

FTC PrivacyCon
January 14, 2016
Segment 4
Transcript

>> WE'RE GOING TO GET STARTED IN
A COUPLE MINUTES HERE SO IF
PEOPLE COULD START GETTING BACK
TO THEIR SEATS, THAT WOULD BE
GREAT.

THANK YOU.

WE'LL WAIT A FEW MORE MINUTES
FOR PEOPLE TO GET BACK.

WELCOME BACK EVERYONE.

MY NAME'S KEVIN MORIARTY, I'M
WITH THE FEDERAL TRADES
COMMISSION.

THIS IS SESSION FOUR OF
ECONOMICS PRIVACY AND SECURITY.

WE HAVE PRESENTING A WEB
DISCOVERY ECO SYSTEMS.

SO WELCOME TO THE FIRST OF TWO
TALKS IN THIS SESSION THAT IS
ACTUALLY ABOUT SECURITY.

THIS IS JOINT WORK WITH OTHERS
AT THE COLLEGE OF INFORMATION

AND SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AT PENN
STATE UNIVERSITY.

MY TALK IS ABOUT THE TOPIC OF
BOUNDARIES AND VULNERABLE
DISCOVERY THAT'S MOSTLY
CONDUCTED BY EXTERNAL
RESEARCHERS WE CALL WHITE HATS.

IN 1995, THE FIRST WUG BOUNTY
PROGRAM WAS FOUNDED BY NETSCAPE
THAT INVITED EXTERNAL SECURITY
RESEARCHERS TO SCRUTINIZE ITS
SERVICES.

SINCE THEN WE HAD A NUMBER OF
OTHER COMPANIES AND PROGRAMS
EMERGING THAT RUN IN AN
INDEPENDENT SESSION.

HOWEVER MORE RECENTLY WE
ACTUALLY OBSERVED THE EMERGENCE
OF SO-CALLED BUG COUNTY PLAT
HOMERS.

TWO OF THEM IS [INDISCERNIBLE]
WHICH IS THE FOCUS OF OUR STUDY.
JUNE WAS FOUNDED IN 2010 AND WAS

FOCUSED ON THE CHINESE MARKET.

IT OPERATES IN EUROPE AND IN THE UNITED STATES MOSTLY AND WAS FOUNDED IN 2007.

THE MOTIVATION FOR OUR STUDY IS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND HOW THESE WEB VULNERABILITY ECO SYSTEMS ACTUALLY OPERATE AND WHETHER THEY MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO WEB SECURITY.

WE ALSO WANT TO PROVIDE USEFUL DATA FOR THE POLICY.

FOR EXAMPLE ON THE LIMITS OF VULNERABLE RESEARCH AND PRACTICE.

OUR APPROACH IS TO DO AN IN-DEPTH IMPEERITY STUDY OF THE ECO SYSTEMS AND IN OUR PAPER WE TAKE A BROAD APPROACH IN A SENSE WE TRY TO UNDERSTAND ORGANIZATIONS, WHITE HATS AND BLACK HATS COULD PROBABLY INTERACT ON THESE THIRD PARTY

VULNERABILITY PLATFORMS.

IN THE PRESENT AGENTS I WILL

MOSTLY FOCUS ON THE PERSPECTIVE

OF COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS.

SO THE TWO PROGRAM THAT WE LOOK

AT HAVE A COUPLE COMMON ASPECTS.

MOSTLY THAT'S A VERY POPULAR.

A LIGHT OF SITES INTERACTING ON

THEM AND A LOT OF VULNERABLE

REPORTS ARE MADE BUT THERE ARE A

COUPLE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES.

THE FIRST ONE IS THAT AN

ORGANIZATION INITIATED IN A

SENSE THAT THESE COMPANIES ASK

TO RUN A PARTICULAR PROGRAM FOR

THEM VERSUS [INDISCERNIBLE]

HACKERS REQUEST COMMIT ANY TYPE

OF VULNERABILITY OF ANY WEBSITE

ON A PLATFORM.

THIS IS DIFFERENT WITH RESPECT

TO THE BOUNTIES.

THE DIFFERENCE IS THE DELAY FOR

THE DISCLOSURE POLICY.

SO IRRESPECTIVE OF THE COMPANY
AFTER 45 DAYS THE WHOLE
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF DISCOVERED
VULNERABILITY WILL BE
COMMUNICATED TO THE PUBLIC.

THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES IN
THE TYPE OF DATA.

WE HAVE A LOT OF PLATFORMS SO WE
CANNOT ALWAYS COMPARE AND
CONTRAST THE TWO BUT WE CAN IN
BROAD CATEGORIES PROVIDE SOME
KIND OF COMPARISON ON HOW THESE
PLATFORMS PARTS OPERATE.

PARTICIPATION BY ORGANIZATIONS,
THE PUBLIC PROGRAMS THAT ARE RUN
IS LIMITED TO ABOUT A HUNDRED
AND ALL OF THOSE ARE I.T.
COMPANIES.

IN CONTRAST, MUCH BROADER
PORTFOLIO OF COMPANIES THEY ARE
MORE OR LESS OWE CURSED TO
PARTICIPATE ON THE PLATFORM.
AND INTERESTINGLY YOU SEE HERE A

LOT OF ORGANIZATIONS THAT
TYPICALLY ARE NOT KNOWN TO RUN
BOUNTY PROGRAMS BY THEMSELVES
LIKE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS,
EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

THE FIRST TAKE AWAY IS THE
INITIATED MODEL PROVIDES FOR
MUCH LARGER PARTICIPATE WHICH
MAY BE GOOD THAT SENSE OF WEB
SECURITY AS A MORE LIMITED
PARTICIPATION MODEL OF PLATFORM
SUCH AS HACKER ONE AND HOW THESE
PLATFORMS CAN ENCOURAGE MORE
COMPANIES TO PARTICIPATE.

A SECOND ISSUE WE WANT TO
EXPLORE IS EQUALITY OF THE
SUBMISSIONS AND WHAT WE OBSERVE
HERE, IN PARTICULAR ON THE
PLATFORM OF REGIME IS THAT WE
HAVE A VERY BROAD RANGE OF TYPES
OF VULNERABILITIES THAT ARE
SUBMITTED.

AND 44% OF THESE CASES, THESE
ARE ACTUALLY CLASSIFIED AS HIGH
SEVERITY VULNERABILITIES.

ON HACKER ONE THIS IS A LITTLE
BIT HARDER TO DETERMINE FROM
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA.

HOWEVER IF YOU ACTUALLY PERUSE
THE BOUNTY AMOUNTS

[INDISCERNIBLE] LOOK INTO THE
POLICY STATEMENTS BY COMBINING

THESE TWO DATA POINTS WE CAN
ACTUALLY ALSO INFER HOW MANY

VULNERABILITIES OF HIGH AND
MEDIUM SEVERITY WHICH IS PLOTTED

ON THE SLIDE.

HERE WE CAN ALSO CONCLUDE ACROSS

THESE TWO PROGRAMS WHITE HATS

HAS MADE SIGNIFICANT

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SECURITY OF

THESE WEBSITES BY CONSULTANT

BOOTH -- CONTRIBUTING

SEVERITIES.

THE WHITE HAT INITIATED MODEL

THAT WE SEE SEEMS TO HAVE A
SMALL OF THESE VULNERABILITIES
IN A SUFFICIENT FASHION.
NOW THE QUESTION ARISES HOW WELL
ACTUALLY THESE DIFFERENT
PLATFORMS AND IN PARTICULAR THE
COMPANIES ASSOCIATED WITH THEM
CAN ACTUALLY RESPOND TO THESE
SUBMITTED VULNERABILITIES.
HERE WE SEE SOME INTERESTING
DIFFERENCES.
WHEN WE LOOK AT REGIME, ACTUALLY
SEE THAT IN PARTICULAR THOSE
VERY POPULAR COMPANIES AS
MEASURED BY, MEASURE THE AWE LEX
AWE RANK CAN RESPOND TO THE
VULNERABILITIES AND HANDLE THEM.
IN CONTRAST SMALLER WEBSITES IS
NOT CAPABLE TO DO SO.
IN FACT 25% OF THE SUBMITTED
VULNERABILITIES REMAIN ENTIRELY
UNHANDLED BY THE ORGANIZATIONS
TO WHICH THEY ARE TARGETED.

ON CONTRAST SINCE THESE ARE
INITIATED PROGRAMS WE SEE
RESPONSE TIME.

WITHIN FOUR AND-A-HALF HOURS WE
SEE A RESPONSE TO HAVE YOU BEEN
VULNERABILITIES AND MOST THEM HANDLE
IT WITHIN 30 DAYS.

AN INTERESTING TAKE AWAY ON THIS
WHITE INITIATED MODEL ON THESE
PLATFORMS WE SEE A LOT OF
COMPANIES THAT ARE COERCED TO
PARTICIPATE ARE ACTUALLY NOT
PREPARED WHICH IS SOMETHING THAT
WE HAVE TO TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION.

VERSUS THAT OF COURSE RAISES A
QUESTION ON THE BALANCE SHOULD
WE ACTUALLY COERCE THESE
COMPANIES TO PARTICIPATE.

IS IT A REASONABLE ACTIVITY THAT
WE SHOULD BE ENGAGED IN.

THE NEXT QUESTION I'M
APPROACHING IS OF COURSE BROAD

INTAS.

WHAT IMPACT DO THESE KIND OF
BOUNDITIES HAVE.

HERE'S THE FIRST OVERVIEW THAT
WE ARE SEEING.

SO WHAT WE ARE SEEING HERE IS A
SUBSECTION OR SUBSAMPLE OF
COMPANIES PARTICIPATING IN
HACKER ONE.

WE SEE ON THE LEFT SIDE THAT
SOME COMPANIES ARE ACTUALLY NOT
PAYING ANY BOUNTIES AT ALL
VERSUS OTHERS WITH SUBSTANTIAL
BOUNTIES.

VULNERABILITIES ON AVERAGE THIS
DOESN'T HELP US TO DETERMINE
WHAT ACTUALLY WHAT THE
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT IS.

FOR THAT PURPOSE WE ACTUALLY
CONDUCTED THE REGRESSION
ANALYSIS IN WHICH THE DEPENDENT
VARIABLE IS A NUMBER OF
VULNERABLE SUBMITTED.

AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ARE THE AVERAGE BOUNTY PAID BY A PARTICULAR PROGRAM, THE POPULARITY OF THE PROGRAM AND THE MEASURE OF THE OVERALL ACTIVITY OF THE WHITE HATS ON THE PLATFORM IN A PARTICULAR PERIOD.

SO WHAT WE ARE SEEING HERE IS FIRST I WANT TO HIGHLIGHT THE TOP PART OF THE TABLE IS THAT ABOUT \$100 INCREASE IN THE EXPECTED BOUNTY PAY TOWARDS WHITE HATS RESEARCHERS, WE SEE ABOUT THREE MORE VULNERABILITIES REPORTED TO THE PROGRAMS.

WHAT WE ALSO SEE IS THAT PROGRAMS THAT ARE MORE POPULAR ARE ALSO RECEIVING MORE VULNERABILITY RECALLS.

THAT HAS TWO FACTOR.

ONE MORE POPULAR WEBSITES OF COURSE RECEIVE MORE ATTENTION.

BUT OFTEN THEY ARE ALSO MORE
COMPLEX, OFFER MORE SERVICES TO
THE USERS SO THEY HAVE A LARGER
TEXT SURFACE IN THE SENSE FOR
WHITE HAT RESEARCHERS TO FIND
POTENTIAL VULNERABILITIES.

SO THE TAKE AWAY HERE IS THAT
WHITE HATS DO NOT NECESSARILY
ALWAYS FOCUS ON MONETARY
COMPENSATION.

IN FACT WHAT WE OBSERVED IS 20%
OF ALL CONTRIBUTIONS ON HACKER
ONE ACTUALLY GO TO THOSE
PROGRAMS THAT ACTUALLY DO NOT
PAY ANY BOUNTIES AT ALL.

SO PAY NOTHING ACTUALLY SERVES
AS A POTENTIALLY VIABLE
APPROACH.

IN CONTRAST WHAT WE ALSO OBSERVE
IS WELL, A HIGHER BOUNTY AMOUNT
AT THE END OF THE DAY IS STILL
ASSOCIATED ALSO WITH A LARGER
NUMBER OF HAVE YOU BEEN

VULNERABILITIES -- VULNERABILITIES

SUBMITTED BY THE WHITE HAT

RESEARCHERS.

IS THE LAST QUESTION THE ONE ABOUT

SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS.

WHAT DO WE ACTUALLY GET OUT OF

IT.

IN ORDER TO ASSESS IT, WHY WE DO

NOT HAVE AN INSIDE LOOK INTO THE

ORGANIZATIONS, WE ARE USING THE

TREND OF VULNERABILITIES

SUBMITTED OVER TIME.

