Analysis of the Complaint and Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment

I. Introduction

The Federal Trade Commission ("Commission") has accepted for public comment an Agreement Containing Consent Order ("proposed order") with Manheim Auctions, Inc. ("Manheim"), Tyco International, Ltd. ("Tyco"), ADT Automotive Holdings, Inc. ("ADT"), and Cox Enterprises, Inc. ("Cox") (collectively "Proposed Respondents"). The proposed order seeks to remedy the anticompetitive effects of Manheim's proposed acquisition of ADT's wholesale motor vehicle auctions by requiring Manheim to divest eight of the acquired ADT auctions in locations where Manheim already owns auctions and its ownership of these acquired auctions would likely injure competition. Moreover, the proposed order seeks to remedy the anticompetitive effects of Manheim's 1996 acquisition of an auction in the Phoenix, Arizona area by requiring Manheim to divest one of its Phoenix-area auctions.

II. Description of the Parties and the Proposed Acquisition

Manheim, a Delaware corporation, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Cox and is the largest auto auction company in the United States. Manheim operates 65 auctions nationwide and reported sales of 4.1 million vehicles in 1999. Manheim has acquired 55 auctions in the last 10 years. ADT, a Delaware corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco and is the third-largest auction company in the United States. ADT operates 28 auctions nationwide and reported sales of 1.3 million automobiles in 1999.

By the terms of a Stock Purchase Agreement dated January 13, 2000, Manheim will acquire all of ADT's outstanding voting stock for approximately $1 billion.

In a separate transaction that occurred in 1996, Manheim acquired JM Family Enterprises, Inc., its sole competitor in the provision of wholesale motor vehicle auction services in the greater metropolitan area of Phoenix, Arizona.

III. The Proposed Complaint

The proposed complaint alleges that the relevant line of commerce (i.e., the product market) in which to analyze this transaction is the provision of wholesale motor vehicle auction services ("WMVA services") by major vehicle auctioneers. These services include marshaling motor vehicles before auctions, preparing condition reports, reconditioning the motor vehicles, promoting and marketing auctions to potential buyers, auctioning motor vehicles, and reporting the results of those auctions.

Major wholesale auctions serve automakers and large institutional lessors that sell large quantities of used motor vehicles. They are equipped with advanced computer systems and technology that allow them to deal with larger customers than the smaller wholesale auto auctions can handle. Moreover, this technological sophistication and the resulting benefits and services simultaneously attract a large number of buyers and sellers to each auction. These attributes distinguish major wholesale auction services from the broader market, which consists of services provided by small, independent wholesale auctions that serve regional customers. Typically, major wholesale auctions serve a trade area consisting of a large city and the surrounding metropolitan area.

The proposed complaint further alleges that Manheim's proposed acquisition of ADT, if consummated, may substantially lessen competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.  18, and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.  45, in the following trade areas (i.e., the geographic markets): (a) the greater metropolitan area of Kansas City, Missouri; (b) the Colorado Front Range, which includes the greater metropolitan areas of Denver and Colorado Springs; (c) the greater metropolitan area of Atlanta, Georgia; (d) the greater metropolitan area of San Francisco, California; (e) the greater metropolitan area of Seattle, Washington; and (f) the I-4 Corridor of Florida, which includes the greater metropolitan areas of Tampa, Orlando, and Daytona Beach. The acquisition would substantially increase concentration and create a monopoly in the provision of WMVA services, as evidenced by post-acquisition Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices ("HHIs") of 10,000 in each of these geographic markets. After the proposed acquisition, Manheim would have the ability to unilaterally increase prices charged for WMVA services and to substantially decrease the quality and range of services offered to auction customers in these areas.

The proposed complaint also alleges that in 1996 Manheim acquired JM Family Enterprises, Inc., its sole competitor in the provision of WMVA services in the greater Phoenix, Arizona area. The effect of that acquisition, which also resulted in an HHI of 10,000, may have been to substantially lessen competition and create a monopoly in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Manheim may have both unilaterally increased prices charged for WMVA services and reduced the quality and range of services offered to auction customers in the greater Phoenix area.

