Tag: Competition

Cardinal Health, Inc. agreed to resolve charges that it illegally monopolized 25 local markets for the sale and distribution of low-energy radiopharmaceuticals and forced hospitals and clinics to pay inflated prices for these drugs. According to the FTC’s complaint, through separate acquisitions in 2003 and 2004, Cardinal became the largest operator of radiopharmacies in the United States and the sole radiopharmacy operator in 25 metropolitan areas. Between 2003 and 2008, Cardinal employed various tactics to coerce and induce two suppliers to refuse to grant distribution rights for their respective heart perfusion agents products to new competitors in the relevant markets. As a result of these tactics, the complaint alleges that Cardinal obtained de facto exclusive distribution rights to the only HPAs available on the market and prevented numerous potential entrants from gaining access to these radiopharmaceuticals. The stipulated order requires Cardinal to pay $26.8 million of ill-gotten gains and represents the second largest monetary settlement the FTC has obtained in an antitrust case. The money will be deposited into a fund for distribution to injured customers. The order also includes provisions to prevent future violations and restore competition in six markets where Cardinal remains the dominant radiopharmacy.

The FTC filed separate complaints against the three largest U.S. suppliers of ductile iron pipe fittings, which are used in municipal water systems around the United States. The FTC charged that the three companies, McWane, Inc., Star Pipe Products, Ltd., and Sigma Corporation, illegally conspired to set and maintain prices for pipe fittings, and that McWane illegally maintained its monopoly power in the market for U.S.-made pipe fittings by implementing an exclusive dealing policy. Sigma settled the FTC's charges prior to litigation (final order dated Feb. 27, 2012); Star settled soon after (final order dated May 8, 2012).  On 5/9/2013, Chief Administrative Law Judge D. Michael Chappell dismissed charges that McWane illegally conspired with its competitors to raise and stabilize DIPF prices but found that McWane violated the antitrust laws when it excluded competitors from the market for U.S. made DIPF (domestic DIPF). On 5/13/2013, both parties filed notices of appeal of the Initial Decision. On February 6, 2014, the Commission issued a decision finding that McWane unlawfully maintained its monopoly in the domestic fittings market through its "Full Support Program", which foreclosed potential entrants from accessing distributors. The Commission's order bars McWane from requiring exclusivity from its customers. On April 17, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Commission's order.

Global pharmaceutical company Novartis AG agreed to divest Habitrol, its nicotine replacement therapy patch, to settle FTC charges that its consumer health care products joint venture with GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) would likely be anticompetitive. Under the terms of the proposed joint venture agreement, GSK will control the joint venture and contribute, among other products, its nicotine patch business. Novartis will have a 36.5 percent interest in the joint venture, and without the divestitures required by the proposed order, would continue to own the Habitrol business. According to the complaint, without the divestiture contained in the proposed settlement, Novartis’s ownership of both Habitrol and a substantial interest in the joint venture that sells GSK’s nicotine patches would substantially reduce competition and lead to higher prices for Habitrol and Novartis’s private-label patches.  (C-4498)

Separately, Novartis AG also agreed to divest all assets related to its BRAF and MEK inhibitor drugs, products in development, to Boulder, Colorado-based Array BioPharma to settle FTC charges that Novartis’s $16 billion acquisition of GlaxoSmithKline’s portfolio of cancer-treatment drugs would likely be anticompetitive. According to the complaint, the Switzerland-based Novartis and the London-based GSK are two of a small number of companies with either a BRAF or MEK inhibitor currently on the market or in development, and two of only three companies marketing or developing a BRAF/MEK combination product to treat melanoma. If the acquisition goes forward as proposed, Novartis would likely delay or terminate development of both its BRAF and MEK inhibitors, as well as the combination product. Under the terms of the consent agreement, Novartis is required to provide transitional services to Array BioPharma to ensure that development of the BRAF and MEK inhibitors continues uninterrupted and that competition in BRAF and MEK inhibitor markets is not reduced. (C-4510)

On 4/20/2011, the FTC challenged Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.’s (Phoebe’s) proposed acquisition of rival Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc. (Palmyra) from HCA, in Albany, Georgia. The FTC’s administrative complaint alleges that the deal will reduce competition significantly and allow the combined Phoebe/Palmyra to raise prices for general acute-care hospital services charged to commercial health plans, substantially harming patients and local employers and employees. The FTC also alleges that Phoebe has structured the deal in a way that uses the Hospital Authority of Albany-Dougherty County (the Authority) in an attempt to shield the anticompetitive acquisition from federal antitrust scrutiny under the “state action” doctrine. The FTC’s staff, together with the Attorney General of the State of Georgia, filed a separate complaint in federal district court in Albany, Georgia, seeking an order to halt any transaction involving Phoebe, the Authority, or Palmyra, under which Phoebe would acquire control of Palmyra’s operations, until the conclusion of the FTC’s administrative proceeding and any subsequent appeals. On 2/19/2013, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded further proceedings.  On June 27, 2011, the district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the transaction was protected by the state action doctrine.  On December 14, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.  In February 2013, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the state of Georgia had not clearly articulated a policy that would permit the Hospital Authority to approve anticompetitive mergers.

On 3/14/2013, the Commission issued an order granting complaint counsels motion to lift the stay on administrative proceedings. On 4/9/2013, an amended complaint and renewed motions for a PI and TRO were filed in federal district court in Georgia, pending an 8/5/2013 administrative trial. On 5/15/2013, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia granted the FTC’s motion for a temporary restraining order. On 6/25/2013, the Commission granted the motion to withdraw the matter from Part III, and accepted for public comment a proposed settlement of its charges. Due to the unique circumstances of the Certificate of Need (CON) laws in Georgia, the Commission originally believed it was unable to require that the hospitals become independent competitors. On 9/5/2014, based on public comments received, as well as other information, the Commission determined that Georgia’s CON laws may not preclude structural relief, and voted to withdraw its acceptance of the proposed consent agreement and return the matter to administrative litigation. On 3/31/15, the FTC entered into a settlement agreement requiring Phoebe Putney and the Hospital Authority must notify the FTC in advance of acquiring any part of a hospital or a controlling interest in other healthcare providers in the Albany, Georgia area for the next 10 years, and prohibiting them from objecting to regulatory applications made by potential new hospital providers in the same area for up to five years. The settlement is similar to the one proposed in 2013 and does not require structural relief.