SO THE ARGUMENT HERE IS IF YOU

HAVE A DECLINING TREND OF

VULNERABILITIES EVERYTHING ELSE

KEEPING MODERATELY EQUAL, THEN

WE WOULD ARGUE PERHAPS AT THIS

PARTICULAR WEBSITE SECURITY'S

OVERALL IMPROVING.

WHEN YOU TAKE A FIRST LOOK AT

THE DATA YOU SEE IT'S ACTUALLY

RATHER SPIKY.

IT'S NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENT BY

LOOKING AT THESE GRAPHICAL
DEPICTION WHAT KIND OF TRENDS
ARE EMERGING.

WHAT YOU SEE ON THE TOP THREE
GRAPHS FOR HACKER ONE IS
SEEMINGLY INITIAL SPIKE.

WHERE ONCE THE PROGRAM IS OPEN
ONE OF THE VULNERABILITY
RESEARCHERS ARE SUBMITTING THEY
HAVE STOCKPILED OR HAVE BEEN
ESSENTIALLY ENERGIZED BY THE
OPENING OF THE PROGRAM TO DO
IMMEDIATELY A LOT OF RESEARCH
THAT LED TO ADDITIONAL
SUBMISSIONS.

REGIME IS A LIT MORE NOISY TO
GET A BETTER UNDERSTANDING, WE
CONDUCT A STATISTICAL TEST,
ETCETERA CALLED A LA PAZ TREND
TEST AND WE FOCUS HERE ON
PROGRAM THAT HAVE A CERTAIN
AMOUNT OF MINIMUM ACTIVITY THAT
WERE RUNNING FOR AT LEAST FOUR

MONTHS, AT LEAST 50

VULNERABILITY REPORTS SUBMITTED
TO THEM.

WHAT WE SEE HERE IS ACTUALLY TWO
CONTRASTING TRENDS.

SO FOR HACKER ONE, WE ACTUALLY
OBSERVE THAT OVER TIME FOR THE
MAJORITY OF THE PROGRAMS WE SEE
AT DECREASING TRENDS OF
VULNERABILITY REPORTS, IN
CONTRAST FOR REGIME WHICH IS
INITIATED THIS COERCED
PARTICIPATION MODEL WE SEE
EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE.

MOSTLY AN INCREASE IN THE
VULNERABILITIES.

SO IF YOU REASON ABOUT THAT THEN
WE COULD ARGUE WELL DESPECIFIED
MONETARY OR PERHAPS BECAUSE
MONETARY INCENTIVES ARE IN
PLACE, WE ACTUALLY SEE
NEVERTHELESS THESE FEWER
VULNERABILITIES ON HACKER ONE.

SO DESPITE INCENTIVES, FEWER
VULNERABILITIES WE ARGUE THIS IS
INDICATIVE OF ACTUALLY IMPROVED
WEB SECURITY PRACTICES AT THESE
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES.

KEEP IN MIND AGAIN THESE
PARTICIPATING COMPANIES ARE
MOSTLY I.T. COMPANIES IN THE
CASE OF THE PUBLIC HACKER ONE
PROGRAMS.

WE ALSO SEE THIS INITIAL SPIKE
WHICH FROM A WEB SECURITY POINT
OF VIEW MIGHT BE REALLY WELCOME
NEWS IF INDEED IT'S INDICATIVE,
THAT'S A LOT OF THE STOCKPILED
VULNERABILITIES ACTUALLY REMOVED
FROM THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHITEHEAD
AND POTENTIALLY BLACK HEAD.

WE SEE AN OPPOSING TREND FOR
WOYUN PROGRAMS AND OUR
INTERPRETATION OF THAT IS THAT
THIS LIKELY HAS TO DO SOMETHING
WITH LACK OF PREPAREDNESS OF

THIS ORGANIZATIONS WHEN IT COMES TO RECEIVING THESE VULNERABILITY REPORTS.

FOR EXAMPLE THEY MAY NOT HAVE A WELL DEVELOPED SECURITY SOFTWARE DEVELOPING LIFE CYCLE, GOOD INTEGRATION THAT MEAN THE SECURITY TEAM AND THESE EXTERNAL SECURITY DEVELOPERS AND MANY OTHER FACTOR MIGHT ACTUALLY PLAY A ROLE HERE.

WHICH ALREADY BRINGS ME TO THE LAST POINT.

SO WE BELIEVE THAT IT'S INSTRUCTIVE TO CONDUCT A REALLY IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF THESE PROGRAMS TO BETTER UNDERSTAND WHAT CONTRIBUTIONS CAN WE ACTUALLY MAKE TO THE OVERALL WEB SECURITY AND PRACTICE.

AND IT'S DEFINITELY HELPFUL THAT THESE TWO PROGRAMS PROVIDED US WITH PUBLIC DATA WHICH WE CAN

STUDY IN DETAIL.

THERE ARE MANY MORE RESULTS WHICH WE ACTUALLY HAVE ON A PAPER IN PARTICULAR PERTAINING TO HOW [INDISCERNIBLE] BEHAVE.

FOR EXAMPLE WE CAN SHOWCASE ON PAPER HOW WHITE HEADS LEARN FROM ONE ANOTHER BY INVESTIGATING THE REPORTS OF THE\$Jáx

ANOTHER, WE THE CAN ALSO STUDY WHAT KIND OF DISCOVERY PATTERNS THEY ACTUALLY HAVE IN PLACE, FOR EXAMPLE, ARE THEY FOCUSING ON SPECIFIC PROGRAMS OR ARE THEY APPLYING THE SAME TYPE OF TECHNIQUE ACROSS OTHER WEBSITES.

I ENCOURAGE YOU TO TAKE A LOOK AT THEM.

IN TOTAL I BELIEVE THAT THE JURY IS STILL OUT ABOUT WHICH OF THESE TWO PARTICIPATION MODELS, THE WHITEHAT INITIATED MODEL OR THE COMPANY INITIATED MODEL ARE

REALLY BRINGING US THE BEST
ADVANTAGES.

ON THE FIRST GLANCE IT SEEMS
THAT THE WHITEHAT INITIATED
MODEL HAS BETTER PARTICIPATION,
MANY MORE ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE
INVOLVED IN THESE KIND OF
ECOSYSTEMS.

BUT ON THE OTHER HAND A LOT OF
THESE PARTICIPATING
ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT VERY WELL
PREPARED WHEN IT COMES TO
RECEIVING THESE KINDS OF
VULNERABILITY REPORTS AND
ACTUALLY THEN IMPROVING ALSO THE
SECURITY ON THEIR WEBSITES.

SO THERE ARE VARIOUS KINDS OF
PROS AND CONS WE CAN OFTEN, ONE
ISSUE IS CLEAR WE CAN JUMP START
OR FURTHER ENGAGE IN THE
DISCUSSION WHAT KIND OF
CONTRIBUTIONS OVERALL THESE
BOUNTY PROGRAMS MAKE TO THE

SECURITY OF THESE WEBSITES.

OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT IS

POSITIVE BUT I THINK WE CAN GO

INTO FURTHER DETAIL DURING THE

DISCUSSION AND THIS BRINGS ME TO

THE END OF MY TALK.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

[APPLAUSE]

>> THANK YOU.

THANK YOU JENS.

NEXUS WE HAVE VERONICA MAROTTA

AND ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI FROM THE

CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY.

>> THANK YOU, THIS IS A JOINT

WORK BETWEEN VERONICA, C

CATHERINE AND MYSELF.

DECISIONS ABOUT PERSONAL

INFORMATION THE STUDY

REPRESENTED TODAY IS ALSO ABOUT

TRADITIONAL MICROECONOMICS AND

IT IS ABOUT UNDERSTANDING THE

ALLOCATIVE, TARGETED

ADVERTISING.

THERE IS STILL MOTIVATION IS
BEHIND OUR WORK, IN BEHAVIOR
DECISION RESEARCH IT IS VERY
WELL-KNOWN THAT HOW YOU FRAME A
CERTAIN PROBLEM, INFLUENCES THE
WAY PEOPLE WILL THINK ABOUT THIS
PROBLEM AND MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT
IT.

CURRENTLY WE LIVE NOT ONLY IN
THE AGE OF REAL DATA BUT UNDER
THE POWERFUL FRAME, THE FRAME
THAT PERSONAL DATA IS THE NEW
OIL AND WE'RE ALL GOING TO
BENEFIT PERHAPS IN EQUAL PARTS,
FROM SHARING PERSONAL
INFORMATION.

MORE SPECIFICALLY THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF FRAMES WHICH ARE QUITE
COMMON IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER
PRIVACY.

PERSONAL INFORMATION IS THE LIFE
BLOOD OF THE INTERNET.

INCREASINGLY SOPHISTICATED

COLLECTION OF DATA IS NECESSARY
FOR US TO HAVE FREE SERVICES
ONLINE OR ALSO PRIVACY IS THE
PRICE TO PAY TO EXTEND THE
BENEFITS OF DATA, A WIN WIN
WHICH BENEFITS EQUALLY, OUR
BROAD RESEARCH AND AGENDA WE'RE
INTERESTED IN INVESTIGATING ALL
OF THESE FRAMES TO SEE HOW
ACTUAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS
SUPPORTING OR NOT SUPPORTING
THEM.

THE PAPER WE ARE PRESENTING
TODAY TACKLES THE LAST FRAME AND
MOST SPECIFICALLY RELATES TO THE
IMPACT THE TARGETED ADVERTISING
AS ON THE SURFACE OF DIFFERENT
STAKEHOLDERS.

CONSUMERS, ADVERTISING FIRMS AND
INTERMEDIARIES.

AND VERONICA WILL GUIDE YOU
THROUGH THE MODEL.

>> SO THANK YOU, ALESSANDRO.

>>> THE SPECIFIC RESEARCH

QUESTION WE ARE INTERESTED IN ADDRESSING IS TO WHAT EXTENT THE AVAILABILITY OF MORE AND MORE PRECISE INFORMATION ABOUT CONSUMERS IS TO AN INCREASING TOTAL WELFARE, WHAT ALESSANDRO JUST REFERRED THE AS THE ECONOMIC WIN WIN VERSUS THE CHANGE OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS AMONG THE DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS INCLUDING COMPANIES, CONSUMERS AND INTO INTERMEDIARIES.

ALIGNED TARGETED ADVERTISING THAT COMPARE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS THAT DIFFER IN THE TYPE OF CONSUMER INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE TO THE DIFFERENT PLAYERS DURING THE TARGETING PROCESS.

NOW SPECIFICALLY DIFFERENTLY FROM PREVIOUS WORK WE ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPORTANT ROLE PLAYED BY

THE INTERMEDIARY, AND WE FOCUS
ON A SPECIFIC MECHANISM, REAL
TIME BIDDING.

THE REAL TIMING I, LET ME
EXPLAIN YOU QUICKLY HOW IT
WORKS.

WE HAVE DIFFERENT PLAYERS
INVOLVED.

ON ONE SIDE, WE HAVE PUBLISHERS,
NAMELY WEBSITES THAT WISH TO
SELL ADVERTISEMENT SPACE THAT IS
AVAILABLE ON THEIR SITES.

ON THE OTHER SIDE WE HAVE
COMPANIES THAT WISH TO ADVERTISE
THEIR PRODUCTS ONLINE.

THOSE TWO PLAYERS DON'T NEED TO
COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY.

THEY CAN FACILITATE THE LOCATION
EVER ADVERTISEMENTS AND THE
TARGETING PROCESS.

SO THE MECHANISM WORKS AS
FOLLOWS.

WHEN A USER ARRIVES TO A

PUBLISHER'S SIDE, A SIGNAL IS SENT THAT SINGLY BROADCASTED TO COOKIES TO GEOLOCATIONS, AND USE THE LOCATION FOR THE AUCTION OF ADVERTISEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION THE ADVERTISER RECEIVES, THEY FORM A BID, HOW MUCH THEY ARE WILLING TO PAY TO THE USER AND COMMONLY THE CHANGE USES CERTAIN COMPRISEAUCTION. HE PAYS THE SECOND HIGHEST BID, SO ONCE THE BID, THE WINNER IS DETERMINED HE'S ALLOWED TO SHOW THE ADVERTISEMENT TO THE USER. NOW ON THE BASIS OF THIS MECHANISM, WE BUILD A MODEL THAT FOCUSES ON THE INTERACTION AMONG THREE MAIN PLAYERS, THE ADVERTISERS, THE INTERMEDIARY AND THE CONSUMER. THEY WANT TO ADVERTISE THEIR PRODUCT TO THE CONSUMERS THAT THEY WILL LIKE AND THEREFORE BUY

THEIR PRODUCT.

NEVERTHELESS THEY CANNOT CONTACT
CONSUMERS DIRECTLY.

WE ASSUME THAT THE INTERMEDIARY,
PRODUCT PROCESS THEY NEED TO
KNOW WHICH SELLER IS SELLING THE
PRODUCTS.

PLAYS AN INFORMATIVE ROLE,
FURTHER, WE ASSUME THAT THE
CONSUMER CAN BE CATEGORIZED, BY
HORIZONTAL INFORMATION, AND
VERTICAL INFORMATION CAPTURING
DIFFERENCES IN PURCHASE POWER.

