21st Century Hearings: Georgetown University November 1 #FTC-2018-0091-D-0003

Submission Number:
FTC-2018-0091-D-0003
Commenter:
B Henderson
State:
Pennsylvania
Initiative Name:
21st Century Hearings: Georgetown University November 1
I dont understand why these forums are held and the obvious answers to the questions long answered posed again, or at all. Are these forums and this comment section for anti trust and anti competition issues just to placate or so that people who just like to hear themselves have the floor for awhile? Publishing guidelines? Really? There is no leash, there is no care applied to safeguard small businesses or follow guidelines. Just the occassional sacraficial lamb, I guess. Dont know. Maybe we need hearings on who the consitution or bill of Rights applies to? Cause its not to the average citizens benefit and our quality of life continues to be degraded. I continue to be insulted. And I hate how you waste taxpayer funds with meaningless hearings and sessions "opportunities to comment that yield us nothing. Shame. Vertical mergers are subject to the provisions of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A. 12 et seq.) governing transactions that come within the ambit of antitrust acts. Vertical integration by merger does not reduce the total number of economic entities operating at one level of the market, but it may change patterns of industry behavior. Suppliers may lose a market for their goods, retail outlets may be deprived of supplies, and competitors may find that both supplies and outlets are blocked. Vertical mergers may also be anticompetitive because their entrenched market power may discourage new businesses from entering the market. The U.S. Supreme Court has decided only three vertical merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act since 1950. In the first case, United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 77 S. Ct. 872, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1057 (1957), the Court upset the general assumption that section 7 did not apply to vertical mergers. After finding that du Pont's acquisition of 23 percent of General Motors (GM) stock foreclosed sales to GM by other suppliers of automotive paints and fabric, the Court held that the vertical merger had an illegal anticompetitive effect. The next vertical merger case to come before the Court, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 82 S. Ct. 1502, 8 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1962), remains the leading decision in this area of Antitrust Law. The Court stated that the "primary vice of a vertical merger" is the foreclosure of competitors, which acts as a "clog on competition" and "deprive[s] rivals of a fair opportunity to compete." The Court noted that market share would be an important, but seldom decisive consideration. The Court identified other "economic and historical factors" that would determine the legality of the merger. The first and "most important such factor" was the nature and purpose of the arrangement. Another was the trend toward concentration in the industry.