such offers either are fraudulent or are of a character to deceive or mislead. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(g). In addition, optometrists are prohibited from offering a "prize, premium or

gift," except as authorized by the Board of Optometry.³¹ Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(b)(6).

We believe bans on such offers are overly restrictive and unnecessary to protect the public. Such bans may deprive consumers of an important form of price competition. In particular, the ability to communicate such offers to consumers can provide a valuable promotional tool to new practitioners who are trying to enter the market, whereas the absence of this kind of competitive information serves to perpetuate the market position of established practitioners. Also, there is no reason to believe that all offers of free goods or services inherently are deceptive, and those that do deceive can be dealt with under a "false or deceptive" standard.³²

3. Affirmative Disclosures

The statute governing price advertising by dispensing opticians imposes a number of disclosure requirements, at least some of which may be unnecessary to prevent deception and could raise significantly the cost of advertising ophthalmic products. Advertisements for ophthalmic lenses, eyeglasses, spectacles or contact lenses must contain "a further readily legible statement identifying the lens as single vision, bifocal or trifocal and as clear or tinted," as well as "the type of material, the name of the manufacturer, the manufacturer's identifying name or number of lens, and the country of manufacture." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(h)(1). Advertisements for ophthalmic frames also must identify the type of material, name of manufacturer, identifying name or number of frame, and country of manufacture. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-103(h)(2). In all advertisements, the expiration date, if any, of the advertised price and a statement that the price "Does Not Include Professional Services of an Examining Optometrist or Physician" must appear. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-14-

³¹ We have found no board rule that specifically permits such advertising; accordingly, it appears that this provision could be interpreted as banning the advertising of gifts, premiums or free services. See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-120(17) (Div. of Health Related Boards) (prohibits "[a]dvertising any free professional services or free examinations"). In view of the possible constitutional problems with such bans on advertising, see, e.g., Virginia Board of Pharmacy (ban on advertising of premiums); Horner-Rausch Optical Co. (ban on advertising of free services), as well as their anticompetitive effects, we assume that the Legislature does not intend this result and would wish to eliminate or clarify this provision.

³² The FTC has issued a guide concerning the use of the word "free" and similar representations. See 16 C.F.R. § 251 (1990).

103(h)(3), (4). Such extensive disclosure requirements may not be necessary to prevent deception and are likely to reduce the amount of price advertising by increasing its cost.

First, some of these disclosures, because they would require significant time in a radio or television ad, and significant space in a printed ad, could greatly increase the cost of the ad. Second, lengthy disclosures may detract from the impact of the ads, particularly radio and television ads, by cluttering them with information that distorts the primary message of the ads. Third, disclosure obligations may also require practitioners to forego some portion of the advertising message they would otherwise have delivered, thereby resulting in less useful information being made available to consumers. Consequently, disclosures should be mandated only where they are designed to prevent deception.

We recognize that, in general, the more information that is available to consumers, the better prepared they will be to make well-reasoned purchases. However, requiring overly extensive disclosures can increase advertising costs, thereby discouraging some opticians from advertising and denying consumers useful information respecting available opticians' services. We suggest that the state, in determining whether to require a disclosure, consider the possibility that disclosures can become burdensome. Perhaps a requirement that such information be made available to consumers on request would suffice to balance the need to make information available with the need not to unnecessarily burden opticians seeking to advertise to the public.

D. Solicitation

Statutes governing the practices of chiropractors, dentists, podiatrists and optometrists prohibit or restrain solicitation by means of an agent. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-4-114(5); 63-5-124(10); 63-3-119(5); 63-8-120(8); 63-8-113(c)(5).³³ In addition, the

³³ Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-120(8) prohibits solicitation by optometrists in person or by agent by any means other than those authorized in Tenn. Code Ann. Ch. 63-8. Section 63-8-113(c)(5) prohibits optometrists from splitting or sharing fees with any organization in return for solicitation of customers.

Optometrists are also limited in their use of agents by Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(c)(4), under which optometrists may not "[a]ppoint agents or other persons to take orders" for services or materials; and by Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(b)(4), under which optometrists may not "[c]anvass or solicit ... in person or by agent, except as authorized by the board." We have found no such authorization in the rules and regulations of the Board of Optometry, suggesting that such canvassing and

statute governing the Board of Optometry prohibits optometrists from engaging in in-person solicitation (other than by means of advertising authorized by that statute), Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-120(8), including door-to-door solicitation.³⁴

Restrictions on solicitation, in-person or by agent, may deprive consumers of truthful, non-deceptive information that will help them select a provider. Such contacts can convey information about the availability and terms of a provider's services; in this respect, they serve much the same function as print or broadcast advertising. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978). Prohibitions on solicitation by agents may inhibit the operation of some PPOs, HMOs, and other alternative health care delivery systems, and may deter professionals from affiliating with referral services or franchisors, all of whom may solicit on behalf of professionals affiliated with them. As discussed above,³⁵ such organizations and arrangements can be procompetitive and can help to contain health care costs.