NOW, THESE THREE PLAYERS
INTERACT IN OUR MODEL IN THIS
WAY.

AT THE GIVEN POINT IN TIME, A
CONSUMER IS ONLINE, AND HE MAY
BE CHARACTERIZED BY THESE TWO
PIECES OF INFORMATION,
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL.

THE OTHER CHANGE RECEIVE THE
SIGNAL ABOUT A CONSUMER,

INFORMATION AND HOLDS AN AUCTION
FOR THE LOCATION OF AN
ADVERTISEMENT TO THE CONSUMER.
ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION
THEY RECEIVE OTHER ADVERTISERS
FORM A BID.

THE AUCTION IS RUN, THE WINNER
IS DETERMINED AND IT IS ALLOWED
TO SHOW THE ADVERTISEMENT TO THE
CONSUMER.

THE CONSUMER SEES THE
ADVERTISEMENT AND MAKES HIS
PURCHASE DECISION.

IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE
OUTCOME OF THIS PROCESS
CRUCIALLY DEPENDS ON THE
INFORMATION AVAILABLE DURING THE
TARGET PROCESS.

THEREFORE, WE UNDERSTAND HOW THE
INFORMATION CHANGES WHEN
DIFFERENT TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF
THE CONSUMER'S INFORMATION ARE
AVAILABLE.

WE CONSIDER SPECIFICALLY FOUR
CASES.

A CASE WHERE ONLY THE HORIZONTAL
INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, A CASE
WHERE ONLY THE VERTICAL
INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE, A CASE
WHERE BOTH PIECE IS OF
INFORMATION ARE AVAILABLE, AND A
BENCHMARK CASE WHERE NO
INFORMATION ABOUT CONSUMERS IS
AVAILABLE, SO AN EXTREME FULL
PRIVACY CASES.

FOR EACH OF THESE CASES WE
ARRIVE AT WHAT THE FIRM'S BEST
STRATEGY AND THEREFORE WHAT THE
FIRM'S PROFIT, WHAT IS THE
INTERMEDIARY PROCESS.

I WILL NOT GO THROUGH THE
MATHEMATICS OF THE MODEL BUT
SHOW YOU INTERESTING RESULTS
THAT WE OBTAINED BY SIMULATING
THE MODEL.

WHAT WE DO WE ARE ON

COMPUTATIONAL SIMULATIONS TO
ANALYZE THE OUTCOME IN TERMS OF
CONSUMER SURPLUS, INTERMEDIARY
PROFIT AND, IN THE FOUR
DIFFERENT INFORMATIONAL
SCENARIOS.

LET ME START FROM THE CONSUMERS.
NOW, THE GRAPHIC YOU SEE HERE,
THE X AXIS CAPTURES HOW
HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMERS ARE IN
THEIR PREFERENCES.

WHY THE Y AXIS, LOW VALUES MEANS
HIGH HETEROGENEITY.

THE DIFFERENT COLORS CORRESPONDS
TO THE DIFFERENT SCENARIOS THAT
WE CONSIDER.

SPECIFICALLY EACH REGION
CAPTURES UNDER WHICH SCENARIOS
THE CONSUMERS ARE BETTER OFF.
SO WE HAVE TWO PREDOMINANT
COLORS HERE.

THE GREEN REGIONS CAPTURES ALL
THE COMBINATIONS THE MODEL

PARAMETERS FOR WHICH CONSUMERS
ARE BETTER OFF, WHEN ONLY THE
HORIZONTAL INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE DURING THE TARGETING
PROCESS.

SO WHAT'S THE INTUITION THERE?
IN THEIR REGION CONSUMERS ARE
MORE HETEROGENEOUS IN THEIR
PRODUCT PREFERENCES.

ACTUALLY ENSURES THE CONSUMERS
SEE THE ADVERTISEMENTS FOR THE
PRODUCTS THEY LIKE THE MOST.
SO THERE IS A BETTER MATCHING
BETWEEN CONSUMERS AND COMPANIES.

THE YELLOW REGION INSTEAD
CAPTURES ALL THE COMBINATIONS OF
MODEL PARAMETERS UNDER WHICH THE
CONSUMERS ARE BETTER OFF, WHEN
KNOWN INFORMATION ABOUT THEM IS
REVEALED.

IN THEIR REGION CONSUMERS TEND
TO BE MORE HOMOGENEOUS.

SO BRANDS DON'T MATTER AS MUCH.

SO THE TARGETING IS NOT AS
AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS.
WE CAN CONSTRUCT A SIMILAR GRAPH
FOR INTERMEDIARY PRODUCE.
COMBINATION FOR MODEL
PARAMETERS, WHEN KNOWN
INFORMATION IS REVEALED ABOUT A
CONSUMER.
SO WE SAID THE REGION CONSUMERS
TEND TO BE MORE HOMOGENEOUS.
SO WHAT HAPPENS IS THAT IF
ADVERTISER HAD THAT INFORMATION,
THEY WILL TEND TO BID LOWER TO
SHOW THE ADVERTISEMENT, LOWER IN
THE INTERMEDIARY'S PROFIT.
IF THE INFORMATION IS NOT
REVEALED THEN THE ADVERTISERS
HAVE TO BID IN EXPECTATION SO
THEY MAY OVERBID INCREASING THE
INTERMEDIARY'S PROFIT.
THE RED REGION INSTEAD IS THE
COMBINATION OF MODEL PARAMETERS
FOR WHICH THE PROFITS DESIRED,

WHEN THE VERTICAL INFORMATION IS
AVAILABLE.

IN THE REGION CONSUMERS ARE MORE
HETEROGENEOUS, SO REVEALING THE
VERTICAL INFORMATION DURING
TARGETING PROCESS INTENSIFIES
THE COMPETITION AMONG THE
BIDDERS.

THEY MAY TEND TO BID MORE
AGGRESSIVELY.

IF WE PUT TOGETHER THESE TWO
PICTURES, WE HAVE SITUATIONS IN
WHICH THE INTEREST OF THESE TWO
PLAYERS ARE ACTUALLY ALIGNED.

SEE THE YELLOW REGION.

BUT THERE ARE ALSO SITUATIONS IN
WHICH THEY HAVE CONTRASTING
INTEREST.

SO LIMITING CONSIDERATION OF AN
INTERMEDIARY THAT MAY HAVE POWER
OVER THE INFORMATION ABOUT A
CONSUMER, AND MAY DECIDE TO ACT
STRATEGICALLY, EITHER BY

REVEALING THEIR OWN INFORMATION,
SEE GREEN VERSUS RED REGION OR
REVEALING TOO MUCH INFORMATION
WHEN INSTEAD CONSUMERS WOULD
HAVE BEEN BETTER OFF WHERE LESS
INFORMATION WOULD HAVE BEEN
REVEALED.

TO UNDERSTAND AND ANALYZE HOW
THE ALLOCATION OF THE BENEFITS,
CHANGES UNDER THE AREAS, WE CAN
CONSTRUCT A BUY CHART LIKE THE
ONE WE ARE SEEING NOW FOR AN
INFORMATION CASE WHERE WE SEE
THE PERCENTAGE OF THE VALUE
GENERATED TO A TARGETING PROCESS
THAT IS CAPTURED BY EACH PLAYER.
SO WE CAN HAVE A PIE CHART FOR
EACH SCENARIO, AND WHAT THIS PIE
CHART SHOWS IS ACTUALLY A
PATTERN VERY SIMILAR TO WHAT WE
JUST DISCUSSED.

CONSUMERS IN BLUE TEND TO BE
BETTER OFF EITHER IN THE NO

INFORMATION CASE OR ON THE
HORIZONTAL INFORMATION CASE.
WHERE INTERMEDIARY IN RED SEEMS
TO CAPTURE A LOT OF BENEFITS
WITH THE VERTICAL INFORMATION
ONE BEING BY FAR THE BEST CASE.
FOR INSTEAD INTUITIVELY IT IS
BETTER AT LEAST TO HAVE SOME
INFORMATION ABOUT THE CONSUMERS
WITH A COMPLETE INFORMATION CASE
BEING IN THIS CASE IS BEST
SCENARIO.
SO IF YOU WANT TO SUMMARIZE
THOSE FINDINGS WE FIND THAT
CONSUMERS ARE GENERALLY BETTER
OFF EITHER WHEN SPECIFIC TYPE OF
INFORMATION ABOUT THEM ARE
AVAILABLE, OR IN GENERAL, WHEN
LESS INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE,
AND THERE ARE SITUATIONS WHERE
THE INTEREST OF THE PLAYERS SEE
INTERMEDIARY AND CONSUMERS SEEM
A-- ALIGNED.

IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE ITS PROFIT.

SO I'LL LEAVE ALESSANDRO TO DO

SOME FINAL REMARKS.

>> THANK YOU.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF EXTENSIONS

WE ARE PLANNING OR WORKING ON.

PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT IS

THE EMPIRICAL VALIDATION.

IN FACT IF REPRESENTATIVES OF

NETWORKS ARE IN THE ROOM OR

FOLLOWING VEE THE WEBCAST -- VIA

THE WEBCAST, IF YOU WANT TO

PROVE OR DISPROFFER THE PROCESS

WE ARE HAPPY TO WORK WITH YOU.

OT THE LEFT YOU HAVE THE THREE

FRAMES I STARTED FROM, AND I

CLAIM THAT IS IN COMMON, VERY

LITTLE EMPIRICAL VALIDATION.

I'M NOT CLAIMING THEY ARE

NECESSARILY WRONG, I'M CLAIMING

WE DON'T KNOW REALLY HOW TREE

TRUE THEY ARE.

ON THE RIGHT I HAVE THREE BROAD

QUESTIONS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND DATA IS THE NEW OIL AND TO WHAT BENEFITS THE NEW OIL ARE ALLOCATED TO THE DIFFERENCE. HOW IS THE SURPLUS GENERATED, TO FIND A NICE COMBINATION OF PROTECTION OF DATA AND SHARING DATA, ARE THERE COSTS AND IF SO WHO IS SUFFERING THOSE COSTS? INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS BECAUSE THEY MAY GET LESS TARGETED ADVERTISING, SOCIETY AS A WHOLE BECAUSE MAYBE THE NEXT MEDICAL RESEARCHER INVESTIGATING CANCER CAN'T GET ENOUGH DATA OR JUST THE ISSUE OF INCREASING THE RENT EXTRACTED BY OLIGOPOLIES. AND VERY DIFFERENT POLICY CONCLUSIONS AND FINALLY IN WHAT -- UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS TO CONSUMERS BENEFIT FROM TRADING CERTAIN DATA AND WHAT CONDITIONS THEY DO NOT?

I BELIEVE THE ANSWER IS NOT
BINARY, IS CONTEXT DEPENDENT.
THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS.
IN FACT IS WORK IN OUR AGENDA.
HOWEVER IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN
THE CROWN MATERIAL IN THIS AREA
AND BY THIS AREA I MEAN THE
ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY YOU CAN
FIND ON SSRN A SEMI-FINAL
VERSION OF A PAPER THAT CURTIS
TAYLOR, LEA WAGMAN AND MYSELF
HAVE SUBMIT, WE WILL LEAVE WITH
YOU THIS THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR
YOUR ATTENTION.

[APPLAUSE]

>> THANK YOU VERONICA AND
ALESSANDRO.

NEXT IS CATHERINE TUCKER FROM
M.I.T.

>> THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR
HAVING ME.

I'M CATHERINE TUCKER AND I'M A
ECONOMIST WHO STUDIES THE

ECONOMIC FEKS OF ARE PRIVACY
INFORMATION USING REAL LIFE DATA
ACCOUNT.

WHAT I'M GOING TO BE PRESENTING
TODAY IS INFORMATION FROM AMALIA
MILLER, CONSUMER TAKEUP OF
GENETIC TESTING.

I KNOW A LOT OF YOU ARE HERE TO
THINK ABOUT ECONOMIC DATA AND
TESTING.

WHY WE THINK IT WAS INTERESTING
IS THAT FIRST OF ALL THIS IS A
TECHNOLOGY WITH A HUGE UPSIDE AS
I'LL GET OLATER.

SECONDLY IT IS ALSO A TECHNOLOGY
WHERE I THINK EVEN THE MOST
CYNICAL PERSON ABOUT PRIVACY
WOULD SAY THERE ARE POTENTIAL
PRIVACY CONSEQUENCES OF THIS
DATA BEING CREATED.

SOMETIMES WHEN YOU'RE THINKING
ABOUT TARGETED ADVERTISING IT IS
HARD TO ACTUALLY ARTICULATE A

PRIVACY FIRM WHICH IS OFTEN WE
THINK ABOUT HEALTH AND FINANCIAL
EXAMPLES.

BUT GENETIC DATA IT'S NOT HARD
TO COME UP WITH EXAMPLES OF
HARM.

FOR EXAMPLE I TOOK A 23 AND ME
TEST.

