

- What are the Economic Issues Relevant to Antitrust Decision Making?
- Who Decides These Issues?
- How Effective is the Use of Economics in Antitrust Decision Making?

- Facts

- *E.g.*, it costs \$10,000,000 and takes a year to build a widget factory

- Models

- *E.g.*, output is lower and price is higher in highly concentrated industries, *ceteris paribus*

- Statistical Tests

- *E.g.*, the evidence justifies the assumption that 4FCR had no effect on the wholesale price of silicon-based widgets in the U.S. from 1Q 1990 to 4Q 2000 (*i.e.*, the data failed to reject the null hypothesis to the relevant degree of confidence)

- The values of the estimated parameters and the validity of the statistical tests are contingent on the truth of the underlying model (*I.e.*, Garbage In/Garbage Out)
- Example: concentration/price and concentration/profit correlations – powerfully suggested by oligopoly models once regarded as canonical – demonstrated in a host of studies now viewed as discredited
- Skepticism regarding the model resulted from “better” analytical work (*e.g.*, Caves & Porter) supported by shift in surrounding approaches and attitudes

- Decision Makers are Called Upon to Make Specific Findings and Inferences
 - Extent of the Market/Market Power
 - Procompetitive Justifications and Rationales for Conduct
- Every Litigant Tells a Story, Every Story Has a Model
- “Model”-Based Decisions of the Post-*Sylvania* Era
 - *Matsushita* – long-term predatory conspiracy
 - *State Oil v. Kahn* – maximum vertical price agreements
 - But see: *Brooke Group* – “oligopolistic disciplinary pricing”

- Under the law, agency officials, judges and/or juries decide.
- There is no existing institution that can resolve contending economic explanations on a time scale relevant to litigation
 - Peer reviewed scholarship
 - Long-term belief formation based on collective experience
- Until all judges become economists, there will be continuing tension between expert assessments and decision making by non-experts

- **Judicial dissatisfaction with advocacy economics**
 - *Matsushita* – expert report rejected
 - *Brooke Group* – testimony disregarded
- *Daubert Quartet* – although none is an antitrust decision, arguably this series is extension of antitrust trend
- **Justice Breyer**
 - Remarks to AAAS, AEI regarding need for filtration of expert views – another expression of tension inherent in legal system where ultimate decisions are for non-expert courts
- **Judge Posner**
 - *HFCS*, an explicit plea for use of Rule 706 appointed experts by lower courts
 - Decisions remarking on theory, like *Asahi Glass v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals* and others too numerous to mention.

- Foundational insight – customers of A can flee to B. If A merges with B, some A customers need a new escape
- Modeling real markets – assumptions hold numerous variables constant
- In any specific case, what econometric evidence would be sufficient to change a view suggested by (informed) intuition?
- Under what circumstances are non-expert decision-makers qualified to assess whether econometric evidence should be accepted as outcome-determinative?

- Judgment on economic issues – market definition, market power, entry, competitive dynamics – is interactive (*see testimony of Alfred E. Kahn in New York v. Kraft (Nabisco)*)
- “. . . experience is deceptive, reasoning difficult.” – Hippocrates *Aphorisms*
- Narrow market definitions, focus on isolated time periods and “super slo-mo” dynamics will support theories of competitive harm in broad class of cases
- Tendency of positions to go to extremes – trains passing in the front office

- Enhanced reliance on “neutral” experts
 - Agency consultants – excluded from subsequent advocacy role?
 - Rule 706 – is this any way to earn a living?
- Peer review
- Experiments and studies
 - I.O. faculties
 - Federal Judicial Center?

- *United States v. Topco*: considering justifications throws antitrust and business planners into “the wilds of economic theory.”
- Welcome to the “wilds.”