These statutes could also be interpreted to prohibit professionals from hiring third parties such as advertising agencies, public relations firms or telephone marketing firms to assist in marketing a professional's services and products. By communicating useful information, agents may help consumers in their selection of a provider. Restrictions on the free flow of information can make it more difficult for buyers to learn about differences in price and quality, thereby insulating competitors

solicitation may be prohibited.

See also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-14-104 (a dispensing optician may not "act as the agent or representative of any physician or optometrist on any account" (emphasis added)); 63-1-120(11) (Division of Health Related Boards) (solicitation by "agents," "cappers" or "steerers" prohibited).

³⁴ Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-8-113(b)(4) (optometrists may not "[c]anvass" in person or by agent, except as authorized by the board); 63-8-113(b)(3) (optometrists may not "peddle, sell or render optometric services from door to door"); 63-8-120(15) (optometrists may not "peddle or sell ophthalmic materials as to render or attempt to render optometric services from house to house or door to door," except where a patient is confined by virtue of illness or infirmity). It appears that explicit prohibitions on door-to-door solicitation are contained only in the optometry statute. It is unclear what purpose is served by treating optometrists differently from other health professionals in this regard.

³⁵ See Part II.B., supra (Fee Splitting/Referral Fees).

from direct competition and reducing the incentive to compete on the merits. Further, use of agents to undertake such contacts can permit the provider to concentrate on the delivery of professional services.

Certainly, restrictions on practices such as false or deceptive solicitation, or solicitation of persons who have informed the practitioner that they do not wish to be contacted, may appropriately be prohibited. We also recognize that in certain circumstances solicitation could result in undue influence or overreaching, and a state justifiably may act to prevent such undue influence. If there is some reason, such as a past pattern of abuse, to indicate that solicitation, either in-person or by agent, is resulting in deception, overreaching or undue influence, specific regulations can be tailored to prevent specific abuses, as opposed to imposing an outright ban on such solicitation. The Commission considered concerns about overreaching and undue influence when it decided American Medical Association.³⁶ After weighing the possible harms and benefits to consumers, the Commission ordered the AMA to cease and desist from restricting solicitation, but permitted the AMA to proscribe uninvited, in-person solicitation of persons who, because of their particular circumstances, may be vulnerable to undue influence. This standard, which protects consumers from harm while allowing them to receive information about available goods and services, should be considered as an alternative to the above prohibitions on solicitation.

Finally, we are concerned that bans on door-to-door solicitation may in some instances impede the flow of truthful commercial information from practitioners to potential clients. Such restrictions on the dissemination of information may make it more difficult for buyers to learn about the availability of goods and services and differences in price and quality, thereby insulating competitors from direct competition and reducing the incentive to compete on the merits. Although the state may have a legitimate interest in preventing overreaching by canvassers in general, an absolute ban on house-to-house canvassing may not be necessary to prevent this.

E. Specialization Claims

Dentists are prohibited from holding themselves out to the public as specialists in (or as being "specially qualified in," or "as giving special attention to" or "limiting ... practice to") any branch of dentistry other than the seven specialties designated by the statute, and then only if they have been

³⁶ 94 F.T.C. 701 (1979), aff'd, 608 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd mem. by an equally divided court, 488 U.S. 476 (1982).

certified by the board in the specialty in which they wish to advertise as a specialist.³⁷ Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-5-112; 63-5-124(a)(14). The legislature has a legitimate interest in preventing deceptive or misleading advertising of expertise that is very difficult for the general public to evaluate. However, we suggest that in enacting laws to prevent such deception the state consider whether those provisions unnecessarily prevent the dissemination of truthful and accurate information about professional qualifications.

F. Superiority Claims

Optometrists may not "advertise or infer through advertising that [they have] superior professional skills or competence" (with the exception that they may list board certification). Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(d)(1)(B). In addition, dispensing opticians are prohibited from using "comparative statements or claims concerning the[ir] professional excellence or abilities" Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-14-104(5). Superiority claims, including comparative claims, are not inherently deceptive; it is sufficient to prohibit only those superiority claims that are false or deceptive.

Bans on superiority claims can lessen competition, first, because they deprive consumers of information they may need to make an informed choice among practitioners. For example, such a ban would prevent providers who truly possess superior qualifications, skills, methods or materials from making a legitimate claim. Similarly, it would prohibit a legitimate claim that new or innovative services or materials performed or used by a provider are professionally superior to those that are ordinarily performed or used, whether or not the statement is true. Indeed, virtually all statements about an optometrist's or optician's qualifications, experience, or performance can be considered to be implicit claims of superiority; bans on such claims would make it very difficult for optometrists or opticians to provide consumers with truthful information about the differences between their services and those of their competitors.