DEPRESSING I GOT A THREE TIMES
AVERAGE TIME OF GETTING MACULAR
DEGENERATION, WHICH MEANS I
WON'T SEE TOO WELL.

I FEEL CONFIDENCE ANNOUNCING IT
IN THIS AUDIENCE, I PROBABLY
HAVE THE LEAST POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCE HE OF ANYONE IN THE
WORLD OF RELEASING THIS DATA,
BECAUSE I HAVE A JOB AND I HAVE
HEALTH INSURANCE.

THERE IS POTENTIAL, YOU CAN'T GO
FAR WITHOUT THINKING OF
POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF THAT DATA.

AND AS THE PREVIOUS GENERATION
OF GENETIC PRIVACY ARTICULATED
VERY WELL, THERE ARE ISSUES OF
IDENTIFIABILITY.

THE FACT THAT THIS DATA IS
PERSISTENT.

AND THE FACT THAT POTENTIALLY
THIS DATA HAS SPILLOVERS TO
FAMILY MEMBERS SO PRIVACY
CONSEQUENCES THAT ARE
SIGNIFICANT.

THE REASON I THINK THIS PAPER
SETTING WAS USEFUL IS SIMPLY
BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF
EXPERIMENTATION THAT ALLOWS US
TO HAVE MORE OF A HORSERACE THAN
WE USUALLY DO, WHEN WE SEE HOW
PRIVACY OPTIONS WORK.

HUGE UPSIDE, AND THE UPSIDE IS
THE PROMISE OF PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE.

AND THE TYPICAL STATEMENT MADE
IN FAVOR OF PERSONALIZED

MEDICINE IS FOR THE AVERAGE DRUG
BASED ON YOUR GENETIC MAKEUP IT
WON'T WORK 25% OF THE TIME.

SO WE CAN IMAGINE IF WE ACTUALLY
HAD GENETIC DATA WE WILL BE ABLE
TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL DRUGS AND
SAVE MONEY AT THE SAME TIME.

I FIND IT USEFUL TO BRING IT TO
LIFE WITH A VERY PERTINENT
EXAMPLE WHICH IS THE EXAMPLE OF
ANGELINA JOLIE.

SHE DID GENETIC TESTING, SHE
FOUND OUT THAT SHE UNFORTUNATELY
HAD A MUTATION IN HER GENES THAT
SHE WAS LIKELY TO GET BOTH
BREAST AND OVARIAN CANCER AND AS
A RESULT HAD A DOUBLE MASTECTOMY
AND HYSTERECTOMY.

THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A STRIDENT AND
DECISIVE MEDICAL ACTION BUT IN
PRINCIPLE IT'S GOING TO REDUCE
HER CHANCE HE OF GETTING CANCER
BY 70%.

-- CHANCES OF GETTING CANCER BY
70%.

THIS IS DATA WHICH LEADS TO
EXTREME FORMS OF ACTION IN A
MEDICAL SENSE BUT HUGE UPSIDE IN
HEALTH OUTCOMES IN TERMS OF IT
BEING CREATED.

NOW WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO IN
THIS STUDY IS LOOK AT STATE LAWS
EXPERIMENTATION WITH DIFFERENT
TYPES OF PRIVACY REGULATION FROM
2000 AND 2010.

AND WHAT'S NICE ABOUT THIS
VARIATION IS YOU ALWAYS WORRY IN
ANY EMPIRICAL STUDY WHERE THE
VARIATION IS COMING FROM, WHY
ARE THE STATES ACTUALLY
EXPERIMENTING IN THIS WAY AS AN
UNDERLYING REASON.

FROM WHAT WE CAN SEE IT WAS
PRETTY RANDOM DRIVEN BY
INDIVIDUAL STATE SENATORS WHO
GOT A BEE IN THEIR BONNET.

WHAT IS ALSO NICE IS THEY ARE
EXPERIMENTING WITH MANY
DIFFERENT TYPES OF PRIVACY
REGULATION AND WE ARE GOING TO
BUCKET THEM INTO THE STUDY INTO
FREE BUCKETS WHICH ARE INFORMED
CONSENT, REGULATING DATA USE AND
ESTABLISHING PROPERTY RIGHTS.
AND I WANT TO IN THE PAST WHAT
I'VE DONE IS I'VE SAID WELL YOU
KNOW THE GREAT THING ABOUT THIS
IS IT ACTUALLY EMULATES
DIFFERENT COUNTRIES' APPROACHES
TO DOING PRIVACY REGULATION, IF
YOU TAKE EU AND OECU APPROACHES,
INFORMED CONSENT, MAYBE THE U.S.
WE THOUGHT ABOUT RESTRICTING
DATA USE AND THIS ECONOMIST
DREAM OF ESTABLISHING PROPERTY
RIGHTS.
NOW I SAY I'VE SAID THAT IN THE
PAST.
THE REASON I NO LONGER PUSH IT

IS I MENTIONED THIS ONCE WHEN I
WAS GIVING THIS TALK IN PARIS,
AND THIS PERSON FROM THE
MINISTRY OF CULTURE IN FRANCE
STOOD UP AND SAID HOW DARE YOU
SAY THAT.

IN FRANCE WE REGULATE PRIVACY IN
EVERY SINGLE WAY YOU COULD
POSSIBLY IMAGINE SO IT'S NOT
JUST ONE.

BUT IN GENERAL, WHAT'S NICE
ABOUT IT IS AT LEAST WE GOT A
HORSERACE FOR DIFFERENT WAYS WE
MIGHT THINK ABOUT REGULATING
PRIVACY.

NOW, WE'RE GOING TO HAVE DATA ON
PEOPLE'S DECISIONS TO GET THESE
GENETIC TESTS.

WE'RE LUCKY WE HAVE A NATIONAL
SAMPLE THAT WAS DONE EVERY FIVE
YEARS IN THE PEER WE'RE STUDYING
AND THEY'RE GOING TO BE ASKING
30 THOU PEOPLE ABOUT WHETHER OR

NOT THEY HAD A GENETIC TEST IN
EACH SAMPLE.

NOW, IT'S A GREAT DATA SET IN
ONE WAY.

AND THEY FOCUS ON THE DECISION
TO GET A GENETIC TEST FOR
WORKING OUT WHETHER OR NOT YOU
HAVE GENETIC SUSCEPTIBILITY
TORTS BREAST OR OVARIAN CANCER.

THE REASON I SAY THIS IS A VERY
INTERESTING GENETIC TEST IS IT'S
SOMETHING YOU CAN DO WITH THIS
INFORMATION TO SAVE YOUR LIFE IF
YOU TAKE THE TEST.

SO POTENTIALLY, THIS IS A HUGELY
VALUABLE HEALTH -- PIECE OF
HEALTH DATA TO CREATE.

NOW, THE NEGATIVE IS, THAT THIS
IS A TECHNOLOGY IN ITS EARLY
STAGES AND SO AS A RESULT, WE'RE
ONLY SEE A LITTLE BIT OF TAKEUP
IN OUR SAMPLE, ABOUT LESS THAN
1%.

NOW, WHAT WE'RE GOING TO DO IN
THE PAPER IS USE STANDARD
ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES, OF THESE
PEOPLE THIS OUR SAMPLE TO GO AND
GET A GENETIC TEST TO WHAT THE
STATE PRIVACY REGIME WAS LIKE IN
THAT PARTICULAR YEAR.

NOW, I REALIZE THIS IS NOT AN
ECONOMIST AUDIENCE, SO WHAT I
WANT YOU TO THINK OF THIS IS THE
STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIP THAT WE
DO WHERE WE'RE CONTROLLING FOR
JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING THAT YOU
MIGHT THINK OF GOING ON IN THE
BACKGROUND.

WE ARE CONTROLLING FOR THE YEAR.
WE'RE CONTROLLING FOR THE STATE.
WE'RE CONTROLLING FOR EVERYTHING
ABOUT THE PATIENT.

NOW, IF YOU LIKE EQUATIONS AND
SUBSCRIPTS, THE PAPER'S GOT
PLENTY OF THOSE SO I DIRECT
THROUGH.

NOW FOR THIS AUDIENCE WHAT I
DECIDED TO DO IS TO PRESENT THE
MAIN RESULTS IN A BAR CHART.
AND THE BIG PUNCH LINE IS, THAT
WE BUCKET UP OUR STATE
REGULATIONS IN THIS WAY.
WHAT WE FIND IS THAT WHEN YOU
HAVE INFORMED CONSENT, AND
THAT'S INFORMED CONSENT WHERE
WE'RE TELLING PEOPLE HOW THE
DATA'S GOING TO BE USED, WE GET
A REDUCTION OF THIRD OR IN TERMS
OF HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE TAKING A
GENETIC TEST.
NOW, THIS IS A LARGER PORTION
BUT REMEMBER THESE ARE QUITE
SMALL NUMBERS.
SO THE BASELINE IS SMALL.
NOW, WHEN WE HAVE A USAGE
RESTRICTION, THAT IS WE SAY, OR
THE STATE GOVERNMENT SAYS THIS
DATA CAN'T BE USED TO
DISCRIMINATE, SAY BY EMPLOYER,

SAY BY HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES, THAT REALLY HAS NO STATISTICAL EFFECT THAT WE CAN MEASURE.

THE THING WHICH HAS THIS BIG BOOST OR POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE DECISION TO GET A GENETIC TEST IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU ACTUALLY GIVE INDIVIDUALS CONTROL OVER HOW THAT DATA WILL BE USED IN THE FUTURE.

NOW, WHETHER YOU GET RESULTS LIKE THIS, AS AN ECONOMIST YOU'RE ALWAYS GOING TO WONDER WHERE ARE THEY COMING FROM AND WHAT'S THE EXPLANATION.

ONE THING THAT WORRIED ME IS IT'S NOT ABOUT THE PATIENTS, MAYBE IT'S ABOUT HOSPITALS AND WHETHER OR NOT THEY ARE OFFERING THE TESTS.

WE COLLECTED MORE DATA TO TEST THIS AND WE FOUND THAT'S REALLY

NOT THE EXPLANATION.

IT IS THE CASE THAT IF YOU HAVE
THESE CONSENT LAWS HOSPITALS
REACT NEGATIVELY.

THAT'S NOT A SURPRISE.

I FOUND THAT IN THE PAST.

BASICALLY IT'S BECAUSE YOU HAVE
TO CONSTRUCT AN ENTIRE PARALLEL
SYSTEM.

HOWEVER WHAT WAS IMPORTANT ABOUT
THIS STUDY WAS WE DIDN'T FIND,
WHAT WE FOUND WAS A NEGATIVE
REACTION BY HOSPITAL HE IN TERMS
OF WHETHER THEY OFFER GENETIC
TESTS TO GIVEN PATIENTS PROPERTY
RIGHTS.

AGAIN MAYBE NOT SURPRISING WHY
WOULD YOU SET UP A GENETIC
TESTING FACILITIES OF YOUR
HOSPITAL, PROBABLY TO DO SOME
RESEARCH AND THIS IS GOING TO
RESTRICT YOUR ABILITY TO DO
RESEARCH BUT IT SUGGESTS THAT

THE MAIN EFFECT OF HAVING THESE
INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS POSITIVELY
AFFECTING OUTCOMES IS NOT DRIVEN
BY THE SUPPLY SIDE, BUT INSTEAD
DRIVEN BY PATIENTS.

NOW, MORE PROOF OF THIS IS WHAT,
AGAIN, TYPICAL THING WE WOULD DO
IN THE ECONOMICS, THAT WE'RE
ALWAYS GOING TO WORRY ABOUT
WELL, YOU SAY IT'S ABOUT
PATIENTS BUT COULD THERE BE
ANOTHER EXPLANATION OF SOMETHING
ELSE GOING ON IN THE STATE?

WE TESTED FOR THIS BY LOOKING AT
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS.

ONE SUCH TEST WAS, WE LOOKED TO
SEE WELL, IF WE LOOK AT THE
DECISION TO HAVE AN HIV TEST,
WHAT YOU MIGHT SEE, THINK OF IS
SIMILARLY SENSITIVE OHAVING A
GENETIC TEST, COULD WE SEE ANY
INFLUENCE OF THE GENETIC LAWS ON
THAT DECISION?

WE FOUND ABSOLUTELY NOTHING.

WE SUGGEST IT'S NOT DRIVEN BY
UNDERLYING TASTES OR PRIVACY IN
THAT STATE.

SIMILARLY WE COULDN'T FIND
GENETIC LAW EFFECTS ON FLU
SHOTS, WHICH SUGGESTS IT'S NOT
DRIVEN BY TASTE FOR PREVENTATIVE
CARE.

WHAT'S REALLY GOING ON?

I'VE RULED OUT HOSE, I'VE RULED
OUT SPURIOUS CONSULTATION TO DO
WITH THE STATE.

I THINK WHAT WE'RE GOING TO
ARGUE IS THAT ULTIMATELY IT
MAKES SENSE WHEN YOU UNDERSTAND
HOW THIS PRIVACY INFORMATION IS
DELIVERED.

