|Received:||5/24/2005 11:55:29 AM|
|Agency:||Federal Trade Commission|
|Rule:||Definitions, Implementation, and Reporting Requirements Under the CAN-SPAM Act|
|Attachment:||516736-00022.pdf Download Adobe Reader|
Comments:First, the act is already far too weak (see attachment) and should have been titled you CAN-SPAM, due to its premption of stronger state laws and its failure to face, e.g. the issues of invasion of privcy intellectual property, e.g., e-mail addresses theft of service theft by conversion trespass to chattel. With regard to the proposed rule changes: Not only is the change from 10 days to 3 days not onerous; it is far too long to justify either on the basis of equity or on the basis of technical difficulty. There is no reason that removals could not be processed within one hour. Second, if the spam is sent by e-mail then it should be possible to demand removal by e-mail. It is not reasonable to assume that the victim has, e.g., web access. Third; references to "permission based" should be taken no more seriously than references to :"honest" on a used car lot. The services that really are permission based are few and far between, and they will describe their subscription and confirmation process rather than using the unsupported claim. Such services typically process unsubscribe requests within minutes. Fourth, the broadening of the term person is welcome. Fifth, comments about burdens on people who subscribed to advertising do not apply to unsolicited e-mail. Sixth, providing an e-mail address to an association for a specific purpose is not permission or a solicitation of e-mail for an unrelated purpose. Repurposing an address does not convert unsolicited mail into solicited or commercial mail into transactional. No e-mail should be considered transactional that does not directly and explicitly relate to the purpose for which the address was provided. Seventh, I disagree on the status of "forward to a friend". A company that sends a commercial e-amil and provides a web site for forwarding that e-mail is not simply engaging in "routine conveyance"; the message that it is conveying is its own. Eight, I support the prohibitions of charging for or otherwise impeding removal requests. Ninth, while a commercial message whose receipt is a quid pro pro should not be considered to be a transactional message, a company receiving a removal request from someone who had explicitly agreed to receive commercial messages in exchange for the services should be permitted to terminate the service.