Truthful comparative advertising can be a highly effective means of informing and attracting customers and fostering competition. However, if sellers cannot truthfully compare the attributes of their services to those of their competitors, the incentive to improve or offer different products, services, or prices is likely to be reduced. Removing the bans on

³⁷ We take no position on the appropriateness of the state establishing areas of specialization generally, or on the appropriateness of the specific dental specialties the Board has recognized.

nondeceptive superiority claims or comparisons may increase the effectiveness of professional advertising, provide consumers with useful information, and increase competition among the providers of health care services.

G. Guarantees

Optometrists are prohibited from advertising guarantees of optometric services or using "words of similar import." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(d)(1)(C). In our judgment, a ban on the offering of guarantees is broader than necessary to prevent deception.³⁸ We recognize that it may be deceptive to guarantee to "cure" certain optical conditions. However, a truthful communication of a "satisfaction guarantee" could be beneficial to consumers, particularly when a consumer is trying a new product. For example, a purchaser of contact lenses who wishes to wear them for a time to determine their comfort may be deprived of the opportunity to choose a practitioner who is willing to offer a guarantee of consumer satisfaction or money-back.

H. Vague, Ambiguous or Subjective Standards

Several statutes contain vague, ambiguous or subjective standards that could be interpreted in an anticompetitive manner. The statutes relating to optometrists, chiropractors and the Division of Health Related Boards prohibit providers from making "flamboyant" or "extravagant" claims or statements concerning their abilities. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-120(a)(5); 63-4-114(19); 63-1-120(5).³⁹ Provisions relating to the boards of Chiropractic Examiners, Dentistry, Medical Examiners, Optometry and Registration in Podiatry, and the Division of Health Related Boards, prohibit "unprofessional," "dishonorable," and "unethical" conduct. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-4-114(4); 63-5-124(1); 63-6-214(1); 63-8-120(2); 63-3-119(4); 63-1-120(2). The statute governing the practice of veterinarians defines "unprofessional or unethical conduct" as including "objectionable advertising"; it also prohibits "conduct reflecting unfavorably

³⁸ See Horner-Rausch Optical Co., which struck down a ban on advertising of guarantees of services by dispensing opticians.

³⁹ These provisions also prohibit "improbable" statements, a restriction evidently aimed at preventing deception. However, to the extent that an improbable statement or claim might, nonetheless, be truthful and nondeceptive, this restriction may be overbroad.

upon the profession of veterinary medicine." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-12-103(12): 63-12-124(a)(13).⁴⁰

Restrictions such as these often have been interpreted to prohibit "undignified" advertising; and all advertising was once considered by many as "conduct reflecting unfavorably" upon the professions. However, advertising may be viewed by some as "unprofessional" or "undignified" and yet be useful to advertisers to attract and hold consumers' attention. Thus, it can help to communicate messages more effectively to consumers. Such advertising is not inherently deceptive, and prohibiting it may well decrease the effectiveness of advertising, resulting in higher costs and less frequent advertising.

I. Routine Services

Optometrists are prohibited from advertising "routine optometric services such as eye examinations except in accordance with regulations promulgated by the [B]oard [of Optometry]." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(d)(1)(E). The broad language of this provision could be interpreted to give the board discretion to restrict nondeceptive advertising of routine services, including the prices of such services. For example, the board's rules provide that "[n]o range of fees may be advertised for routine optometric services; the exact fee must be specified for each routine service." Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. § 1045-3-.04(1). This rule would appear to preclude not only advertisements that stipulate maximum prices for services, but also those that use terms such as "low cost" or "as low as" to attract consumer attention and communicate a message effectively. The advertising of such price information can benefit consumers. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that such advertising is inherently deceptive, and any such advertisements that are deceptive can be prohibited under a "false or deceptive" standard.⁴¹

⁴⁰ The statute governing the Board of Medical Examiners provides that the board shall adopt rules and regulations to regulate advertising, and that "[i]f advertising is permitted, all methods must be allowed" Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-215. We applaud the statute's inclusion of all media -- the statute relating to podiatry, Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-3-119(b), includes a similar provision. However, we are concerned that the above language could be interpreted as granting the board discretion to determine whether physicians will be permitted to advertise at all.