GENETIC TESTING IS UNUSUAL IN
THAT YOU HAVE GENETIC COUNSELING
WHERE YOU SIT DOWN FOR GENETIC
COUNSELOR AND YOU WILL DISCUSS
THESE PRIVACY POLICIES FOR

PERHAPS 20 MINUTES AS WELL AS
THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
CONSEQUENCES OF TAKING A TEST.
SO THIS IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM
THE TYPICAL ONLINE ENVIRONMENT.
WE KNOW THAT CONSUMERS ACTUALLY
FIND OUT ABOUT SOME OF THESE
LAWS.

THE LAWS THEY DON'T FIND OUT
ABOUT, THOUGH, ARE THE
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS.

THESE AREN'T USUALLY PART OF THE
CONVERSATION.

AND I THINK THAT SPLAIBS REALLY
WHAT THE -- EXPLAINS REALLY JUST
THE LACK OF EFFECT, CONSUMERS
AREN'T REALLY CONCERNED BECAUSE
THEY DON'T FIND OUT ABOUT THESE
LAWS EXISTING.

ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN YOU GO
THROUGH THE TYPICAL FORMS OR
PROCESS WHEN SOMEONE IS GIVEN
INFORMED CONSENT AND TOLD HOW

THE DATA IS BEING USED BUT NOT
CORRESPONDINGLY GIVEN CONTROL,
WE ARE GOING TO HIGHLIGHT THE
SENSE OF POWERLESSNESS WHICH CAN
PERHAPS EXPLAIN SOME OF THE
NEGATIVE EFFECTS.

WHEREAS WHEN YOU RESTORE CONTROL
TO THE PATIENT OVER HOW THEIR
DATA MIGHT BE USED IN THE FUTURE
THEN WE HAVE RECEPTION OF
CONTROL AND POTENTIALLY A
POSITIVE EFFECT WHICH MIGHT
ENCOURAGE THEM TO GO AHEAD WITH
THE TEST.

NOW, WE HAVE SOME MORE MATERIAL
IN THE PAPER WHERE WE TRY AND
PROVE THAT THIS REALLY IS ABOUT
PRIVACY CONCERNS IN THAT WE SHOW
THAT THESE EFFECTS ARE GOING TO
BE HIGHER IN SITUATIONS WHERE
THERE'S MORE LIKELY TO BE BAD
NEWS IF YOU HAVE A GENETIC TEST,
THAT ISSUES A REASON TO THINK

YOU'RE GOING TO HAVE BAD
INFLUENCES FROM THE TEST.
HOWEVER WE ALSO SHOW THERE'S
ABSOLUTELY NO EFFECT IF YOU HAVE
ALREADY GOT BAD NEWS.

THAT IS, IF YOU ALREADY HAVE
CANCER, THE BAD NEWS IS OUT
THERE IN YOUR RECORD AND NONE OF
THESE PRIVACY ISSUES ARE GOING
TO DRIVE ANY OF THE EFFECTS.

WE ALSO SHOW THAT THE EFFECTS
ARE LARGEST FOR PEOPLE IN THE
SURVEYS WHO TOOK VARIOUS PRIVACY
PROTECTING ACTIONS SUCH AS
REFUSING TO STATE INCOME.

SO AGAIN THAT'S GOING TO DRAW IT
BACK TO PRIVACY RATHER THAN
SOMETHING ELSE EXPLAINING MY
RESULTS.

SO LET ME JUST SUM UP WHAT WE
FOUND.

SO I WANT TO EMPHASIZE AND I
THINK THIS IS IMPORTANT OF EVERY

STUDY THERE'S GOING TO BE
LIMITATIONS, CERTAINLY IN THIS
STUDY.

WE DO OUR BEST TO TRY MAKE IT
CAUSAL.

HOWEVER YOU CAN ALWAYS COME UP
WITH ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS.

WE DON'T ACTUALLY SIT THERE IN
THAT PATIENT AND GENETIC
COUNSELING ROOM WHERE THEY GO
THROUGH PRIVACY, SPECULATING ON
THE MECHANISM, REVIEWING THE
PRIVACY POLICIES IN OTHER
STATES.

STUDY IN EARLY STATE OF
DIFFUSION SO THIS IS GOING TO BE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WHO EMBRACE NEW
TECHNOLOGIES EARLY.

HAVING SAID THAT, I THINK THERE
IS SOMETHING TO BE LEARNED WHICH
IS WHEN STATES GIVE MORE
CONTROL, OVER HOW PRIVATE

INFORMATION IS SHARED, WE DO SEE
AN INCREASE IN GENETIC TESTING.
AND WE SEE THIS INCREASE
PARTICULARLY FOR PEOPLE WHO ARE
WORRIED THERE MAY BE BAD NEWS
FROM THE GENETIC TEST.
NOW, WE FOUND THAT IN GENERAL,
INFORMED CONSENT, THAT IS GIVING
PEOPLE INFORMATION ABOUT HOW
THEIR DATA WILL BE USED BUT
WITHOUT GIVING THEM
CORRESPONDING CONTROL, JUST
DETERS PATIENTS AND BOTH
PATIENTS AND HOSPITALS FROM
HAVING GENETIC TESTS AND
OFFERING GENETIC TESTS.
LASTLY WE FIND THAT DATA USAGE
POLICIES HAVE ABSOLUTELY LITTLE
EFFECT, SO IT'S EITHER GOOD OR
BAD NEWS DEPENDING ON HOW YOU
LOOK AT IT.
I WAS QUITE POSITIVELY
ENCOURAGED BECAUSE USUALLY WHEN

I RUN A RELATIONSHIP, I FIND A
NEGATIVE EFFECT SO I WAS QUITE
PLEASED TO FIND NOTHING BAD.
ON THE OTHER HAND, THESE LAWS
ARE DESIGNED TO HELP PEOPLE AND
PERHAPS MY RESEARCH SUGGESTS
THAT THEY'RE ACTUALLY JUST NOT
BEING PUBLICIZED FLUFF TO
REASSURE PATIENTS.

SO WITH THAT I WILL SAY --
ENOUGH TO REASSURE PATIENTS.
WITH THAT I'LL SAY THANK YOU
VERY MUCH FOR ORGANIZATIONS
GIVING ME A CHANCE TO SPEAK.

[APPLAUSE]

>> THANK YOU, CATHERINE, NEXT UP
IS SASHA ROMANOSKY OF THE RAND
CORPORATION, INVESTIGATING THE
CAUSES AND COSTS OF
CYBER-INCIDENTS.

>> THIS HAS BEEN A LONG DAY,
ISN'T IT?
THANK YOU FOR FTC FOR HAVING US

HERE.

I'M SASHA ROMANOSKY.

I WILL PRESENT EMPIRICAL WORK
RELATED TO CYBER EVENTS, AYE
DEFINE THOSE IN A SECOND.

BUT I WANTED TO EXPLAIN A BIT OF
A MOTIVATION, TWO MOTIVATIONS
BEHIND THIS WORK, ONE IS YOU'VE
PROBABLY HEARD OF THIS EXECUTIVE
ORDER BY THE PRESIDENT A COUPLE
OF YEARS AGO TO HELP IMPROVE
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE, AS PART
OF THAT NIS DEVELOPED THE
BEAUTIFUL FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER
SECURITY.

IF ANYONE HAS QUESTIONS ABOUT
HOW TO DEVELOP STANDARDS, IT
WILL TELL YOU EVERYTHING YOU
WANT TO KNOW.

THE TROUBLE WITH THAT -- THE
TROUBLE WITH THAT IS THAT IT'S A
VOLUNTARY STANDARD.

IT'S CERTAINLY NOT MEANT TO BE

REGULATED IN ANY KIND OF WAY, I
THINK DESPITE SOME OF THE
CRITICISMS THAT PEOPLE HAVE HAD.
AND SO THE QUESTION THEN
BECOMES, HOW DO YOU GET FIRMS TO
ADOPT?

HOW DO YOU GET FIRMS TO ADOPT
THESE STANDARDS?

WE THINK THEY'RE UNDERINVESTED
IN SECURITY SO HOW DO WE GET
THEM TO INCREASE THEIR SECURITY?

THAT'S A GREAT QUESTION.

SO THE STORY BEHIND THIS
EMPIRICAL WORK IS TRYING TO
UNDERSTAND THE INCENTIVES OR
FIRMS.

ARE THOSE INCENTIVES, DO THOSE
INCENTIVES EXIST TO ADOPT A
APPROPRIATE AMOUNT OF SECURITY
OR FAIR AMOUNT OF SECURITY OR
EFFICIENT AMOUNT OF SECURITY?

WE'RE GOING TO LOOK AT THAT.

THE OTHER MOTIVATION FOR ANYONE

WHO HAS HAD A CONVERSATION WITH ME OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS KNOWS I'M KEY ON CYBER INSURANCE.

THE KIND OF WORK THAT CYBER INSURANCE CAN DO, UNDERSTANDING THE VARIATION IN RISK ACROSS FIRMS TO PRICE THAT AND THE KIND OF DE FACTO POLICY THAT THEY ARE CREATING NOW WITH THESE POLICIES.

SO WITH THOSE, WITH THOSE MOTIVATIONS WHAT I LOOK AT, THE DATA SET I HAVE COMES FROM A COMPANY CALLED ADVISANT.

TRADITIONALLY THEY LOOK AT LOSS OF PROPERTY, OTHER KINDS OF GENERAL LIABILITY, THAT FIRMS WILL FACE.

THESE ARE CORPORATE DATA EVENTS RELATED TO LOSS AND LITIGATION.

MOST OF THE DATA SETS THAT YOU SEE OUT THERE RELATING TO CYBER EVENTS INCLUDE 5,000, 6,000

OBSERVATIONS.

WE HAVE A DATA SET OF 12,000.

AS FAR AS I KNOW THIS IS THE
LARGEST DATA SET OF CYBER EVENTS
OF DATA BREACHES AND PRIVACY
VIOLATIONS, WHICH IS VERY NICE
WHICH ALLOWS US TO DO ANALYSIS
TO UNDERSTAND BETTER DIFFERENT
PATTERNS AND THE RISK THAT WE
WILL TALK ABOUT.

I'M SEPARATING THE DIFFERENT
KINDS OF EVENTS.

WHEN I SAY A CYBER EVENT THEY
ARE GENERALLY BROKEN INTO THESE
CATEGORIES AS I'M DEFINING THEM.

THERE ARE CERTAINLY OTHER WAYS
OF CATEGORIZING THEM FOR
PURPOSES OF MY TALK HERE.

I'M SEPARATING THEM INTO DATA
BREACHES.

WE NORMALLY TALK ABOUT AN
UNAUTHORIZED DISSEMINATION OF
PERSONAL INFORMATION, CAUSING

HARM TO A COMPANY, FOR EXAMPLE A DENIAL OF SERVICE OR A THEFT OF INTELLECTUAL INFORMATION, UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PERSONAL INFORMATION AND OTHER TYPES OF PHISHING AND SKIMMING ATTACKS.

FOR THIS AUDIENCE WE'RE MORE INTERESTED IN THE DATA BREACHES AND THE PRIVACY INCIDENTS.

WHAT WE MIGHT THINK OF ACTS CAUSED TO THE FIRMS, SO THEY ARE BEARING, THEY ARE SUFFERING THESE ATTACKS AS OPPOSED TO PRIVACY VIOLATIONS WHERE THE FIRM IS ENGAGING IN SOME KIND OF ACTIVITY.

IT'S ALWAYS USEFUL TO UNDERSTAND THE DATA JAILING PROCESS, TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THE DATA ARE COMING FROM AND WHAT'S INCLUDED AND WHAT'S NOT INCLUDED.

SO TO BE CLEAR THESE DATA COME FROM PUBLIC SOURCES.

THERE IS NO PROPRIETARY
INFORMATION.

ADVISANT, SCOURS LOCAL NEWS
SITES, USING THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT, THEY USES
LEXLAW AND OTHER FIRMS.

EITHER BY THE FIRM BY A THIRD
PARTY BY CONSUMER BY LAW
ENFORCEMENT, SOMEHOW IT'S BEEN
OBSERVED BY THE FIRM.

WE OF COURSE HAVE NO INFORMATION
ABOUT THOSE EVENTS WHICH ARE NOT
DETECTED, NOT IN OUR DATA SET.

GIVEN DETECTION IT IS DISCLOSED
TO THE PUBLIC SO CERTAINLY OF
COURSE THERE IS NOT ALWAYS A
REQUIREMENT FOR A FIRM TO
DISCLOSE AN EVENT.

THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS EVEN WITH
THE BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS SO
WE DO NOT OBSERVE THOSE THAT ARE
NOT BEING DISCLOSED.

CONDITIONAL ON DISCLOSURE, WE

WOULD HOPE WOULD BE REPORTED
WITHIN THIS DATA SET AND OF
THESE RECORDED IN THE DATA SET
WOULD LEAD TO ACTION, EITHER
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL.

