About the Administrative Law Judge

James P. Timony is presiding over In the matter of Intel Corporation, Docket No. 9288.

Timony graduated from Ohio University in 1954 and was an infantry lieutenant in the United States Army during 1954-56. He received LL.B and LL.M degrees from Georgetown University Law Center, and was on the law review. He joined the Commission in 1959 as a trial attorney and later spent seven years in the Office of General Counsel representing the Commission in federal trial and appellate court litigation. He also was in private practice for two years at Smith and Schnacke, in Dayton, Ohio.

Timony was appointed as an administrative law judge at the FTC in 1976 and chief administrative law judge in 1998. He has also heard cases for 16 other agencies. He wrote "Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges," 6 W. New England L. Rev. 807 (1984) and "Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges," 7 Ad. Law J. of Am. U. 629 (1993), and served as president of the 500-member Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference.

Judge Timony is married to a District of Columbia school teacher, and they have two children, a rock musician and an artist, living in Boston.

The following is taken from Judge Timony's article, Performance Evaluation of Federal Administrative Law Judges, 7 Admin. L.J. A.U. 629, 633-34 (1993) describing the judicial status and decisional independence of federal administrative law judges.(1)

The decisional independence of federal ALJs is important because ALJs function as trial judges, hearing disputes and issuing written decisions in formal administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court has recognized the "importance of preserving the independent judgment of [ALJs] . . . free of pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency."(2) Congress recognized this need to preserve the independence of ALJs. The Administrative Procedure Act contains numerous provisions designed to guarantee their independence.(3)

To further promote independent and impartial decisionmaking, federal ALJs are selected from the top three on a national list of hundreds of successful applicants - rated numerically by test score -- on objective standards of merit, litigation experience, ability to write an opinion and an oral examination by a special panel.(4) Individuals appointed as federal ALJs hold a position with tenure very similar to that provided for federal judges under the Constitution(5) and are "functionally comparable" to judicial branch trial judges.(6)

1. For a more detailed statement of the status and powers of federal ALJs, see Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. New England L. Rev. 807, 810-15 (1984).

2. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).

3. ALJs are exempt from performance evaluations by their agencies, 5 U.S.C. § 4301 (1988), and can be removed only for cause after a hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). Id. § 7521. They receive periodic step increases in pay without approval by their employing agency. Id. § 5335. Cases are assigned to ALJs on a rotating basis, as far as is practicable, so that agencies cannot fix the results by choice of ALJ. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988). ALJs are independent of investigative or prosecutorial personnel in the agency. Id. § 554(d). ALJs may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties as judges, id. § 3105, and may not consult any person or party, including agency officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, unless with notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. Id. § 554(d)(1).

4. The rigorous selection process for federal ALJs is well described in NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527-28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J., concurring).

5. S. Rep. No. 697, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 496, 497 (stating "[i]n essence . . . ALJs hold a position with tenure very similar to that provided Federal judges under the Constitution").

6. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513 ("There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal . . . [ALJ] . . . is 'functionally comparable' to that of a judge."); Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980) (comparing ALJs to Article III judges).