The proposed complaint further alleges that new entry into the relevant geographic markets will not be likely, timely or sufficient to prevent or counteract these anticompetitive effects. Building an auction requires substantial amounts of capital and entails significant assumption of risk. Other companies have recently required more than two years to complete construction of major auctions. Moreover, even if built, a competing auction would not likely provide significant competition to an existing firm. Because of the large capital investment required, major auctions must sell a high volume of motor vehicles to be profitable, while sellers are reluctant to use the services of an auction that does not have an existing base of strong buyers and buyers are reluctant to attend an auction that does not have a significant number of participating sellers. Consequently, existing auctions possess a considerable first-mover advantage over new entrants. Thus, even if a competitor entered the market, it might not attract enough business to restore competition. In the Phoenix area, no new competitors have entered since 1996.

IV. Terms of the Agreement Containing Consent Order

The proposed order is designed to remedy the alleged anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition. Under the terms of the proposed order, the Proposed Respondents must divest to ADESA eight of the acquired ADT auctions and one Manheim auction that currently operate in the geographic markets described above.

The Commission's goal in evaluating possible purchasers of divested assets is to maintain the competitive environment that existed prior to the acquisition. A proposed buyer of divested assets must not itself present competitive problems.

The Commission is satisfied that ADESA is a well-qualified acquirer of the divested assets. Based in Indianapolis, Indiana, ADESA is a large chain with 30 auction sites throughout the United States. ADESA possesses the necessary industry expertise to replace the competition that existed prior to the proposed acquisition in the divestiture markets. Furthermore, ADESA poses no separate competitive issues as the acquirer of the divested assets.

The proposed order requires that Proposed Respondents divest the nine auctions to ADESA, in accordance with an agreement between Manheim and ADESA, within 3 months after Manheim acquires ADT. If, at the time the Commission decides to make the proposed order final, the Commission notifies the Proposed Respondents that ADESA is not an acceptable acquirer, or that the agreement with ADESA is not an acceptable manner of divestiture, then Proposed Respondents must immediately rescind the transaction and divest the auction, within 6 months after the proposed order becomes final, to an acquirer approved by the Commission.

The proposed order also includes a provision requiring Proposed Respondents to use their best efforts to maintain the auctions as they would in the ordinary course of business until the divestiture occurs. Moreover, the proposed order prohibits Proposed Respondents from soliciting and hiring employees away from the divested auctions for a period of one year after the divestitures occur.

Additionally, for a period of 10 years after the proposed order becomes final, Proposed Respondents must provide written notice to the Commission prior to acquiring any interest in any wholesale auction facility. Furthermore, Proposed Respondents must provide the Commission with a report of compliance with the proposed order within 30 days after the proposed order becomes final and every 30 days thereafter until they have complied with their divestiture obligations. Respondents are also required to provide annual reports during the term of the proposed order. For Manheim and Cox, the term of the proposed order is 10 years; for ADT and Tyco, the term ends when the eight ADT auctions are transferred to Manheim.

In the event that Proposed Respondents fail to divest the required auctions within the time allotted, the proposed order enables the Commission to appoint a trustee to divest any assets necessary to satisfy the requirements of the proposed order. Appointment of a trustee is in addition to civil penalties and other relief available from Proposed Respondents for non-compliance with any provision of the proposed order.

V. Opportunity for Public Comment

The proposed order has been placed on the public record for 30 days for receipt of comments by interested persons. Comments received during this period will become part of the public record. After thirty 30 days, the Commission will again review the proposed order and the comments received and will decide whether it should withdraw from the proposed order or make it final. By accepting the proposed order subject to final approval, the Commission anticipates that the competitive problems alleged in the proposed complaint will be resolved. The purpose of this analysis is to invite public comment on the proposed order, including the proposed divestitures, to aid the Commission in its determination of whether to make the proposed order final. This analysis is not intended to constitute an official interpretation of the proposed order, nor is it intended to modify the terms of the proposed order in any way.