TO GIVE YOU A SENSE OF THE
OVERALL TOTALS WE SEE THAT DATA
BREACHES HAVE BEEN IN FACT
INCREASING OVER THE PAST FEW
YEARS SO THESE CLAIMS BY OTHERS
THAT THERE ARE MORE BREACHES NOW
THAN THERE WERE BEFORE DO SEEM
TO BE TRUE.

HOWEVER WE FIND THAT THEY'RE
INCREASING AT A DECREASING RATE.
AS OPPOSED TO SECURITY INCIDENTS
PRIVACY VIOLATIONS AND THESE
PHISHING AND SKIMMING ATTACKS,
WHICH REPRESENT A MUCH SMALLER
PROPORTION OF THE OVERALL
INCIDENT.

SO WE SEE WE FIRST TAKE AWAY
FROM THIS IS THAT DATA BREACH

REALLY REPRESENTS A MAJORITY OF
THESE EVENTS.

SECURITY EVENTS SEEM TO BE
INCREASING AT AN INCREASING RATE
OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.

AS FAR AS I KNOW, AN INCREASE IN
SECURITY INCIDENTS, CONDITIONAL
ON THE SAME LEVEL OF REPORTING,
WHAT THIS MIGHT SUGGEST IS FIRMS
MAY BE ATTACKED MORE NOW THAN
THEY WERE BEFORE.

IN RELATION TO THE -- IN REGARD
TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND
TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE RISK OF
THEIR INSUREDS, ONE WAY IS TO
LOOK AT ANALYSIS BY INDUSTRY.

WHAT KINDS OF INDUSTRIES SUFFER
THE GREATEST NUMBER OF ATTACKS
OR POSE THE GREATEST RISK?

THERE ARE WAYS TO LOOK AT THIS,
WE COULD LOOK AT TOTAL NUMBER OF
EVENTS BY INDUSTRY BUT THAT
GIVES US AN INCOMPLETE PICTURE.

SO WE MIGHT LOOK AT THE INCIDENT
RATE, THE PROPORTION OF FIRMS
WITHIN A GIVEN INDUSTRY THAT
SUFFER THE GREATEST NUMBER OF
ATTACKS.

AND YOU COULD ALSO LOOK AT
LAWSUITS AS AN AGGREGATE, COST
OF EVENTS, I WON'T GO THROUGH
ALL OF THESE IN THE INTEREST OF
TIME.

BUT I'LL SHOW YOU THESE.

SO AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL
INCIDENTS, THE FINANCE AND
INSURANCE INDUSTRY SUFFER THE
GREATEST NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
FOLLOWED BY HEALTH CARE AND
GOVERNMENT.

EDUCATION AND THEN
MANUFACTURING.

BUT IT'S A FUNCTION OF INCIDENT
RATE, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES SO
THESE ARE STATE AND LOCAL DMVs
LAW ENFORCEMENT COURTS SUFFER

THE GREATEST INCIDENT RATE
FOLLOWED BY EDUCATION.
LET ME JUST SKIP THROUGH THESE.
AND THEN WE LOOK AT THE LEGAL
ACTIONS.
SO OF THE 1700 OR SO LEGAL
ACTIONS THAT WE HAVE RECORDED IN
THIS DATABASE, 300 OR SO ARE
CRIMINAL ACTIONS.
AND SOME FILED IN FEDERAL COURT,
SOME FILED IN STATE COURT.
BUT REALLY, THE BULK OF THESE
LEGAL ACTIONS ARE PRIVATE
ACTIONS BROUGHT -- PRIVATE CIVIL
ACTION BROUGHT IN FEDERAL CIVIL
COURT AND THESE WILL BE
ALLEGATION OF OF ALL KIND OF
COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY ISSUES.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT, A LITTLE
SMATTERING, FROM PREVIOUS
RESEARCH WE FOUND ALMOST 80
UNIQUE CAUSES OF ACTION BROUGHT
BY PLAINTIFFS IN THESE SUITS.

WHEN WE LOOK AT THE LITIGATION
RATE, WE SEE THE PRIVACY
LAWSUITS HAVE BEEN INCREASING
DRAMATICALLY OVER THE YEARS
WHEREAS THE DATA BREACHES HAVE
BEEN HELD STEADY.

NOW THESE REPRESENT THE --
SPECIFICALLY THESE PRIVACY
VIOLATIONS ARE -- IN REGARD TO
THE LAWSUITS THE PRIVACY
LAWSUITS, THE ALLEGATIONS
REPRESENT CLAIMS OF TYPICALLY
UNSOLICITED E-MAIL OR SPAM OR
FAXING, UNSOLICITED
TELEMARKETING, RECORDING, EITHER
INDIVIDUAL GROW OR AUDIO
RECORDING.

AN OVERALL THE LITIGATION RATE
FOR DATA BREACHES AND SECURITY
INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN DECREASING
OVER THE YEARS WHICH CONFIRM
SOME OF OUR PREVIOUS WORK, AND
SO RIGHT NOW WE'RE LOOKING AT A

RATE OF ABOUT 3 OR 4%.

WHAT WE ALSO SHOW HERE IS THAT YOU'LL NOTICE THAT THE LITIGATION PRIVACY VIOLATIONS IS REALLY QUITE HIGH, 95%.

I THINK THIS IS MORE OF AN ARTIFACT OF THE DATA.

I THINK WHILE FOR DATA BREACHES WE CAN UNDERSTAND THE SAMPLE OF BREACHES AND IDENTIFY WHICH OF THOSE HAVE BEEN LITIGATED BECAUSE OF THE BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS BUT FOR PRIVACY VIOLATIONS WE DON'T HAVE THAT SAME DENOMINATOR.

WE DON'T UNDERSTAND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS SO THE PERCENTAGE THAT WOULD LEAD TO LITIGATION.

IN OUR DATA SET ALL WE'RE FINDING, WE'RE ONLY OBSERVING A PRIVACY VIOLATION WHEN A LAWSUIT IS OCCURRING.

NOW, THE NEXT QUESTION WE'RE
GOING TO LOOK AT SOME COST DATA
SO I WILL COUCH THIS BY SAYING
THAT THESE ARE ESTIMATES OF
COST, THEY DON'T INCLUDE --
CERTAINLY DON'T INCLUDE LOTS OF
OTHER INFORMATION.

THEY'RE ALL FIRM BASED, SO
TYPICALLY FIRST PARTY LOSSES AND
THIRD PARTY LOSSES.

ALL THE COST A FIRM WOULD OCCUR
BECAUSE OF A DATA BREACH THAT
YOU COULD IMAGINE.

THE COST OF NOTIFICATION, THE
COST OF FORENSICS, THE COST OF
REPAIRING ANY I.T. SYSTEMS.

IN SOME CASES THEY REPRESENT A
DOLLAR FIGURE LOSS, A FINANCIAL
LOSS.

THE THIRD PARTY LOSSES REPRESENT
THE COST OF LITIGATING, THE
LAWSUIT OF ANY KIND OF CONSUMER
REDRESS, OR FINANCIAL SANCTIONS

IMPOSED BY REGULATING AGENCIES.

SO GIVEN ALL THESE COSTS, THE
BIG QUESTION IS HOW MUCH DOES A
DATA BREACH COST?

SO PONEMAN AND OTHERS HAVE
PRODUCED SOME GREAT SURVEYS OVER
THE YEARS TRYING TO ESTIMATE
THESE COSTS AND WHAT THEY COME
UP WITH ARE TYPICALLY FIGURES OF
\$5 MILLION, \$7 MILLION AS THE
COST OF A DATA BREACH.

I MIGHT ARGUE THOUGH, THAT THIS
IS AN IMPROPER MEASURE BECAUSE
THEY ARE LOOKING AT THE MEAN,
THE STATISTICAL AVERAGE.

SO BECAUSE OF THE VARIATION OF
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THESE COSTS,
A MEDIAN IS A BETTER METRIC.

SO NOT EVERY DATA BREACH IS A
TARGET OF \$270 MILLION AND
RISING.

NOT EVERY BREACH IS SONY, NOT
EVERY BREACH IS J.P. MORGAN OR

HOME DEPOT.

THERE ARE MANY AFFIRMS HAD DON'T
LOSE THAT MUCH MONEY.

WHAT WE FIND HERE IS MOST
COMPANIES LOSE LESS THAN
\$200,000.

IF YOU WERE TO ASK ME THE
QUESTION OF HOW MUCH DOGS A DATA
BREACH COST I WOULD SAY LESS
THAN \$200,000.

AND SO THIS IS GETTING BACK AT
THE INCENTIVES THAT FIRMS MAY OR
MAY NOT HAVE IN INVESTING IN
SECURITY AND PRIVACY PROTECTION
CONTROLS.

THE MEDIA COST IS A LITTLE BIT
HIGHER FOR PRIVACY VIOLATIONS, A
WORK WE'RE TRYING TO EXPLORE TO
UNDERSTAND EXACTLY WHY.

THE TAKE AWAY HERE IS THIS \$5
MILLION, \$7 MILLION COST IS
OVERBLOWN.

WE ALSO WANTED TO LOOK AT REPEAT

PLAYERS.

SO THIS NOTION COMES UP, QUITE A BIT IN DIFFERENT CONVERSATIONS, OF WHAT IS THE IMPACT TO FIRMS THAT SUFFER MULTIPLE KINDS OF EVENTS?

ARE THEY BEARING HIGHER LITIGATION RATES, ARE THEY BEARING HIGHER COST, HOW OFTEN DO THEY OCCUR?

WE FINDER IN OUR DATA SET THAT ALMOST 40% OF FIRMS ARE THESE SO-CALLED REPEAT FIRMS, SUFFER MULTIPLE EVENTS, THAT IS QUITE A BIT HIGHER THAN I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT BEFOREHAND.

I THINK THAT'S QUITE EXTRAORDINARY IN FACT.

IN THE INFORMATION AND INSURANCE SECTORS ALMOST 50% OF THEM ARE REPEAT PLAYERS.

I THINK THAT IS QUITE INTERESTING ALSO.

THE FIGURES HERE I'M SHOWING 9.5 MILLION VERSUS 4 ARE THE MEAN. WHAT IT'S SHOWING YOU IS THE COST FOR THESE REPEAT PLAYERS IS ALMOST TWICE, A LITTLE OVER TWICE THAN THE NON-REPEAT PLAYERS, THOSE THAT SUFFER JUST A SINGLE EVENT.

NOW THE MEDIANS ARE SHOWING EXACTLY THE SAME THING THAT THE COST IS HIGHER FOR THESE REPEAT PLAYERS.

WHAT I THEN ALSO WANTED TO DO IS TRY AND UNDERSTAND OKAY, MAYBE 200,000 IS ACTUALLY A LOT FOR THESE FIRMS.

WHAT DOES THIS REPRESENT AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR REVENUE?

WHAT I DID WAS WENT THROUGH ALL OF THE DATA TO TRY AND UNDERSTAND WHAT DO MOST COMPANIES LOSE AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR REVENUE AND THEN TRY AND

COUCH THAT RELATIVE TO DIFFERENT
KINDS OF LOSSES IN DIFFERENT
INDUSTRIES.

WE WANTED TO LOOK AT RETAIL,
HOSPITAL BAD DEBT GLOBAL PAYMENT
FRAUD.

WHAT YOU CAN IMAGINE IS VISA,
MASTERCARD HAVE A TOLERANCE FOR
BAD DEBT, THROUGH ORGANIC
PROCESS OR SOME CALCULATIONS
THEY HAVE SETTLED ON SOME
PERCENTAGE.

THESE NUMBERS COME FROM INDUSTRY
REPORTS.

SHOWING 5.9%, 5.2%, 3.1% FOR
FRAUD.

CYBER EVENTS, LESS THAN HALF A
PERCENT.

SO IT'S SAYING THAT CYBER EVENTS
COST LESS THAN HALF A PERCENT OF
A FIRM'S REVENUE, A GREAT DEAL
LESS THAN THESE OTHER -- THAN
THESE OTHER INDUSTRIES.

IN ADDITION TO THAT, IN OTHER
WORKS, BY SOME COLLEAGUES, VILLY
ABLON AT RAND, A GREAT SURVEY
INSTRUMENT THE RAND HAS
AVAILABLE TO IT TO TRY AND
UNDERSTAND CONSUMER SENTIMENT
TOWARDS BREACH NOTIFICATION.
HOW DO THEY FEEL IN RESPONSE TO
FIRMS GETTING THESE NOTICES OF A
DATA BREACH?

WHAT WE FIND IS THAT FOR THE
MOST PART THEY'RE REALLY QUITE
CONTENT.

THEY ARE QUITE HAPPY WITH THE
TIMELINESS, INFORMATION
PRESENTED IN THE NOTIFICATIONS,
AND REALLY HAVE GENERALLY NO
CONCERNS.

THERE WAS A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF
THEM THAT MAY CHANGE FIRMS BUT
BY AND LARGE THEY ARE REALLY
QUITE HAPPY.