⁴¹ The above statutory provision might even be interpreted as granting the board discretion to prevent advertising of routine services, or the prices of such services, altogether. In view of the possible constitutional problems with prohibitions on such advertising, see Bates (ban on advertising of prices of

J. Signs

The statute governing the practice of optometrists prohibits any person not licensed as an optometrist to "[d]isplay a sign or symbol which leads the public to believe that such person is an optometrist." Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-8-113(a)(7). To the extent this provision is targeted at deceptive advertising of the qualifications of non-optometrists, it appears overbroad; such deception can be dealt with under a "false or deceptive" standard. Moreover, this restriction may have harmful effects on competition. The provision is sufficiently vague that it may be interpreted so as to prevent the communication of useful, nondeceptive information. For example, a sign or symbol that mentions the availability of eyeglasses for sale, and that is displayed by a commercial optician or a retail merchant who sells ready-to-wear (non-prescription) eyeglasses, may be construed as a sign or symbol that "leads the public to believe that such person is an optometrist." Such advertising is not inherently deceptive, and should be barred only if it is false or deceptive.⁴²

K. Restrictions on Provision of Services and Products by Non-Traditional Providers

Statutes governing the Board of Dentistry require that dental hygienists must practice only in the office and under the "direct supervision" of a dentist. Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-5-115. This provision may restrict dentists' ability to best use dental auxiliary personnel to provide services to patients. While we take no position on the degree of supervision that is appropriate for specific procedures performed by dental auxiliaries, we understand that most states require that hygienists practice under a dentist's general supervision, including hygienists practicing in non-traditional settings, such as nursing homes, schools, public health department clinics, HMOs, hospitals, and other institutions where dental services are provided.⁴³ General supervision typically means that the dentist must in some manner delegate and be responsible for the task, but need not be present

routine services held unconstitutional), as well as their anticompetitive effects, we assume that the Legislature does not intend this result and would wish to clarify this provision.

⁴² It should also be noted that, in such situations, consumers can easily determine the identity and qualifications of the advertiser by inquiring.

⁴³ See also Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-19-106(a), which appears to require physician assistants to practice under a form of general supervision by physicians.

during the hygienist's performance of the service. A direct supervision requirement may increase the cost of dental care to consumers.⁴⁴ If costs increase, consumers may purchase fewer dental services and overall dental health may decrease as a result.⁴⁵

The potential benefits to consumers under a general supervision standard could be substantial. Under it, dentists who need not be present during the performance of authorized hygienist services could spend that time engaged in the more complex services for which they were primarily trained, such as diagnosis and treatment of other patients. At the same time, the cost of providing preventive dental care, such as prophylaxis, could be reduced significantly because of the reduced amount of dentist time required to provide those services. Lower costs could, in turn, lead to increased output of dental services, better consumer access to those services, and improved dental health.

In offering these comments we are not attempting to suggest particular standards that the State of Tennessee should adopt to govern the relations between dentists and dental hygienists. We also do not offer suggestions regarding the appropriateness of allowing specific types of products or services to be provided by any given type of individual or entity. Delineating the appropriate standards may involve quality of care considerations and choices that turn on medical safety questions, and we lack the expertise to offer guidance on such determinations. We urge, however, that none of the provisions governing these areas be more restrictive than is necessary to protect the public.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ See J. Liang and J. Ogur, Restrictions on Dental Auxiliaries 2 (1987) (FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report).


⁴⁵ See General Accounting Office, Increased Use of Expanded Function Dental Auxiliaries Would Benefit Consumers, Dentists, and Taxpayers., HRD-80-51, March 1980, at 14-15.

⁴⁶ We also note that under the statutes governing dispensing opticians and optometrists, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 63-14-102(3); 63-8-114(4), wholesale suppliers of optical products are barred from distributing directly or advertising the prices of such products to the public, while retail merchants are prohibited from assisting their customers in fitting or selecting ready-to-wear eyeglasses. The latter provision could be interpreted to prevent retail merchants from providing even such assistance to customers as helping them choose a particular style or color of eyewear, or from physically assisting an elderly or handicapped customer to try on a pair of eyeglasses.

III. Conclusion

We are pleased to have this opportunity to present our views on the statutes that you have submitted for our review. Our analysis suggests that certain provisions governing health care professionals regulated by nine of the state boards could have anticompetitive effects that may reduce output and increase prices to consumers. If you have questions concerning provisions not discussed in this letter, we encourage you to contact us for further review.

Sincerely,


Kevin J. Arquit
Director

We do not offer suggestions regarding the appropriateness of allowing any specific type of product or service to be provided by optical wholesalers, retail merchants or any other person or entity. Such a determination may involve questions of quality of care and medical safety upon which we lack the expertise to offer guidance. However, we would point out that such competition can create new consumer options and competitive pressures on practitioners already in the market, which could improve consumer welfare by lowering costs and improving quality. In view of these potential benefits, restrictions on such forms of competition should be examined to determine whether they are necessary, and whether they provide public benefits that outweigh the potential costs to competition and consumers.