SO CONSUMER SENTIMENT IF IT IS

IN FACT HIGH COUPLED WITH A
SMALL COST TO A FIRM BECAUSE OF
THESE EVENTS, REALLY MAY SUGGEST
THAT FIRMS HAVE VERY LITTLE
INCENTIVE TO CHANGE THEIR
PRACTICES.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

[APPLAUSE]

>> THERE IT IS.

THANK YOU SASHA AND THANK YOU TO
EVERYONE FOR THOSE
PRESENTATIONS.

THEY WERE WONDERFUL.

AND VERY VARIED, SO I WANT TO
RECAP THEM BRIEFLY BUT FIRST I
WANT TO INTRODUCE DOUG SMITH WHO
IS FROM THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND SIONA LISTOKIN.

WE HAD FOUR DIFFERENT
PRESENTATIONS, JENS PRESENTED
BUG BOUNTY AND VERONICA AND
ALESSANDRO PROPOSED AN ECONOMIC
MODEL FOR ADVERTISERS, PLATFORMS

AND CONSUMERS AND CONCLUDED THAT
THE ALLOCATIONS OF SHARING
CONSUMER INFORMATION TENDS TO
BENEFIT THE PLATFORM AND THE
ADVERTISER.

IF I'M WRONG YOU CAN TELL ME IN
JUST A SECOND.

CATHERINE PRESENTED A STUDY OF
THE RATE OF CONCLUDED THAT
STATES WHERE REDISCLOSURES
RESTRICTED HAVE THE HIGHEST
TESTING RATES AND THAT STATES
WITH INFORMED CONSENT DECREASES
THE RATE OF GENETIC TESTING.

AND FINALLY SASHA LOOKED AT ONE
SET OF DATA, AND OFFERED
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE MEDIAN
COST OF CYBER EVENTS PUTTING IT
AROUND 200,000 AND LESS THAN
WHAT OTHER STUDIES HAVE FOUND
ABOUT THE COST OF CYBER EVENTS.

TO START I OFF I WANT TO TURN IT
OVER TO SIONA.

>> KEVIN HAD ASKED ME TO TALK ABOUT THEMES IN THIS PANEL AND I WOULD NOTE THAT THE TITLE OF THE PANEL IS THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY AND I THINK THAT'S ABOUT AS CLOSE AS WE'LL GET TO A THEME.

LOTS OF VARIATION HERE.

PAPERS COVERED SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OR TOUCHSTONE TOPICS IN PRIVACY, HEALTH DATA, ONLINE ADVERTISING AND OF COURSE SECURITY.

ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE PANEL HAD A LOT MORE FOCUS ON HOW FIRMS RESPOND TO INCENTIVES AND NOT JUST CONSUMERS.

AND FINALLY, A LOT OF TALK OR THE PAPERS HERE REALLY ARE A CROSS-SECTION OF STAGES OF RESEARCH DESIGN.

SO IF YOU THINK ABOUT ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY YOU HAVE A MODEL THAT

EXTENDS EXISTING THEORY, NEW
DATA SETS AND EXPLANATORY OR
CAUSAL PAPERS.

SO MY METATHESIS HERE IS THAT THE
FIELD OF ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY IS
ALIVE AND WELL AND QUITE ROBUST
BUT THAT'S GOING TO BE MY
QUESTION.

SO EXTENDING COMMISSIONER
BRILL'S COMMENTS AFTER LUNCH AND
THE CONCLUSION AT THE END OF
VERONICA AND ALESSANDRO'S PAPER,
IN THIS FIELD WHERE WHAT'S YOUR
WISH LIST?

THIS IS FOR EVERYONE.

WHERE DO YOU SEE THE GAPS IN
THIS LITERATURE?

SPECIFICALLY AS IT WOULD RELATE
TO POLICY MAKERS AND INDUSTRY
PRACTICE.

SO NOT JUST ADVANCING ACADEMIC
RESEARCH.

I'LL START WITH VERONICA AND

ALESSANDRO BUT I'M INTERESTED IN
EVERYONE'S THOUGHTS.

>> ONE COMMENT AND I'LL

PIGGYBACK ON OUR LAST SLIDES
ABOUT THE PIECE IN JAIL WHICH A
LOT OF SSRN.

IN DOING THAT REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE OF ECONOMICS OF
PRIVACY WE IDENTIFIED THREE
WAVES OF RESEARCH.

THE FIELD IS NOT NOVEL AT ALL.
IT STARTED IN THE LATE 1970s,
EARLY 1980s.

THERE IS A SCHOOL OF SCHOLARS,
THERE IS A BEAUTIFUL PEDIGREE
AND ALSO QUITE A BIT OF WORK
STARTING BACK 40 YEARS OR SO.
HOWEVER, ONLY IN THE TIME THERE
WERE NO MODELS, BACK IN LATE
'70s EARLY 80s, NO MODELS OR
MICROECONOMICS IN THE FIELD OF
PRIVACY WAS MORE ABOUT USING
ECONOMIC CONCEPTS SUCH AS

SYMMETRIC INFORMATION, APPLIED
TO PRIVACY.

WHAT WE HAVE NOW IS LOTS OF
CAREFULLY MODEL -- CAREFUL
MODELING WORK.

THANKS TO THE WORK OF THINGS
LIKE CATHERINE TUCKER AND OTHERS
IT'S BEAUTIFUL EMPIRICAL WORKS.

IN TERMS OF MY WISH LIST IS TO
SEE MORE EMPIRICAL WORK AND IN
ORDER TO HAVE MORE EMPIRICAL
WORK, SOMETIMES WE WANT DATA
FROM THE INDUSTRY.

IF THE INDUSTRY IS SERIOUS AND
SEES THE DATA AS MORE OIL, GOOD
FOR EVERYONE THEN WE SHOULD HAVE
ADDRESSED THE PROBLEM OF
INFORMATION SYMMETRY THAT SURGE
WAS REFERRING TO AS ONE OF THE
CRUCIAL PROBLEMS WE HAVE IN THE
PREVIOUS PANEL, WE WANT MORE
DATA FROM THE INDUSTRY REGARDING
EXACTLY WHAT THEY DO FROM THE

INFORMATION THEY COLLECT.
MAY NOT CARE ABOUT WHAT
COMPANIES ARE DOING.
RESEARCHERS CAN ACTUALLY STUDY
THE DATA AND THEN COME OUT
AGGREGATIVE, AND COME UP WITH
POLICY RECOMMENDATION.
SO MY WISH LIST IS MORE
EMPIRICAL WORK AND MORE
TRANSPARENCY FROM THE INDUSTRY
SIDE.

>> I MEAN I WOULD ECHO THAT,
RIGHT?

I THINK THERE'S BEEN A LOT OF
TIME SPENT DOING WHAT A
COLLEAGUE WOULD REFER TO AS
ADMIRING THE PROBLEM.
AND I THINK THAT'S USEFUL,
THAT'S GOOD, I THINK THAT ONLY
GETS US SO FAR.

I LIKE EMPIRICAL WORK BECAUSE IT
SPEAKS TO EVIDENCE FOR
SOMETHING.

IT GETS US PAST NORMATIVES, AND HELPS US ANSWER THE HE EFFECT, WHAT THE EFFECT WILL BE A ON B, THE GOLD STANDARD, IN ORDER TO DO THAT, THE POINT IS EXACTLY TRUE.

YOU KNOW, WE NEED DATA, RIGHT? AND SOMETIMES, THAT TAKES US BEING VERY CREATIVE ON FINDING IT IN CLEVER WAYS LIKE THE PREVIOUS PANEL, THE RESEARCHERS DID THEMSELVES, COMING UP WITH THESE SPEERMTS WHICH I THINK ISs -- EXPERIMENTS, WHICH TAKES PAIN, THAT IS OKAY TOO, BUT I WOULD ECHO EVERYTHING ALESSANDRO HAD TO SAY, ESPECIALLY IN THE WONDERFUL ACCENTED WAY THAT HE SAID IT.

>> WELL I WOULD ADD TO THE ACCENTS.

SO I -- YOU KNOW UNSURPRISINGLY I AGREE FOR THE NEED FOR

EMPIRICAL WORK.

WHAT ALWAYS STRIKES ME IS IF I'M
A POLICY MAKER TRYING TO DECIDE
IF I WANT THE MINIMUM WAGE, WHAT
LEVEL THE MINIMUM WAGE SHOULD
BE, I COULD DRAW ON HUNDREDS OF
ECONOMIC STUDIES THAT HAVE
MEASURED AND HAVE HUNDREDS OF
DIFFERENT WAYS HOW MINIMUM WAGES
AFFECT WAGE LEVELS.

HOWEVER IF I'M A POLICY MAKER
MAKING REALLY IMPORTANT
DECISIONS ABOUT WHETHER TO
RELATING PRIVACY OR DATA, I'M
INSTEAD RELYING ON JUST A
HANDFUL OF STUDIES IN
POTENTIALLY NONGENERALIZABLE
SPHERES.

ITS PERSONNEL AND NUMEROSITY.

>> THE LOSS OF PRIVACY AND SOME
WORK THAT ALESSANDRO AND I HAVE
DONE GOES IN THAT DIRECTION TO
UNDERSTAND HOW PEOPLE PERCEIVE

POLICY MAKING OVER TIME BUT WHAT WE COULD NOT ASSESS IN A ROBUST MANNER IS WHAT ARE ACTUALLY THE POTENTIAL LOSSES THAT WE MAY FACE DOWN THE ROAD.

AND I THINK THIS IS A VERY CRITICAL ISSUE WHEN IT COMES TO GENETIC PRIVACY BUT ALSO TO CONSUMER PRIVACY.

A SIMILAR ISSUE ALSO RISES WHERE THE TO SECURITY, WHERE ACTUALLY THINGS MIGHT ARISE IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT WE DO NOT OBSERVE.

YOU SAW IT IN SASHA'S CHART. WE COULD ONLY ANALYZE THE DATA THAT WAS DETECTED.

SO WHAT ABOUT ALL THE SECURITY BREACHES THAT WE DO NOT OBSERVE AND WE KNOW NOTHING ABOUT?

SIMILAR WITH RESPECT TO MY PRESENTATION, WHEREAS THE BEHAVIOR OF WHITEHATS, WE WE CAN

OBSERVE, WHAT WE DO NOT OBSERVE
IS THE BEHAVIOR OF BLACKHATS AND
THERE WE STILL HAVE A LOT OF
WORK TO BE DONE IN TERMS OF
INVESTIGATING THEM AND GETTING
MAYBE QUALITATIVE DATA BUT ALSO
TYING TOGETHER DATA SETS SUCH AS
SASHA'S WITH ANALYSIS THAT WE
HAVE DONE, TO KIND OF BE ABLE TO
INFER WHERE VULNERABILITIES HAVE
BEEN KNOWN THAT HAVE NOT BEEN
DISCOVERED BY THE WHITEHATS.

>> SOMETHING REALLY IMPORTANT
ABOUT LONG TERM EFFECTS AND HERE
IS THE DILEMMA, THE DILEMMA THAT
THE FIELD THE ECONOMICS OF
PRIVACY FACES.

IN MY RUE, THE EFFECT IS LONG
TERM, ECONOMIES THAT WE CAN
PUBLISH AND DO RIGOROUS WORK, IT
IS VERY, VERY DIFFICULT TO DO
STUDIES AND FOUND CAUSAL LINKS
OVER, WHEN THERE COULD BE A DATA

BREACH NOW WHICH IS ONLY IN
EFFECT SEVEN YEARS LATER.

AND YOU ARE NOT GOING TO SATISFY
REVIEWERS IN LEGAL HISTORIC
JOURNAL TO FIND THESE KINDS OF
EFFECTS.

I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY
SIMPLE METHODOLOGICAL EFFECTS.

>> CATHERINE, YOUR RESEARCH
SHOWED EFFECTS ON CONSUMERS
CHOICES IN THE CONTEXT OF
GENETIC PRIVACY.

I WAS CURIOUS JUST HOW YOU THINK
THIS RESEARCH, WHAT IMPLICATIONS
IT HAS FOR OTHER AREAS OF
PRIVACY?

>> OKAY, SO WHAT WAS NICE ABOUT
THIS SETTING IS IT ALLOWED US TO
HAVE MORE OF A HORSERACE WHERE
WE HAD THE SAME THING WE WERE
TRYING TO EXPLAIN IN LOTS OF
DIFFERENT PRIVACY REGIMES.

NOW, THE EXTENT OF -- THE REASON

I FIND IT USEFUL OR REASSURING
IS IT HELPS ME BELIEVE SOME OF
THE RESEARCH I'VE DONE IN OTHER
AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN MORE
CASE-BY-CASE.

ON THE RESEARCH I'VE DONE FOR
EXAMPLE IN TARGETED ADVERTISING
WHICH A LOT OF PEOPLE HAVE
TALKED ABOUT TODAY HAS
EMPHASIZED THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS
OF INFORMED CONSENT BUT ALSO
POSITIVE EFFECTS FROM IMPROVE BE
CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL.

I WAS ALWAYS NERVOUS BECAUSE
THOSE WERE TWO VERY SEPARATE
STUDIES, DIFFERENT TIMES
DIFFERENT STUDIES EVEN DIFFERENT
COUNTRIES.

I FOUND IT REASSURING TO USE
THIS HORSERACE, TO MAKE ME THINK
PERHAPS THERE IS SOMETHING MORE
GENERALIZABLE TO STUDY THE
EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT PRIVACY

REGIMES.

>> THANKS.

THE QUESTION I HAVE FOR THE GROUP IS ACTUALLY A LITTLE BIT OF A FOLLOW-UP ON ONE OF THE THINGS SIONA POINTED OUT WHICH IS, YOU GUYS ARE LOOKING A LOT AT HOW FIRMS' CHOICES ARE HAVING IN THIS ARENA.

SO WHAT ARE THESE PAPERS AND RESEARCH IN GENERAL SUGGEST ABOUT WHAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS GETTING RIGHT, WHAT IT'S GETTING WRONG?

YOU KNOW WHAT CAN THIS IMPROVE ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT KIND OF MARKET FAILURES WE MIGHT BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN THIS AREA? WHY DON'T WE START AT THIS END I GUESS?

>> I THINK ONE OBSERVATION THAT ALESSANDRO AND I HAVE MADE OVER TIME, WE HAVE SOONER A LOT OF

PRIVATE ENTITIES ENTERING THE
MARKET WITH PRIVACY ENHANCING
OFFERS BUT NOT PICKED UP IN THE
MARKETPLACE IN A SUFFICIENT
DEGREE.

SO WELL, THE GOOD NEWS IS THAT
WE DO SEE THESE OFFERS, WE SEE A
LOT OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
THAT ARE EVENTUALLY PICKED UP BY
STARTUPS.

BUT WHAT WE SEE LESS IS AN
ADOPTION BY THE BIG PLAYERS,
BECAUSE OF A LACK OF INCENTIVES.
TARGETING MARKETING IS JUST TOO
ENTICING TO GIVE IT UP IN
EXCHANGE FOR MORE PRIVACY
FRIENDLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

SO THERE'S A FUNDAMENTAL
CONUNDRUM THAT WE ARE PRESENTED
WITH THAT IS VERY HARD TO SIDE
STEP.

NEVERTHELESS I THINK IT'S VERY
IMPORTANT THAT WE SEE THESE NEW

OFFERS IN THE MARKETPLACE AND I
HOPE MORE OF THEM ARE ACTUALLY
PICKED UP IN PRACTICE.

>> WHAT ARE THEY GETTING RIGHT?

>> ONE REASON FOR OPTIMISM IS
THE SENSE OF PRIVACY, ANNOUNCING
TECHNOLOGIES, ALMOST EVERY TIME
OF YEAR, TALKING ABOUT PATs
BECAUSE I STRONGLY THINK THAT
TECHNOLOGY, CAN BE A SOLUTION,
TECHNOLOGIES DO NOT STOP
ALTOGETHER THE FLOW OF DATA BUT
RATHER MODULATE THE SHARING OF
PROTECTION.

PRIEVES FIRMS CAN ACTUALLY
MAKE, THIS MAY BE WISHFUL
THINKING BUT MAY BE PROACTIVITY
IN DEPLOYING P.A.T.S, SO THEY
CAN STILL DO MUCH OF WHAT THEY
ARE DOING NOW BUT IN A MORE
PRIVACY PRESERVING MATTER.

NOW TRUTH TO BE TOLD, SOME OF
THESE TECHNOLOGIES ARE STILL IN

THEIR INFANCY.

FOR INSTANCE AMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION, PROMISING FOR MOMENT
AND I DO BELIEVE THAT WE COULD
IN THE SPACE OF PRIVACY WE CAN
ACTUALLY HAVE THE CAKE AND EAT
IT TOO BECAUSE OF THESE
TECHNOLOGIES.

>> IN TERMS OF WHAT ARE FIRMS
GETTING RIGHT, GOD, THAT'S SUCH
A GOOD QUESTION AND I WISH I HAD
A BETTER ANSWER THAN THE ONE I'M
ABOUT TO GIVE.

I THINK -- SO I THINK WHAT WE
CAN RELY ON IS THAT FIRMS
WILL -- FIRMS WILL OPERATE BASED
ON INCENTIVES.

AND THE GOAL THEN IS TO TWEAK
THE INCENTIVES SUCH THAT THEY
BECOME ALIGNED FOR ALL THE
PLAYERS, RIGHT?

THAT'S NOT NEW.

AND WHAT THAT MEANS IS THAT, YOU

KNOW, LOOK IF PRIVACY REALLY IS
A BIG DEAL THEN CONSUMERS SHOULD
REALLY ACT LIKE IT'S A BIG DEAL.
AND IF AND ONLY UNTIL THEY DO
WILL FIRMS HAVE INCENTIVE TO
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.

SO I GUESS I NEED -- I GUESS I
WOULD SAY THAT CONSUMERS SHOULD
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY, AND ACT LIKE
IT, AND THEN FIRMS WILL TAKE IT
SERIOUSLY.

NOW IF THERE ARE -- SPECIALS.
SERIOUSLY.

IF THERE ARE MARKET FAILURES FOR
WHICH FIRMS CAN'T IMPOSE ANY
KIND OF EFFECT ON THE FIRM THEN
THAT'S WHERE REGULATION OR
POLICY OR FTC ACTIONS CAN COME
INTO PLAY.

GO AHEAD.

>> NO, I JUST WANTED TO BUILD
OPEN THAT.

BECAUSE I THINK -- I THINK WHAT

I OFTEN SEE IN THE DISCUSSION IS
THIS UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION THAT
IT'S NEVER IN FIRMS' INTEREST TO
REGULATE ON PRIVACY.

AND THEREFORE, GOVERNMENT HAS TO
INTERVENE.

BUT I THINK THERE ARE INSTANCES
THAT WE SEE IN RESEARCH WHERE
THERE ARE INCENTIVES FOR FIRMS
TO ACTUALLY IMPROVE PRIVACY
PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS.

FOR EXAMPLE, THE PROVISION OF
USER CENTRIC CONTROLS.

AND SO I SORT OF SEE THAT AS A
BEAM OF LIGHT IN AN ALSO CYNICAL
WORLD.

>> I THINK IT DOES TOUCH ON THE
WORLD OF INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
AND CHOICE AND NOTICE.

AND POOR CHOICE AND NOTICE.
YOU KNOW, POOR CHOICE, OVER THE
PAST FIVE, SIX YEARS HAS TAKEN A
BEATING, HASN'T IT?

BUT IT'S RELIED ON THE NOTION
THAT FIRMS DON'T BEHAVE THE
RIGHT WAY, CONSUMERS DON'T
BEHAVE THE RIGHT WAY BECAUSE
THEY DON'T HAVE THE RIGHT
INFORMATION.

ONLY IF WE COULD GIVE THEM THE
RIGHT INFORMATION WOULD THEY
MAKE THE PROPER CHOICES?

AH, I'M JUST NOT SURE THAT'S
TRUE.

AT LEAST LET ME SAY IT THIS WAY.
THAT MAYBE FIRMS AT LEAST IN MY
CASE WITH THE DATA, THAT MAYBE
FIRMS DO HAVE THE RIGHT
INFORMATION.

MAYBE THEY ARE AWARE OF ALL THE
RISKS THAT USING AND COLLECTING
THE DATA HAVE AND MAYBE THEY ARE
MAKING RATIONAL CHOICES AND FOR
THEM INVESTING A CERTAIN AMOUNT
WHICH WE MAY THINK IS
UNDERINVESTING ISN'T THE PROPER

AMOUNT.

BUT MAYBE IT IS ACTUALLY THE
RIGHT AMOUNT AS FAR AS THEY'RE
CONCERNED.

>> I JUST WANT TO ALSO ADD THAT
THIS PANEL WAS ALSO ABOUT
SECURITY.

AND I THINK ONE THING THAT FIRMS
DO RIGHT IS PARTICIPATING IN
BUCK BUOYANT -- BUCK BOUNTY
PROGRAMS.

HEIGHTENING WEB SECURITY AND
OTHER SECURITY ASPECTS.

I THINK THEY'RE STILL QUITE A
STEP AWAY FROM ANYTHING
APPROACHING FULL SECURITY.

BUT I THINK HAVING A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL SECURITY
PROGRAM INCLUDING BUCK BOUNTY
PROGRAMS ARE A CORRECT
DIRECTION.

>> JENS, I WANTED TO ASK YOU,
THERE WAS A NOTORIOUS BLOG POST

ON THE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
OF ORACLE, BEHAVIORAL THE
ANALYSIS WAS IT'S VERY EXPENSIVE
TO GO THROUGH THESE BUG REPORTS,
IT VERY RARELY YIELDS USEFUL
INFORMATION.

YOUR STUDY SHOWS THERE ARE
BENEFITS TO PARTICIPATION BUT
THE QUESTION SHE WAS RAISING IS,
ARE THE BENEFITS OF
PARTICIPATION GREATER THAN USING
THAT SAME MONEY TO PAY ANOTHER
ENGINEER TO EVALUATE INTERNALLY
THE CONTROLS ON YOUR SOFTWARE?

>> SO BUCK BOUNTY PROGRAMS ARE
NOT THE FIRST SECURITY MEASURE
THAT ANY COMPANY SHOULD
IMPLEMENT.

HOWEVER AS YOU SAW IN ONE OF MY
EARLY SLIDES VERY MATURE
COMPANIES, RUNNING THEIR OWN
BUCK BOUNTY PROGRAMS LIKE
FACEBOOK, GOOGLE AND SO ON.

SO FROM THAT PERSPECTIVE IT WAS
WORTH THEIR WHILE.

SO CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MAIN
SELLING POINTS IS IT PROVIDES A
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE, IN
ADDITION TO RUNNING SOFTWARE
SECURITY TOOLS, HAVE SECURITY
RESEARCHERS IN THE SENSE THAT
WHITEHAT RESEARCHERS HAVE
SOMEWHAT MORE OF A VIEW LIKE A
BLACKHATTED ORGANIZATION, THEY
ARE MORE CREATIVE, IN PLACES
WHERE OTHER SECURITY RESEARCHERS
WOULD NOT LOOK, A GOOD SECURITY
POINT TO INCH THE SECURITY OF
YOUR WEBSITE EVEN A COUPLE OF
STEPS FURTHER.

THERE IS ALSO A LOT OF CRITICISM
ABOUT THESE BAD RATIOS, THE DATA
THAT IS ACTUALLY THEN USEFUL AND
I THINK WHEN YOU ACTUALLY LOOK
VERY CLOSELY AT THAT A LOT HAS
TO DO WITH THE MATTER OF

DUPLICATE REPORTS.

I MEAN THIS IS WHEAL WHITEHAT

RESEARCH DOING THEIR JOB.

IF RESEARCH HASN'T BEEN THIS

CLOSE THEY WILL REPORT

OFTENTIMES THE SAME KIND OF

SECURITY WEAKNESSES TO THE

PARTICULAR ENTITIES, AND WELL,

TAKING THIS INTO ACCOUNT AND

ACTUALLY THE ERROR RATE IS NOT

THAT HIGH.

LAST POINT HERE IS THAT HERE,

ACTUALLY, THE INVOLVEMENTS OF

BUCK BOUNTY PROGRAMS, CAN

INTRODUCE MEASURES SUCH AS

REPUTATION MECHANISMS,

COORDINATE REWARDS AND SO ON

THAT ACTUALLY THEN ALSO INSTILL

SOME PART OF COMPETITION,

BETWEEN THE WHITEHAT COMMUNITY

PARTICIPANTS SO THAT THEY ARE

MORE INCLINED TO ACTUALLY

PROVIDE HIGH QUALITY DATA TO THE

PARTICIPATING COMPANIES.

>> ALL RIGHT, WE HAVE 20 SECONDS
LEFT.

SO SIONA DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL
THOUGHTS?

>> CAN I JUST CLARIFY SOMETHING?

>> VERONICA, PLEASE.

>> I WANTED TO CLARIFY IN OUR
FINDINGS WE DON'T FIND AN
INTERMEDIARY IS ALWAYS BAD BUT
SOMETIMES THEY DO THE RIGHT
THINGS FOR CONSUMERS.

SO THERE ARE POLICIES IN THEE
CASES MORE THAN ONCE.

THERE ARE CASES IN WHICH THE
INTERESTED INTERMEDIARY IS
ALIGNED WITH THE CONSUMERS, BUT
MAY BE CONTRASTING WITH THE
CONSUMERS.

>> YOUR PAPER ISN'T CURRENTLY ON
OUR WEBSITE BUT I BELIEVE WE
WILL HAVE IT UP FOLLOWING THIS
PRESENTATION SO IF PEOPLE WANT

MORE INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR
FINDINGS THEY CAN LOOK AT IT
THERE.

THANK YOU ALL FOR PARTICIPATING
IN THIS SESSION, WE REALLY
APPRECIATE IT, THANK YOU.

[APPLAUSE]